The manuscript as it stands now only covers verses 1.3.6 to 1.5.3. See Torella 1988 (this first part of the fragment was in fact edited from a transcript of the original manuscript D later found by R. Torella in the National Archives of India and used for the edition of the remaining parts of the fragment), and Torella 2007a, 2007b, 2007c and 2007d.

For a list of parallels between marginal annotations in D2, SOAS and S3 and the fragment edited by R. Torella, see Ratié 2016. Five other ĪPV manuscripts—namely J^R, S2, S5, S7, S9—have been shown to contain such fragments in Ratié 2016b, and one more (S15) in Ratié forthcoming (see also below).

S12 and J11.

On this discovery, see Ratié 2017 and Ratié forthcoming.

See Kawajiri 2016 and 2016b for a diplomatic edition of marginal annotations containing Vivṛti quotations in a Vṛtti manuscript from Lucknow in Devanāgarī script. Note, however, that S19 (a Śāradā manuscript used by Raffaele Torella for his edition of the Vṛtti) also contains many Vivṛti fragments. It is described in Torella 2002, l–li (under siglum N) as “profusely annotated by a different hand with single glosses or long passages (mostly drawn from the ĪPV) between the lines and often entirely covering the margins.” Indeed, many of these quota- tions are from the ĪPV; but some are Vivṛti fragments, as shown in Ratié forthcoming (see also Ratié 2018b, Appendix I). S19 was not taken into account here, not because it would be irrelevant (its margins bear several fragments on ĪPK 1.5.6–9, and interestingly, most of them are not found in the ĪPV and ĪPVV manuscripts used below), but because unfortunately, I made this discovery too late to incorporate the new findings in this article.

So far I have not found any Vivṛti quotation on ĪPK 1.5.7 in ĪPV or ĪPVV manuscripts. It should also be noted that S12, to which I only recently had access, bears the fragment edited in Ratié 2016, 239–240 from marginal annotations in S3. In S12 the fragment appears in the margins of folios 119A–120B. The missing words in S3 (Ratié 2016, 239, note 35) appear as tathā carati in S12; the compound parajñānaviṣayabhāvagamanābhisandhir (ibid., 239, § 1, last line) has the wrong reading parajñānaparajñānaviṣayabhāvagamanābhisandhir; S12 shares with S3 the wrong readings °vyavahārādy° instead of °vyāhārādy° (see ibid., 239, note 36 and 37), and occasionally reads °vyavahārādy° where S3 has the right reading °vyāhārādy° (in tajjñānagatavyāhārādy°, ibid., 239, § 2, line 5); it reads yadi where S3 has yad iha (ibid., 239, § 2, line 6—I had conjectured yadi hi); it also has ābhāsabhedahetutva° instead of ābhāsabhede hetutva° (ibid., 240, § 5, line 5); it shares with S3 the wrong readings yathāvabhāsānāṃ (see ibid., 240, note 41) and pramātṛprābhāsaparyavasānaṃ (see ibid., 240, note 42); finally, it reads nāpi pratibodhitā ekaiva instead of S3’s nādhipratitvocitaikaiva (and my conjecture nādhipatitvocitaikaiva).

See Formigatti 2011 and Ratié 2018b. Formigatti 2011 (a very interesting study of marginal annotations in Sanskrit manuscripts from northern India and Nepal) bears in part on ĪPV manuscripts; unfortunately it makes no mention of Vivṛti fragments, although at least one of the manuscripts examined, Ś7 (= S9 in the present paper), contains quotations from Utpaladeva’s detailed auto-commentary (see Ratié 2016b). The reason for this is that due to the length of the ĪPV, Formigatti chose to confine his research to the annotations on the first chapter, which are apparently devoid of such quotations.

This happens, however: see Ratié 2016, 228, note 10, and below, note 58.

The marginal annotations most often quote from Utpaladeva’s Vṛtti and Abhinavagupta’s ĪPVV, but other works are occasionally cited, including Śaiva texts (such as the Śivadṛṣṭi) as well as Buddhist works (e.g. Dharmakīrti’s Sambandhaparīkṣā) or Brahmanical treatises (e.g. Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī): see Ratié 2017, 165.

See fragment no. 6^? on ĪPK 1.5.8–9.

On the portrayal of this philosophical figure by the Śaiva nondualists and Utpaladeva’s refutation of his thesis (both of which are only briefly outlined here), see Ratié 2011, 368–402 and 442–473, and Ratié 2011b.

See ĪPK 1.5.6: syād etad avabhāseṣu teṣv evāvasite sati | vyavahāre kim anyena bāhyenānupapattinā || “Let [us admit] this: since ordinary human practice (vyavahāra) is determined on [the basis of] these manifestations alone, what is the point of some external [object] that would be distinct [from consciousness and] that is not [even] logically possible (anupapatti)?” On the two possible interpretations of syād etat according to Abhinavagupta, see Torella 2002, 114, note 12, and Ratié 2011, 386, note 48.

Cf. ĪPV, vol. I, 178, quoted and translated in Ratié 2011, 386.

On this work see Ratié 2018.

See below, notes 88–90.

See below, note 115.

See Ratié 2014.

See ĪPV, vol. I, 178: … yatra sādhakaṃ ca nāsti pramāṇaṃ bādhakaṃ ca prakāśād bhede ’numeyatayāpi prakāśanābhāva iti tāvan mukhyam. “And there is no argument proving [the existence] of the [external object], and the main (mukhya) [argument] refuting [its existence] amounts to this much: the fact that there [can] be no manifestation (prakāśana) [of it] even as a [mere] object of inference if [this object] is distinct from the manifesting consciousness (prakāśa).”

On the title Viṃśikā (rather than Viṃśatikā), see Kano 2008, 345.

See ĪPV, vol. I, 181: abhyuccayabādhakaṃ cedam iti nātrāsmābhir bharaḥ kṛtaḥ. vistareṇa ca prajñālaṅkāre darśitam ācāryaśaṅkaranandanena. “And we have not taken the trouble of [detailing] here what these additional refuting arguments are; and the master Śaṅkaranandana has shown [this] at length in his Prajñālaṅkāra.”

See ĪPV, vol. I, 178: abhyuccayabādhakās tv avayavino vṛttyanupapattiḥ samavāyāsiddhiḥ kampākampāvaraṇānāvaraṇaraktāraktadigbhāgabhedādiviruddhadharmayogaḥ … “As for the additional arguments refuting [the existence of the external object], they are: the impossibility of the existence of a whole (avayavin) [in its parts]; the fact that the inherence (samavāya) [of the whole in its parts] is not established; the fact that the [external object must] possess some contradictory properties, such as movement and the absence of movement, being covered and being uncovered, being colored and being colourless, being differentiated into parts according to [the six] directions (digbhāgabheda), etc.” On Abhinavagupta’s explanation of these additional arguments and its Buddhist sources see Ratié 2010, 446–452, and Ratié 2011, 390–403.

See above, note 18.

See ĪPVV, vol. II, 138: na ca kevalam idam eva bādhakaṃ yat pramāṇamukhena pravṛttaṃ yāvat svato ’pīti svamukhena prameyasvarūpanirūpaṇapravṛttapratītidvāreṇāpi pravṛttam, prameyasvarūpam evāsattvāviṣkaraṇenonmūlayaty* eva bāhyam iti yāvat. pūrvakaṃ hi bādhakaṃ prameyasvarūpam anapekṣayaiva sāṃśam anaṃśaṃ viruddham aviruddhaṃ yad bhavatu tad bhavatu, prakāśād bhinnaṃ na prakāśata iti tu sarvagrāsena pravṛttam. [*evāsattvāviṣkaraṇenonmūlayaty conj.; evāsattvāviṣkaraṇaivonmūlayaty T; eva sattvāviṣkaraṇenonmūlayaty J10, ĪPVV; eva sattāviṣkaraṇenomūlyaty J11.] “And [against the thesis of the existence of the external object,] there is not only this [aforementioned] refuting argument (bādhaka) which functions through the means of [valid] knowledge (pramāṇa) [lacking in the case of the external object]; [there is] also [a refuting argument] which functions ‘by itself’ [according to the Vivṛti], that is to say, through the [external object’s] own [nature, or more precisely,] through the awareness arising from the examination of the [contradictory] nature of the object of knowledge (prameya). [The latter argument] completely eradicates the very nature of the object of knowledge—that is to say, the external [object]—by showing that [this contradictory nature can]not exist. For the first refuting argument functions while completely disregarding the nature of the object of knowledge—[i.e.] whether it has parts or is devoid of parts, whether it is contradicted or not [by this or that particular property]—rather, [it functions] through a global refutation (sarvagrāsena [lit. ‘by devouring everything’]), thus: ‘[What is] distinct from the manifesting consciousness (prakāśa) is not manifest (na prakāśate).’ ”

See Vṛtti on ĪPK 1.5.6, 20–21: … bāhyaś cārthaḥ pramāṇabādhitaḥ sāvayavo viruddhadharmādhyāsāder niravayavaś ca dikṣaṭkayogāder bahuśaḥ. “Moreover, [the existence of] the external object is refuted by a means of [valid] knowledge if it has parts, because of [the necessity then] of attributing to it contradictory properties, etc.; [and it is contradicted] in many ways if it has no parts, because [then] it must be in contact with the six directions, etc.”

See ĪPVV, vol. II, 138, quoted above, note 23.

For an explanation of Abhinavagupta’s commentaries on this point see Ratié 2010, 451–452 and Ratié 2011, 395–399.

See below, note 94.

On this divergence see Ratié 2011b, 496–498.

See below, note 99.

See e.g. ĪPVV, vol. II, 133: paramabhūmir āgameṣu paramarahasyāpi satī naivānābhāsamānā bhavaty api tv ābhāsamānaiveti tātparyam. etad ādisiddhasūtre ca vyākhyātam. “The highest level [of reality], although it is concealed to the highest point within the [Śaiva nondualistic] scriptures, is absolutely never unmanifest; rather, it is always [in the process of] manifesting [itself]—this is the gist [of Utpaladeva’s answer]. And [Utpaladeva] has explained this in the verse on [the Self being] always already established.” The verse to which Abhinavagupta is alluding here is ĪPK 1.1.2: kartari jñātari svātmany ādisiddhe maheśvare | ajaḍātmā niṣedhaṃ vā siddhiṃ vā vidadhīta kaḥ || “What conscious Self could produce either a refutation or a demonstration [of the existence] of the agent, the knowing subject, the always already established (ādisiddha) Self, the Great Lord?”

On the attempt in the Pratyabhijñā treatise to eliminate all rival explanations for phenomenal variety (i.e. that of the Sautrāntikas, but also that of the Vijñānavādins, who account for phenomenal variety by invoking an internal mechanism of latent traces or imprints, vāsanā) in order to show that the freedom of consciousness is the only possible cause for it, see e.g. ĪPV, vol. I, 163–164 (quoted and translated in Ratié 2011, 367–368); see also ĪPV, vol. I, 184–185, and ĪPVV, vol. II, 80–81 (quoted and translated in Ratié 2010, 461–464).

See Ratié 2010b.

anumānam anābhātapūrve naiveṣṭam indriyam | ābhātam eva bījāder ābhāsād dhetuvastunaḥ || ābhāsaḥ punar ābhāsād bāhyasyāsīt kathaṃcana | arthasya naiva tenāsya siddhir nāpy anumānataḥ || “No inference can be admitted as regards that which has never been manifested previously. [Before being inferred,] a sense organ has already been manifested [at least in the general form of a cause] through the manifestation of a real entity that [happens to be] a cause, such as a seed [which is the cause of a sprout]; but the manifestation of an object external to manifestation has never occurred in any way. Therefore there can be no establishment of this [external object]—not even through an inference.”

Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 161: tad anupapannaṃ saṃvidbāhyasya svapne ’py anābhātasya vikalpyatvāyogād anumeyatānupapannā yataḥ. “This [inference of an object particularized by its being external to consciousness] is impossible, since [an entity] external to consciousness—[and therefore] unmanifested, even in a dream—cannot be an object of inference, because [such an entity] cannot be the object of a concept.”

See Torella 2002, 117, note 19.

On the probability that Abhinavagupta at least saw Dharmottara as defending the Sautrāntika position, see McCrea and Patil 2010, 141–142, note 71, and McCrea 2016.

See below, note 111.

See below, note 113.

On Abhinavagupta’s explanation of this objection see Ratié 2011b, 486–488.

See below, note 115.

As noted by Torella (2002, 116, note 18), Utpaladeva thus “include[s] the concept of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa within the pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa.”

See note 79.

See below, note 119.

See Ratié 2011b, 491–498 and below, note 119.

This passage is found in S3 (where it begins on the top margin of folio 40B), S15 (top margin of folio 47A), J^R (folio 82B, top margin) and (up to the quotations mentioned below in note 51) ĪPV, vol. I, 176–177, note 170. It does not appear in D2, S2, S5, S7, S9 or SOAS, but it is found in ĪPVV manuscript S12 (folio 121B, right and bottom margins).

yathaiva ] conj.; yathā S3, S15, J^R, note 170 ĪPV (vol. I, 176). Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 131: yathaivety asya tathaivety anena sambandhaḥ.

na na kiñcid upapadyate ] conj.; na kiñcid upapadyate S3, S15, J^R, S12, note 170 ĪPV (vol. I, 176). The conjecture is of course tentative but I cannot understand the text as it stands. Vincent Eltschinger and Eli Franco both suggested eliminating the negation as a corruption instead of doubling it, and they might be right. However, I personally find the double negation more in accordance with the writing habits of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta (I am assuming that the former shared with the latter a propensity for double negations). For his part Eli Franco considers that “nobody writes like this” and that “if a second negation should be added, one would expect it in the beginning (yathā na hi …).” (Personal written communication.) However, there is no doubt that at least Abhinavagupta writes like this (i.e. by simply juxtaposing two negations, whether the sentence comprises subordinate clauses or not), and in fact such occurrences of na na are quite often found in his works, not only in those which are not directly related to the Pratyabhijñā (see e.g. Tantrāloka 9.251cd and 12.5a; Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa, 190, line 11; Mālinīślokavārttika 1.123ab, etc.) but also in the ĪPV (see e.g. vol. I, 216, line 5, or vol. II, 33, last line), and they are particularly numerous in the ĪPVV (see vol. I, 36, line 21; 38, line 16; 60, line 12; 109, line 17; 181, line 12; 287, line 17; 296, line 11; vol. II, 6, line 5; 57, line 22; 82, line 3; 325, line 6; 332, line 9; 334, line 5; 344, line 7; 347, line 11; 350, line 16; 357, line 12; 415, line 23; 436, line 21; vol. III, 34, line 19; 66, line 13; 107, line 12 and line 20; 218, line 6; 301, line 3; 344, line 9; 366, line 12; 369, line 7; 382, line 24). These double negations often occur with verbs the meaning of which is close to upapad- (such as yujyate/yuktam, vaktuṃ śakyate, etc.) and both the expressions na nopapadyate and na nopapannā are found in the ĪPVV (see vol. II, 334, line 5 and 357, line 12).

vicārasiddhatvam ] S3, S15, J^R, S12; vicārasiddham note 170 ĪPV (vol. I, 176).

asya ] conj.; api S3, S15, J^R, S12, note 170 ĪPV (vol. I, 176).

parasparātmakatvam ] S3, S12, note 170 ĪPV (vol. I, 176); parasparātmatvam S15, J^R. There is a discrepancy here between the text of the Vivṛti as found in the marginal annotations (parasparātmakatvam) and Abhinavagupta’s pratīka in the ĪPVV (pratītiparamparātmaketi). Abhinavagupta’s explanation, however, seems to require rather parasparātmaketi since it makes no mention of a series or succession (paramparā) of cognitions (pratīti) and explains that ultimately the vyavahāra requires the identity of the object with the manifesting consciousness (see below, note 92), which fits with the text given in the marginal annotations. So I assume that parasparātmaketi first got corrupted into paramparātmaketi and that someone then added pratīti° to try and make sense of this “succession,” but I might be entirely wrong (this pratīka might in fact belong to a passage of the Vivṛti that is missing in the marginal annotations; see the following note).

At this point the marginal annotations in S3, S15, J^R and S12, as well as note 170 in ĪPV, vol. I, 176–177, give a series of quotations that do not seem to belong to the Vivṛti itself (?). The ĪPVV, which makes no mention of these quotations, comments on a hi and a tat not found in the annotations: ity abhipretyoktaṃ gītāsu* yo māṃ paśyati sarvatra sarvaṃ ca mayi* paśyatīti tathā sarvabhūtastham ātmānaṃ sarvabhūtāni cātmanīti tathā mahāgurubhir* ātmaiva sarvabhāveṣu sphuran nirvṛtacid vibhuḥ | aniruddhecchāprasaraḥ prasaraddṛkkriyaḥ* śivaḥ || iti śivadṛṣṭau*. [gītāsu S3, S15, J^R, S12; śrīgītāsu note 170 ĪPV (vol. I, 176). *mayi S3, J^R, S12, note 170 ĪPV (vol. I, 176); maya S15. *mahāgurubhir S3, S15, J^R, S12; mahāgurubhiḥ śivadṛṣṭau note 170 ĪPV (vol. I, 177). *°kriyaḥ S3, J^R, S12, note 170 ĪPV (vol. I, 177); °kriyā S15. *iti śivadṛṣṭau S3, S15, J^R, S12; iti note 170 ĪPV (vol. I, 177).] “It is with this [very] intention that it has been said in [Bhagavad-]gītā [6.30]: ‘He who sees me and sees everything in all circumstances in me …’; and similarly, [in 6.29,] ‘[He sees] himself [as] residing in all entities and all entities [as residing] in himself’; [and] similarly, the great master [Somānanda has said] in Śivadṛṣṭi [1.2]: ‘Śiva, who is [constantly] engaged in flashing forth, whose consciousness is blissful, who is all-pervading, whose flow of will is not obstructed [by anything], [and] whose perception and action are [constantly] flowing, is none other than the Self of all entities.’ ” S3 then gives the Vṛtti (bottom left margin) followed by what seems to be the Vivṛti again; in J^R this passage, in the right margin, is clearly separated from the Vṛtti, which is copied at the bottom of the page (and indicated as such at the end: iti vṛttiḥ), and immediately followed by the same passage apparently taken from the Vivṛti. The same happens in S15 (where the Vṛtti and the remainder of the annotation are found in the left margin). Note that note 6 of the Śivadṛṣṭi edition, 4, which is apparently borrowed from a marginal annotation in manuscript D3 (the latter being in all probability the manuscript “a” used by the KSTS editors), gives the same quotations from the Bhagavadgītā while commenting on this verse, and introduces them with a text almost identical to that found here: evaṃ cārthasya prakāśatve prakāśo ’py arthaḥ, artho ’pi prakāśaḥ. “And [since it is] so, since the object is the manifesting consciousness, the manifesting consciousness is the object, and conversely the object is the manifesting consciousness.” My assumption that the Śivadṛṣṭi manuscript called “a” by the KSTS editors is none other than D3 is based on the fact that the description of “a” (Śivadṛṣṭi, I–II) closely corresponds to D3 (which unfortunately I was only able to examine very quickly at the National Archives of India) as regards the number of folios, the average number of lines per folio, and the average number of akṣaras per line, not to mention that both manuscripts bear many marginal annotations (at least some of which are identical). Both, moreover, are bound together with manuscripts of the ĪPV, Parātrīśika and Paramādvayadvādaśikā. It should also be noted that another Śivadṛṣṭi manuscript originally owned by the Śrinagar Research Library is now preserved in the National Archives of India (D4); I could not consult it as it had been sent for repair at the time of my visit to the Archives, but from the catalogue description I suspect that it might be the Devanāgarī transcript called “b” by the KSTS editors. A thorough analysis of D3 and D4 would therefore certainly be a welcome addition to the examination of some Śivadṛṣṭi manuscripts provided in Nemec 2011, 79–90.

This passage occurs in S3, folio 40B (third line from the bottom of the page), S15, folio 47A (left margin) and J^R, folio 82B (bottom margin, from line 2 onwards, then on the right margin). It is not found in D2, S2, S5, S9, S10, SOAS or in the footnotes of the KSTS edition of the ĪPV, but it also occurs in the ĪPVV manuscript S12 (folio 121A, bottom margin).

svargāpavargādinārthena ] conj.; svargāpavargādinā nārthena S3, S15, J^R; sargāpavargādinā nārthena S12. Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 132, quoted below, note 95.

S3, S15, J^R and S12 all bear this reading, and although the pratīka in ĪPVV, vol. II, 132 is given as vikalpapratibhāsiteti, at least one ĪPVV manuscript has vikalpapratibhāsineti (see below, note 95).

ca S3, J^R, S12; om. S15.

tadābhāsamānataivākasmikī ] S15, J^R, S12; tadā[?]samānataivākasmikī S3.

ca nopapadyata ] conj.; copapadyata S3, S15, J^R, S12.

This passage is again found in S3 (folio 41A, top margin, from line 3, continuing on the left margin), S15 (from folio 47B, bottom margin, to folio 48A, top margin), J^R (folio 83B, bottom margin, immediately after a quotation from the ĪPVV corresponding to vol. II, 141, and folio 84A, top margin) and S12 (folio 124B, top margin). In all of these manuscripts it is preceded by etad evāha svavṛttivivṛtigranthakāra utpalācāryaḥ (S12 has tad āha instead of etad evāha). It is also found in D2 (folio 108B, right margin), SOAS (folio 100B, top margin) and note 192 in ĪPV, vol. I, 180, in all three cases from ghaṭo vitatarūpatvena prathamānaḥ … (with a hi inserted after ghaṭo) to atīndriyatvāt. I could not find it in S2, S5, S7 and S9.

bāhyārthāḥ ] conj.; bāhya .. S3, S15, J^R, S12.

āpadyeta ] S3, J^R, D2, S12; āpadyete SOAS; āpadyate note 192 ĪPV (vol. I, 180). It is impossible to decide whether S15 reads āpadyeta or āpadyate.

ekaparamāṇvābhāsataiva ] S3, S15, J^R, D2, S12; ekaparamāṇur bhāsetaiva SOAS, note 192 ĪPV (vol. I, 180).

aparaparamāṇusaṃsparśe ] S3, S15, J^R, D2, S12; aparaparimāṇusaṃsparśe SOAS; aparaparamāṇusaṃsparśo note 192 ĪPV (vol. I, 180).

ekaparamāṇumātraprakāśaḥ ] S3, S15, J^R, D2, S12, note 192 ĪPV (vol. I, 180); ekaparimāṇumātraprakāśaḥ SOAS.

ekaikaparamāṇor ] S3, S15, J^R, D2, S12, note 192 ĪPV (vol. I, 180); ekaikaparimāṇor SOAS.

From this point onwards, the marginal annotations in S3, S15, J^R and S12 quote ĪPVV, vol. II, 141 (evaṃ kramasaṃśleṣe doṣaḥ, etc.) without mentioning this change (but the sentence has been put in what looks like parentheses in S12). The annotation on the right margin in S3 is also taken from the ĪPVV (see vol. II, 142: ṣaṭkoṇe devanākṣādau, etc.).

This fragment appears in marginal annotations in S3 (top of folio 43A, line 1, after a quotation from the ĪPVV, then on the right margin—see figure 5.1), S15 (folio 50A, top and left margins), JR (folio 87B, right margin) and S12 (folio 130A, left and bottom margins); I could not find it in D2, S2, S5, S7, S9 and SOAS.

pūrvapratyakṣatāpekṣā ] S3, J^R, S12; pūrvapratyatāpekṣā S15.

I assume that the reading avyabhicārīti in ĪPVV, vol. II, 161 is a corruption for avyabhicāreti (see below, note 108).

viśiṣṭadeśakālo viśiṣṭadeśakālasyaiva svalakṣaṇasya ] conj.; viśiṣṭakālasyaiva svalakṣaṇasya S15, J^R; viśiṣṭadeśakālasvalakṣaṇasya S12; vi[??]deśakāla[?]svalakṣa[?]sya S3. This is merely tentative, but from the meaning of the passage as it is summed up by Abhinavagupta (see below, note 110), I assume that something is missing in the text of the manuscripts.

prāpyatvenābhīṣṭārthakriyākāritvena ] S15, J^R, S12; prāpya[?]nābhīṣṭārthakriyākā[?]tvena S3.

pravṛttiviṣayatāyogyatvād ] S15, J^R, S12; pravṛttiviṣayatāyo[?]tvād S3.

pūrvāvabhāteti ] S15, J^R, S12; pūrvāva[?]teti S3.

nāntarīyakārtheti ] S15, J^R, S12; nāntarīya[?]rtheti S3.

tattaddeśakālādīti ] corr.; taddeśakālād iti S15, J^R, S12; taddeśakālād[?] S3. Cf. Vṛtti, 21–22, quoted below, note 111.

Here a part of the text is missing, as is obvious from Abhinavagupta’s commentary (ĪPVV, vol. II, 162), which mentions the words eṣa punar and vyāptivimarśāt, and again (ĪPVV, vol. II, 163) dharmapratyakṣa. The next fragment is commented in ĪPVV, vol. II, 163.

The following fragment appears in marginal annotations in S3 (folio 43A, right margin—see figure 5.1), S15 (folio 50A, left margin), JR (folio 87B, right margin) and S12 (folio 130A, bottom margin), in all cases immediately after the preceding Vivṛti fragment. The first sentence up to sāmānyena is also found in note 236 in ĪPV, vol. I, 188, but I could not find it in D2, S2, S5, S7, S9 and SOAS.

mṛdāder ghaṭādinimittatājñāne ] S3, J^R, S12; om. S15.

kāraṇaṃ ghaṭasya ] S15, J^R, S12; kāraṇaṃ gha[??] S3.

This annotation is not found in S3, S15, J^R or S12, but it appears in both SOAS (folio 106B, upper right corner) and D2 (folio 115B, upper and right margins); it is also found in note 248 in ĪPV, vol. I, 190. In all three cases this passage is preceded by a quotation from ĪPVV, vol. II, 165 (from bāhyatvaviśiṣṭo ’rthaḥ up to kramikābhāsavaicitryāt). This ĪPVV quotation is also found in S9, S10 and followed in all cases by ity āśaṅkyāha grāmagṛhāder iti. But after that point, while S9 and S10 add ayam āśayaḥ and then quote again the ĪPVV from nedaṃ bāhyatvaṃ ghaṭasya onwards, SOAS, D2 and the ĪPV note give tathā cātra pūrvavyavasthā sphuṭam eva dṛśyate yathā, and then the text quoted above. There is very little direct evidence that this annotation is indeed a quotation from the Vivṛti: the only ĪPVV passage that could comment on it apparently explains a sentence beginning with nanu cakṣurādi° (see ĪPVV, vol. II, 165), whereas no nanu is to be found in the annotations and I had to conjecture it. Nonetheless, it seems to me quite probable that the words preceding cakṣurādi° are not part of the quoted text, as I cannot understand the sentence with the presence of the word yathā twice (the KSTS edition has vā after the second yathā, although this vā is found neither in D2 nor in SOAS; but even with this additional vā I fail to see the structure of the sentence). Besides, as shown in Ratié 2011b, 491–499, this passage expresses a crucial objection against Utpaladeva’s reasoning, and it is at least certain from Abhinavagupta’s explanations in the ĪPVV (see below, note 119) that the Vivṛti stated this very objection in a passage beginning with nanu cakṣurādi°. So it seems likely that this passage is a genuine fragment from the Vivṛti, although this is by no means certain.

nanu ] conj.; om. D2, SOAS (see above, note 79).

yathā bījādyanubhavāt ] D2, SOAS; yathā vā bījādyanubhavāt note 248 ĪPV (vol. I, 190).

kāraṇatāsāmānyam ] conj.; kāraṇasāmānyam D2, SOAS, note 248 ĪPV (vol. I, 190).

evājñānaviśeṣeṇa ] conj.; eva jñānaviśeṣeṇa D2, SOAS, note 248 ĪPV (vol. I, 190).

vyāpāra ] D2, note 248 ĪPV (vol. I, 190); vyāpārā SOAS.

See ĪPVV, vol. II, 131: nirapāyety apāyaḥ pramāṇābhāvo dūṣaṇasaṃbhavaś ca, tadrahitā. “[This ascertainment] is successful[ly performed] (nirapāya), i.e.,] it is devoid of the failure (apāya) [consisting in] the lack of a means of [valid] knowledge, and [it is devoid of] the possibility [that the means of valid knowledge] may be refuted.”

The word adhikatara is the comparative form of adhika, which by itself means “something more.” According to Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva uses it because if the manifestations of objects in consciousness are something more than the consciousness manifesting them, the so-called external object must be considered as something more than these very manifestations: the external object must be considered as existing over and above phenomena and the consciousness taking their form—which is absurd. See ĪPVV, vol. II, 131: adhikatarety ābhāsā eva darpaṇāt pratibimbānīva saṃvedanād adhikāni, yac ca tato ’py adhikataraṃ na kvacid bhāvi tat tata eva* dṛṣṭaṃ tac ca vastu katham. [*tat tata eva conj.; tata eva J10, J11, T, ĪPVV]. “ ‘adhikatara’ [means the following]: the [various] phenomena are [something more (adhika)] than consciousness, just as reflections are something more than a mirror [reflecting them]; and that which is something more than something more, [i.e., that which is something more] than these very [phenomena,] can never be perceived in any [circumstance] for the very [reason that it is distinct from phenomena]; and how could that be a [real] entity (vastu)?”

Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 131: svacchandaceṣṭitam iti na pramāṇabalopanatam ity arthaḥ. “[It is] ‘a [purely] arbitrary endeavour,’ i.e. it is not brought about by the force of [necessity inherent in] a means of [valid] knowledge.”

Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 131: dṛṣṭaṃ cedaṃ prāmāṇikānāṃ yat saty api vastuny anupayogināṃśena na prayasyanti vicāritena yathendriyādiṣu ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣākārādyā bārhaspatyā vā. ekair* hi bhūtapañcakaṃ cetanā cetīyati vyavahārasamāptir aṅgīkṛtā tatraivānyasyendriyāder anupraveśāt. anyair api bhūtacatuṣṭaye vicitramelanoditasaṃvedanākhyavikāraviśeṣe ’nuditatadvikāre ca grāhakagrāhyavyavahārasamāptir upagatā. [*ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣākārādyā bārhaspatyā vā T; ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣākārādyo vārhatyo vā J10, J11; ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣākārādyo bā(vā)rhatyo vā ĪPVV. *ekair J10, J11, T, Ka (quoted in ĪPVV, vol. II, 131, note 1); etair ĪPVV.] “And [we] observe the [following] among philosophers (prāmāṇika): even if [something] exists [as] a real entity, they do not concern themselves with the aspect [of it] that is useless [and] speculative (vicārita)—for exemple, regarding such [imperceptible things] as the sense organs, [this is the case of philosophers] such as the author of the Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā, or of followers of Bṛhaspati. For the former acknowledge that ordinary human practice is accounted for if this much [is admitted]: the five elements and consciousness, because such other [things as] the sense organs are included in these; whereas the latter admit that the ordinary human practice [consisting in the relationship between] an apprehending [subject] and an apprehended [object] is accounted for if a particular transformation called ‘consciousness’ arises in the four elements from [some of their] various combinations, and if this transformation does not arise [from other combinations of the four elements].” On the author of the Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā and the followers of Bṛhaspati see below, notes 89 and 90, and Ratié 2018.

According to Abhinavagupta’s commentary (see above, note 88), their “theory of the six elements” (ṣaḍdhātuvāda) includes a set of five elements (bhūtapañcaka)—i.e. most probably earth, water, fire, wind and ākāśa—to which consciousness (cetanā) is added. At first sight one might assume that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta had a Buddhist author in mind (on the Buddhist theory of the ṣaḍdhātu see e.g. Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 28 [on Abhidharmakośa 1.27]: ya ime tatra ṣaḍ dhātava uktāḥ pṛthivīdhātur abdhātus tejodhātur vāyudhātur ākāśadhātur vijñānadhātuḥ …; cf. La Vallée Poussin 1923, 49, note 2 for sources). But according to Abhinavagupta’s commentary (ibid.), here Utpaladeva is rather hinting at the Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā—a lost work ascribed to Bhartṛhari. This treatise, alluded to by Somānanda in Śivadṛṣṭi 2.73 as the Samīkṣā and mentioned by Utpaladeva himself in Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti, 83–86, is also known as the Śabdadhātusamīkṣā (see e.g. Iyer 1969, 9–10), but as already pointed out in Torella 2002, xxvi–xxvii, note 39 (cf. Torella 2014, 573), the latter title, which appears in the KSTS edition of the Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti, is a corruption (note that as seen above, note 88, the ĪPVV gives the title as Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā). On the few known fragments of it and what might have been the overall goal of the work, see Ratié 2018. As pointed out there, Abhinavagupta makes some interesting remarks regarding this ṣaḍdhātuvāda while commenting on another part of the Pratyabhijñā treatise (ĪPVV, vol. I, 93): sāṅkhyasya yady api pañcaviṃśatis tattvāni sphuranti, tathāpi pañcaiva bhūtāni cetanā cety etāvanmātre tāvat sākṣātkārarūpo ’nubhavo nādhike. tata eva tatrabhavato dhātuṣaṭkanirūpaṇa eva viśvaṃ nirūpitaṃ bhavatītyāśayena tatsamīkṣodyamaḥ. saṃbhāvanānumānāgamajaniteṣv api jñāneṣu tad eva bhāsate, kevalaṃ yojanāmātram adhikam. yathā pṛthivy eva yā surabhyasurabhyādivicitragandhā tatraiva viśeṣatyāgena saukṣmyeṇa ca gandhatanmātrarūpateti. “Even though for a [follower of] Sāṅkhya, the twenty-five principles (tattva) are manifest [as the universe], to begin with, experience (anubhava), that is, immediate perception, consists in nothing but this: the sole five elements (bhūta) and consciousness (cetanā)—and nothing more. This is why for the master [Bhartṛhari] (tatrabhavant), the universe is [entirely] explained as soon as the six elements are explained—it is with this intention that he has undertaken their Examination (Samīkṣā). It is also this [set of six elements] that is manifest in cognitions that arise from hypothetical inferences or scripture [and not only in perceptions; and] anything else is nothing but a mere combination [of these elements]. For example, [the property of] consisting in the subtle sensory object (tanmātra) of smell lies in the [element (dhātu) of earth]—that same earth that may possess various smells, some pleasant, others unpleasant, etc.—insofar as [earth] is devoid of particularities and subtle.” So it seems that Utpaladeva alluded to this theory at this point of the Vivṛti because according to the author of the Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā, perception can be explained in its entirety as the result of a mere combination of the six elements, without inferring the existence of imperceptible indriyas that would be fundamentally distinct from these elements; or, as Abhinavagupta puts it (see above, note 88), according to this theory the indriyas are already included within the six elements.

If we follow Abhinavagupta’s interpretation of this passage (see above, note 88), these “others” are “followers of Bṛhaspati” (bārhaspatya), i.e. some materialists (cārvāka) who embrace the ideas expressed in the sūtras traditionally ascribed to Bṛhaspati (on the known fragments of this work and the probability that it was written around the sixth century, see Namai 1976, Bhattacharya 2002 and Franco 2011, 634–636). According to Abhinavagupta, they understand the relationship between the apprehending subject and the apprehended object as the mere result of various combinations between four material elements. Thus the fragments of the Bṛhaspatisūtras do not deny the very existence of sense organs, but they refuse to see them as distinct entities: whereas the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theories of vision for instance present the visual organ as an imperceptible ray of light fundamentally different from the perceiving body and perceived object (see e.g. Preisendanz 1989), the materialists see the indriyas as mere aggregates made of the same matter constituting the subject and object. See fragments A2 to A4 in Namai 1976, 39 (cf. Bhattacharya 2002, 603–604 and Franco 2011, 635): pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni || tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasañjñāḥ || tebhyaś caitanyam || “Earth, water, fire and wind are the principles. [It is merely] their aggregates that the terms ‘body,’ ‘sense organ’ (indriya) and ‘object’ designate. Consciousness [arises] from these.” Besides, according to the “follower of Bṛhaspati” whose views are mocked by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (the term bārhaspatya appears e.g. in Nyāyamañjarī, vol. I, 496 and Āgamaḍambara, 63), inferences are valid only if they regard entities that have already been perceived, but not if they are meant to establish the existence of entities that are by nature imperceptible, such as God and the Self. See Nyāyamañjarī, vol. I, 326: dvividham anumānam, kiñcid utpannapratīti kiñcid utpādyapratīti. īśvarādyanumānaṃ tūtpādyapratīti. tatra dhūmānumānādeḥ prāmāṇyaṃ kena neṣyate | ato hi sādhyaṃ budhyante tārkikair akṣatā api || yat tv ātmeśvarasarvajñaparalokādigocaram | anumānaṃ na tasyeṣṭaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ tattvadarśibhiḥ || “Inference is of two sorts: one [concerns an object] the perception of which has [already] occurred [at some point]; the other [concerns an object] the perception of which has [yet] to occur. But the inference of [entities] such as God [concerns an object] the perception of which has [yet] to occur. Among these [two types of inference,] who would not admit the validity of an inference such as that [of fire] from smoke? So [people] apprehend what is to be established [by such an inference] even though they are not pestered by logicians. But the validity of an inference regarding such [entities] as the Self, God, an omniscient or an afterlife is not acknowledged by those who know reality.”

Whether the materialists of Jayanta’s time had also explicitly targeted the inference of the indriyas or not, Jayanta criticizes their thesis by emphasizing that it leaves them with no choice but to reject the inference of imperceptible indriyas as well. See Nyāyamañjarī, vol. I, 501: śrotrādyanumāne ’pi yathodāhṛte śakyam evam abhidhātum … “And also with respect to the inference of the hearing organ and so on, according to the way in which it is formulated, one can declare similarly, [as in the case of the inference of God or the Self, that it is invalid] …” Cf. Āgamaḍambara, 68, where the Saiddhāntika arguing with a Cārvāka who denies the validity of the inference of īśvara points out that then the Cārvāka should equally dismiss the inference of the indriyas. The Cārvāka replies: “Let [us admit that] the [sense organs] too are not inferred; why should it be a problem for us?” (tad api mānumāyi, kiṃ naś chinnam); the Saiddhāntika asks in turn: “But [then] how can you see a visual form without any visual organ?” (nanu cakṣuṣā vinā kathaṃ rūpaṃ drakṣyasi). See Dezső 2005, 168–169. On the possibility that the materialist portrayed by Jayanta might be a caricature of a ninth-century Kashmirian materialist, poetician and grammarian named Udbhaṭa, see Solomon 1977–1978, Bronkhorst 2008 and Bronner 2016. Cakradhara, while commenting on the Nyāyamañjarī, explicitly identifies Jayanta’s materialist target as Udbhaṭa, to whom he ascribes a commentary on the Bṛhaspatisūtras (see Solomon 1977–1978, 988–990), and it is not impossible that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta also knew this work.

Utpaladeva has just argued that there is no universal acknowledgement of the necessity of positing the existence of imperceptible entities (such as the indriyas) so as to account for perception. He now adds that even granted that we admit this necessity (hence the “Let us admit this,” syād etat, in the verse), such an argument is in fact invalid because, as he is about to show, the existence of the external object is contradictory to reason. Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 131: anupayogino ’pi vastuvicāracakṣuranveṣyatvāt* tattvam, iha tu bāhye ’rtha idam api nāstīty āha nāpīti. [*vastuvicāracakṣuranveṣyatvāt conj.; vastuno vicāracañcuranviṣyatāt ĪPVV, vastuvicāracañcuranveṣyatāt T; vastuvicāracaṃcaranviṣyatāṃ J10, J11.] “[With] ‘Nor …’, [Utpaladeva] says that [something may be considered as] having a reality (tattva), even though it is useless [in ordinary human practice], on the grounds that [the existence of] the visual organ [for instance] is required when speculating on the real entity [that contributes to the production of a visual perception]; but in the [case of the] external object, there is not even [room for] such an [assumption].”

See ĪPVV, vol. II, 131: parasparātmaketi. krayavikrayāder api tathāprakāśanam eva prāṇāḥ. yad evedaṃ yasyetthaṃ* prakāśate tad etenaiva mama prakāśamānasya prakāśamānāyām evārthakriyāyām upayogaḥ. [*parasparātmaketi conj. (see above, note 50); pratītiparamparātmaketi ĪPVV, J10, T; pratītiparasparātmaketi J11. *yasyetthaṃ conj.; asyetthaṃ ĪPVV, J10, J11, T.] “[They] ‘consist in each other’ [means the following]: even the essence of [ordinary human practice] such as buying and selling, etc., is nothing but such a manifesting consciousness. Only that which is manifest in such a way is for this very reason useful [in providing] to me, for whom [this thing is manifest and while I am] being manifest [myself], an efficacy which is [itself] necessarily manifest!” That is to say, as far as I understand the passage: objects can be desired and aimed at by a subject in the sphere of human practice only if they are forms taken on by the subject’s consciousness, and are ultimately nothing but the manifesting consciousness itself.

See above, note 51.

Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 131–132: bāhya eveti saugatais tāvad adhyavasāyabalāt prāmāṇyaṃ vadadbhir anumānam api bāhyaviṣayam evety uktaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ vastuviṣayaṃ dvayor apīti. asmanmate tu vikalpasyāvaśyaṃ vastuniṣṭhatvam evety uktaṃ bhrāntitve cāvasāyasyetyādyantare. tata eva yad āha bāhyavādī vikalpasyāsatyaprakāśanatvam iti, tad asmanmate niravatāraṇam eva. sākārajñānavādinā vikalpaḥ svātmani prakāśaḥ, arthe tv avasāya ity ukte katham asatprakāśanam. tad āstāṃ tāvat. “[Here is what Utpaladeva means with the words] bāhya eva. To begin with, the Buddhists, when saying that the validity of a means of knowledge arises from the force of determination (adhyavasāya), admit that even inference must have an object that is external [insofar as it is based on the determination of a previously perceived object. This is what Dharmakīrti has said in Pramāṇaviniścaya 2.7b]: ‘In both [inference and perception], the validity [of the means of knowledge] concerns a real thing …’. But in our doctrine, the concept necessarily rests on the real thing, [even at the time of conceptualization: Utpaladeva] has [already] stated this elsewhere, for instance in [verse 1.3.5 beginning with] bhrāntitve cāvasāyasya. For this very reason, in our system the [Buddhist] externalist’s claim that a concept involves no real manifestation cannot be accepted at all: since the proponent of the theory that cognition has aspects says that a concept is [immediately] manifest in itself [insofar as every cognition is immediately aware of itself,] even though with respect to the object, [this concept] is a [mere] determination, how could it have a nonexistent manifestation? So enough with this.”

Here is the gist of Abhinavagupta’s reasoning as I understand it. The Buddhists see conceptualization as bearing on a mere generality or a pseudo-object resulting from a process of exclusion (apoha); yet they acknowledge (as Dharmakīrti in the Pramāṇaviniścaya) that a valid inference has as its object a real entity inasmuch as its object is capable of efficacy (see Pramāṇaviniścaya 2, 48: … arthakriyāyogyaviṣayatvād vicārasya, “because a [valid inferential] speculation has an object that is capable of efficacy”). According to Dharmakīrti, this is the case because although the generalities aimed at in concepts are no real entity (since reality is purely singular), they result from the determination (adhyavasāya) as one single entity of many perceived singular entities that have a somewhat similar efficacy (thus the concept of “fire” results from our determining as one many perceived fires that are all in fact different from each other but share the capacity to burn, etc.). So even inferences are somehow based on at least one aspect of perceived entities (namely arthakriyā), and this is why valid inferences enable us to obtain desired entities and to shun undesirable objects. Nonetheless, the Buddhists consider that only perceptions involve an immediate manifestation of the object, and the Śaivas see this as a contradiction in the Dharmakīrtian system: according to Abhinavagupta, the Buddhist theory of determination entails that conceptual objects too are directly manifested at the very time of their conceptualization (and not only in some perception anterior to the conceptual elaboration), at least as regards their efficacy (see e.g. ĪPVV, vol. II, 132: arthakriyāpi cābhāsamānatayaivābhilaṣaṇīyeti sāpy ābhāsaviśrānteti. “And even efficacy can be desired only insofar as it is being manifest; therefore it too rests on manifestation.”). Besides, the Buddhist epistemologists cannot deny that concepts involve a real, immediate manifestation since they consider that all cognitions have two aspects (“an aspect [consisting in] the object,” viṣayākāra, and “an aspect [consisting in] themselves,” svākāra), and that even concepts, insofar as they possess self-awareness (svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti), involve an immediate manifestation of themselves (on this idea and its appropriation by the Śaivas see Ratié 2011, 44–45, note 20).

Abhinavagupta thus emphasizes in this passage the major point of contention between the Śaiva nondualists and their Buddhist counterparts as regards concepts: according to Utpaladeva, all concepts involve the immediate manifestation of a real thing at the very moment when they arise, because there can be no conscious representation of something that consciousness cannot present to itself in an immediate way; without such a manifestation, concepts could not occur or would be similar to a state of unconsciousness. And this means that even objects conceptualized as being external are ultimately internal aspects of consciousness manifesting itself as if it were external to itself. See e.g. ĪPVV, vol. II, 129–130: anumito ’pi bāhyo ’rthaḥ prakāśamāna eva vaktavyaḥ, prakāśād bhede hy aprakāśanaprasaṅgād anumitatvam api vastuno mūrchāprāyaṃ bhavet. “Even [if] an external object [is] inferred[, it] can be talked about only insofar as it is being manifest, for if [it] were distinct from the manifesting consciousness (prakāśa), since as a result it would not be manifest, [the awareness of] the very fact that the entity is inferred would amount to a state of stupor!”

Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 132: vikalpapratibhāsinety* upalabdhikriyākaraṇatayā sāmānyendriyaṃ, niratiśayasukhatatsādhanaviṣayatayā svargaḥ, anāhṛtasahajānandaghanataikasāraparipūrṇatātmanāpavargaś* cābhāsabhuvam abhyety* eva, anyathābhilaṣaṇīyatvatatsādhanānveṣaṇatadrūpadeśatadavadhāraṇatadanuṣṭhānādyayogāt. [*vikalpapratibhāsinety J11; vikalpapratibhāsitety ĪPVV; vikalpapratibhāsanety T, J10. *°paripūrṇatātmanāpavargaś T; °pūrṇatāpavargaś ĪPVV, J10, J11. *cābhāsabhuvam abhyety T; cābhāvabhuvam abhyety ĪPVV; cābhāva .. satyety J10; cābhāvam abhyety eva J11.] “[The passage] ‘inasmuch as they are [somehow] manifest in the concept [representing them’ means the following]. The ‘sense organ,’ [apprehended as] a generality (sāmānya) [by conceptual thought, i.e.,] as the instrument of the action of perceiving, [as well as] ‘heaven,’ [apprehended] as the object of unsurpassed pleasure and as [the means of] realizing it, and ‘liberation,’ [apprehended] as consisting of an absolute fullness the essence of which is nothing but the plenitude of a bliss that is not brought about [because in fact it is] innate—[all these] must belong to the realm of phenomena; otherwise such [things] as the fact that [they] can be desired, the search for the realization of this [desire], their determination [as having] this [particular] form and place, the practice in accordance with [this determination], etc., would [all] be impossible.”

Here the opponent is arguing that by definition, an object is what we apprehend as being distinct from—i.e. external to—us considered as conscious subjects, so that the idealist’s thesis is absurd because it contradicts our most ordinary experiences in the sphere of human practice. He is therefore implicitly invoking the evidence of common knowledge (prasiddhi) to show that there must be some external object. Utpaladeva answers that this evidence, far from being contradictory to his idealism, is in fact an argument in favour of it. Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 132: tataś ca prasiddhyaiva bāhyaḥ sidhyatīti pratyuta viparītam etat … “And therefore, [to the objection:] ‘the external [object] is established through mere common knowledge,’ [one should answer] that it is rather the contrary.” According to this fragment, the reason why this is so is that apprehending an object means making the object manifest to consciousness, and such a manifestation can only occur if the object is nothing but consciousness taking the form of an object. This idea is justified at length at the beginning of chapter 1.5 (see Ratié 2011, 309–366).

Cf. the beginning of Vṛtti on ĪPK 1.5.6, 20: ābhāsamānair evārthair vyavahāraḥ, te cābhāsātmakāḥ santu, kā kṣatiḥ. “Ordinary human practice occurs thanks to objects precisely insofar as [they are] being manifested, and let [us admit that] they consist in phenomena [and nothing else]—what harm [might ensue for human practice if it is the case]?” See Torella 2002, 114.

See ĪPVV, vol. II, 132–133: ābhāsānām eva vastutām abhidhāya prāmāṇikatvāt svayaṃ svapakṣe dūṣaṇam āśaṅkya darśayaty āśayaśuddhipradarśanena vītarāgatāṃ* vaktuṃ kevalam iti. paryanuyojyam idaṃ paryanuyogārham, kim, āha ābhāsamānatāyā iti. pūrvam ūrdhvaṃ ceti … [*āśayaśuddhipradarśanena vītarāgatāṃ conj.; āśayaśuddhipradarśanenāvitārakatāṃ ĪPVV, J10, J11, T.] “Having explained that only phenomena are real entities because [only they are] established by a means of [valid] knowledge, [and] anticipating by himself the refutation of his own thesis, [Utpaladeva now] expounds [this refutation with the passage beginning with] ‘only …’ by empasizing the purity of his intentions, in order to state that [he] is free of bias. [According to him] this ‘could [still] be objected,’ [i.e.] it deserves the [following] objection. Which one? This is what [Utpaladeva says] in ‘[if these objects did not exist] after as well as before [their] being manifest …’ ” My tentative emendation above (vītarāgatām instead of avitārakatām) is based on passages such as Nyāyamañjarī, vol. I, 25: “and it [i.e. tarka] can be used in order to show [one’s] purity of intentions in a debate” (sa cāśayaśuddhim upadarśayituṃ vāde prayokṣyate). Cakradhara (Granthibhaṅga, vol. I, 17) explains that it can be used “in order to make clear ‘[one’s] purity of intentions,’ [i.e.] the fact that one is free of bias” (āśayaśuddhiṃ vītarāgatvaṃ prakaṭayitum), and he adds: tarkakrameṇa svārthānumānakāle yathā pratipannaḥ svayam asāv arthas tathaiva parasya pratipādyate, vītarāgakathātvād vādasyeti. “Through the method of tarka, something is demonstrated for the opponent exactly as it was understood by oneself at the time of an inference for oneself, because a debate is a discourse of [people] who are free of bias.” This is an allusion to the Naiyāyikas’ distinction between three kinds of discourse, namely debate (vāda), disputation (jalpa) and sophistry (vitaṇḍā), and the Śaivas are well acquainted with it. See e.g. Kṣemarāja’s Svacchandatantroddyota, vol. VI, 98 (alluding to Nyāyasūtra 1.2.1, according to which “debate comprehends both the thesis and the antithesis,” … pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ): … pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vītarāgakathārūpo vādaḥ. “Debate, which comprehends both the thesis and the antithesis, [and] which is a discourse of [people] who are free of bias …” On vāda as a vītarāgakathā see also e.g. Nyāyamañjarī, vol. I, 18 or Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, 328; cf. Tantrālokaviveka on Tantrāloka 13.126, vol. VIII, 90. So as far as I understand the ĪPVV passage, Abhinavagupta simply means here that by raising himself (svayam) this objection to his own thesis, Utpaladeva is showing to his opponent that he is an unbiased interlocutor.

Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 133, which explains the objection in the following way: … ābhāsanam avaśyaṃ bhavane cābhavane ca nimittam apekṣate. tac cen nāsti, tan nirhetukatā. tataś ca kāryakāraṇābhāvād ghaṭārthī na mṛdam āharet, na kumbhakārakulam abhigacchet, na dhūmārthī hutabhujam ādadīta. kāryakāraṇatāmūlaś ca jñāpyajñāpakabhāvaḥ … “A manifestation necessarily requires a cause as regards both [its] arising and [its] not arising. And if there is no such [cause], then [this manifestation] is causeless. And since as a consequence there is no relation of cause and effect, [someone] who wants a pot should not get clay [and] should not go see a family of potters; [and someone] who wants smoke should not get himself a fire. Moreover, the relation between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge has as its root the relation of cause and effect …” As for the gist of Utpaladeva’s reply to this objection according to Abhinavagupta, see above, note 30.

This fragment, which targets the Buddhist Vaibhāṣika theory according to which external objects are nothing but aggregated atoms, must have followed a criticism of the Vaiśeṣika thesis that the external object is a whole (avayavin) distinct from its parts (avayava), hence the atha here. See ĪPVV, vol. II, 140: evaṃ kāṇādasaṃmataṃ bāhyaṃ dūṣayitvā vaibhāṣikaparibhāṣitam api dūṣayaty atheti. “Having thus refuted the external [object as it is] understood by the followers of Kaṇāda, [Utpaladeva now] refutes as well [the external object as it is] explained by the Vaibhāṣikas [in the sentence beginning with] ‘If, on the other hand.’ ” This line of argument is of course borrowed from the famous criticism in Viṃśikā 11–15 of the various theories claiming to account for the external object. Vasubandhu shows there that we cannot make sense of this external object whether we try to understand it as a whole distinct from its parts, as atoms taken individually, or as aggregated atoms. On the recent debate as to whether Vasubandhu’s reasoning was meant to show that the external object cannot exist, or whether his goal was merely to point out that such an object cannot be known, and for convincing arguments in favour of the first hypothesis, see Kellner and Taber 2014; on the Śaiva nondualists’ unambiguous interpretation of the Viṃśikā along the same lines, see Ratié 2014. On Vasubandhu’s refutation—summed up in this fragment—of the Vaibhāṣikas’ atomism, see e.g. Kapstein 2001, 181–204; for Abhinavagupta’s explanation of it, see Ratié 2010, 450–452, and Ratié 2011, 395–399.

Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 140: na caivaṃ paramāṇumayatva iti vaitatyaṃ digbhāgabhedavattvam. “And [spatial] extendedness, which [consists in] being differentiated into parts according to the directions, is ‘[not possible] if [this pot] is thus made of atoms.’ ”

The main idea is that if perceptible things, which are made of imperceptible atoms, are spatially extended, the atoms too must have such an extendedness, but spatially extended atoms must have parts, which is absurd since the atom is by definition partless. Cf. Viṃśikā 14ab: digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvaṃ na yujyate | “That which is differentiated into parts according to the directions cannot be one.” See also Viṃśikāvṛtti, 7: anyo hi paramāṇoḥ pūrvadigbhāgo yāvad adhodigbhāga iti digbhāgabhede sati kathaṃ tadātmakasya paramāṇor ekatvaṃ yokṣyate. “For if an atom has one part in the direction of the east, [and others in the directions of the south, west, north, above] and below, given that [the atom] is differentiated into [various] parts according to the directions (digbhāgabheda), how could the atom be one [whereas it] consists of these [different parts]?”

According to Abhinavagupta, here Utpaladeva has the externalist face a dilemma, the first part of which remains implicit in the Vivṛti. See ĪPVV, vol. II, 140: tac ca bahūnāṃ paramāṇūnāṃ bhinnadeśatve mūrtatvenānyonyarūpadeśākramaṇayogyatvābhāvāt* pratilabdhe kimiti na ghaṭata ity āśaṅkyāha tathā hīti. ayaṃ bhāvaḥ—yadi sāntarāḥ paramāṇavo ghaṭaḥ, tad adṛśyatā … [*mūrtatvena° corr.; ’mūrtatvena° ĪPVV.] “[The opponent:] ‘And why is [this spatial extendedness of the pot] not possible if [we admit that] the numerous atoms get to have different places because, since they are of a material, [i.e. solid] nature (mūrta), [they] cannot extend to the place of the others’ forms?’ Anticipating this [objection, Utpaladeva] says ‘To explain …’ Here is the implicit meaning [of this passage]: if the pot is [nothing but] atoms with intervals [separating them from each other], then [the pot] must be imperceptible …” In other words, the opponent is tempted to respond to the objection just stated in the fragment by explaining that atoms can indeed occupy different locations because although partless, they cannot penetrate each other so as to coexist in the same spot. But this reply is unsound, first and foremost because then the macroscopic pot should remain imperceptible, as it would merely consist of imperceptible atoms and intervals between them. After enumerating a few more of the “countless defects” (śataśo doṣāḥ) inherent in the thesis that atoms are separated by intervals, Abhinavagupta adds (ibid.): nairantarye tu parasparasaṃśleṣaḥ. “But if [the atoms] are contiguous, they [must] be in contact with one another.” It is the absurdity of the latter hypothesis that the fragment is now going to point out.

Alternatively, one could understand: “a second atom that is connected with the atom considered as [located] in the east.”

If atoms are in contact, they must all share the same place since they are partless, and as a result their aggregate, however complex, cannot be larger than a single atom. See Viṃśikā 12cd: ṣaṇṇāṃ samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakaḥ | “If the six [atoms supposedly surrounding the first one] share the same location [as the first one], [they] must [constitute] a lump [of matter] that has the size of a [single] atom.” Cf. Viṃśikāvṛtti, 7: atha ya evaikasya paramāṇor deśaḥ sa eva ṣaṇṇām. tena sarveṣāṃ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ piṇḍaḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syāt parasparāvyatirekāt. “If, on the other hand, the place of one atom is also that of the six [atoms supposedly surrounding it], then since they all have the same place, [they] must all [constitute] a lump [of matter] that has the size of a [single] atom, since they are not distinct from each other.” See also ĪPVV, vol. II, 141: iti dvāv api militau nādhikaṃ rūpaṃ samutthāpayeyātām. evam anyamelane ’pi vācyam. tad āha ananteti. “Therefore two connected [atoms] cannot bring about a form larger [than one single atom], and the same must be said if another, [third atom] gets in contact [with them]—this is what [Utpaladeva explains] with ‘[even if] an infinite [number] …’ ”

If aggregated atoms are not larger than one atom, no material object should be perceptible, since a single atom is imperceptible. Cf. Viṃśikāvṛtti, 7: iti na kaścit piṇḍo dṛśyaḥ syāt. naiva hi paramāṇavaḥ saṃyujyante niravayavatvāt. “So no lump [of matter] at all should be perceptible; for the atoms cannot be in contact [with each other] at all, since they have no parts.”

Literally, “non-deviating.”

According to Abhinavagupta, here Utpaladeva specifies that inference is a “non-deviating” means of knowledge (that is, according to the Buddhist epistemologists, a means of knowledge that is valid inasmuch as it unfailingly enables us to reach a given object) so as to point out that although conceptual, it is not a mere mental construct absolutely unrelated to perception, since it regards a previously perceived object. See ĪPVV, vol. I, 161: pūrvābhāta evānumānam ity etat sādhayituṃ tāvad āha anumānaṃ hīti. yata evaṃ tasmād yuktaḥ sūtrārthaḥ. nanu vikalpamātram eva kim anumānam. netyāha avyabhicāreti*. [*avyabhicāreti conj.; avyabhicārīti J10, J11, T, ĪPVV.] “In order to demonstrate that inference only regards a previously manifested [object], first [Utpaladeva] states [the sentence beginning with] ‘For inference …’ [And] since [inference] is so, the meaning of verse [1.5.8] is justified. But is inference nothing but a mere concept? With [the word] avyabhicāra°, [Utpaladeva] answers ‘no’ [to this question].”

Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 161: anumānaṃ kartṛ prathayatīti sambandhaḥ.

See ĪPVV, vol. II, 162: na ca tāvatety antaḥsthitasaṃskāraśeṣasya bahīrūpatāvabhāsanalakṣaṇena vicchedamātreṇābhāsitenāpi viśiṣṭau deśakālau vinā kāyīyavyāpāraparyantapravṛttijananam anumānena na kṛtaṃ bhaved iti viśiṣṭadeśakālāliṅgite ’rthe pravṛttiyogye yad vikalpanaṃ tat pramāṇarūpam avisaṃvādakatayānumānam ucyate. “ ‘And this … is not enough’ [means the following]. [Something] that [only] consists of the manifestation in an external form, [i.e. in the form ‘this,’] of what remains [of the past experience in the shape of] an internal residual trace; [that is to say, something] that is merely separated [from the subject expressed as ‘I,’ but] that, although manifested, [appears] without any specific place and time—[this is] not [enough] for inference to trigger any activity ending in a bodily action. Therefore what [we] call an inference is [not just any] conceptualization (vikalpana), [but only one] that consists in a means of [valid] knowledge since it is reliable (avisaṃvādaka), [and one] that concerns an object possessed of a specific time and place, [therefore being] fit to be [something on which] an activity [is exerted].”

Cf. Vṛtti on ĪPK 1.5.8, 21–22: pūrvāvabhātāntaḥsthita evārthe nāntarīyakārthadarśanavaśāt tattaddeśakālādiyojanayā vimarśanam anumānam. “Inference is an act of realization (vimarśana) with respect to an object that exists internally [now in the form of a residual trace because] it has [already] been manifested in the past. [This act occurs] thanks to the perception of an object invariably concomitant [with this entity,] due to the association [of this entity] with this or that [specific] time and place, etc.” As noted in Torella 2002, 117, note 19, Utpaladeva’s definition specifies that inference “aims at proving the existence of an object that is able to propose itself as the possible object of purposeful activity (i.e. specified by a definite time and space […]).” And this amounts to saying that the external object cannot be an inferential object, not only because there can be no previous experience of such an object, but also because according to Utpaladeva’s definitions of time and space (on which see e.g. Ratié 2011, 197–201), spatial and temporal relationships can only belong to manifested entities. See e.g. ĪPV, vol. II, 16: nanv evam ābhāsaviṣayābhyām eva deśakālakramābhyāṃ bhavitavyam. “But [if it is] so, the spatial and temporal sequences can only regard phenomena.”

See above, note 75.

On the Śaivas’ understanding of this type of inference called sāmānyatodṛṣṭa (which infers the mere existence of some imperceptible and therefore indeterminate entity so as to account for a phenomenon that would remain inexplicable otherwise) see e.g. Torella 2002, 117, note 20, and Ratié 2011b, 486–488.

Cf. Vṛtti, 22: indriyam apy anumīyate kiñcinmātraṃ nimittaṃ tac ca bījādyābhāsād ābhāsitam eva. “Even a sense organ is inferred [as] a cause that is a mere indeterminate thing; and this [sense organ] has already been manifested due to the manifestation of a seed, etc.” See Torella 2002, 117.

Utpaladeva considers every perceived object as a particular synthesis of general features (including that of causality); see Torella 1992, 332–333, and Torella 2002, 89–90, note 3. On Abhinavagupta’s explanations of this point see Ratié 2011b, 488–491. It is this theory that enables Utpaladeva to claim here that although the sense organs are imperceptible in the sense that they can never be apprehended as singular entities existing in a determinate place and time, they can still be considered as having somehow been perceived before being inferred (so that their inference is valid); this is so because the inference of the sense organs does not concern a particular entity but a mere generality (that is, an indeterminate cause that must be postulated on top of other conditions such as light so as to account for the phenomenon of perception), and this general notion of causality is part of countless perceptions of particular fires seen as causing smoke, etc., since the perception of a particular is nothing but the apprehension of a synthetic unity of generalities, including causality.

Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, 163: na hi tatreti bījasya nimittatājñāne.

Utpaladeva is arguing here that within any act of perception, the apprehension of universals or generalities (such as causality) comes first, and it is only once these general features are apprehended that we determine our perception as being that of a singular synthesis. This determination of the perceptual object as a singular entity takes the form of the mental process of exclusion (vyavaccheda, apoha) which, according to Dharmakīrti, produces generalities (Utpaladeva’s system thus integrates the Dharmakīrtian notion of apoha, but not without turning it upside down). In other words, upon seeing a pot being made out of clay, we first apprehend a number of generalities inherent in the clay, and then we exclude from e.g. the generality “causality” whatever falls into the general category of cause (or, as Utpaladeva says, is intrinsically linked with it) but has a different efficacy—seeds for instance. According to Abhinavagupta, it is because we thus apprehend the generality “causality” before the particularities of the perceived cause that we are capable of using the word “cause” to describe various entities. See ĪPVV, vol. II, 156: anyathaikatra bīje kāraṇaśabdaḥ saṅketito na mṛtpiṇḍādau saṅketito bhavet. “Otherwise, the word ‘cause’ would be conventionally associated with one single [entity, such as] the seed, [but] it could not be conventionally associated with a lump of clay, etc.” It is also this theory that enables Utpaladeva to claim here that in a sense, all causes (including imperceptible ones such as the sense organs) are perceived when we perceive clay, although contrary to the singular clay perceived at that particular time and place, all the other causes are only apprehended in the form of the general feature “causality.” Cf. Abhinavagupta’s explanation in ĪPVV, vol. II, 163: nanu kumbhaṃ prati mṛdo nimittatājñāne bījam api nimittabhāvena svīkṛtam iti kutaḥ. atrocyate prasakteti. prasaṅgaś ca kāraṇatāsāmānyapratibhāsasamutthāpita iti bhāvaḥ. “To the [question:] ‘But how is it that in the cognition that the clay is a cause with respect to the pot, [we] apprehend the seed too as a cause?,’ [Utpaladeva] replies [with the expression] ‘that which is intrinsically linked (prasakta) [with the notion of cause in general].’ And this intrinsic link arises from the manifestation of the generality [consisting in] causality—this is what [Utpaladeva] means.”

On my reasons for thinking that this passage might be a fragment from the Vivṛti, see above, note 79.

I now think that my understanding of the last part of this sentence was mistaken in Ratié 2011, 466, note 221, and Ratié 2011b, 494, note 48. As for the general meaning of the passage, see ĪPVV, vol. II, 165: grāmād darpaṇād gṛhād dehāt saṃvedanād bāhyam iti bāhyatāsāmānyam* ekam, tac ca gṛhād bāhyam iti pratītau siddham. tataś ca samarpakaṃ darpaṇād iva bāhyaṃ* saṃvedanād api setsyati kramikābhāsavaicitryād dhetor ity āśayena pūrvapakṣayati nanu cakṣurādīti. [*bāhyatāsāmānyam conj. Ratié 2011b, found in J10, J11, T, marginal annotations in SOAS, D2, and note 248 in ĪPV, vol. I, 190; bāhyataḥ sāmānyam ĪPVV. *darpaṇād iva bāhyaṃ conj. Ratié 2011b, found in T; darpaṇādibāhyaṃ J10, J11, ĪPVV, marginal annotation in SOAS, D2 and note 248 ĪPV (vol. I, 190).] “With [the sentence beginning with] nanu cakṣurādi-, [Utpaladeva] states the prima facie thesis [that he is about to refute] with the intention [of conveying the following objection]: It is one [and the same] generality of externality [that is present in these various cognitions: ‘this is] external to the village, to the mirror, to the house, to the body, to consciousness.’ And this [generality of externality] is established in the [mere] experience: ‘[this is] external to the house.’ And as a consequence, [something] may be established to be external to consciousness as well and to project [its specific form onto consciousness], just as [something is external] to a mirror [and projects its specific form onto the mirror, and it may be established to be so] on the basis of the [logical] reason that is the variety of successive phenomena [experienced by any conscious being].” As to how, according to Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva was answering this objection in the now missing Vivṛti passage following this fragment, see ĪPVV, vol. II, 165: naivaṃ* bāhyatvaṃ ghaṭasya grāmāc ca saṃvedanāc caikam, saṃvedanād bāhyaṃ hy asaṃvedanarūpam, na tu gṛhād bāhyam agṛharūpam. evaṃ sati hi gṛhaikadeśaḥ kuḍyādir gṛhāntarvarty api ca ghaṭādir gṛhabāhyaḥ syāt. na caivam, gṛhasannikr̥ṣṭaṃ ca yadvad* bāhyaṃ gṛhān na tadvad eva saṃvedanāt tasyāmūrtasya sannikarṣādideśavyavahāryatvābhāvāt. tataḥ śabdasāmyamātreṇedaṃ* sādhyam ekaṃ pratibhātīty abhiprāyeṇottarayaty atrocyata iti. [*naivaṃ T; nedaṃ J10, J11, ĪPVV. *ca yadvad T, ĪPVV; yadvad J10, J11, Kha (ĪPVV, note 1). *śabdasāmyamātreṇedaṃ conj. Ratié 2011b, found in T; śabdasāmānyamātreṇedam J10, J11, ĪPVV.] “In ‘To this [objection we] reply …,’ [Utpaladeva] answers [the objection] with [the following] in mind. The externality of the pot is not thus one [and the same whether it is considered] with respect to the village or with respect to consciousness; for that which is external to consciousness consists in that which is not consciousness, whereas that which is external to the house does not consist in that which is not a house! For if that were the case, a particular element of the house—such as a wall—or a pot, for example, although it is located inside the house, should be external to the house [since they are not the house itself]; and it is not so. And whereas that which is external to the house is next to the house, it is absolutely not the case as regards that which is [external] to consciousness, because of the impossibility for [consciousness]—which is devoid of material form (amūrta)—of having any spatial relation whatsoever such as proximity. Therefore this [externality] that must be established appears to be one thanks to a mere similarity (śabdasāmya).”