Introduction

In the last two decades, major changes have taken place in the livelihoods of Indonesian people. Some groups in society have experienced major improvements in living conditions, benefitting from steady economic growth of about 6.5% annually (Burke and Resosudarmo 2012:301), while other groups have missed the boat and face economic stagnation, social exclusion, political underrepresentation, dispossession of land and growing inequality (Alatas et al. 2012, Hall et al. 2011, McCarthy et al. 2012, Nooteboom 2008:43). This inequality is often based on class and ethnicity and includes spatial dimensions such as inequalities between cities and rural areas and between regions (Mishra et al. 2009, Suryadarma et al. 2006). A significant group of people who seem to have largely missed out in the new Indonesia are the Madurese¹ (Stenross 2011:27–29).

Although the national economy has almost doubled since 2000,² a large proportion of the Indonesian people still live in poverty and face daily difficulties in making ends meet. According to a 2012 World Bank Country Report: ‘Out of a population of 234 million, more than 32 million Indonesians currently live below the poverty line and approximately half of all households remain clustered around the national poverty line set at [a very low] 200,262 rupiahs per

1 Throughout this book, the term ‘Madurese’ simply refers to Madurese-speaking people. Among them, there are many differences regarding area of origin, self-identification and official representation. Madurese themselves make more refined qualifications regarding region of origin and language use, and their self-identification might differ from those imposed by outsiders. Madurese from Madura, for instance, do not always regard Madurese from mainland East Java as Madurese.

The Madurese originally came from the densely populated and resource-poor island of Madura. Since the 17th and 18th centuries Cribb 2000:33, 52, large groups of Madurese have moved to eastern parts of mainland Java (including Surabaya, Malang, Pasuruan, Sitobondo, Bondowoso and parts of Jember, Banyuwangi and Lumajang). See: Cribb 2000:52; Stenross 2011:24; Tennekens 1963:310. They also live on the Bawean and Kangean islands. Nowadays, they can be found in all the major cities of Indonesia and in rural West and Central Kalimantan Husson 1997a with major concentrations in Pontianak, Sambas and the large cities of East Kalimantan, Balikpapan and Samarinda.

2 The country’s gross national income per capita has steadily risen from \$2,200 in 2000 to \$3,720 in 2009, and it continues to grow at rates above 6 – 6.5% annually (www.worldbank.org country overview, accessed February 2013).

month (\$22).³ This poverty consists of 'old' patterns and 'new' forms of poverty.

Poverty in Indonesia is not as static as the World Bank and BPS (National Board of Statistics) figures of persistent poverty might suggest. Some of the poor have lived in abject poverty all their lives, others have only recently fallen into poverty, while others have managed to climb the social ladder. Key elements are social relations offering support and protection, but surprisingly little is known about the meaning and scope of these relations today (Hüsken and Koning 2006:8). The existence or absence of social ties and relationships of care, support and social security make a great difference to the ultimate consequence of poverty on people's lives. Today, poverty in Indonesia is diverse and dynamic and, consequently, social relations of support and protection that provide social security are worthy of a more detailed study.

In this book, this persistent and yet dynamic nature of poverty will be explored in detail. The book aims at understanding the unstable, vulnerable and dynamic livelihoods of poor, Madurese people living on the margins of a nation in flux. It is based on extensive fieldwork in a village in Bondowoso, East Java, and among migrants in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, between 1998 and 2010. To maximize contrast in the case studies, the first selected location is an upland village (Krajan⁴) in rural Bondowoso, East Java, and the second is the urban Samarinda in East Kalimantan (see Map 1). In East Java, the population of Krajan speak Madurese and moved there long ago, whereas the Madurese migrants in East Kalimantan are relatively recent arrivals. While livelihoods and social relationships are reasonably established in East Java, the livelihoods of Madurese migrants in East Kalimantan are both dynamic and precarious. The book will use these two case studies of Madurese livelihoods outside Madura as a window to study the universal theme of poverty, social security and risk in Indonesia. The cases contrast the relatively stable setting of a rural society in East Java with the vagaries of migrant life in the bustling city of Samarinda and, at the same time, they are linked through the study of one ethnic group.

Although the case studies in this book deal with people living in small areas, namely the village of Krajan, close to the Argopuro Mountain in East Java, and those people working and living in the brick kilns, stone quarries, plantations and slums of Samarinda, East Kalimantan, it develops an approach which aims

3 www.worldbank.org country overview Indonesia (accessed February 2013). Exact figures differ depending on the kind of poverty line used. In January 2014, Kompas speaks of 28,55 million people in Indonesia who live below the very low BPS poverty line (Kompas, Special Supplement Indonesia Satu, Wednesday January 8, 2014: A-D).

4 Most of the names of places and people in this study are pseudonyms.

MAP 1 *Map of Indonesia. Research locations*

SOURCE: CRIBB 2010, DIGITAL ATLAS.

to go beyond the study of small localities. The study aims to overcome static images of poverty and simplified distinctions between migrant survival strategies and village support systems in isolated areas. Before addressing the key themes of this book, we will first look at the Satrawi and Patik families in East Java and illustrate the dynamic nature of poverty in more detail.

Fallen from affluence: the Satrawi family

It is hard to estimate Satrawi's age. I guess he is around sixty. Work starts to become a burden now and income hard to gain, especially when times are tough. Mr (*Pak*) Satrawi married about thirty years ago to a daughter of a relatively rich family but, nowadays, not much of these riches are left. They had six children and adopted a seventh. Now, three of their children are married, one has died and three still live at home.

'Nowadays, my household owns only a tiny plot of infertile land, not enough to feed the family for more than two months' Satrawi tells me. 'In the past, however, we belonged to the better-off'. Faded remnants of woodcarvings above the doors and inside their house recall this more glorious past. Today, the house looks shabby and worn-out, windowpanes have been sold, and the roof is in urgent need of repair. 'Our match (*jodoh*) was not good, they say. I probably should not have married my wife', Satrawi sighs, 'but what else did we do wrong?'

In front of his house, and in the houses of neighbours and old friends, I was gradually told the full story of the Satrawi family. It is a long history of a family going from riches to rags through a combination of misfortune, sheer bad luck and perhaps an inability to read the changes in the social and economic fabric of Krajan society.

After marriage, they inherited many rice fields, dry fields and cattle – they were part of the top echelon of rural society. Many recall how, in the past, Satrawi was charitable towards poor people, gave alms to the needy and staged huge parties where everybody felt welcome, even his poor neighbours. Gradually, twenty years ago, decline set in in the house of Satrawi. The rituals (*selamatan*) performed to commemorate their parents' deaths were costly, cattle were sold and land had to be pawned. Their second daughter died a year after her marriage while giving birth, leaving a grandchild to be taken care of and more costly rituals to perform. Ami, their third daughter divorced and remarried three times within six years, costing a fortune. Additionally, she had to be treated in hospital for over a month and so cattle were sold and more land had to be pawned. They had to cover most of these costs themselves as gifts and support from relatives and neighbours were insufficient.

Notwithstanding dwindling resources, Mrs (*Bu*) Satrawi continued to spend money freely on 'expensive' food such as meat, chicken, noodles, coffee and sugar. She was known for her collection of *sarong* and 'her children looked like princesses', as people say in the neighbourhood. She kept up her lifestyle even when the family income was far too low to finance all her luxurious expenditures. The pawned rice fields had to be sold, and more land had to be pawned in order to obtain credit to keep up appearances and to meet the demands of the ritual exchange economy (organizing large *selamatan* and giving expensive presents). They still hoped to recover from their misfortune but, as their main resources such as cattle and land had gone, household income fell drastically making it impossible to repay debts and regain the pawned lands.

In 1997, at the onset of the economic crisis, their situation was dire. They had fallen into the lowest stratum of the village. During the economic crisis at the end of the millennium and the subsequent rapid inflation, Satrawi's cash income dropped yet further and he could no longer buy items such as fish, eggs, noodles, coffee, sugar or cigarette wrapping paper. He had to use the dried leaves of maize cobs to roll his own cigarettes. Every time I met him, he smiled happily, but his face looked older and more tired. If I asked him how he was, the answer was always the same: '*Biasa, biasa saja, kerja terus [...] Alhamdulillah saya masih makan*', ('The same, the same, we just work on [...] Thank God, I can still eat').

Nevertheless, Satrawi was still invited to weddings, praying groups and *selamatan*, often as a special guest or as a prayer leader (freeing him from the obligation to contribute financially). He is known as a good and respectable man, a good prayer leader, as one who never complains and is always ready to join mutual help and cooperative labour activities. He does not try to keep up appearances now that he is poor. By knowing his place, he is accepted by everyone. 'His wife is different. She still has difficulties in adjusting to lower living standards and rejects work such as helping with kitchen activities in the houses of rich people', *Bu Maryami*, a neighbour, commented. 'She never learnt to work. Still today, she cannot do dirty work and instead calls her daughter to do it. *Bu Satrawi* is still so haughty. People here do not want to help her'.

Although the cash income of the household decreased substantially and prices tripled in the course of the crisis years, Satrawi's family did not slide much further down. Their own resources were completely used up, but friends and neighbouring landowners continued to offer work regularly. By working their fields, Satrawi earned some stable income in kind (rice and maize). They also helped his family out with some small loans,

free meals and invitations to religious parties and *selamatan* where food is served and can be taken home. Also, Satrawi's fourth son, Saleh, married into a richer family who owned rice fields and were also active in house construction. 'I hope Saleh will be able to support himself, and maybe us, in the future', Satrawi said.

Upwardly mobile: Patik

The story of one of Satrawi's neighbours, the Patik family, forms quite a contrast. The house of Pak Patik is made from solid bricks and stands on a hill a hundred metres above the crowded and dirty neighbourhood where Satrawi lives. While the family of Satrawi was falling from relative wealth to poverty over the course of a dozen years, in the same period the Patik family moved from rags to riches. Once, Patik and his wife worked for the Satrawi family, but now Satrawi works for the Patik family.

Pak Patik, a cattle trader, is a self-made man, and he is proud of this. He likes to wear good shirts and jeans, and often wraps an expensive Madurese sarong over his shoulders, making his tall figure even more imposing. When Patik enters a house, he enters slowly and with dignity. He says he is not even afraid of the village head, and that one day he will run for village head himself. However, when sitting in the same room as Bagenda, the village head, he is noticeably silent. Other villagers all agree that the story of Patik is a fine one, and that he is very clever, perhaps too clever, in accumulating wealth.

In the past, he was one of the former friends and frequent visitors to Satrawi's *selematan* and, just after his marriage, he worked as a poor labourer in Satrawi's fields. Nowadays, as a rich man, he seems to have forgotten the former generosity of the Satrawi family. Patik's children played in Satrawi's house and were given sweets and snacks, but now they order him around when working in the fields and only pay him a little respect because of his age. However, their father is said to be worse. 'Patik has no heart', villagers say. Even if he has ready money in his pocket, he does not lend money to less fortunate villagers such as Satrawi. 'Those people don't know how to deal with money', Patik says, 'I will not give them money, because they only know how to spend it. They should take better care of their own money'. Saleh, the son of Satrawi, put it differently: 'If I ask for help or money, there is none to be had they say, but, if I am in need and want to sell a cow, or if I need to pawn a piece of land, definitely there is money'. Indeed, half of the five hectares of land that Patik has acquired over the last fifteen years was once the property of *pak* Satrawi, his former patron and protector who is now a labourer on his own land.

In Patik's perception, he acquired his wealth on his own merits. At least that is what he likes his visitors to believe. However, people say that, in fact, it was his wife who did most of the work in managing the lands, controlling the household budget and building up a large network of labourers through exchanging gifts with neighbours and friends in the village. She comes from a relatively well-off family but only inherited a small area of rice field because her father used almost all of his land, cattle and money to finance his pilgrimage to Mecca. According to neighbours, she used to work terribly hard, and for years did not ask for anything for herself being determined to regain the 'lost' family property. She became famous for saying: 'Don't spend, save the money to buy a calf first'. Although thrifty, neighbours generally respect her, and all mention her kindness. She secretly offers free meals to poor children from the neighbourhood on a regular basis and is willing to provide small incidental loans (in the form of cash, rice or maize) to the wives of their labourers. Besides this, labourers praise the food she serves for being tasty. 'There you get real coffee, and plenty of sugar in it', they say, 'she is not like her husband, who is even too greedy to buy cigarettes for his workers'. Without her, probably no-one would have been willing to work for Patik and so she helped him build his wealth.

In Patik's view, he, and he alone, can take care of their family wealth, and he even tries to check all his wife's expenditure. Others are not entitled to his support 'because nobody has helped me in the past'. He once said, 'Why should I help someone who should be able to take care of themselves?' Only if people are struck by disaster is he willing to support them, he says. 'He doesn't notice common people. In the past he was poorer than I am, but now he only thinks about money, not about us'. Patik says himself that he doesn't want to have too many social relations. 'Having too many friends is an expensive business'.

What went wrong with the Satrawi family? Was it simply bad luck with the family hit by a series of misfortunes? Clearly, they made poor choices in maintaining a high level of consumption and by failing to accumulate as household resources dwindled. They also clung too long to their previous elite status and sold productive assets such as land and cattle to maintain this status. They kept on investing in social relations through expensive rituals, helping out and gift giving even when they were impoverished. Maybe they backed the wrong horse by clinging on too long to old village values of sharing and mutual help and expected more help in return when times got tough. When confronted

with a series of misfortunes and becoming impoverished, little came back from all the past investments.

Were all the investments in social relationships unsuccessful? During and after the crisis, they clutched to their last straw: the once large network of neighbours and friends. Where other villagers and returning migrants had difficulties in finding work, they remained part of a social network which offered access to work, small loans and irregular distribution of food. Slowly, with help from children and relatives, the family has recovered to the level of 'poor but decent' in recent years. Until today, however, they have not regained their former lands.

For the Patik family, social relations are also important, but perceived as 'expensive'. For them, social obligations are a barrier to social mobility, but also needed to mobilize labour. They strategically juggle between opportunities and obligations. While the thriftiness of Patik is resented, his wife is praised for being good, and she maintains good relations so as to be able to mobilize loyal workers. The case of the Patik family also shows that social relations might be less relevant for social climbers, as their maintenance might hamper accumulation, while they do not protect against falling into poverty. Here, the double meaning of social relationships comes to the fore; they can be useful and protecting, as well as exploitative and a means to control people. Social relations have multiple meanings for different people in different periods of time.

These examples show that the lives and living conditions of poor people are not stable, should not be taken for granted and can change quickly. Poverty and affluence are not fixed categories, and neither are friendships and other social ties. Wealth can diminish over time, and friends and relatives can disappear or turn out to be unreliable partners. Sometimes minor events or misfortunes are sufficient to trigger the downfall of a family while others receive support and are able to cope with the difficulties. Conversely, with some luck, hard work and favourable conditions, some Madurese manage to rise above others and establish a stronger livelihood or better support relationships. How should one capture these differences among socioeconomic classes, events and trajectories?

Key Themes of the Book

The examples also show that people seldom bring about major changes in their livelihoods on their own. Households consist of men, women, children and often elderly parents. Even if these members have conflicting interests,

they eat together, work together, pool resources and care, and support one another. As a household, and sometimes as individuals, members exchange gifts, cooperate or compete, and claim or provide support to other households and individuals in times of need. Establishing and maintaining good relationships with others is of crucial importance in enhancing and maintaining a living but, at the same time, others can also be a major source of insecurity. It is precisely the ways in which poor people handle insecurities, both alone and together, and the dilemmas associated with exchange and support that form the core of this study.

This book thus has a larger story to tell. It is about the difficulties that people face in making a living, and about the ways in which they try to safeguard their livelihoods when times get hard. More than anything, it sets out to understand the everyday responses of people when they are confronted with misfortunes, hazards and major and minor crises in their lives. It describes the multiple ways in which people try to secure their livelihoods over time, directly through their own efforts or indirectly through support from others. Such actions vary greatly between people of different socioeconomic backgrounds, occupations, age and gender. Central to this book is the idea that people follow diverse trajectories guided by individual and cultural preferences that are shaped within structural boundaries, which I call styles. It offers an alternative to poverty studies focussed primarily on incomes and assets as well as to structural approaches which emphasise structural inequalities and the adverse consequences of capitalism and globalisation. This book searches for new conceptual ways to deal with diversity and agency, and aims to integrate both the strategic and structural dimensions of making a living and securing support at a daily basis. How should one capture these differences between socioeconomic classes, events and trajectories, and how can we develop a dynamic understanding of livelihood insecurity and poverty in Indonesia?

Many of the people who are described in this book can be called poor – living below or close to the official Indonesian poverty line – and are living in a more-or-less continuous state of insecurity. Poor people however do not stand alone, but search out and receive – directly or indirectly – support from others. Moreover, they are not always ‘frozen’ below or close to the poverty line since poorer and richer periods alternate as a result of seasonal fluctuations in income, lifecycles and alternating periods of misfortune and relative prosperity. Clearly, the poor I describe are not living in isolation, but need and use other individuals and institutions to secure their living, to access resources, to gather wealth and status and to provide support in times of need.

The book aims to find the middle road between studies focussing on the agency, capability and opportunities of the poor and critical approaches which

emphasise structural inequality, adverse incorporations into the capitalist system and the adverse effects of structural power differences.⁵ First, it highlights the material basis of poverty by studying the resource base and livelihoods of peasants and migrants and the diversity found within the livelihoods and the repertoires of mutual help and social assistance. Second, it describes the different combinations people make in linking their livelihoods to mutual relationships of support, social security arrangements and institutions of mutual help to show opportunities for social protection and room to manoeuvre for poor people living under adverse conditions. And third, I analyse the intricate interplay of structure and agency, individual survival and social protection. This approach differs from conventional approaches that insufficiently take into account the capabilities and agency of poor people living under conditions of coercion and which are often one-sided in the emphasis on social exclusion and vulnerability. This book uncovers patterns and trajectories in the ways people try to obtain and maintain this access both individually and collectively within constraining and enabling structures. Before we study these issues in detail, key concepts of livelihood, social security, risk and insecurity will be discussed.

Livelihood

The livelihood approach, developed by DFID (the British Department for International Development) and still influential among human geographers, rural sociologists and development economists, takes the above-described dynamics of poverty into account (Bebington 1999, Chambers and Conway 1992, Scoones 2009:171).⁶ The livelihood framework offers a good way to start to capture poverty as multidimensional. Moreover, it acknowledges the strategic and creative choices people make in dealing with poverty. Livelihood studies not only focus on the ownership of assets and structural constraints in society, but also on the actual and potential ways to access resources. As Frank Ellis put

5 Such as for instance Hall et. al. (2011), Tania Murray Li (2007, 2014).

6 Livelihood studies and intervention programmes have never been very popular within Indonesian policy circles. This might have to do with the participatory nature of most livelihood programmes – participatory development planning is not a strong point in Indonesian policy – or with the fact that applying a livelihood approach implies recognition of the capabilities and capacities of local people – a feature which has often been ignored. The Indonesian state-led anti-poverty programmes can be better characterised as welfare policies. Hüsken and Koning (2006:4).

it: 'a livelihood comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household' (Ellis 2000:10).⁷ A livelihood thus includes assets, entitlements, individual characteristics, relationships and activities.

A livelihood is not something temporal, but embedded in social, economic and political relationships which stretch over time. Chambers and Conway (1992: 8) define, in their classic conceptualization, a sustainable livelihood as follows: 'a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with, and recover from, stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base'.

Over the years, livelihood studies have received criticism for generally failing to integrate regional, global-local and state-power connections. Most livelihood studies have been unable to analyse the social, structural and cultural embeddedness of action (Scoones 2009:174). In livelihood studies, being somewhat preoccupied by people's and households' strategies, there is an inherent risk of too narrow a focus on the actions and strategies of a group of poor people. One of the consequences of adopting a livelihood perspective is that a fairly positive image of poverty is created. In its focus on capabilities, it fits well with recent development approaches that put 'rational' individuals and their actions to the fore. This explains its appeal in neoliberal policies, and partly explains its popularity.

A livelihood perspective can be blind to the structural causes of poverty, such as unequal power relationships and unequal access to resources. It also fails to explain why some poor people are better able to climb out of poverty than others, and why some are better protected against shocks and stresses than others. This can be addressed by paying close attention to the notion of embeddedness and the social relationships which offer potential access to resources and social assistance in times of need. It is helpful to add a social security perspective to livelihood studies that takes power differences and structural inequalities into account.

7 See also on livelihood: Akram-Lodhi and Borras 2007; Bebington 1999; De Haan and Zoomers 2005; Farrington, Carney, Ashley and Turton 1999; Kaag, Brons, De Bruijn, De Haan, Nootboom, Van Berkel, Van Dijk and Zoomers 2004; Moser and Norton 2001; Scoones and Wolmer 2003.

Social Security

A central aspect for poor people confronted with misfortune is access to social security. This security can be either provided by the state or locally organized. In Indonesia, the state has been relatively weak in providing social welfare to its people, but discussions and attempts to establish systems of social welfare, such as national health insurance, labour benefits and anti-poverty schemes, regularly surface. Some nationwide schemes have been established, but these are far from effective. Social welfare remains ad hoc and selective in its concentration on disasters and poverty alleviation programmes, and sensitive to political priorities during election times. Over the past three decades, pension schemes, social protection programmes and health insurance have become available to greater numbers of the Indonesian population including civil servants, military personnel and private sector actors rich enough to buy private social security bonds. Within the last decade, increasingly, the poor are also reached through several government programmes. These include subsidized rice (Raskin), free health cards (Jamkesmas), cash transfers for poor students (BSM), conditional cash transfers (PKH) and a temporary unconditional cash transfer (BLT) (WorldBank 2012b:12). However, it has been shown that at best, only half of the targeted people in extreme poverty have been reached by 'at least one of these programmes' (WorldBank 2012b:47). Overall, full coverage is still a long way off. Moreover, for the majority of the Indonesian population, the government tends to add to their insecurity rather than to their security through the risk of eviction, legal insecurity and direct or indirect processes of dispossession (Aspinall and van Klinken 2011, Collins 2007, Ford and Lyons 2006, Hall et al. 2011, Hüsken and Koning 2006, Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann 1998, Wilson 2011).

This does not mean that the people studied here do not do anything to organize their own welfare. On the contrary, they do so constantly, and they often do this in a social way by involving relatives, neighbours and friends, and also, as many studies show, political leaders (Collins 2007, Hüsken and Koning 2006, Kreager and Schröder-Butterfill 2005, Marcus and Asmorowati 2006, Suryahadi and Sumarto 2003, Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1994). Often this does not concern general social security but the security of life, health, a social position and access to resources. In Chapter 4, some key mechanisms in this respect will be evaluated.

Since the 1988 and 1994 classic studies of Von Benda-Beckmann et al. on insecurity and locally organized social security, the study of local forms of welfare provision and social security has increased. This approach investigates welfare organized by people themselves, or provided by village, ethnic or

religious institutions, NGOs and charity organizations. These local forms of support are not embedded in state regulations and legislation, are generally not formalized in explicit rules and regulations, are context-specific, are restricted to small areas and are mainly organized by local people. This will be explained in more detail below.

Throughout the book, when I refer to social security I am including self-organized or locally organized social security. As such, by 'social security' I am referring to all the ways in which individual people, households and communities protect their livelihoods in a social way and are protected socially against the shocks and stresses that threaten its continuity and stability. This includes both established institutions, norms and structures of mutual help as well as individual strategies to obtain support from others such as the everyday tactics for improvement and protection of individual people. Adopting such a definition results in this book focusing primarily on non-state, people's and locally-organized forms of social security,⁸ often referred to using terms such as 'informal', or 'traditional', social security.⁹

Whereas strategies for survival, access and the maintenance of access (by risk avoidance, diversification and insurance) are central in livelihood studies, social security studies are much more oriented towards support, protection, collectives and welfare provisions, and consider the embeddedness and vulnerability of livelihoods. Naturally, the focus tends to be on national schemes, coverage, policies and legislation. However, a social security approach that

8 In the late 1980s and 1990s, the study of local forms of social security gained momentum, including studies by: Ahmad, Dreze and Hills 1991; Biezeveld 2002; De Bruijn and Van Dijk 1994; Hirtz 1995; Leliveld 1994; Platteau 1991; Van Ginneken 1999; Von Benda-Beckmann, Von Benda-Beckmann, Casino, Hirtz, Woodman and Zacher 1988; Von Benda-Beckmann, Von Benda-Beckmann and Marks 1994.

9 The use of terms such as traditional, indigenous or informal social security is problematic due to misleading connotations and suggestions of false dichotomies. For a discussion on these dichotomies, such as formal – informal and traditional – modern, see: Hüsken and Koning 2006; Midgley 1994; Von Benda-Beckmann 1990, Von Benda-Beckmann, Casino, Hirtz, Woodman and Zacher 1988; Von Benda-Beckmann, Von Benda-Beckmann and Marks 1994. If a distinction needs to be made between state-organised social security and other forms of social security, I prefer the term local social security for the latter to stress its heterogeneity and embeddedness in local communities, the specific socioeconomic landscapes and the cultural repertoires. This does not mean that the state is absent in those communities but that old and new forms of social security are intermingled and that state programmes are modified and negotiated at the local level. Different forms of social security can all be relevant for people at the same time. Throughout this book, when I speak of social security I refer to all forms of local as well as state-organised social security.

claims to take the priorities and considerations of local people into account cannot do without having an understanding of the strategies of individuals and households and an emphasis on their ways of accessing resources.

In this book, I combine the study of poor livelihoods with a social security perspective. Such a perspective builds upon and augments previous livelihood studies by combining two perspectives: attention to actors' and households' strategies within the enabling and constraining landscape of social security opportunities, inequalities and limitations, and the role of social relations. I define livelihood security as follows: livelihood security covers the – often local – provision of care, support and welfare to individuals and groups through social and/or individual means. This provision can be achieved either by individual, social and collective strategies, or by arrangements and institutions that offer access to care, insurance and general wellbeing to individuals, households and specific categories of people. Both strategies for achieving social security, and the mechanisms that provide support, are often intermingled and simultaneous, and therefore inseparable. Moreover, they are diverse and not uniform for all people.

A secure livelihood can thus be achieved in various ways, differently organized for different people, and subject to changes over time. It includes institutional and arranged social protection against shocks and stresses that occur when conditions change and major contingencies arise. It addresses unequal access and changing strategies and the networks of support to be mobilized. If people or households are confronted with shocks and stresses, then how many ways they have to access support matters, rather than their wealth or poverty as such. Although all layers of society are confronted with occasional and periodic uncertainties, it is particularly the poorer sections that face the greatest problems when fate hits them. To thoroughly analyse the lives of poor people on the margins of Indonesian society, livelihood and social security studies need to be integrated.

The core question is what underpins local forms of social security, and are they, or have they ever been, able to protect people in times of need? Moreover, what happens when networks stretch over place and time? In any society, the crux of social security boils down to a few basic questions for the people involved: how can they get direct or indirect access to resources to secure basic needs, how can they themselves directly or indirectly protect, secure and maintain this access (and their livelihood in general) and through what mechanisms and processes are people excluded from benefit of access to resources. Such questions are relational since survival necessarily involves other people (with the possible exception of Robinson Crusoe, but even he had a Friday). They are also stretched over time through relationships of kinship, shared

descent, language and friendship. These networks consist of partners, household members, relatives, the neighbourhood, the community, the state and state bodies, and possibly larger social groups or associations, all of whom can offer and/or expect to receive care. While they may be supportive and protective, they may also demand support, be exploitative or even threaten survival.

Poverty and Economic Growth in Indonesia

The impressive economic growth of Indonesia during recent decades has enabled many rural people to find pathways out of poverty. Nevertheless, very large numbers remain poor and vulnerable. According to the World Bank, about 32 million people live below the national poverty line in Indonesia and almost half of all households remain highly vulnerable (2012a:6). Seventy per cent of these poor live in rural areas.¹⁰ The basis for these developments was laid during the New Order years. Indonesian development during the New Order, and its aftermath, contained several key aspects: rural development, poverty eradication and social welfare development through healthcare and education, modernization, infrastructural development and industrial policy.

In the mid-1990s, it was believed that Indonesia would become one of the economic 'miracles' in Asia, able to sustain high growth levels and be successful in eradicating poverty. In 1996, for instance, the Australian economist Hal Hill wrote an optimistic book on the modernization and development of the Indonesian economy: 'The Indonesian Economy since 1966: Asia's Emerging Giant'. His analysis of the Indonesian economy included a core section on agricultural developments in which he states that the New Order (*Orde Baru*) regime had been successful in creating rural development and improving rural people's livelihoods. However, this growth was not seen by all and during the same period inequality grew.

Ironically, a year after the publication of this book, Indonesia faced a severe economic crisis, and economic development slowed for many years.

10 According to the World Bank 2012 report on Protecting Poor and Vulnerable Households in Indonesia: 'Declining poverty, however, partially masks a high degree of vulnerability: much of Indonesia's population is clustered just above the 2011 poverty line of Rp 233,000 per month (about US\$27 at 2011 nominal exchange rates). Around 24% of Indonesians live below the official near-poor line of 1.2 times the poverty line while 38% of the population lives below 1.5 times the poverty line and is almost equally vulnerable. Even relatively small shocks to these vulnerable households can be enough to push them into poverty' World Bank (2012a:7). Moreover, inequalities are rising. See also the special edition added to Kompas January 8 2014 for a recent overview of Indonesian poverty statistics.

Notwithstanding this setback in Indonesia's economic development in the late 1990s, impressive changes have taken place on the economic, social, cultural and demographic levels in recent decades. For example, population growth has decreased, education and basic healthcare have improved, economic growth has increased and large numbers of the rural population have migrated to the large cities. These, and other, developments have led to higher life expectancy, widespread commercialization, industrialization and globalization.

Economic development during the New Order regime also brought about a gradual shift of focus to the urban areas, and the urban problems of unemployment and poverty. The New Order government's attention to the rural areas materialized in a series of rural development programmes, such as the Green Revolution programme,¹¹ education for all, the 'Colt Revolution',¹² road construction projects, electrification and the development of small-scale industries. Between 1975 and 1997, the living conditions in rural areas of Indonesia in general improved significantly and mobility became possible. Moreover, after this period, welfare support by the state increased, as did access to higher education. At the same time, in most areas, the pressure on rural resources also continued to increase, and the negative consequences of decreasing fertility and the migration of many (often landless) villagers to the cities in search of work became apparent. New Order policies created rapid agricultural development and increased rural incomes, but they also put a strain on employment. While agricultural production increased, inequality grew, and employment opportunities for landless villagers decreased so rapidly that growing numbers of young villagers left to work in the cities.¹³ This process has only increased in recent years, with smallholders having experienced dispossession of their lands and reduced access to arable land (Hall et al. 2011). As a result, domestic migration, both rural to urban and rural to rural, has massively increased. Once people arrive in the cities or in settlement areas, success is far from guaranteed. There are simply too few jobs being created in the new and growing economic sectors (Li 2009:78), and land has become increasingly difficult to get. Transnational migration to Malaysia or to the Gulf States (mostly women to the latter) is much more profitable. However, for many poor families, these

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- 11 Many studies exist on the social and economic consequences of the Green Revolution: Collier 1981; Hart, Turton and White 1989; Hüskens 1988; Hüskens 1989; Hüskens 1988; Hüskens 1999; Hüskens and Kemp 1992; Hüskens and White 1989; Wiradi 1984.
 - 12 The 'Colt' was a popular motorized vehicle and its name became synonymous with the improvement of roads and infrastructure which boosted mobility and migration opportunities.
 - 13 See: Berman 2000; Edmunson 1994; Hart, Turton and White 1989; White 2000; White and Wiradi 1989.

better labour opportunities are beyond reach or fail to yield the expected returns (De Regt and Moors 2008). Migration is also not free from risks, and migrants sometimes end up in countries or circumstances which were not foreseen (Ford and Lyons 2011, Ford and Lyons 2007).¹⁴

The situations outlined above show that, in the middle and longer terms, the quest to create and maintain secure livelihoods will remain important for large numbers of Indonesians and therefore deserves continuing attention. Social protection is needed, both to address the vulnerability of the poor (through social assistance) and the risk of becoming poor (through social insurance). In Indonesia, various factors hamper state responses, and there remain large holes in the state-provided social safety nets (Alatas et al. 2012, WorldBank 2012b). Problems include widespread under-delivery of assistance and inadequate targeting of poor populations. Social protection efforts are also fragmented across a range of different agencies with resulting coordination and integration problems (World Bank 2012).¹⁵ Since blanket coverage is not achieved, the poor in Indonesia need to organize their own social security.

All of these abovementioned processes and welfare incentives have touched upon and changed Madurese lives and have helped many Madurese in rural areas to survive and to maintain some basic level of living. With rural livelihoods being transformed in recent decades, smallholders must intensify their own production and diversify livelihoods, or move out of farming altogether. In the absence of supporting rural policies for such transitions, the risk of poverty and vulnerability follow and may create significant pockets of disadvantaged rural households (McCarthy et al. 2012). Madurese are often among those to be found in these 'pockets'.

Risk

Over the last two decades, the group of people under study here, the Madurese, seem gradually to have lost what seemed a relatively favourable, or at least a

14 For instance, a number of Indonesian citizens are held in (mainly Saudi Arabian) prisons without trial or contact with their families or compatriots Nootboom and Bakker (2013).

15 These facts are not widely acknowledged among government officials. Romantic images of homogeneous villages prevail at the government level. This is not only the heritage of the major scholars who have studied Java, but also the heritage of political and cultural norms in society. These romantic ideas about the village where life is good and harmonious, the place where the good life is, are to be found in many countries in Southeast Asia Barlocco (2010).

relatively well protected, position in society. It is not that they have been impoverished but more that other groups in society are doing better – at least when it comes to education, income, health and political participation. Except for some individuals who have been able to establish thriving businesses or to achieve good education, the majority of the Madurese have remained in sectors of the economy which have not experienced much economic growth, or they have remained where they were a generation ago.

During the Suharto years, rural, Islamic and Java-based sections of the population were relatively privileged. The rural Javanese and Madurese benefitted directly from state programmes of rural investment, including in rural infrastructure, rural anti-poverty programmes, education and community development programmes, and indirectly through transmigration¹⁶ schemes and systematic attempts to create national citizens through the curtailment of local ethnic groups through forced migration and resettlement as part of Suharto's territorial policies (Bertrand 2004:58, Peluso 2006, Peluso and Harwell 2001:84,105). However, most Madurese did not migrate to the cities, but migrated to outer islands or to Malaysia to work as rural or unskilled labourers. This is not without risk as the following story of the Holik family shows.

Tied up in debts: Holik

While the members of the Satrawi and Patik families have stayed in rural East Java, many young families moved away in search of greener pastures. Kalimantan is one of the main destinations for poor, unskilled migrants from Madura and East Java. Among them was the Holik family who, in early 2004, suddenly decided to accept a cash offer from one of the *mandor* (recruiters, foremen) who roamed the villages in search of cheap labourers to work in the oil palm plantations of Kalimantan, in stone quarries and in brickmaking kilns. In return for a cash sum of Rp 1.5 million (125 Euro), which they used to pay off their long standing debt from their marriage, they followed the recruiter to the outskirts of Samarinda, East Kalimantan, to work in a brick kiln owned by a Madurese from rural Bangkalan, Madura. 'I had heard that work in the plantations was hot and heavy. So I thought that working in a brick kiln would be easier', Holik told me. He also hoped to be able to send money home to repay his father's debts who pawned his cattle and the family land to cover debts

16 Organised schemes to transport poor, landless villagers from Java and Bali to sparsely populated or empty areas in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. For a historical overview and problems see: Elmhirst 1999; Evers and Gerke 1992; Harjono 1988.

from unsuccessful tobacco trading. 'The work in the kiln would enable us to stay together as a family', Holik said, 'I talked with my wife, and within two hours we decided to go'.

After arrival, the family soon found out they had been cheated. 'The gift of Rp 1.5 million turned out to be a loan and was added to the costs of the trip to Kalimantan (Rp 2 million), the *mandor's* premium of Rp 1 million and the living costs incurred during the first months after arrival. We did not know how to make bricks fast enough and our debts only increased during the first months'. The Holik family, unable to read nor write, did not receive any salary or any information about their total debts. They worked day and night to pay off their debt to the owner of the brick kiln. Daily necessities such as rice, cooking oil, soap, tea and cigarettes were provided by the kiln owner, but again added to the debt. According to the kiln owner, the debt was still not paid off at the end of 2004.

I regularly visited them at their brick kiln. After a year, and still deep in debt, they had been unable to send back money to their parents in East Java. Increasingly, they felt unhappy and mistreated, and thought about ways to get away and return to East Java. 'Better poor without land in Bondowoso, than labouring day and night for money which we cannot hold'. The kiln owner forced them to work faster and faster and became angry when they asked for payment. He told them time after time that they were still indebted. 'I cannot check it', said Holik, 'I do not keep any records of expenses and I only know the number of bricks we've made in a week. I think he is cheating us and I want to go home'. In 2005, they finally received Rp 1 million as a loan, to buy clothes and necessities for the festivities of *Idhul Fitri*. The day after, I received a text message in the middle of the night, that they were heading to the harbour to catch the first ship home. They had decided to walk away and return to their village, after one and a half years of labouring in Kalimantan and with no money to take home.

Many studies on social security in rural societies deal with a range of institutions and mechanisms for support and assistance that exist to protect villagers from the consequences of adversities. Poor people are assumed to be risk averse and to optimize security, and rarely is it mentioned that social relations can also be exploitative. Recently, the focus has shifted to risk and resilience studies (Hilhorst and Bankhoff 2004) with livelihoods seen as at risk (Blaikie et al. 1994). Implicitly, most of these studies appear to start from the assumption that people prefer security above insecurity, and that social relationships and village institutions are oriented towards enhancing some form of social

security rather than disrupting it. In this book, I intend to draw a more nuanced picture by taking a closer look at Madurese who are involved in ambiguous practices, which are either risk reducing or risk increasing, and thus endangering as much as enhancing livelihood security. Some even explicitly increase risk-taking practices as described in Chapter 5.

The Holik story above shows that migration can be very risky, although in this instance they were unaware of the risks. In other cases, poor people deliberately take risks, as in the example of Wahyudi, an uncle of Holik, who went to Kalimantan six months later.

In Bondowoso, Wahyudi is known as a daredevil, drinker, gang leader and gambler. After running into trouble due to an affair with a married woman and being threatened with murder (*carok*), he ran off to Kalimantan to work in one of the stone quarries at Lempake, northeast of Samarinda. Soon, once he found out how difficult the work was and how hard it was to earn money, he started organizing night-time gambling and drinking parties at the market. He made good money with this but, at one of these parties, a fight broke out between two competing gangs. The police came and Wahyudi was beaten up and imprisoned. I was not able to visit him there and after his claimed release from prison nobody could tell me where he went. According to one informant, he had died from pneumonia and general weakness.

Risk, vulnerability and security have become an important and emerging field of study. Although a highly interdisciplinary field, three basic schools or traditions can be distinguished in risk and disaster studies: a psychological school, looking into the different perceptions and decisions people make during disasters, and two that address livelihood risks – one focussed on the material conditions which explain vulnerability, and one that integrates social and cultural elements to understand risk. The first of these three is more focussed on individual characteristics and psychological coping strategies, while the second looks at the circumstances, conditions and physical differences that can be mapped and is a field largely dominated by geographers. Both tend to be technocratic, focus on resilience, homogenise the poor, have difficulties in capturing the diversity in responses to risks and disasters, are largely insensitive to deliberate risk taking and are generally blind to the reasons why people make different choices. The third tradition aims to understand the social, cultural and political embeddedness of risk. It is this third debate to which this book contributes.

Rural development economists generally point to the fact that poor farmers adopt a diversified portfolio of income-earning activities, accepting lower

returns for the benefit of avoiding and spreading risks. Such assumptions on the nature of poor people's behaviour are also prevalent and influential in anthropology.¹⁷ The risk aversion assumption is widespread in development theory, and seems to be even more dominant than the assumption that farmers are profit maximizing. Ellis (2000: 61) for instance notes that: 'The amelioration of risk helps to explain much observed livelihood behaviour in rural areas of developing countries, including the economic strategies of occupational diversification and migration, and supporting social strategies of maintaining an extensive network of kinship ties'.

The assumption that peasants in Southeast Asia are risk-averse has been criticized from several angles, but still retains a powerful hold among policy-makers. Poor people, and not only peasants, are assumed to be able to take risks only after 'liberalization', the removal of certain barriers and restrictions such as monopolies, cultural barriers, poverty and political repression. Such studies usually address risk-taking related to agriculture, innovation and income activities. They often blame the structure of a society for preventing poor people from taking risks, and suggest that risk-taking is only possible if there is a basis of security, a well-prepared subsistence floor and a financial infrastructure accessible to all villagers. This fits neatly in neoliberal ideas which produce policies to enable people to engage in risks (Rankin 2001, Shakya and Rankin 2008). In practice, these conditions seldom exist and therefore such an understanding of risk-taking means that, in such societies, only the rich will be able to take risks. These assumptions only partly hold. Often, insufficient attention is given to those cultural and normative decisions of people which are not directly related to farming or work but do affect their occupational strategies and the risks taken in other parts of life, such as in gambling, spontaneous migration and partaking in illegal activities.

Some relevant examples of risk-taking by poor people can be found in older studies of farmers who were engaged in commercial vegetable farming in the Philippines and Indonesia. Lewis (1992) described the excessive ecological and financial risk-taking by Philippine mountain peasants in vegetable production in Northern Luzon. 'Buguias residents became professional risk-takers; their agricultural endeavor, as they perceive it, is now one of continual gambling [betting]' (Lewis 1992:131). He distinguishes various production strategies by

17 One example is the so-called moral economy approach Scott (1976) although this has been criticized from a rational actor perspective Popkin (1979), leading to what is generally known as the Scott-Popkin debate. For a description of this debate, see among others: Feeny 1983; Keyes 1983; Platteau 1991.

peasants, some of whom were opposed to the more conservative strategies. 'Other gardeners deliberately choose risk, gambling [betting] on the chance of a windfall. Precarious strategies include planting a crop during its season of maximum hazards, or sowing a dry field at the first rain, in hope that more will soon follow' (Lewis 1992:136). These farmers indeed seem to prefer risk to security: '[...] the Bugias farmers have never shied away from the risks so entailed. Indeed, many have welcomed them, pinning their hopes not so much on steady income, as on a jackpot. Their belief that the flow of luck is largely controllable promotes this attitude; the new economic realities only affirm traditional ideology on this score'. (Lewis 1992:138). Hefner (1990) described similar practices in Indonesia, and their social, cultural and political embeddedness in vegetable production in Tengger in East Java. Bankoff showed in his studies in the Philippines how risk perceptions are often culturally informed (Bankoff 2009). The majority of risk studies are dominated by structural approaches to risk, by vulnerability mapping and by cultural perceptions (Wisner et al. 2012), and there is a need for a detailed, well-informed inquiry into the diversity of individual and collective reasons for engaging in risk. We need to understand why some poor people actively engage in risky lifestyles – an under-researched aspect to date.

During fieldwork, I became increasingly dissatisfied with the view that peasants and migrants shun risks and prefer stability and security. I observed that nearly all villagers and migrants sometimes took risks, and that some of them deliberately and constantly sought risks (see Chapters 5 and 8). Some take huge risks, even though this behaviour may endanger security and the long-term continuity of their households' livelihoods. How can we understand such 'excessive' risk taking in regard to mainstream society given the abovementioned assumptions, and how does studying the various forms of risk-taking help in understanding poverty and livelihoods?

By describing and analysing risk taking in an ethnographic way, I want to show that deliberate risk-taking cannot simply be labelled deviant behaviour. It represents an attractive way of living for some people who search for alternatives to norms of decency and conformity. They deliberately forego investments in social security and reciprocal relationships. Further, studying these practices helps to explore the contours of risk protection and risk-taking, even of those people living close to subsistence. It hints at the structural underestimation of diversity and the human agency of people living on the margins of society in their daily quest for provision and support and their strategies to achieve security.

Filling the Gap: Bridging the Dichotomies of Provision Versus Strategy Approaches

In the above sections on livelihood, on social security and on risk, two theoretical standpoints vie for position. On the one hand, we see attention given to local people who employ livelihood strategies, take risks and strategically organize their own social security. The other perspective focuses on structural inequalities and views social security as something that needs to be provided by outside agencies or the state, and risk as something that people need to be protected from. As such, it is either communal institutions and organized structures, based on long-term bonds of reciprocity or state intervention, which provide support in times of need, or it is individuals designing strategies to cover their own risks through maximizing profit, and only sharing among a small groups of social equals, plus some stubborn individuals who take 'irresponsible risks'. However, these positions are not mutually exclusive.

Rather than initially opting for one of these two perspectives as the more valid, they should both be 'tested' and integrated in specific research settings. In my fieldwork in Krajan and East Kalimantan, I set out to ascertain the role of communal institutions in providing social security, and what room individuals have, and use, to achieve such security. Moreover, I go beyond the 'either/or' and the 'both/and' questions by building upon Giddens' concept of agency which integrates individual and structural dimensions. Below, this is related to the often divergent ways in which people manage their social security.

A good starting point is to acknowledge that both locally organized institutions and people's strategies are by nature diverse: 'people survive by doing many different things, rather than just one thing or a few things' (Ellis 2000:ix). Further, they do not do this in a social vacuum since social and familial constraints do apply, and not only what people do, but their capacity to change what they do, is influenced by their social and institutional context (Ellis 2000:8–9) and, one may add, by personal choices and characteristics. Returning to the story of local social security, and the diversity of strategies and opportunities one can observe in this field, it pays to look back to common patterns of protection, coping and security strategies. People do not randomly invest in reciprocal relationships, or opportunities for social security, but establish specific and meaningful combinations reflecting their orientations, perceptions and assessments, as well as their capabilities and resources.

Not every combination is open to all. Wealthy people can heavily rely on their own resources and networks, while their less fortunate neighbours must heavily invest in mutual support and care in order to be eligible for social

security when they, in turn, are in need. These combinations can also be gender-specific since men and women can have different orientations and resources. Often, women are much more concerned with household food security and livelihood protection than their husbands. At the household level, these differences may be smoothed out as many activities require the involvement of both husband and wife, and social relations are a matter for the whole household.

At the local level, therefore, there can be a large heterogeneity in strategies and arrangements for social security that stem from the differentiated responses of actors to the ecological, economic, political and social insecurities that they face and the resources to which they have, or can mobilize, access. In this heterogeneity, one can distinguish patterns or pathways or, as I prefer to call them, 'styles' of social security. Styles are coherent patterns that reflect the strategic and habitual decisions people make.

Research Strategy: Combining Structural and Agency Perspectives into Styles

The concept of style I take loosely from the work of Van der Ploeg and Bolhuis (1985) and of Van der Ploeg (Van der Ploeg 1990, 1999, Van der Ploeg 2008) who use the concept of farming styles to analyse patterns of farming strategies in Peru, Italy and the Netherlands. Van der Ploeg argues that the heterogeneity in contemporary agrarian societies can be explained by the wide range of differential responses made by farmers to the political, social, economic and environmental problems they face, and that these reflect their ideas about solutions, 'good' farming and the desired future of the farming enterprise. In the late 1990s, his styles framework provided a basis for a powerful critique on the hegemonistic policies of European governments and banks to stimulate farmers to engage in capital-intensive farming in the Netherlands and Italy. In a similar vein, I studied the livelihood styles of Madurese in Indonesia which occur mainly as blind spots beyond the attention of the state. More recently, the approach has been improved by De Jong (2013) to analyse livelihood diversity in Toraja and Van Voorst (2014) in a context of vulnerability to disasters in Jakarta. Especially, the study of Van Voorst shows convincingly how the style concept is able to capture and analyse diversity in responses to floods and explain why some people and households are more vulnerable than others.

Like Van der Ploeg's farming styles, the styles of Van Voorst are also based on emic categorizations of farmers, and are empirically validated by analysing farmers' orientations towards markets and the level of intensification and

intensification in their use of labour and technology. In his view, 'a style of farming is a valid structure of relations between producers, objects of labour, and means of production. It is the outcome of a particular labour process guided by certain options, structured in a specific way by a corresponding "logic," and conditioned by particular social relations of production. Through the farm labour process both the social relations of production and the style of farming are reproduced' (Van der Ploeg 1990).

In an analogous fashion, I see livelihood and social security styles as distinguishable patterns of orientations and actions regarding the range of means (labour, capital, social relations and the market) to address risk and security within a livelihood. As such, these patterns are structured by an internal logic and conditioned by social, economic and personal characteristics of the people involved. Again following Van der Ploeg, I see these styles as emic social constructions based on the various ways people manage their livelihood and mix risks and social support options. In the research areas, for instance names are used such as thrifty, sociable and business oriented to indicate the different values behind and activities of people. Styles are not the same as strategies in the sense that they are strategically designed by individuals. People do not follow a style, but have a style of organizing their livelihood and social security. These styles are made tactically as well as representing habitually reproduced patterns of dealing with livelihood insecurity and risks in daily life.

Applying the concept of style in poverty studies has the advantage that it includes the structural, individual and the 'habitual' dimensions of social action (such as the concept of *habitus* introduced by Bourdieu (1980) can bridge the dichotomy between structural and individual dimensions as the concept entails agency in mutual interplay with structure).¹⁸ It also helps to identify pathways out of poverty and to capture the diversity in responses to poverty and vulnerability. Style operates as an interface between long-term

18 The habitual everyday responses on risk and insecurity are analytically not the same as 'habitus' such as defined by Bourdieu which has a more structural dimension. '*Habitus* refers to the views and preferences held by individuals, which are molded within specific contexts of nationality, ethnicity, gender, age and class' Dahles and Bras (1999). Bourdieu (1989:13) explains *habitus* as the internal, 'embodied' dispositions which are drawn in individuals as durable schemes of observation and interpretation which bring action into being. In his understanding, *habitus* remains structural. It is the result of institutionalising the social and the objective field structures in separate bodies, and generates, as a practical matrix of practices, the determinants for the reproduction of these structures. Such an understanding of the concept of habitus does not leave much analytical space for the capacity to make a difference, the creativity to play with different repertoires in a style and to reproduce it in a creative way.

practices and institutions on the one hand, and individual strategic choices on the other. People have a certain style because of past experiences, because they like it, were raised in a particular fashion, share a cultural repertoire or because circumstances force them into a style. When conditions change, people can turn to new, and probably more advantageous, ways of organizing their livelihood and social security. However, for social and economic reasons, such a shift of style is not always that easy since styles carry a history and a legacy: if one has been strongly involved in profit maximizing and has made individual arrangements for social security, it will be well-nigh impossible to suddenly switch to a style based on strong ties with neighbours, relatives or patrons. There is, nevertheless, room for gradual shifts if one moves out of tight networks, or if one's economic position dramatically changes. A style perspective offers a possibility to link livelihood strategy approaches as well as structural analysis and welfare state perspectives in one analytical frame.

A focus on how people shape their lives and how they form and reproduce their orientations on life requires a view from below, or in the words of Benda-Beckmann et al. (1994) an 'underall perspective'. Such an approach seeks to understand the lifeworlds of people through the close and intimate study of the actors' points of view as well as their strategies and constraints. This book is based on detailed anthropological fieldwork and puts people at the centre. By its nature, this is a holistic approach. It includes an analysis of the embeddedness of social action and includes the study of the social and economic context, structures of cultural domination within and through which people think, form opinions, act and give meaning to their actions. Olivier de Sardan, influenced by Bourdieu, speaks of understanding the 'entangled social logic', an approach 'centred on the analysis of the embeddedness of social logic' (Olivier de Sardan 2005:11).

Methodological Approach

I carried out research in the village of Krajan in 1998 and 1999. I collected in-depth data on village livelihoods, wealth and poverty, perceptions of threats and insecurities, coping strategies, labour and migration, and on the role of the local government. The research in East Java took place primarily in one village but this does not mean that the research area was confined to the village of Krajan. In the research, I have tried to study the relationships of Madurese with the outside world, not only those living within specific boundaries. Neighbouring villages were taken into account when it came to trade, exchange, family relations and access to resources. Since then, migrants have been

followed and studied in for instance the harbour of Surabaya, on Pelni ships to Kalimantan, and in urban and rural Bangkalan on Madura. I accompanied Krajan villagers when they went back to their religious teachers at the Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) and leaders who went to government meetings or to informal encounters with military or police officials in town. Moreover, I followed migrants to Denpasar and Bali, and to Ijen in East Java, and met semi-resident villagers there. I also visited villagers living in other parts of East Java, and tried to recover the migration histories of villagers who worked in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Malaysia. However, all my case studies of families and the main survey were carried out within the village since I needed to study families on a daily basis, something that would not be possible in a larger area.

In Samarinda, I carried out research in several periods between 2003 and 2009. Both in Samarinda and in Krajan, I used a number of qualitative research methodologies including life histories, participant observation and semi-structured interviews. I also conducted extensive surveys. In these surveys, I concentrated on six major themes: household and family composition; expenditure and consumption; property and income; adversities and people's perceptions of them; engagement in mutual help, giving or receiving support; and debts and saving. Although the questions were predetermined, I used the list in a rather flexible way, sometimes changing the sequence or the formulation of the questions depending on the interview process and the quality of the conversation, allowing me to go deeper into subjects when needed. The majority of the survey interviews were carried out with an assistant, Pak Eko in Java and *mas* Taufiq in East Kalimantan. They translated complex questions and answers as required, and often reassured people and explained the purpose of the survey. We developed a close working relationship and found ways to encourage informants to elaborate on relevant stories, examples, experiences and sensitive topics. Most of these interviews lasted three to four hours and often ended in being offered a meal at the house. In most cases, both wife and husband were present. Wherever possible, questions were addressed to the household member who knew most about the topic, often the mother of the family.

In total we interviewed 100 families in Krajan, each on two occasions, and 300 families in Kalimantan once. In both locations, a dozen families were studied in greater depth and followed on daily and important events. The purpose of this detailed study of a limited number of families and individuals was not only to see how they coped with adversities in life, but also to identify the daily and small ways they employed in making a livelihood. These families were studied using the extended case study method (Van Velsen 1967) which provides a framework for studying networks, activities, labour relations, conflicts,

insecurities, norms and practices in a coherent and interrelated way. An extended case study is the study of an event, phenomenon or, as here, a household with all its members, activities and interrelationships through time. An extended case study makes it possible to study the changes, dynamics and problems of coping with insecurity in actual daily life. It also provided the opportunity to link strategies and arrangements for social security to changes in the wider social, economic, political and environmental context. 'The extended case method applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from the "micro" to the "macro," to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future' (Burawoy 2009:21).

Last but not least, I also studied these families from a three-generational perspective, and made genealogies to document changes and to gain insights into family histories and kinship relationships (Den Ouden 1989). Historical information was gathered by studying secondary sources such as historical records and maps, and by interviewing various family members, both young and old, about the past.

In dealing with such a multiplicity of topics and personal experiences, I used different levels of inquiry to come to a rich as possible picture, focussing on subjects and events, and on individuals, households, families and social networks. I started by studying general perceptions of livelihood, poverty, risks and insecurities, coping strategies, economic activities, labour relations and village values of support and, later, the focus shifted towards people and households. In addition to the wide and integrated scope of this study, the specific normative dimensions of social security also created methodological difficulties. What people say they would do, does not always coincide with what actually happens. In helping or not, the social actions of villagers are the critical issue, not norms and values. In adopting that stance, my fieldwork has been focussed on observation and analysis of actual support (or the lack of) rather than norms and values.

My position as an insider/outsider enabled me to visit and participate in most activities in the neighbourhood. I also participated as far as possible in forms of mutual help and, especially in the dry season, the numerous mutual help parties and housebuilding activities. While participating, I could observe the rules of the game, the people present and those absent, gift giving, food sharing and gambling. While working in the fields with others, I could ask numerous questions about details, reasons and the past, while it simultaneously enhanced my acceptance as a member of the community. I also visited many poor people, widows and handicapped, to unravel the support for these vulnerable and weak groups, their orientations and their strategies. Finally, I

tried, by making frequent visits to a few selected families, to observe the daily, minor ways of support and subsistence.

In East Kalimantan, I followed similar lines of enquiry. Long informal talks with neighbours and during long nights at the brick kiln formed a crucial source of additional information to the systematic data collected in the surveys and from the many semi-structured interviews. In this way, I gathered subjective accounts of insecurity, cooperation and survival, all contributing to my search for and understanding of support and subsistence in the village. Moreover, by participating in as many activities as possible, by using intuition and by visiting people at different times of the day, I had opportunities to discover aspects of village life I could never have imagined in advance. Many of these I stumbled upon by accident, while other opportunities were more-or-less deliberately created.

A Note on Language

In both Krajan and Samarinda, most Madurese are bilingual, able to speak both Indonesian and Madurese. In Krajan, about half of the male population and a quarter of the women were able to speak Indonesian fluently. Most of the men and the majority of the women could speak some Indonesian but about a quarter, mostly elderly and women above 50, could not (see Map 2). Communicating with those who were not fluent in Indonesian was sometimes difficult, and in those cases I had to ask for help from bystanders or assistants. In casual village life, there were always people willing to explain what was going on when I did not understand something. Sometimes these translations were explanations in themselves, and the comparison between explanations given by different people enhanced my understanding of local terms or reference and frames of meaning and interpretation. After a year, I had acquired some fluency in Madurese. In Samarinda, everybody was able to speak Indonesian well.

Forgotten People: Madurese in Indonesia

In Indonesia, the Madurese officially constitute the fourth largest ethnic group, after the Javanese, Sundanese and Malay.¹⁹ In general, they constitute a diverse

19 Since 2000, the Madurese have been officially ranked as Indonesia's fourth largest ethnic group with 6,771,727 people, 3.37% of all citizens BPS 2001; Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta 2003:7. Other estimates suggest much higher numbers of Madurese and rank them the

group of farmers, traders, migrants, labourers and entrepreneurs (De Jonge 1995). They have not been intensively studied²⁰ and, as a group, are underrepresented in Indonesian politics, government bureaucracies, the educational system, the media and in popular culture. Stenross (2011:1) notes: 'Although one of the main ethnic groups of the archipelago, the Madurese are arguably the least understood and, in recent times, the most controversial'. Since colonial times, Madurese men have been known for their touchiness, suspicion, temperament, hot temper, fierceness, vengefulness, combativeness and violence (De Jonge 1995:13). Besides this, many sexual stereotypes exist as the men are said to be macho and promiscuous, and the women to be good providers of sexual pleasures. The most well-known feature of Madurese violence is revenge killing (*carok*), committed when a man's honour is insulted. Among the main reasons for *carok* are (rumours of) someone having had a sexual affair with a wife or daughter. *Carok* is still regularly committed (Latief Wiyata 2002). In contrast to the many negative stereotypes of Madurese in Indonesia, researchers often report Madurese as being hospitable, friendly, open, direct, sociable, reliable and loyal (Bouvier 2002:14,32, De Jonge and Nootboom 2006:460, Retsikas 2007, Stenross 2011:xxv, Van Dijk et al. 1995:3).

Although some very rich Madurese entrepreneurs can be found in East Java, Jakarta and East Kalimantan, and Madurese being popularly seen as being able to prosper even under difficult circumstances – yet another powerful stereotype – the Madurese are in general relatively poorly educated and often on low wages as most occupy the lower echelons of society and the majority live in marginal and unfertile areas. Madurese traders, migrants and labourers can be found in many places ranging from cities and towns in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Java, Bali and Lombok to as far away as Singapore and Malaysia. They are well known as sellers of *sate*, traders in second-hand items and recycled goods, construction workers, rural labourers on large agro-industrial estates such as for palm oil, rubber and coffee, and as seasonal sugar-cane workers. They often occupy, and sometimes monopolize, niche markets, such as in selling *sate*, fruit and vegetables in a communal way where members come almost

third largest ethnic group Husson (1997a:77); Stenross (2011:18–19). Less than one-third of Madurese live on Madura.

- 20 Notable exceptions include: Bouvier, De Jonge and Smith 2006; Bouvier and Smith 2006; De Jonge 1995; Husson 1997a; Husson 1997b; De Jonge and Nootboom 2006; Kuntowijoyo 1980; Latief Wiyata 2002; Mansurnoor 1990; Niehof 1985; Niehof, Jordaan and Santoso 2005; Smith 1997; Smith 2011; Stenross 2011; Van Dijk, De Jonge and Touwen-Bouwisma 1995. There was an upsurge in Madura studies in the 1980s and 1990s, largely as a result of the Dutch Indonesian Madura Research Project.

exclusively from one area. Here, the *sate* sellers mostly originate from Bangkalan, West Madura, and the brick-makers in East Kalimantan who come from Geger village, Tanah Merah, Madura.

Such stereotypes are constantly reproduced in daily life and serve as social and psychological barriers for many Madurese in establishing themselves as a trader, entrepreneur or farmer in other areas of Indonesia. Moreover, they have been officially excluded from transmigration programmes because of their bad image.²¹ Nevertheless, in the slipstream of transmigration programmes, they have settled and started businesses in Kalimantan, albeit restricted to economic niches considered too dirty, dangerous or rough for many outsiders. Nowadays, millions of Madurese live outside Madura (Stenross 2011:24) and explanations offered for this 'will to survive' or 'will to succeed' range from push factors related to poverty and overpopulation on the island of Madura and in adjacent areas of East Java to the existence of a 'migration ethic' (Husson 1997b). How did the Madurese actually become involved in this migration and can a historical pattern be distinguished?

For centuries, Madurese have been known as brave soldiers, strong and reliable labourers and as vigorous migrants travelling to many places in the Malay world. In modern history, this migration has been more significant than other, better-known, diasporas such as the Bugis and the Minangkabau (Husson 1997a:98, Stenross 2011:23). There are indications that as far back as the thirteenth century inhabitants of Madura travelled and settled in Java as serfs and rural labourers (Husson 1997a:80–81). From the 16th to the 19th centuries, Madurese soldiers, recruited by Javanese and colonial forces of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), were a feared force and a crucial instrument in the power play of kings and rulers (Husson 1997a:81–84). Many of them were rewarded with land in East Java for their military services.

Since the 17th century, large numbers of Madurese have moved to the mainland of Java and especially to its north coast and its eastern part (Cribb 2000:52, Nooteboom 2003:78, Tennekens 1963). Husson (1997: 85) quotes Van Nes (1832) who writes that already by 1832 the residence of Pasuruan (on the mainland of Java) had a population of 170,049 Javanese and 92,463 Madurese. This migration increased in the late 19th and throughout the twentieth centuries when many Madurese labourers were sought for work in the plantations in Malang and Besuki district and in the growing factories of Surabaya (Nawiyanto 2003:36–39). Elson (1984: 4), quoted in Stenross (2011: 23), notes a Madurese population seven times larger than the Javanese for the residence of Besuki.

21 Personal communication: officers Department of Transmigration (Depnekartrans), 2005.

After the age of plantations, this migration continued. In the population census of 1930, 14% of all people born on Madura were living in other parts of the archipelago (Cribb 2000:54). According to some sources, the population on the island of Madura even declined in the period between 1940 and 1950 due to outmigration (Husson 1997:89). Major factors in this mass migration, which continues to the current day, are the infertility of the island of Madura, a lack of natural resources and labour opportunities, overpopulation and the widespread belief that only by migration (*merantau*) can economic success be achieved.

Since 2000, the Madurese have been officially ranked as Indonesia's fourth largest ethnic group with 6,771,727 people, 3.37% of all citizens (BPS 2001, Suryadinata et al. 2003:7). 92.8% of the Madurese live in East Java where they comprise 18.1% of the provincial population. There have been Madurese diaspora of all sorts, mainly to Kalimantan which is relatively near and has offered many opportunities for unskilled labourers. According to official data collected in 2000 (BPS 2001), about 4.92% of counted citizens in Kalimantan were self-identified as Madurese (5.5% in West Kalimantan, 3.5% in Central Kalimantan, 1.22% in South Kalimantan and 1.24% in East Kalimantan). These figures are based on ethnic self-definition of residents and do not include temporary workers or those who wish to avoid calling themselves Madurese. The real figures for the number of Madurese in Kalimantan are thought to be much higher.

To date, little is known about the current everyday livelihoods of Madurese in the areas where they are mainly concentrated outside Madura, that is on mainland East Java and in parts of Kalimantan, except for Stenross' 2011 book on seafaring Madurese.

Why the Madurese?

The book describes and analyses Madurese lifestyles in making a living in both Java and Kalimantan. The Madurese make an interesting study given their high levels of poverty, their close networks of kinship and ethnicity, their image as troublemakers and violators of the law, their lack of political capital on both regional and national scales – especially after the fall of Suharto – and their recurrent exposure to violence and ethnic conflict in migration areas. From a state perspective, they are neither indigenous – and thus able to claim special benefits as an indigenous people – nor dominant or privileged, and thus also unable to benefit from close proximity to the state or developmental resources. Although they are officially the fourth largest ethnic group, after the Javanese, Sundanese and Malay, they are a kind of forgotten people of Indonesia, often

invisible, poorly represented at higher governmental levels and squeezed between Java and the rest. In recent decades, there has been little research on this ethnic group.²²

In this book, by looking at Madurese, I look into the margins of the Indonesian developmental state and pay attention to the creation of new inequalities within a nation in flux. The impact and experience of the two major developments in Indonesia, rural development and poverty eradication, as well as the preservation and exploitation of local traditions such as mutual help are explored through the eyes of local Madurese people. Often forgotten as a group, and neglected as citizens by a largely ignorant state, this study shows the intricacies, insecurities and ambiguities of these, frequently poor, people making a living through turbulent times in Indonesia.

Research Locations

The book divides into two parts. The first deals with rural communities in East Java and offers an in-depth case study of a rural Madurese community in Bondowoso, East Java. Madurese migration to that area has been ongoing for generations and, today, many migrants to Kalimantan depart from here. It offers a relatively stable and confined location to study the core themes of livelihood, social security and risk. The second part of the book deals with an area in Kalimantan where Madurese migrants go to try and make a better living. Sometimes families stay connected but, more often, migration means disconnectedness and severed ties with the home community. Both parts of the book come together in the study of the livelihoods of people on the margins of Indonesian society, their quest for livelihood security and the parallels in the constitution and reproduction of poverty, inequality, social security and risk.

In the first part of the book, Madurese life on Java is studied in detail by studying Krajan, an upland village in East Java. In the second part, people from this village and from similar villages, both on Java and Madura, are followed into Borneo and East Kalimantan. The book starts with a historical chapter on

22 Nowadays, very few scholars work on this ethnic group and they are seldom studied in Indonesian academia except for a wave of attention during the outbreaks of violence following the fall of Suharto. Notable exceptions are: Bouvier and Smith 2006; De Jonge and Nootboom 2006; Retsikas 2007; Smith 2011; Stenross 2011. During the process of regime change and decentralisation, the Madurese have disappeared from the larger picture and have received only negative attention during the outbreaks of violence in West and Central Kalimantan between 1999 and 2003.

Java in the late 1990s and analyses the inequalities in access to resources, welfare schemes and leadership at the village level, as well as risk-taking practices and active participation in dangerous styles of living. It follows these people for more than a decade in their search for money and a livelihood, through both failure and pleasure. The successes and failures of individual people, as well as their insecurities, worries, jealousies and dreams surface through intimate encounters and detailed descriptions of events.

In the second part of the book, the locations of these Madurese migrants and settlers in Kalimantan are analysed in more detail. Some of the villagers could be traced to East Kalimantan's brickmaking and plantation industries, but the story mostly deals with other Madurese with similar backgrounds who struggle to make a living in a hostile and insecure environment. The focus in Kalimantan is no longer purely rural, and looks to three sectors of economic activity: the construction sector, the brickmaking sector and the agricultural sector. Within these sectors, the livelihood activities of Madurese are described and analysed as practices embedded in larger contexts of political change and economic insecurity. Risk-taking practices such as speculation, gambling and engagement in criminal activities, as well as threats and interpretations of violence, will be discussed in detail.

Krajan, a Village in Upland Java

Krajan is situated on the slopes of Mount Argopuro between 800 and 1,200 metres above sea level (see Map 3). The area is fairly infertile and dry. Except for some small plots of rice fields, the landscape is dominated by tobacco and maize grown on dry lands (*tegal*). Since the road was asphalted in the 1990s, Krajan is easiest reached from the direction of Bondowoso. After the junction on the main road towards Besuki, a small asphalted road heads uphill towards Krajan. It follows a ridge of the mountain and is very winding and, in some places, quite steep. In good weather, the road is covered in rice, maize, coffee beans and bamboo strips laid out to dry.

Before reaching Krajan, the road passes through five large hamlets, separated by tegal fields and sometimes lush plots of *sawah*. Just before reaching Krajan's welcome gate, an asphalted side road goes down to the rice growing village of Ardisaeng. The first hamlets of Krajan, Mengkuara and Pakuarah can be spotted somewhat later as green islands of bamboo bushes down the hill to the right. The houses are built in small clusters around a central courtyard (*tanèan*) along the road, similarly to village housing patterns seen on Madura (Smith 2011:145–150). The houses are made of wood or bamboo plaid and covered with terracotta roof tiles and, typically, one *tanèan* consists of one or two conjugal units. After a few more bends and another steep climb, the houses of

MAP 3 Research location I: Krajan, a village in Bondowoso district, East Java

SOURCE: MAP EAST JAVA: CRIBB 2010, DIGITAL ATLAS. MAP OF KRAJAN: AUTHOR.

Sayuran can be seen on a small hill to the left. Closer to the road, on the right, are situated a mosque, a shop, two coffee stalls and some stone houses. After another kilometre, passing more scattered and clustered dwellings, Krajan's village office is reached. It lies along a flat stretch of the road, away from the larger hamlets of Krajan. Around the village office, one sees a dozen houses (some made of bricks), a shop and a coffee stall, including the houses of the village head, his mother and his sister. Here the dirt road towards Dluwang starts. This was improved with World Bank money between 1998 and 2000, as part of social safety programmes and rural infrastructural schemes, but is still impassable in cars. By this part of the road, there is little motorized traffic but many people walk along the road carrying cattle fodder, fuelwood, rice or maize. Besides income from agriculture, small trade and home industries, such as the production of brooms and bamboo baskets (*beseke*), and occasional government projects such as road construction and repairing irrigation canals, there are few other income earning opportunities.

Desa Krajan is situated in the middle of the poor and fairly infertile mountainous area between Bondowoso and Besuki. The village is demarcated to the northwest by the deep ravine of the Dluwang River which forms a natural border with the Besuki sub-district, and to the southeast by a gentle ravine covered with sawah belonging to the villages of Ardisaeng and Andungsari. Krajan itself does not have much sawah as irrigation in the higher areas is problematic. With its rugged terrain, the village has always been much more isolated than most of the lowland villages on Java. It was only in 1994 that the village road to Krajan was asphalted and irregular, but daily, transport to Bondowoso or Besuki became available by pickup trucks. Krajan is far from the large urban centres of Java. The nearest city is Jember at a distance of 60 kilometres, and few villagers have ever been there.

The village of Krajan receives slightly more rainfall than the other villages in the region due to its high altitude but it has few irrigation opportunities and sawah is scarce. The major crops include maize, tobacco and rice. Besides this, cattle raising is important. Given that land is scarce and not very fertile, yields tend to be insecure compared to villages in lowland Java. Krajan is a relatively poor village but is doing slightly better than many other villages in the area which have even fewer resources, less fertile soils and less rain. Only the neighbouring villages of Ardisaeng (with its sawah-covered valley) and Andungsari (with lower population pressure, easier access to the state forest and a coffee plantation) have higher average incomes.

In the village, access to resources is unequally distributed. About one-third of the population can be called rich, while two-thirds have difficulties in making ends meet. The 9% richest families own 53% of all village sawah and 37%

of all tegal in the village. Fifty-one per cent of the village population is landless or virtually landless. In the next chapter, these differences will be described and analysed in more detail. These differences in wealth are visible in consumption styles. Eating white rice, vegetables from the market and meat or fresh fish are clear indicators of a high social status, along with the ownership of brick houses, motorbikes, television and radio sets, jeans, mobile phones and expensive *sarong*. Distinctions between social classes are especially visible in the smoking habits of men, and the cigarettes provided at praying sessions and celebrations.

In 1997, Krajan numbered about 3,400 inhabitants of which 48% were male and the rest female, spread among 880 households of which 150 were female-headed.²³ This number has since declined to below 3,000 as a result of migration and declining fertility. The majority of the villagers are engaged in farming, supplemented with one or more other income-generating activities such as trade, handicraft production and house construction. Unlike many Javanese villages, migration rates to urban areas and to other countries are relatively low. Krajan migration is mostly rural to rural, and Krajan people who migrate permanently, in as far as it is possible to trace them, mostly go to Kalimantan and end up in low paid jobs such as waged workers in oil palm plantations, road construction or the brick industry, or as petty traders. As a result of these poor migration livelihoods – see Part II of this book for a detailed description – remittances are rarely sent and do not form a significant source of income for most households. In addition, there are village members who do not wish to migrate to far away areas and who look for temporary jobs in the area such as harvesting coffee in Bondowoso, Banyuwangi and Jember, in sugar cane production, or as a brick maker. Some sell brooms and cheap artefacts in Bali. Typically, these jobs are very low paid, lower than those found by those who migrate to Kalimantan. Very few people have good contacts in urban areas and are able to mobilize and organize groups of workers. Villagers often expressed a reluctance to leave when they own or care for cattle. The background and logic behind these choices will be described in detail in Chapter 4 when I analyse the styles of making a living.

23 Most of the female-headed households are headed by 'widows' (*janda*). *Janda* are women without men, and can be divorced, unmarried or left alone by the departure or death of their husband. Widows who are living with children and are being cared for are often not counted as individual households. The large number of female-headed households can partly be explained by absent men working in Kalimantan.

Madurese in Samarinda, East Kalimantan

Samarinda (see Map 4) is a medium sized city with 726,223 inhabitants in 2010.²⁴ It is the capital of East Kalimantan province and lies inland on the Mahakam River, about 50 kilometres from the sea. It consists of three parts, Samarinda upstream (*ulu*), downstream (*ilir*) north of the Mahakam River, and Samarinda across (*seberang*) which lies to the west of the river. The two sides of the city are connected by a bridge. As a provincial city, it contains most of the important governmental offices and police headquarters. Economically, it has always been overshadowed by Balikpapan, the major oil, gas and mining city in East Kalimantan. In the past, up to the mid-1990s, Samarinda was booming due to the logging industry and the large number of sawmills along the Mahakam River. Now it is a major governmental city and a hub for coal mining and oil palm development in the massive hinterland of the Mahakam River.

Most Madurese in Samarinda have not been very successful economically and remain poor. They are poorly educated, but are known for being hard workers and reliable guards. This means that they are in demand in sectors where hard physical labour is required, such as in transport and construction, and as security guards. Many porters in the harbour and at the markets are Madurese, as are many road workers, construction workers, garbage collectors, stone-cutters and brick makers. Others work as security guards or carpenters and a few as owners of repair shops and hairdressers. The banana trade and the *sate* sector are dominated by Madurese, as are most of the canteens on the main university campus. In general, one can say that Madurese migrants occupy the lower strata of East Kalimantan society.

It is widely claimed that Madurese migrants in Kalimantan tend to spatially isolate themselves from other groups (Peluso and Harwell 2001: 103). In this, however, they do not differ from other ethnic groups who also prefer to live close together. In East Kalimantan, Madurese do tend to settle in close proximity to each other, often in groups related to occupation and village of origin. In Samarinda, they live in the old quarters close to the harbour and the city markets. Clusters of brick makers from rural Bangkalan can be found on the outskirts of the city on otherwise unused land. Temporary labourers engaged on roadworks and building sites mostly originate from eastern Java and Sampang in Madura. And they tend to live in barracks or deserted houses scattered throughout the city. Migrants who stay for longer sometimes live in mixed communities and interact with other ethnic groups such as the Javanese, Banjarese, Kutai Malay and Butonese. However, relationships between

24 BPS Indonesia (Indonesian Statistical Office) <http://dds.bps.go.id/hasilSP2010/kaltim/6400.pdf> (last accessed April 2012).

MAP 4 Research location II: East Kalimantan and Samarinda

SOURCE: MAP EAST KALIMANTAN: CRIBB 2010, DIGITAL ATLAS. MAP SAMARINDA: MADE FOR THIS STUDY BY PUSLITBANGWIL UNMUL 2004, MULAWARMAN UNIVERSITY, SAMARINDA, EAST KALIMANTAN

Madurese and Bugis, the second largest ethnic group in East Kalimantan, have long been tense. Traditionally, contacts with the indigenous Dayak, are relatively cordial, although they also became tense following the violent attacks on Madurese by Dayaks in West and Central Kalimantan between 1999 and 2003.

During the colonial era, most Madurese in this province were employed as unskilled labourers on plantations and in the mining and oil industries around Balikpapan.²⁵ This situation remained largely unchanged until the late 1970s since when migrants have mainly been engaged in road construction, the recycling business (scrap metal and tyres), petty trade, brickmaking, logging, and the building and transportation sectors. Some have become very successful, acquiring heavy machinery and large trucks. A small number have also been involved in illegal activities.

The Madurese in Samarinda live simply, save money to invest, marry young and work together. They also provide accommodation for newly arriving migrants – who are often relatives or people from their villages – and help them to find work. They are not attracted by education and the few Madurese in East Kalimantan who have graduated from university face difficulties in finding suitable jobs. As a result, there are almost no Madurese in the government bureaucracy or in the higher ranks of the police in East Kalimantan. According to Hendro (2001:72), ‘the majority can neither read nor write’, with illiteracy rates of 40 to 50% for male workers and even higher for women. Madurese parents often keep their children away from school to help them in making a living. Religious knowledge is however highly appreciated and several Madurese *pesantren*, religious boarding schools, have been founded in East Kalimantan. Well-to-do Madurese often send their children to *pesantren* in Madura and Eastern Java. Some have made the hajj. The various groups of Madurese speak different dialects, follow different religious leaders (*kiai*) and emphasize different cultural traits. For instance, Sumenep Madurese are said to be more refined than those from Pamakasan, whereas those from Sampang are generally perceived – and perceive themselves – as being the least refined of all, and as being troublemakers and unreliable.

In the following chapters, I first turn to East Java, after which I will return to East Kalimantan in Chapter 6.

25 During the Japanese occupation, an unknown number of forced labourers (*romushas*) were ‘recruited’ from Madura to work on plantations and infrastructural projects in Kalimantan.