CHAPTER VI

RIVALS IN TRADE

The activities of the Jan Company in Coromandel acquire significance only as a phase in the effort of European merchant capital to engross world trade on the basis of monopolistic and monopsonistic control wherever possible. Even their impact on the indigenous economy can best be understood in this particular context. The seventeenth century merchant capitalists, no believers in free commercial competition, first carefully secured by charter from their own national governments the right to exclusive trade with specified regions for their monopolistic joint stock companies and then tried hard, openly or surreptitiously, to exclude not only all other traders from their own country but similar monopolistic companies of other nations as well, from all share in the trade of the area assigned to themselves. The weapons used in this struggle were as often political or even military as commercial. This was particularly true of Coromandel in the first half of the seventeenth century. The issue of the struggle was however eventually decided by the relative magnitude of capital resources and flexibility of commercial organization. While the struggle lasted, the economy of the coast undoubtedly benefited therefrom in so far as it gave greater bargaining power to the middleman as well as the producer, an advantage that was lost with the establishment of the unquestioned ascendancy of a single buyer in the market.

The Portuguese

The Portuguese settled at San Thomé and Negapatam and active all along the coast were the first rivals that the Dutch encountered in Coromandel. The Coromandel Portuguese were no representatives of any chartered company nor even of the Spanish-Portuguese State. Their hostility to the Dutch derived primarily from a desperate struggle for survival of a sorely pressed trading community in an alien background. Though the mother country had little direct interest in the coast settlements, the latter had benefited from the Portuguese hegemony in the
Asian waters and long enjoyed a position of advantage in Coromandel's overseas trade. Their commercial interests were similar to those of the local merchants in so far as they sought profit from both import and export and, unlike the Dutch, were not primarily concerned with securing commodities for export on advantageous terms. The reason why the Portuguese did not try to co-operate with the Dutch in the same way as the local traders appears to be two-fold. The long-established political enmity was a barrier to any such development and the active instigation of the Spanish state made it even more so. The question of the local Portuguese seeking secure and profitable trade as the Company's middlemen and suppliers hence could not arise. Besides, in the early years of the seventeenth century, the Coromandel Portuguese apparently had a much greater share in the trade with the Indies than was available to the local merchants. The decline of Portugal and the advent of the Dutch threatened this lucrative commerce. The coast Portuguese had to fight the new-comers for the security of their livelihood. Lacking in adequate economic power, they used the weapons of diplomacy, intrigue and adventurist action to thwart the hated rival.

From the earliest days of the Company's contact with the coast, the Portuguese did their best to secure the expulsion of their arch-enemies from the Golconda ports. In Coromandel the Dutch, in fact, had fired the first shot, for the yacht Delft on its second voyage to the coast in 1606 had burnt three Portuguese ships anchored off San Thomé. The conflict between the rising power of the Dutch Company and the decadent Portuguese settlements in Coromandel was an unequal one, and by the middle of 1608 the local populations of Masulipatam and Petapuli had been definitely won over to the side of the new-comers. That year the Portuguese captain at Masulipatam was taken prisoner by order of the mir jumla, as a reprisal for Portuguese piracy against Muslim ships in the Bay and such misfortunes of their arch-enemy further strengthened the Dutch position in the Golconda kingdom.175

In south Coromandel the Portuguese tried to induce the Carnatic king and the Gingi nayak to expel the Dutch from Tierepopelier and would have succeeded but for the influence of the 'great Aya'. In 1609 they scored a point over the Dutch, when for 1500 pardaus they secured the lease of Tegenapatam and seven villages though the Company had offered double the amount. The ascendency of their enemies in the

175 Begin ende Voortgang, II, van der Hagen's voyage, p.60; K.A.967, van Wesick to Ysaacx, 26.6.1608.
neighbouring harbour seriously affected the Company’s trade at Tiere­
popelier. But the failure of the Portuguese to carry out their promises to the nayak led to their expulsion from Tegenapatam in December, 1609, an incident in which the Dutch had some hand. Still they retained sufficient control over the neighbouring sea-routes to force the Tiere­
popelier factors to abandon their plans to secure Pulicat cloth by sea.176

The Portuguese, having failed in their diplomatic manoeuvres, now decided to launch a direct attack on the newly established factory. On May 29, 1610 some Portuguese ships approached Pulicat but were beaten back by the Dutch who captured two of the ships with all the men on board. At about the same time an encounter near Masulipatam led to the capture of two more Portuguese ships. When three ships from l’Hermite’s fleet came to Coromandel in the spring of 1610, rumours about the twelve year’s truce with Spain concluded in Europe had already reached the East. But as l’Hermite’s instructions were to con­
tinue hostilities against San Thomé until more definite news was re­
cieved, the Dutch captured and burnt a few more Portuguese ships near the coast.177

The truce with Spain concluded at Antwerp on April 9, 1609 was to be implemented in the East twelve months later. It enjoined mutual friendship between the subjects of the two states and guaranteed the right “to frequent and remain in the places of either side, and follow out there the trade and commerce in all security.” Besides, the Dutch were to be allowed to seek trade “in the places of all other princes, potentates and peoples” without any hindrance from the Portuguese. But shortly before the conclusion of the truce the king of Spain had sent secret instructions to his subjects in India asking them to prevent the Dutch “by all possible means” from securing admission to the ports of the neighbouring kings.178 As subsequent developments showed, the Coromandel Portuguese were inspired more by the spirit of these secret instructions than by the terms of the truce.

The Portuguese menace assumed dangerous proportions soon after Wemmer van Berchem succeeded Jan van Wesick as the Director of

176 K.A.967, Bourgonje to Ysaacx, 6.2.1609, Bourgonje to North Coromandel, 17.6.1609, Bourgonje to van Wesick, 7.4.1609, Bourgonje and Marcelis to North Coromandel, 13.1.1610, Bourgonje to l’Hermite, May 1610; Koro­
mandel, p.116; de Jonge, III, pp.345 ff.
177 K.A.967, Marcelis to Maertissen, 31.5.1610, l’Hermite’s ‘Memorie’, 15.10.1609, Bourgonje and Marcelis to Ysaacx, 3.3.1610, van Wesick to Bantam 15.6.1610.
ment No.s 86, 122.
the Coromandel factories in 1612.179 On June 9, 1612, when van Berchem was away on a mission to Golconda, the Portuguese of San Thomé, inspired by their bishop, Dom Frey Sebastião de São Pedro, attacked and destroyed the Pulicat factory, killed three of the Company’s men and carried away six, including factor Adolff Thomassen, as prisoners while the rest took shelter in the neighbouring villages. The king of Spain in his letter to the Viceroy of Goa commended the action of the San Thomé Portuguese and emphasized the need to frustrate Dutch efforts to procure Coromandel cloth and thereby undermine their south-east Asian trade. Van Berchem, on his return, opened negotiation with the Bishop and Captain of San Thomé for the release of the Dutch prisoners but it was not until January, 1616 that they were all freed.180

The Portuguese, frustrated in their efforts to destroy fort Geldria, now tried to secure the desertion of the Company’s men through bribery. But two Dutch sailors who went over to the Portuguese were imprisoned at San Thomé as suspects and this acted as a sufficient warning to potential traitors. Next, the Portuguese induced some of their underlings to take shelter with the Dutch as fugitives with the object of poisoning the Pulicat factors. The conspiracy was, however, discovered in time and two of the enemy agents were hanged. A second attempt of the Portuguese to poison the Dutch factors also ended in failure. In 1613, the San Thomé Portuguese were preparing a fresh attack on Pulicat and a fleet sent from Goa to help them tried to capture the Dutch ship Star anchored off Pulicat. But the attack was successfully beaten back and the Portuguese had to withdraw with heavy casualties.181

In 1613 the Portuguese also tried to induce Krishnappa Nayak of Gingi to deliver Franco van der Meer, chief factor of Tegenapatam, into their hands. The ‘great Aya’, won over to their side, began to harass van der Meer and two ships were sent to Tegenapatam to reinforce the threatened factory. Eventually the Aya gave up his hostile intentions on receiving a large present from the Dutch.182

By 1614, the tide had definitely turned against the Portuguese on the

Coromandel coast. The trade of San Thomé had been on the decline ever since the arrival of the Dutch. Conditions became worse after the establishment of fort Geldria. In the old days, large number of ships came to San Thomé every year from Malacca, Goa, Cochin, Burma and Siam, but few traders arrived there between 1612 and 1614 and in 1615 only one ship came from Malacca. The Dutch were confident that continual cruising by their ships along the coast would eventually achieve the complete ruin of Portuguese trade. Against the persistent hostility of the Dutch their enemies could retaliate but feebly by the occasional capture of some Indian provision-boats on their way to Pulicat. The conquest of San Thomé was now considered a definite possibility and Narpa-raja invited the Dutch to join him in an attack on the Portuguese colony. But this would involve the eventual obligation to settle at San Thomé which the Company with its limited resources was not in a position to undertake, and consequently the Dutch evaded the request.  

In the early decades of the century the Portuguese were not merely political enemies but able to compete commercially, though only to a limited extent. The heavy establishment cost of the Dutch Company forced it to seek always a wide margin between their purchase and sale prices, i.e., a high rate of gross profit. This fact was often a source of advantage to competitors who had to spend less on their establishment and could therefore afford both to buy dearer and sell cheaper. The Dutch generally purchased only cloths of specific size and quality which fetched high prices and ensured a wide margin of gross profit. The Portuguese on the other hand bought up all available supplies somewhat indiscriminately, a small margin of gross profit per unit being enough to cover their costs and leave a residue of net profit. In consequence the Company was at times forced to buy poor quality cloth, just to maintain its hold on the buyer's market. Manufacturers and middlemen also complained with truth that the Portuguese paid at higher rates for all products. Unless the Company could meet this challenge, there was a real danger of the Portuguese recapturing the Coromandel cloth trade.  

bers to the Portuguese colonies on the coast; the large volume of their imports often adversely affected the demand for the Company’s wares and caused sharp decline in prices.\(^{185}\)

To expel the Company from Pulicat and eventually from Coromandel and thus “deprive the Dutch of the greatest outlay which support them in the south” long remained a cherished object of the Spanish king. The Viceroy of Goa consulted Captain Manuel de Frias who led the attack on Pulicat in 1612 and opened negotiations with a local prince in an attempt to fulfil the king’s wishes. In 1620, a *fidalgo* of the king’s household was appointed Captain of San Thomé and Captain-General of the Coromandel coast with specific instructions to expel the Dutch. But nothing came out of these grandiose plans and ships deployed for the purpose had to be recalled as they failed to secure provisions from the coast guarded by Dutch cruisers. In 1623, “some gentlemen well-known as persons of worth” were permitted by the Viceroy at their own request to equip ships for cruising against the enemy along the Coromandel coast. But these Portuguese free-booters, powerless against the Dutch, started indiscriminate attacks on Indian shipping and so the permission had to be quickly withdrawn. In 1628–29 the Captain of San Thomé resumed negotiations with a local prince for the capture of Pulicat, but to little purpose. Only in June, 1629 the Portuguese from San Thomé “ventured into Pallicatt Roade and burned a juncke, notwithstanding the Dutch forces.”\(^{186}\)

Frustrated in their designs on Pulicat, the Portuguese started regular cruising in 1616–17 against Indian boats which carried provisions from Orissa to Pulicat, and for a time successfully prevented them from reaching their destination. As a counter-measure, the Dutch deployed some ships to protect Indian shipping sailing to Pulicat and attack those going to the Portuguese settlements. Provision-boats were diverted in large numbers from San Thomé to Pulicat. In consequence, food shortage became so serious at San Thomé that 70 families came over to Pulicat as refugees. The Dutch - Portuguese conflict in Coromandel once more revealed the consequences of India’s naval weakness. Indian ships were diverted from established routes and their trade forced to suit the convenience of foreign traders, while the Indians gratefully

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accepted the protection of one European nation against the ravages of another. The Dutch organised intensive cruising against Portuguese ships along the entire coast and as far as Point de Galle. Ships sailing to and from Bengal, Orissa, Cochin, Malacca, Manilla and Macao were captured in large numbers. This became a regular source of income for the Company. “It appears,” reported the Dutch in 1621, “as if no Portuguese would navigate these quarters any more and that they have yielded the sea-way to us.” “At St Thomé they are wore threadbare,” commented the English, “besides dare not pepe out att their doore, are growen so generally poore that they have almost nothing left them att least to oppose such fortunes.” The Bishop of San Thomé secretly confessed his fears of “losing the city of Meliapur, both on account of the vicinity of the Dutch and by reason of the weak government”. Naval and commercial supremacy in the Bay had definitely passed from Portuguese to Dutch hands by the mid-'twenties. The final extinction of Portuguese power in this region was now only a question of time.187

By the 'thirties the power of the Portuguese was definitely in decline throughout Asia and an attack on Negapatam by the nayak of Tanjore in 1632 further weakened their position in Coromandel. The regular cruising of the Dutch ships against the Portuguese along the Coromandel and Ceylon coasts yielded a large and steady income. The booty seized from Portuguese ships during 1630—32 was valued at 24,851 florins, while during the same period the Dutch suffered a total loss of 1,260 florins through Portuguese counter-cruising.188 By 1637 the field of operation was extended to the more distant parts of the Bay in a bid to clear the seas of the Portuguese pirates who infested the Bengal coast. In May, 1640 the Batavia authorities decided that all Indian ships carrying Portuguese wares to Pegu, Achin and other places were to be accosted by Dutch cruisers and forced to surrender the enemy’s merchandise.189 The Orissa coast, which acted as a rice-bowl for Coromandel, was now closed to the Portuguese as none dared navigate there without a Dutch passport. San Thomé and Negapatam suffered from a perpetual shortage of foodstuffs in consequence. Describing San Thomé in 1635, its Bishop lamented, “That city which was formerly one of the

most opulent in India, has fallen so low that it has but few residents and no capital". The Coromandel Portuguese, who once controlled a large part of the overseas trade of that coast, failed to send abroad a single ship in 1640—41.  

Despite their fallen state, however, encouraged by the Viceroy at Goa they continued to intrigue feverishly with the Carnatic king for the capture of the Dutch factories. But fleets sent from Goa for the purpose in 1631 and 1633 had to return disappointed. In 1634 a secret agreement was concluded with the Carnatic king for the joint siege of Pulicat, but the proposed attack was never carried out, and two years later, while Venkata declared to the Portuguese his determination to make war on the Dutch, his emissaries to Pulicat carried reassuring messages of friendship at the very same time. By 1639 the Portuguese lost all hopes of any joint action with the king.  

Their position in Coromandel was, however, strengthened to some extent by the Anglo-Portuguese non-aggression pact in the East concluded in 1635. Besides in 1638 the Danish captain at Tranquebar offered them not only fort Dansborg but also the services of Danish ships for bringing relief from Malacca, Ceylon and other places. The sale of Dansborg did not take place as the Portuguese had doubts regarding its utility. A good understanding with the Danes was, however, maintained and they undertook to supply the Goa authorities with secret intelligence regarding the movements of the Dutch in Coromandel.  

Still, such minor advantages made no basic change in the situation and in 1642 the Dutch, confident of their superiority, planned a lightning attack on San Thomé and Nagapatam with a view to destroying them completely. The Portuguese got wind of these plans and made all possible preparations for defence with the assistance of Goa. But when on April 12, 1642 a Dutch fleet from Ceylon under commanders Blau and Bouwens arrived at Negapatam, the settlement, unable to offer any resistance, was forced to sue for terms as most of the citizens had taken to flight. By an agreement signed on April 13 the Dutch formally took over Negapatam which was described in the document

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as a Dutch town’. On April 17 a Portuguese fleet sent from Jaffnapatam to help the threatened colony was defeated by the Dutch in a combat near Negapatam. The Dutch also beat back an attack of general Timappa sent by the nayak of Tanjore to punish them for the violation of his territory. But eager to retain the nayak’s good-will which was of great importance for its cloth-trade, the Company decided to withdraw from Negapatam and abandoned the project of attacking San Thomé. On April 22 the Dutch left Negapatam with a ransom worth 10,000 pagodas and two hostages as security for the payment of another 40,000 pagodas. At the same time they assured the Tanjore nayak in reply to his angry letters that they had no aggressive intentions against him, but would defend themselves against any attack.193

Meanwhile in Europe, following the revolt of Portugal against Spain in 1640, a ten years’ truce had been concluded between Holland and Portugal in June, 1641. In October, 1642 Batavia called upon all the Dutch factories in Asia to abide by the terms of the truce, but Negapatam was to be considered outside its scope until the stipulated ransom had been paid.194

The circumstances of the attack on Negapatam finally proved the hopeless inability of the Coromandel Portuguese to defend themselves against their rivals. True, their colonies managed to survive for some more decades. But from this time onward they were very much at the mercy of the Dutch. From 1642 to 1652 the Dutch and the Portuguese were officially at peace with each other in the East. But when the Portuguese violated the truce in 1643 by capturing a Dutch boat, two Portuguese boats were seized by way of reprisal. Otherwise things remained peaceful on the surface and the Company abandoned as futile its claims for the balance of the ransom due from Negapatam. The main conflict after 1645 centred round the new factories in Tanjore and Madura which vitally affected Portuguese trade, because the cloth supply from Coilpatam was one of its staples. Their machinations in the nayaks’ courts at times adversely affected the Dutch position. But the Company with its superior resources could retaliate by drawing away the weavers and painters of cloth from San Thomé. In 1647 the Portuguese seized one of Mir Jumla’s ships which carried

a Dutch passport, but such violations of the truce were rather exceptional. More often the Portuguese ships helped Indians to evade the restrictions imposed on the latter's trade with Achin and the 'tin areas' by carrying their merchandise to the forbidden places. Yet in view of the weakness of the Coromandel Portuguese such efforts had little more than a nuisance value. In 1649 they made a vigorous attempt to revive their trade, — particularly with Pegu and Macassar, — but to little purpose. In fact so low was their credit that their bills of exchange sent from Golconda were not honoured at Goa. In 1652 the Dutch reported home with contempt that the activities of the Portuguese were hardly worth describing.¹⁹⁵

In July, 1652 the Coromandel factories learnt that the ten years' truce had ended and that the two nations were once more at war. The Portuguese on the coast, conscious of their weakness, were however reluctant to resume hostilities and protested in vain against the capture of their ships. For some years the hostilities in Coromandel assumed no more serious a form than cruising and counter-cruising along the coast in which the Portuguese fared badly. Meanwhile the nayak of Tanjore was persistently urging the Dutch to join him in an attack on Negapatam. Pulicat's suggestion that the Company should undertake this independently was turned down by Batavia in 1657. But the following year Rijcklof van Goens, who had been appointed commissaris for Surat, Persia, Ceylon and Coromandel and was in charge of the operations against the Portuguese in these areas, decided to attack the enemy colonies on the coast.¹⁹⁶

On July 20, 1658 Jan van der Laan arrived with a fleet before Negapatam and even before van Goens could join him, as had been planned, the colony surrendered to the Dutch on July 23 without any resistance on condition the Portuguese inhabitants were allowed to leave for Goa with all their moveable property. The Tanjore nayak, enraged at the prospect of the Dutch securing a foothold in his land, came to the vicinity of Negapatam with a large army, but the Company's firm attitude eventually induced him to withdraw. The intended attack


on San Thomé was however not carried out as Krishnappa, — now one of Mir Jumla’s generals, — had taken the colony under his protection. The Batavia authorities were at first inclined to abandon Negapatam as being unprofitable, but subsequently changed their mind at the instance of van Goens, who pointed out the possibilities of the place as a ‘provision store’ for Ceylon and Batavia.\footnote{K.A.1110, 19.11.1657, f.679vo; K.A.1115, 14.12.1658, ff.104vo, 114 ff; K.A.1117, 18.7.1658, f.46, 31.7.1658, f.69; van Dam, II, ii. p.107 ff; J. Aalbers, \textit{Rijcklof van Goens}, pp.168—70.}

Not satisfied with the capture of Negapatam, Laurens Pit and Rijcklof van Goens secretly came to an understanding in 1661 to conquer San Thomé before the peace with Portugal was concluded in Europe. But the news somehow leaked out and San Thomé was taken under the protection of the Golconda king, who sternly warned the Dutch against any attack on his protégés. The Company, therefore, had to change its tactics and after some negotiation Qutb Shah agreed to expel the Portuguese from San Thomé and permit the Dutch to establish a factory there. Accordingly in April, 1662 General Neknam Khan laid siege to the town, while the Dutch on their own initiative sent three ships to blockade the sea-passage so that the Portuguese were forced to surrender on 1 May, 1662. But the Golconda authorities ignored the assistance given by the Dutch and the only advantage which the latter derived from the whole business was the final expulsion of the Portuguese from the coast as a political power. Later when Golconda got into trouble with the Goa authorities over the question of San Thomé and Qutb Shah’s ships were attacked in the Arabian Sea, the Company’s help was sought on the false plea that the Portuguese settlement had been conquered really for the sake of the Dutch. The Company evaded such requests and decided not to open a factory at San Thomé. By 1667 the Portuguese definitely gave up all ideas of recapturing the town. Most of the old settlers now took shelter at Madras or Porto Novo and from there carried on a certain amount of trade, mainly with Sumatra and Siam. But its volume was not large enough to cause any serious worry to the Company. By the middle sixties, the Portuguese had ceased to be a factor in Coromandel trade so far as the Dutch were concerned.\footnote{K.A.1124, 22.12.1661, ff.104 ff, 15.9.1661, f.130vo; K.A.1128, 26.12.1662, ff.204 ff; K.A.1133, 27.1.1663, ff.1082 ff; K.A.1136, 4.8.1664, f.265; K.A.1147, 31.8.1666, f.695, 15.11.1666, f.660; K.A.1152, 24.6.1657, f.592vo.}
The English

While the Dutch-Portuguese relations on the coast were more overtly hostile, the competition with the English East India Company implied a far more serious threat to the Jan Company's commercial interests. The real and potential capital resources of the English Company, the support of the buoyant English nation-state, use of techniques similar to those of the Dutch for the establishment of exclusive control on the market were all factors full of ominous significance for the future of the Dutch on the coast and indeed throughout Asia.

As early as 1611 the English East India Company had established a factory at Masulipatam and, a little later, also opened trade at Petapuli. In June, 1613 an English ship, the Globe, visited Pulicat in the quest of trade but had to leave disappointed as van Berchem reminded the local authorities of the exclusive trading rights already granted to the Dutch. In other places the Dutch tried to buy up all available cargo as far as practicable before the arrival of the English ships, but were often hindered in this effort by the inadequacy of their capital resources. The order of the States General, however, required them to follow a friendly policy and not to obstruct in any way the trade of the English. Van Berchem promised to abide by this order though he would have preferred to oppose the establishment of any further English factories in Coromandel, for otherwise, in his opinion, "the English would shear the sheep and we, the Dutch, the pigs." The conflict between state policy and local commercial interests, a familiar and determining influence in the history of European trade with Asia in the 17th century, thus became evident even in the initial stage of the Jan Company's activities in Coromandel.

However, despite van Berchem's gloomy prognostications, the English for a long time were in a position of comparative disadvantage. Their capital resources were still much smaller than those of the Dutch. They had little control over the supply of spices which alone could make up to some extent for the shortage of cash specie in Coromandel. They were thus in no position yet to compete effectively with the Dutch. Indeed, in 1617—18, the English were in despair over the trade prospects in Coromandel which the Court of Directors considered "dis­tasted as unprofitable". Yet at times the Dutch felt rather badly the pressure of English competition. The rivalry of the two Companies forced up the price of indigo at Masulipatam and gave the Indian

199 K.A.968, 30.8.1613, ff.158vo, 163; K.A.969, 16.8.1614, ff.130, 130vo, 133; Floris, pp.10—12.
cultivators and middlemen a superior bargaining position until an agreement between the English and the Dutch altered the situation. When in November, 1617 the Dutch declared war on the English in the Moluccas, Banda and Amboina, the Company followed a policy of cautious vigilance on the coast, and there were no actual hostilities. In fact the Coromandel factors with their hands sufficiently full with the Portuguese would have preferred more friendly relations with the English.²⁰⁰ Their earlier eagerness to expel the English at gun-point checked by a contrary state policy had given place to a willingness to co-exist at a time when the two nations were at war. The conflict between state policy and local commercial interest persisted, though the circumstances had changed radically. The State's control, in varying degrees, over the commercial policies of chartered companies in distant lands, a familiar feature of the Mercantilist era, hampered in this instance the adoption of measures which might have proved most sound economically. The Dutch Company, conscious of the power of their rivals, was evidently seeking the establishment of a limited dual control on the buyer's market which would have eminently served their ultimate purpose of reducing the bargaining power of local suppliers and eliminated the effects of powerful competition.

The manner in which co-operation with the English was eventually forced on them was something they had neither expected nor desired. In June, 1619 a 'Treaty of Defence' terminated the Anglo-Dutch war and inaugurated a partial partnership between the two companies. Among other things, the Companies were to share the trade of Pulicat as also the expenses of Fort Geldria. A detailed agreement to regulate the Pulicat trade and joint management of the fort was drawn up at Batavia in April, 1621 and on June 9, 1621 the English came to the southern port, abandoning their Petapuli factory in order to reduce expenses.²⁰¹

This was an arrangement foredoomed to failure. The employees of the Dutch company in the East, whatever the attitude of their masters, were not ready to give away entirely through a partnership the definite advantage they had over their rivals. Coen, who seldom minced matters,

enquired if their Honours in Amsterdam had been lacking in good counsel. To his mind, friendship with the English was an impossibility; for it would mean that the Dutch "would have to quit not only the Indies, but the world".

In tune with this spirit, he instructed the Coromandel factors not to trust the English in anything, zealously to guard the rights and prerogatives of the Company and carefully preserve the secrets of the cloth trade. It is to be noted, however, that the Coromandel factories at this stage were not in full sympathy with Coen's extreme attitudes inspired by his ambition to establish a vast and exclusive colonial empire. Centralisation of control over local commercial policy, with two often warring centres of authority at Amsterdam and Batavia, frequently frustrated attempts to adopt rational economic measures and was in fact one of the basic weaknesses of the Dutch East India Company.202

The English in the East also felt that this co-operation with a powerful rival would only mean numerous encumbrances and surrender of legitimate rights. As early as March, 1622 the English Council at Batavia reported to London that the partnership with the Dutch in Coromandel was working very badly and asked the home authorities to "consider whether to be free from them may not be more beneficial for your trade than to live under their subjection and take their leavings." The English, with a much smaller capital at their disposal, found it impossible to trade on a basis of equality with the Dutch. With a larger seller's market under their control, the latter could also afford to buy up much larger quantities of return cargo. Besides, they refused to undertake joint investments and rejected the plea that purchases should be shared equally, insisting that each Company would get a share of the return cargo proportionate to their respective capitals. The English were, of course, free to invest independently. But with their limited knowledge of local markets they hesitated to do so. At times, the Dutch bought up all the available supplies, including those for which the English had advanced money. The heavy expenses of Fort Geldria were also a serious strain on the slender resources of the English and, in their opinion, disproportionate to the benefits derived. A conference to settle the differences and a complaint to Batavia led to the redress of some minor grievances. But such tinkerings were of little help in an unworkable partnership of two companies with vast differences in resources. For "no concessions... could make up for the want

202 Coen, I, pp.543 ff, 735, III, p.75.
of an adequate supply of capital”. A joint control with no qualifications was obviously unworkable under the circumstances.

The ‘massacre of Ambonina’ and the subsequent withdrawal of the English from the Moluccas, Siam and elsewhere practically closed for the English many markets for Coromandel cloth in South East Asia. The authorities in London were now inclined to listen to their subordinates’ plea for the termination of the Anglo-Dutch partnership in Coromandel and on July 1, 1623 the English withdrew from Pulicat.203

The policy now recommended by Batavia to Coromandel was to leave the English in peace “so long as they do not first give trouble”. But in matters of trade the Dutch tried to oust the English from the Coromandel spice market by undercutting prices. Only the price of pepper was kept high enough to prevent the English from buying up supplies for Europe. English attempts to open a new factory in south Coromandel, at Pondicherry, were foiled through the influence of the Company’s middleman, Malaya. But at Armagon the English succeeded in securing the right to establish a factory, to the exclusion of their rivals, despite Dutch machinations.

Armagon soon threatened to grow into a serious rival of Pulicat and the English efforts to draw away the textile manufacturers from the latter place were successful to some extent. But through shortage of capital they failed to provide adequate employment for the textile workers thus lured away. The weavers of Armagon had to secure permission from their nayak to work for the Dutch in order to maintain themselves. In 1629 there was a serious danger of armed conflict between the two nations when the English forced provision boats sailing from Orissa to Pulicat to go to Armagon instead. This was stopped only when the Dutch offered the Indian boats the protection of their armed frigates.204 The same year the Dutch and the English were forced to co-operate at Masulipatam in the face of a common danger. But such an alliance, forced by exigencies of circumstance, was essentially temporary.

In the 'twenties of the seventeenth century the Dutch enjoyed a position of distinct advantage over their European rivals in Coromandel.

The power of the Portuguese was on the wane and that of the Danes was insignificant. The English with their limited resources and comparative inexperience were still lagging far behind. The Dutch had arrived on the scene a few years earlier and, profiting by this fact, now jealously guarded their trade secrets. For decades to come, they were destined to maintain this position of ascendancy and effectively replace the Portuguese as pedlars of Coromandel ware in the markets of Asia, only on a much larger scale. But already the English had given enough evidence of their potential strength and once the problem of capital supply was solved, they would be more or less on an equal footing with the Dutch. For though the latter long continued to dominate the trade of East and South East Asia, the markets of Europe were equally open to both.

Officially, the relationship between the two companies continued to be friendly, but there was a strong undercurrent of hostility, specially after the conclusion of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1635. The Dutch suspected that the English were plotting against them with the Portuguese and had a hand in their troubles with the sar-i-khail. In 1633, the English began forcibly to divert the Orissa provision-boats to Armagon away from their usual destination, Pulicat. This affected the food prices at Pulicat and there was a general exodus of cloth manufacturers to Armagon where living was now cheaper. Eventually the Dutch had to deploy a cruiser to escort the provision-boats to Pulicat and by 1636, "the vexations from the... English near Armagon had ceased as they realised that our people the Dutch had resolved to withstand force with force. The Dutch efforts to prevent collusion between the English and the Portuguese were in fact more aggressive. In 1639 the Portuguese owners of a yacht carrying English flag, which had taken shelter in Armagon, were forced to abandon the boat so closely did the Dutch pursue and watch it. The same year an English ship was accosted off the coast in the belief that it belonged to the Portuguese.

But the techniques adopted by the Dutch in their rivalry with the English were mainly commercial rather than political or military in nature, and centred in efforts to prevent their competitors from pro-

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206 K.A.1019, 15.8.1633, ff.21vo—22; K.A.1038, 4.1.1636, f.44.
curing Coromandel cloth with a view to undermining their spice trade.

At Ambonina, the chief source for the supply of cloves, the Dutch could exercise a monopsonistic control to the exclusion of other European nations, but were powerless to prevent the trade of Asian traders from Malay and Macassar, from whom the English and the Danes in their turn procured their supplies in exchange of coast cloth. So the Dutch tried to buy up in Coromandel all varieties of cloth which might be required by their rivals for Malay and Macassar and to under-cut the prices of all commodities which the latter offered for sale on the coast. Still when the English had adequate capital — which, however, was not a frequent occurrence at this stage — they, like the Asian merchants, would purchase cloth somewhat indiscriminately in order to capture the market and prices went up in consequence, to the great inconvenience of the Dutch. At times, the Company used its political influence to exclude its competitors from the cloth market and for quite some time the Pulicat region, which was farmed out to Malaya’s relations, was out of bounds to the English, whose contract with the Conjiveram weavers for procuring cloth was also undermined through Dutch intrigues. Lack of capital hampered all English efforts to counteract such hostile manoeuvrings and in 1640, — the year in which the Madras factory was established by the English, — the Coromandel factors, while fully aware that English trade might seriously affect their position in future, confidently reported to Batavia that they had little to fear until their rivals had more capital.208

The danger of increasing English investments on the coast took quite some time to materialise. Meanwhile the superior resources of the Dutch frustrated all efforts of the English Company to extend its trade southwards and were often a serious hindrance to the procuring of return cargo. The English, depending chiefly on the supply of merchandise from Europe, could hardly hope to compete with a nation which controlled the trade of East and South East Asia and could thus procure the commodities in demand on the coast. The Dutch thus had the advantage of an additional means besides liquid capital for procuring the return cargo. Still, with supplies of capital from England and Bantam, the English factories in Coromandel did their best to maintain a hold on the market and enjoyed a short-lived advantage in north

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Carnatic during the Company's troubles with Chinanna in 1645. During 1649 to 1652, the Dutch records report an improvement in the state of English trade on the coast, but as the English themselves recognised, it was "of small consequence in respect of the Dutches vast traffique in these parts." 209

The position of the English in Coromandel deteriorated considerably after 1652, despite the fact that for a time they enjoyed a certain advantage over the Dutch, thanks to their friendly relations with Mir Jumla. In 1653—54, all English factories on the coast excepting Masulipatam and St. George were abandoned as being unprofitable. Early in 1653 the news of the Anglo-Dutch War in Europe reached Coromandel and though no actual hostilities took place on the east coast, the English ships practically stopped sailing for fear of the Dutch until peace was once more established in November, 1654. During 1657—58, the English Company's troubles with Mir Jumla, which led to actual attacks on Madras, further helped the Dutch to maintain their ascendancy.210

In the 'sixties, for the first time, the activities of the English became a serious threat to the Company's Coromandel trade. By 1660, English investments in the imported varieties of cloth were large enough, not merely to cause a rise in prices, but to induce the Company's own middlemen to supply the English with cloth which they had already contracted to supply the Dutch. English agents now went far inland to procure cloth and in consequence the Company's supplies for Persia fell far short of the required quantity. The sale of coast cloth in Malacca and adjacent regions was seriously affected as supplies brought by the English to Achin eventually reached Johor and other places and caused a glut in the market. For several months in 1661 not a bale of Coromandel cloth could be sold in Malacca and only 30 bales were therefore ordered for the following year. In the 'seventies, the impact of English competition was felt in the cloth trade in Java as well. The demand for the Company's wares on the coast also varied with the volume of supplies brought by the English. Further, the lucrative freight trade between Coromandel and Persia suffered a decline as the English,

Unlike the Dutch, now agreed to accept payment at the end of the voyage.211

Anglo-Dutch rivalry in Coromandel was not confined to the sphere of commerce in this period. In August, 1665 Batavia communicated to the coast factors the news of the outbreak or war with England with instructions to do all possible damage to the enemy. But three yachts sent from P tulicat under Peter de Lange to capture the English ships, anchored off Madras, merely succeeded in seizing near Masulipatam a small ship belonging to an English private trader. This action was taken by the Golconda authorities as an unlawful violation of the peace of the harbour and temporarily involved the Dutch in serious difficulties. But Batavia was inclined to ignore the warnings of Indian powers against hostilities in their harbours or near their coasts. Accordingly, in June, 1666 the Dutch ships posted near Madras to keep watch on enemy shipping pursued an English ship, the Constantinople Merchant, to the harbour of Masulipatam with the intention of capturing it. As the Masulipatam factors feared an attack on the Dutch factory by the numerically superior English garrison, Pulicat decided to postpone any decisive action until further orders from Batavia. But the officers responsible for this decision were subsequently summoned to Batavia to answer charges of disobeying instructions. This measure was partly meant to impress the Golconda authorities with the seriousness of the Company’s intentions against the English, and the accused were eventually acquitted. In 1668, instructions received from Holland again enjoined that enemy shipping should be attacked in neutral harbours, but much to the relief of the Coromandel factors the news of peace with England came soon afterwards.212

Late in 1672, Coromandel was informed by Batavia of the renewal of war with England and in September, 1673 a naval engagement took place south of Masulipatam between a Dutch fleet of four ships, under Admiral Cornelis van Quaestbergh, and an English fleet of ten. It ended in a decisive victory for the Dutch with the capture of three English ships. Emboldened by this success, the Coromandel factors now fully approved of Batavia’s recommendation that in time of war no heed


should be paid to Golconda’s prohibition of hostilities in her waters. But no further hostilities with the English took place before the termination of the war in 1674.213

By the late 'seventies the situation had definitely changed in favour of the English. The Dutch, now inadequately supplied with capital, had to depend on credit for a large part of their business. The English on the other hand were supported by increasing supplies of capital from home and could afford to make large purchases for Europe. In 1678, for instance, the capital imported by the English, as estimated by the Company, amounted to 3,000,000 florins besides 600,000 imported by the private traders; the capital supplied to the Dutch factories for the same year was probably around 2½ million florins. By now, the Dutch openly admitted that the ascendancy in the Coromandel trade had passed to the English. The situation had two particular implications for the Company. First, they could no longer procure from Coromandel cloth of the right quality in adequate quantity and warnings to the middlemen prohibiting the supply of cloth to the English directly or indirectly was of no avail. The Masulipatam market was now fully under English control, while the Company was heavily in debt there. A second consequence of the English ascendancy on the coast was that the Dutch were also ousted from the market for Coromandel cloth in Europe. The English procured new varieties of patterned piece-goods in accordance with samples sent from Europe. Dutch efforts to follow their example were handicapped by inadequacy of capital. Samples of guinea cloth purchased by the English on the coast were sent to Holland in 1681 to see if they would secure enough profits. But the profits fetched by this item, — 35 % on the unbleached and 63 % on the bleached varieties, — were considered inadequate, and it was decided to stick to the usual purchases which gave more profit. Later, in 1683, the policy was modified to some extent and the purchase of the comparatively less profitable varieties authorised, in order not to cede the European market entirely to the English. The English private traders and interlopers, particularly the latter, satisfied with even lower rates of gross profit per unit than the English Company, were considered the most dangerous competitors of the Dutch. As a net result of this increased capital investment by their rivals, the Dutch entirely lost their control over the Coromandel market. The abandonment of Bantam

by the English and their war with the Mughals in 1689—90 roused false hopes in the minds of the Dutch. But the English had never been primarily dependent on the South-East Asian trade and no temporary calamity could effectively destroy their ascendancy based on the solid foundation of a large capital supply.214

The change in the position of the Company vis-à-vis the English was not the result of any basic alteration in the economic situation or the pattern of trade. Formerly, the Dutch with their larger capital and their command over the South-East Asian market had an advantage over their rivals. Their chief weakness then, as later, was the heavy burden of administrative and military expenses which forced them to trade exclusively for a high margin of gross profit per unit. So long as they controlled the Coromandel cloth market by virtue of superior capital resources this weakness was not a very great handicap, for they could afford to bind up the manufacturers and middlemen and make them procure the required commodities strictly according to specification. They lost their position of advantage when their chief rivals, the English, surpassed them in the volume of capital import. The inadequacy of capital created a vicious circle.215 It prevented the Dutch from procuring cloth at profitable rates and this in its turn undermined the profits in Europe and Asian markets though this was by no means the only reason for the shortage of capital. As a net result, the English


215 The following data regarding the value (in florins) of the capital supplied to Coromandel from various regions during 1675—'90 are taken from the "Generale Missiven".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Batavia</th>
<th>Far East</th>
<th>Malacca</th>
<th>Persia</th>
<th>Ceylon</th>
<th>Pegu</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1675</td>
<td>1,435,807</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1676</td>
<td>661,049</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>786,141</td>
<td>160,879</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>239,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1677</td>
<td>420,815</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>35,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1678</td>
<td>1,288,510</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>çà 900,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>1679</td>
<td>1,104,495</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>222,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1680</td>
<td>702,585</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,052,397</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>161,254</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>çà 2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1683</td>
<td>1,937,624</td>
<td>309,154</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>268,595</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2,978,035</td>
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<tr>
<td>1684</td>
<td>617,321</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>583,371</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100,384</td>
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<tr>
<td>1685</td>
<td>331,163</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11,694</td>
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<tr>
<td>1686</td>
<td>1,281,401</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>1687</td>
<td>321,626</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>850,114</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1688</td>
<td>1,163,717</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1689</td>
<td>543,382</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1690</td>
<td>992,377</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>176,857</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
captured both the buyer's market in Coromandel and the seller's market in Europe by virtue of their larger capital. The fact that the Dutch still enjoyed a position of advantage in South-East Asia — especially after the English left Bantam — made little difference to the situation. The English had found in Europe an alternative market for Coromandel cloth which was potentially much bigger than the South-East Asian market; and so long as they could provide enough capital, they could control the source of supply. In the economy of the region, the commerce of the English replaced that of the Dutch as the most decisive external influence.
The Danes

While the trade of the English and, to a lesser extent, that of the Portuguese, were serious problems for the Dutch, the activities of the Danes on the coast were no more than a minor irritant. Still, when Roelant Crape of the Danish East India Company secured the cession of Tranquebar port from the na\text{\textit{ayak}} of Tanjore in 1620 and built their fort, Dansborg, the Dutch could do little to prevent it. By 1625, the Danes secured freedom of trade at Masulipatam, took Pondicherry in lease and established a factory at Pipli in Bengal. It appeared, commented governor Ysbrantsz, “as if they wanted to buy up the whole world”.

With little capital and less support from home, the Danes, as competitors of the Dutch, had only a nuisance value. Still their offer of high prices for saltpetre, indigo and Coromandel pepper pushed up the prices of these commodities, while their intrigues often caused serious hindrance to Dutch trade. Having a smaller burden of expenses to bear, they also sold Coromandel cloth at comparatively cheap rates in Sumatra and Celebes and thus spoilt the market for the Company. They were friendly to the Portuguese and carried on their ships Portuguese cargo from Bengal to Coromandel, which the Dutch cruisers were powerless to prevent. But shortage of capital and troubles with the Masulipatam governor and the na\text{\textit{ayak}} of Tanjore soon forced them to assume a humbler attitude. In 1628, they sold their stocks of indigo and saltpetre to the Dutch and in 1629 Crape actually offered to sell Dansborg to the Company. Though Ysbrantsz had been in favour of securing the fort, Coen turned down the offer as he considered any more establishments unnecessary in Coromandel.\textsuperscript{216} This proposal was considered from time to time until it was finally dropped in 1659 to avoid any further addition to the Company’s burdens.\textsuperscript{217}

By 1629 the affairs of the Danish Company were in such a sad state that they leased out fort Dansborg to Malaya who administered it apparently until his death with the help of a few soldiers supplied by the Dutch.\textsuperscript{218} But the Danes continued to import cloves, sandal wood, \textit{radix\textit{ china}}, tortoise shell, sugar and silk stuffs from Macassar and

\textsuperscript{216} E.F.I., 1618—21, p.xlv; van Dam, II, ii, p.118; Coen, V, pp.383, 581 ff., VII, pp.1218, 1334 ff, 1443, 1511; D.R., 1624—29, p.134; K.A.994, Ysbrantsz to Amsterdam, 12.10.1624; K.A.996, Ysbrantsz to Amsterdam, 28.4.1625; K.A.998, 3.2.1626, ff.2vo, 4; K.A.999, Ysbrantsz to Batavia, 5.12.1625, same to Amsterdam, 8.3.1626.

\textsuperscript{217} K.A.1119, 16.12.1659, f.46.

\textsuperscript{218} K.A.1012, 25.1.1630, f.68vo.
bartered these for Coromandel cloth, and also traded coast tobacco for Bengal sugar which was then exported to Persia. Their import of cloves did adversely affect the price of the commodity in Coromandel and the Dutch had to under-cut prices in order to retain their hold on the market. The secret Danish-Portuguese entente was a source of still greater embarrassment. The Danish ships brought to Masulipatam a steady stream of Portuguese emigrants from Bengal and Macassar and the practice stopped only after severe threats from the Dutch. In 1641, the Danes, reduced once more to a precarious position, renewed their periodical overtures for the transfer of fort Dansborg to the Dutch. The Company entered into these negotiations with great caution and was guided by Batavia's recently formulated obiter which required all intercourse with the rival nations to be reduced to a minimum.

The activities of the Danes in Coromandel, by the middle 'forties, ceased to have even a nuisance value so far as the Dutch were concerned. With little support from home and an irregular trade with Java and Macassar which hardly covered the expenses involved, the Danes were once more forced to resume their interminable negotiations for the transfer of Dansborg to the Dutch. The authorities both at Batavia and in Amsterdam were now seriously interested in the deal, particularly after the Muslim conquest of the northern Carnatic, because they wanted some place to fall back on in case the Golconda government prohibited the Company from holding forts in their territory. But the Danes, still expecting the arrival of adequate capital from Europe, failed to come to a decision and after the capture of Negapatam the Company also lost its interest in Dansborg.

The relations between the two nations on the coast in the 'fifties were, however, closer than ever before. To the great chagrin of the Portuguese, the Karikal factors were allowed to reside in Dansborg in 1633 as a precautionary measure. Arrangements for the delivery of Karikal cloth to Tranquebar, for which 1% duty was paid to the Danes, worked very satisfactorily and the Company employed twelve soldiers for the protection of the Danish fort. In 1657, there was a temporary hitch owing to the seizure of a Danish boat by the Company, but eventually the Dutch decided to return the boat and maintain their

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221 K.A.1044, 12.12.1641, f.78; K.A.768. 3.4.1641, f.77.
garrison at Dansborg, lest the fort might be taken over by the English.222 The trade of the Danes was evidently allowed to survive on sufferance and this was a small price to pay for a political and military alliance against powerful enemies.

By the 'sixties, the trade of the Danes was altogether moribund though with occasional assistance from Europe they continued to send their ships to Macassar and Japara, and later to Bantam and Manilla as well. In 1659, Laurens Pit wanted to withdraw the Company's soldiers from Dansborg, but eventually allowed the Danes to retain a small Dutch garrison provided they paid for its upkeep. At times, as in 1673, their supplies of painted cloth affected the prices at Bantam, while their import of copper to Coromandel caused a glut in the market. In the main, however, Danish trade counted for little.223
The French

It was the cherished object of Dutch policy to exclude, so far as practicable, all other European nations from a share in the Coromandel trade. Early French efforts to open trade with this region were frustrated mainly as a result of this policy. In June, 1617 the ship St. Michel, belonging to La Compagnie des Moluques, organised by the merchants of Dieppe, Rouen and St. Malo, anchored off Pondicherry and wrote to the Dutch at Tierepopelier enquiring about trade prospects. The French received only a hostile reply and their attempt to secure trading rights in G ingi were foiled through Dutch machinations. But they did eventually succeed in opening trade with Pondicherry. As Pondicherry produced no cloth and the Dutch prevented supplies from Tierepopelier, the French were however soon forced to leave Coromandel. In 1621, a Frenchman sent by Beaulieu, the commander of a French fleet which had sailed from Honfleur, tried to secure trading rights at Masulipatam and failed, apparently owing to Dutch intrigues.224

Nearly five decades later, in 1670, the French East India Company appeared on the coast and made its début at Masulipatam. The Company did not have much to fear from the French as commercial competitors though the latter secured the right to duty-free trade in the Golconda kingdom. But the repercussions on the coast of the Franco-Dutch wars in Europe constituted a threat to the Coromandel factories and the Company’s shipping. When in July, 1672 the French forcibly seized the town of San Thomé from the Golconda authorities and Golconda forces laid seige to the town, the Dutch felt seriously concerned about their future security, and their fears were aggravated by the French attack on the Masulipatam harbour.225 Following two decisive defeats in February and March, 1673 the Golconda army practically abandoned their seige of San Thomé and withdrew to a safe distance. But for the intervention of the Dutch, the San Thomé episode would have ended in a decisive victory for the French.

In June, 1673 Rijcklof van Goens, appointed Admiral and Superintendent for the war against the French both on the east and the west coast of India, arrived before San Thomé with his fleet from

224 Coen, II, pp.201, 298, 338; K.A.978, Lefebvre to Amsterdam, 24.9.1617, S. Luys to Symon Joosten, 17.6.1617, 19.7.1617, Symon Joosten to de Haze, 3.8.1617; Kaeppelin, p.2; Sen, The French in India, p.5.

Ceylon and induced the Golconda authorities to resume the siege while the Dutch blockaded all outlets to the sea. The French Viceroy, de la Haye, who had gone south with some of his ships, tried to run the blockade without success and it was only some weeks later that he managed to evade the Dutch men of war and re-enter San Thomé. As the Golconda authorities were still lukewarm about continuing the war against the French, van Goens left San Thomé in June, 1673. The second siege of San Thomé began in September, 1673 when van Goens not merely organised a naval blockade but sent a large contingent to help the Golconda force besieging the town. The local Muslim officers were still reluctant to take part in the campaign and were at times positively obstructive. The siege was apparently carried on chiefly because of the insistence of the Dutch. Eventually, it was recognised that the defences of the town were too strong for any successful assault and the only hope of the besiegers lay in starving out the French. So the siege now took the form of a prolonged trial of patience, with occasional skirmishes and foraging expeditions by the French. As the supply of food ran short, a steady stream of deserters from the French camp came over to the Dutch. François Martin, who later founded the French settlement at Pondicherry, induced Sher Khan Lodi, the Bijapuri governor of upper Gingi, to enter into an agreement for secretly supplying provisions to San Thomé. But Dutch threats soon forced the governor to give up the idea. In August, 1674 van Goens returned to Negapatam with the bulk of the fleet, leaving Governor Pavilioen in charge of the siege. About a month later, de la Haye, the Viceroy, surrendered San Thomé to the Dutch on condition that he and his men would be allowed to sail to France on ships lent by the Company. Accordingly, on September 23, 1674, the French vacated the town and the Dutch and the Golconda forces moved in. San Thomé once more passed into the hands of Golconda and Qutb Shah decided to destroy the city, so that it should not attract the undesired attention of any European nations in future. The Dutch, as mentioned earlier in this volume, were rewarded by exemption from all tolls payable at Masulipatam and a grant in perpetuity of the township of Palicol. Besides, the victory at San Thomé meant a tremendous accession to the Company's prestige. It did not, however, lead to the expulsion of the French from Coromandel nor imply any basic improvement or alternation in the Dutch position on the coast.226

226 The siege of San Thomé and the Franco-Dutch War in Coromandel, 1673—74, have been discussed in great detail in several works, — e.g.,
Kaeppelin's *Les Origines de l'Inde Francaise* (Pt. I, Ch. V), Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde Française avant Dupleix* (pp.101 ff), S. P. Sen, *The French in India*, Chs. VI—X, — on the basis of the French and English sources. The Dutch archives contain a wealth of material on the subject which corroborate in the main the story already known, except that they contain further details about the diplomatic background and military operations. While they are of importance to the military historian, such details are irrelevant to the general theme of the present work, for the siege of San Thomé was little more than an episode in the history of the Dutch in Coromandel. For the Dutch sources see K.A.1181, 13.11.1673, ff.30 ff, 28.6.1673, ff.504 ff, 29.4.1673, f.513vo, 23.11.1673, ff.493vo—502; K.A.1182, 11.7.1673, ff.261 vo—264vo; K.A.1188, Resolutions, 23.7.1674 — 29.7.1674, ff.278—284 and letters written from June to September, ff.609—643; Ceylon Government Archives, *Colombo Records*, Journal of the voyage of Rijcklof van Goens (No. 3399), ff.725—851; Heeres, II, pp.505—13. For the French sources, *Mémoires de François Martin*, (Edited by A. Martineau), I, Chs. VI—IX, *The Travels of the Abbé Carré* (translated by Lady Fawcett), Chs. IV—VII and letters of François Martin, Bayon and others, 5.2.1673 to 6.9.1674, in the *Archives Nationales*, Paris C²62 (Correspondance générale), ff.197—210, 239—243vo.
Asian Traders

The competition of the Indian and other Asian merchants, destined to become a source of great worry to the Company, did not present any very serious problem initially. Compared to the magnitude of available supplies and the markets for the same, the volume of the Company's trade and capital resources was somewhat limited at the outset and consequently there was little clash of interest between the Dutch and Asian traders. And so long as the Company's resources did not increase substantially, attempts at monopsonistic control were bound to fail. The trade between Coromandel and the East Indies, however, was fast becoming a monopoly of the Dutch as it had been of the Portuguese to a more limited extent for many decades. But occasionally the Dutch ships carried small quantities of merchandise to the Indian Archipelago on behalf of the great Coromandel merchants, — some of whom combined offices of state with their trading activities, — and these were sold by the Company's agents, the proceeds being paid to the owner in merchandise, mainly spices. But such infringements of the Company's monopolistic policy were permitted rather reluctantly and, in fact, avoided whenever possible.227

The regions with which the Coromandel merchants had direct trade relations were Pegu, Arakan, Tenasserim and Sumatra in the East and Mokha and Mecca in the West.228 With their relatively limited capital resources and unwillingness to undertake more than they could manage, the Dutch considered the lands bordering the east coast of the Bay of somewhat secondary importance. In these countries, the Indian merchants were in a position of advantage, — an advantage they really never lost. In contrast to the erratic and half-successful efforts of the Dutch, their trade with both Arakan and Burma was steady and successful, though limited in range and volume. In the early decades of the century, the Dutch felt the impact of Asian competition in Coromandel mainly at the time when Indian and Asian ships were loaded for voyages abroad. Procuring cloth for the Company was very difficult at such times. The Dutch tried to tackle this problem by purchasing their return cargo beforehand. Besides, occasionally, in some countries,

228 A letter from Coromandel (Coen, VII, p.102) mentions the arrival of two Chinese junks at Masulipatam from Bantam in 1616. The local governor seized them as prize. Mrs. Meilink-Roelofsz of the Algemeen Rijksarchief, the Hague, suggested to the present writer that these junks probably belonged to Chinese settlers in Java.
there was discrimination against them in favour of Indians. In 1621, for instance, the king of Achin allowed pepper to be sold at comparatively cheaper rates to the Masulipatam merchants.

The world of Asian trade was still found wide enough for the Dutch and Asian merchants and in Coromandel at least there were no attempts as yet at monopsonistic control. As to exclusive control on the overseas trade, the system of 'passes', a legacy of the era of Portuguese domination, requiring Indian ships to take passports from the Dutch factories as guarantee against attack by Dutch ships, was already there. But the extent to which the system was generally accepted is uncertain. At times passes were refused to merchants or nobles who, as late as 1628, were in no position to retaliate; but the seizure of a Surat ship off Point de Galle for not carrying a pass involved the Company into considerable trouble and greater circumspection in future was recommended by Batavia. On the other hand, the Coromandel factors discouraged Coen's idea of making the Indians pay toll for the use of the sea-ways. The eventual exclusion of all Asian shipping from the eastern seas, recommended by Coen in 1623, was approved in principle by the Seventeen. But cruising against Indian ships carrying Portuguese ware was the only practical way in which this policy was implemented in Coromandel. In fact the Dutch ships often had to carry cargo for influential Indians to Batavia despite the repeated instructions of the Governor-General and Council to the contrary. It was only in the later decades of the century that the Dutch, with increased power and an uncompromising policy of monopoly, tried to exclude Indian traders from all direct share in overseas trade.229

By the sixteen thirties, there was a distinct change in the situation. Dutch attempts to establish exclusive control over both the buyer's and the seller's market for Coromandel ware clashed with the Indians' eagerness to expand their trading activities. The Company's aims were rendered feasible by an increased supply of capital. The new commercial ambition of the Indian merchants was the result of a series of complex and related circumstances: end of Portuguese hegemony, European investments increasing the capital resources of Indian merchants and the example of profitable trading by Europeans in various lands with Coromandel ware as their staple. Besides Indian merchants from the

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inland areas of Golconda, Bijapur and Hindustan flocked as before to the Coromandel cloth-marts and their indiscriminate purchases pushed up the price of all textile products. The Company, now keen to control the local market on advantageous terms, found this highly inconvenient. Thanks to the stimulus to Coromandel’s overseas trade provided by European commercial activity the number of Indian ships sailing from the coast to other parts of Asia was steadily on the increase. Profiting by the Company’s shortage of capital, a problem which had not been entirely solved, the Indian traders purchased cloth at high prices all along the coast for export to Achin, Pegu, Tenasserim, Malay and other regions. The trade of one single merchant, the Company’s chief supplier Chinanna, with Ceylon, Arakan and Pegu was large enough to be considered detrimental to Dutch interests.

Particularly thriving was the cloth trade of the Coromandel merchants with Siam and Sumatra through the ports of Tenasserim and Achin respectively. The prices offered by the Indian merchants in these markets were so low that the Dutch could in no way hope to compete with them successfully. The kings of Siam and Achin also regularly sent their own ships to Coromandel to procure cloth in exchange of the wares of their own countries. In consequence, the Company barely managed to continue its precarious trade in Siam, while at Achin, in view of the overwhelming Asian competition, they decided in 1634 to abandon the effort for some years.²³⁰

Tin, one of the commodities which the Dutch hoped to sell very profitably in Coromandel, was imported in large quantities by the Indian and Siamese traders from Siam. This metal could be brought to Coromandel from Malay via Batavia by the sea-route far more cheaply than from the inland areas of Siam via Tenasserim. Yet the Asian traders, who, being unburdened with heavy establishment costs, could afford a small margin of gross profit per unit, successfully undercut prices and maintained their hold on the Coromandel market against Dutch competition.²³¹

The incipient commerce of the Dutch with Persia was also threatened by the growing trade of the Coromandel merchants with that country. Mir Kamaluddin (?),²³² a Masulipatam merchant with whom the

²³¹ K.A.1031, 3.5.1636, f.1102.
²³² This seems to be the most likely Indian form of the name mentioned in the Dutch records as ‘Mircomaldy’.
Dutch had extensive trade relations, regularly sent to Persia large cargoes of cloth, Bengal sugar as also sappan wood purchased from the Dutch themselves. Helpless against this competition, the Company had to content itself with merely stopping the sale of sappan wood to Kamaluddin.

Already by the 'thirties, Batavia’s avowed policy was to reduce Asian competition in the Coromandel trade by exploiting the Company’s control over the sea-routes. Accordingly passes were no longer granted gratis to Indian ships and altogether refused whenever possible. After the fall of Malacca, ships from Coromandel and elsewhere sailing to that port were made to pay to the Company the tolls previously paid to the Portuguese. To facilitate collection of tolls, passes were often granted only for Malacca, ships sailing to the Malay peninsula being thus forced to call there. The customary permission granted to Indian traders to sail in Dutch ships from Coromandel to Batavia was now withdrawn and the practice of lending Dutch sailors and gunners to Indian merchants generally discontinued.

But such measures were at best a half success. In 1635, Batavia urged the authorities at Amsterdam to accept Asian participation in the Coromandel trade as an established fact. In 1640, the refusal of passes to Bengal and Masulipatam traders, accustomed to sail to Tenasserim and the ports of Malay, was also considered inopportune. The Company wanted Chinanna to abandon his trade with Pegu in return for a contract giving him the sole right to purchase Dutch imports from Pegu to Coromandel. But the point was not pressed for fear that Chinanna might otherwise go over to the English. The Dutch ships continued to carry Indian passengers and cargoes on freight to Persia, Pegu and even to Batavia despite strict instructions to the contrary. Refusal to help Muslim ships with sailors and gunners was also not always possible in practice. In short, the Dutch gradually accepted Asian competition as a 'habitual plague' and concentrated more on ousting their European rivals.

233 K.A.1019, 15.8.1633, f.43; K.A.1022, 15.8.1634, f.30; K.A.1028, 4.1.1636, f.42.
But the 'habitual plague' soon assumed dangerous proportions and constituted a serious threat in more than one sector of the south-east Asian trade. The increasing participation in this trade of powerful officials like Mir Jumla, Khan-i-Khanan and Krishnappa, and the acquisition of administrative authority in the Carnatic by merchant-princes like Chinanna and Koneri Chetti, facilitated by the anarchic conditions in the Carnatic, gave a fresh edge to the Company's commercial rivalry with the Indians. In Achin and the 'tin areas' around Malacca, as also in Burma and Siam, the Company's trade suffered badly from the competition of the Indian merchants, who "were satisfied with small profits and were much subtler than the Company's servants in the matter of procuring cloth and other merchandise". They glutted the markets with all varieties of cloth, evaded the payment of the 'Malacca toll', which was compulsory in the days when the Portuguese were in possession of Malacca, and made it impossible for the Company to secure the quantity of tin required for its trade in Coromandel and elsewhere. The large volume of return cargo brought back by these merchants to the coast undermined the demand for the Company's wares. The growing tendency on part of the king of Queda and the traders of Achin, who were mostly of Indian origin, to send ships to Coromandel, despite Batavia's refusal to grant passes, intensified the existing problems and the Company's authorities were more and more inclined to believe that they could maintain their hold on the south-east Asian market only by the use of force.\(^{236}\)

In 1647, Batavia finally decided on a drastic measure. The factories in Coromandel and other places in India were forbidden to give passes to any Indian ships for Achin, Malacca, the 'tin quarters' of Perak, Queda, Oujang-Salang (Junk Ceylon) etc. and any other places thereabout or further east. All ships sailing to these prohibited regions would be seized as legitimate booty.\(^{237}\)

This policy achieved a temporary and very limited success. For a year or two, comparatively few Indian ships sailed to the south east. But the widespread resentment provoked by the new measures threat-\(^{236}\)K.A.771, 9.8.1644, f.542, 23.9.1644, f.638; K.A.772, 15.3.1645, ff.128—29, 133; K.A.774, 27.7.1647, f.378; K.A.1051, 22.12.1643, f.39vo; K.A.1054, 23.12.1644, f.541vo, 4.5.1644, f.569vo; K.A.1056, 3.6.1643, f.775vo, 26.9.1643, ff.791vo—92.

\(^{237}\)These detailed instructions are contained in a letter from Batavia to Coromandel, dated July 27, 1647 (see K.A.774, f.378). But a similar decision with regard to Mir Jumla and some others had been taken in the previous year (see K.A.1062 (vervolg), 24.8.1646, ff.833vo ff.).
ened the very basis of the Company's trade in Coromandel and thus
neutralised the rather doubtful gains which were expected to follow
from them. Mir Jumla and the Golconda authorities in the north, the
Tanjore nayak, and, after 1649, the representatives of Bijapur on the
east coast vigorously protested against these restrictions and even threat-
ened reprisals. Contrary to Batavia's expectation, the Indian merchants,
particularly powerful nobles like Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Khanan, did
not pay much heed to the Company's prohibitions and, by 1649, began
to send their ships freely to these forbidden areas. The Indian merchants
of Negapatam, at times helped by the Portuguese, played a leading role
in this respect. The Company's prestige suffered a serious decline
through such open violation of its orders. Pulicat urged an abandonment
of Batavia's ineffectual policy as early as 1648, and the Bengal factories
actually granted passes for the forbidden regions despite Batavia's orders
to the contrary. In 1651, the Indies Council decided to withdraw the
restrictions as far as Achin was concerned because of the great hatred
they had provoked and their general ineffectiveness. The prohibitory
orders with regard to Malacca and places further east were also can-
celled before long, the ships sailing to those regions being only made to
pay the 'Malacca toll'. Besides, during the war with Macassar, ships
destined for that kingdom were diverted to Batavia at the Company's
request. The general policy henceforward was to grant passes on a
selective basis, chiefly to nobles who were too powerful to be alienated.
Still, the occasional refusal of passes to influential nobles or traders and
the collection of the 'Malacca toll' led to recurrent troubles. This was
only to be expected, when not only the Bijapur and Golconda nobles,
but emperor Aurangzeb himself began to send ships to Ceylon and
South East Asia from the Coromandel ports. Even worse for the Com-
pany was the growing practice of sending ships without Dutch passes
adopted by some Indian traders, particularly those of Negapatam, who
now knew by experience that they could defy the Company with impu-
nity. A policy which was intended to increase the Company's power and
improve its finances thus resulted only in the lowering of its prestige and
the subversion of its authority. The danger of Asian competition now
assumed a more formidable character.\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{238} K.A.776, 13.8.1649, f.116vo; K.A.778, 16.6.1651, ff.208—9; K.A.782,
21.7.1654, ff.280ff, 16.4.1655, f.149; K.A.784, 8.9.1657, f.463; K.A.1066,
3.3.1648, f.485vo, 5.10.1647, ff.519ff; K.A.1068, (vervolg), 2.4.1649, f.536;
K.A.1071, 25.7.1650, f.201; K.A.1072, 10.2.1650, ff.58ff; K.A.1074,
The price of cloth rose sharply on the coast as a result of this competition and the volume of supply for the Company was also affected. The demand for tin went down considerably as the Indians brought large quantities from Malacca and the adjacent regions. In the early 'seventies, the profits on copper, which were formerly very high, also declined because the Indians imported large supplies from Siam, where the metal was now brought by Chinese traders in increasing quantities from Japan. The trade in Ceylon areca nuts, which had once been very promising, was undermined by the Coromandel traders who sent their ships to the sources of supply, although this was strictly prohibited.

The Company's greatest worry, however, was the effect of this growing Indian overseas trade on the South-East Asian market, particularly on the sale of cloth, still the chief medium of exchange for procuring spices for Europe. In Siam, Achin, Malacca, Bantam, Java, Japara and Macassar the Company's profits on the sale of cloth suffered heavily through the import of large quantities of comparatively cheap cloth by Indians from the coast. The Indian merchants sold their cloth which was often of a poor quality at a profit of only about 20% and took back gold and Japanese cobangs on which they made another 15% profit in Coromandel. Unable to trade for such a small margin of gross profit per unit, the Company was helpless against such competitors. At times the Indians increased their profits by smuggling out gold which was subject to a 10% toll in the Company's territories. To improve the sale of their cloth, the Dutch lowered the price and tried to procure it comparatively cheaply from Coromandel. The old technique of building up large inventories and releasing them at low prices when the competitors arrived with their supplies was also tried. The coast factors further sought in vain to compel groups of handicraftsmen to supply cloth exclusively to the Company. Offers of exemption from payment for sea-passes were made to Indian merchants on condition they would not import painted cloth to Java and Malacca. But eventually, in the 'seventies, the Dutch were forced to stop the import of some varieties of cloth in a desperate effort to boost sales.

In Coromandel itself, in face of this menacing situation, the Company was forced into an over-all retreat from its policy of strength. In the early 'sixties, the general policy was not to refuse passes for any place as far east as Malacca for it would have been impossible to do so. But severe restrictions were imposed on Indian trade with regions further east, though frequent exceptions had to be made in favour of powerful applicants and, by the 'seventies, the policy of refusing passes appears
to have been thoroughly discredited. The Company encouraged Indians to trade with Malacca rather than any other region, for though the profits there were affected by Indian imports, the Dutch hoped partially to make up for their losses through the collection of the 'Malacca tolls'. But the Indians often evaded these tolls by successfully smuggling merchandise out of Malacca and the adjacent regions. The necessity for sending provisions on freight to Ceylon in Indian ships, owing to shortage of available shipping space, also forced the Company to allow Indians to procure elephants from the island without paying any tolls, contrary to the general custom. This policy however had the additional advantage of boosting the sale of Ceylon elephants without any expense to the Company.

The custom of taking sea-passes from European nations which had been long accepted with little protest by Indian merchants and potentates, came to be challenged in the mid-sixties. The increase in the amount charged for the passes granted by the Company, — from 100 rials to 100 pagodas each, — was only partly responsible for this. The wars between the European nations now rendered the system more irksome for the Indians than ever before, because passes had to be secured from each of the belligerent nations at a given moment. Even the Danes, who earned little by honest trade, threatened to seize Indian ships unless separate passes were taken from them as well. No wonder the Indians began "to understand better their right to freedom of navigation". As a letter from the Pulicat factory pointed out in 1667, the Indians found it increasingly irksome that they dared not send their ships from their own ports across the open sea to the coast of friendly countries without purchasing passes from the different foreign nations whom they had generously allowed to trade in their lands. It was reported that in future the Dutch might be denied their freedom of trade on the coast if they insisted on the system of passes.

The final breakdown of the system, in fact, seemed near at hand. In 1666, the Qazi of Srikakole sent a ship to Tenasserim with an English pass only, and one of Sayesta Khan's ships sailed from Masulipatam with an outdated pass. A Hindu merchant sailed to Malacca without any pass at all. The Dutch tried to cope with the situation by relaxing the conditions for granting passes and authorising the dependent factories to issue them, so that it was no longer necessary to apply to Pulicat. But such measures did not affect the basic problem which was rooted in a far-reaching clash of interests.239

239 For the competition with Indian merchants, 1660—1670, see K.A.789,
Fundamentally, the problem of Indian and other Asian competition was also linked up with the questions of capital resources and the ability to trade for a small margin of gross profit. Only it was more complicated by the Indians' ability to exert political pressure and their traditional acquaintance with the techniques of trade in various parts of South-East Asia. The total capital resources of the very large number of Indian merchants who now regularly sent their ships abroad were evidently not negligible. Their volume of export was indeed of impressive magnitude. In 1681, 28 ships are reported to have sailed from Porto Novo alone for Achin, Qeda, Manila, and Bengal with more than 12,000 packs of cloth. The policy of refusing passes had become thoroughly discredited and the Seventeen's obstinacy on the point merely made the Dutch obnoxious to the local rulers. Indian merchants now appealed for passes to other European nations or went through a pretence of selling their ships, so that Indian ships under European flags sailed to all parts of South-East Asia including Bantam. The effects of this trade in the Coromandel cloth market were similar to those of the English competition. In 1685—86, the Dutch failed to procure a single piece of cloth at Palicol for nearly a year, because the weavers were paid at much higher rates by Indians procuring cargo for Manila. Even during the Maratha wars in the South, the Indian merchants


The following figures are available for the number of Indian ships which sailed to various parts of Asia from the different Coromandel ports in 1681—82. (See K.A.1267, ff.2083vo ff).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Coromandel</th>
<th>Pulicat</th>
<th>Porto Novo</th>
<th>Negapatam</th>
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<tr>
<td>Achin</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Arakan</td>
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<td>Bengal</td>
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<td>Bantam</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Ceylon</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pegu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Persia</td>
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<td>Macao</td>
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<td>Malacca</td>
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<td>Manilla</td>
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<td>Oujang-Salang</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tenasserim</td>
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</table>
continued to buy up all available cloth for Achin and Manilla.\textsuperscript{241} A letter from Pulicat in 1680 stated with deep regret that the days when the Company was the chief buyer of cloth on the coast were gone for ever and the Indian merchants purchased the bulk of the available supply in many places. Of the 23 ships equipped at Porto Novo that year, 16 were owned by Indians. The monopoly of particular varieties of cloth formerly enjoyed by the Dutch was now thoroughly undermined, because the Indians offered higher prices for all items and often purchased from the weavers the very cloth they had undertaken to supply to the Company. The growing trade with Manilla, whence Spaniards also now frequently visited the coast in quest of cloth, was partly responsible for this increased demand, and the Company's representatives saw no chance of any improvement unless that trade could be stopped.\textsuperscript{242}

The mass of evidence provided by the factory records proves beyond doubt that in the latter half of the 17th century the trade of the Coromandel merchants had become one of the major facts in Asian commerce. They explored not only the regions directly or indirectly familiar to Indian traders, but at least one new field, — the Philippines. In the last quarter of the century this expansion of trading activities continued steadily in the face of immense problems thrown up by wars, famine and pestilence, — a testimony to the resilience of the Indian commercial and production organization. Nothing inherent in this process of expansion itself suggests the possibility of an early eclipse. One wonders whether further developments, both quantitative and qualitative, might not have followed but for the exclusive control eventually established by a single company of monopolistic merchant capital which reduced independent traders to the position of middlemen and financiers. It is, however, to be remembered that against the competition of a buoyant joint-stock company with vast potentialities of steadily increasing resources, individual merchants, however resourceful or capable, did not have much chance. Besides, the Indian merchants had not learnt one important lesson: to invest capital in production itself which alone could adequately reduce cost and expand the volume of produce. The European companies, on the other hand, were already introducing the manufacture system on the coast. The relative success of the Indians in their competition with the Dutch was largely a result of the Company's over-all


\textsuperscript{242} K.A.1244, 6.11.1680, ff.379vo—381; K.A.1258, 24.7.1681, f.1466vo.
decline and an inefficient organisation. Against the English, with their new ascendancy in world commerce, there was hardly any possibility in the long run of such success in trade rivalry.