CHAPTER FIVE

FROM CITIZENSHIP TO STATELESS CITIZENSHIP

When we say ‘Jewish independence’ or ‘Jewish state’ we mean Jewish country, Jewish soil, we mean Jewish labour, we mean Jewish economy, Jewish agriculture, Jewish industry, Jewish sea. We mean Jewish safety, security, independence, complete independence, as for any other free people.

David Ben-Gurion, 1947, before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine (quoted in Lustick 1980, 88).

Negotiations and bargaining over citizenship, or patterns of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, are, as Israeli political scientist Baruch Kimmerling says, “not only related to who gets what but also to who is what and who can decide who is what” (Kimmerling 2002b, 181–195). The complex dynamic of citizenship and its ability to contribute to the formation of socio-civic and political identities resurfaced in an important debate covered by Kimmerling. This debate took place in 1985 between writer and Arab citizen of Israel, Anton Shammas, and Jewish-Israeli writer A.B. Yehoshua, and was later revisited by the two in 1992. Addressing the question of the Jewishness of Israeli identity and citizenship, and in a response to Shammas’s accusation against Israel that it marginalized the Arab population’s collective identity, along with its social, cultural and political spheres, Yehoshua asserted:

I am suggesting to you ... that if you want to exercise your full identity, if you want to live in a state that has a Palestinian character with a genuine Palestinian culture, arise, take your chattels, and move yourself one hundred yards eastward, into the independent Palestinian state, that will be established alongside Israel (Kimmerling 2002b, 181–182).

To this, Shammas responds “I have no intention to leave my motherland and my father’s home, for the country Yehoshua will show me,” and goes on to describe his political (and indeed, personal) project:

What I’m trying to do – mulishly, it seems – is to un-Jew the Hebrew language, to make it more Israeli and less Jewish, thus bringing it back to its Semitic origins, to its place. This is a parallel to what I think the state should be (Kimmerling 2002b, 182).
Kimmerling explains that this project continues six years later in a second debate, as Shammas, once again faced with Yehoshua, states:

You see Israeliness as total Jewishness, and I don’t see where you fit me, the Arab, into that Israeliness. Under the rug? In some corner of the kitchen? .... France and Frenchness come from the same root. But Judaism and Israeliness are a different matter. That’s why I advocate the de-Judaization and de-Zionization of Israel .... I am asking you for a new definition of the term ‘Israeli’, so that it will include me as well, a definition in territorial terms that you distort, because you’re looking at it from the Jewish point of view ...

(Kimmerling 2002b, 183).

With this we learn that rather than demolishing the State of Israel, Shammas’s project, as outlined above, is instead to provoke and confront ensconced Jewish control in Israel. In doing so, Shammas intends to formulate the parameters of an identity, accessible to both Palestinian-Arabs and Jews in Israel, grounded upon state representation, shared territory and genuine citizenship. Important for our purposes is the familiar structure of Shammas’s critique of Israeli national homogeneity. Similar to other prominent Arab and Jewish intellectuals, the argument contends that as a result of the regime’s multifaceted manifestation of Jewish dominance, Palestinian-Arabs in Israel are denied equal citizenship. And, as we will see below, for the most part, this is where the existing scholarly literature stops. This chapter begins with an outline of the effects of the basic and inherent contradictions in the Israeli incorporation regime through a comparative sample of the notable social science research conducted on Arabs in Israel and their respective and various formulations of what Palestinian citizenship entails or lacks. From here, the paradigm of stateless citizenship is introduced alongside the existing scholarship as part of a response to the yet unanswered question of how Palestinian citizenship came to embody its existing exclusionary dynamics.

‘Israeli’ and ‘Palestinian’ as Incomplete Identities

Basic and inherent contradictions of Israeli citizenship are by no means a new issue within Israeli political and social discourse. Often a comparative approach that places Israeli citizenship alongside its European and North American variants of state-citizen relations is adopted to critique and address these contradictions. Kimmerling makes use of such a comparative analysis when discussing the structure of identity in the Jewish state and writes:
At first glance, nothing is wrong or contradictory in this definition. After all, it sounds precisely like ‘French and democratic’ or ‘German and democratic’. After all, a Jew who was entitled to French or German citizenship, but needed to keep his or her ethnic or religious identity became a ‘French-Jew’ or ‘Jewish-French’, etc.….. Nevertheless, taking into account that Israel is a ‘Jewish state’, can we even consider a fusion of ‘Jewish-Christian’, or ‘Jewish-Muslim’, or ‘Jewish-Buddhist’? These ‘impossible combinations’ are almost inconceivable to the ‘Jewish-Israeli’ ear – and by the way why not a ‘Jewish-Jew’? …. It is not accidental that the inscription on the rubric of my official ID card is ‘nationality (leom): Jewish’ and not ‘citizenship: Jewish’ or even ‘Israeli’. This is simply because neither Jewish nationalism in its Zionist incarnation nor the Israeli state were able to invent or construct a purely secular or a civil national identity (Kimmerling 2002b, 187–188).

Echoing the notion that Israel has been thoroughly unable to form a more liberal and identity-indifferent civic entity Shammas states:

My nationality, according to the Israeli Ministry of the Interior, is ‘Arab’; and my Israeli passport doesn’t specify my nationality at all. Instead, it states on the front page that I am an Israeli citizen .... If I wrote ‘Arab’ under Nationalité in the French form, I would be telling the truth according to the state that had issued my identity card and my passport, but then it might complicate things with the French authorities. On the other hand, writing ‘Israeli’ under Nationalité is worse still, because in that case I would be telling a lie; my passport doesn’t say that at all, and neither does my ID (Kimmerling 2002b, 193).

Here he continues to explain that the problem may be internal to the language of ethno-national identity itself:

I do not know many people in the Middle East who can differentiate between ‘citizenship’, ‘nation’ (leom), ‘nationalism’ (leumit), ‘nationalism’ (lemanut), people (Am) and nation (umah). In Arabic as in Hebrew, there is no equivalent for the English word ‘nationality’ (Kimmerling 2002b, 193).

To Shammas, even at the level of nomenclature, in a Jewish state there is no possibility for an Israeli nationality. Israel is a Jewish state, and the Jewish state becomes a state of the Jewish people; citizenship in a Jewish state becomes Jewish citizenship; and nationalism in a Jewish state becomes Jewish nationalism. Indeed, this was affirmed in a 2002 report by Miloon Kothari, the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living. Kothari explained that:

Nationality status in Israel is not linked to origin from, or residence in a territory, as is the norm in international law. Rather, the basic theocratic character of the Israeli legal system establishes ethnic criteria as the grounds for the enjoyment of full rights. The Israeli Citizenship Law (ezrahut), officially
In effect, a relation of non-identification and rejection between Palestinian-Arab identity and Zionism (even in its most liberal form) emerges with constituent effects on the system of naming used to characterize Israeli identity. On this question of the development of a contradictory and deficient Palestinian social and political identity in Israel, two impressive publications deserve notice. These are Nadim Rouhana’s *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict* (1997) and As’ad Ghanem’s *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel: 1948–2000* (2001).

As evident in the title of his book, Rouhana pays particular attention to the labels that people combine to describe their collective identity. Using a combination of survey research, archival material, first-hand interviews and news and policy reports, Rouhana, a social and political psychologist and Palestinian citizen of Israel, goes on to deconstruct the self-labelling of Palestinians in Israel. He writes:

The way in which people combine the various available labels should reflect all layers of their collective identity. People who use different combinations of available labels might hold different political and social views and might have different levels of psychological connection with the political system. Therefore, even apparently slight differences in the way labels are combined might be of extreme importance to the individuals who choose the label (Rouhana 1997, 21).2

In other words, the labels of *Arabs of Israel* and *Israeli-Arabs* bestowed to the community by Israeli media, social scientists, and public figures and outside observers indicate a specific socio-cultural, legal, and political relationship with the Israeli state and society. And one that is immensely different from the kind of relationship implied when this community is defined as *Arabs (or Palestinians) of 1948*, the *Arabs inside* (Mandate Palestine, or modern Israel), or *Palestinian-Israelis* used by many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Rouhana 1997, 111–112).

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1 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-ninth session, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, Mr. Miloon Kothari, on his visit to the occupied Palestinian territories*, (E/CN.4/2003/5/Add.1), June 12, 2002, http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/36351ea8a4425fcc1256c84003e0e84/$FILE/G0214506.pdf. It is worth adding here that Israeli civil status is not only “distinct from” but it is also *inferior to* that of Jewish nationality. The mechanisms of control and discrimination to which those Israeli citizens who do not have Jewish nationality are exposed and outlined in Chapter Two of this book.

2 For more on social identity and minority status see also Suleiman (2002).
Rouhana deconstructs the three-pronged construction of Israeli policy and law through an analysis of the internal contradictions of Israel as a Jewish state, as a democratic state, and as a state with security needs, to illustrate the practical and conceptual mechanisms through which Palestinian-Arabs are excluded from the national identity of the state (Rouhana 1997, 44–64). From this, the forces internal and external to the state – including Israel's ethnically exclusionary policies and laws against its Arab citizens and the broader Palestinian-Zionist conflict – are used to outline the confusing and contradictory dynamics of Arab collective identity in Israel. Rouhana explains that

... their Israeli identity was devoid of the essence that holds collective identity together – the affective axes, which include belonging and connect all layers to the self-definition core. Thus the Arabs in Israel were left with an identity that could be neither fully Israeli nor fully Palestinian (Rouhana 1997, 202).

And reasserts:

[T]he identity of the Arabs in Israel is doubly incomplete. Although it is true that they are both Israelis and Palestinians, neither of these identities is complete. ... [Yet] their Israeli identity is incomplete in a different way – it lacks the exact same components that engulf their Palestinian identity (Rouhana 1997, 219, emphasis added).

Rouhana points out that the multifaceted separation between Arabs and Jews at the level of national symbols, narratives, institutions, structures and discourses generates two distinct and unrelated collective identities. This situation is reinforced with the legal and political absence of an ‘Israeli’ nation – a point I will revisit below – and results in a situation where both Arabs and Jews have an incomplete and deficient Israeli collective identity. Of course, both are deficient in different ways. Considering seriously the possibility of a “multilaterally accepted identity” negotiated among opposing groups, Rouhana dedicates the latter part of his book to various structural political options for the development of a genuine collective Israeli identity (Rouhana 1997, 23, see also chapters 11 and 12). Here he posits a bi-national state and concludes that Israel must dispose of its ethnic exclusivity as a Jewish state in order to be both a democratic state accessible to all of its citizens and residents, and to construct a meaningful and united collective Israeli national identity.

Working from Rouhana’s assessment that the Arab citizens of Israel are “partial Israelis and partial Palestinians” and that both identities are “incomplete,” As’ad Ghanem’s book examines what he calls the “distressed
development” – as opposed to the “normal development” – of Arab political and social activity (Ghanem 2001, 9, 175). The political evolution of Arabs in Israel is divided into four ideological and political streams: an Israeli-Arab stream promoting Arab integration in an Israeli political environment dominated by Jews; a communist stream encouraging a secular bi-national state formation with an Israeli-Palestinian or Palestinian-Israeli identity; a national stream that emphasizes the Arab and Palestinian identities of the community but does not reject Arab-Jewish cooperation; and an Islamic stream that promotes the political organization of Arabs in Israel on an Islamic religious basis (Ghanem 2001, 37–38). Ghanem thoroughly examines the historical evolution, along with the values, aims and models of organizing adopted by each of these major streams of political activity, and points to their stunted development given the “iron wall erected by the Jewish-Zionist character of Israel” (Ghanem 2001, 157). Limitations to Arab political development stems from the reality that they “cannot be Israelis in the full sense of the word as defined as a stream,” leaving them only as “partial Israelis” (Ghanem 2001, 176). As such, Arabs are faced with a dilemma and an uncertainty causing them “a sense of distress that goes beyond the level of emotions and belonging” (Ghanem 2001, 158). Ghanem contends:

The Arabs’ quandary is not a contradiction between two full identities, the Israeli and the Palestinian, but the incompleteness, in different ways, of each of these identities. This constitutes the most important evidence that the model of normal development … is fundamentally flawed with regard to the Arabs in Israel. …. The Arabs will continue to suffer distress and crisis as long as there is no change in the ethnic system [of the State of Israel] (Ghanem 2001, 176, 182).

Again, it is not that the Israeli and Palestinian identities are necessarily contradictory, or that one has to be premised on the rejection of the other. But the dilemma here is that they are both incomplete and deficient in different ways, thereby preventing either from fully solidifying as a meaningful and accessible identity. Juxtaposing a bi-national alternative – similar to Rouhana’s – to the existing ethnically exclusive national identity in Israel, Ghanem promotes the idea of an accessible and meaningful Israeli nationality. Based on the equal arrangement of Arab and Jewish ethnic collectivities, along with equality for all citizens through their membership in the state, the bi-national model is, for Ghanem, the only channel.

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3 Each of these political streams is explained in-depth in Ghanem (2001, Chs. 3–6).
for the civil and national fulfillment and “normal development” of the Arab citizens of Israel (Ghanem 2001, 200).

**Defining the 'Israeli' Nation**

Scholars such as Kimmerling (2002), Rouhana (1997) and Ghanem (2001) point to the central, and deeply controversial, feature of Israeli national identity, or Israeli nationality: its internal social contradictions and chasms. The dominance of Jewish-Israeli citizens and others granted the status of ‘Jewish nationality’ under Israeli law makes ‘Israeli nationality’ an impossibility. And this impossibility has, on numerous occasions, been upheld through Israeli court decisions. For instance, in 1970 when the registration of the children of a Jewish naval officer and his non-Jewish wife as ‘Jews’ was accepted by the Supreme Court – along with the recommendation that the classification of ‘nationality’ be completely withdrawn from the Israeli identity card – a Knesset law fuelled mainly by religious parties was passed stipulating that both parents need to be Jewish in order to register the child as a Jew (Keren 2002, 105). On April 18 of the same year, and in response to the limitations and controls this law imposes on personal status, Jewish-Israeli psychologist George Tamarin sought to challenge the official designation of his nationality from ‘Jewish’ to ‘Israeli’. The process for a change of registration requires public notice and, as such, Tamarin even filed a petition at the District Court asking it “to affirm that he had appeared before it and alleged in good faith his commitment to the Israeli nationality.”

In considering Tamarin’s petition, the District Court Judge, Yitzhak Shilo, acknowledged the oppressive character of laws that impose an unwanted designation and even agreed that nationality ought to be determined by the individual. Yet, Justice Shilo concluded that the existence of an Israeli nation as distinct from a Jewish nation seemed to be an impossibility on account of his “living amongst [his] people,” and stated that “a person cannot create a new nationality just by saying it exists, and then say he belongs to it” (Keren 2002, 106–107). The impossibility of a

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separation between the Israeli state and the Jewish nation was also affirmed in Tamarin’s appeal to the Supreme Court whose participation in the same national consensus was revealed in the opinion of Justice Shimon Agranat, then President of the Court. Ruling that “there is no Israeli nation separate from the Jewish nation ... composed not only of those residing in Israel but also of Diaspora Jewry,” Justice Agranat went on to stress that recognizing a uniform Israeli nationality “would negate the very foundation upon which the State of Israel was formed.” In his denunciation of the petition, he continued:

If a handful of people or more wish to separate themselves from the Jewish people – only twenty-three years after the establishment of the state – and acquire the status of a separate Israeli nation, this separatist trend should not be regarded as legitimate and should not be recognized.

At first glance, the accusation of separatism appears to be extreme and unfounded. Tamarin is an Israeli citizen who merely asks to be officially recognized as bearing the nationality of his state. Nationality expresses the legal relationship of an individual to her/his state, and given that Tamarin is not detracting from nor formulating an exclusive identity within and apart from an Israeli identity, the accusation of separatism appears to be misplaced. But if we take a closer look, we see that Tamarin’s petition does advocate a certain separation from the Zionist framework of identity and inclusion that serves as the basis for the State of Israel. And here the Jewish ethnocentric and primordial foundations of Israeli nationhood and citizenship begin to emerge. The Israeli government and its Supreme Court cannot recognize an ‘Israeli’ nation separate from a ‘Jewish’ nation because, from their ideological perspective, Israel is the state of the Jewish nation. To officially recognize an Israeli nationality, and even to adopt the language of an ‘Israeli’ nation as a category distinct from a ‘Jewish’ nation, would imply that, at some conceptual level, the two are distinct. That one category includes a collective identity that the other does not. However small, this conceptual separation between ‘Israeli’ and ‘Jewish’ would have juridico-political repercussions for the entrenchment of Jewish ascendancy within the state. Of course, this is because, in doing so, it could open a window of inclusion within the Israeli nation for non-Jewish citizens. It is the conceptual separation between ‘Jewish’ and ‘Israeli’ along with the potential practical implications of having to

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7 Gorali, “So this Jew, Arab, Georgian and Samaritan go to court.” Emphasis added.
formally – and even equally – incorporate a non-Jewish collective within the self-definition and self-understanding of the state that renders Tamarin’s petition a danger to the existing Zionist consensus. Though put forth by a Jewish citizen concerned with the state’s hegemony over personal status, the petition simultaneously and acutely points to the absence of any meaningful Israeli citizenship for the non-Jewish Arab community within the state. Understanding this, we come to learn that the accusation of separatism by Justice Agranat is not inconsistent with the Zionist foundations of the State of Israel. This is because its language, conceptual framework and practices eternally fuse Israel with the Jewish people; both within and outside of its ‘formal’ borders.

As it stands, Israel remains the only recognized state in the world whose citizens do not constitute its nationals. In fact, although the Interior Ministry includes 137 nationalities in its list of recognized designations for Israeli citizens, including Assyrian, Albanian, Burmese, Hong Konger, Samaritan, and even Hebrew, it denies its citizens an ‘Israeli’ nationality.8 The Israeli government has even gone so far as to create nationalities that are not recognized outside of Israel including ‘Arab’, ‘Druze’ and ‘Unknown’ to evade the formation of an ‘Israeli’ nationality.9 Tamarin’s initiative has been reawakened in recent years. In December 2003, thirty-eight signatories mainly composed of Jewish-Israelis but also including some Arab citizens submitted a petition to the High Court of Justice asking it to “order the Ministry of the Interior to inscribe their nationality as Israeli in the population registry” (Avishai 2008, 54). Though unsuccessful, the petition put forth by this group of academics, and social, cultural and political figures urged the formation of a more inclusive nationality that does not simply privilege Jewish members of Israeli society over their non-Jewish counterparts. This request again resurfaced in 2008 when a similar group of Arab and Jewish citizens, including former Members of Knesset, submitted a petition challenging the state’s refusal to recognize an ‘Israeli’ nationality. Here they argued that an ‘Israeli’ nation was simultaneously created with the establishment of the Israeli state. Headed by retired professor Uzi Ornan, the petition argued that the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, its Declaration of Independence, also distinguished between the ‘Jewish nation’ within Israel and the ‘Jewish nation’ abroad. The former collective was to “establish the state and

become like all other nations standing in its own right in its sovereign state,” while the latter were to first migrate to Israel to then contribute to building the state.10 As a result, the petition held, the designation of “Jewish” is not merely limited to Jewish-Israeli citizens and therefore another national classification is necessary. This petition was predictably rejected by the Jerusalem District Court Judge Noam Sohlberg on the grounds that the matter was “not justiciable.” Significantly, for Justice Sohlberg, the fact that the appeal included Jews, Arabs and Druze citizens, among others, rendered it un-justiciable. Unlike the Tamarin petition, which the Supreme Court had agreed to consider, the implications of Sohlberg’s verdict would be to include non-Jews in the ‘Israeli’ nation. He writes:

I don’t think we can treat the two cases similarly .... In the present case, people of many different religions, cultures and nationalities, Jews, Arabs, Druze and others, have joined together. This was not true in the previous case, which involved only a Jew. It is not at all the same to recognize Israeli nationality for a Jew as it is for members of other nations.11

Though this implies that Justice Sohlberg may have reached a different conclusion had all of the applicants been Jewish, it is evident that the Zionist national consensus to which he subscribes prevents him from considering non-Jews as belonging to an ‘Israeli’ nation, even prior to the acknowledgment that such a nation exists. The ‘Jewish’ and ‘Israeli’ are synthesized to such a degree in the Zionist framework that the acknowledgment of the latter by the court would be equivalent to it “creat[ing] something out of nothing.”12 In hearing the appeal of the petition in 2010, the Supreme Court fiercely rejected Justice Sohlberg’s argument that the petition was “not justiciable,” but it also strongly indicated that it was likely to refuse the appeal. The degree to which the Israeli Knesset and courts can exercise their authority on the question of the relationship between a ‘Jewish’ and an ‘Israeli’ nationality was also pointed to by former President of the Supreme Court, Justice Aharon Barak. In The Hebrew Republic (2008), Israeli academic Bernard Avishai explains:

In May 2006, Barak’s court in effect answered the petition, with a ruling in an entirely different case. The suit in question challenged army deferrals for

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11 Sohlberg quoted in ibid.
12 Ibid.
ultra-Orthodox students – a clear case of inequality. Barak declared, rather clumsily, that ‘there is room for the idea that a law or Basic Law that denies Israel’s character as Jewish or democratic state is unconstitutional’. Many experts interpreted this to mean that the High Court could abolish a law, or even a Basic Law, if it impairs Israel’s Jewish character, even if equality is at stake. .... Indeed, to protect the Jewishness of Israel, the Knesset could do pretty much what it wanted (Avishai 2008, 56–57).

Similarly, and as previously mentioned, in August 2011 the subservience of Israel’s democratic character and the equality of its citizens to the state’s self-definition as a ‘national home for the Jewish people’ was proposed as a new Basic Law. Backed by Members of Israel’s eighteenth Knesset, representing a range of political parties from both the opposition and the ruling coalition, this new proposed legislation would change the existing definition of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state” to its definition as “the national home for the Jewish people.” Should the two identities conflict, this new Basic Law instructs the courts to trump the Jewish character of the state over its democratic principles, and can only be amended through the passing of another Basic Law in its place.

The refocus of the Israeli political and legal establishment on preserving the Jewishness of the state has recently been met with a similar international refocus on the same. Journalist and writer Jonathan Cook explains that in May 2011, American President Barak Obama became the first US president to formally affirm Israel’s self-definition as ‘a Jewish state and the homeland for the Jewish people’. In July of the same year the New York Times reported that the Obama Administration is “currently working behind the scenes to press key allies to adopt a formula that would call on Israel and the Palestinians to resume negotiations on the basis of the 1967-lines and—for the first time in Mideast peacemaking—spell out international expectations that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state.” What comes to the fore here is that an issue absent from both the 1993 Oslo Accords that set into motion the diplomatic process for a two-state settlement and the failed 2000 Camp David Summit, and which was first introduced only at the 2007 Annapolis Conference, has now risen to the level of other long-standing and internationally

13 Lis, “Lawmakers seek to drop Arabic as one of Israel’s official languages.”
recognized final-status issues including illegal Jewish settlements, the return of refugees, recognized borders and the status of Jerusalem. As Cook points out, rather unlike other nation-states, Israel is not asking its Palestinian counterparts to recognize its territorial borders, sovereignty or even its democratic identity. Instead, it is strictly asking for formal recognition of its ‘Jewish’ character.

RESEARCH ON PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL: AN OVERVIEW

The relationship between Palestinian-Arabness and Zionism, founded on an interaction of political rejection and non-identification, has produced a range of critical scholarship. This research, from Arab, Jewish and Western sources, has sought to conceptualize the particular features, uses and dynamics of the citizenship bestowed to Palestinian-Arabs in Israel. Put together, these scholars are attempting to deconstruct the internal contradictions and paradoxes that arise, both conceptually and in practice, with the state’s provision of Israeli citizenship to Palestinian-Arabs on the one hand, and with its unabridged fusing of ‘Israeli’ and ‘Jewish’ identity and nationhood on the other. The scholarly literature largely agrees that the most important factor in delineating the contours of the relationship between Israel and Palestinian-Arab citizens is the constitutional and practical ethnic exclusivity of the state. Viewing this self-definition as a significant determinant of the relationship between the State of Israel and the Palestinian-Arab community, most critical scholars agree that Israel’s institutional and structural components leave them with mere citizenship status, or citizenship in the law. As a result, most scholars point to a paradox that emerges with the simplistic designation of this community as citizens with a citizenship. They argue that the self-identification of the state as an essentially Jewish state, with a Jewish identity, and a demographic caveat requiring a Jewish majority within the territories of Israeli control complicates, but does not cut, political, national, identity and membership ties between the state and the Palestinian-Arab citizenry. From this, many continue to posit that, in the case of the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel, the constitutional self-definition of the state as Jewish, and its repeated need for the adoption of structural and institutional policies of dominance and control, essentially repudiates the citizenship of this community. As such, to say that Arabs in Israel

16 Cook, “Israel's Jewishness.”
have citizenship in any meaningful way is not only misleading, but in many ways even inaccurate.

In one of the first impressive publications by an Arab citizen of Israel, Sabri Jiryis’s *The Arabs in Israel* (1976) provides important material on the subordinate socio-economic, educational and political development of Palestinians in Israel from the British Mandate to Zionist rule until the 1970s. Thoroughly documenting the legal and political foundations of the Israeli Military Government (1948–1969) as borne from security laws during the British Mandate, Jiryis’s book points to a systematic policy of neglect and targeted formal and informal mechanisms of disenfranchisement that arose after the establishment of the State of Israel. The book also rather meticulously examines the colonial vocabulary of the Zionist movement, and points to the ethnically exclusivist practices and policies that accompanied the “redemption” and “liberation” of the land (Jiryis 1976, Chs. 4 and 5). Indeed, the expropriation of Arab land through an exclusivist security discourse and oppressive “strong-arm” policy figures prominently in Jiryis’s detailed account of the Arab experience inside Israel, pointing to commonalities in the Palestinian encounter with the Zionist colonial project. Perhaps most important for our purposes is that Jiryis concludes the book with a bold reading of Arab citizenship in Israel that remains remarkably relevant to contemporary discussions. He states:

> A basic fact that emerges from a study of the history of the last quarter of a century is that the Arab in Israel has been, and continues to be, a ‘different’ citizen, ‘non-Jewish’, belonging to the goyim and excluded from the rights enjoyed by Jewish citizens. This distinction, which affects every aspect of Arab life, has been officially implemented from the establishment of Israel to the present. … [And where] necessary, additional provisions have been drafted to protect the Zionist character of the state (Jiryis 1976, 235).

Though not theoretically based, in connecting well documented statements and facts about the aims of the Zionist colonial project that place it alongside earlier European colonial schemes, Jiryis’s book served as a tool for other critical social scientists to examine theoretically the internal colonization of the Arabs in Israel.

Published in 1979, and referring to the important contributions made by Jiryis, one of the first notable theoretical accounts of Arabs in Israel from Western academia was *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study of Internal Colonialism* by sociologist Elia Zureik. Written in an intellectual and
political milieu where any criticism of Israeli policies was vociferously labelled anti-Semitic, Zureik's book was a daring theoretical challenge rich in its account of the social condition of the Palestinians inside Israel through the lens of race, ethnic relations and colonialism. Unlike his contemporaries and the Israeli writings available on Arabs in Israel at the time, Zureik's analysis of the Arab and Jewish historical relationship is the first impressive attempt at examining Jewish colonization at the turn of the twentieth century rather than from the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Zureik begins by outlining the features of a settler-society that apply to Israel with a keen eye on the primacy of Israeli political economy, its class structure and Jewish-Arab class relations. The transformations in the traditional peasant social order and the socio-economic structure of the indigenous Arab community “in the context of a superimposing capitalist economy;” the acquisition of land by Jewish settlers and the formation of a subordinate and occupied native labour force “creating identified pockets of hinterland in the midst of areas with native concentration” with metropolitan centres in regions occupied by Jewish settlers and their agents; and the political domination fuelled by an economic one which reproduces a “justificatory ideology” rooted in the dehumanization of the indigenous society, are all explained by Zureik as working in tandem to establish a value-system that is in-tune with the hegemonic structure of the Zionist colonial project (Zureik 1979, 28–29). He explains that the Arab and Jewish sectors of Israeli society, “did not develop separately and independently under similar conditions,” but were “interconnected in an asymmetrical relationship mediated by the British [colonial] presence” (Zureik 1979, 5). Working from this important framework, Zureik goes on to relate the system of domination in pre-1948 Palestine, first during the Ottoman, then the mixed Anglo-Zionist colonial rules, and on to the post-1948 Zionist colonial social order in contemporary Israel to which its Arab population is exposed. Delineating the mechanisms of Israel's oppressive socio-political system, and its effects on Arab education, social services, health care, employment, and 'criminal' behaviour, Zureik concludes that the situation of Palestinian citizens in Israel define it as an internal colony. Taken together, the state of Arabs in Israel therefore renders inapplicable characterizations of the community as simply members of a multicultural Israeli society (Zureik 1979, 140). He writes:

The situation in pre-1948 Palestine was more like a dual society, with one society, mainly the Zionist, deriving benefits from the sponsoring imperial power at the expense of the other, namely the indigenous Palestinian society. .... [But] the post-1948 period ushered in a third cycle of colonialism. ....
The model of *internal colonialism*, when applied to the Arabs in Israel, differs from the dual society model applicable to pre-1948 Palestine. .... However, the internal colonialism model also differs significantly from the fashionable models of cultural and social pluralism which are the favourite of most Israeli and Western social scientists. .... Unlike the cultural model of pluralism, and other variants of it [e.g. multiculturalism], the internal colonialism model accounts for possible politicization and reaction against forms of domination (Zureik 1979, 6, 195, 197–198, emphasis added).

Though popular among liberal Western and Zionist scholars at the time, formulations of Arab citizens as simply part of the multicultural mosaic of Israeli citizenry were here exposed and demystified. Zureik unveils such accounts as both historically inaccurate, given the *indigeneity* of Palestinian-Arabs, and as politically misleading through the model of ‘internal colonialism’; a model that more effectively reflects the multifaceted mechanisms in Israel that ensure Jewish ascendancy. As such, in meticulously outlining the ideological and institutional frameworks that dominate and marginalize Palestinian existence within the Zionist regime, Zureik was able to deconstruct the widely held image of Israel as a progressive and multicultural society alongside other Western democratic nations.

Now, Zureik was born in Acre, Palestine, almost a decade before the establishment of Israel, but is, according to Israeli law, an Israeli citizen. Worth reading is a short personal account Zureik wrote in September 2004 of his travel to Israel and experience of interrogation at Ben-Gurion Airport. In this account, Zureik explains the bizarre questioning he is faced with, and outlines the depth of the Orientalist logic of the Israeli security officials who repeatedly ask him for his *hamula* (clan) name. Interesting here is that Zureik is willing to enter the country as a Palestinian-Canadian with Canadian citizenship, and he admits to have given up his Israeli citizenship around forty years prior, leaving him with only a voided Israeli identity card. But he is nonetheless instructed by the Israeli official that he remains an Israeli citizen and that he must enter and exit on an Israeli passport. Zureik recounts his confusion at the eagerness of the Israeli official to ‘include’ him (and other Palestinians outside of Israel) in the Israeli body politic. Building on American sociologist John Torpey’s *Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (2000), Zureik concludes:

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Modern nation-states are obsessed with exhibiting signs of sovereignty, authority, and territoriality. Among the essential requirements of a state are [sic] the ability to control entry and exit, define belonging and exclusion, and patrol the territorial boundaries. The passport becomes a certification tool for authorizing the construction of citizenship. ... What makes the Israeli case intriguing is that none of these elements of statehood – borders, population composition, and sovereignty – have yet been finalized and legitimated. What to do with the Palestinians, both inside Israel and in the Occupied Territories, remains a contested issue.19

The intricacies and dynamics of the Zionist system of control and expulsion to which Zureik points above were outlined in the second major scholarly publication in the West, this time from the American academia, on Arabs in Israel. A revised version of the author’s doctoral thesis at the Department of Political Science at Berkeley, and published one year after Zureik’s book, Ian Lustick’s Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control of a National Minority (1980) is a penetrating study of the mechanisms of control to which Arabs in Israel are exposed. Defining Arabs as a “national minority” and focusing on the question of control – both of which were previously largely unexplored terrains of study – Lustick begins his examination with a focused question: “How, indeed, is the striking political quiescence of Israel’s Arab minority to be explained” (Lustick 1980, 5)? With this, he quickly clarifies that his purpose is specifically to analyze the control system within which Arabs are located, how it has operated and why it has been so successful (Lustick 1980, 27). He argues:

[T]he failure of Israel’s Arab minority to ‘organize itself’ and the minimal significance, to date, of the communal segmentation of Israeli society for the operation and stability of the Israeli political system are due to the presence of a highly effective system of control which, since 1948, has operated over Israeli Arabs (Lustick 1980, 25).

Though rejecting the apartheid characterization of the Zionist regime, Lustick holds that Israel’s sophisticated system of control was able to effectively “manipulate the Arab minority, to prevent it from organizing on an independent basis, and to extract from it resources required for the development of the Jewish sector” (Lustick 1980, 26). Supporting Lustick’s thoughtful examination are numerous first-hand narratives provided by Arab lawyers, students, communal leaders, farmers, villagers and workers, among others, of their marginalized situation, interspersed with statements and perceptions of the community by founding fathers, government

19 Ibid.
officials, military advisers, and other social and cultural centres of authority within Israel.

Part and parcel of his critical approach to Palestinian sociology in this book is a meticulous outline of major theoretical frameworks and techniques of control in deeply divided societies. Reading the Zionist project through a pragmatic lens, Lustick appears to take as genuine the expressions and declarations of intent made by leading Zionist figures regarding the Arab minority. He holds that, though the Zionist leadership aimed otherwise, the “irrelevance of ... factors and policy objectives for the actual ordering of relations between Arabs and Jews” made it so that Arabs were “dealt with purely on the basis of what was expedient for the specific objectives of the regime in the early years of statehood” (Lustick 1980, 39–40). That said, Lustick continues to unapologetically explain:

The regime did not want, nor did it strive to achieve, the integration or absorption of the Arab population into the Jewish community. Neither did it entertain seriously the possibility of wholesale expulsion, though various schemes of population transfer were discussed. Rather it set out to maintain the social segregation of Arabs and Jews, to extract certain important resources from the Arab population, and to regulate and direct the behaviour of the Arab minority to serve the interests of the Jewish majority. This Israeli policy toward the Arab minority was determined by an overriding objective – to control the Arab community in Israel rather than to eliminate, integrate, absorb, or develop it (Lustick 1980, 63–64).

This system of control within which Arabs in Israel are placed is, Lustick holds, composed of three separate components, namely segmentation, dependence and co-optation, each with interrelated networks of relationships:

Segmentation refers to the isolation of the Arab minority from the Jewish population and the Arab minority's internal fragmentation. Dependence refers to the enforced reliance of Arabs on the Jewish majority for important economic and political resources. Co-optation refers to the use of side payments to Arab elites or potential elites for the purposes of surveillance and resource extraction (Lustick 1980, 77).

These components of control are then individually looked at through three analytical levels: the structural level which includes social, cultural, historical and economic factors, the institutional level which examines the exclusion of Arabs at an institutional level, and the programmatic level which points to Zionist policies and laws that maintain the above structural conditions and institutional arrangements. Throughout this analysis Lustick provides extensive data outlining the extent of land expropriated
from Arabs by Jewish settlers, the distorted socio-economic development of Palestinians, their dependence on the Jewish economic sector and the general irrelevance of Arab needs in the mindset of Zionist policy-makers. Rather disappointingly, however, Lustick concludes that any fundamental change in the existing relationship between Arabs and Jews will come from a Jewish leadership committed to its development. Though recognizing an inherent tension and imbalance between Israel’s “liberal and Zionist ideological commitments;” and having spent the majority of the book laying out the racial exclusivity of the Zionist policy-making that guides the structural, institutional and programmatic developments within the state and the multifaceted system of control of Arabs it creates, Lustick nevertheless concludes that a dedicated Jewish leadership can guide the “transformation of Israel toward a consociational or pluralist society” (Lustick 1980, 271). In the words of Zureik, whose review of Lustick’s book was nevertheless overall positive,

... it is not clear ... what makes Lustick believe that a pluralist framework which has had little success in resolving the basic problems of other racially and socio-economically bound societies will succeed in a more ideologically rigid settler regime, such as Israel (Zureik 1981, 91).

Taken together, the work of Jiryis (1976), Zureik (1979) and Lustick (1980) inspired and paved an academic space for numerous important, useful and critical conceptualizations of the features, dynamics and constrains of Arab citizenship in a Jewish state. Today, this scholarship has been developed and compiled mainly by Arab academics, intellectuals, political representatives, urban planners, researchers, social justice community activists and civil society organizations in Israel, but also by Jewish-Israeli and Western sources.

In a recent publication, The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel (2011), Ilan Pappé works from the publications of Rouhana and Ghanem to outline the changing historical realities of the Palestinians in Israel from 1947 to 2010. Along the way, Pappé also points
to developments in critical social science research on this community.\textsuperscript{21}

Importantly, he does not take a solutions-based approach to the question of Palestinians in Israel. More interested in “the lessons of history than the perils of the future,” Pappé’s treatment of the historical development of the Palestinians who remained in their homeland after the newly established Jewish state constantly points to their complex relationship with the dispersed Palestinian nation, the Zionist movement and its institutions, and the broader Arab society (Pappé 2011, 11). For instance, Pappé details the 1956 Kufir Qassem Massacre where forty-eight Palestinian villagers were killed and thirteen wounded by Israeli soldiers for unknowingly violating an amended curfew whose time had been changed from 9 p.m. to 5 p.m. only hours before. He explains that this massacre, whose public coverage was largely censored by the military and state institutions at the time and whose known perpetrators escaped serious punishment, was committed on the eve of the Israeli, French and British military invasion of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, which launched the 1956 Suez War. But significantly, this massacre was also later officially justified by the Israeli government as a response to the Palestinian \textit{Fida'i}, a volunteer-based guerrilla group composed of expelled Palestinian refugees (Pappé 2011, 55–57). The ways in which Palestinian citizens are viewed as an extension of the broader Palestinian and Arab nation, as opposed to part of the Israeli social fabric, in the Zionist mindset becomes apparent here. What is revealed is that a massacre of the Palestinian-Arab villagers of Kufir Qassem, living in Israel and part of its citizenry, was not actually a product of the actions of those villagers. Instead, it was prompted by Israel’s attack with its European allies on a neighbouring Arab state and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{21} Pappé’s previous research on Israel and Palestine also produced \textit{The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine} (2006), a key resource for students and observers of the conflict. It meticulously outlines the historical events of 1948 through first-hand statements and documentation of the Zionist movement’s systematic destruction and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian population in their homeland.}
justified due to actions of resistance by members of the exiled Palestinian nation.

Perhaps most significant in Pappé’s history of the Palestinians in Israel is a 16-page Appendix at the end of the book that chronologically outlines the notable research conducted on this community. Pointing out that a large part of this research treats the community as “a test case ... for a plethora of theories,” Pappé briefly documents the existing critical scholarly contributions to the sociology of the Palestinians in Israel. Throughout this work, he places these texts within the historical and political context of their publication. Beginning after the 1967 war and immersed in a discourse of modernization common to other settler-colonial states, the scholarly research during this time promoted the de-Palestinianization and de-Arabization of the community. In sum, scholarship after the 1967 war...

With the diminishing credibility of modernization theories, explains Pappé, critical research examining Israeli policies and mechanisms of control through a lens of ethnic exclusivity and colonialism began to surface (Pappé 2011, 282–283). By the 1980s, critical theoretical accounts of the community and their intricate relationship with the Jewish state, the Palestinian national movement and the Arab world developed among a new generation of Palestinian academics in Israel. Working from many of the theoretical and structural frameworks set in place by Zureik, Palestinian intellectuals – many of whom also incorporated a feminist analysis examining the marginalizing effects of patriarchal social and political practices on Palestinian women – began collaborating with critical Jewish voices in the Israeli academia to form “a more systematic view of Israel as a settler colonialist society” (Pappé 2011, 284–285). Theoretical studies from the mid-1980s to around the mid-1990s on the effects of Israeli

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22 Along with the mentioned contributions by Zureik (1979) and Lustick (1980), the writings of Khalil Nakhleh challenging the dominant Zionist anthropology of Palestinians in Israel and abroad and those of Sami Khalil Mar‘i on the use of the Arab education system as a structural and conceptual tool of control by the Zionist regime are mentioned.

23 Here Pappé mentions Nadim Rouhana, Majid al-Haj, As‘ad Ghanem, Ramzi Suleiman, Adel Manna and Ahmad Sa‘di as some of the Palestinian scholars aiming to elaborate the levels of marginalization with which Arabs in Israel were faced (ibid., 284). We can also include the writings of Bishara (1997); Touma (1985); and Halabi (1993), among others.
spatial policies, urban planning, resource distribution and demographic policies against indigenous Palestinians from this perspective worked in tandem with this wave of critical sociology to deepen the analysis of the Zionist regime. During the final period of innovative thinking in the 1990s, which Pappé calls “post-Zionist research,” Jewish scholars challenged prevailing historical and sociological readings of the Zionist movement and its core beliefs around Jewish statehood. Also at this time, Palestinian intellectuals in Israel began to more actively enhance their work into research centres, independent academic organizations and policy institutes. These spaces served as intellectual and institutional bases for conducting critical and applied research free of the disciplinary and ideological trappings of a hegemonic Zionist discourse imposed in university spaces. Pappé writes:

Through analysis of the education system, the official language, spatial policies, legal practices, media treatment and other aspects of life, the discrimination has become more evident, even if at times subtle. All this essential research has been done by Palestinian scholars teaching and working in Israel (Pappé 2011, 288).

Important to note here too is that in addition to critical and applied research on marginalized issues pertaining to the Arab community in Israel, much effort from Palestinian scholars in these autonomous academic institutions was made to make this research available in Arabic, Hebrew and English. Though often difficult to finance and incredibly time-consuming, the intended audience of the research, encompassing Israeli Jews, Arabs in Israel, Palestinians abroad and Western academics, is evident in these efforts. An example of this essential research is the Political Monitoring Reports, first published on a monthly basis and later reworked into quarterly reports by Mada al-Carmel, a Palestinian academic organization located in Haifa. In reviewing and monitoring the effects of developments in the Israeli political, social, legal and economic scene on Palestinian life in Israel, these important and publicly available publications look extensively at first-hand Knesset documentation, statements by public representatives, public opinion polls and policy advancements made in parliamentary bodies, academic institutions, and local and national organizations. Even a brief examination of the issues addressed

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24 Here Pappé includes the research of Nira Yuval-Davis and Oren Yiftachel (ibid., 285). We can also include Kimmerling (1983); Falah (1985, 1993); Haidar (1995); Rabinowitz (1997); and Shafir and Peled (2002), among others.

25 See Mada al-Carmel’s quarterly Political Monitoring Reports for more.
and sources used in the *Political Monitoring Reports*, reveals the broad-based readership for which they are intended.

**FORMULATING PALESTINIAN CITIZENSHIP**

Over the years, critical social science research on Palestinians in Israel, some of which has been outlined above, has produced various formulations of Arab citizenship, its dynamics and relations of exception. The formulations of Arab citizenship I will examine below work from the premise that, in tune with the mentioned Israeli court decisions and legislations passed by the Knesset, the state’s professed democratic principles are merely auxiliary to its Jewish self-definition. The conceptualizations constructed in the existing scholarship seek to outline how, for the Palestinian citizens of Israel, the Zionist hegemonic project of Judaization defines and delimits *Israeliness* as a Jewish-Zionist state of being. A state of being which, by definition and political practice, rejects constituent elements of Palestinian-Arab existence. As formulated by Dr. Azmi Bishara:

> Israeliness does not distinguish the Arabs in Israel from the rest of the Arabs in the same way that it distinguishes the Jews in Israel from the rest of the Jews, because from the very onset, Israeliness has been Jewish-Zionist and rejected the Arab and even perceives itself as such. In order to be Arab-Israeli, the Israeli-Arab has to be part of his rejection.26

Paradoxically, the constituents included in the Zionist national project are not limited to those within or even legally tied to Israel itself; whereas those who are actually within the state and legally bound to it are not actually viewed as its constituents. Given this reality, Bishara considers the citizenship given to Arabs in Israel to be *incidental citizenship* and the citizenship given to Jews to be *substantive or essential citizenship*.27 This is because Israeli citizenship was not designed for Arabs; it did not intend to include Arabs, and only granted citizenship status to certain members of this community who happened, by chance or circumstance, to remain on their land during and after the *Nakba*. Recounting Israel’s self-definition, Bishara states:

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Israel does not express the Jewish majority in Israel. Israel expresses the existence of the trans-historical, trans-geographical Jewish people around the world. This notion has nothing to do with modern citizenship. It is a medieval idea. It has also nothing to do with the fact that the majority of citizens are Jews. This reality according to this view is totally unimportant, actually accidental, or if you want, it is man made; a majority is produced to meet the needs of the principle that this country is the country of the Jewish people, including those who do not live in the country. Israel does not express the Jewish majority in the country. It expresses the Jewish people, *en genera*, and the Jewish people are not all in Israel. .... *You cannot separate a Jew from his right to become an Israeli citizen.*

With this Bishara unmasks a key element of the Zionist use of the principles of classical liberalism. As we saw in the argumentation put forward by Yakobson and Rubinstein in the previous chapter, reference to the principle of majority rule was repeatedly made so as to justify a decision-making process privileging the Jewish-Israeli population, given their demographic majority. Yet, what Bishara points to is that within this liberal-Zionist framework the democratic principle of majority rule is only secondary to a more primary objective of maintaining the exclusive ethno-national character of Israel. Put differently, practices of population management to (re)produce Jewish demographic domination are exercised so that the principle of majority rule can be applied to meet the greater interest of maintaining a state with a ‘Jewish’ character. What this implies is that the principle of majority rule would most probably no longer be applied by the Israeli government should the non-Jewish population become the majority. Again, the aim here is not to ensure that the liberal-democratic principle of majority rule is genuinely applied, but it is instead referred to because it dovetails nicely with the discriminatory aim of maintaining Jewish dominance in the state.

Arab academic Raef Zreik, paints a similar picture of the civil status of Palestinians through a discussion of Israel’s borders. Pointing out that the institutions and bodies that actually created Israel are Jewish national bodies which represent not only Jewish citizens of Israel, but Jews worldwide, Zreik goes on to explain:

> The emerging picture is as follows: the borders of the state are almost meaningless in that being a Palestinian citizen *inside* Israel does not mean that you are part of the collective [national] project, while being a Jew living *outside* the state does not mean that you are *not* part of this project since,

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28 Ibid. Emphasis added.
according to the ethos of the state (and the Law of Return), every Jew can become a citizen at any point in time. All of this renders the difference between the actual and potential (Jewish) citizen marginal and blurs the concept of borders (Zreik 2008, 140).

The blurring of the distinction between the actual and potential citizen, and by association the actual and potential member of Israeli society, points directly to the Zionist project of Judaization that delineates and restricts Arab citizenship. In his examination of the structural constraints on any meaningful Israeli citizenship for the Arab community, Oren Yiftachel also points to Israel's ethnocratic structure to account for the inability of Palestinian citizens to convert their de facto citizenship, their formal inclusion as Israeli citizens, into a substantive and equal inclusion. In a 2002 article, Yiftachel points to the “shrinking space of citizenship,” linking it to legally and politically entrenched ethnic separatism in Israel. He writes:

Like most ethnocratic states, whose main project is the ethnicization of contested lands, institutions and resources, Israel is now facing an increasing challenge from an alienated and frustrated Arab public, fuelled by the illusions of ‘democracy’ and ‘equal citizenship’. .... Indeed, given the ongoing occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the strengthening of Jewish settlement in these regions, the actual existence of an Israeli state (and hence citizenship) can be viewed as an illusion. Israel has ruptured, by its own actions, the geography of statehood, and maintained a caste-like system of ethnic-religious-class stratification. Without an inclusive geography and universal citizenship, Israel has created a colonial setting, held through violent control and a softening illusion of a nation-state and democratic citizenship (Yiftachel 2002, 44, emphasis added).

For Yiftachel, democratic citizenship for Arabs is an illusion that reproduces (and is reproduced through) intensifying policies of oppression. On the one hand, it is generated from the wavering, undetermined and ambiguous parameters of the state itself, its geography, borders, jurisdiction, inhabitants, and represented citizenry. On the other hand, this chimera of democratic citizenship simultaneously provides internal and international legitimacy to expansionist and exclusionary Zionist policies and practices, thereby maintaining a complex system of unequal citizenship. In a more recent article, published in 2009, Yiftachel continues to point to ways in which the increasing oppression and exclusion of Palestinians, with or without Israeli citizenship, contributes to the political instability of the state and, by extension, its citizenship regime. The de-Arabization policies of the Zionist hegemonic project, he explains, outweigh Israel's official allegiance to democratic principles and determine the aims,
resources and practices of its state and quasi-state institutions (Yiftachel 2011, 132). This Judaization project is, Yiftachel asserts, supported by the security establishment, capital accumulation and social development policies, the legal system, state symbols, urban planning, and settlement and demography plans (Yiftachel 2011, 132–134). And, taken together, these forces structurally marginalize Israel’s Palestinian citizenry. Having “framed the meaning of Israeli citizenship,” this Judaization project renders the status of Arab citizenship “precarious,” with a “separate and unequal’ citizenship structure” that leaves Arab citizens both “exclude[d] and marginalize[d]” (Yiftachel 2011, 130, 134, 135). In effect, argues Yiftachel, Israel’s stratified and ethnocratic incorporation regime has created a kind of “ghettoized citizenship” for the Arab community. He writes:

Palestinian Arab citizenship in Israel can be characterized as existing in a ghetto. This ghetto is multifaceted—political, cultural, economic, and administrative. Consequently, it is also spatial. The Palestinian Arabs in Israel are officially part of [the] society, yet structurally they are isolated into enclaves and weakened by domination, exclusion, and disempowerment, the end of which does not appear to be in sight (Yiftachel 2011, 135).

This point is reasserted by Amal Jamal, examining what he terms “the dialectics of state-minority relations in Israel” (Jamal 2007, 473). Jamal treats Israel as a “nationalizing state,” explaining that its mechanisms to structurally, politically, economically and culturally deepen and reinforce its ethno-national character have, over the decades, effectively “hollowed out” Arab citizenship. He writes:

Nationalizing states ... have special characteristics that make multidimensional analytical frameworks necessary in explaining state–minority relations. These states, conceived as complex institutional entities composed of legal, economic and cultural components, design and render the citizenship of indigenous national minorities into a ‘hollow citizenship’ that is devoid of substantive cultural, economic and political meaning, since these minorities, often by their mere existence, tend to challenge the basic vision of the state (Jamal 2007, 473, emphasis added).

In other words, apart from any real claims for equality or genuine citizenship, it is mere Palestinian-Arab existence that constitutes the challenge to the state’s vision of Jewish exclusivity. And this exclusionary vision of Israel’s nationalizing project impedes genuine Arab participation and representation in state institutions and rids – or “hollows out” – their citizenship of any concrete meaning. Having examined three scholarly traditions that have studied state-minority relations in Israel, including the state-centric, the political economy and the ethno-nationalist readings, Jamal
posits a multidimensional analytic framework to show ways in which the three spheres intersect one another to generate structural inequality. What is revealed in this multifaceted framework is that the “hollow citizenship” of Arabs is not solely the product of a single element of state-minority relations, whether it is socio-political, economic, or ethnocultural, but must instead be understood as the product of a combination of all of these factors. Indeed, Jamal explains that these frameworks of exclusion “feed off and promote one another in such a way that makes the treatment of any one of them in isolation ineffectual in comprehensively explaining majority-minority relations in Israel” (Jamal 2007, 489).

Israeli political scientist Yoav Peled posits a similar relationship between the character of the state and the nature of its citizenship. Unlike Rouhana, Ghanem and Yiftachel, Peled rejects definitions of the Israeli political system as an ethnocracy, preferring to describe its as an ethnic democracy in that it combines the domination of a particular ethnic group over another with democratic structures and processes, including the extension of rights and privileges to individuals and collectives (Peled 1992, 432). Specifically, Peled considers Israel as “one successful example of a democratic yet deeply divided society” and actually goes on to read the citizenship status of Arabs citizens as “one of the key features of Israeli democracy.” Already, we see here that the historical, political and ideological reading of the Zionist settler-colonial project provided by Peled is deeply divergent from the above authors. This includes both Peled’s reading of Israel as a divided yet ‘democratic’ society, and his account of Arab citizenship as one of its validating features which indicate a more mitigated and softened understanding of the exclusionary dynamics of Israeli citizenship than the ones posited by the above scholars.29

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29 Nira Yuval-Davis and Nahla Abdo have recently written on the problematics of ethno-centric readings of the Israeli political regime. Yuval-Davis explains that the notion of an ‘ethnic democracy’ creates a normalization of Jewish ethno-national domination in Israel by depicting its democratic structures as reconcilable with the construction of Israel as a Jewish state. She points to Yiftachel’s warning of the “softening illusion of a ‘nation-state’ and ‘democratic citizenship’” of Israel and argues against a “certain complacency that sometimes appears when analyzing Israel as a post-Zionist, liberal, multiculturalist society and/or even as an ethnic democracy.” Such complacency, or “blindness,” explains Yuval-Davis, maintains the illusion of a Jewish and democratic Israel and “prevents most Israelis [and we may add most Western observers and scholars], both emotionally and analytically, from understanding some epistemological and ontological aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (see Yuval-Davis 2003, 193). Further, in a recent publication examined more closely later in this chapter, Nahla Abdo takes this argument further and argues that “[e]thnocentric approaches ... are problematic on all counts: at the levels of gender, race/ethnicity, and class. ... Ethnic-centered approaches, whether they describe the Israeli state as ‘ethnic
Peled holds that the “tension” within the Israeli political system is not merely accounted for by distinguishing Israel’s Jewish character from its democratic form of government. He contends that “it would be more useful to understand Israeli political culture as comprised not of two constitutional principles – liberalism and ethno-nationalism – but of three – republicanism, liberalism and ethnicity” (Peled 1992, 432). The liberal reading of citizenship stresses the individual, universal, autonomous and equal character of the subject, whose status and access to rights and privileges do not require an active or hands-on engagement with their citizenship and where the state exists on behalf of all of its citizens. In contrast, explains Peled, the republican conception of citizenship involves direct participation in and active engagement with citizenship in the form of a political and moral purpose, shared among all members, in reproducing, protecting and developing the common good of the society. And it is exactly this kind of civic engagement that Peled argues is denied to Arab citizens of Israel:

The only solution ... for people who cannot acquire full republican citizenship is to grant them a residual, truncated status, similar to the liberal notion of citizenship as a bundle of rights. Bearers of this citizenship as status do not share in attending to the common good but are secure in their possession of what we consider essential human and civil rights. Precisely this type of citizenship is possessed by Israel’s Arab citizens (Peled 1992, 434, emphasis added).

But it is not full liberal citizenship that is bestowed to Palestinians in Israel. As we know, the State of Israel does not, nor does it claim to, represent all of its citizens – Arab and Jew alike. Using statements by Zionist representatives just before the state’s establishment and reviewing the political and conceptual logic of David Ben-Gurion, Peled argues that though national discrimination was not officially on the agenda, there nevertheless remained a “gap between the Arabs’ formal citizenship status and their actual treatment (in this early period) as an occupied enemy population” (Peled 1992, 432). As a result, Israeli citizenship comes in two distinct
democracy’ ... or ‘ethnocracy’ ... or even singularist ethnocracy ... all tend to dismiss the central feature of the Israeli state, namely, its settler-colonial character. ... After all, ethnocentric approaches provide softer, less politically charged concepts to describe what are basically racist policies and practices embedded in the Zionist ideology on which Israel has been – and continues to be – founded.” For this reason, Abdo pushes forward the need to adopt “more apt descriptions and characterizations of the Israeli state” so as to remind scholars of their responsibility to “dig deeper into the racist nature of their own upbringing – Zionism” (see 2011, 16–17, 39).
forms: a partial *liberal citizenship* for Palestinian-Arabs, and a *republican citizenship* for Jews. Both have formal citizenship rights, but only Jews can actively engage with and practice their citizenship by ministering to the common good. Thus, in considering republican, liberal as well as ethno-national discourses of citizenship, Peled holds that the extension of Arab citizenship into the realm of ethnic power relations shows that the determining feature of Israeli political culture is thereby best termed *ethnorepublicanism*. Because active participation in ‘reclaiming’ and ‘redeeming’ the land is constantly stressed in the Zionist project and because Jewish ethnicity is a fundamental prerequisite for any genuine participation in the Israeli political community along these lines, as non-Jews, Arabs in Israel are necessarily excluded from republican and full liberal citizenship. In other words, “they cannot belong to the ethnically defined community ... [and] they cannot partake of Zionist civic virtue” (Peled 1992, 436). Here Arab citizenship is seen as governed by a principle of ethnorepublicanism, effectively limiting its development:

[A] protective wall (so to speak) has been placed around Israel's Arab citizens – a wall that separates them from both the Jewish citizens, who can attend to the common good, and the non-citizen Arabs of the occupied territories, who are Israel's metics. Within the area confined by this wall, Arab citizens can securely enjoy (formally at least) the rights of liberal citizenship. They must not, however, challenge the existence of the wall itself (Peled 1992, 436).

Israeli liberal-Zionism, therefore, provides a diluted and nominal membership to its Palestinian citizenry, that is effectively walled-in through a range of what Peled calls *ethnorepublican* policies and practices.

Another version of this thesis was co-written by Peled a decade later, with Israeli sociologist Gershon Shafir. In this text, formal Arab-Jewish relations are used to similarly depict the State of Israel as an “ethnic democracy” or a “third rate democracy,” set apart from consociational (where groups have guaranteed representation) and majoritarian (where the majority decides on behalf of society as a whole) models of state representation (Shafir and Peled 2002, 31). With extensive reference to Soysal’s concept of incorporation regime, outlined in Chapter One of this book, the authors argue that citizenship cannot be limited to “a bundle of formal rights.” Rather, it ought to be conceived as an entire mechanism or regime of incorporation of individuals and collectives into state and social membership (Shafir and Peled 2002, 11). An account of key allocative structures and the associated discourse(s) of citizenship is, according to Shafir and Peled, part and parcel of any reading of an incorporation regime.
And adjustments in the particular incorporation regime of a nation-state usually reflect changes in inter-group attitudes, interactions and relations of power – all of which affect the dominant reading(s) of citizenship. Similar to Peled's argument in 1992, the authors again reassert that, as a constitutionally ethnic state, the practice of Israeli citizenship is constituted by liberal, republican, and ethno-national elements superimposed on each other. Together, these discourses of citizenship function to legally, socially, and politically limit Palestinian-Arab access to citizenship as non-Jewish citizens – each expanding and retracting in stages thereby resulting in waves of differential allotment of obligations, privileges and domination. The hierarchical citizenship framework of today's Israel is rooted in this interaction (and, as the authors would contend, even cooperation) between the discourses, explain Shafir and Peled:

First, the liberal discourse of citizenship functioned to separate the citizen Jews and Palestinians from non-citizen Palestinians in the occupied territories and abroad, whether these Palestinians were conceived of as refugees or as stateless, non-citizen subjects of Israel's military occupation. Then the ethno-nationalist discourse of inclusion and exclusion was invoked (often under the guise of the republican discourse), in order to discriminate between Jewish and Palestinian citizens within the area of the sovereign State of Israel. Lastly, the republican discourse was used to legitimate the different positions occupied by the major Jewish groupings: Ashkenazim versus Mizrachim, men versus women, secular versus religiously orthodox (Shafir and Peled 2002, 22).

We should note that the inclusion of Soysal’s analytical schema is particularly useful here. Its various parameters allow the authors to consider Israel's “multiple and hierarchical citizenship” framework from social, political, economic, cultural and institutional lenses to show how such fragmented citizenship legitimates (and is legitimated by) its “complex incorporation regime.” However, the sophisticated analysis of Shafir and Peled is made problematic in their deficient reading of the aims and objectives of the political Zionist project, and its claims to liberal principles. Despite stating that citizenship ought to be understood as the ‘entire mechanism or regime of incorporation of subjects’, the authors seem to neglect the existential and epistemological exclusions embedded in even the liberal-Zionist framework of the state and its social membership. Indeed, this is a tendency that also surfaces in their argument that Israel's citizenship regime is genuinely composed of the varying – and one can even say conflicting – discourses of democratic liberalism, Jewish ethno-nationalism, and civic republicanism.
The authors locate the objective of a multicultural and democratic incorporation regime within the tension between varying elements of Israeli political culture and citizenship. It is this belief in the possibility of a democratic and multicultural incorporation regime within an exclusivist settler-colonial Zionist state framework that allows the authors to conclude by proposing “a non-hegemonic citizenship discourse” of “democratic multiculturalism” as “the most worthy incorporation regime achievable under present conditions” (Shafir and Peled 2002, 343). Holding that a non-hegemonic discourse of citizenship can be achieved under Israel’s existing social, political and conceptual structure neglects the real objectives of Zionism. As outlined in Chapter Two of this book, the Judaization project that lies at the root of the Zionist national project is, by definition, one of exclusion. It cannot genuinely coexist with the classical principles of equality, common possession, democratic participation, representation, inclusion, and multiculturalism. It seeks to create an exclusive state for the Jewish people, while simultaneously rejecting the rights, presence and history of the non-Jewish Other. If one considers the political Zionism, as we do here, through the lens of settler colonialism, where mechanisms of occupation and apartheid function in conjunction with (and are intensified by) one another, Shafir and Peled’s promise of a democratic multiculturalism surfacing under present conditions, present practices and present policies, most certainly must remain unfulfilled.

We can conclude that the notions of a shrinking citizenship, a ghettoized citizenship, or a hollow citizenship, along with formulations such as substantive versus incidental citizenship, actual versus potential citizens, and republican versus liberal citizenship all point to an internal and irreconcilable disconnect between de jure and de facto citizenship status in Israel, including their own inherent contradictions. Despite their differing readings of the dynamics of the Israeli incorporation regime, all of these scholars distinguish, in one form or the other, between what can be deemed citizens and citizens without citizenship – the latter of which holds that citizenship can only be said to genuinely exist when it generates rights along with a profession of formal status. Absence of benefits and representation accompanying formal citizenship in the face of the Other contradicts its objective. For this reason, a person holding citizenship of this kind is a citizen without citizenship. Such a status is what one may call one-way citizenship, where the motion of interaction and exchange is not reciprocated or mutual. Here the common good and interests of the regime not only fail to include Palestinian-Arab citizens, but are instead achieved at their expense. Important to point out, however, is the specific
reading of citizenship, its features and dynamics that is projected by the above formulations of Arab citizenship in Israel. Each of these scholarly accounts depict the citizenship provided to Arabs in Israel as lacking a symbolic feature, deficient in a range of provisions, or bereft of any genuine substance. In other words, there is *something missing* in the membership provided to Arab citizens so that characterizations of it as a complete or real citizenship cannot be sustained. The focus, therefore, is often on the rights, freedoms, resources, benefits, discourses and symbolisms that are lacking, absent, exclusionary or made inaccessible.

The *citizens without citizenship* paradigm is most impressively and extensively applied by Nadim Rouhana, and attorney and Palestinian citizen of Israel, Nimer Sultany. Their reading of Arabs as citizens without citizenship distinguishes between the dynamics of de jure and de facto membership in Israeli society and links the precarious situation of Arab citizenship to the rise of a ‘new Zionist hegemony’. For the authors, what is specifically ‘new’ about this discourse is that this hegemony involves an intensification of rooted ideological and political components of Zionism. This includes a reasserted emphasis on Israel’s exclusively Jewish foundations, an aggressive rejection of any contradiction between its simultaneous Jewish and democratic character, and an intensified security discourse, among other elements.\(^{30}\) Here formerly right-wing extremist politics have entered into more mainstream Israeli political spaces which have thereby adopted more antagonistic readings on the above topics. This new Zionist consensus, prevalent across the Israeli political spectrum, effectively reshapes the dynamics of Israeli citizenship so that any “meaningful citizenship” is denied to Arab citizens through government policies, public discourse, official symbols and legislation. Rouhana and Sultany explain that

... the goals of the policy shift are clear: to bolster the Jewish character of the state while reducing the status of the Arab citizens to *something less than citizenship*, but in ways not dramatic or abrupt enough to disrupt Israel’s democratic image abroad or its own comforting illusions about itself as ‘Jewish and democratic’ (Rouhana and Sultany, 2003, 19–20, emphasis added).

In other words, the intensification of the rooted ideological and political elements of Zionism – even in its most liberal form – shrinks and repeatedly reconfigures the margins and parameters of Palestinian existence, thereby rendering Israeli citizenship “a conditional privilege to be

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\(^{30}\) See Rouhana and Sultany (2003) and also Sultany (2003).
conferred by the state” (Rouhana and Sultany, 2003, 14). The development of this ‘new Zionist hegemony’ has therefore formed an understanding shared by both Palestinian-Arab and Jewish-Israelis that the citizenship of Arab citizens is “not real,” that it is a “citizenship emptied of real substance;” or alternatively “that the Arabs are in effect citizens without citizenship” (Rouhana and Sultany, 2003, 10, 19).

The citizens without citizenship paradigm has also been applied to feminist, gendered and critical race theorizing of Israeli citizenship to illuminate the particular levels of marginalization and exclusion affecting Palestinian women citizens of Israel. A recent scholarly contribution with such a reading is Women in Israel: Race, Gender and Citizenship (2011) by Arab feminist Nahla Abdo. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Palestinian women face discrimination on three distinct yet connected levels: as members of an underdeveloped minority, as women living in Israel, and as women in Palestinian society. Each of these dynamics works to compromise the social, political and economic welfare of Palestinian women, and in turn, reflects the kind of citizenship made available to this community. From an incisive anti-racist and anti-colonial feminist perspective, Abdo analyzes the disproportionate effects of Zionist mechanisms of economic disenfranchisement, legal and constitutional exclusion, geographic confinement, social inferiority, and political and civic under-representation on marginalized women citizens of Israel. From this, she develops a theory of gendered exclusion that is applicable to the situation of Palestinian women at large. Abdo writes:

What actually differentiates the status of Palestinian women in Israel from their counterparts in other parts of the Middle East is the ambiguous relationship they have with the type of state imposed on them as their own. Palestinian women citizens find themselves in a unique position where the self-defined Jewish state became the only force which accorded them partial and inferior citizenship status while simultaneously removing them from the nation-state (Abdo 2011, 39).

Again, and key to the citizens without citizenship paradigm, the notion that there is something lacking in the kind of citizenship offered to Palestinian women in Israel resurfaces. Abdo looks closely at the structural, institutional and operational dynamics of the state as part of a settler-colonial regime that grants partial and inferior citizenship to marginalized women both in the Palestinian community and within the Jewish, especially the Mizrahi, community. Abdo points out that

[t]he hierarchical state of citizenship that is expressed in the differential distribution of rights allocates more power, access and resources to Ashkenazi
men and women, enabling them to control and monopolize epistemological production, whereas the marginalized Other such as Palestinians and Mizrahi Jews tend to be relegated to an inferior position with much less access to power and resources, negatively affecting their production of knowledge and human capital development (Abdo 2011, 8–9).

Perhaps most important for our purposes here is that Abdo focuses her examination of the processes of exclusion, racialization and exploitation that simultaneously disenfranchise women in Israel through a critical feminist reading of citizenship. The relations of exclusion that produce and reproduce the inferior status and development of women in Israel, mainly Palestinian and Mizrahi Jewish, but to some extent also Ashkenazi Jewish women, are made possible and reinforced by the structure of Israeli citizenship. As such, an examination of the gendered and racialized boundaries of citizenship in Israel is, for Abdo, part and parcel of any genuine challenge to Israel’s state system and its policies and practices of exclusion.

Stateless Citizenship

Of course, we have not exhaustively examined all of the kinds of social science research on the Palestinians in Israel, nor have we covered all of the formulations of Palestinian citizenship put forward by scholars and theorists. Yet, from the above small sampling of the scholarship on Arab citizens, and specifically on the dynamics of their citizenship, we already have a range of impressive analytical and conceptual paradigms at hand that seek to outline the practical and theoretical effects of the Zionist fusing of ‘Jewish’ and ‘Israeli’ identity on Arab citizenship.

As shown above, the academic literature has largely focused on the question of what Palestinian citizenship entails: What are the levels and sublevels of citizenship in Israel? What kinds of rights and privileges are provided to Arabs by virtue of their citizenship? What is the relationship between Arab citizenship and the project of Judaization? Between Israeli citizenship and Jewish ethno-nationalism? Between a systematically stratified citizenship and Arab political, cultural, economic and social (under) development? By and large, the academic literature has tried to make analytical sense of what has led – through a multifaceted range of exclusionary legal, social and political developments since Israel’s founding – to a deepening internal and disparate disconnect between de jure and de facto citizenship for the Arabs in Israel. In doing so, it has described the Israeli citizenship of its Palestinian population as a one-way citizenship, hegemonic citizenship, illusory citizenship, shrinking citizenship, ghettoized
citizenship, *hollow* citizenship, *mere* citizenship, *something less than* citizenship, and a citizenship *emptied of real content*. Whether it is Bishara’s comparison between *incidental* and *substantive* citizenship, Zreik’s attention to *potential* and *actual* citizenship, Peled’s distinction between *liberal democratic* versus Jewish *ethnorepublican* citizenship, or Rouhana and Sultany’s concept of *citizens without citizenship*, scholarly developments in the research on Palestinians have largely tried to answer the question of *what* Arab citizenship means by pointing to an absence of benefits, protection, identification and representation accompanying formal Israeli citizenship.

On the question of *how* the space for Palestinian citizenship has *(d)evolved, (de)generated, and been (re)drawn*, the above literature has mainly focused, as most impressive social science research of recent vintage does, on structural, institutional, conceptual, ideological, sociological, legal, racial, historical, economic, and gendered tendencies within the Israeli incorporation regime. In other words, it is through these and other disciplinary lenses that the academic literature has approached the question of *how* this Palestinian citizenship came to embody its existing exclusive dynamics. As a result, these formulations of Arab citizenship, of its features and dynamics, depict it as *missing something*, as an *incomplete* or *partial* citizenship whose structure cannot be used to sustain a liberal democratic society. For Arabs, Israeli citizenship lacks a symbolic element, is deficient in a range of rights and privileges, and is wanting of any genuine content. Thus, in answering the question of *how* this deprived citizenship is generated and maintained, along with the way in which its relations of exclusion are created, the focus of these scholars has often been limited to the rights, freedoms, resources, benefits, and discourses that are lacking, exclusionary or made inaccessible.

This book does not contest these conclusions. On the contrary, it is upon the impressive and rich critical sociological scholarship on Palestinians in Israel that this book is based, and from which it seeks conceptualize an analytical framework for understanding *how* the dynamics of Palestinian citizenship have developed. However, the above scholarship has left out an important and elemental part of the answer to *how* Palestinian citizenship is maintained: the means, the actual medium, *through* which, *by* which, and *from* which marginalized Palestinian existence is maintained in Israel is citizenship itself. Key to the project revolving around the paradigm of *stateless citizenship* is both to build on and move beyond the discourse of *citizens without citizenship*. Arabs living in ‘Israel proper’ have citizen status with citizenship rights, however limited. This is not a controversial point to make, nor does it describe anything

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outside of the realities on the ground to which all of the above scholars point. To call it *without citizenship* is to blur the reality that the Arab lack of a genuine interaction with the Jewish state is a condition brought about precisely via their bestowal of citizenship. It is the very bestowal of citizenship, the *actual inclusion* within the Israeli incorporation regime, that produces the internal contradictions and paradoxes embedded in any Arab membership in the Israeli political and social system. Had the Arabs in Israel – the forgotten Palestinians of 1948 who remained in their homeland upon which the Jewish state was subsequently formed – not been granted Israeli citizenship, the discussion about and approach to the question of Israeli citizenship would have been very different. In such a situation, the relation of the Palestinian-Arab with the Israeli citizen regime would perhaps have been characterized as a strict exclusion, as something *outside and forever peripheral to the Israel regime*.

But as we already know, this is not the case. However truncated, the forgotten Palestinians have been granted Israeli citizenship and are, at least formally, part of the Israeli civic body. This is where the concept of *stateless citizenship* becomes a useful conceptual and analytical framework for understanding the various dynamics and levels of (in-)existence and (non-)representation to which Palestinians in Israel are subjected. Though the above scholars disagree on the particular kind of incorporation regime Israel has, differ in their analysis of mechanisms of power and control, and have contrasting understandings of the true aims of the Zionist project, they nevertheless agree that the movement of interaction between the State of Israel and its Palestinian citizenry is one of exclusion and non-reciprocation. This interaction results in a situation where the empowerment, expansion and common good of the Zionist regime not only fails to encompass Palestinian-Arab subjects, but is inevitably structurally and conceptually achieved to their disadvantage. However, what is left out of the discussion of *how* Palestinians are excluded from the Israeli political regime is that this movement or transition into a relation of exclusion is conducted through and generated from citizenship. Again, it is the provision of citizenship itself, the actual inclusion within the exclusionary Israeli citizenship regime that creates the inherent contradictions and paradoxes of Arab citizenship in a Jewish state. *In other words, it is through the granting of Israeli citizenship that Arabs are deemed stateless; it is through inclusion within the Israeli citizenship regime that they are excluded.* As such, it is the associated conceptual and political dynamics of this provision of citizenship that the paradigm of *stateless citizenship* seeks to emphasize and analytically deconstruct.