Pointing to Common Ground in Dramatic Dialogue: The Case of δῆ and τοι

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1 Introduction

Every word we speak, every speech act we perform, is only intelligible to our interlocutor against the backdrop of a body of shared knowledge and beliefs. When we are engaged in a conversation, we assume that our interlocutor knows such things as the vocabulary and rules of the language in which we hold the conversation. We naturally assume that our conversation partner is talking about the same topic, and has not forgotten the preceding part of the conversation. We take a certain amount of general world knowledge for granted and we often also presuppose knowledge of our personal lives. People engaged in conversation do not only share a considerable amount of information, but they are also mutually *aware* that they share this information. This presumed background information, often left implicit, but no less vital to successful communication, is usually referred to as *common ground*.

Common ground as a theoretical concept has been developed in the field of language philosophy in the 1970s by philosophers such as Robert Stalnaker, who defines common ground as follows:

[1] Stalnaker (2002: 701)

To presuppose something is to take it for granted, or at least to act as if one takes it for granted, as background information—as common ground among the participants in the conversation.

The psycholinguist Herbert Clark, a prominent figure in the study of common ground in conversation, describes common ground in a similar way as: '[...] the sum of [two people's] mutual, common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions' (Clark 1996: 93). Fundamental to Clark's view on communication is that communication is a form of joint action:

[2] Clark (1996: 92)

Everything we do is rooted in information we have about our surroundings, activities, perceptions, emotions, plans, interests. Everything we do

jointly with others is also rooted in this information, but only in that part we think they share with us. The notion needed here is common ground. [...] When my son and I enter a conversation, we presuppose certain common ground, and with each joint action—each utterance, for example—we try to add to it. To do that, we need to keep track of our common ground as it accumulates increment by increment.

Common ground typically plays a dual role in communication. First, speakers will normally tailor their utterances in order to bring them in alignment with the common ground; that is, to relate them to what they presume their interlocutors know or believe. The most obvious way to adapt your utterance to the common ground is by simply leaving out information you suppose your interlocutor already possesses. However, also many choices regarding vocabulary and grammatical constructions are dependent on the common ground. For example, speakers will use a definite article if they presume that the entity at issue will already be known and identifiable to the addressee.

In a similar way, common ground management is relevant to Greek word order. It is by now commonly accepted that the crucial factor determining the position of a constituent in a Greek clause is its information status: does the constituent at issue refer to given information (i.e. is it a Topic) or does it provide new or otherwise salient information (i.e. is it Focus)? The distinction between topicality and focality, which is at the heart of the grammar of Greek word order, can readily be described in terms of common ground management. Topical referents are referents that are already (presumed to be) part of the common ground, while focal information is not yet part of the common ground but is mentioned in order to add information to the common ground. This brings us to the second aspect of common ground.

The second key aspect of common ground in communication relates to the fact that the common ground is not a static entity: it changes in the course of the conversation through a process referred to as *grounding* (Clark and Brennan 1991). During a conversation, common ground is being negotiated by the interlocutors. Utterances can be seen as proposals to add to the common ground, or to correct an element in the common ground. By accepting the proposal—sometimes implicitly—the interlocutor effects an update of the common ground. The updated common ground then serves as a basis for further communication.

In order to add to their common ground, interlocutors will have to engage in a process of aligning their, possibly different, perspectives on the world. In Arie Verhagen's cognitive linguistic approach to common ground negotiation, speakers are seen as subjects of conceptualisation co-operating in order to co-

ordinate their perspectives with respect to some object of conceptualisation to which their joint attention is directed, a process called *intersubjective coordination* by Verhagen:

[3] Verhagen (2005: 7)

[The] subjects of conceptualization engage in cognitive coordination by means of the utterance, with respect to some object of coordination. [...] The point of a linguistic utterance, in broad terms, is that the first conceptualizer invites the second to jointly attend to an object of conceptualization in some specific way, and to update the common ground by doing so.

According to Verhagen, the interlocutors' cognitive coordination is a crucial function of many linguistic (lexical as well as grammatical) phenomena:

[4] Verhagen (2005: 4)

For a range of linguistic phenomena which are arguably quite basic (negation and negation-related constructions, complementation, discourse connectives) it can be demonstrated that connecting, differentiating, and 'tailoring' the contents of points of view with respect to each other (rather than organizing a connection to the world) is essential for understanding their semantics and, perhaps surprisingly, their syntax.¹

A cognitively-oriented approach to discourse, very similar to Verhagen's, is that of Ronald Langacker, who defines the common ground—which he refers to as Current Discourse Space—as: 'the mental space comprising those elements and relations construed as being shared by the speaker and hearer as a basis for communication at a given moment in the flow of discourse' (Langacker 2001: 144). In Langacker's insightful model, the Current Discourse Space, i.e. common ground, is structured as represented by Figure 1.

Langacker distinguishes a number of elements that, together, constitute the Current Discourse Space, i.e. common ground. Central to the common ground are the *speaker* (S) and the *hearer* (H) as the subjects of conceptualisation, and the *time* and *space* of the speech event.²

1 A helpful introduction to the cognitive linguistics approach to joint cognition and common ground is Verhagen (2015).

2 Langacker calls the ensemble of speaker, hearer, time and space of the speech event the

FIGURE 1 *Common ground/Current Discourse Space in Cognitive Grammar*
 Usage Event = utterance, actual instance of language use (typically a clause)
 LANGACKER 2001: 145

The second element of the common ground is the speaker's and hearer's *joint attention* (indicated in Figure 1 by the dashed arrows) directed at some real or imagined entity or situation, i.e. the object of conceptualisation. This entity or situation is in the focus of their attention.³ This focused entity is located within a viewing frame, a window (or, to use a theatre metaphor, an 'on stage' region) through which we are viewing the world. The speech act participants are also mutually aware of one another's knowledge and perspectives (see the double-headed dashed arrow between S and H in Figure 1). The third element of the common ground is the *immediate context* of the speech event: the various physical, mental, social, and cultural circumstances of the conversation. The fourth element is the body of knowledge shared by the interlocutors. *Shared knowledge* can have roughly two sources: it is either general knowledge, which is often based on a shared community, or culture. Shared cultural knowledge includes knowledge of social practices, cultural norms, ste-

Ground. In Langacker's terminology, in other words, the Ground is only a part of the common ground, i.e., in his terms, Current Discourse Space.

3 It should be noted that the term *focus*, as it is used here, is not equal to the information-structural notion of Focus, i.e. new information. In this context, it is used in a broader sense, as the conceptual content referred to by an utterance, typically a clause or an intonation unit, which is fully active in the consciousness (that is, in the focus of attention) of the interlocutors at some point in time.

reotypes, *topoi*, genre conventions, etc. Shared knowledge can also be based on shared personal experiences. The fifth element relates to the *discourse context* of the utterance. A speaker can presuppose that the information conveyed by their previous utterances is known to the addressee, and the speaker may also presume that the addressee entertains specific expectations about how the conversation will further develop.

Elements of the Current Discourse Space/Common Ground:

- (1) **Speaker (S), Hearer (H), speech time and space (Ground)**
- (2) **Joint directing of attention** on a focal entity (Focus)
- (3) **Context of speech:** immediate perceivable physical, mental, social, and cultural circumstances (+ simple inferences based on them)
- (4) **Shared knowledge:**
 - general world knowledge, typically based on shared culture (social/religious practices, cultural norms and values, stereotypes, *topoi*, genre conventions etc.)
 - shared personal experience
 (+ simple inferences based on shared knowledge)
- (5) **Discourse context:** shared knowledge of preceding discourse, shared expectations about subsequent discourse (+ simple inferences based on discourse context)

Let us now move away from the theory and turn to particles. What I would like to show is that the notion of common ground can also be helpful in understanding what the function of Greek particles in discourse is. More specifically, what I will argue is that particles play an important role in what you might call *common ground management*. Particles can be seen as instructions from the speaker to the addressee on how to cognitively anchor the utterance at issue to the common ground.⁴ As an illustration of this aspect of particle meaning, I will examine two particles more closely, namely *δή* and *τοι*, particles that are usually classified as modal or interactional particles but whose precise meaning is not easy to pinpoint.⁵ What I would like to show is that it is helpful to analyse

4 In Allan and van Gils (2015) and Allan (2017a), I argued that Greek adversative particles such as *ἀλλά*, *καίτοι*, *μέντοι*, and *μήν* can also be insightfully analysed as devices used to anchor their host utterance in the common ground. There is also an increasing number of studies approaching particles in modern languages in terms of common ground management, e.g. Karagjosova (2003), Verhagen (2005), Fetzer and Fischer (2007), Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007).

5 For this classification, see e.g. Wakker (1997: 211), van Emde Boas et al. (2018: 686–688).

δὴ and τοι as *grounding devices*, that is, as a signal from speaker to addressee specifying the relationship between the utterance and the common ground. More specifically, I will argue that δὴ and τοι are used to communicate that the proposition or the speech act is supposed to be cognitively accessible to the addressee as part of the common ground, or otherwise easily inferable on the basis of the common ground.

2 The Particle δὴ: Pointing to Common Ground

A convenient starting point for our discussion is the particle δὴ, since it is probably the particle that relates to the common ground in the most direct and obvious way. There has been, and still is, considerable discussion on the exact function of δὴ. Since space prevents me from rehearsing the extensive scholarly discussion on the particle, I will here only present the two most prominent approaches to the particle.⁶

One approach stresses the particle's function as a marker of evidentiality, that is, the particle as a marker of information that is visible, evident, or otherwise known to the addressee. An influential proponent of this view is Kühner's and Gerth's grammar:

[5] Kühner and Gerth (1898: II 123)

[...] aus dieser [temporalen Bedeutung, *RJA*] entwickelte sich die bildliche, in der es auf **bereits** (*iam*) **Bekanntes, Offenbares, Augenscheinliches** hinweist, so dass es sich oft durch **gewiss, offenbar** erklären lässt.

More recently, this view has also been advocated by Sicking and van Ophuijsen, who characterise the particle's function as:

[6] Sicking and van Ophuijsen (1993: 52, 141)

[I]t is possible to describe δὴ as a primarily 'evidential' sentence particle which presents a statement as immediately evident to the senses or the understanding or as common knowledge. It thus implies that the speaker and hearer are in the same position with respect to this statement.

6 For a very helpful overview of the discussion, see now the Online Repository of Particle Studies (Volume 5 of Bonifazi et al. 2016).

[...] the basic value of the particle relates to what is visible to the mind's eye as well as to the organ of sight [...]

Sicking and van Ophuijsen's characterisation of $\delta\eta$ as a marker of what is evident and common knowledge, of course, comes very close to viewing the particle as a marker of common ground.⁷

Beside the 'evidential' view on $\delta\eta$, there is an approach to $\delta\eta$ which states that the particle serves to draw attention to the proposition in which it occurs and to point out to the addressee that it is of special importance. This is the approach proposed by linguists such as Ruijgh and Wakker who describe the particle's function respectively as:

[7a] Ruijgh (1971: 646–647)

En effet, $\delta\eta$ semble souligner l'importance du fait nouveau qui est le contenu de la phrase. En exagérant beaucoup, on pourrait rendre $\delta\eta$ par 'voici un fait important'.

[7b] Wakker (1994: 351)

an attitudinal particle which demands the addressee's special attention for the (important and interesting) proposition presented by the speaker.

How to overcome this deadlock of opposing views? My answer would not be to accept one in favour of the other, but to acknowledge that both approaches capture important aspects of the particle's meaning. In other words, it is more attractive to come to a synthesis between the two approaches, recognising that $\delta\eta$ combines two functions: it is *both* a common ground marker (its 'evidential' function) *and* an attention-focuser.⁸ A characterisation of $\delta\eta$'s function along these lines would run as follows:

7 The new *Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek* (CGCG), which has an excellent chapter on particles, also seems to side with the 'evidential' view (van Emde Boas et al. 2018: 686–688). The term 'evidential', in the sense of 'marking what is evident', is somewhat unfortunate because it is potentially confusing: the term is more often used in a different sense, namely referring to the grammatical system found in many languages which indicates the *source* of knowledge.

8 In their monumental study of Greek particles, Bonifazi et al. (2016) also acknowledge these two central, i.e. 'intensifying' and 'evidential', functions of $\delta\eta$. However, they do not seem to

[8] The particle $\delta\eta$ **focuses the joint attention** on an entity (i.e. a person, object, property, proposition, or speech act) which is (construed as being) part of the **common ground**.⁹

The fact that $\delta\eta$ may focus on the attention on different types of entities, e.g. properties, persons, objects, states of affairs, propositions, and even speech acts, has consequences for the syntactical scope of $\delta\eta$: the particle may scope over adjectives, (pro)nouns, verbs, and whole clauses. According to Wackernagel's Law, $\delta\eta$ is normally placed in the second position in the syntactic unit it has scope over, i.e. a word, phrase, or clause.¹⁰

To fully understand the use of $\delta\eta$, it is not sufficient to solely consider its inherent semantic features, but it is also important to take a number of its—contextually evoked—pragmatic features into account. More specifically, $\delta\eta$'s attention-focusing property tend to be associated with a number of additional pragmatic side-effects (implicatures).

A natural side-effect of the attention-focusing function of $\delta\eta$ is that the speaker wishes to point out to the addressee that an entity is noteworthy for some reason. Depending on the context, this sense of noteworthiness may be accompanied by more specific mental attitudes or emotions such as contempt, indignation, irony, sarcasm, or scepticism.¹¹ Another occasional side-effect of the focusing function of $\delta\eta$ is *exclusivity*. In some contexts, $\delta\eta$ emphasises that a proposition is true *only* for the entity in its scope, in contrast to a set or scale of (implicit) potential alternatives.¹²

assume that these two functions operate *simultaneously*. Kees Thijs is preparing a doctoral dissertation on $\delta\eta$ (and other particles) in which $\delta\eta$ is also analyzed in terms of Common Ground and focus of attention.

- 9 The combination of focaliser and common ground marker should not come as a surprise. Cross-linguistically, discourse markers and adverbs, e.g. English *indeed*, often combine functions such as common ground marking, expectation marking, emphasis, and focalisation (see e.g. Simon-Vandenberg and Aijmer 2007).
- 10 Occasionally, however, $\delta\eta$ may also be separated from the item in its scope by one or more words or it may be placed *before* the item in its scope (Denniston ²1954: 228–229). For its scope, see also Bonifazi et al. (2016: IV.4 § 100).
- 11 Irony may also be a side-effect of the common-ground-marking function of $\delta\eta$: cross-linguistically, irony is frequently associated with common ground markers, cf. English *no doubt* (Simon-Vandenberg and Aijmer 2007). For the use of $\delta\eta$ with an ironic undertone, see also Bonifazi et al. (2016: IV.4.5.5, 4.6.4).
- 12 As a marker of exclusivity (or restrictiveness), $\delta\eta$ shows some similarity to more typical focus (or scope) particles such as $\gamma\epsilon$, $-\pi\epsilon\rho$ and $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ 'also, even'.

FIGURE 2 Occasional pragmatic side-effects of $\delta\eta$'s attention-focusing function

3 $\delta\eta$ in Drama

The dual function of $\delta\eta$ as an attention-focusing device and a common ground marker can also be observed in its use in drama.¹³ $\delta\eta$ seems to be capable of invoking all possible components of the common ground, such as (i) the immediate physical context, (ii) shared personal and communal knowledge (and inferences based thereon), and (iii) shared knowledge of, and expectations about, the discourse. In other words, $\delta\eta$ may mark out an entity that is supposed to be perceptually or cognitively accessible to the addressee, e.g. ‘as you can see/hear’, ‘as you know’, ‘as expected’, ‘evidently’, ‘obviously’, ‘clearly’, ‘of course’, ‘indeed’.

3.1 *Immediate Context: Focus on a Visible Entity or State of Affairs*

The first category concerns cases in which $\delta\eta$ is used to direct the addressee’s attention to a person or an event in the immediate physical context of the speaker and addressee. In the following example, $\delta\eta$ is used ‘marking the

13 The corpus examined consists of Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* and *Persae*, Sophocles’ *Ajax* and *Antigone*, and Euripides’ *Bacchae* and *Medea* (96 instances of $\delta\eta$ in total). I will, at times, also cite examples from other plays in case a particular type of particle use did not occur in the corpus of these six plays.

appearance of a new character on stage' (Denniston ²1954: 103): the chorus interrupt their song to announce the arrival of Creon on the scene.

[9] Sophocles *Antigone* 155–158

ἀλλ' ὅδε γὰρ δὴ βασιλεὺς χώρας,
†Κρέων ὁ Μενοικέως,†... νεοχμὸς
νεαραίσι θεῶν ἐπὶ συντυχίαις
χωρεῖ [...]

But here comes the new king of the land, ... Creon, under the new conditions given by the gods [...]¹⁴

The function of δὴ in [9] is related to the function of the combination καὶ δὴ as a marker of entries. According to van Erp Taalman Kip, καὶ δὴ 'is used to mark an entry that has been prepared for by the words that precede it'.¹⁵ The use of καὶ δὴ can be contrasted with the use of καὶ μὴν which 'marks an entry that is not prepared for by the words that immediately precede it [...]' (van Erp Taalman Kip 2009: 128). δὴ in the context of entries seems to evoke two different aspects of common ground: not only does it draw the attention to a person that is *visible* in the direct physical context (note the presence of the deictic pronoun ὅδε in [9]), it also points out to the addressee that the entry is somehow *expected* on the basis of (or prepared for by) the preceding discourse. In [9], the chorus of elders already expect Creon's arrival since he has summoned the elders in order to address them. The function of ἀλλ', incidentally, can also be described in terms of common ground management. What we have here is ἀλλά in its function as a marker of discourse boundaries: it signals that the speaker interrupts the expected flow of discourse and shifts the interlocutors' joint focus of attention to another discourse topic.¹⁶

[10] Sophocles *Antigone* 441–442

σὲ δὴ, σὲ τὴν νεύουσαν ἐς πέδον κάρα,
φῆς, ἢ καταρνήϊ μὴ δεδρακέναι τάδε;

14 The Greek texts are taken from the OCT editions of Aeschylus (Page 1972), Sophocles (Lloyd-Jones and Wilson 1990) and Euripides (Diggle 1981–1994). The translations are taken, sometimes with minor adaptations, from the editions of Fraenkel (1950) (Aesch. *Ag.*), Lloyd-Jones (1994–1996) (Sophocles) and Kovacs (1994–2003) (Euripides), unless otherwise indicated.

15 E.g. Soph. *Aj.* 544, Eur. *Med.* 118.

16 For this function of δὴ in drama, see Drummen (2009: 151–152), Allan (2017a: 287).

You there, you that are bowing down your head towards the ground, do you admit, or do you deny, that you have done this?

Creon is calling Antigone's attention in a rather harsh way by means of an accusative (suggesting an ellipse of a verb like *καλῶ*). The use of *δῆ* can again be interpreted in terms of its two functional aspects: it focuses the attention on Antigone ('you there!'), who is as the addressee by definition part of the common ground. As often, *δῆ* in combination with a personal pronoun conveys an additional sense of the speaker's contempt for the addressee.¹⁷

[11] Sophocles *Antigone* 937–939

ὦ γῆς Θήβης ἄστρῳ πατρῶιον
καὶ θεοὶ προγενεῖς,
ἄγομαι δῆ 'γὼ κούκέτι μέλλω.

O city of my fathers, land of Thebes, and you gods, our ancestors! I am led away now; there is no more delay!

In a final emotional appeal to the Thebans, Antigone draws attention to the outrageous fact, visible to the Thebans, that she is being led away. *δῆ* seems to convey an additional sense of indignation.¹⁸

3.2 *Shared Communal Knowledge: Common Knowledge, Gnostic Knowledge*

With *δῆ*, a speaker may also invoke general knowledge that is shared among members of a particular community. For example,

[12] Sophocles *Antigone* 162–163

ἄνδρες, τὰ μὲν δῆ πόλεος ἀσφαλῶς θεοὶ
πολλῶι σάλωι σείσαντες ὥρθωσαν πάλιν· (Soph. *Ant.* 162–163)

17 More examples in Denniston (2015: 208).

18 Other examples of *δῆ* drawing attention to observable entities or events in the immediate context are: A. *Pers.* 1071 (sounds of wailing), A. *Ag.* 887 (dried up eyes), Soph. *Aj.* 877 (Ajax has clearly *not* appeared), Soph. *Aj.* 1271 (ἀλλ' οἷχεται δῆ πάντα ταῦτ' ἐρριμμένα. 'All this is clearly cast and gone!' [indignant tone also present?]).

Sirs, the gods have shaken the city's fortunes with a heavy shaking, but now they have set them right in safety.

As a strategical starting-point of his maiden speech as a ruler of Thebes, in which he is to proclaim a number of rather controversial issues, Creon refers to what is undoubtedly the most salient element in the common ground between him and the elders: their shared experience of the recent civil war ('Sirs, *we all know* the gods have shaken ...').

δῆ also occurs in gnomic expressions, emphatically pointing out that the content of the utterance is supposed to be well-known to the addressee. In [13], γάρ δῆ ('for, after all') stresses that it is an obvious fact that hope brings profit as well as deceptions:

[13] Sophocles *Antigone* 613–617

οὐδέν' ἔρπει
 θνατῶν βίωτος πάμπολυς ἐκτὸς ἄτας.
 ἂ γάρ δῆ πολὺπλαγκτος ἐλ-
 πὶς πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνησις ἀνδρῶν,
 πολλοῖς δ' ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων·

To none among mortals shall great wealth come without disaster. For, after all, widely wandering hope brings profit to many men, but to many the deception of thoughtless longings.

In the following example, in Euripides' *Bacchae*, δῆ once again marks out a fact that is common knowledge: we all know what kind of schemes the gods are inclined to devise.

[14] Euripides *Bacchae* 290–291

Τε. ... Ἥρα νιν ἥθελ' ἐκβαλεῖν ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ,
 Ζεὺς δ' ἀντεμηχανήσαθ' οἷα δῆ θεός.

Ti. Hera wanted to hurl him it out of heaven. But Zeus in return devised a scheme such as a god indeed devises.¹⁹

19 The translation is from Seaford (2001).

However, as is often the case when $\delta\eta$ is used in a relative clause, additional pragmatic effects come into play.²⁰ In this case, $\delta\eta$ might have a disapproving, or even sarcastic, undertone *vis-à-vis* the notorious wiliness of the gods. Another pragmatic effect which is also frequently found with $\delta\eta$ in relative clauses is that $\delta\eta$ marks *exclusivity*, contrasting the referent with possible alternatives: ‘*precisely* such a scheme as a god devises’ (‘a scheme typical of a god’). A comparable effect can be observed in the following example:

[15] Sophocles *Ajax* 1045

Μενέλαος, ᾧ δὴ τόνδε πλοῦν ἐστείλαμεν.

Menelaos, for whom we launched this expedition.

Again, the speaker, namely the chorus of Salaminian sailors, who are friends of Ajax, refer to the well-known fact that the Trojan expedition was launched for the sake of Menelaos. Again, one may also sense an additional notion of exclusivity (‘precisely for whom’, ‘for whom alone’, ‘the very man for whom’), accompanied by a sense of contempt.

3.3 *Shared Knowledge of Preceding Discourse and Shared Expectations about Subsequent Discourse*

$\delta\eta$ may also refer to common ground which is based on the discourse in which the speaker and addressee are currently engaged. For example, in [16], Antigone and Ismene are coming to the end of their heated discussion whether or not they should bury Polyneices:

[16] Sophocles *Antigone* 78–81

Ισ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἄτιμα ποιούμεαι, τὸ δὲ
βίαι πολιτῶν δρᾶν ἔφυν ἀμήχανος.

Αν. σὺ μὲν τάδ’ ἂν προὔχοι· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τάφον
χώσουσ’ ἀδελφῶι φιλτάτῳ πορεύσομαι.

Is. I am not dishonouring them, but I do not have it in me to act against the will of the people of the city.

20 See also Denniston (1954: 218–220). For the meaning of $\sigma\iota\alpha$ in this line, see Rijksbaron (1991: ad loc.).

An. You may offer that excuse; but I go to heap up a tomb for my dearest brother!

To put an end to their discussion, Antigone emphatically repeats her firm intention to bury their brother, thus hammering home to Ismene, once and for all, that she will bury Polyneices (*'As should be clear to you by now, I will go to bury my brother'*).

The particle is also used in reference to words that have been spoken at an earlier stage of the conversation and are, therefore, presumed to be familiar to the addressee.²¹

[17] Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 539, 550

Κη. χαίρω τὸ τεθνάναι δ' οὐκέτ' ἀντερῶ θεοῖς.

[...]

Χο. ὥς νῦν, τὸ σὸν δῆ, καὶ θανεῖν πολλή χάρις.

Her. Joy I have; and I no longer object to being dead.

[...]

Ch. [I had to fear] So much that now, in your own words, even death is a great joy.

In [17], δῆ is used by the chorus to remind the Herald of his own words, spoken a dozen lines earlier (539).

A very frequent discourse-oriented use of δῆ relates to its occurrence in commands and questions. In such contexts, too, δῆ shows its dual function as an attention-getter and a common ground marker.

[18] Sophocles *Antigone* 531–535

σὺ δ', ἢ κατ' οἴκους ὥς ἔχιδν' ὑφειμένη
 λήθουσά μ' ἐξέπινες, οὐδ' ἐμάνθανον
 τρέφων δὺ' ἄτα κάπαναστάσεις θρόνων,
 φέρ', εἰπέ δῆ μοι, καὶ σὺ τοῦδε τοῦ τάφου
 φήσεις μετασχεῖν, ἢ 'ξομῇι τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι;

21 For δῆ's quoting function, see also Denniston (²1954: 235), Sicking and van Ophuijsen (1993: 142) and Bonifazi et al. (2016: 111.2 § 76).

You, whom I never noticed as like a viper hiding in the house you sucked my blood—nor did I know that I was rearing up two plagues and two subverters of the throne—come, tell me, do you admit being a party to this burial, or will you swear that you know nothing?

δὴ combined with an imperative shows two functions: (1) it reinforces the imperative by urging the addressee to pay attention to it, and (2) it construes the command as a part of the common ground. More specifically, it presents the discourse act to the addressee as expected and understandable, and as a logical consequence prepared by the preceding discourse ('then', 'therefore').²² Thus δὴ often implies that the addressee is supposed to comply with the order without any hesitation.

In [18], Creon expresses his suspicion against Ismene. He presents his request to Ismene—to tell him whether or not she has been an accomplice—as a discourse act following logically from the preceding discourse ('tell me, therefore, ...').

In questions, as well, δὴ invokes the common ground: its function might be compared to its function in directives, expressing that the speech act at issue, be it a command or a question, should be seen as an expected continuation of the preceding discourse.²³

[19] Euripides *Bacchae* 821–822

Δι. στεῖλαι νυν ἀμφὶ χρωτὶ βυσσίνους πέπλους.

Πε. τί δὴ τόδ'; ἐς γυναικάς ἐξ ἀνδρὸς τελῶ;

Di. Then dress yourself in a long linen robe.

Pe. Why that? Shall I become a woman instead of a man?

²² See also Kühner and Gerth (1898: II 127), Denniston (²1954: 216).

²³ See also Bonifazi et al. (2016: III.2 § 78). In commands and questions, δὴ functions, in terms of the layered model of Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008), on a different linguistic layer from the uses mentioned earlier. While, in the uses mentioned earlier, the particle functions as an operator on the level of the Communicated Content (as it marks that the Communicated Content or some part of it is known information), in commands and questions the particle can be analysed as an operator on the level of the Discourse Act: it reinforces the illocution and signals that the speech act is an expected consequence of the previous discourse. In the FDG model, both the layer of the Communicated Content and the layer of the Discourse Act are part of the Interpersonal Level. It is incorrect to interpret δὴ as only having scope over (and thus emphasising) the interrogative pronoun since the particle also occurs in yes/no-questions, with an identical function.

Dionysus orders Pentheus to put on a linen robe. With $\delta\eta$, Pentheus signals that his question ('Why that then?') is an understandable reaction to the order, given by Dionysus, to put on a linen robe. The use of $\delta\eta$ in questions is often also associated with emotions such as indignation or impatience (Denniston ²1954: 236), a contextual side-effect of its attention-getting function.

Another frequent context in which $\delta\eta$ appears in drama is in the combination $\kappa\alpha\iota \delta\eta$. As we have seen earlier, $\kappa\alpha\iota \delta\eta$ can be 'used to mark an entry that has been prepared for by the words that precede it' (van Erp Taalman Kip 2009: 128). The particle combination $\kappa\alpha\iota \delta\eta$ is also used in other contexts, such as in responses to requests. In this context, too, we may recognise $\delta\eta$'s twofold function as a common ground marker and attention-focuser.

[20] Sophocles *Antigone* 244–245

Kρ. οὐκ οὖν ἐρεῖς ποτ', εἴτ' ἀπαλλαχθεὶς ἄπει;
 Φυ. $\kappa\alpha\iota \delta\eta$ λέγω σοι.

Cr. Will you not speak out, and leave after having been discharged?²⁴
 Guard I am already telling you.²⁵

$\kappa\alpha\iota \delta\eta$, in reactions to a request, is used to express that—or at least to pretend as if—the order has already been carried out, or is in the course of being carried out: in most cases, the tense used is either a present (cf. λέγω in 245) or a perfect indicative.²⁶ With $\kappa\alpha\iota \delta\eta$, the speaker suggests to the person giving the order not to insist any longer, as the speaker has no intention to hesitate to comply with the order. In [20], Creon commands the guard finally to speak out as to why he has come (οὐ plus future indicative is often used to express an emphatic command; see Rijksbaron ³2006: 34). $\delta\eta$, on the one hand, signals to the addressee to pay attention ('Look!'); on the other hand, $\delta\eta$ suggests that the addressee should be able to *observe* ('as you can see') that the action ordered is already being performed (or has been performed).

There may be a further element relating to common ground management that is relevant in such contexts—that the speaker's compliance to the order should come as *expected* to the addressee ('of course'). That the element of expectation does indeed play a role in this use of ($\kappa\alpha\iota$) $\delta\eta$ may be gathered

24 For ἀπαλλαχθεὶς meaning 'having been discharged' here, see Allan (2006: 119).

25 My translation.

26 See also Denniston (²1954: 251), Wakker (1997: 216–217).

from the contrasting use of *καὶ μήν* in reactions to orders, which expresses that the speaker somehow *counters* an expectation entertained by the person giving the order: speakers use *καὶ μήν* to indicate that their *compliance*²⁷ or their *non-compliance*²⁸ with the command may come as unexpected to the person ordering. In short, *καὶ μήν* and *καὶ δὴ* show complementary pragmatic functions: while the former signals that the speaker's reaction is somehow contrary to expectation, the latter suggests that the compliance should not come as a surprise to the addressee.²⁹

There is still one other intriguing use of *καὶ δὴ* worth discussing in more detail. We have seen that *καὶ δὴ* usually points out that some entity or event is perceivable (and often also according to expectation) to the addressee, and, thus, part of the common ground. Building on the notions of perceivability and joint attention, the combination *καὶ δὴ* is also used to invite the addressee to vividly imagine ('before the inner eye'), for the sake of the argument or by way of thought experiment, that a particular situation has indeed (already) been realised. For example,

[21] Euripides *Medea* 1107–1111

καὶ δὴ γὰρ ἄλλις βίωτόν θ' ἡῦρον
 σώμα τ' ἐς ἥβην ἤλυθε τέκνων
 χρηστοί τ' ἐγένοντ'· εἰ δὲ κυρήσαι
 δαίμων οὕτως, φροῦδος ἐς Αἴδου
 θάνατος προφέρων σώματα τέκνων.

Suppose they have found a sufficient livelihood, suppose the children's bodies have arrived at young manhood and their character is good: yet if their destiny so chances, off goes death carrying the children's bodies to Hades.

27 Denniston cites a considerable number of instances of *καὶ μήν* 'expressing, directly or by implication, agreement or consent' (Denniston 1954: 353). As Wakker (1997: 216) has shown, however, *καὶ μήν* in consenting reactions does not express the consent itself, but the fact that the consent is (presumably) *not expected* by the addressee (the person commanding).

28 For example, *Αἰ. κόμιζε νύν μοι παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν, ὡς ἴδω. Τε. καὶ μήν φόβοισι γ' αὐτὸν ἐξελυσάμην.* ('Ajax: Then bring me my son so that I can see him. Tecmessa: Why, I was afraid and sent him away', *Soph. Aj.* 530–531).

29 Note that solitary *δὴ*, without *καί*, can also be used in assentient reactions (Denniston 1954: 227).

In such contexts, καὶ δὴ introduces a presupposition ('let us assume that ...', 'suppose that ...'), functioning as common ground between the interlocutors and serving as a starting point for further reasoning.³⁰

Let us move away from the combination καὶ δὴ and examine yet another combination in which δὴ tends to occur: with anaphoric pronouns and adverbs. In narrative texts, as we know, combinations such as οὗτος δὴ, τότε δὴ, ἐνταῦθα δὴ abound. Although in drama occurrences of this combination are few and far between, it is not difficult to recognise the double function of δὴ. On the one hand, δὴ marks that the element in its scope is part of the common ground. In the case of an anaphoric pronoun, this is not very surprising since an anaphoric pronoun by definition refers to an entity which has already been mentioned, and which is therefore necessarily part of the common ground.³¹

On the other hand, the attention-focusing function of δὴ serves to single out the referent of the anaphoric pronoun while excluding potential alternative candidates.³² Thus, a combination such as ταῦτα δὴ can be paraphrased by 'that alone', 'precisely that', or 'that and nothing else'.

[22] Aeschylus *Persians* 159

[Chorus: Queen, you were wife and are mother of a god, unless ancient fortune has abandoned our army.]

30 More examples can be found in Denniston (1954: 252).

31 I do not see the necessity to distinguish an additional function of δὴ as a marker of larger narrative steps (Bonifazi et al. 2016: II.3.3.1, IV.4.5.1). In my view, δὴ in combinations such as ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ or δὴ τότε/τότε δὴ can be explained well on the basis of its focusing function, excluding alternative (earlier or later) moments on the time line ('once', 'as soon as', 'at the very moment', 'only when', 'not until'), e.g. Soph. *Ant.* 91: οὐκοῦν, ὅταν δὴ μὴ σθένω, πεπαύσομαι 'Then, not until my strength fails, will I be at rest' (my translation). The fact that, in narrative, there is often a discourse boundary should be ascribed to contextual elements rather than to the function of δὴ: e.g., the boundary marking should be ascribed to the presence of ἀλλά, or to δὴ's occurrence in preposed temporal clauses, which typically mark transitions to a new narrative episode/move/paragraph (see Buijs 2005). In the same vein, frequent combinations such as πρὶν δὴ ('until the very moment', 'until at last'), δὴ ποτε and τότε δὴ ('only then', 'at that very moment', 'not until then', 'then at last') can be explained well on the basis of the exclusive function of δὴ—it is, again, unnecessary to invoke an additional function of δὴ as a marker of narrative steps.

32 Depending on the context, the set of alternative referents may be ordered on an implicit scale, e.g. a temporal scale, as in the case of τότε δὴ 'at that very moment', 'only then' (i.e. neither at an earlier, nor at a later moment in time).

Βα. ταῦτα δὴ λιποῦσ' ἰκάνω χρυσεοστόλμους δόμους ...

Qu. For this very reason I have left the gold-decked palace and come here ...³³

In some contexts, the combination of δὴ + anaphoric demonstrative seems to be associated with an indignant undertone ('that—of all things!'):

[23] Sophocles *Electra* 385

[Chrysothemis tells Electra that they plan to lock her up in a dungeon.]

Ηλ. ἦ ταῦτα δὴ με καὶ βεβούλευνται ποεῖν;

El. Is that really what they have decided to do with me?

The particle ἦ in questions usually expresses a sense of disbelief ('really?').

That δὴ is indeed also a common ground marker and not only an attention-focusing device, as is sometimes claimed, can be concluded from the fact that δὴ only combines with *anaphoric* (backwards-referring) pronouns—that is, referring to entities already known from the preceding discourse—and not with *cataphoric* (forwards-referring) pronouns. If δὴ would merely be an attention-focusing device, there would be no reason why it would not also be combined with cataphoric pronouns. However, the striking asymmetry between its distribution with anaphoric and cataphoric pronouns shows that δὴ is indeed also a common ground marker.

The last context of use to be addressed here is δὴ's combination with lexical items which inherently tend to attract the clausal focus, such as αὐτός, μόνος, πᾶς, πολύς, and superlatives. An example from drama of δὴ with a superlative is:

[24] Aeschylus *Persians* 331

αἰαί, κακῶν ὕψιστα δὴ κλύω τάδε.

Aiai, what I hear is the worst disaster indeed.³⁴

33 My translation.

34 My translation.

The fact that $\delta\eta$ is so often combined with these inherently focus-oriented words should not be surprising, given its function as an attention-focuser: $\delta\eta$ reinforces the focality of the item in its scope. As often, the attention-focusing aspect of $\delta\eta$ is also accompanied by additional senses, such as exclusivity (i.e. 'only', 'the very ...' + superlative) and noteworthiness (or, more specifically, mental attitudes such as indignation, contempt or amazement).

However, when combined with such focus-attracting items, not only $\delta\eta$'s focusing function is relevant, but I would argue that $\delta\eta$ also invokes the interlocutors' common ground. For example, in [24], $\delta\eta$ not only focuses the attention to $\psi\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$ ('the very worst', 'absolutely the worst'), but it also used by the Queen to signal that it should be obvious to the messenger (i.e. common ground) that the catastrophic lost battle at Salamis is indeed the worst disaster she has ever experienced.

4 The Particle $\tau\omicron\iota$: Reminding the Addressee of Common Ground

It is not easy to pinpoint what $\tau\omicron\iota$ exactly does in the interaction between the speaker and the addressee. There is a general consensus that its function is strongly interactive: it serves to make an urgent appeal to the addressee. In this interpretation, the particle's origin as an ethic dative of the second person pronoun ('to you', 'for you') undoubtedly plays an important role.³⁵ A helpful characterisation of the particle's function, reflecting the common opinion, is given by Annemieke Drummen:

[25] Drummen in Bonifazi et al. (2016: III.4 §58); Drummen (2017: 258)

The particle $\tau\omicron\iota$ [...] works to further a speaker's persuasive ends. The particle's function is to signal an appeal to the addressee, who is strongly encouraged to take note of, and believe, the statement being uttered.

Drummen rightly stresses strong persuasive force of $\tau\omicron\iota$ as a device to appeal to the addressee to take note and to believe the truth of the statement.³⁶ Although this characterisation of $\tau\omicron\iota$ is correct, I would like to argue that it is possible to arrive at a more precise definition if one takes into account its function in common ground management. I, therefore, propose to describe $\tau\omicron\iota$'s function along the following lines:

35 For the diachronical development (grammaticalisation) of $\tau\omicron\iota$, see Allan (2017b).

36 A similar characterisation of $\tau\omicron\iota$ is given by the *CGCG* (van Emde Boas et al. 2018: 691).

[26] The particle $\tau\omicron\iota$ is used by a speaker to emphatically **appeal to the addressee** to pay attention to the speech act, typically serving to **remind** the addressees of **common ground** information which the addressee seems to ignore or to have forgotten.

What $\tau\omicron\iota$ shares with $\delta\eta$ is its function to point out an element in the common ground to the addressee. The main difference, however, is that $\delta\eta$ typically refers to an element in the common ground that is already relatively active in the addressee's consciousness or, at least, (supposed to be) easily accessible to the addressee's mind or perception. $\tau\omicron\iota$, on the other hand, is used to bring information to the addressee's attention that, for some reason or another, has been lying dormant in the addressee's memory, or information which the addressee might even be unwilling to recall to mind.³⁷ In other words, $\tau\omicron\iota$, unlike $\delta\eta$, implies that the speaker confronts, or expects to confront, a certain degree of resistance on the part of the addressee to acknowledge a piece of information in the common ground.

A typical context for the use of $\tau\omicron\iota$ in Greek drama is a speaker's attempt to persuade an addressee to perform a particular *action*; that is, $\tau\omicron\iota$ is not so much employed for the purpose of conveying information as it is part of a rhetorical strategy to bring the addressee to change his or her behaviour: it points out to the addressee that there is some sort of conflict between the addressee's present behaviour or beliefs on the one hand, and an element in the common ground on the other.³⁸

4.1 *Shared Communal Knowledge: Common Knowledge, Gnostic Knowledge*

In drama, $\tau\omicron\iota$ frequently appears in gnomic statements. As general truths express shared communal knowledge, they are by definition presumed to be known to the addressee and as such part of the common ground. In gnomic expressions, $\tau\omicron\iota$ is used to remind the addressee of some conventional wisdom as the addressee seems to be behaving or thinking contrary to the content of the gnomic statement at issue. For example,

37 Compare also Denniston's formulation: 'Its primary function is to bring home to the comprehension of the person addressed a truth of which he is ignorant, or temporarily oblivious' (Denniston ²1954: 537).

38 The corpus examined, again, consists of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* and *Persae*, Sophocles' *Ajax* and *Antigone*, and Euripides' *Bacchae* and *Medea* (59 instances of $\tau\omicron\iota$ in total).

[27] Sophocles *Antigone* 241–243

Κρ. εὖ γε στοχάζημι κάποφάργνυσαι κύκλωι
τὸ πρᾶγμα. δηλοῖς δ' ὥς τι σημανῶν νέον.
Φυ. τὰ δεινὰ γάρ τοι προστίθης' ὄκνον πολύν.

Cr. You are skilfully setting fences and palisades around the matter,
and it is clear that you have some news to tell us.

Guard Yes, serious matters make one very nervous.

Creon is annoyed by the guard's circuitous approach to the matter at hand and urges him to get to the point. The guard defends himself by reminding Creon of a gnomic truth which states that terrible things normally bring about a strong hesitation.

The particle also occurs in other expressions of common knowledge:

[28] Sophocles *Antigone* 834–835

[Antigone: Like Niobe, I will die the saddest death.]

Χο. ἀλλὰ θεός τοι καὶ θεογεννής,
ἡμεῖς δὲ βροτοὶ καὶ θνητογενεῖς.

Ch. But she was a goddess and the child of gods, and we are mortal and the children of mortals.

Antigone tells the story of Niobe, who died a terrible death, while comparing herself to Niobe, since the gods also bring death upon her. The chorus reject Antigone's identification with Niobe by reminding Antigone of Niobe's divinity ('But *don't forget* she was a goddess and the child of gods etc').³⁹

In the following instance from Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, Agamemnon emphatically reminds Clytaemestra of the fact that the tokens with which she wishes to honour him are only fitting to the gods:

39 Other examples from my corpus of τοι in gnomic expressions and other statements of common communal knowledge: A. *Ag.* 974, 1014, 1040, 1304, *Pers.* 287, 706; *Soph. Aj.* 520, 580, 988, 1119, 1350, *Ant.* 473, 522, 580, 1028. See also Denniston (1954: 542–543).

[29] Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 922

θεούς τοι τοῖσδε τιμαλφεῖν χρεών·

The gods we must honour in this way.

4.2 *Immediate Context*

τοι is also used to draw the addressee's attention to an element present in the immediate physical environment which is ignored by the addressee, even though it is (supposed to be) perceivable and obvious. An illustrative example of this use of τοι is from a messenger speech in Euripides *Bacchae*.

[30] Euripides *Bacchae* 1118–1119

[Messenger, quoting Pentheus' words:]

ἐγώ τοι, μήτηρ, εἰμί, παῖς σέθεν
Πενθεύς, ὃν ἔτεκες ἐν δόμοις Ἐχίονος·

'It's me, mother, Pentheus, the son you bore in Echion's house!'

The messenger is describing the events leading to Pentheus' death, citing Pentheus' last words. Failing to recognise his true identity, Agaue hurls herself upon Pentheus, who tries to stop her by reminding her that he is, in fact, her son. Again, τοι is used in an appeal to alert the addressee to an obvious fact which the addressee fails to acknowledge. A similar example is seen in the *Ajax*:

[31] Sophocles *Ajax* 356–360

ἰὼ
γένος ναῖας ἄρωγόν τέχνας,
ἄλιον ὃς ἐπέβας ἐλίσσων πλάταν,
σέ τοι, σέ τοι μόνον δέδορ-
κα πημονὰν ἐπαρκέσοντ·

Hail, race helpful with the seaman's skill, you who came on board to ply the oar at sea, you, you are the only guardians I see who will help me!

Ajax is inside the hut in which he killed the cattle which he took for the Greek commanders. Tecmessa opens the door of the hut and Ajax is revealed sitting

motionless among the slaughtered cattle. Ajax catches sight of his friends, the sailors from Salamis, who are with Tecmessa, and he calls upon them to help him. The sailors ignore Ajax's call for help and, instead, say to Tecmessa that Ajax is still beside himself. Ajax, then, for a second time attempts to appeal to the sailors. With the use of *τοι* Ajax desperately tries to finally establish contact with the sailors by stressing (cf. the emphatic repetition *σέ τοι, σέ τοι*) the evident fact, ignored by the sailors, that they are indeed the only ones to be seen (*δέδορκα*) in the immediate environment who are able to help him.

4.3 *Shared Knowledge of Preceding Discourse: Reminding the Addressee of What Has Been Said Earlier*

τοι can also relate to the discourse context, serving to remind the addressee of what has been said earlier. In [32], from the *Ajax*, the messenger asks the chorus where Ajax is. The chorus reply that Ajax is not in his hut but has just left. The messenger tells that Teucer has said that they should not allow Ajax to leave until Teucer himself would be present. In line 734, the chorus ignore the messenger's words (note the particle *ἀλλά* at the beginning of their turn, forcefully redirecting the discourse) and emphatically remind the messenger that they had already mentioned that Ajax had left.

[32] Soph. *Ajax* 735–736, 743–744

[Messenger: Teucer is here from Mysia. Where is Ajax?]

Χο. οὐκ ἔνδον, ἀλλὰ φροῦδος ἀρτίως, νέας
βουλὰς νέοισιν ἐγκαταζεύξας τρόποις.

[Messenger: Teucer said that you should not allow him to go out until Teucer himself would be there.]

Χο. ἀλλ' οἴχεταιί τοι, πρὸς τὸ κέρδιστον τραπεῖς
γνώμης, θεοῖσιν ὥς καταλλαχθῆι χόλου.

Ch. He is not in, but departed lately, with fresh counsels harnessed to a fresh mood.

[...]

Ch. Well, as I said, he has gone. He had turned his thoughts in a more profitable direction, to be reconciled with the gods with whom he had been angry.

A similar example is:

[33] Euripides *Bacchae* 489–490, 515–517

Πε. δίκην σε δοῦναι δεῖ σοφισμάτων κακῶν.

Δι. σὲ δ' ἀμαθίας γε κάσεβούντ' ἐς τὸν θεόν.

[...]

Δι. στείχοιμ' ἄν· ὃ τι γὰρ μὴ χρεῶν, οὔτοι χρεῶν
παθεῖν. ἀτὰρ τοι τῶνδ' ἄποιν' ὕβρισμάτων
μέτεισι Διόνυσός σ', ὃν οὐκ εἶναι λέγεις·

Pe. You'll pay for your knavish cleverness.

Di. And you for your obtuseness and impiety against the god.

[...]

Di. I'm ready to go: I shall not suffer anything I am not meant to suffer. But Dionysus, you know, will punish you for this highhandedness.

Pentheus has just ordered to lock Dionysus up. Dionysus has the last word before he is led away and he reminds Pentheus one last time that he will not escape punishment for his impiety.

5 Conclusion

It is certainly no overstatement that Greek particle research has been flourishing over the last two decades. Thanks to a number of significant studies, we are slowly getting to grips with these 'intangible and elusive words'—as Denniston called them in his preface to the first edition of *The Greek Particles*. What I have tried to show here is that the notion of common ground may be a helpful addition to the existing theoretical apparatus that has been brought to bear on the Greek particles. It seems worthwhile to analyse Greek particles as *grounding devices*, that is, as the speaker's instructions to the addressee how to relate the utterance to the common ground. In the case of *δή* and *τοι*, for example, a common ground approach helps to distinguish the two particles more clearly from one another and from other attitudinal or interactional particles such as *ἦ* or *μήν*. An additional advantage of a common ground approach as a general framework for discourse analysis is provided by Occam's razor: common ground management is a crucial factor in many different discourse-pragmatic phenomena, including such basic linguistic phenomena as the use of negation,

the article, deictic pronouns, conjunctions, clausal complementation, tense-aspect, modality, and word order.

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