NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1 The first Indonesian Parliament, possessing only advisory powers, was instituted on August 29th, 1945. Two days later the first Republican Cabinet was formed. An Indonesian Army was officially called into being on October 5th.

2 For clashes between Indonesian and Japanese armed forces in Java see, for example, Anderson (1972) and Smail (1964).

3 For the social revolutions in Tegal and Aceh respectively see p. 137–143, and p. 273–284.

4 Kiyai Jusuf Tauziri was for a time a close friend and mentor of Kartosuwirjo's.

5 The proclamation of a Darul Islam State by Kartosuwirjo in August is also mentioned by Brugmans (1966).

6 At the end of 1945 or the beginning of 1946 an Islamic State was proclaimed in Ciamis by one Kiyai Abdul Hamid, a then member of Masyumi.

7 For the Japanese policy vis-à-vis the Islamic leaders see inter alia Benda (1958) and Sluimers (1968).

8 Most of the information on Kartosuwirjo is taken from Pinardi (1964). A short biography on Kartosuwirjo is also found in Boland (1971:55–57); The (1968); Van Nieuwenhuijze (1958:167–169); and Horikoshi (1975).

9 According to the results of the Welvaartsonderzoek (Prosperity Survey) of 1904/1905, there were in the afdeling Rembang, of which Cepu was part, four schools of the second grade (cf. Volkswelvaart 1914:491). See also Kats (1915).


11 The section of the party under which this was done was the so-called section B (cf. Dahm 1971:54–55; Noer 1973:123–125).

12 Cf. issues of the Jong Java magazine Wederopbouw, tijdschrift aan de Jong-Javane-Beweging en het Javaanse geestesleven gewijd.

13 Benda (1958:49) also observes that "a nucleus of leaders was being trained in the Jong Islamieten Bond, who in later years were to occupy central positions in Islamic political parties".

14 According to Pinardi (1964:22), Kartosuwirjo became chairman of the Jong Islamieten Bond. It is not clear whether this was of the central board or of the Surabaya branch.

15 Before the adoption of the name Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia the party was called Partai Sarekat Islam Hindia Timur.

16 As other mentors of Kartosuwirjo Noer (1973:148) mentions Kiyai

18 Agus Salim was chairman of the party council, or Dewan Partai, while Abikusno Tjokrosujojo headed the executive committee.
19 This of course does not mean to say that there were no Catholic, Protestant or atheistic nationalists.
20 As the number of those expelled Noer (1973:146) mentions 28, Pluvier (1953) and Horikoshi (1975:62) both 29.
21 For a synopsis see also Noer (1973:146–148).
22 In earlier years Kartosuwirjo had not been opposed to cooperation with other parties. In December 1927 he had attended the inaugural meeting, as representative of the PSII, of the Permusafakatan Perhimpunan-Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (PPPKI), or Congress of Nationalist Political Associations of Indonesia. See Pinardi (1964:35), who incorrectly calls the PPPKI the Perhimpunan Pimpinan Politik Umum Indonesia.
23 In some sources this committee is referred to as Komite Pembela Kebenaran PSII.
24 Pinardi bases his account on written statements by Kartosuwirjo to military officials of the Siliwangi Division of West Java after his arrest (Pinardi 1964:26).
25 On the meaning of Suffah, Horikoshi (1975:63), citing Noer (1973:340), writes: "Suffah refers to an institution at the time of the Prophet at which a number of young men were instructed by the Prophet himself in order to propagate Islam". According to Boland (1971:56), "As-Suffa... was probably a long covered portico in the courtyard of the prophet's house and temporary mosque at Medina. According to later tradition... the 'people of the suffa' were a group of poor and pious Muslims who lived there, spending their time in study and worship... The word suffa was sometimes considered the origin of the term tasawwuf (sufism, mysticism)."
26 For the decline in membership of the (Partai) Sarekat Islam (Indonesia) cf. Pluvier (1953:197) and Deliar Noer (1973:125). Pluvier writes: "Whereas the SI in 1919-1920, according to the — probably exaggerated — account of Tjokroaminoto, counted 2 million members, in 1930 this number had dwindled to circa 20,000. Five years later the PSII had about 45,000 members. Although there are no figures available for the later years, it can be assumed that, in view of the ruptures in the party after 1935, this latter figure was not exceeded in these years."
27 Kartosuwirjo had also been imprisoned for a few days in 1936, when he had been accused of plotting a rebellion.
28 It should be noted that the territory of the former Dutch East Indies did not come under a single Japanese war command. Java and Madura came under the jurisdiction of the 16th army, Sumatra under that of the 25th army, and Kalimantan, Sulawesi and the Nusa Tenggara under that of the 2nd southern fleet (cf. Dahm 1971:84).
29 Benda (1958:112) writes: "Abikusno Tjokrosujojo,..., had understandably enough endeavored to reap the fruits of his obstinately 'non-cooperative' past, by prematurely offering his services as Indonesian premier to the 'liberators'". It is doubtful whether Benda's statement
constitutes a true representation of the facts. Sluimers’ reading of the events surrounding the formation of an Indonesian cabinet is more likely. It is clear from his article (1968) that the source mentioned by Benda, *Tjahaja Timoer* of March 1942, only published an unofficial list after Abikusno Tjokrosujoso told one of its journalists that he had been appointed *formateur* of an Indonesian cabinet. In the list drawn up on March 9th Abikusno Tjokrosujoso is only mentioned as a candidate for the post of minister of transport (for this list cf. Sluimers 1968:366).

The decision seems to have been operative only for Java. Because of poor communications it never reached the other islands (cf. M 28-4-1947).

According to Horikoshi (1975:66) the *Suffah* institute was closed soon after the beginning of the Japanese occupation.

The Japanese name for the Committee was *Dokuritsu Zyunbi Tyoosakai*. In Indonesian the Committee is called by some *Badan untuk menyelediki usaha persiapan kemerdekaan* (Yamin 1959-1960 I:60, Boland 1971:16) and by others *Badan penyelidik usaha persiapan kemerdekaan* (Tudjuh 1961:11). Cf. for the composition of the Committee Muhammad Yamin (1959-1960 I:60) or Harun al Rasjid (1968:23–24).

At the time of its formation the Committee comprised 62 members, with Radjiman Wediodiningrat as chairman. The original intention had probably been that a Japanese should share its meetings, with Radjiman Wediodiningrat acting as deputy chairman. This is why the Committee was officially said to have 63 members, while it was popularly referred to as the Committee of Sixty-two. Later on still six new members were added.


This address by Soekarno has become known under the title *Lahirnya Pancasila*, or Birth of the *Pancasila*. A condensed English version is to be found in Feith and Castles (1970:40-49). Particularly since September 1965 a number of Indonesians have argued that it was not Soekarno but Muhammad Yamin who was the first to formulate the *Pancasila*. As representative of this view Boland (1971:17–18) mentions an article in *Pandji Masjarakan* in October 1967, a series of articles by Mohamad Roem (*Pandji Masjarakan* 11, 12 and 13, March-April 1967), and a study by K.H.M. Isa Anshary entitled *Mudjahid da’wah*. These all point to Muhammad Yamin’s address to the Committee for the Preparation of Independence of May 29th, which was divided into five sections, dealing with nationalism, humanity, belief in God, democracy and prosperity for the people respectively. Boland points out that this division into sections could have been made later. Nugroho Notosusanto (1971a: 14–20) also states that Yamin was the first to formulate the *Pancasila*. He, however, describes Yamin’s version of these principles, along with that of Soekarno and the Jakarta Charter, as “only a rough draft”. The authentic draft of the *Pancasila*, according to him, is that included in the preamble to the Constitution of 1945.

The least one can say of the respective speeches of Soekarno and Muhammad Yamin in this connection is that the former shows much
more internal consistency than the latter; linking the various “pillars” with each other in a clear way and thus showing that Soekarno had a very clear idea of what he wanted to say. Muhammad Yamin’s speech, although being the only one in his book which has a “table of content”, lacks this consistency. Nowhere does it contain any evidence that he had such five principles in mind, or indications as to why he divided his speech into the said five sections. Belief in God, for instance, which is dealt with in a very brief subsection, is not presented as one of the bases of the state, but as a factor underlying society. The section on prosperity is lengthier but says little about prosperity and much more about the state territory, the position of the Chinese and Arab citizens, and the unitary basis of the state. Another point to make is that only in later years did the question of who introduced the Pancasila become at all important. Even as late as 1951 Muhammad Yamin (1951) still mixed up the Pancasila with the Jakarta Charter, writing that the Jakarta Charter constituted the preamble to the Constitution of 1945. Later on, around the time he published his minutes of the 1945 meeting (Yamin 1959-1960), he himself gave credit for introducing the Pancasila to Soekarno (cf. Yamin 1958).

36 Yamin’s report on the first series of meetings of the Study Committee for the Preparation of Independence does not contain much information on the standpoint of the advocates of an Islamic state (Yamin 1959-1960:1:59–145). The author does not fully cover this session, however. He only reproduces his own two speeches and those of Soekarno and Supomo. The reactions to these, inter alia Mohammad Hatta’s, are not included in his work.

37 The relevant Indonesian sentence reads: “ke-Tuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya”. I have followed Boland’s translation. He renders “menjalankan” with “to practice” and points out (Boland 1971:31) that this is an “imprecise verb”, which can mean “to keep, maintain, carry out, make operative, apply, give effect to”. ( Cf. also for the discussion on the Jakarta Charter Wawer (1947:47–51).)

38 The third committee, that on finance and economics, was headed by Mohammad Hatta. For the composition of the three committees cf. Yamin (1959-1960:1:250–253, 257).


40 A draft constitution had been prepared by a smaller committee of the sub-committee headed by Supomo, with as members Wongsonegoro, Subardjo, Maramis, Singgih, Agus Salim and Sukiman. This draft constitution is reproduced in Yamin (1959-1960 I:264–270). The version of the constitution as given by Yamin may differ from that which was actually debated. The articles on religion were article 4, of which the second paragraph reads: “Only autochthonous Indonesians shall be eligible as President and Vice-President”, and article 29, which reads: “The state shall guarantee the freedom of all citizens to adhere to any religion whatever and to fulfil their religious duties prescribed by their religion”. It may thus well be that the wording of the article being debated differed slightly from that reproduced above, and that the draft did not speak of “any religion whatever”, but of “other religions".
that case the article would have read: “The state shall guarantee the freedom of all citizens to adhere to other religions [or, as Indonesian does not differentiate between the singular and plural, to another religion] and to fulfil their religious duties in accordance with their own religion and belief”, which could mean something quite different.

41 In the seventies at least a distinction came to be drawn between secularism and secularization. Secularism involves a non-religious attitude, secularization the separation of religion and state. Cf. Boland (1972-1973).

42 Cf. for the dispute about the word kepercayaan during the discussion on the Broad Outlines of the Course of the State in 1973 *Indonesië van Maand tot Maand* 15:47, and during the parliamentary debates on the Marriage Act in 1973 *Indonesië van Maand tot Maand* 16:62.

43 Again Yamin’s minutes of the meeting of the Study Committee are incomplete. According to him (1959-1960 I:278), Soekarno replied to Hadikusomo that Achmad Sanusi also wanted to scrap the words “for the adherents”, without, however, reporting Sanusi’s statement.

44 The article concerned in the draft constitution is article 29. That the constitution reproduced by Yamin is different from that actually discussed may be deduced inter alia from the fact that according to Yamin’s (1959-1960 I:264–270) minutes the discussion concerned article 28.

45 In Indonesian it is called *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*. The Japanese name for which was *Dokuritsu Zyubī Inkai*. For the members of the Preparatory Committee cf. Harun Al Rasjid 1968:25; Muh. Yamin 1959-1960 I:399.

46 Later on six additional members were appointed. The Dutch, who after August 1945 were keen to uphold the impression that the Indonesian Republic was a Japanese creation and was confined only to Java, incorrectly adduced the composition of the Preparatory Committee as an argument in support of their view. So Van Mook, the Dutch Lieutenant Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, writes in a memorandum of September 3rd, 1945, to Lord L. Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia: “From the final list of members of the ‘final Committee for the completion of Independence’ of August 19th it can be concluded that the movement is limited to Java; no delegates from Sumatra of any importance have participated. The construction is in fact, a one-man government along Japanese lines”. (NIB I:82).

47 Later a Ministry of Religion was after all established. On the founding of this Ministry and its duties cf. Steenbrink (1972); Boland (1977); and Van Nieuwenhuijze (1958: 217–243).

48 The epithet Republican will be used throughout this book to distinguish the official (Republican) Army from the irregular guerilla groups.

49 The *Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang* itself had superseded the *Badan Pembantu Prajurit* or *Badan Pembantu Pembelaan*, an organization for assisting *Peta* members and their families from the Japanese period (cf. Smail 1964:31).

50 As it was put in a telegram to Terauchi (the Japanese commander): “I am informed that several days after the original offer of surrender of Japan you declared the independence of the republic Indonesia, naming Soekarno as president and that the Japanese would henceforth leave the
gvt of Java in the hands of Soekarno. This is contrary to the Rangoon agreement and I must insist that you abide by that agreement under which you remain personally responsible for civil administration until my forces take over and that you accordingly and immediately cancel the declaration and announcement to which have referred above." Of course Terauchi could only reply that "there is no fact that at a time after our peace offer I approved the independence of Indonesian Republic and designated Soekarno as president, instructing him with the executive power over Java" (cf. NIB I:88, 97). The misconception that the Japanese had proclaimed Indonesia’s independence was quite persistent, especially on the Dutch side. Cf., for example, NIB I: 91, 92, 97, 107, 110 and 248.

CHAPTER II

1 A Dutch report of November 1945 on the attitude of the Japanese troops in Java and their demoralized condition states: “The reactions of the Japanese so far had been threefold. A small minority among them had tried to keep control till the Allies would be able to take over. Amongst other places in Bandoeng, they quickly restored order by drastic action. A large proportion of the Japanese forces, on the other hand, had lost morale and had voluntarily gone into self-imposed internment, in the majority of cases in cool and attractive hill stations, taking large stocks of foodstuffs and other commodities with them. Considerable quantities of weapons had fallen into the hands of the most extremist nationalist elements, as a result of the demoralization of these Japanese forces, while numerous public services and buildings were left by them to the ‘republicans’. Finally, a third group of Japanese in the island had actively organized the transfer of the administration to the ‘republic’ and aided in the equipment and armament of their bands.” (NIB II:133). Although the report was written in reaction to opinions expressed in the British press, this assessment seems to have been a correct illustration of the prevailing situation.

2 This account is given in a manuscript on the history of Serpong lent to me by Drs. H. Borkent. For fuller information on the battle at Lengkong see, for example, Peranan (1965:41–44) and Cuplikan (1972:100–102).

3 In West Java incidents also occurred in a number of other places in the vicinity of Jakarta, such as Klender, Kranji and Pondokgede (cf. Sumantri n.d. II:47), and in and around Bandung. An excellent description of the latter is given by Smail (1964).

4 Van Wulfften Palthe does admit that one should distinguish in theory between bands in the strict sense and groups into which the regular Army had dissolved. He is uncertain about the real guerilla character of the latter, however, saying: “One should think more in terms of War Lords with their followers, and for all practical purposes again ends up close to ‘bands’. ” See also Hettinga (1946:12–13), who says: “The chaos of the present consequently is inherent not in this transitional phase, but in the current spiritual and social make-up of Indonesian society”. The Dutch frequently used the term “bende” (band) to describe both regular and irregular units.
5 A *wali* in this context is a guardian.
6 Smail (1964:91) states: “In the last nine months of the occupation an estimated 50,000 Hizbullah members were given some rudimentary military training in Java”. This figure seems greatly exaggerated.
7 Such a moderate estimate is given by Dahm (1971:94), according to whom there were 35,000 *Peta* soldiers at the end of the Japanese occupation. The same figure is quoted by Van der Plas, a Dutch East Indies government representative and political advisor to the Supreme Allied Command, in a report sent by him to Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook in September 1945 (cf. NIB I:127). George McTurnan Kahin (1970:109) writes that, “at its peak strength in the middle of 1945 it numbered about 120,000 armed men”.
9 So Smail writes, for example: “In this respect it is significant that in early 1948, when Republican forces evacuated Priangan, Hizbullah (i.e. urban Islamic) units generally accompanied the army on the trek to Central Java, while Sabilillah (i.e. rural Islamic) groups did not” (Smail 1964:92). Superficial reading of a sentence like this may lead to considerable misunderstanding. It was indeed mostly rural groups, in Smail’s terminology *Sabil’illah* groups, which stayed behind, but the majority of these groups styled themselves or were styled *Hizbu’llah*.
10 See, among the numerous publications dealing with the early history of the Indonesian Army, A.H. Nasution (1956, 1977); Sumantri (n.d.); Peranan (1965); and Cuplikan (1972). For West Java in particular see Siliwangi (1968).
11 According to Smail (1964:129) this acronym stood for *Markas Dewan Pimpinan Perjuangan* (Perjuangan Leadership Headquarters). “Later in the MDPP’s career, when it was beginning to be more active in other parts of Priangan outside the city, its initials were sometimes interpreted as meaning *Markas Dewan Perjuangan Priangan* (Priangan Perjuangan Board Headquarters)”. In the Indonesian literature the MDPP is often only referred to in the second sense. See, for example, Djawa Barat (1953:183). In Peranan (1965:49) and Djen Amar (1963:69) the letters MDPP are interpreted as *Majelis Dewan Perjuangan Priangan*. Yet another name is mentioned in Siliwangi (1968:184), where it is referred to as *Markas Dewan Pimpinan Perjuangan Priangan* or MDP3. According to Smail the MDPP was set up in the middle of November 1945, whereas the date of foundation given by Peranan and Djen Amar is September 15th, 1945.
12 Other leaders were: Djamhuri (Jamhuri), Male Wiranatakusumah, Astrawinata, Samaun Bakri, Nukman and Pakpahan (Djawa Barat 1953:183). According to Smail (1964:132) Pakpahan was the leader of the *Pasukan Istimewa* (Special Troops). The *Pesindo* of Bandung was the continuation of the *Pemuda Republik Indonesia* (Youth of the Indonesian Republic), which again was a continuation of the *Persatuan Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia* (P3I, Indonesian Student Association).
13 As with the MDPP, there are different interpretations of the acronym MPPP. Djen Amar (1963:69), who mentions as its founding date December 14th, 1945, refers to it as *Majelis Persatuan Perjuangan Priang-
an, as does Djawa Barat (1953:184). Siliwangi (1968:184), on the other hand speaks of Markas Pimpinan Perjuangan Priangan. According to Siliwangi, Kamran was chairman of the MPPP, while Sutoko headed the logistic department.

14 See, for example, Brochure (1977:12) where Abu Hanifah relates how he disobeyed an order from Nasution to come to Garut.

15 The other four battalions were: the Garuda Hitam, made up of former BPRI units and commanded by Major Rivai, the Taruna Jaya, made up of Pesindo units and headed by Major sudarman, the Barisan Banteng Republik Indonesia (BBRI), commanded by Captain Rachmat Sulaeman (Rakhiat Sulaeman), and the Gabungan Battalion, headed by Major Pelupessy (Peranan 1965:50).

16 Alers (1956:242) mentions fights between Hizbu'llah and Sabili'llah at Muntilan.

17 According to Sutomo, the anti-Linggarjati guerilla organizations formed the Divisi 17 Agustus. Their commander was Evert Langkay of the KRIS, and the Chief of Staff Amir Fatah (the later Darul Islam leader of Central Java). In West Java a Resimen Macan Citarum of the Divisi 17 Agustus had been formed in early February. It comprised inter alia units of the Hizbu'llah, Barisan Banteng, BPRI, Lasykar Rakyat and KRIS (cf. M 11-2-1947).

18 Kahin (1970:210) writes: "The feeling among Masjumi and other political circles was overwhelming that political opportunism was the chief impulse towards formation of the new PSII". According to Dahm (1971:154), "The old PSII had split off from Masjumi, partly from political opportunism and partly because it had always looked askance at the liberal philosophy which was gaining ground in that body".

19 For the announcement of the Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet see M 4-7-1947. Kartosuwirjo's letter is referred to in M 8-7-1947, and the composition of the boards of the PSII is announced in M 19-6-1947. The official decision to reactivate the PSII was taken on June 16th, in confirmation of a decision of the Executive Committee of April 14th. See also M 28-4-1947.

20 Oni's full name according to Anne Marie The (1968:4) was Oni Qital, and according to C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze (1958:170) R. Oni Manda­latar.

21 Toha Arsjad was commander of the Pasukan Pemuda operating around Garut (Suherly 1965:31).

22 BARIS stands for Barisan Rakyat Indonesia, PADI for Pahlawan Darul Islam. Pinardi refers to the latter troops as Pasukan Darul Islam. Pahlawan Darul Islam seems to be the correct name, however. The PADI was incorporated into the TII on October 30th, 1949.

23 Although Hiroko Horikoshi writes, following C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze (1958:173), that Oni became Prime Minister of the Negara Islam Indonesia, this statement seems incorrect.

24 The Dewan Imamah was composed as follows: President or Imam, and concurrently chargé d'affaires (Minister of Foreign Affairs) — S.M. Kartosuwirjo; Minister of Defence — Kamran; vice-Minister of Defence — Oni; Minister of Internal Affairs — Sanusi Partawidijaja; Minister of Finance — Sanusi Partawidijaja; Minister of Information — Toha Arsjad (Pinardi 1964:81). These same names are
mentioned in Djawa Barat (1953:214) and by Anne Marie The (1968:8). According to the constitution of the Islamic State of Indonesia as published in Boland (1971:263), however, the composition of the *Dewan Imamah* was to be as follows: President and Minister of Defence — S.M. Kartosuwirjo; Minister of Internal Affairs — Sanusi Partawidjaja; Minister of Finance — Sanusi Partawidjaja; Minister of Justice — Abdul Kudus Gozali Tusi; Minister of Information — Toha Arsjad; and members — Kamran and Oni. Sanusi Partawidjaja was later, around 1960, sentenced to death by Kartosuwirjo and executed. There are two different accounts of the reason for this. According to one Sanusi Partawidjaja was executed because he tried to reconcile the Islamic State of Indonesia with the Republic. According to the other, put forward by the prominent *Darul Islam* figure Djaelani Setiawan (shortly after his surrender in early 1962), the reason was that Sanusi Partawidjaja (in cooperation with the Dutchman Van Kleef) had acted too independently and was suspected by Kartosuwirjo of trying to supplant him (DM 20-3-1962). The said Van Kleef was a former member of the APRA who joined *Darul Islam* and allegedly became head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information of the Islamic State of Indonesia; he became ill and died in the course of the *Darul Islam* rebellion (DM 20-3-1963).

25 Some Republican troops had remained behind, while there had also been some Republican infiltration in the area, *inter alia* in August 1948, when a battalion commanded by Rukman was sent back to West Java after clashing with units of the *Tentara Pelajar* (Student Army) in the vicinity of Surakarta. This, however, was more in the nature of an expulsion than an official reinfiltation attempt (Siliwangi 1968:287).

26 How precarious the Republican Army's position vis-à-vis the Islamic Army of Indonesia was at that time is testified by the fact that in January 1949 the Siliwangi Division was obliged to hide its standard, after recapturing it from the Islamic Army of Indonesia, which had seized it a short while before (Siliwangi 1968:324–328).

27 Although article 7 states that every Act required the consent of the *Dewan Syuro*, clause 1 of article 11 stipulates that the *Imam* was to have the power to draw up statutes with the consent of the *Majlis Syuro*.

28 This single Indonesian publication on the Islamic state referred to by him is Z.A. Ahmad, *Membentuk Negara Islam* (Jakarta 1956).

29 There are some slight differences between them, such as, for example, the requirement for the *Majlis Syuro* to assemble at least once a year, and the MPR once every five years.

30 According to Boland (1971:59), the word *infaq* is derived from the Koran, Sura 17:100, where it means "the giving of contribution". The Islamic State of Indonesia defines *infaq* as "a due of every citizen to the state, in the form of both property and goods, which is to be paid a) in both war and peace time (*infaquddin*), and b) only in time of war (*infaq fi sabillilah*)" (Pinardi 1964:86).

31 In Banten a group styling itself *Tentara Rakyat* (People's Army) was operating. In October 1949 the Republican Army *Tirtayasa* Brigade was dispatched against it from Bogor. The *Tentara Rakyat*, which derived its main support from the *Bambu Runcing*, sometimes also styled itself
Darul Islam, and was often in fact referred to as a Darul Islam force.

32 Westerling was a captain of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL), who had gained a frightening reputation as commander of the “Special Forces”. These counter-insurrection troops had with great success inflicted heavy losses on Indonesian guerilla forces in Sulawesi, for instance, where they had been called in to restore law and order. They had also been active in West Java and other areas of Indonesia. Westerling had remained in command of the Special Forces until the end of 1948, not long after which he proposed the formation of the private army to assist the State of Pasundan in its resistance of guerilla attacks. With the tacit consent of Dutch army authorities and financial assistance from the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (Nefis) Westerling thereupon accomplished the formation of the Army of the Just King, or Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (APRA).

33 Jaquet suggests that the first contacts between the State of Pasundan and Darul Islam may have been established by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Utaro Anwar Tjokroaminoto (Utaryo Anwar Cokroaminoto), the Prime Minister of the State (Jaquet 1950:7). Mention is also made of a secret meeting of Kartosuwirjo and the Head of the State of Pasundan, Wiranatakusumah.

34 The existence of such external contacts is taken for granted by Indonesians and the relevant information cited without questioning in the Indonesian literature on Darul Islam. The persons and foreign Governments accused of involvement vehemently deny these charges. This is particular true with respect to the testimonies given at the Jungschläger and Schmidt trials. By the Dutch these trials — held in 1956, when relations between The Netherlands and Indonesia were rapidly deteriorating — are represented as sham, and the testimony given at them as false and inconsistent. Mentioned in connection with Jungschläger’s alleged smuggling of weapons to Darul Islam are planes of the B[ataafsche] P[etroleum] M[aatschappij] and of the Embassies of Great Britain and the United States of America, while the Dutch Military Mission to Indonesia was also alleged to have a hand in the affair. The United States are further mentioned in a letter by Van Kleef to Westerling, dated May 10th, 1952, where Van Kleef says that in the course of 1950 the Islamic State of Indonesia had been successful in establishing diplomatic relations with the American Government. He goes on to claim that subsequent to the establishment of these contacts a special American Government envoy had been sent to Indonesia to establish contact with representatives of the Islamic State of Indonesia in order to discuss the possibility of American aid. This envoy had been captured by the Republican Government, however. According to Van Kleef this capture constituted the prelude to the problems surrounding the Mutual Security Act. The letter concerned is cited in, among others, Pinardi (1964:140—145). For the Jungschläger and Schmidt trials cf. Schmidt (1961), Beynon (n.d.) and Soenario (1956).

35 Originally there had been a Citarum Battalion, formed by Republican troops remaining behind at the time of the Siliwangi Division’s retreat to Central Java. The Citarum Battalion had encompassed a number of irregular guerilla units, including Tjetje Subrata’s Pasukan Semiaji, or
Semiaji Troops. After the Siliwangi Division’s return to West Java, Tjetje Subrata and his men had broken away for fear of disarmament. They continued using the name Citarum (Suherly 1965).

36 For data on individuals and bands reporting and arms handed in, cf. Indonesian Review no. 7, December 1950. In the whole of Java 8,467 people surrendered, and 710 firearms were turned over.

37 On December 21st, 1950, the military commander of Jakarta also declared the Darul Islam a prohibited organization.

38 The name Arends is spelled variously as Arend or Arens. Conspicuous by its absence on this list is the NIGO, or Nederlandse Indische Gerilla Organisatie. The NIGO, a rather dubious organization, if it existed at all, was supposed to have been founded by former APRA members after the debacle of the attempted APRA coup. Dutch citizens accused of having joined the Darul Islam were alleged to have done so as members of this NIGO.

39 Colonel Sadikin had been appointed military governor of West Java early in December 1949. He was assisted by Mr. Makmun Sumadipradja, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the State of Pasundan, throughout the period of military rule.

40 This conference took place on December 20th and 21st, 1949, and was attended by representatives of the Masyumi, Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Jamaatul Waisiah (from Medan), Tardiul Islam (from Bukittinggi) and Sarekat Muslimin Indonesia (from Banjarmasin).

41 It was also Ijet Hidajat who had escorted Affandi Ridhwan to Sanusi Partawidjaja’s headquarters. He had been Darul Islam bupati and chairman of the Majelis Islam of Bandung between 1947 and 1950. Later, in 1954, he himself was sentenced to 1½ years’ gaol, under deduction of the months already spent in detention (PR 19-5-1954).

42 The other movements mentioned in the Bill were the Citarum Brigade, the Bambu Runcing Division, the APRA, the White Eagle Battalion the RMS, the NIGO, the Barisan Sakit Hati, the MMC (short of Merapi-Merbabu Complex) and the Tentara Rakyat of West Java.

43 See Kartosuwirjo’s letters to Soekarno published in Boland (1971:244-255).

44 See Kartosuwirjo’s letter on the position of Van Kleef (PR 10-11-1953).

45 Abdul Malik should not be confused with Imam Malik, who also led an irregular band in East Java, and who was arrested in May 1951.

46 In some years Darul Islam also stepped up its activities in February in celebration of a victory by Oni over Dutch troops at Mount Cupu on February 17th, 1948.

47 According to Boland (1971:50) the more traditional members of the Nahdatul Ulama, in order to distinguish themselves from the modernists, ‘liked to call themselves the ahlī sunnah wal dūmā’ah, that is, the people who keep the sunna (usage) of the Prophet, in community with the one great umma or dūmā’a, in short the orthodox...’.


49 The idea to involve the civilian population was not new. Even in the early 1950’s battues in which the population of one or more villages, armed with bamboo spears, participated, were resorted to. What was new in 1960 was the large scale on which this was done.
50 At this revival of the *Darul Islam* movement in 1976, Dodo was one of those arrested by the Government. Adah Djaelani Tirtapradja and Kurnia had also taken part (cf. *Tempo* 26-11-1977). According to this same report, Dodo was looked upon by *Darul Islam* followers as the *Putera Mahkota* (crown prince).

CHAPTER III

1 According to Wertheim (1959:270) there are reports of nearly 300,000 *romushas* being sent overseas, while at the end of the war the number of those who were still alive seems to have been no more than 70,000.

2 See, for example, Suryanegara (1977).

3 See for the role of Islam as an oppositional force against Dutch colonial rule amongst others Tichelman (1975:205–210) and Kartodirdjo (1966).


5 Sungeb Reksoatmodjo, was captured after attending a meeting chaired by resident Besar. The youth at the same time took Tjitrosatmoko but subsequently dropped him at his office (Pranata 1976 n. 3).

6 The leaders of the Republican Army (at that time still BKR) in the town of Tegal were: Pitojo (Pitoyo, a former *syodantyo*, or *Peta* platoon commander), Parwoto (a former *Heiho*), Sugiono (a former *syodantyo*) and Sumardi (a former *Heiho*). Kiyai Haji Iskandar Idris was a former *daidantyo*, or *Peta* battalion commander (cf. Pranata 1976 n. 4, 5).

7 Dressing the victims in gunny sacks was meant not only to humiliate them, but also to give them an idea of what the people suffered. As Lucas (1977:97) points out: "In the town people could still get cloth, whereas gunny sacking and sarongs of rubber were generally worn in rural areas towards the end of the occupation".

8 Abu Sudjai according to Sajuti Melik was a member of the PSII and an associate of Kartosuwirjo’s (Sajuti Melik 1977).

9 Initially it was called *Badan Pekerja Tiga Daerah* (Lucas 1974:176).

10 For Sajuti Melik’s own account see: Melik (1977).

11 According to Pranata (1976 n. 3) the rebels did not occupy Pekalongan but fell into a trap set by the Republican Army commander of the town, Ali Murtopo. The latter lured Kutil’s troops into the town by creating the impressing that Pekalongan had been evacuated by the Republican Army. He thereupon had all the roads closed and had the rebels encircled and disarmed. Judging from the other sources this account is incorrect. It is possible that it was made up to clear Ali Murtopo’s reputation. At the end of 1977, and probably also earlier, in the struggle for power taking place at the time, Ali Murtopo was accused by his enemies of involvement in the *Tiga Daerah Affair*, implying that he had been a communist or at any rate had had leftist sympathies during the Indonesian revolution.

12 According to Anderson (1972:340) Sardjio was a member of the pre-war PNI and the illegal PKI. The resident, Besar, had fled Pekalongan in November, and was replaced by Suprapto as acting resident.
Anderson (1972:341), following Overdijkink (1948:34), writes: “It seems that at first the central government was willing to accept his [Sardjio’s] accession as a fait accompli. But again local forces ignored official policy and proceeded to try to overthrow Sardjio.” According to Nasution (II:548) the Republican Government in Yogyakarta had ordered the arrest of resident Besar and had instructed the new resident (Suprapto) to negotiate with Kutil. The Government’s reason for doing so, according to Nasution, was that it attached credence to the allegations of Kutil and his men that resident Besar and Iskandar Idris were NICA agents.

In Pemalang, on the other hand, the Hizbul’lah appears to have participated in the social revolution. According to Lucas (1977:114): “Pemalang was unique in the Residency of Pekalongan in that santri pemuda from both the GPAI [Gerakan Pemuda Arab Indonesia] and Hizbullah played a major role in the early part of the social revolution”.

Lucas (1977:120) quotes an interview he had with a former jailer of Pemalang, saying: “People were taught a lesson by the TKR. They were lined up in the town square and whipped until they were half dead. People were screaming, “Tolong! Tolong! Help.”

An(an)tareja is a wayang hero. He is the son of one of the Pandawas, Wrekodara (or Bratasena), and the brother of Gatot Kaca. An(an)tareja has the ability to move under the ground.

Troops that complied with the rationalization scheme were, for example, BPRI units from the Pekalongan residency. In May members of these units from Pekalongan, Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang handed over their arms to the Republican Army as a contribution to the scheme (M 10-5-1948).

According to Alers (1956:246) Amir Fatah’s real name was Sjarif Hidayatuliah (Syarif Hidayatuliah). Alers also states that he was overste (lieutenant-colonel) in the Republican Army. According to Pranata (1976-1977 n. 13) Amir Fatah was made major-general after the integration of his troops into the Republican Army. According to Jusmar Basri (n.d.: 1) Amir Fatah was a member of the Markas Pembela Masyumi.

The SWKS-III, comprising Brebes and Tegal, formed part of the first Wehrkreise of the 3rd Division. Besides the Wehrkreise and Sub Wehrkreise Operational Command and the Civil Administration a Military Administration was also formed. In each kabupaten a Komando Distrik Militer (KDM) or Military District Command was instituted. In Tegal this was headed by Major Kasimin, in Brebes by Captain Abduljailil. In each kecamatan, moreover, a Komando Onder Distrik Militer (KODM) or Military Sub District Command was introduced.

An additional circumstance inspiring Amir Fatah to proclaim the Darul Islam in Central Java may have been that the commander of the Sub Wehrkreise, Wongsoatmodjo, had given orders for the arrest of the Hizbul’lah soldiers. These orders may have been issued after Amir Fatah’s withdrawing the Hizbul’lah troops to Pengarasan. Upon the commander of Brebes, Captain Prawoto (the commander of the section B (Brebes) of the Sub Wehrkreise, not to be confused with the commander of the KDM), going to Amir Fatah to find out what was happening, the latter had shown him the order for the arrests. Prawoto was subsequently ordered out of Brebes and Tegal by Amir Fatah.
21 As *Darul Islam bupati* of Tegal was appointed Kosim Nachrowi, the former commander of the Tegal *Hizbu'llah* branch. Sachroni (Sakhroni) was made head of Intelligence. Later Radimum Sastrastopo was appointed *bupati* of Cilacap. Muchsin (Mukhsin) was appointed Chief of Staff of the SHWK Battalion, with as company commanders Dimjati (Dimyati), Sjamsuri (Syamsuri), Solihin Subchi (Subkhi) and Slamet.


23 Co-founders of the AUI were Moh. Sjafei (Moh. Syafei), Saunari and Haji Affandi. Machfudz became its chairman, Moh. Sjafei vice-chairman, Saunari secretary, and Affandi treasurer.

24 The rebel movement was also joined by a small *Hizbu'llah* unit of 40 men which had formed part of the *Surengpati* unit.

25 Machfudz had a predilection for the word "heaven". So he called the *pesantren* of Sumolang and its *pondoks Kunci Sorga*, Key to Heaven.

26 According to Indonesian sources there were enmity between the members of the 426 Battalion and other *Darul Islam* troops in Brebes and Tegal (ANP-Aneta 1957:739). Other dissatisfied former guerilla groups which had moved to Brebes and Tegal included fighters from the said Merapi Merbabi Complex, who before their defeat had operated around Surakarta, Semarang, and Yogyakarta. They were partly former members of irregular guerilla units. There was less question of a distinct ideology in the case of these groups than in that of the *Darul Islam*, and they were, in fact, commonly referred to as *grajaks* (robbers) (cf. Handjojo 1977). Nevertheless, some of them had risen in rebellion out of protest at the results of the negotiations with the Dutch and at the Army reorganization. The Round Table Conference (*Konperensi Meja Bundar*) was styled *Konperensi Militer Belanda* (Dutch Military Conference) by them. They regarded themselves as "The defenders of the proclamation of August 17th", and also referred to themselves as the "Union of the victims of rationalization" (PR 11-3-1953). Nevertheless, some of them had risen in rebellion out of protest at the results of the negotiations with the Dutch and at the Army reorganization. The Round Table Conference (*Konperensi Meja Bundar*) was styled *Konperensi Militer Belanda* (Dutch Military Conference) by them. They regarded themselves as "The defenders of the proclamation of August 17th", and also referred to themselves as the "Union of the victims of rationalization" (PR 11-3-1953).

27 One of the districts of Klaten that suffered most was the *kewedanaan* Jatinom. Here 425 houses were damaged or destroyed, and 46 civilians killed and 37 badly wounded (19-1-1952, 10-1-1952, 6-4-1952).

CHAPTER IV

1 His name is generally spelt Kahar Muzakkar or Kahar Muzakar. Harvey (1974:VII), following the latter's own spelling of the name between 1958 and 1961, writes it as Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar.

2 This short biography of Kahar Muzakkar is based on Tjatatan (1950). See also Harvey (1974:474) and Andaya (1976).

3 Andaya (1976:4) writes: "In that year the Hadat, or governing council, of the kingdom of Luwu passed the sentence of *Ripaopangitana* on him. This term means literally 'to put someone or something downward on land', or in other words to treat someone as if dead. To translate the term simply as 'banishment' is to ignore its most dreaded aspect: the severing of the ties which makes a Bugis or Makassar person one, emotionally and spiritually, with all the members of his community."

4 In some sources this organization is referred to as the *Gerakan Putera Indonesia Sulawesi Selatan.*
5 According to Abbenhuis, the then chief commanding officer of Amacab (Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch) in Jakarta, an additional reason for the general resentment against the Menadonese was provided by the fact that they had collaborated with the enemy to the extent of betraying Indonesians engaged in underground activities during the Japanese occupation (NIB II: 567–569).


7 Harvey (1974:174–175) notes that the rendering of the name of the Batalyon Kesatuan Indonesia is inconsistent. Some sources call it Barisan Kemajuan Indonesia or Batalyon Kemajuan Indonesia.

8 Andi Selle, who was to play a prominent role in the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion, was one of the regional commanders.

9 According to Harvey (1974:178) about 1,000 youths were estimated to have come to South Sulawesi on these expeditions, and only about 100 of them to have escaped imprisonment or death to return to Java. Mohammad Saleh Lahade and Andi Mattalatta were among those who returned.

10 The Prince of Bonthain, who was not prepared to surrender, was arrested by the Dutch at the end of November.


12 The following organizations merged into LAPRIS: Penerjang Penjajah Indonesia (PPI) (Ousters of the Colonizers of Indonesia), Lasykar Pemberontak Turatea (Laptur) (Revolutionary Army of Turatea) I and II, Lipang Bajeng, Buka, Kebaktian Rakyat Palangga (Dedication of the People of Palangga) (Kerap), Angkatan Lasykar Rakyat (ALR) (People’s Army Task Force), Barisan Pemberontak Indonesia (Indonesian Revolutionary Corps) (BPI), Persatuan Pemuda Nasional Indonesia (PPNI) (Indonesian National Youth Association), Tentara Pemberontak Republik Indonesia (TPRI) (Revolutionary Army of The Indonesian Republic), TPRI Mares, TPRI Camba, Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Corps of The Indonesian Republic) (BPRI), Harimau Indonesia (Indonesian Tigers) (HI), HI Tanete, Angkatan Muda Republik Indonesia Sulawesi (AMRIS) (Sulawesi Youth Front of The Indonesian Republic) and KRIS Muda (Cuplikan 1972:120). According to Nasution (1977 III:604), who states the number of organizations which originally made up LAPRIS to be 19, it was eventually joined by a total of 26 organizations.

13 This Sulawesi branch was made up of inter alia the Lasykar Harimau Indonesia, Lasykar Pemberontak Turatea, Mobile Brigade Ratulangie, and the Paceke Battalion (PR 6-6-1956).

14 Harvey (1974:184–185) also relates how originally Lieutenant-Colonel Lembong was to have become commander to the Brigade XVI, but as a result of opposition from Kahar Muzakkar was transferred to Army headquarters.

15 After 1949 the region was to become the area of operation of the Abdul Malik rebels.
16 Worang and his men left Surabaya on February 15th, but went to Jakarta first. Here they were addressed by Soekarno before setting sail for South Sulawesi.

17 Among the members of Mokoginta’s staff was Major Mohammad Saleh Lahade, who was charged with the military responsibility for South Sulawesi. Mokoginta was head of the Komisi Militer Territorial Indonesia Timur, which Komisi was dissolved and converted into the Komando Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat Territorium Indonesia Timur in April.

18 On Andi Abdul Azis’ rebellion cf. Bardosono (1956), Cuplikan (1972:224–230) and Soumokil (1950). In 1953 Andi Abdul Azis was sentenced to 14 years’ gaol, the time he had spent in detention counting towards this sentence. In November of the same year President Soekarno reduced the sentence to 8 years.

19 Before the founding of the KGSS the guerillas had been organized into 11 battalions. For these battalions and their commanders see Harvey (1974:203). The KGSS is sometimes also referred to as Komando Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan. Possibly this is just another name for the same organization; but possibly the KGSS changed its name from Kesatuan to Komando somewhere in July 1950.

20 In sending Kahar Muzakkar back to Sulawesi, the Army Command may have been acting on the advice of Bahar Mattaliu, who at any rate claims so in his book (1965:33). Harvey (1974:220), on the other hand, notes that “letters requesting that Qahhar be sent to Sulawesi flowed in the MBAD [Army headquarters]”.

21 According to the historiographers of the “Y Battalion”, Kahar Muzakkar was kidnapped by the KGSS on June 6th. If this is true, it may, in fact, have been done with his own consent, for as Djarwadi writes: “Thereupon Kahar Muzakkar was kidnapped by the guerillas on June 6th, 1950 (or, in point of fact, fled to them in order to provide direct leadership)” (Djarwadi 1959:122).

22 Kahar Muzakkar made this statement to Samsudin Rasid, a senior official with the Information Department of West Java. On the latter’s return from the trip on which he had this personal meeting with Kahar Muzakkar, he stated it to be his impression that the guerillas had adopted a wait-and-see attitude and had no intention of attacking unless they themselves were attacked (I 29-9-1950).

23 The Committee was styled the Komite Jasa Baik dalam Masalah Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan. It was not recognized by the Army. Its members did confer with Mohammad Saleh Lahade, but, as was explicitly pointed out, they met the latter in his capacity as a private citizen. Kawilarang still asserted after the committee had already started functioning that he knew nothing of any Committee of Good Services, and that if such a committee was really needed the Army would form one itself. His statement was confirmed by Army headquarters in Jakarta (I 24-8-1950, 26-8-1950; N 18-11-1950).

24 The other members were Bebasa Daeng Lalo (Partai Rakyat Nasional), Zainal Arifin (Masyumi), Lukman Wiriadinata (PSI), H. Siradjuddin Abbas (Sirajuddin Abbas) (Blok Islam), Mustapha (Partai Buruh), Huto­mo Supardan (PKI), and E. Sumantri (a parliamentary employee acting as secretary to the mission).
25 Virtually the same conclusion was arrived at by Makmun Sumadipradja, who, after his return from Sulawesi, where he had worked out an agreement with the guerillas (see below), testified before Parliament that the population sympathized with the guerillas not only because of the latter's contribution to the struggle for independence, but also on account of its many family ties with them and its agreement with the guerillas' view that they should be in charge of the development of the region (N 23-12-1950).

26 Those who were not to be admitted to the Army were to be assisted by a "Guerilla Rehabilitation Committee", or Panitya Rehabilitasi Bekas Gerilya.

27 The tendency in Jakarta to think first of Java and Sumatra in dealing with the guerilla problem became evident once more on the occasion of the stipulation of rules for the demobilization of the Student Armies, which again were in force only for Java and Sumatra. Hence, the members of the Student Armies in South Sulawesi had to ask for the same treatment as students in Java and Sumatra, stressing that students in South Sulawesi, too, had fought in the revolution.

28 In early February 1951 the Committee in charge of the demobilization of the guerillas or their admission to the Republican Army stated that of the 15,000 guerillas who had entered the zones, 12,000 had had to be sent back to society (I 7-2-1951).

29 This committee, named Panitya I Penyelesaian Masalah Gerilya, had Major Mochtar, a territorial officer, as vice-chairman. Its members included Abas Daeng Malawa, Mrs. Salawati Daud, Makaraeng Daeng Djarung (Jarung), Aminuddin, S. Sunari, Amin Daud, Jozef Latumahina, and police commissioner Moh. Junus Hile (Moh. Yunus Hile). A guerilla representative still remained to be appointed (N 29-12-1950).

30 This committee was named Panitya II Penyelesaian Masalah Gerilya. Its other members were S. Sunari, Alinuddin Daeng Mattiro, Saleh Daeng Matirni, Nanlohy, Samsul Kamar, and Lieutenant I.B. Supit. Here, too, a representative of the guerillas still remained to be appointed (N 29-12-1950).

31 As Chief of Staff of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi was appointed B. Sutrisno. The incorporation of the Persiapan Be Hasanuddin did not imply that peace and order now prevailed everywhere in South Sulawesi. Groups operating independently of the Persiapan Be Hasanuddin continued disturbing the public order, notably in the area surrounding Kolaka, in Majene (where members of the Tengkorak Putih (White Skull), who had crossed the Ujungpandang Straits from Kalimantan, were operating) and in Gowa and Jeneponto.

32 Batu Putih is the name of the area surrounding Siwa. Robert Wolter Mongisidi was a former freedom fighter executed by the State of East Indonesia in September 1949. The name "40,000" was chosen in commemoration of the allegedly 40,000 victims of the Westerling action. Arief Rate was the former commander of the Mobile Battalion Ratu Langie who had been killed by Republican troops in August 1950. Andi Abdullah Bau Massepe was a former Prince of Supa who had been tortured and killed by Westerling's troops after refusing to disclose the whereabouts of Andi Selle.

33 The difference was, in fact, one of emphasis rather than of name.
official name of the corps was Korps Cadangan Nasional/Persiapan Brigade Hasanuddin.

34 In the weeks preceding August a conflict about a fourth issue—money—broke out. From mid-December 1950 Kahar Muzakkar and his men had received a living-allowance of Rp. 90,000 a day. This allowance was stopped in June, when responsibility for the guerillas was transferred from the so-called Staf K (= Keamanan) to the Army. This new arrangement led to mutual accusations of fraud and corruption. The Government later claimed that between December 16th, 1950, and August 1951 it had paid a total of Rp. 17 million. This was, in fact, the total amount of money reserved by the Government for the guerillas of South Sulawesi from the start in December. Kahar Muzakkar claimed to have received only Rp. 7.5 million, however, while according to the Government he had been paid this sum between the end of March, when the National Reserve Corps was formed, and July 1951. Mussaffa (1951), who investigated the matter, reported that there had indeed been some malversation on the part of the Government. So money had been set aside for barracks that had never been built. He was nevertheless of the opinion that Kahar Muzakkar also had used money for personal ends. As proof he cited the marriage of Usman Balo, the expenses for which had run up to Rp. 35,000.

35 Originally Lieutenant-Colonel Sukowati had been commander of these A-troops. Warouw had taken over the command on May 22nd.

36 The historiographers of the Siliwangi Division (1968:571) depict Kahar Muzakkar as “narrow-minded and very easily influenced by counter-revolutionary elements”. Radik Djarwadi’s observation (1963:5–6) that “KM had long been known as an officer with progressive ideas, while there were even many people who thought him to be a communist” may be just as biased in the opposite direction.

37 For PKI contacts with Kahar Muzakkar see Harvey (1974:250–252).


39 At the time of the relevant proclamation people doubted its authenticity. That is why Kahar Muzakkar a few weeks later issued a second declaration, stressing that it really had been he who had proclaimed Sulawesi part of the Islamic State (PR 31-10-1953). There were a national flag and a war standard. The national flag was red with a yellow crescent and star. The war standard was also red, and displayed three yellow stars with the number twenty-four in the upper left corner. Both flags were said to have been approved by the Central Government of the Islamic State (IB 11-8-1953).


41 According to the historiographers of the Siliwangi Division (1968:573), Kahar Muzakkar, because of “his oath of loyalty to the TII . . .”, “could not and would not be officially recognized with his men as members of the APRI”. It is also hinted that his contacts with the West Javanese Darul Islam made him more uncompromising.

42 Regular reports of alleged sexual abuses by the guerillas appeared in the Indonesian press, moreover. In April 1954 IB (24-4-1954), for instance,
it was reported that compulsory “beauty contests” were held by the guerrillas at Sidenreng/Rappang, at which the guerrilla leaders chose their wives. Some of these leaders reportedly already had five wives.

43 In another section of the Makalua Charter the existing political parties are attacked. The secular parties, such as the PNI, Murba and PKI, are described as “hypocritical” (munafik) and atheistic. The Islamic parties such as Masyumi and Nahdatul Ulama are branded “counter-revolutionary”. Both types of parties had to be opposed (Simatupang and Lapian 1978:10).

44 According to the ‘Notes’ men were forbidden to wear or have in their possession “The excellent stock of material” (as the original text phrases this in English) “in the form of woollen and other materials affected by big-city nobs” (continued in Indonesian). Nor were they allowed to have more than two military uniforms, three sarongs with printed patterns, two towels, three undershirts, four pairs of underpants, and one raincoat in any one year. Women were not allowed to wear “Especially women stock of materials” (as it is again stated in English) “in the form of tiger fur and other clothes affected by big-city ladies” (continued in Indonesian). Further, they were forbidden to have more than four blouses, four sarongs with printed and/or batik patterns (apart from their praying garments), one night sarong, two towels, four chemises, four pairs of “women’s breeches” and one stagen (abdominal belt) a year.

45 In a contemporary series of articles on Kahar Muzakkar (Mussaffa 1951) the number of men due to be demobilized was stated to be 10,000, making the total figure a little higher, i.e. between 13,000 and 14,000.

46 Andi Tenriadjeng fell in battle in May 1954, one month after the surrender of his Chief of Staff, Andi Panrenregi (PR 11-3-1954; IB 9-6-1954).

47 The same factor – competing territorial ambitions within the rebel force – prompted the outbreak of fighting in early 1953 between units of the 40,000 Battalion and the Batu Putih Battalion, which both claimed control over the Wajo region. In this fighting 750 people were killed according to a communique issued by Army headquarters in Jakarta (PR 14-4-1953).

48 This fighting erupted between members of the 719 (Andi Selle’s men) and 711 Battalions on January 7th, 1953. A military commission instituted to investigate the matter eventually concluded that this fighting had taken place not between two battalions, but between individual members of the battalions (IM 10-1-1953).

49 Later, Soekarno visited Aceh and toured the trouble-spots of West Java.

50 There were Darul Islam troops operating in Tual Tengah, Tengah Liang, Tolehu, Buru, Morotai and North Halmahera (Tobelo).

51 For the English text of the charter as well as its signatories see Harvey (1977:164–167).

52 The territorial Command of East Indonesia (the TT-VII) was officially dissolved on June 8th, 1957, as was the KoDPSST. A month prior the same fate had befallen the KDM-SST (Komando Daerah Militer – Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara) (cf. Harvey 1977:59–63).

53 Warouw had been replaced as territorial commander of East Indonesia by Lieutenant-Colonel Ventje Sumual in August 1956. The latter also became involved in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion.
Some commanders had preceded Bahar Mattaliu in surrendering. There were reports of small Darul Islam units surrendering in the Indonesian press as early as July, for instance, with as reason for their decision being stated their disapproval of the cooperation with the Permesta (DM 8-7-1959, 22-7-1959).

Sjamsul Bachri left South Sulawesi in December 1958. He went to Egypt, formally for reasons of study and in order to establish contacts with groups abroad which were sympathetic to the Indonesian Darul Islam movement (DM 7-4-1959).

CHAPTER V

1 On the origin of the ALRI Div IV (Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia Divisi IV) and the infiltration of Kalimantan from Java see Basry (1961), Nasution (1977, II:467–474; 1977, III:597–600), and Mussaffa (1954).

2 According to Nasution (1977, II:468, 471) the Kalimantan branch of the PRI comprised about 250 members, that of the Pesindo only 120.

3 This committee was made up of Mohammad Noor, Gusti Muis, Achmad Jusuf (Ahmad Yusuf), Rezekan, and Hasjim Amin (Hasyim Amin) (Nasution 1977, III:600).

4 Gusti Aman, who had been born in Banjarmasin around 1925, had gone to Java after the proclamation of independence, returning to Kalimantan for a short period at the end of 1946.

5 According to Nasution (1971, II:44) Gusti Aman unfolded to Hasan Basry’s troops new ideas on the conduct of guerilla warfare, the so-called “territorial system”, evolved by the Republican Army.

6 Before joining the ALRI Div IV, P(angeran) Arya was a contractor working inter alia at Dutch military barracks.

7 Kahin (1970:354), explaining the difference between states (negaras) and autonomous areas (daerahs istimewa), writes: “Those in the second category were usually much smaller in population than those in the first or else had been more recently created. The theory upon which this distinction was based was that the less populous of these territories (and usually the most backward with respect to cultural level and economic development) were fit to receive a lesser degree of self-government than the larger, and were to be more dependent upon the central government of the federation.” The autonomous area of Banjar had been created in January 1948.

8 Nasution (1971, III:45) mentions Hamdi as Minister of Information and Religion, instead of Budy Gawis and Natsir respectively.

9 Initially there were only three military districts (or regiments) in South Kalimantan, namely Kandangan, Barabai, and Banjarmasin, with Gusti Aman, Martinus and Rustam as commanders, and one in Southeast Kalimantan, with Muljono (Mulyono) as commander (Mussaffa 1954:n. 3,9). Yet another subdivision is mentioned by Nasution (1971, III:46), who mentions Ibnu Hadjar as one of the two commanders of South Hulusungai.

10 The Gerakan Repolusi Rakyat Indonesia (GRRRI), which claimed a membership of one thousand armed men and was commanded by R. Kusumanegara (KB 6-10-1949), had operated in the Barito area. It was
officially incorporated into the ALRI Div IV in November 1949 (KB 13-11-1949). The Tentara Lawung, also a former opponent of the ALRI Div IV, operated in the same area, under the command of J.C. Rangkap (KB 8-10-1949).

11 The then leader of the Lasykar Rakyat Murba in Kandangan was Go Teng Po. Probably some skirmishes took place between members of the Lasykar Rakyat Murba and the ALRI Div IV in Kandangan, but reports of such fighting were denied by the leaders on both sides (KB 6-10-1949). According to the leaders of the Lasykar Rakyat Murba this name, incorporating the word Murba, had been chosen because its members belonged to the proletariat. They denied the existence of any ties, ideological or otherwise, with the Murba in Java, however (KB 24-10-1949).

12 Burhanuddin was arrested by the Police in connection with the strike on September 19th, 1949, but was released again in early October of that year.

13 A reporter with the Kalimantan Berdjuang, when visiting the ALRI Div IV’s camp in August 1949, was informed that Hanafiah and the other kidnapped persons were engaged in forming a KNI to replace the Banjar Council (KB 23-8-1949).

14 Others who “disappeared” included Sjahrl (Syahrul) and M. Fadlan, kiai kepala and kiai kota of Martapura respectively; A. Arief, kiai at Pengaron; Ramlan, kiai kepala of Pleihari; Kadri Noor, kiai at Karang Intan; and Gusti Darman, public prosecutor at Martapura (KB 23-8-1949, 30-8-1949).

15 The five were A. Ruslan, Dr. Suranto, Achmad Hudari (Akhmad Hudari), Suroto, and R. Sa'ban. At an emergency meeting called on September 28th the daily executive refused to accept their resignation (KB 21-9-1949, 4-10-1949).

16 The member-organizations of the Gabungan Buruh Kalimantan were: Persatuan Pekerja Indonesia, Serikat Guru Indonesia, Serikat Pos, Persatuan Kaum Perawat Indonesia, Persatuan Pegawai Indonesia, and Rukun Pertukangan Indonesia.

17 At the end of September Hassan Basry himself issued the order for all schools, private as well as public, to re-open in view of the importance of education (KB 27-9-1949).

18 As a consequence the Dutch had to step up their repressive measures. So it was announced on July 20th that harsh steps would have to be taken and that anyone found out in the streets after curfew would be shot without notice (KB 5-8-1949). Furthermore, all officers from the rank of corporal upwards, as well as all members of the Central Military Intelligence Service (KB 22-7-1949), were empowered, where military interests so required, to arrest people and hold them in custody for a maximum of ten days.

19 Just before the establishment of this contact, on August 30th, Hassan Basry had appointed an ALRI Div IV commission to conduct negotiations. Its chairman was P. Arya, its vice-chairman Burhanuddin, and secretary Mas Sumarjo (Mas Sumaryo), while Gusti Aman and Dr. Gambiro were ordinary members, and Hassan Basry himself was to be advisor (KB 1-9-1949, 9-9-1949).

20 On the basis of this interpretation, Deelman assumed in an announce-
ment that, because Hassan Basry had been ordered to cease all hostile acts before September 16th, all people on strike would accordingly resume their work as of that date. He added here that he believed that the strike had been forced on the workers concerned, so that as a consequence sanctions would only be taken against those failing to report for work on September 16th (KB 14-9-1949).

21 There still remained some confusion. People believed that, as with the ALRI Div IV before, it was compulsory to pay a contribution to the Committee or to become a member. Thus an announcement had to be made that neither the payment of a contribution nor membership was obligatory, but that it was simply hoped that many people would join. Every member was required to pay a membership fee of minimally Dfl 1.— a month (KB 21-10-1949).

22 Lambung Mangkurat Division represents the most common form of the Division's name, although it is sometimes referred to as the Lambu Amangkurat or Lembu Mangkurat Division. Lembu Amangku Rat was the Mangkubumi (governor or vice-regent) of "the famous mythical King of Nagara Dipa, Pangeran Suryanata ..." (Saleh 1976:204).

23 Some of the members of the Tengkorak Putih Division joined the Republican Army, but others kept out of it. In East Kalimantan groups like the Banteng Itam (Black Buffalo), commanded by Daeng Toba, the Kucing Itam (Black Cat), headed by Pak Bindruk, the Tentara Pelajar (Student Army) P 18 of Rede, the Harimau (Tiger) commanded by Agust Times, and the Culik Hitam (Black Kidnappers) or Macan Ketawa (Laughing Tiger) continued operating (KB 9-12-1949).

24 Panglima Batur was the old name of the battalion, which was changed to Kinibalu after the second Dutch military action.

25 Firmanjah was attached to the staff of the Army and Territory Command of Kalimantan, and was soon to become Commander of the First Sub-Territory of West Kalimantan.

26 In theory, as was explained by a spokesman of the Kalimantan Command, later, in 1952, a territory constituted a permanent military unit, while a division formed part of a battle formation which could be transformed at will (IM 4-11-1952).

27 Sometimes this organization is referred to as Kesatuan Rakyat Yang Tertindas (KRYT).

28 The resentment against the appointment of Javanese to government functions was felt not only in Hulusungai or by Ibnu Hadjar and his followers alone. The resident of West Kalimantan, commenting on the tension there, stated in August that he refused to put stop to the import of civil servants from Java as he wanted to build up a capable regional government apparatus and police force.

29 Sitompul was replaced as Commander of the F Brigade in October 1951 by Major Sjammaun Gaharu, who in turn was replaced a month later by Lieutenant-Colonel Suadi Suromihardjo. Sitompul in January 1952, by which time he had become a lieutenant-colonel, was appointed Chief of Staff of the Kalimantan Army and Territory in place of Colonel Eddy Sukardy.

30 Those of its leaders who surrendered were Latuk in Amuntai, Abubakar in Batumandi, Ibak, Kaderi and Muis in Barabai, and Mastur and Kardjah (Karjah) in Rantau. Yet other groups independent of the
KRIYT continued their resistance. As late as December 1953 a group of guerrillas led by one Kumis, or Moustache, for instance, surrendered at Karang Intan, totally exhausted from having had to defend themselves not only against the Republican Army but also against the KRIYT (IB 27-12-1953).

31 Another Asmuni surrendered in Awayan in March 1954 (IB 4-3-1954).

32 It has been noted that in this field the ALRI Div IV was, in fact, most successful. In other areas it had not always had the right people with the right knowledge and experience, which had led to fraud, corruption and self-interest.

33 There were also allegations of communist sympathies in certain guerilla groups. In 1954 a letter bearing the stamp of the PKI was confiscated, as were some books written by Aidit (IB 4-4-1954). Around the same time there were reports of a group styling itself the Harimau Hitam (Black Tigers) striving to introduce a communist system, demanding from the well-to-do (including school teachers) one third of their incomes (IB 16-4-1954). The precise connections of these groups with the KRIYT remain obscure.

34 Anang Sulaiman was sentenced to two years' imprisonment.

35 Imbran Kamarullah was a die-hard, who in the prison of Balikpapan obstinately persisted in his efforts to get an Army of the Islamic Republic off the ground. He was aided in his attempts by one Rusman, sentenced to gaol for having KRIYT sympathies, and a man named Ali, a common criminal. This plot again was made public before it might have repercussions. It was a mystery to everyone how the three conspirators had imagined to extend their activities outside prison (IB 23-1-1954).

36 The version in Indonesian Berdjuang (14-9-1955) ran:

Indonesia Tuhan jang ratu
Tuhan jang amat tahu
Disanalah aku ta’atibar
Bakti setiap hari

[The original may have been:]

Indonesia Tuhan jang ratu
Tuhan jang amat tahu
Disanalah aku ta’ati
Berbakti setiap hari

[Translation]

Indonesia God is King
God who is omniscient
Him I obey
And serve devotedly each day

Indonesia kebangsaanku
Bangsa dan agamaku
Mari kita berseru
Agama Islam banyak jang tak tahu
Indonesia kebangsaanku
Bangsa dan agamaku
Marilah kita berseru
Agama Islam bersatu

Indonesia my motherland
My people and my faith
Come, let us shout
Muslims unite

Hiduplah agamaku
Hiduplah negaraku
Hiduplah rakyatku
Semua

Hiduplah agamaku
Hiduplah negaraku
Bangsaku, rakyatku semuanya

Long live my faith
Long live my state
my nation, my people all of them

Bangunlah badannya
Bangunlah jiwanya
Untuk agama Allah jang Esa

Bangunlah jiwanya
Bangunlah badannya
Untuk Agama Allah jang Esa

Arise in spirit
And Body
For the Religion of the One and Only God

Indonesia Raya merdeka merdeka
Rakyatnya agamanya semua
Indonesia Raya merdeka merdeka
Rakyatnya agama Islam bersama

Indonesia the Great, freedom, freedom
Its people and its religion
Indonesia the Great, freedom, freedom
Its people and Islam together.

37 Djohansjah was sentenced to six years' gaol in 1955.

CHAPTER VI

1 Around the same time the Central Government appointed A.K. Gani coordinator of the Republican Army for Sumatra. The latter set up a
General Headquarters in the island of which he put Suhardjo Harjo-wardojo (Suharjo Haryowardoyo) in charge. As Chief of Staff for Sumatra was appointed Mohammad Nur (Nasution 1959:110).

2 Nasution is probably mixing up the Barisan Pemuda Indonesia with the Pemuda Republik Indonesia

3 Similar differences arose between the Pesindo board and its local branches in East Sumatra, where in early 1947 the Pesindo of Pematang Siantar clashed with the Sumatran Pesindo command (Nasution 1977, IV:377–380).

4 This book is quoted extensively in Sumatera Utara (1953). Sumantri's account (n.d.:167–170) also seems to be based on it.

5 This Barisan Penjaga Keamanan reportedly was divided into three divisions: the Barisan Cap Bintang (Star Column), whose task it was to "annihilate those who would not bend to its superior force", the Barisan Cap Saud (probably Sauh, anchor), which had as task "to seize the property of persons who were members of independence movements in order to finance the barisan", and the Barisan Cap Tumbak (Lance Column), which had the task to "capture intellectuals for imprisonment or execution, and kidnap girls" who were members of independence movements (Revolusi December n.d.:17).

6 So the ulèëbalang of the Sagi of the XXII Mukim declared on February 19th that: 1) the ulèëbalang's right of succession as the leaders of the country was no longer in keeping with the times; 2) the ulèëbalang were citizens of the Indonesian Republic and respected the people's well-being; and 3) they had decided, for the sake of the attainment of a perfect organization, a) to request the Government respectfully to grant the population of the twenty-two mukim the right to choose its own leaders, and b) to ask all ulèëbalang, with the inclusion of the Sagi head, to resign their functions (NIB III:553).

7 As deputy commander of the Fifth Division was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Nurdin Sufi, while Major Bachtiar was appointed Chief of Staff (Sumatera Utara 1953:164; Dua Windhu 1972:114).

8 Personal jealousies and regional antagonism may have played a role here. Amir Husin al Mudjahid came from East Aceh, as did Mohammad Daud-sjah. According to some observers the fact that the key military and civil functions in Aceh were occupied by two East Acehnese was resented by people from Greater Aceh and Pidie (Persoalan 1953:5).


10 See the letter of Nja’Umar, Chairman of the Council of Review of Pidie, to the bupatis and wedanas of Sigli, Lammeulo and Meureudu (Sekitar n.d. I:218–227).

11 See, for example, the speeches of Nur el Ibrahimy and Kasman Singodi-medjo (Sekitar n.d. I:134–139, 192–249).

12 Even someone like Amelz, who usually defended the Darul Islam rebels, stated in Parliament in October 1953: "Although I had many differences of opinion with him in the past, I – like his many other friends and enemies – am forced to recognize the enormous influence he enjoyed among the people, especially in the period of our independence, since his becoming head of the Office of Religion, military governor and
subsequently governor of Aceh. Admittedly his reputation suffered after his appointments as military governor and governor of Aceh and he became very unpopular with a proportion of his former followers. But his influence became very strong again after his resignation, notably in 1952 and 1953” (Sekitar n.d. I:269).

13 This merger was effected on April 26th, 1947 (Dua Windhu 1972:116–117). In February 1947 the Sumatra Command had been divided into three Sub-Commands, one of them that of North Sumatra, headed by Mohammad Daudsja.

14 Four days after this the Sumatra branch of the Pesindo had issued a directive to the effect that all the Pesindo troops throughout Sumatra should cooperate in the effort to create a National Army of Indonesia. As we have seen, however, relations between the central board and the Aceh branch were not good.

15 Maludin Simbolon was commander of North Sumatra from 1950 till 1956. Abdul Haris Nasution was Chief of Staff of the Republican Army from 1950 to 1952 and from 1955 to 1962. Tahi Bonar Simatupang was Acting Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Republican Army from 1949 to 1954.

16 This information derives from a secret report cited by K. Werdojo (K. Werdoyo) during the parliamentary debate on the Daud Beureu’eh rebellion (Sekitar n.d. I:302–303).

17 Among the persons mentioned as attending were: T. Aziz (chairman of the Social Council of East Aceh), Burhanuddin (camat of Langsa), Aminuddin (chief of Police of Idi), Garbie (wedana of Idi), and Abdul Rani (camat of Peureulak), while the names of Hasan Aly and A.R. Hadjat (A.R. Hajat), the patih of Binjai are also mentioned in connection with the meeting, though it is not clear whether they were actually present or not. The name of Hasan Aly, former director of Public Prosecutions in Aceh and the later Darul Islam Prime Minister of the region, is also mentioned in connection with a third preparatory meeting which allegedly took place. For this he and a number of other persons were reported to have gathered at the house of the patih of Binjai, who later denied that Hasan Aly’s visit had had anything to do with the Darul Islam, saying that Hasan Aly had only come to his house to pay his respects before leaving for Jakarta, to which city he had been transferred. Hasan Aly had admittedly brought some friends along, but Hadjat did not know what Hasan Aly and these friends had talked about, because they spoke Acehnese, a language he did not understand (Sekitar n.d. I:33).

18 A third bupati, Moh. Husin of Central Aceh, was taken prisoner by Republican troops at the outbreak of the rebellion.

19 The Acehnese Darul Islam movement had four flags: one red with a white star and crescent, one green with a white star and crescent, one red with a white crescent and four stars, and one white and red, with a crescent in the red bar and a star in the white one (PR 4-11-1953).

20 Amin’s report (1956:60–61) confirms that the assistant wedana of Peureulak, A.R. Hasan, sided with the rebels. The latter chaired a meeting on September 21st en 22nd at which the fortunes of the rebellion were discussed and a branch of the Islamic Army of Indonesia was called into being.
21 A keuchik is the head of a gampong (kampung). A number of such kampungs make up a mukim.

22 Bachtiar Yunus noted (1953:3) with respect to Aceh that whereas such companies as Atra and Nasional were able to continue operating undisturbedly, others had to practically discontinue their services because their vehicles were frequently stopped or attacked.

23 Aceh had earned itself the name Daerah Modal Republik Indonesia, Capital Area of the Republic of Indonesia, for the role it had played during the revolution. On the one hand the name gave expression to the fact that Aceh — unlike the rest of the Republic — had never been occupied by Dutch troops. On the other hand it was indicative of the financial and material support given by it to the Republican Government.

24 The Dewan Syura consisted of a chairman (Daud Beureu'eh), a deputy chairman (Amir Husin al Mudjahid), and five members. The Majlis Syura also comprised a chairman (Daud Beureu'eh) and a deputy chairman, while its exact composition as well as the number of its members still remained to be fixed.

25 For the commanders of the regiments and their battalions see Amin (1956:83–85).

26 The bupatis at the time were:

Pidie: T.A. Hasan
North Aceh: Teungku Sjeh Abdul Hamid (Ayah Hamid)
East Aceh: Saleh Adri
South Aceh: Teungku Zakaria Junus (Zakaria Yunus)
Central Aceh: Saleh Hadji (Saleh Haji)
Greater Aceh: Ishak Amin (the first bupati here, Sulaiman Daud, the former resident-coordinator of Aceh, having been arrested in May 1954).

The commanders of the Regiments were:
Regiment I (Pidie): Ibrahim Saleh, an elder brother of Hasan Saleh
Regiment II (North Aceh): H. Ibrahim
Regiment III (East Aceh): A.R. Hanafiah
Regiment IV (South Aceh): Saleh Kafa
Regiment V (Central Aceh): Iljas Lebai (Ilyas Lebai)
Regiment VI (Greater Aceh): Abdullah Wahab
Regiment VII (East Sumatra): Haji Hasanuddin
(the troops of West Aceh, which were commanded by T.R. Idris, formed part of the Regiment for South Aceh).

The Darul Islam Police Force was headed by A.R. Hasjim (A.R. Hasyim).
There were further three deputy military governors, viz.
Hasan Aly for Greater Aceh, Pidie and Central Aceh,
Hasan Saleh for North and East Aceh and Langkat-Tanah Karo,
A.G. Mutiara for South and West Aceh and West Tapanuli.

27 For its composition see Meuraxa (1956:54–56).

28 T.M. Amin was a former bupati attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He had been managing director of Dagang dan Pembangunan (formerly Indolco) Ltd. and a member of the board of the Aceh Mining Co., of which Hasballah Daud, the son of Daud Beureu'eh, was the director.
A.G. Mutiara (also known as Abdul Gani) had been managing editor of the newspaper *Tegas*, published at Banda Aceh.

Zainul Abidin Muhammad Tiro (also known as Zainul Abidin) was an ex-judge of the court of Sigli (PR 4-1-1956; Amin 1953:6).

29 So there were reports of villagers near Kualabéé, in West Aceh, receiving free medical care at the local *Darul Islam* hospital, of which a foreigner who was also military instructor was in charge. This foreigner may have been one Dr. Schiphorst, who together with a nurse called Adrie Israel had been missing from the hospital of Kabanjahe, in Tanah Karo, since February 1954, and who was reported to be working for the rebels (Sekitar n.d. III:143–144, 151). Abdul Murat Mat Jan (1976:24) notes that the *Darul Islam* trained its medical personnel at the island of Pulau Kampai, in East Sumatra, and that it obtained medicines from the latter's relatives outside Aceh and from medical workers within Aceh who sympathized with it.

30 Besides Singapore, Penang and New York, Tokyo was mentioned as one of the places in which sympathizers of the Acehnese Islamic State of Indonesia tried to rally financial and moral support. In Singapore the movement was moreover represented by "an enterprising Irish public relations officer" (Mossman 1961:44).

31 D.M. Djuned, a member of the *Perti* of Aceh, was arrested in May 1954, shortly after the arrest of Sulaiman Daud by Republican troops. After his release Djuned continued his efforts. In February 1955 he visited Jakarta in order to discuss the situation in Aceh and the possibilities of its solution with Central Government officials (Sekitar n.d. III:94, 204). For the composition of the *Badan Kontak Pribadi Peristiwa Aceh* see Amin (1956:198). In March 1955 the *Panitia Badan Penyelesaian Peristiwa Aceh* chaired by T.M. Jahja (T.M. Yahya) was formed at Medan. Like the *Badan Kontak Pribadi*, it set itself the task of finding a solution by maintaining relations with Daud Beure'u'e as well as the Central Republican Government. The initiative for the foundation of this new committee had been taken by the *Persatuan Masyarakat Aceh* (PERMA) in November of the previous year (Sekitar n.d. III:89–90, 220).

32 Other recommendations by the Islamic scholars to the Government which were cited by the parliamentary commission in its report were that it should stimulate cooperation between the *teungkus* and *teukus*, give priority to Acehnese in its appointment policy, try and treat Aceh as a father would his son (in view of the courage shown by the Acehnese), and strive to achieve equity in all fields to satisfy the strong sense of justice of the Acehnese people. The commission itself recommended that the Republican Government and its apparatus should eschew everything in their measures that might be offensive to the Acehnese or provoke further discord, avoid creating the impression in the appointment of its employees that it favoured a particular group and consequently make sure that everyone it appointed to positions in Aceh met the requirements of acceptability, capability and integrity, and give priority to Aceh in the allocation of funds and materials for the administrative and power machinery in order to reward the Acehnese population for defending the nation so well.

33 These nineteen provinces were: Aceh, East Sumatra (including Riau),
Tapanuli, Minangkabau (West Sumatra), South Sumatra (Jambi, Palembang, Bengkulu, Lampung, Bangka and Belitung), West Java, Central Java, East Java, West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, Bali-Lombok, the Lesser Sunda Islands, the Moluccas, West Irian, Mataram (Yogyakarta and Surakarta), and Jakarta (Sekitar n.d. III:15).

34 This proposal was co-signed by Amelz, A.M. Djohan (A.M. Johan) (PIR), Ibrahim Sedar (independent), Mayor Polak (PSI), and A.C. Manoppo (Demokrat).

35 At the time of Amin's appointment twenty parties and organizations, among them the Masyumi, GPII and Muhammadiyah, had pressed for Abdul Hakim's continuation in office. The parties adopting the opposite stance included the PKI, which wanted to see Abdul Hakim fired immediately. The point at issue was Abdul Hakim's agrarian policy, the PKI holding him responsible for the arrests of farmers (Sekitar n.d. I:369-370).

36 Zulkifli Lubis and Burhanuddin Harahap were also involved in an attempt to establish contact with Kartosuwirjo. This became apparent in February 1956, when an envoy carrying letters for Kartosuwirjo asking him to agree to a cease-fire was intercepted (PR 4-2-1956, 14-2-1956, 15-2-1956).

37 There were none the less some reports of disciplinary action being taken against local Darul Islam commanders. In North Aceh, for instance, one of Hasan Saleh's lieutenants Usman Balo, fled to Pidie on learning that he was to be punished for cruelty (Sekitar n.d. III:18). In spite of the reports of conflicts and of struggles for power between the top leaders — in which the names of Daud Beureu'eh, Hasan Saleh and Husin Jusuf crop up most frequently —, on the whole there was great unity and cohesion in this area.

38 Haji Hasanauddin's function as commander of the East Sumatra Regiment was taken over by Teuku Saat; most of the soldiers followed Hasanuddin, however (DM 7-8-1959).

39 The vagueness of the compromise gave rise to some problems in 1962. At the end of that year the rumour circulated that the Central Army Command was opposed to the introduction of Islamic law in Aceh, which rumour was subsequently contradicted by an Army spokesman. He read out a statement the purport of which was that 1) Islamic law was not a priori rejected, hence also not in Aceh; 2) laws could be made for the Islamic community which might be adjusted to Islamic law; and 3) the Regional Government of Aceh, in accordance with the statement of the Hardi mission, might issue regional regulations in conformity with Islamic law in the fields of religion, education and customary law, provided these did not run counter to the general principles of the state policy, the public interest, or legal rules of a higher order. The discussion was joined by the Minister of Religion, who stated himself to be convinced that the Central Army Command recognized, and hence did not reject, the principle of Islamic law in Aceh (DM 11-12-1962, 12-12-1962, 19-12-1962).

40 This was by Keputusan Penguasa Perang Pusat no. 01054/1959 of October 31st, 1959. Indonesia was under martial law from March 1957 till March 1962. During this time it had a Central War Administration,
Penguasa Perang Pusat (Peperpu), and in the provinces a Regional War Administration, Penguasa Perang Daerah (Peperda). In Aceh the chairman of the Peperda was the military commander, Sjammaun Gaharu, and the vice-chairman the governor, A. Hasjmy.

Both these officers belonged to the so-called OSM, or Operasi Sabang Merauke, an organization headed by Major Bojke Nainggolan (Boyke Nainggolan). This had originally been the name of the PRRI operation whereby Medan was occupied by the rebels for one day in March 1958.

The Republik Persatuan Indonesia was sometimes also called the Negara Demokrasi Indonesia (NDI) (Democratic State of Indonesia). Consequently its Army, the Tentara Persatuan Indonesia (TPI), was sometimes also referred to as the Tentara Demokrasi Indonesia (TDI). For the constitution of the RPI see Mudzakkar (n.d.: 24–64).

The other Sumatran states were: the combined State of Tapanuli and East Sumatra, the States of West Sumatra, the Riau Archipelago, Jambi and South Sumatra. The other state in Sulawesi was that of North Sulawesi (Mossman 1961: 228).

Hasan Muhammad Tiro (1965: 19), who espoused the United Republic of Indonesia as its representative with the United Nations, pleaded for a Confederation of Southeast Asian States made up of the Republics of Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, the Moluccas, Irian Jaya, Bali, and Sunda. Although overlooking Java and the other Sunda Islands in his enumeration, he did state that Java should also form part of the confederation.

Lieutenant-Colonel Achmad Husein had played an important role in the events leading up to the PRRI/Permesta rebellion. He had been chairman of the Banteng Council of Central Sumatra and in February 1958 had issued the ultimatum to the Central Republican Government the refusal of which had prompted the proclamation of the PRRI.

One of these reporting together with Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was Amelz.

CHAPTER VII

1 See Anderson (1976) and Onghokham (1978) for an analysis of the influence of rationalization and of resistance against expanding central control on the Madruin affair.

2 This Bureau was headed by Major General Djokosujono (Jokosuyono) and Ir. Sakirman.

3 The TNI bagian Masyarakat was headed by Major General Ir. Sakirman.

4 The core of the Sayap Kiri was formed by the PKI, Partai Sosialis, Pesindo, and Partai Buruh.

5 According to Djamhari (1971: 41) the strength of the TNI bagian Masyarakat was 90,000. Nasution (1968 II: 130), in his discussion of the problems of rationalization, speaks of a strength of 350,000 with reference to the Armed Forces (including the navy), and 470,000 for the nastykars.

6 The Sayap Kiri coalition was transformed into the Front Demokrasi Rakyat, headed by Amir Sjarifuddin, at the end of February 1948. Its principal participants were the Partai Sosialis, Partai Buruh, PKI, Pesindo and SOBSI.
7 As Makassarese and Bugis had also migrated to Pulau Laut, this seems to account for the fears and frequent rumours of infiltrations by Kahar Muzakkar's troops on this island.

8 For a list of the goods involved see Wirodihardjo (1965:102–104).

9 The practice of sub-leasing land or share-cropping to poor farmers or landless labourers made for an increase in the number of large landlords and big farmers. More land was controlled by these latter two categories than appeared at a superficial glance at land ownership. The extent to which land was controlled indirectly, through leasing or share-cropping arrangements, was later used, in fact, as a major justification for legislation providing for the redistribution of land. However, in a country where land-holdings in general were very small, and large land ownership was restricted to specific regions, land reforms and land redistribution seemed to have little point. Nevertheless, as the memorandum to the Act on the Size of Agricultural Holdings stated, even if large land ownership was not so widespread (so that there might not appear to be much land to redistribute), most large landholders had become so as a result of the acquisition of land through leasing or share-cropping. The area of the land involved might comprise tens, hundreds and even thousands of hectares (Himpunan 1965:284).

10 A commercial edition of Jackson's thesis was published in 1980 (Jackson 1980).

11 An additional problem is that Jackson obtained his information on land ownership and share-cropping by means of a questionnaire distributed to village officials. Obviously the official village records do not necessarily reflect the actual landholding situation. To evade the law on maximum holdings, for instance, larger landholders might have some of their land registered in the names of relatives.

12 Jackson's findings indeed corroborate this. He writes: "The conclusion to be drawn is that landownership is more widespread in the D.I. villages but that the plots of many are not large enough to preclude the necessity of also working for others. In contrast landownership is more concentrated in the pro-government villages, but those who own land own enough and are not forced to work simultaneously for other farmers" (Jackson 1971:132).

13 I will not enter into discussion of whether genealogical ties were of no importance in South Sulawesi, as has been argued by Ter Haar, who probably influenced Vink, or whether this is a false assertion, as is claimed by Chabot (1950:17).

14 Looking at the question from the opposite viewpoint, there was one notable exception: the eastern part of East Java, including Madura, in which area, although markedly Islamic, armed support for Kartosuwirjo's Islamic State was not forthcoming. There had been attempts here to build up an East Javanese Division of the Islamic Army, to be commanded by one Achmadi (Akhmadi). In 1954, however, this Achmadi was arrested and sentenced to six years' gaol. His arrest came before he was able to recruit any followers or to collect a significant number of firearms: at the time of his arrest he only had one Colt with five bullets in his possession (PR 26-8-1954, 28-8-1954, 10-9-1954). The absence of a Darul Islam movement in East Java is all the more striking as in the late 1970's this was one of the areas in which Holy War Commands, or
Komando Jihad, which also strove after the establishment of an Islamic State of Indonesia, were active.