Preface

The beginning of this century was marked by a great schism in European history - that between communism and capitalism. There are, however, good indications that this will finally be overcome. At the same time, however, another schism of the twentieth century - that between analytical, and continental philosophy, has not got such good chances of being eliminated. In a paradoxical way, typically of philosophers,¹ those who try to give advice on how to overcome gaps and walls, slip even deeper into the cleavage of their own bifurcation.

It is true that in the last ten years or so serious attempts have been made to relax this tension. Here I have in mind, e.g the works of Richard Rorty. They, however, are so militant against analytical philosophy that they miss their point. Rorty is too destructive towards this kind of philosophy for him to be able to give a relevant map of it.

Meanwhile post-war developments in analytical philosophy, especially those in America, have shown that, in fact, the purely conceptual investigations of Russell, Carnap and Tarski, e.g., are not so separate from causal problems as Frege and Wittgenstein once believed. In fact, thanks to their results such philosophical logic is even closer to the problems of everyday discourse - e.g., what is metaphor (Max Black and Davidson), argumentation (Toulmin), how language functions (Quine), how are the paradoxes of irrationality to be judged (D. Pears, D. Davidson) -, than the classical, pre-analytical "pure" philosophy.

This state of affairs is obviously due to the fact that since they are primarily (philosophical) logic, they can illuminate (see here the Motto to the Part Two of the book by P.F. Strawson) the problems which have traditionally occupied philosophers.

This shows another interesting characteristic of philosophical knowledge which is that the discoveries made in the different realms of philosophy, which prima facie look absolutely different from one

another, are in a position, totally unexpectedly indeed, to illuminate each another. This ability is so unexpected that philosophers resist any attempt to explore it. The presumption is to keep close to the "purity of the subject".

Contrary to this, in our investigation we try to achieve such an understanding, such a point of view, which will give as a most illuminating for the whole of philosophy, results. But here it is necessary to add further considerations.

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It is often assumed that the philosophy, and logic in particular, can give models for understanding reality. It is thought, also, that the "pure analytical" philosophy, with its "sprachliche Klarheit, Einheitlichkeit der Terminologie und logische Durchsichtigkeit der Argumentation" is the only way to reach certain knowledge in philosophy. This is impossible to do with the help of what usually is called "speculations".

Here the word "speculation" is used as an abusive name. In this place, however, it is useful to remember that in everyday practice we are often urged to make speculations, and despite the fact that sometimes they are wrong, our life would be poorer if we had to abstain from them. In fact, some of them are good, others not so good - just in the same way as it is with the results from the analytical thinking. There is nothing a priori wrong with speculation. The "rightness" is possible in both cases.

What is important to realise here is that any abstention from any kind of philosophical insights (and aslo from speculation) will just deprive our mind of important experiences and truths; it will impoverish our intellect. Analytical fundamentalism seems close to another fundamentalism which had a place in this very philosophical tradition in the years before World War II. Than it was believed that any semantics which differed from those accepted by Russell in his "Theory of Descriptions" were "illegal". Perhaps the logical discoveries of Sir Peter Strawson, with his insistence on the possibility of individuals of various kinds, has persuaded the analytics that tolerance in analytical philosophy can be very fruitful for its development.

It is instructive to note here that the author of this discovery P.F.

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2 "This paragraph is reminiscent of Freud", as Wittgenstein would say (see Philosophical Grammar, p. 382) in such a place.
Strawson, saw the illuminating power of the different branches of philosophy so clearly. Now, I believe, it is time for analytical philosophy to open the doors not only for different individuals, but for different kinds of philosophical insights. If in this we want to follow Wittgenstein, we can remember his aphorism - back to the rough Earth. We need not "have everything wrapped in cellophane".4

Continental philosophy, with its flirtation with the so called deconstructivist idea, has also tried to impose frames on philosophy; e.g. to prohibit the so called "foundationalism". After the initial euphoria of "The End of Philosophy" development however, today more and more people have realised that this movement is not the right path of intellectual development in the West.5

Philosophy, however, is so difficult an enterprise that it can scarcely accept the luxury of refusing some particular philosophical technique. Actually it is not clear a priori where in it a new thought should appear. Here the advice of B. Russell must be followed, that every true discovery in philosophy, regardless of how little and prima facie unimportant it is, must be respected with care.

The process of opening the doors of the analytical "ivory tower", or of surmounting the wall which encircles it, began at least twenty years ago. Many of the philosophical insights in Rawls' Theory of Justice, or in Parfit's Reasons and Persons, or in Thomas Nagel's Mortal Questions, are difficult to define as strictly analytical. It turns out that the natural development of analytical philosophy itself gives birth to speculative insights.6

What is even more interesting is that the very "high" problems and paradoxes which are discussed by contemporary orthodox analytics -, subjects of the quarrels between, e.g., realists and anti-realists, externalists and internalists, connectivists and representativists, etc. - are to be seen much more clearly from a new and fresh point of view of

5 According to Camille Paglia, e.g., "these minor French theorists have had a disastrous effect on American education. Lacan encourages pompous bombast and Foucault teaches cheap cynicism, while Derrida's aggressive method, called deconstruction, systematically trashes high culture by reducing everything to language and then making language destroy itself". C. Paglia, "Ninnes, Pedants, Tyrants and Other Academics", New York Times Book Review, 26 April, 1991.
6 A recent good example of this is the book by Amélie Rorty, Mind in Action, Boston: Beacon Press, 1988.
some speculative philosophical insight. In fact it can be said that the whole point of the book consists of showing that the recent discourses in analytical philosophy can be enriched if seen from a new perspective.

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In this context it can be said that in this book an attempt is made to make a retro-analysis in the spirit of the old traditions of building philosophical systems. More precisely, despite Wittgenstein's advice in 4.112 (of the *Tractatus*) I accept "a body of doctrine". In the last twenty or so years many bad words were used about the builders of "possible worlds", or "Hollywood Semantics" (Geach). It must not be forgotten, however, that many intellectuals now believe that America "leapt far beyond European thought the moment we invented Hollywood".

This body of doctrine seems just now, and from one pint of view, to be most powerful and effective in explaining the philosophical problems with which we are here concerned. This is a theory which from the outset knows that is fallible, and that it is accepted as one among many others. Or, as the "later" Wittgenstein use to say, it is just one language-game among many others, invented for certain purposes. In this way, the very doctrine is at the same time an activity...

The state of affairs that the investigation proposed here is both "a body of doctrine" and an activity, can present additional difficulties in conceiving its idea. The more so because, following its natural development, in its different parts, different aspects of the proposed theory are developed. So whereas in Part Two it is vehemently asserted that philosophy is a certain type of critical inquiry, in Part Three a more or less dogmatic theory (description of entities, individuals) is accepted.

As can be expected, in accordance with this "reconciling" position as to what philosophy is (theory, and activity) the book takes a "metaxological", middle position in the recent quarrel between relativists (Rorty) and fundamentalists (Peacocke). Hilary Putnam these

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7 Recently a similar attempt, was made (starting from the phenomenological tradition) in: Gerold Prauss, *Die Welt und wir*, Band I, Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1990.
8 C. Paglia, op. cit.
days tries to do something similar - but by different means. On the one hand, he denies any a prioristic Weltanschauungen. On the other hand, however, he believes that "rightness is not subjective".\textsuperscript{10} I, on my part, have tried to show that although we accept a form of realism (which is really a very mild form of realism), at the same time we accept a very relativistic solution to the problem.\textsuperscript{11}

We can clarify the scheme of the book by saying that each of its three parts three each deal with one of the three main parts of philosophy: epistemology, logic, and ontology (or metaphysics).

An even simpler definition of this type of philosophical study is that it is primarily concerned with problems of logic. It is a theory of judgement (Part One), the main idea of which is a manual for developing good taste in thinking. This is elaborated in Part Two and in Part Three the possible content of Judgment is described.

Another peculiarity of this book is that as long as its tries to make use of different philosophical traditions, it uses sources of philosophers writing from different schools, and languages - chiefly German and English, but also French, Russian, Italian, Ancient Greek and Latin. Following Quine's "indeterminacy of translation" principle, I have left a considerable amount of these quotes in their original language. In such a way I am attempting to reach not only a vertical unity in philosophy (a unity in "philosophical depth" which will be explained later) but also a horizontal unity of the different schools and traditions of European philosophy. This is another effort to overcome, and destroy, the walls of European philosophy.

Nevertheless, it can be said that in the already described its efforts, the book follows primarily one philosophical tradition - that of the analytical philosophy (especially early analytical philosophy) and, more precisely, the philosophy of Wittgenstein. But here again I have attempted a new approach. On the one hand, the book strictly follows Wittgenstein's philosophy. In fact it is a result of a close and long study of his philosophy, including a PhD thesis on "logical atomism",

\textsuperscript{10} Hilary Putnam, "Why is a Philosopher", In: A. Cohen & Marcelo Dascal (eds.), \textit{The Institution of Philosophy}, La Salle (Ill.): Open Court, 1989, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{11} This method was developed in N. Milkov, "Philosophy of Language without Meaning, and without ... Language", \textit{Current Advances in Semantical Theory} 73 (1992), pp. 197-202.
and the translation of three of Wittgenstein's works (of *Tractatus*, *Investigations*, and *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*) from German into my native Bulgarian.

It can be said without hesitation that the task of this book is also to give an understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy. In the same way, however, it is conscious that the very logic of this philosophy shows beyond it, towards its overcoming. It urges us to go further, to go beyond it. More precisely, in this book we use Wittgenstein's propositions in accordance with his own prescriptions "as elucidations in the following way: one who understands me eventually recognise them as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright" (6.54). It is really astonishing how little attention philosophers pay to the literal meaning of Wittgenstein's statements...

In order to use the ladder called "Wittgenstein" however, it is necessary to command it correctly; in other words, we must "try to master" this philosophy, its "language games", the examples with the help of which Wittgenstein has tried to make our logic clearer.

In this way we reach the paradox that, whereas on the one hand the investigation is a strict continuation of Wittgenstein's project in philosophy, it is, at the same time, its "negation", and even a parody of it. What I have in mind here can be understood better if we first realize that, despite the fact that he followed closely the philosophical *problematic* which he was taught (by Russell, Moore, and Johnson) in 1911-1913, the movement of Wittgenstein's thinking from one problem to another, and then back to the first, etc., registered in his *Notebooks*, MS and TS *in fact* suggest models of developing human rationality in general.

A peculiarity of this book which I should mention, connected with its subject and method, is that it has emerged as a result not of analyzing models (as Wittgenstein did), but of immediate reflections on the innumerable perplexities which are to be meet everyday - from "ordinary people", not just from philosophers. Examples of such perplexities are: What is the difference between the baby and the adult person? What is the difference between various types of furniture? Between liberalism and socialism? Is liberalism compatible with pornography prohibition? etc. etc.

Because of this the book, especially in some parts, appears more fragmentary than the usual narrative prose. But this choice of style is
a consequence of the fact that it follows (and in some places this can be especially well seen) "the logic" of our encounters with these problems, the logic of rationality in thinking about them. In this it follows Wittgenstein's models of developing human reasoning.

If we want to express this peculiarity of the book in different way, we can say that it has anti-Moorean character. The stimuli for its development are not philosophical propositions, but problems from "real life", which occupy the minds of everyone on a practical level. On the other hand, however, immediately after the problems have been stated we seek the context of some actual professional philosophical discourse in order to investigate them further and in detail. Especially respected in this investigation (in Part One) are the later developments in the analytical analyses of the cognitive sciences.

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Another thing that must be mentioned here is that this book is, as it were, the other side of another study which has occupied my attention for the last eight years - the study of the true, authentic history of early British analytical philosophy. In fact both studies (the second one is to appear next year under the title The Varieties of Understanding: English Philosophy since 1899) can be considered as two volumes of the same investigation, the first part of which has the provisional title Para-Wittgenstein - in other words, philosophy beyond Wittgenstein; and the other volume - Peri-Wittgenstein - in other words, philosophy immediately before him (that of Moore and Russell), and immediately after him (John Wisdom, G. Ryle, J.L. Austin); i.e., the philosophy around him.

My main concern is, however, to try to break the vicious circle around his philosophy, which is an obstacle to its fruitful reception. The paradox here is that whereas on the one hand Wittgenstein today is the most often quoted philosopher, at the same time it cannot be said that his philosophy has a great influence.12

A central assumption in this attempt is that the progress Wittgenstein made in philosophy was also expressed as several (a perspicuous number) philosophical discoveries. In our book we shall try develop these discoveries further, which means that we shall try to finish, to grind them additionally. These discoveries however will be described

in the Introduction.

Nikolay Milkov
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