Book censorship has a negative connotation. After all, it is the attempt of those in power to ban a certain message and to prevent it from spreading and influencing a larger audience. It hinders our freedom of expression, which is often associated with the freedom of the printing press. Early modern authors whose works clashed with the views and policies of secular or religious rulers often faced the censorship of the authorities who sought to hinder the dissemination of such texts at all costs. Yet censorship has a paradoxical effect – it attracts attention. Forbidden texts trigger people’s curiosity. Early modern authorities were well aware of this, and frequently sought to execute bans as quietly as possible.1 In the early modern Dutch Republic, authorities often quietly removed works from stores with such care that the suppression has left only a few traces in the archives. Discreet censorship was done precisely to prevent a ban from generating extra attention.2
In 1688, on the eve of the Dutch invasion of England in which stadtholder William III dethroned his Catholic father-in-law, James II, a pamphlet entitled La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé was banned in Holland. The attempted censorship of the pamphlet originated in the inner circle of stadtholder William III during the run-up to the successful invasion of England that would become known as the Glorious Revolution. However, the content of this pamphlet was pro-Orange and proclaimed its own propagandistic message, making a ban on this specific pamphlet seem strange. In this article, I will show that the prohibition served two purposes. On the one hand, the Dutch Republic appeared to distance itself from the content to create goodwill amongst ambassadors and foreign rulers. On the other hand, by deliberately imposing censorship, it was an attempt to generate extra attention on the domestic market for the pamphlet, the dissemination of which was not actively stopped after the ban was issued.
While most studies exclusively concentrate on suppression, this article focuses on a spectacular case in which the authorities made use of the extra attention generated by the banning of books. It will show that in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, the measure of banning books (on foreign affairs) was used deliberately to generate extra domestic attention for the political content of those works. By proclaiming the apparent prohibition, those in power benefited from the dissemination, while pretending to be innocent of it toward foreign ambassadors.3 Meanwhile, thanks to the attention generated, the public became curious about the content of the forbidden book. This article will demonstrate how the prohibition of a pamphlet could serve as a propaganda technique.
William III’s Propaganda Machine in 1688
Although it has often been stated that propaganda played a key role in the Glorious Revolution, remarkably little research has been done on pamphlets written for the domestic market in the Dutch Republic leading up to this change of power.4 I specifically focus on the involvement of the Prince of Orange’s inner circle in the creation of propaganda. Before examining this pamphlet and its ban as a sophisticated use of censorship as a propaganda tool, I will discuss the propaganda machine of William III and his attempts to make the European public believe that the newborn Catholic Prince of Wales was an imposter.
The success of the Glorious Revolution was partly determined by William III’s propaganda, which both encouraged Dutch citizens to support the operation and tried to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the English by presenting the invasion as a liberation. William was supported by a well-functioning network of propagandists, each with their own specialization. The network was led by William’s best friend and right-hand man Hans Willem Bentinck (1649–1709). Correspondence in archives shows that Bentinck and his men were well informed on what information was useful for their propaganda and that they were well aware of their audiences.5 They knew which rumours had to be reinforced, what to emphasize and what information should be undermined. The information that ended up in pamphlets originated with intelligences services and advisers. The latest works were immediately translated into multiple languages. A contemporary stated that ‘neither art, money, nor pains are omitted’.6 The propaganda machine that revolved around William III was perhaps the most sophisticated in Europe.
William III had a considerable network operating in England. Diplomats Everard van Weede van Dijkveld (1626–1702) and Willem Hendrik van Nassau-Zuylestein (1649–1708) had established contact with opposition leaders, and due to the many English and Scottish Protestant exiles in the Republic, a whole network of sympathizers who favoured the dethroning of James II. The court in The Hague welcomed these sympathizers with open arms and made use of their knowledge, contacts and connections. Many of them became, to a greater or lesser extent, part of William III’s intelligence service. Bentinck recruited a team of talented individuals sharing common political and religious interests.7 Compared to surrounding countries, they formed a superior group of agents tied together by a common ideology. William was also a ‘Meister propagandistischer Selbstdarstellung’ who ‘employed writers who understood the technique of propaganda, and … took advantage of the strong prejudice against everything papist’.8 Kenneth Haley and John Carswell have shown how, as early as 1673, William made brilliant use of propaganda to raise the morale of his people. His propaganda machine, or in the words of Madame de Sévigné (1626–1696) ‘lardonnerie hollandaise’, evolved into the most sophisticated in Europe.9 Whereas Louis XIV ‘relied on display rather than subversion’ William was able to use intelligence and propaganda as a much more versatile weapon.10
1688 marked the pinnacle of this achievement. As Lois Schwoerer argued, a propaganda war had never before been waged for a political goal with such great effect.11 Within the broad range of printed media William’s propagandists employed, pamphlets were perhaps the most prominent.12 The famous Declaration of Reasons (1688), in which William legitimized the invasion, showcases the care and sophistication with which the propaganda campaign was prepared.13 Secretly printed, and distributed with the aim of revealing its content at the exact moment when he would set foot on English soil, the Declaration sought to convince the English public that William was not a usurper, but their Protestant saviour.14
Entertaining the Nation
Pamphlets were used as mass media. Roeland Harms stated that ‘seeking publicity was important in state forms where power was partitioned (as in the Republic) or where the existing political relations were under attack’.15 A Dutch pamphlet even once declared: ‘libels rule the nation’.16
Pro-Williamite pamphlets were brief compared to Stuart counterpropaganda. William’s chief propagandist, Gilbert Burnet (1643–1715), hardly published pamphlets longer than twelve pages, and he would rather cut his text into three short pamphlets than publish a single long one.17 By delivering these pamphlets free of charge to booksellers, who made pure profit by selling them, the Dutch ensured wide circulation. In terms of content, too, Dutch pamphlets outshone their English counterparts. William’s pamphleteers knew that the public needed to be entertained. As secret agent and propagandist James Johnston wrote:
If you intend to keep the nation in humour, you must entertain it by papers. The Spirit of a People is like that of particular persons, often to be entertained by trifles; particularly that of the English, who, like all islanders, seems to ebb and flow like the neighbouring sea. In the late fermentation about the Exclusion, the Excluders never lost ground till they lost the press.18
The sophistication of Orangist propaganda also appears in the fact that the anticipated invasion was never mentioned. The threat of a foreign ruler who would establish order to England would be damaging for William III. The question of the consequences that would arise if William III took the English throne as Mary’s husband was also carefully avoided. Texts dealing with the politics of James II and the Catholic threat and ‘suggestions of effective alternatives were better postponed until power had passed into other hands’.19 According to Schwoerer, the Orangists deliberately ‘aimed their propaganda at, and were successful in reaching, a broad spectrum of society – including literate, marginally literate, and, perhaps, even illiterate Englishmen far outside socially and politically elite categories’. She stated that ‘scholars who regard the Revolution of 1688–89 as a coup d’etat, carried out by a very small number of people, have not understood the nature of the campaign William mounted’.20 The language had to be clear and understandable, in order to encourage people to act in the Republic’s favour.21 ‘In order to win the people over’, an anonymous Dutch pamphleteer wrote, ‘one must thoroughly know their tendencies, and what they think is of the greatest importance: without [such knowledge] we will never strike the right way to obtain victory’.22 The Dutch stayed on message: to ensure the enduring attention and support of the people, new pamphlets were constantly issued.23
The Announced Birth of the Prince of Wales
One of the most successful actions of William III’s inner circle was the effort to discredit the suddenly announced birth of James II’s son and heir. This event caused William III to launch his most targeted and vicious propaganda campaign. After the succession of James II, Protestant England consoled itself by assuming the situation was temporary. First, there were laws that excluded non-conformists (including Catholics) from having a seat in parliament. Second, James only had two daughters, who were both raised as Protestants. The elder, Mary, was married to William III. The fact that James II did not have a son as a legitimate Catholic heir ensured that there was no chance of a Catholic dynasty. The possibility of a Catholic heir to the throne was a doomsday scenario for Protestant Europe. With the birth of a son, Mary Stuart’s claim to the English throne would suddenly be undone, and Protestants feared a shift in the balance of power between Protestant and Catholic European nations. When Mary of Modena was unexpectedly pregnant, a fierce propaganda campaign at the expense of the unborn child’s reputation – largely orchestrated from the Dutch Republic – was the result.
The announcement of Mary’s pregnancy was so unexpected that the anti- Jacobean propagandists immediately took the chance to present it as a conspiracy in a flood of pamphlets. Readers could enjoy a variety of theories surrounding the pregnancy. Some pamphlets argued that the queen pretended to be pregnant by walking around with a pillow. Others gossiped that in the event the Queen was really pregnant and gave birth to a girl, Jesuits would swap her for a boy.24 The pamphlet campaign was not about establishing the truth; it was about making people doubt the truthfulness of the news. Thanks to a constant stream of printed matter, the propagandists in William’s service had succeeded in convincing the English population that the newborn son of James (James Francis Edward Stuart, born 10 June 1688) was an imposter child.
The Orangists kept themselves busy with feeding and spreading these rumours. Informants each had their own channels to do this. In London, the Scot James Johnston (1655–1737) was one of William’s most important secret agents.25 Johnston was required not only to provide information but also to do ‘impressions to rectify false reports’.26 In other words, apart from being an agent, he was also a propagandist with the explicit assignment to distribute a specific type of information. Like no other, he emphasized the importance of an effective and uninterrupted flow of propaganda.27 As Carswell writes, Johnston ‘demanded to be consulted on every major move about publicity, and devoted much time to organizing the distribution of Williamite literature’.28 Rumours, jokes, and remarks which Johnson heard on street were used in the propaganda.29 For Johnston, ridicule was more effective than argument.30 Entertainment, satire and false reporting were fundamental elements for Johnston.31 He reported that although ‘wise people say that there is no reason to believe that this is a true child’, he emphasized immediately after the birth of the Prince of Wales that William III had to use humour in his own favour to keep the people believing in its illegality.32
In June 1688, Johnston was confronted with a draft of a pamphlet entitled A Paper to shew that no man ought to believe that the child call’d the Prince of Wales is the Queen of England’s Son, till it be made appear that he is indeed so after a fair and strict enquiry. The pamphlet proposed that the legitimacy of the Prince of Wales should be examined by the English Parliament. Johnston commented that the text would have more impact because it would not be an official pamphlet of William III but would appear in the name of an (as yet unknown) individual.33 This would exacerbate prevailing scepticism: it strengthened the suspicions of the doubters and convinced others.34
From messages sent by Johnston and the Dutch ambassador Aernout Citters in London to The Hague, we know that the rumours bothered James, who failed to counter William’s propaganda. In late September 1688, James wrote that he knew what the people thought of him and that ‘they talk of my sonne as if he were a suposed child, they that believe such a falcety must thinke me the worst man in world. I supose they judg of me by themselves, for els they could not thinke me capable of so abominable a thing’.35 He saw himself compelled to gather testimonies from all those present at the birth of his son in a desperate attempt to convince his subjects of the heir’s legitimacy.36 It was striking that the infallible king had to respond to the rumours to defend himself. He could no longer ignore the accusations. The pamphlet with the testimonies contains no half-hearted references to the possible rumours. James II had noticed that rectifying this issue at all was almost impossible. The child was doomed to be seen as a changeling and a supposititious child. The public’s faith in a made-up pregnancy was too deeply rooted to be replaced by the truth.
La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé
In September 1688, the French-language pamphlet La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé was published.37 It was (directly) translated into Dutch twice, which was, surprisingly, not uncommon for a pamphlet in 1688.38 The first translation, De gefalieerde koning, en de prins tegen dank. Of Een klaar en bondig bewijs van de onweerdigheid van Jacobus de twede, om den koninglijken throon te bekleden, was printed in four different editions.39 The second translation, of which we know only one edition, was De geusurpeerde kroon, en de gesupponeerde prins.40 The names of the original author, as well the names of the translators, were intentionally omitted from the title pages.
The original pamphlet is one of the few pamphlets which was subjected to censorship in the Dutch Republic in 1688.41 While the other pamphlets censored in that year opposed the Dutch Republic or the stadtholder, La couronne usurpée defended everything William III stood for. Although the pamphlet contained slander against James II, it was similar to many other works published in those months. Those works were all written and published with the approval of William III’s inner circle. The content of the pamphlet contained information provided by the advisors. Despite this close connection to the Williamite network, the pamphlet was officially banned. The question is, of course, why?42
In the Dutch Republic, the content of the pamphlet contained hardly any grounds for prosecution. The text echoed all the arguments that Dutch pamphleteers had circulated in previous months: James II did not obey the law, he did not keep his word, he suffered from syphilis, Catholicism was a bloodthirsty religion full of errors and lies, the Jesuits whispered to the king that the Protestants in England must be exterminated, the Prince of Wales was an imposter child, and William III was a great, wise, devout, brave and noble Prince with an unquestionable right to the English throne. All in all, the content of the pamphlet added nothing new to the flood of Dutch pamphlets in the summer of 1688.
Verdict and Ban
According to the title page, the pamphlet was translated from the English version printed in London. This, however, is incorrect. In fact, the author, as we shall see, was Pierre Boyer (1619–c. 1703), a French refugee and preacher living in the Dutch Republic.43 To smooth diplomatic relations with England, an investigation was started. It was likely instructed by the English envoy extraordinary Marquis d’Abbeville.
In their attempt to trace the unknown author, the Court of Holland decided on 17 September to interrogate the printer of the work.44 Apparently, everything went smoothly. Not only did the court determine who the printer of the anonymously printed work was, the printer’s testimony also established that Pierre Boyer was its author. The court decided to summon Boyer on 20 September to confront him with the printer’s confession. Curiously, the court had already decided what to do when the author confessed: it would place him into custody and his arrest would be announced in the newspaper Oprechte Haerlemsche courant. His sentence was also predetermined: Boyer would be compelled to personally tear up a copy of his pamphlet in the presence of the court.45 Of course, Boyer complied. Both the printer and the bookseller were forced to watch the symbolic punishment. The verdict showed that this was actually a show trial – a mere gesture to England and other foreign parties.
On 20 September 1688, La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé was banned by the Court of Holland on the grounds that it was ‘most disadvantageous for the state of the nation’.46 Selling, distributing or reprinting was punished with a fine of one hundred carolusgulden. The attorney general made several unsuccessful attempts to seize all the copies.47 As announced, the ban was also mentioned in the newspaper. The abovementioned translations were left alone, and their existence was not even mentioned in the corresponding trial documents. The Oprechte Haerlemsche courant (25 September 1688) stated that: ‘this morning the Court of Holland condemned the author of La couronne usurpée to appear at the Court of Holland, and in the presence of the bookseller and printer who had printed the work, to tear up the aforementioned writing with his own hands, as has been done’.48
The sentence of bookseller, Johannes Aelberts, and printer, Matheus Roguet, of the anonymously printed La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé, was extremely lenient, as they got away with the ‘punishment’ of attending the tearing up of one single copy of the pamphlet.49 Officially, even publishing anonymously was punishable by a fine and a public corporal punishment.50 When the printer, Roguet, was asked why he had not mentioned the author and the publisher, and instead had pretended that the work was printed in London, Roguet simply replied: because that was the case with the original manuscript.51 Even though several placards had repeatedly stated that including the name of the producer of printed matter was required by law, in the period 1650–1749, 48 per cent of the pamphlets appeared anonymously. In 1688, the placards were even more ineffective than in a regular year: 65 per cent of pamphlets appeared without the name of the printer or bookseller.52
What was the reason for the ban of La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé? The content of the pamphlet was not unique and not directly harmful to the Dutch Republic.53 It was directed against England and its supposed heir and propagated the notion that the English throne belonged to William and Mary. Perhaps it was just bad timing. The pamphlet was published in the period in which Bentinck and his associates were busy preparing the invasion in complete secrecy.54 It seems that the work of Boyer was specifically prohibited to distract attention from other businesses. The ban and punishment were a diversion to somewhat reassure England (and also France) on the eve of the upcoming invasion that the Dutch Republic had the best intentions.55 Hence, the prohibition and condemnation were publicly proclaimed in the Dutch newspaper Oprechte Haerlemsche courant, which was also read abroad. In that case, it was most likely part of a diplomatic move. Dutch pamphlet specialist W.P.C. Knuttel also mentioned that the verdict was ‘the result of politeness to a foreign authority rather than a proof of oppression’.56 Historian Michel Reinders took the example of Boyer to illustrate that ‘[p]unishments for pamphleteering usually included shame’.57
Involvement of William III’s Inner Circle
A prohibition as a diplomatic manoeuvre was neither unexpected nor uncommon. However, even more than politeness towards foreign authorities, it was a tactical and political use of propaganda. When deliberating the original confessions, a few strange remarks stand out. These remarks point to the involvement of William III’s inner circle, putting the ban in a different perspective.
During his trial, Boyer claimed that he meant no harm and that he had written the pamphlet with the best of intentions. Boyer himself had visited a ‘Monsieur Ouwerkerk’ for approval of the content. This was none other than Hendrik van Nassau-Ouwerkerk (1640–1708), a (bastard) grandson of Prince Maurice of Orange and second cousin and confidant of William III. Although Ouwerkerk was not at home, Boyer claimed that his request for approval was proof of his good intentions.58 By mentioning Ouwerkerk, Boyer seems to imply that Ouwerkerk had knowledge of the pamphlet and perhaps was even involved in its production. The revelation of his name may be remarkable, but his involvement was not. Although they operated in the shadows, the writing of pamphlets was regularly initiated by politicians and ministers.59
Ouwerkerk was not the only name from William III’s inner circle to pop up from the interrogations. Printer Roguet claimed that bookseller Aelberts had given him the manuscript with the announcement that it was at the order of the raadspensionaris himself.60 Whether Grand Pensionary Gaspar Fagel (1634–1688), another confidant of William III, was indeed involved in the dissemination of the pamphlet is uncertain.61 In an attempt to check this statement, the court confronted the bookseller, but Aelberts denied it, after which Fagel’s name disappears from the procedural documents. There is no way to ascertain the statements made in the interrogations. Evidently, the author was not an einzelgänger, but how much value can we assign to the confessions? Were remarks that revealed the names of the people within William’s inner circle based on truth? We know Ouwerkerk and Fagel were deeply involved in orchestrating a propaganda campaign against James II and that they provided authors with information.62
There is another testimonial on the apparent involvement of Ouwerkerk: that of Claude de Mesmes, comte d’Avaux (1640–1709), the famous and powerful French ambassador in the Dutch Republic. D’Avaux was a political opponent of William III. He openly interfered in Dutch politics and supported the city of Amsterdam in 1684 to obstruct William III. He was one of the best-informed ambassadors in Europe.63 In a letter to the marquis de Louvois (1641–1691), Louis XIV’s war minister, dated 3 September 1688, d’Avaux wrote that La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé was personally given to the bookseller by ‘M. d’Overkerk’, meaning Ouwerkerk. The letter was written two weeks before the Court of Holland first mentioned the French pamphlet (17 September). D’Avaux also gave a brief description of the pamphlet, which makes certain that he spoke of La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé. The actual title of the pamphlet d’Avaux mentioned was somewhat different (Le Royaume usurpé; & l’Enfant supposé, contenant quatre Traités), but the four main points of the content appear in the same order as on the original French title page – namely that James II was a usurper, William III was the rightful heir of the English crown, the English Parliament could dethrone the king, and the Prince of Wales was an imposter child.64
Both the author Boyer and the French ambassador d’Avaux pointed to Ouwerkerk, and Roguet spoke about the involvement of Fagel. This makes the association of the stadtholder’s inner circle with Williamite propagandists clear and the prohibition of the pamphlet more intriguing, especially when we consider what d’Avaux wrote to France a month before the aforementioned letter (10 August).65 D’Avaux stated that he did not want to believe that the Prince of Orange was involved in the dissemination of the slanderous rumours, but evidence clearly shows the opposite.66 He had received two or three reports that confirmed involvement of the Prince of Orange, including one that suggested ‘they’ were truly planning to print a work to prove the deceit around the birth of the Prince of Wales.67 Once the work had been sold and read, d’Avaux asserted, the prince would officially protest the content of this work.68
The involvement of William’s inner circle clearly raises the possibility that the prohibition of Boyer’s work was an act of propaganda. At first, the pamphlet was forbidden as a way of pleasing foreign diplomats and to show that something was being done about the flood of anti-English and anti-Catholic pamphlets sold openly in the Dutch Republic – pamphlets that diplomats knew William’s inner circle was involved in producing.69 A letter from Dutch ambassador Aernout Citters suggests that James II himself might have been the person behind a complaint, after which the court decided to act. In a letter from Windsor (14/24 September 1688) to The Hague, Citters wrote that James II complained to him about the stream of scandalous pamphlets. In particular, he mentioned a pamphlet entitled La couronne usurpée et l’Enfant supposé. Several English ministers insisted that the Dutch ambassador write to the authorities in The Hague in order to suppress this pamphlet, and to offer a reward for the identity of the author and printer. Citters simply replied that this was useless, and that it was impossible to stop the dissemination of those pamphlets.70
Second, the prohibition of the pamphlet served as a diversion. D’Avaux as well as James II had complained at great lengths about the anti-English and anti-Catholic pamphlets.71 The timing of the censorship was strange. William III had already decided to invade England, and preparations were at an advanced stage. Prohibition of one of the pamphlets would show good will for the sake of peace, and it would somewhat satisfy the ambassador and distract him.
Finally, censorship can have unintended consequences. The banning of books can backfire.72 The supporters of William III knew that a forbidden pamphlet would sell.73 They simply used the prohibition of the pamphlet to their advantage. Thanks to all the extra attention, the pamphlet would sell better, and the content would become publicly known.74 The banning of the pamphlet was a publicity stunt and can be seen as a stealth marketing campaign. The fact that the prohibition seems to have been a show trial could explain why the two different translations were not mentioned or specifically prohibited. Knuttel reported that it was strange how no mention was made of the two Dutch translations of the work in the trial documents.75 Yet there is something noteworthy about the translations. Knuttel mentioned that De geusurpeerde kroon was a shortened edition, but the opposite is true.76 Knuttel probably never saw the original text and could not compare both translations. De geusurpeerde kroon is in fact a literal translation of the French La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé. The other Dutch translation, De gefalieerde koning, is a much freer translation and an extended edition. Given the content of the additional text and the choice of words, I am inclined to identify the famous pamphleteer Ericus Walten as its translator and editor.77
Interestingly, it was not uncommon for non-Dutch pamphlets in 1688 to be translated by at least by two different translators. At least nineteen originally non-Dutch pamphlets were translated into Dutch at least twice, meaning that the message was spread further and repeated more often.78 As the agent Johnston had advised, repetition of the same message nourishes prevailing doubt and strengthens suspicions, as was the case with De gefalieerde koning. By giving translations of the same pamphlet different titles, the translated pamphlets appeared different than others or even ‘new’, but their propagandistic message was the same.
Conclusion
Looking back on 1688, the English quickly noticed how the Prince of Orange’s campaign had blinded them. Soon, they had to conclude that he was not the saviour that they had so eagerly hoped for. In the years after 1688, when the dust of the propaganda war had settled, authors reflected with a certain estrangement on the Declaration of Reasons and admitted how the manifesto had succeeded in ‘debauching’ the English public, making them forget their true allegiance and turn against their legitimate monarch.79
The Orangist campaign against the Prince of Wales was effective. The English envoy d’Abbeville called the successful nourishing of doubt regarding the legality of James II’s son a ‘dirty trick’ and ‘worse … and more unpardonable’ than the entire invasion of England.80 However, the campaign did not come out of the blue. On the contrary, the plan might have been much older and even been started years before the pregnancy was announced. In 1682, people feared that Charles II would be succeeded by his Catholic brother. Both brothers lacked male heirs, but in 1682, James’s wife was pregnant. James II could possibly produce a male heir. However, it turned out to be a girl who died two months later. In The Observator (no. 194) of 23 August 1682, a commentary addressed to the Prince of Orange was written:
If it had pleased God to give his Royal Highness the blessing of a son, as it proved a daughter, you were prepared to make a Perkin of him. To what end did you take so much pains else, by your Instruments and Intelligences, to hammer it into the people’s heads that the Dutchess of York was not with child? And so, in case of a son, to represent him as an imposture; whereas you have now taken off the mask in confessing the daughter. I would have the impression of this cheat sink so far into the heads and hearts of all honest men, as never to be defaced, or forgotten. For we must expect, that the same flam shall, at any time hereafter, be trumpt up again, upon the like occasion.81
The idea of spreading lies to deny that Mary of Modena was pregnant predated 1688.82 In the case of the birth of a son, the claim that the newborn son was an imposter could then be made quickly and easily. In 1688, the fact that Mary’s succession to the throne, the real fear of Catholics ruling England and a European war were at stake made the fierceness of the pamphlets and the number of pamphlets spreading false claims much greater. In 1688, John Wildman even wrote that eventually 199 out of 200 people believed that the queen was not really pregnant.83
The rumours arose immediately after the announcement of the pregnancy, but the plans were much older. The slander involving the Prince of Wales was an excuse for William III to defend the hereditary right to the throne of his wife Mary. It is clear that the myth of the imposter child was exploited by the Orangists, but it is unknown to what extent William and Mary had created and spread the rumours. The story was a gift for everyone in favour of preventing a Catholic dynasty. The issue of the Prince of Wales’ birth and its legitimacy is not a question of whether the Prince of Wales was or was not the true son of James II; the very fact that this question was asked demonstrates the effectiveness of the propaganda.
Jacob Cats, Alle de wercken (Amsterdam, 1658), STCN 09092553X, p. (Q3) Aa3r: “Een schrift dat niet en deught wort des te meer gesocht / En wat verboden is te grager opgekocht”. [A book that is not honourable is bought all the more / And those that are forbidden are sought after even more eagerly]. All translations are my own unless indicated otherwise.
Ton Jongenelen, Van smaad tot erger: Amsterdamse boekverboden 1747–1794 (Amsterdam: Stichting Jacob Campo Weyerman, 1998), pp. I–XX; Ingrid Weekhout, Boekencensuur in de noordelijke Nederlanden. De vrijheid van drukpers in de zeventiende eeuw (’s-Gravenhage: Sdu Uitgevers, 1998), pp. 102–107; Enno van Gelder, Getemperde vrijheid: een verhandeling over de verhouding van Kerk en Staat in de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden en de vrijheid van meningsuiting in zake godsdienst, drukpers en onderwijs, gedurende de 17e eeuw (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1972), pp. 151–194.
Helmer Helmers, ‘Public Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe’, Media History, 22:3–4 (2016), pp. 401–420; Joop Koopmans, ‘Dutch Censorship in Relation to Foreign Contacts (1581–1795)’, in Joop Koopmans, Early Modern Media and the News in Europe (Leiden: Brill, 2018), pp. 282–302; Inger Leemans, ‘Censuur als onmacht. De omstreden Nederlandse publieke ruimte 1660–1760’, in Marita Mathijsen (ed.), Boeken onder druk. Censuur en pers-onvrijheid in Nederland sinds de boekdrukkunst (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), pp. 45–58; Olga van Marion, ‘Verboden in de Gouden Eeuw. Schrijvers, drukkers en hun strategieën’, in Mathijsen (ed.), Boeken onder druk, pp. 31–44.
Most attention has been paid to the famous Declaration of Reasons (1688) in which William III indicated his grounds for the invasion, see amongst others Wout Troost, Stadhouder-koning Willem III: een politieke biografie (Hilversum: Verloren, 2001), pp. 186–191; Arie Theodorus van Deursen, ‘Propaganda: The Battle for Public Opinion’, in J. North and P. Klein (eds.), Science and Culture under William and Mary (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1992), pp. 23–37, here p. 27; John Carswell, The Descent on England: a study of the English Revolution of 1688 and its European Background (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1969), p. 85; K.H.D. Haley, William of Orange and the English Opposition, 1672–4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953); Paul Hoftijzer, ‘“Such Onely as Are Very Honest, Loyall and Active”: English Spies in the Low Countries, 1660–1688’, in P.G. Hoftijzer and C.C. Barfoot (eds.) Fabrics and Fabrications: The Myth and Making of William and Mary (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1990), pp. 73–95; A.H. Huussen jr., ‘Censorship in the Netherlands’, in R.P. Maccubin and M. Hamilton-Phillips (eds.) The Age of William & Mary: Power, Politics, and Patronage 1688–1702, (Williamsburg: College of William & Mary, 1989), pp. 347–351; Emma Theresa Bergin, The Revolution of 1688 in Dutch Pamphlet Literature: A Study in the Dutch Public Sphere in the Late Seventeenth Century (unpublished PhD-thesis, University of Hull, 2006); Hans Willem Blom, ‘“Our prince is king!”: The impact of the Glorious Revolution on Political Debate in the Dutch Republic’, Parliaments, Estates and Representation, 10:1 (1990), pp. 45–58; Tony Claydon, William III and the Godly Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 24–31; Matthijs Wieldraaijer, Oranje op de kansel. De beeldvorming van Oranjestadhouders en hun vrouwen in preken, 1584–1795 (PhD-thesis, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2014); Richard Velthuizen, ‘De verovering verslagen. Publieke reacties en propaganda in de Engelse en Hollandse pamflettenliteratuur tijdens de Glorious Revolution 1688–1689’, Jaarboek voor Nederlandse Boekgeschiedenis, 8 (2011), pp. 97–114.
The University of Nottingham, Manuscripts and Special Collections, Manuscripts Online Catalogue, ‘Papers of Hans William Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland (1649–1709), statesman, in the Portland (Welbeck) Collection’, GB 159 Pw A (hereafter University of Nottingham, Pw A). Inter alia: University of Nottingham, Pw A 2086; Pw A 2099/1-2; Pw A 2118/1-2; Pw A 2120/1-3; Pw A 2124/1-5; Pw A 2126/1-9; Pw A 2127/1-3; Pw A 2129/1-4; Pw A 2131/1-3; Pw A 2133; Pw A 2139/1-2; Pw A 2147/1-4; Pw A 2159/1-5; Pw A 2167/1-7; Pw A 2161/1-5; Pw A 2169; Pw A 2171/1-2; Pw A 2173/1-2; Pw A 2175/1-5.
Lois G. Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 120.
David Onnekink, The Anglo-Dutch Favourite: The Career of Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland (1649–1709) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 28.
Olaf Mörke, ‘Stadtholder’ oder ‘Staetholder’? Die funktion des Hauses Oranien und seines Hofes in der politischen Kultur der Republik der Vereinigten Niederlande im 17. Jahrhundert (Munster: Lit, 1997), p. 302; Van Deursen, ‘Propaganda: The Battle for Public Opinion’, p. 35.
Carswell, The Descent on England, p. 25.
Carswell, The Descent on England, pp. 24–27; Helmer Helmers, ‘1685 and the Battle for Dutch Public Opinion. Succession Literature from a Transnational Perspective’, in P. Kewes and A. McRae (eds.), Stuart Succession Literature: Moments and Transformations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 95–113; Renaud Adam and Laurence Meunier, ‘Une enquête de police dans les milieux du livre à Bruxelles en avril 1689’, Histoire et Civilisation du Livre: Revue Internationale, 14 (2018), pp. 53–64; K.H.D. Haley, William of Orange and the English Opposition, 1672–4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953); Henk van Nierop, The Life of Romeyn de Hooghe 1645–1708: Prints, Pamphlets, and Politics in the Dutch Golden Age (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018), p. 239.
Lois G. Schwoerer, ‘Propaganda in the Revolution of 1688–89’, The American Historical Review, 82:4 (1977), pp. 843–874, here: p. 843.
In their correspondence Bentinck asked William III to allow him to reward those who used their pen for the justification of the stadtholder’s cause. This request was made during the ‘pamphlet war’ of 1690. Nicolas Japikse, Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck eersten Graaf van Portland. Eerste gedeelte: het archief van Welbeck Abbey. Deel I (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1927), p. 102. A few years later, in 1694, the Stadtholder-King William III himself wrote about this pamphlet war that a lot of people, including politicians, were involved. W.P.C. Knuttel, ‘Ericus Walten’, Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde. Vierde reeks, Deel I (1900), pp. 345–455, here: pp. 442–444. About this pamphlet war: Rindert Jagersma, ‘Het leven van de polemist, vrijdenker en pamflettist Ericus Walten (1662–1697)’, Mededelingen van de Stichting Jacob Campo Weyerman, 1 (2013), pp. 35–43, here pp. 36–41; Roeland Harms, Pamfletten en publieke opinie: massamedia in de zeventiende eeuw (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), pp. 171–198.
Tony Claydon, ‘William III’s Declaration of Reasons and the Glorious Revolution’, The Historical Journal, 39:1 (1996), pp. 87–108; Claydon, William III and the Godly Revolution, pp. 24–31, 64–74.
Machiel Bosman, De roofkoning: prins Willem III en de invasie van Engeland (Amsterdam: Athenaeum-Polak & Van Gennep, 2016); Jonathan I. Israel, ‘General Introduction’, in Jonathan I. Israel (ed.), The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1–43; Jonathan I. Israel, ‘The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution’, in Israel (ed.), The Anglo-Dutch moment, pp. 105–162.
Harms, Pamfletten en publieke opinie, p. 254.
The original quote: “Paskwillen vriend, regeeren ’t land”. [Le Francq van Berkhey], Samenspraak tusschen Govert Bidlo, Romein de Hooge, en de Politieke kruijer, in de Acherontsche velden (s.n., [1784]) STCN: 170106322, p. 4.
Van Deursen, ‘Propaganda: The Battle for Public Opinion’, pp. 30–31.
Carswell, The Descent on England, p. 132.
Van Deursen, ‘Propaganda: The Battle for Public Opinion’, p. 35.
Schwoerer, ‘Propaganda in the Revolution of 1688–89’, p. 874.
Van Deursen, ‘Propaganda: The Battle for Public Opinion’, p. 30.
“Om de menschen te winnen, moet men haar neigingen, en het geen sy meenen haar grootste belang te wesen, grondig kennen: zonder het zelve zullen wy noit de rechte weg inslaan om een gantsche winning te bekomen”. Het eenigste middel om de Test en penale wetten van Engeland af te schaffen en te vernietigen (1688), STCN: 863186564, p. 5.
Van Deursen, ‘Propaganda: The Battle for Public Opinion’, p. 31.
Troost, Stadhouder-koning Willem III, p. 190; Lisa Jardine, Gedeelde weelde: hoe de zeventiende-eeuwse cultuur van de Lage Landen Engeland veroverde en veranderde (Amsterdam: Arbeiderpers, 2008), p. 77; University of Nottingham, Pw A 2120/1-3 (21 December 1687); University of Nottingham, Pw A 2141/1-3 (16 February 1688); Van Deursen, ‘Propaganda: The Battle for Public Opinion’, p. 26.
Van Deursen, ‘Propaganda: The Battle for Public Opinion’, p. 27; Bosman, De Roofkoning, p. 103; Carswell, The Descent on England, p. 131.
Carswell, The Descent on England, p. 131.
Carswell, The Descent on England, p. 132.
Carswell, The Descent on England, p. 132.
Carswell, The Descent on England, p. 132.
The University of Nottingham, Pw A 2129/1-4 (23 January 1688).
Schwoerer, ‘Propaganda in the Revolution of 1688–89’, p. 848.
The University of Nottingham, Pw A 2173/1-2 (18 June 1688).
The University of Nottingham, Pw A 2086 (June 1688).
The University of Nottingham, Pw A 2167 (13 June 1688).
Richard Doebner (ed.), Memoirs of Mary, Queen of England, (1689–1693) together with her Letters and those of Kings James II and William III to the Electress, Sophia of Hanover (Leipzig: Veit, 1886), p. 72.
Depositions taken the 22d of October 1688 Before the Privy-Council and Peers of England Relating to the Birth of the (Then) Prince of Wales (1688).
[Pierre Boyer], La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé, ou Traité dans lequel on prouve … que le prince d’Orange étoit le … legitime successeur de Charles II ([London], 1688]). STCN: 207207208.
W.P.C. Knuttel, Catalogus van de pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek … Tweede deel. Tweede stuk. 1668–1688 (’s-Gravenhage: [Koninklijke Bibliotheek], 1895), pp. 406–461.
[Pierre Boyer], De gefalieerde koning, en de prins tegen dank. Of Een klaar en bondig bewys van de onweerdigheid van Iacobus de twede, om den koninglijken throon te bekleden (Cologne, 1688). STCN 290736226. Also: STCN 863087353; 863087329; 86308723X. Knuttel 12982; 12983; 12984. Tiele 8669; 8670; 8671.
[Pierre Boyer], De geusurpeerde kroon, en de gesupponeerde prins (Vrystad, 1688). STCN 863087485. Knuttel 12985. Tiele 8672.
Weekhout, Boekencensuur, pp. 387–388.
Jan Wagenaar, Vaderlandsche historie, vervattende de geschiedenissen der Vereenigde Nederlanden … Vyftiende deel, beginnende met het jaar 1679, en eindigende … in’t jaar 1689 (Amsterdam, 1756), p. 450. STCN: 260604550; Weekhout, Boekencensuur, p. 71.
Pierre Boyer belonged to the Waldensians and was a well-known preacher in the Cévennes. John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 89. Boyer worked in the department Gard in southern France: Avèze (1651), Bagard (1654), Canaules (1665). In 1686 he could no longer stay in France, fled to the Dutch Republic, and ended up in The Hague. According to a spy, in 1683 he had “prêchait hardiment qu’on pouvait s’attaquer au roi, qui forçait les consciences”. Charles Bost, Les prédicants protestants des Cévennes et du Bas-Languedoc, 1684–1700 (Paris: Champion, 1912), p. 24; W. Gregory Monahan, Let God Arise: The War and Rebellion of the Camisards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 17–18; Bibliothèque Nationale de France: <
Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Hof van Holland, 1428–1811, 3.03.01.01 (hereafter NA, HvH), inventory number 285, f. 103v; NA, HvH, 5347.10 [Confession of Boyer, 20 september 1688]; NA, HvH, 5657 [Registers of criminal justice, 1663–1688]. Also see W.P.C. Knuttel, Verboden boeken in de Republiek der Vereenigde Nederlanden, Beredeneerde catalogus (’s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1914), pp. 4 and 31–32, no 106.
“[A]enstonds te ontbieden, en hem sulcx voor te houden, en soo die bekent ’t selve Tractaetie te hebben gemaeckt dat hij als dan in de Castellenije van den Hove sal werden gebraght, en sulcx in de Haerlemsche Courante te laten stellen, dat men oock dat Boeckje off Tractaetie selffs ter Rolle door Monsr. Boije sal doen lacereren, ende de Publicae, soo ras die gedruckt sal sijn en alle de Officieren toesenden”. NA, HvH, 285, p. 103v.
“[D]en Staet van den Lande ten hooghsten nadeeligh”, NA, HvH, 5347.10.
“[D]at eenige gedrucckte Exemplaren van het selve Geschrifte, welcke den Procureur Generael niet heeft konnen saiseren, reets zijn verkocht, ende gedistraheert”. Compare this with the firm measures taken against the anti-William III pamphlet Hollands Koors, prohibited around the same time on 2 October 1688. Knuttel, Verboden boeken, pp. 64–65; Weekhout, Boekencensuur, pp. 211–212.
Original quote: “’s Gravenhage den 25 september. Desen morgen heeft ’t Hof van Hollant den Autheur van ’t Geschrift, geinitituleert: La Couronne Usurpée, gecondemneert, te verschijnen ter Audientie van de Rolle van den Hove, om in ’t aensien van den Boeckverkoper, voor wiens reeckening ’t gedrukt is, en van den Drucker, die ’t gedrukt heeft, het gem. Geschrift met eygen handen te lacereren; en is ’t selve oock alsoo geëxecuteert”. Oprechte Haerlemsche courant, 25 September 1688.
Both joined the booksellers guild in 1687, a year before the publication of La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé. Ernst F. Kossmann, De boekhandel te ’s-Gravenhage tot het eind van de 18de eeuw: biographisch woordenboek van boekverkoopers, uitgevers, boekdrukkers, boekbinders (’s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1937), pp. 1, 331.
Weekhout, Boekencensuur, pp. 44–59.
Roguet also seems to be a fine example of a printer who preferred money over his own ideology. As a Roman Catholic he printed phrases like: “La Religion Romaine comme vous sçavés tres-bien, est une Religion pleine d’erruers & de mensonges C’est une Religion qui ne respire qua Sang, & que carnage, une Religion ennemie irreconciliable de l Église, & la cruelle perseccutrice des fideles”. La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé, p. 4. The fact that his pamphlet was printed in his print shop, of course does not mean that he was involved in the typesetting, printing, correcting, nor that he even read the manuscript. It is possible that Rogue did not have known anything about the content, although this seems unlikely, because of his young age and the fact that he just started his print shop. Publishers and booksellers benefited from extensive debates and pamphlet wars. Often it is the question to what extent publishers worked from an ideology or from a financial point of view. Rindert Jagersma and Trude Dijkstra, ‘Uncovering Spinoza’s Printers by Means of Bibliographical Research’, Quaerendo, 4 (2013), pp. 278–310. Goldie showed that English publishers “had marked but not rigid political bias”. Mark Goldie, ‘The Revolution of 1689 and the Structure of Political Argument: An Essay and an Annotated Bibliography of Pamphlets on the Allegiance Controversy’, Bulletin of Research in the Humanities, LXXXIII (1980), pp. 473–564, here pp. 492–493.
Rindert Jagersma, Ericus Walten, pasquillemaker voor eene civile prijs. Productie, distributie en de consumptie van pamfletten rond 1690 (University of Amsterdam, PhD dissertation, 2021). As is well known, many pamphlets contained deliberate deceptions, such as ‘printed in London’, while typographic material indisputably shows that the printed material originated from, for example, The Hague or Amsterdam. Booksellers also acted as safe intermediaries between English spies and Orangists in The Hague, such as Meyndert Uytwerf. Speck, ‘The Orangist Conspiracy against James II’, p. 459. Speck transcribed his name as Clytvoerff.
Bergin, The Revolution of 1688, pp. 134–141. NA, 1.10.29 (Collectie Fagel), 2019, nr. 12.
Bosman, De roofkoning, pp. 130 ff.; Israel, ‘General Introduction’; Israel, ‘The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution’; David Onnekink, ‘The Revolution In Dutch Foreign Policy (1688)’, in Femke Deen, Michiel Reinders and David Onnekink (eds.), Pamphlets and Politics in the Dutch Republic (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 143–171; Charles-Édouard Levillain, ‘French Diplomacy and the Run-up to the Glorious Revolution (1688): A Critical Reading of Jean-Antoine d’Avaux’s Correspondence as Ambassador to the States General’, The Journal of Modern History, 88: 1 (2016), pp. 137–138.
NA, 1.10.29 (collection Van Citters), 6 (verbaal 1688), pp. 194–204 (letter 11/21 September 1688).
Original quote: “uitvloeisel van beleefdheid tegenover een buitenlandsche autoriteit dan een bewijs van vervolgingszucht”, see Knuttel, Verboden boeken, p. IX.
Michel Reinders, Printed Pandemonium: Popular Print and Politics in the Netherlands 1650–72 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 38–39.
NA, HvH, 5347.10. Confession of Boyer, 20 September 1688.
Harms, Pamfletten en publieke opinie, pp. 247–256; Weekhout, Boekencensuur, pp. 172–173; Maarten Hell, De Amsterdamse herberg (1450–1800). Geestrijk centrum van het openbare leven (University of Amsterdam, PhD dissertation, 2017), pp. 203–204.
“[D]at sij daer ordre toe hadden van den Heer Raedt Pensionaris”. NA, HvH, 5347.10.
There is no mention in the archives of Fagel that proves his direct involvement.
Levillain, ‘French Diplomacy’, p. 132; Claydon, William III and the Godly Revolution, pp. 24–31, 64–65; Carswell, The Descent on England, pp. 24–30.
Levillain, ‘French Diplomacy’.
“Le Royaume usurpé; & l’Enfant supposé, contenant quatre Traités. Le premier, que le Roi d’Angleterre d’à présent est un Usurpateur. Le second, que le Prince d’Orange est le véritable héritier de la Couronne d’Angleterre. Le troisieme, que le Parlement d’Angleterre peut deposer le Roi d’à present. Et le quatrieme, que le Prince de Galles est un enfant suppose”. Edme Mallet (ed.), Négociations de Monsieur le comte d’Avaux en Hollande: depuis 1679 jusqu’en 1684. Tome sixieme (Paris: Durand and Pissot, 1753), pp. 183, 212–213. Edme Mallet and Pieter le Clerq (eds.), Negotiatiën van den heer graave d’Avaux, ambassadeur van het hof van Vrankryk, by de Staten Generaal. Zesde Deel (Rotterdam, 1754), pp. 165, 168.
The question is, to what extent was Pierre Boyer as a French preacher really aware of the larger political game in which he had taken part? We cannot prove that he was in league with William or that he was a hack, and we can only guess whether he had anticipated that his work would be banned. We do know that, in the end, he did not seem embittered by his punishment. Four years later, he dedicated his Abrégé de l’histoire des Vaudois /The History of the Vaudois to William III as king of England and hero of the Protestants. Cited from the English translation: The history of the Vaudois. Wherein is shewn their original; how God has preserved the Christian religion among them in its purity … Peter Boyer … and newly translated out of French by a person of quality (London, 1692). This is the English translation of the first edition: Abrege de l’histoire des Vaudois (The Hague, 1691). STCN 852679734.
“Quoique j’aye peine à croire que le Prince d’Orange osât avancer une calomnie si notoirement fausse, ni se charger de la honte d’une action si noire, néantmoins il sera facile de juger s’il y a lieu d’en douter lorsque j’aurai rapporté deux ou trois autres avis que j’ai eus qui confirment celui-ci: l’un est que l’on imprime actuellement un Livre pour prouver la supposition de la naissance du Prince de Galles; & qu’aussi-tôt qu’il sera imprimé & débité, le Prince d’Orange sera des protestations”. Négociations de Monsieur le comte d’Avaux en Hollande, p. 185.
Negotiatiën van den heer graave d’Avaux, pp. 146–147.
Already in May 1688, d’Avaux had informed Paris that William III had given permission for the publication of printed material that stated that the Prince and Princess of Orange were the only legitimate heirs because Catholics were excluded from the throne: “Il n’en est pas de ce Libelle, ni de ceux de cette nature, comme de ces imprimés secrets, qui ne se vendent que fous main; ceux-ci sont publics & exposés aux boutiques, & se distribuent sans aucun ménagement; & le Roi d’Angleterre ne peut être trop attentif à découvrir les pratiques secrettes que le Prince d’Orange entretient avec les principaux membres du Parlement, & avec les premières perfonnes de sa Cour”. Négociations de Monsieur le comte d’Avaux en Hollande, p. 149. D’Avaux reported that in the weeks before the publication of the pamphlet both William III and Fagel had called the Prince of Wales an enfant supposé. Négociations de Monsieur le comte d’Avaux en Hollande, pp. 183, 191 (10 and 20 August 1688).
NA 1.10.29 (collection Van Citters), 6 (Verbaal 1688), pp. 194–204: letter 11/21 September 1688.
NA 1.10.29 (collection Van Citters), 6 (Verbaal 1688), p. 206: letter 24/14 September 1688. Also see p. 202: letter 11/21 September 1688.
Levillain, ‘French Diplomacy’.
S.C. Jansen and B. Martin, ‘The Streisand Effect and Censorship Backfire’, International Journal of Communication, 9 (2015), pp. 656–671.
Knuttel, Verboden boeken, p. 13, 110; Van Gelder, Getemperde vrijheid, pp. 151–166.
This paradoxical effect of censorship was already noticed by Tacitus. Jansen and Martin, The Streisand Effect, p. 659. The American statesman John Adams (1735–1826) wrote that the strict measures that had been taken in Holland to ban the pamphlet Brief aan het Volk van Nederland (1781) had the opposite effect than what was intended. Banning the pamphlet caused that a text that would otherwise have become known in a small circle, was now being discussed everywhere in Europe. Hella S. Haasse, ‘De vierde macht’, in Hella S. Haasse, Uitgesproken, opgeschreven. Essays over achttiende-eeuwse vrouwen, een bosgezicht, verlichte geesten, vorstenlot, satire, de pers en Vestdijks avondrood (Amsterdam: Querido, 1996), p. 67.
Knuttel, Verboden boeken, pp. 4 and 31–32. no 106. Despite the ban, La couronne usurpée et le prince supposé was already reprinted in 1689. Based on the two Dutch translations, two German-language translations were published: Der Faliirte König (based on the Dutch translation De gefalieerde koning) and Die wider-rechtlich angemassete Cron, und der unter – oder beygeschobene Printz (based on De geusurpeerde kroon).
Knuttel, Catalogus van de pamfletten-verzameling, p. 449.
About Waltens work as an Orangist pamphleeter in 1688, see Jagersma, ‘Het leven van de polemist’; Knuttel, ‘Ericus Walten’, pp. 345–455; Martin van Gelderen, ‘In Defense of William III: Eric Walten and the Glorious Revolution’, in Esther Mijers and David Onnekink (ed.) Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-Stadholder in International Context (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 143–156. The adaptation starts already on the title page. Walten translated the title a lot more freely. “De falieerde koning, En de Prins tegen Dank. Of en klaar en bondig bewijs van de onweerdigheid van jacobus de twede, om den Koninglijken Throon te bekleden: ’t onwedersprekelijke Erfregt van mevrouw de Princesse van Oranjen, en het bedrog aangaande het supposeren van den sogenaamden jongen Prins van Walis. Tot Keulen, by Pieter Marteau, 1688.” Walten added and removed passages, was fiercer about the bloodthirsty papists, and scattered much more with names and events from England. Details and specific aspects matches his other work. The same goes for his noticeable terminology, such as ‘Hof van inquisitie’ which is not mentioned in the original; but is mentioned in Waltens Nieuw-Modische Getuigen. Another big difference is that Walten speaks of the English as ‘they’, while the French preacher Boyer pretended to be an author living in England (‘Our Nation’, and ‘we’).
Even if the translators in different places were unaware of another translation, it indicates the appeal of the text.
Jonathan I. Israel, ‘Propaganda in the Making of the Glorious Revolution’, in Susan Roach (ed.), Across the Narrow Seas: Studies in the History and Bibliography of Britain and the Low Countries (London: The British Library, 1991), pp. 167–177, here p. 172.
Schwoerer, ‘Propaganda in the Revolution of 1688–89’, pp. 853–854.
Thomas Bayly Howell, Cobbett’s State Trials, Vol. XII (London: Longman et all., 1812), pp. 157–158.
Rachel Weil, ‘The Politics of Legitimacy: Women and the Warming-pan Scandal’, in Lois G. Schwoerer (ed.), The Revolution of 1688–1689: Changing Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 69.
An Account of the reasons of the nobility and gentry’s invitation of His Highness the Prince of Orange into England being a memorial from the English Protestants concerning their grievances: with a large account of the birth of the Prince of Wales, presented to Their Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Orange (1688), p. 11.