CHAPTER 3

Praeambulum libri

The habit of our divinising beyond-wisdom exceeds every other habit, not only of the sciences, but even the habit of intellect that is wisdom, through which Aristotle receives the principles of his first philosophy, which is merely of beings.1

Berthold has moved from the consensus of authorities in the Prologus to the focalisation of ancient wisdom on Proclus and his works in the Expositio tituli. The third and final preface to the Expositio is a Praeambulum to the first thirteen Propositions, and establishes the rational and scientific validity of the knowledge transmitted in the Elementatio theologica. In sequence, the three prefaces thus display roughly the same pattern found in each of Berthold's commentaries (suppositum, propositum, commentum), which move from the general and authoritative background to the textual specificity of the Elementatio, and finally to demonstration alone.

In Berthold's view, Proclus' first thirteen propositions formed a coherent group, which established the existence of the One and the Good, demonstrated that the two names refer to the same first principle, and showed that everything that is one or is good derives from that principle. The Praeambulum aimed to account for the two “complex principles” or propositions that Proclus assumed in these arguments. Since these propositions are so fundamental for the remainder of the Elementatio, these two principles can be regarded as “the foundations” of Proclus' philosophy. According to Berthold, Proposition 1 (Omnis multitudo etc.) assumed “that there is multitude” (multitudinem esse) and moved from the many to the One, while Proposition 7 (Omne productivum etc.) presupposed that “the productive exists” (productivum esse) and established the existence of the Good. At Proposition 13, after six Propositions each,  

1 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 65, l. 454 – p. 66, l. 458: Igitur habitus istius nostrae divinalis supersapientiae excedit omnem alium habitum, non solum scientiarum, sed etiam habitum intellectus, scilicet sapientiam, per quem Aristoteles in sua prima philosophia, quae solum est entium, quia entis in eo, quod ens, accipit sua principia.
Proclus showed that “the Good is identical with the One” (*bonum uni idem*). Since Proclus’ arguments in his proofs for Propositions 1 and 7 take these principles for granted, Berthold felt compelled, somewhat surprisingly, to address doubts as to whether the science of the *Elementatio theologica* is a true science at all:

Proclus assumes these two principles, upon which the edifice of this entire philosophy depends as upon its own foundations, as if they are grasped through the reception of the senses and in no way are intellec
ted, known, or apprehended by any other scientific habit, but only are believed, just as the theology that concerns the divine Good according to the order of voluntary providence is founded upon principles that are believed, which are the articles of the Christian faith.

The argument of the *Praeambulum* will be that a science founded on principles that are only believed (*credita*) is nevertheless a science in the genuine sense.

Berthold divided the *Praeambulum* into three sections, discussing (A) scientific principles in general, (B) the three kinds of scientific principles, as well as the properties and character of these principles in particular, and (C) the true and properly scientific procedure of Proclus’ theology.

The way Berthold has presented the analogy between Proclus’ science and Christian theology (both begin from believed principles, but with the distinction of natural and voluntary providence), following so soon after his use of Dietrich of Freiberg’s *De subiecto theologiae* in the *Expositio tituli*, have understandably led commentators to assume that Berthold’s *Praeambulum* remained faithful to Dietrich’s strict and methodological separation of the divine science of the philosophers and revealed theology.

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the broader intertextual patterns in the Prologus and Expositio tituli, we have found that Berthold decidedly and repeatedly blurred these boundaries in light of the textual evidence that confronted him. The Praeambulum was no exception to this pattern. Now, it is clear that Berthold held that the articles of faith are the principles of the science of Christian theology, which holds sway over the domain of voluntary providence. But through a consideration of the Praeambulum with a view to its tacit sources, I will suggest that Berthold conceived of that theology under the banner of a broader Platonic divine science that united both orders of providence. Unlike Dietrich, who had maintained a clear subordination of “the divine science of the philosophers” to “our theology of the saints”, Berthold’s confrontation with the soteriological Platonism of Proclus and Dionysius made this position impossible. Both sciences of natural and voluntary providence begin from belief and both terminate in a deifying apprehension of God. The dignity that Berthold’s predecessors and contemporaries reserved for Christian theology and the habit of faith that it cultivated was thus extended to the natural revelation of supersapientia and the unum animae awakened through speculation and contemplation.

1 Theology as a Science

Like the Prologus and the Expositio tituli, Berthold wrote the Praeambulum with the Sapientiale of Thomas of York near at hand. And, like those two pref- aces, Thomas was synthesised with the anthropology and noetics of a German Dominican authority, and both were finally transformed and subordinated to the definitive philosophical concord of the Platonists (Dionysius, Proclus, and Boethius). This time, however, we must proceed carefully because Berthold’s German Dominican source is, it seems, no longer extant. As Loris Sturlese first observed, the final phrase of the introductory passage just cited, and perhaps also a good deal of the Praeambulum, echoes Dietrich of Freiberg’s lost treatise, De theologica, quod sit scientia secundum perfectam rationem scientiae, as it was listed in an early catalogue of his works. Now that Berthold’s reliance on

Thomas of York has been recognised, the range of material that could derive from Dietrich has now been considerably narrowed. Indeed, what remain are the pivotal epistemological passages in sections B and C that explain how a legitimate science can begin from belief. If we entertain the possibility that Dietrich was the source of these arguments and transpose them back into the Parisian context within which Dietrich would have written such a treatise on theology, certain puzzling aspects of the *Praeambulum* are clarified.

The surprising doubt raised “by many” about the scientific credentials of the *Elementatio theologica* can be explained: this remark was copied from Dietrich’s defence of the scientific status of theology in Paris. There were not in fact “many” who doubted the legitimacy of the *Elementatio theologica*, though there were who questioned the scientific status of Christian theology in the late 13th century. I will propose that the *Praeambulum* followed Dietrich’s *De theologia* by drawing an important analogy between the scientific procedure of revealed theology and that of every other science (except the purely mathematical), including metaphysics. Berthold would have found in this analogy the resources to show that metaphysics or, in this case, Proclus’ philosophy, even though it begins from believed principles (because it begins from the senses), is still a genuine science. But since Berthold’s soteriological Platonism was not Dietrich’s divine science of the philosophers, this meant that the central element of disproportion in the analogy of metaphysics and revealed theology that may also have been present in the *De theologia* was left unaddressed by Berthold – I will suggest that this disproportion would have concerned the relation between natural and voluntary assent or belief.

Let us first imagine what the context for Dietrich’s lost *De theologia* might have been. While Dietrich was in Paris as a *baccalaureus* and lecturing on the *Sentences*, sometime between 1282–1292, debates concerning the scientific status of theology conceived according to the model derived from Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* reach “a fever pitch”. Followers of Thomas Aquinas invoked the deductive model of Aristotle’s text and argued that theology is a science in the strong sense, in that our theology is subalternated to the higher science

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possessed by God and the blessed. They often drew an analogy with the human sciences: an expert geometer knows demonstratively what the practitioner of optics assumes – that is, the geometer knows the reason why (propter quid), while the optician knows the fact that (quia) – but this does not undermine the scientific status of optics. Among the most innovative and polarised reactions to Aquinas in this debate came from Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) and Godfrey of Fontaines (d. 1309). Both went back to the Posterior Analytics to criticise the subalternation theory on its own grounds. For Henry of Ghent, we must look beyond Aristotle to Christian authorities in order to ground the subalternation theory. Henry proposed his famous notion of the middle light (lumen medium), which the theologian possesses between the obscure light of faith, which every believer has, and the clear light of glory of God and the blessed.

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Godfrey of Fontaines also went back to Aristotle but opposed both Henry and the Thomists. Godfrey argued that we simply must give up calling theology a science in the strict sense. In his fourth and eighth Quodlibets from 1287 and 1292, which probably coincided with Dietrich’s baccalaureate, he argued against the subalternation theory, contending that any science that receives its principles from a higher science through mere belief cannot be a science in the strict sense of the term:

Therefore, to say that the principles of theology or the knowledge of anything in theology itself [are merely believed], or that in the one who is said to be knowledgeable in theology [these principles] are merely believed and are not known or intellected [sunt solum credita et non scita vel intellecta], and thus merely possess the certitude of adhesion, and nevertheless produce the certitude of knowledge in the conclusions reached from them, is to say that the conclusions would be better known...
than the principles, and so have a twofold certitude, whereas the principles would have but one [kind of certitude]. This is to say contradictory things and greatly to dishonour sacred theology and its teachers, by propagating such lies about theology to those drawn to it.\textsuperscript{12}

Godfrey based this argument on a distinction between the certitude of evidence, which belongs to \textit{scientia}, and the certitude of adhesion, which belongs to faith. The latter comes from assent to authority and, he maintained, is weak and imperfect compared to the certitude of scientific evidence.\textsuperscript{13} According to Godfrey, one cannot deduce stronger conclusions from weaker principles.\textsuperscript{14} Therefore, since theology relies on principles that are only believed, which are grounded on certitude of adhesion to authority, Godfrey concluded in 1293/1294 (after Dietrich had left Paris) that "theology is less properly a science than natural science".\textsuperscript{15}

The ensuing debate lasted well into the 14th century, with important responses to Godfrey coming from Duns Scotus, James of Metz, Hervaeus Natalis, and Bernard of Auvergne.\textsuperscript{16} What concern us are not these details but

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Godfrey of Fontaines, \textit{Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines}, eds M. de Wulf, A. Pelzer, (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'Université, 1904), iv, q. 10, p. 262: \textit{Dicere ergo quod principia theologiae […]} sive apud illum qui dicitur esse sciens theologiae sunt solum credita et non scita vel intellecta et sic solum certitudinem adhaesionis habentia, et tamen efficiunt certitudinem scientiae in conclusionibus ex ipsis elicitis, est dicere quod conclusiones sint notiores principiis, scilicet duplicem certitudinem habentes, cum principia non habeant nisi unam. Et hoc est dicere contradictoria et multum derogare sacrae theologiae et doctoribus ipsius, tales fictiones de ipsa theologia attractantibus ipsam propalare.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Godfrey of Fontaines, \textit{Le huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines}, ed. J. Hoffmans (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'Université, 1924), viii, q. 7, p. 73: \textit{notitia debilis vel imperfecta ad evidentiam, sed firma quantum ad adhaesionem, quia innititur auctoritati solum et non rei in se vel ostensae per rationem evidentem.}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Godfrey of Fontaines, \textit{Les quatre premiers Quodlibets}, iv, q. 10, p. 262.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Godfrey of Fontaines, \textit{Le neuvième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines}, ed. J. Hoffmans (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'Université, 1928), ix, q. 20, p. 292: \textit{Ergo videtur quod theologa sit minus proprie scientia quam naturalis non tantum propter hoc, quia scilicet habet evidentiam quae requiritur ad scientiam, sed minorem quam naturalis, – immo etiam quia nec habet evidentiam quae requiritur ad illam scientiam quae debet dici proprie scientia. Propter quod dicendum esset illis, qui dicunt modo supradicto theologiam esse scientiam proprie dictam, dicentes hoc se credere, quia infinitae auctoritates sanctorum quibus in hoc credendum est videntur hoc dicere, quod non est ita. Immo nec una sola auctoritas viri magnae auctoritatis inventur per quam possit hoc evidenter persuaderi.}
\end{itemize}
simply the fact that after Godfrey no one held that theology is a science in the strictest demonstrative sense. Those who continued to regard it as demonstrative had to admit some flexibility into their notions of what constituted a demonstrative science. The Praeambulum was no exception to this pattern.

If the key passages from sections B and C of the Praeambulum are read as traces of Dietrich’s lost treatise on the scientific status of theology, we can surmise that Dietrich largely accepted the way in which Godfrey had framed his own position in terms of the certitude of evidence and the certitude of adhesion. But Dietrich’s original response would have been to focus on the role that belief plays in every particular science that begins from without (quasi ab extrinseco), including metaphysics and theology, and indeed every science except the purely mathematical disciplines. In a sense, this argument would have amounted to an intensification of Godfrey’s focus on subjective certitude, but in so doing it redefined what constitutes a true science: the stability of first principles is to be found within the cognitive process by which the subject grasps universal propositions.\(^\text{17}\)

With this background in mind, we will proceed gradually through the Praeambulum. All of section A, which serves as a terminological dossier for

Berthold’s argument, was taken from *Sapientiale* III.23. These passages explained how every science uses its rules and principles as its “proper foundations”. These principles are already known and assumed (*ex praecognitinis*) as the basis for syllogistic reasoning and are “the most certain propositions received from common teachings”. These propositions, although they are commonly called simply “by the name of principles”, in fact receive different names in each science, as Alan of Lille explained. Following Eustratius, we may divide principles into three kinds:

Axioms (*dignitates*): believed (*credita*) through self-evidence.

Hypotheses (*suppositiones*): lack self-evidence; belief in them is conceded following teaching or demonstration.

Postulates (*petitiones*): lack self-evidence; their truth is not conceded but is granted for the sake of the argument.

These principles are used in different ways in demonstrative syllogisms. The truth of an axiomatic proposition is grasped immediately because of the identity of subject and predicate or, in the case of a syllogism, because of the identity of the middle term with either extreme. A second group called theses (*positiones*) is subdivided into hypotheses (*suppositiones*) and definitions (*definitiones*). In general, a thesis is someone’s opinion that is gathered from their philosophy. It is not grasped by all and its necessity is not immediately understood. If it is presented as having been demonstrated in a higher science, as in optics one appeals to geometry, and if it seems probable to a student of the subalternated science, it is called a hypothesis (*suppositio*). If it does not seem probable, it is a postulate (*petitio*). Unlike axioms and theses, definitions do not predicate one thing of another; they are neither affirmative nor negative but are a simple understanding regarding one explicated thing (*intellectus quodammodo simplex cadens super unum explicitum*).

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21 One need not situate Berthold among his contemporaries John Buridan and Gregory of Rimini who held that science concerns propositions and not things (cf. König-Pralong, “Expérience et sciences de la nature”, p. 123). Berthold received this view from Thomas of York.
Berthold began Section B with an outline of the three properties or proper modes that the three kinds of principles presented in section A can assume. He arranged these modes in terms of the various degrees of commonality found among principles: some principles descend into every science, others only into some sciences, while those in the third group are proper only to one science. Once these modes of commonality have been explained, this classification will be used to discuss the different modes of certitude proper to each kind of principle.

The “most-common” principles, by virtue of their universality, descend into every science: for example, there is the principle of non-contradiction or the principle that words (voces) have determinate significations. The “modes or conditions” of such principles are to be “the most secure of all” and beyond deceit; they are true for everyone, everywhere, and always (omnibus ubique et semper), and thus are present by nature and not by instruction. Berthold tells us that these principles concern “being as being”, since being (ens) is “the most universal of all formal intentions” – however, he added cryptically, “according to Plato it is otherwise”.

The second group comprises “common” principles. These are proportionately taken up by some, though not all, sciences. Examples come from Euclid’s “common conceptions of the mind”: “the whole is greater than the part” or “if equals are subtracted from equals, then the remainders are equal”.

The third group includes principles proper to particular sciences that have no proportional or analogical commonality across diverse sciences. For example, it is a principle only in geometry that “all right angles are equal”, only in optics that “light and colour move sight”, or only in physics that there is movement in nature.

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We then come to the various modes of certitude found in these three kinds of principles. The most-common and common principles are known through intellect (intellectus). Here Berthold used Thomas of York to explain how the habit of intellect differs from the other habits presented by Aristotle in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. But the most important point, around which the argument of the Praeambulum hinges, concerns the principles unique to particular sciences. Only in some sciences (the purely mathematical), are particular principles apprehended by intellect. The particular principles of all other sciences, as we shall see, have a different mode of certitude and truth. The notion of a veritable science will have to have sufficient latitude to include these, which by far comprise most disciplines normally regarded as sciences.

Therefore, each science must be considered separately to determine, first, whether it is purely mathematical and, if not, how it relates to the physical world. Purely mathematical sciences like geometry and arithmetic have the same certitude as the most-common and common principles, for their principles are known through intellect and not sense-experience. In such cases, exemplified by Euclid, the orders of nature and our knowledge are parallel: “we apprehend the proper principles of such sciences by intellect in the first steps in the progress in these sciences”.24

Sciences relating to the physical world apprehend truth in another way and have a different degree of certitude. These sciences include physics and ethics, where what is prior by nature comes later in the order of knowing because the sciences begin with sense-perception. Here Aristotle’s dictum holds true: every art and intellective discipline begins from the prior cognition of the senses.25 The principles in these sciences are universals derived from sense, memory, and experience. For example, in physics sense-perception establishes “that there is motion” and, in medicine, experience establishes “that scammony purges bile”. In optics and astronomy an instrument is used to capture an experimentum. In these sciences, there is no necessary relation between experience and the universal proposition or principle derived from it.26 Therefore, whereas intellect apprehends the principles of purely mathematical sciences as well as most-common and common principles, which have an intrinsic mode of certitude and truth, the principles of every other particular science “have their cause and reason as it were from the outside” (quasi ab extrinsecō).27 Belonging

to this second group are “the principles of metaphysical or divine sciences”.28 It is relative to this domain of exteriority that the text will make the decisive argument that extends the true notion of a science to disciplines founded on believed principles (credita).

Any proposition or principle derived from sense-experience in sciences in this second group is “only believed and in no way known or intellected” (as Godfrey had said of revealed theology), since it lacks the necessity of intellect.29 These principles, insofar as they are believed, are “apprehended under the certitude of the ‘true’, [which] cannot possibly be otherwise”. This apprehension has three components: (1) the “apprehended” is what reason objectively deals with in thinking, such as “this, which is moved, exists”;30 (2) it is “true” by the equality of the thing apprehended and intellect, which occurs through “a combination or composition of speech”;31 finally, (3) “certitude” is “the firm and unshakeable assent of reason” concerning the thing apprehended as true.


29 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 59, l. 217-229: Sic igitur procedente indagatione per viam sensus et experientiae in praemissis scientiis sumptum est unum universale pro ipsarum scientiarum principio, quod principium in quacumque huiusmodi scientia solum creditum est et nullo modo scitum nec intellectum, quia nec ex proroppria ratione terminorum cognitum est, quod esset intelligere, nec ex aliquibus principiis aliis seu causis conclusum et ita nullo modo scitum, sed, ut dictum est, solum est creditum, et sic apprehensum sub certitudine veri, quod impossibile est alter se habere. Dico autem [1] ‘apprehensum’ id, circa quod obiective negotiatur ratio per cognitionem, ut hoc, quod est motum, esse; [2] ‘verum’ autem hic intelligo ipsam aequalitatem sive consonantiam rei apprehensae et intellectus, quae quantum ad rationem et modum attenditur circa compositionem sive compositionem locutionis; [3] ‘certitudo’ autem de ipsa veritate rei apprehensae est firmus et indeclinabilis assensus rationis in rem sic apprehensam. For Godfrey, see n. 12-13, above.

30 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 249-250, clarifies that these are first intentions. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 5.47, p. 194, l. 463-468: Circa quaedam enim entia sic negotiatur intellectus […]; 5.54, p. 197, l. 566-568: Unde huiusmodi entia proprie diciuntur res rationis, non autem ea, quae sunt primae intentionis, quae important aliquam rem naturae et circa quae negotiatur intellectus tamquam circa res naturae.

31 Presumably by affirmation and negation, and second intentions. This rare expression, complexio locationis, appears also in Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 5.54, p. 197, l. 559-562: Possunt enim non entia, sicut et entia, in compositionem locationis et in praedicationem affirmativam vel negativam venire […]; id., De natura contrariorum, ed. R. Imbach, in Opera omnia, vol. 2, 13.1, p. 93, l. 44-55.
Within this framework, the *Praeambulum* then compared mathematical and physical sciences. What is known demonstratively (*scitum*) by intellect is also “apprehended by reason under the certitude of truth”, but the principle that is believed (*creditum*) differs from it in two respects: (a) by its mode of certitude and (b) in the order of apprehension. (a) *Scientia* takes its certitude from the intrinsic evidence of the thing, that is, from the intention and rational relations that the terms have to one another in a complex proposition, whether immediately in the case of first principles, or mediately when a conclusion is deduced from prior principles. By contrast, the certitude of faith derives not from intrinsic evidence but has its cause and reason from without (*quasi ab extrinseco*), such as “from the clear authority of an expert, from whose truth the intellect cannot reasonably dissent”. At this stage one should note how closely *scientia* and *fides* align with what Godfrey called the certitude of evidence, where knowledge begins with *per se* principles that lead to clear conclusions, and the certitude of adhesion, which begins from authority.

(b) The second difference between *scientia* and *fides* concerns the order of apprehension. In *scientia*, the evidence of the thing arises from the intention and rational relation of the terms which are, so to speak, “the intrinsic principle of cognition found in the thing”. The thing itself is by nature apprehended first, prior to truth or falsehood, which both arise from the combining activity of intellect. By contrast, in belief, the authority of an expert comes first, “in whose truth reason declares our trust must absolutely be placed and the will inclines to it”. In belief, the order of apprehension begins with truth as such and not with the intrinsic evidence of the thing. Any necessity lacking in the evidence of the terms is supplied by the authority of an expert, which provides the secure foundation of truth.

At this point, Berthold gave a summary of what has been concluded so far concerning principles in general. No principle is ever demonstrated; wisdom declares (*manifestare*) but does not demonstrate principles. The habit of

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34 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb. B*, p. 60, l. 254-56: *Quia enim causam et rationem suae certitudinis non habet a re ipsa, sed ab auctoritate alicuius experti, cuius veritati omnino standum esse dicit ratio et inclinat voluntas [...].*
principles of first certitude (which would correspond to most-common, common, and purely mathematical principles) is innate. For Aristotle, this habit is only in potency before being actualised by sense-cognition, but for Plato, according to Boethius, there is already in us “the seed of truth”, which is always active, even if it “is aroused by instruction fanning the ember”.35

What remains to be determined is whether there can be a true science (vera scientia) which begins from belief. Section C of the Praeambulum argues in the affirmative, and proceeds by establishing an analogy between theology and natural science. Godfrey refused to accept such a comparison. But the argument in the Praeambulum allows for it insofar as it has found a role for belief in the physical sciences. Berthold will then argue that Platonic wisdom (divinalis sapientia) has the same scientific structure, proportionately speaking (proportionaliter loquendo), as the other genuine sciences, except the purely mathematical.36 That is, it uses most-common principles (e.g., non-contradiction) and common principles (e.g., “the whole is greater than the part”), which are apprehended by the intellect. As for the two principles unique to this science, “there is multitude” and “there is producer and produced”, Berthold will affirm that Proclus assumes them and “proceeds perfectly following the scientific mode”. In this most divine science (divinissima scientia), these two principles are known in a way analogous (proportionaliter) to the sciences concerning things conjoined to motion or change. Although Berthold did not make this clear, we should assume that we need to understand both the elements of similarity and difference in the analogy of (Platonic) theology and the natural sciences.

In terms of their similarity, this theology resembles the physical sciences in which there is no intrinsic or necessary connection between sense-experience and the universal proposition that serves as its principle: these principles must


be believed. The Praeambulum explains this with an important account of the cognitive structure of belief which, however, differs subtly from the account of the secure foundation provided by belief in authority in section B:

Therefore, in taking this universal principle from sense-experiences there is nothing but a conjectural inference under the aspect of the true and not under the aspect of being, as has been said. Accordingly, it is received as believed, not as intellected or known [ut creditum, non ut intellectum vel scitum]. As has been said, it is taken by a certain conjecture, but still with the firm and unwavering assent of reason. This firmness and unwavering assent arises from a certain natural instinct founded in the power that at once distinguishes, collects, and gathers, which we call the cogitative. In and through this power the simple and pure intentions of things, separated from their images, to use the phrase of Averroes, are apprehended, distinguished, collected, and gathered.37

The production of the conjectural inference and the firm belief in it both occur entirely in and through the cogitative power. The “true” as such, rather than the thing itself, is still primary, but its stability comes not from authority, as section B argued, but from the cogitative power, which separates the intentions stored in memory and acquired by sense-perception. Its activity, in other words, is at once rational and natural or automatic. The parallels between the Praeambulum and Dietrich’s extant works are strongest here, especially in the description of the cogitative power and its close association with the estimative faculty,38 in its

37 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 62, l. 340-349: Igitur in sumptione talis universalis principii ex sensibilibus experimentis non est nisi quaedam coniecturalis illatio sub ratione veri et non sub ratione talis entis secundum praemissa, et ideo solum accipitur ut creditum, non ut intellectum vel scitum, et, ut dictum est, sumitur secundum quandam coniecturam, cum firme tamen et indeclinabili assensu rationis. Quae firmitas et indeclinabilis assensus surgit ex naturali quodam instinctu fundato in virtute distinctiva et collectiva simul et collativa, quam cogitativam dicimus, in qua seu per quam apprehenduntur, distinguuntur, colliguntur, conferuntur simplices et purae rerum intentiones separatae a suis idolis, ut verbo Averrois utar.

38 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, 111.27-2, p. 200, l. 26-32: Ratio particula-ris, quam etiam aestimativam seu cogitativam vocant, est vis distinctiva, quae componit et dividit et versatur circa intentiones rerum, etiamsi sint res universales, universales, inquam, secundum considerationem, inquantum videlicet considerat rem aliamquam absque principiiis secundum considerationem individuantibus seu particulantibus eam. Et hoc est, quod ille commentator Averroes dicit, scilicet quod denudate rem a suo idolo, id est ab accidentibus, sub quibus imaginativa rem considerat. See also id., De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 5.26, p. 187, l. 224 – p. 188, l. 228; id., De intellectu et intelligibili, 111.7-5, p. 182, l. 112 – p. 183,
phrasing, and its terminology of conjecture. A mechanism like this could serve as the beginning of a reply to Godfrey of Fontaines, in that it has effectively extended the certitude of adhesion beyond the domain of revealed theology to all physical sciences. There is an act of belief in all non-mathematical scientific habits.

This account of induction, appealing to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics 11.19 and Metaphysics 1.1, also resembles Dietrich's presentation of dialectical demonstrations in De intellectu et intelligibili. The reference in the Praeambulum to "the weaker mode of argumentation" that proceeds "by induction or by example" recalls Dietrich's description of how from "sense, memory, and experience" there arises "a sort of logical or dialectical universal" that properly speaking pertains to "our cogitative power". If, Dietrich continued, a definition is made from such terms, and from these definitions propositions are developed to reach conclusions, this is called a demonstration only in an attenuated sense. For a dialectical universal is not truly universal; it is only an intention stripped of individuating, particular components so that, for example, "human" or "horse" subsequently can be predicated of many things, rather than the individual "Socrates", which can be predicated only of one. Similarly, we read in the Praeambulum that the universal arising from this weaker mode of argumentation or induction – from many sense-perceptions, from memory, and from experience – is "beyond the particulars but not really separate" from them (praeter particularia non quasi separatum).

The Praeambulum will not, however, leave us with only dialectical demonstrations for all non-mathematical sciences – nor, for that matter, would Dietrich. For Dietrich, the basis for necessary and demonstrative knowledge

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40 See 2.3, n. 110, above.


42 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, 111.27.2-3, p. 200, l. 26-42.

43 On Dietrich's theory of demonstration, see W. Wallace, The Scientific Methodology of Theodoric of Freiberg. A Case Study in the Relationship between Science and Philosophy
is the *ratio definitiva* that is constituted in the possible intellect, which apprehends the quiddity of a thing through the parts of its definition or its causes.\(^{44}\) This *ratio* is apprehended in different ways in the sciences, depending on the number of causes taken into account, whether formal causes alone (as in metaphysics and mathematics) or all four causes (as in the other physical sciences).\(^{45}\) In some cases, for example in the study of the rainbow and other radiant meteorological phenomena, these procedures will yield mixed demonstrations, since the properties being studied are physical but the middle terms of the demonstrations are mathematical and are derived from optics.\(^{46}\) Certain entities like accidents, however, cannot be understood independently of the substance in which they inhere ("snub" cannot be understood independently of "nose"; inversely, "nose" is the more formal element in the definition of "snub" that makes it intelligible).\(^{47}\) Since their definition includes something extrinsic to the thing defined, accidents do not have a quiddity in the strict sense. They do, however, have a quiddity in our way of understanding them – that is, one can give an answer to the question “What is an accident?” or “What is the colour white?”, even though these have no reality apart from the substance in which they inhere. Dietrich would call the answers to such questions "logical definitions" or universals, and a demonstration founded on such a definition is "logical" or “dialectical”. In his view, the failure to observe this difference has led many to suppose that accidents are in fact separable from their substances simply because we can understand them in this logical fashion. For Dietrich the same rules also impose themselves on the other end of the ontological spectrum: we have already noted that for Dietrich the separate substances, because they are simple, also do not have a quiddity in the strict sense. For this reason, we can infer that the part of metaphysics that reflects on the existence of such substances, rather than the part that studies

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\(^{44}\) Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentalium*, 5.26, p. 187, l. 221-226; id., *De intellectu et intelligibili*, III.28.1, p. 201, l. 45-59.

\(^{45}\) Dietrich of Freiberg, *De origine rerum praedicamentalium*, 5.60-67, p. 199, l. 630 – p. 201, l. 698. Metaphysics and mathematics differ in how they conceive the formal *ratio*: metaphysics considers being as being, while metaphysics looks only to a determinate genus of being; mathematics considers its subject according to the quiddity and form found concretely in nature; mathematics considers the form as abstracted.


\(^{47}\) Dietrich of Freiberg, *De accidentibus*, 12.1–15.5, p. 68, l. 3 – p. 74, l. 60.
the attributes and properties of being as being, would also remain at the level of probability and dialectics.\textsuperscript{48}

Now, at this point, Dietrich would have to offer an account of how, even though a person begins with a “logical universal”, one nevertheless arrives in some non-mathematical sciences to attain the necessary knowledge of proper demonstration. Dietrich's reflections on this subject, limited though they are, can be presented as follows. In the formation of a speculative habit, there are two active principles: the agent intellect and, in relation to the cogitative power, the heart. We act primarily in this process through our cogitative power, by which we reflect on the universal intentions of things, but these are only completely realised in the possible intellect.\textsuperscript{49} The cogitative power, by “denuding” the intention of the substance from its images and accidental “idols”, places the possible intellect in a disposition to receive the intelligible species directly from the agent intellect.\textsuperscript{50} For Dietrich, in other words, the agent intellect does not abstract the species from the imaginative or cogitative power. Instead, the possible intellect emanates from the agent intellect (\textit{procedit enim ab eo intelligendo ipsum}), first by thinking the agent intellect as its productive principle under the aspect of a determinate \textit{ratio}, and then it thinks that determinate intention as such.\textsuperscript{51} The contracting disposition produced in the cogitative is related to the determinate intelligible species as matter is related to the form.\textsuperscript{52} That is, although the possible intellect and the cogitative are turned toward the same object, they are not turned toward one another: the possible intellect never turns away from the agent intellect, and relates to its object by the intelligible species, while the cogitative relates to its object by the intentions it separates from the “idols”. This means that the cogitative can apprehend an object that is in itself self-evident and necessary, even though it does not apprehend the object as such.\textsuperscript{53} In this life, the possible intellect always depends on the disposition it receives from the cogitative

\textsuperscript{48} See 2.3, n. 121, above.
\textsuperscript{50} Dietrich of Freiberg, \textit{De origine rerum praedicamentarium}, 5.26, p. 187, l. 226 – p. 188, 232: alioquin non differret intellectus a virtute cogitativa, quae etiam sic intentionem substantiae denudare potest, ut nuda apud ipsum maneat denudata ab omnibus imaginibus, ut Averroes loguitur, et appendiciis accidentalius. Et sic est intentio substantiae in ea dispositione, ut secundum eam fiat virtute intellectus agentis forma in intellectu possibili, qua ipsi formae seu rei secundum suam formam determinantur sua principia. Et ex hoc iam habet forma rationem quiditatis et ipsa res esse quiditativum.
\textsuperscript{51} Dietrich of Freiberg, \textit{De intellectu et intelligibili}, 111.36.1-2, p. 208, l. 25-41.
\textsuperscript{52} Dietrich of Freiberg, \textit{De visione beatifica}, 4.3.2 (9), p. 115, l. 48-54.
\textsuperscript{53} Dietrich of Freiberg, \textit{De intellectu et intelligibili}, 111.33.2, p. 204, l. 45-53.
and, therefore, it never knows without phantasms.54 Presumably this is how Dietrich would explain the way in which a demonstrative scientific habit is formed from premises that are initially believed. Unfortunately, Berthold does not provide us with any further clues in the Praeambulum or elsewhere in the Expositio about how this process occurs.

2

“Our Divinising Theology”

A more obvious and unresolved ambiguity in the Praeambulum relates to its assumption that we can draw a valid analogy between what we might call, echoing Godfrey’s language, the certitude of adhesion to authority and the certitude of adhesion to a conjectural inference. The Praeambulum has maintained that, in the order of apprehension, both kinds of certitude in some sense come from without (quasi ab extrinseco), and both are grasped primarily as true with enough firmness to serve as a basis for scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, if this argument originally derived from a theological debate, we would expect to find an explanation of the element of difference in the analogy, namely, how theology is as scientific as natural philosophy and yet retains its exalted position as the noblest of the disciplines. Berthold will take one route to establish this conclusion, but he will not appeal to a mechanism of belief or to notions of authority and conjecture to do so. One can easily conceive another path to a similar result relative to Christian theology in particular that would also clarify the ambiguous relationship between authority and inference: one, for example, proceeds automatically (the conjecture) and one is voluntary (assent to authority).

If Berthold was indeed using Dietrich’s De theologia, then at this point he would have had to diverge, in his characteristic way, from his source. For if we accept the reconstruction of a Parisian context for Dietrich’s De theologia, and recall his Pauline discussion of the two orders of providence in the fragment De subiecto theologiae, we can easily imagine one way to resolve the ambiguity between authority and conjecture: the natural, automatic assent of the cogitative power would pertain to what the De subiecto called “the divine science of the philosophers”, whereas the free assent to sacred authority would relate to our science (nostra scientia), theology as such (theologia simpliciter), our divine science of the saints (nostra divina sanctorum scientia).55 Up this point

54 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, 111.36.3-4, p. 208, l. 42-54.
in the *Praeambulum*, “the principles of metaphysical or divine sciences” had been spoken of as if they were on equal footing, where it was possible to move between belief in authority to belief in the conjectural inference for the sake of the argument. But we know from the *De subiecto* that such an undifferentiated sense of theology (*in hac scientia*) with *ens divinum* as its unifying subject must be divided, in an eschatological perspective, into the two orders of providence: the divine science of the saints looks and will abide beyond the limits of this world, whereas the divine science of the philosophers is as finite as the order of nature. While the philosophers’ theology, like every natural science, begins from believed principles, and nevertheless is a legitimate science, the free assent to the authority of the highest truth surpasses it in certitude. Metaphysics, as the study of being and as theology, begins with principles deriving from sense, memory, and experience in the cogitative power. But even though the cogitative gives spontaneous, firm assent, it is not infallible, especially where no quidditative knowledge is available to our intellect. While it is entirely conceivable that Dietrich would place metaphysics as ontology on the solid ground of demonstrative knowledge that reasons about formal causes, he consistently maintained that our natural knowledge of the separate substances remains tentative, even though our conclusions can reach a level of hypothetical necessity. For Dietrich, as we have seen, only in ethics and the order of voluntary providence do we reach the things themselves, for faith begets charity, and charity does not fail.

Berthold, however, took the difference in the proportion between theology and the other sciences, including metaphysics, in another direction. His departure from the spirit of Dietrich’s *De subiecto theologiae* is clear simply from the fact that the mark of ownership for the highest science has passed from the theology of the saints to the “science” achieved by Proclus:

*Praeamb. A*, p. 53, l. 29: *in ista sapientia divinali seu theologia sapientiali*  
*Praeamb. B*, p. 62, l. 321: *haec sapientialis scientia*

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With Berthold, the disproportion no longer fell between the divine sciences of the saints and the philosophers, but between Platonic *supersapientia* and Aristotelian first philosophy: “above the mode common to it and the other sciences, [Proclus’ science] has something more in its reason and cause of its certitude and unshakeable assent in these principles”.

Berthold made the comparison between Aristotelian metaphysics and Platonic *supersapientia* in two parts: (1) by an inspection of the cognitive principle used in theology (p. 63, l. 375 – p. 65, l. 425), and (2) by a consideration of the supersapiential and divinising habit through which Platonic theology receives its principles (p. 65, l. 426 – p. 69, l. 569). While Berthold’s argument proceeds mostly by compiling citations from Proclus, Dionysius, and Boethius, and tacitly *Sapientiale* iii.23, its structure was clearly still indebted to theological discourse – these are the sort of distinctions one would expect to find relative to (2) faith, the habit perfecting (1) the intellect under the free movement of the will, as we find for example in Thomas Aquinas.

On these same lines, Ruedi Imbach has observed that Berthold’s procedure in this part of the *Praeambulum* recalls Aquinas’ discussion of sacred doctrine as a wisdom surpassing human wisdom. If Berthold indeed has been using Dietrich’s *De theologia*, then this structural parallel between sacred doctrine and *supersapientia* should be interpreted in the maximal sense: Berthold has subordinated Aristotelian *sapientia* to Platonic *supersapientia* as Dietrich had subordinated pagan philosophy to Christian theology. This was possible because, as we have seen, notions like revelation and deification through grace have been extended


59 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 11a 11ae, q. 4, a. 2.

to Hermetic and Platonic theology and anthropology, in no small part under
the inspiration of Romans 1:19: “What was known of God is manifest to them;
for God revealed it [revelavit] to them”. Unlike Dietrich’s divine science of the
philosophers, Berthold’s Platonism was soteriological.

Berthold was led to this remarkable conclusion by the texts. In Proclus he
found parallels to passages from Dionysius that his predecessors had used to
create the superiority of faith over natural philosophical reason. As with
Prologus 17, here the crucial source was Proclus’ De providentia et fato on the
modes of cognition. Berthold appealed to Proclus now to explain (1) the nature
of the cognitive principle used in theology. Contrasting the certitude of the
lower sciences with that of Platonic science, Berthold now shifted from speak-
ing of the cogitative power – the basis for belief in natural science – in the
first-person (quam cogitativam dicimus), which (perhaps citing Dietrich) he
had used when describing mechanism of belief in natural science, to the third-
person (ratio particularis, quam quidam cogitativam vocant). As in 123D, he
subdivided the ratio particularis into three functions (triplex officio): turning
below to imagination (phantasia), it is “opinionative” and is occupied with the
intentions of physical things; turning above itself, it is “scientific” and treats
pure mathematical; in its middle operation, it considers mathematical
applied to physical beings (harmonics, perspective, astronomy), which would
be the domain of mixed demonstration mentioned already. The cognitive prin-
ciple of Platonic science, Berthold continued, also exceeds the universal reason
(ratio universalis) or possible intellect that “apprehends the thing in its reason”
that, turned below, concerns logical intentions, whether first or second inten-
tions; toward itself, “metaphysical” intentions; and above, “it reflects beings
as such” (simpliciter entia speculatur). With the possible intellect we reach the
level of metaphysics as the study of being and its properties.

In 123D, Berthold had expanded the description of the lower function of the
cogitative by tacitly drawing from a passage in Albert’s Summa theologiae that

61 The same verse in the Vulgate reads: Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis: Deus enim illis manifestavit. As the editors of the Expositio indicate, Berthold’s source here at the beginning of the Praemus was Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, ed. I. Brady (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971–19813), lib. i, dist. 3, cap. 1, §35, on the knowledge of God from creatures.
63 Instead of mathematicas, as is found in the Vatican manuscript, here the reading in the Oxford manuscript (p. 64, l. 392: metaphysicas) should be followed in light of 123D (p. 129, l. 134: metaphysicas).
distinguished between conviction (*fides*), that must be placed below *scientia*, from the theological faith (*fides*) that is above knowledge.64 Albert's text, not cited by Berthold, continued as follows:

But faith in theological matters is not this kind of faith, which occurs through a medium, but is a light that, like a medium without a medium by which would be proved, locates the faithful in the first Truth through assent and certitude.65

Albert here echoed a phrase from Dionysius that he had just cited, which also featured prominently in the question concerning the scientific character of theology at the beginning of the *Summa*:

Dionysius in chapter 7 of his book *On the Divine Names* says that faith is a light locating the faithful in the first Truth and the first Truth immutably in them. And likewise, under this light, things are received that cannot be received under the natural light.66

When Berthold moved beyond the possible intellect to establish the superiority of the Platonic divine science over Aristotle's metaphysics, we find him appealing to Dionysius for an account of (1) the *unum animae* and (2) the cognitive habit belonging to it (*supersapientia*) that has a structurally identical role to *fides* in Albert:

Indeed, these cognitive principles relate only to beings, although according to different reasons. However, many divine things are above being, as is evident in the case of things divine according to essence and what is divine according to cause, which is ‘above all beings’, as Dionysius attests in chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names* B. For this reason, in chapter 1 of the

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65 Albert the Great, *Summa theologæae*, pars 1, tr. 3, q. 15, c. 3, a. 1, p. 78, l. 69-72: *Fides autem in theologicas non est talis fides, quae per medium fit, sed est lumen, quod ut medium non habens medium, quo probetur; credentes locat in prima veritate per assensus et certitudinem*.
66 Albert the Great, *Summa theologæae*, pars 1, tr. 1, q. 1, p. 7, l. 53–57: *Et Dionysius libro De divinis nominibus cap. VII dicit, quod fides est lumen locans credentes in primam veritatem et primam veritatem in ipsis immobiles. Et ideo sub lumine illius accipitur, quod sub lumine connaturali accipi non potest*. 
Mystical Theology, he calls ‘unlearned’ those ‘who are sealed off in beings and believe that there is nothing supersubstantially beyond beings, but they presume to know, with that cognition that is according to themselves, him, who makes the shadows his hiding place’. Consequently, it is impossible that we should receive those things that are above us according to our ownness \([\text{iuxta proprietatem nostram}]\) and thus compare things divine with a reason that has been reared on the senses, with which we are deceived by appearances, as he says there in chapter 7 of On the Divine Names. Dionysius adds an explanation for this, when he describes the cognitive principle in us of things divine, which we are seeking here: ‘one must see that our mind has a certain power for knowing, through which it examines things intelligible, but a union exceeding the nature of the mind (the other translation says: “a unity superexalted beyond the nature of the mind”), through which the mind is conjoined to those things that are above it. Therefore, it is necessary to think divine things according to this, not according to ourselves, but our whole selves placed outside our whole selves and deified wholly. For it is better to be God’s and not our own’.

This is (1) “the cognitive principle with which the theologian is occupied concerning divine things to be apprehended”.\(^6^7\) Here Berthold speaks only of the theologian (\textit{theologus}) and posits no distinction between the pagan Proclus or the Christian Dionysius. The key doctrine that unites both theologians is the principle that divine things must be known in a divine mode, for like is only known by like, and that this knowledge is inherently dispossessive – it is not according to the creature’s ownness (\textit{proprietas}).\(^6^9\) Indeed, the major attributes of the \textit{unum animae} mentioned here by Berthold correspond to those used, for example, by Thomas Aquinas relative to the nature of faith, and the distinction between knowing divine things “according to our mode”, as the philosophers do, and knowing them “according to the mode of divine things”

\(^{67}\) Berthold of Moosburg, \textit{Expositio, Praeamb.} C, p. 64, l. 395-415.

\(^{68}\) Berthold of Moosburg, \textit{Expositio, Praeamb.} C, p. 63, l. 375-377: \textit{Quod patet primo ex principii cognitivi inspectione, quo theologus in divinis apprehendendis versatur, quod est eminens et sic perspicacius omni alio principio cognitivo, quo circa alia quaecumque scibilia occupamur.}

through infused faith.  

Similarly, Aquinas’ commentary on the *De divinis nominibus* implied that the “union above the nature of the mind” should be identified with knowledge of divine things by grace. The crucial passages from *De divinis nominibus* c. 7 on the unity exalted above the nature of the mind and faith locating the soul in the highest Truth find a direct correlate in Proclus’ statement in *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, that “this *unum* is more divine than intellect”, and “locates” the soul in the divine life.

Berthold would entirely accept the way Albert and Aquinas had used Dionysius to describe this supra-intellectual perfection of the intellect they identified as faith. The only difference was that he realised that the same principle had to be extended to the pagan Proclus and, through him, to the Platonic tradition.

Finally, Berthold contrasted (2) the cognitive habits of Platonic *supersapiencia* and Aristotelian *sapientia* in terms of their (a) certainty, (b) complexity, and (c) nobility. Berthold’s source for the citations of Aristotle was *Sapientiale* 111.23, where Thomas of York had focused on the dignity of wisdom in relation to all the other intellectual habits discussed in *Nicomachean Ethics* vi.  

Berthold’s arguments involved primarily *a fortiori* comparisons, which followed quite naturally from the name he invented for the habit of Platonic theology: if Aristotelian *sapientia* is so noble, how much nobler must Platonic *supersapiencia* be! (a) Wisdom, according to Aristotle, demonstrates not only from the principles of things, but is a “veridical science” of the principles themselves. The examples taken from Eustratius of “distances, length, breadth, depth” as the principles of geometry then accomplishes an important transition in the

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70 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, ed. P.-M.J. Gils (Roma: Commissione Leonina, 1992), q. 2, a.2, p. 95, l. 65-77: *Et secundum hoc de divinis duplex scientia habetur: una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensibilium principia accipit ad notificandum divina, et sic de divinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam primam scientiam divinam dicentes; alia secundum modum ipsorum divinorum, ut ipsa divina secundum se ipsa capiantur, quae quidem perfecte in statu viae nobis est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu viae quaedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam ineremus ipsi primae veritatis propter se ipsam.*

71 Thomas Aquinas, *In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. vii, lect. 1, n. 705, p. 262: *secundo vero, habet quandam unitionem ad res divinas per gratiam, quae excedit naturam mentis nostrae, per quam unitionem, coniunguntur homines per fidem aut quamcumque cognitionem, ad ea quae sunt super naturalem mentis virtutem.*


Praeambulum from the earlier epistemological account of principles as propositions to an ontological conception of principles as objects. This shift made possible Berthold's ensuing argument, citing Proclus, that the Platonic ascent through dialectic and the principles of the various sciences (the point in geometry, the monad in arithmetic, etc.), rising to the unhypothetical first principle, reaches a domain beyond what Aristotle had considered. To this extent must the principles of Platonic wisdom surpass Aristotle's in certitude. These are precisely not the arguments we would expect to find in Dietrich, for they imply that our knowledge of the separate substances can in fact be more certain than our knowledge of being and its properties.

(b) Whereas sapientia is a combination of intellectus and discursive scientia, the habit of “our super-sapiential wisdom” is, in the words of Boethius, “the simple inspection of the Form forming all things as such” (simplex inspectio formae simpliciter omnia formantis). In other words, supersapientia is the non-discursive apprehension of the entire universe as it is enfolded in the Form forming all things. This would correspond to the content of the intellectus adeptus as Berthold inherited it from Dietrich of Freiberg, as implied in Dietrich's citation of Gregory the Great on St. Benedict's vision of the entire universe in a single ray of light. But, as we saw, the Boethian notion of intelligentia for Berthold includes a deeper cognition prior to reflexivity. This fundamental dimension of intelligence emerges in Berthold's subsequent citation of Dionysius on the capacity of rational souls who, “by enveloping the many into one” become “worthy of intellecstions equal to the angels”, insofar as this is possible for the soul. The angels, Dionysius continued, are capable of a unitive, uniform contemplation and are “figured [figurata] after divine supersapientia”. In other words, to know the simple, the soul itself must become simple. The “most divine cognition of God” for angels or for souls, Berthold concluded with Dionysius, is “through ignorance according to the union above mind, when the mind, having departed from everything else, and then also sending itself away, is united with the super-resplendent rays, and is illuminated hither and yon by

74 This elision was noted by S. Gersh, “Berthold of Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277, p. 493–503, at p. 499–500.
75 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 66, l. 488: certissima et altissima cognitio hominis deificati.
76 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 67, l. 521-523: intelligentiae vero celsior oculus existit, supergressa namque universitatís ambitum illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur. This is a combination of syntagsms from Boethius' De Trinitate (c. 2), on the intellectual mode of theology, and the Consolatio philosophiae (lib. v, prosa 4), on intelligentia.
the inscrutable depth of wisdom [inde et ibi non scrutabili profundo sapientiae illustnata]". These are the same texts Berthold used later in the Expositio to describe the circular and the direct motions of the soul and the doctrine of contemplation. If we are to assume a coherent doctrine behind it all, we must again conclude that the habit of supersapientia, though it is first cultivated in the oblique motion, is only perfected in these two higher motions, which are given by God.

(c) The nobility of this science surpasses Aristotelian metaphysics in its subject and in its form. Whereas Aristotle's metaphysics treats "being as being, its parts and properties", Plato's divine science concerns "the universe of divine things": God, the primordial causes, and their orders. The latter science is comprised of "principles" through which the mind ascends to the contemplation of the existence (anitas), but not the essence (quiditas) of God. Berthold once again relies chiefly on the authority of Dionysius: the mind cannot know God simply from his nature, for God exceeds all reason, "but from the ordering of all things, placed out before him". For Berthold, in a phrase redolent of Dietrich, this is a necessity recognised by the philosophers in the domain of natural providence that must be respected by theologians reasoning within the sphere of voluntary providence: "if none of the wise inquires generally after the essence [quid est] of the superessential principle of all [...] what theologian presumes to inquire after the superunifical superessence of the primarily One?"

Here yet again, the Platonic consensus, which united the best of the pagans with the doctors of the Church, has transcended the boundaries of natural and voluntary providence in the Praeambulum. Nevertheless, just as we saw with Berthold's incorporation of the terminology of antarkia and hierarchia, this did not amount to a confusion of the two orders. Berthold had clearly asserted that the articles of faith are the first principles in the theology of voluntary providence. If questioned further about the difference between the two theologies, perhaps he would draw on the unused resources of the Praeambulum to

77 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C., p. 67, l. 523 – p. 68, l. 538.
78 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 1, p. 5, l. 15-16. Commenting on the same passage (De divinis nominibus, 7,3, 869C-D), Albert denied that even the blessed know the quid est of God, but only the quia est. Cf. Albert the Great, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1972), 7,25, p. 356, l. 32 – p. 357, l. 55, as well as 1,21, 1,24, 1,62, 5,3, 6,9, 7,30, 13,27; id., Super Dionysium De mystica theologia, c. 1; Super Epistulas I and V. F. Ruello, Les “Noms divins” et leurs “raisons” selon saint Albert the Grand commentateur du De divinis nominibus (Paris: Vrin, 1963), p. 98–101, has argued convincingly that, for Albert, there are degrees of knowledge of the divine quia est in the beatific vision according to the various apprehensions of the rationes of the divine attributes.
79 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 123K, p. 133, l. 271-274, cited in 1,2, n. 86.
explain that they are believed through the free assent to authority rather than through the spontaneous assent of the cogitative power. But whether he would follow this route or not, it is clear that the habit of Platonic theology has not replaced faith. Berthold has rather extended the dignity that had exclusively belonged to faith, as Albert and Aquinas had understood it through Dionysius, to the habit of *supersapientia*: the cognition of the *unum animae* is deifying and salvific, it is given by a divine gift, and the difference between contemplation, in the strict sense, *in via* and *in patria* is simply one of degree rather than kind.

There was for Berthold some doctrinal overlap between the articles of faith and *supersapientia*. Following Thomas of York, Berthold held that the Trinity was known to the philosophers reasoning to the *invisibilia Dei*; building on the *Clavis physicae*, he held that the general Resurrection accords with the laws of natural providence. This of course left out the doctrine of the Incarnation and the sacramental means by which the restoration achieved through Christ is communicated to individuals who are members of his body. As we will see in Chapter 5, Berthold’s Eriugenian conception of human nature and the Fall, as set out in his commentary on the final propositions of the *Elementatio theologica*, brings the reader as close to the Incarnation of the Word as the order of natural providence allowed. Sacred history and matters relating to the fate of individuals would fall within the study of the order of voluntary providence, which presupposes and consummates the order of natural providence. The precise character of this consummation can only be surmised in its barest outlines from the *Expositio*. What seems clear is that no proponent of the methodology of *gemina providentia* held that an individual, as an individual, could somehow stand outside the order of voluntary providence. Even though, as we have seen, the ontological constitution of angels embeds them in the order of natural providence, we must assume for Berthold that the study of the order of natural providence through the *Elementatio theologica* is something a person undertakes who is always embedded within the voluntary order.

The astonishing thing about Berthold’s position is that the study of Platonic philosophy through a pagan text and the development of the habit of *supersapientia* makes a person more receptive to divine grace. This is possible because, as we will see in further detail in Part Two, Berthold understood deification to consist in the restoration of the human individual to the dignity that belongs to human nature (the microcosm), which is itself a recapitulation of the

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macrocosm. This pushes the dialectical relation between natural and voluntary providence in Berthold's doctrine of the *unum animae* even further: the highest freedom for the human individual consists in living in conformity with the human nature that always abides in the Word. In other words, it seems from the *Expositio* that the “consummation” of natural providence by voluntary providence is for the individual to become adequate to the hidden depth of its nature where God already dwells.

What difference remains between *supersapientia* and faith, then, must chiefly concern the means by which the perfecting habit dispossesses, unifies, and locates its subject in the first truth. Both would begin from the outside, both would begin with belief, and would both go beyond the mundane wisdom of the (Aristotelian) philosophers. One follows the arduous way of reasoning by the theorems of Platonic philosophy, which united knowledge and action, the study of nature and ascesis, to the apprehension of the primordial causes and the awareness of a more hidden depth in the soul. This enlarges the mind and prepares it to be elevated to a non-discursive but reflexive vision of those hidden mysteries through the acquired intellect (the *sublevatio mentis* that occurs through human industry and grace) and, within and beyond that, to an operative union with the plentitude of the Word (the *exultatio mentis*). As Tauler succinctly put it, to the extent that a person abandons themself and turns to the ground of the soul, grace is born within them.\(^1\) Thoroughly in agreement with the spirit of Berthold's teaching, Tauler acknowledged that the pagans were familiar with this ground through their knowledge and ascesis, while we Christians, he lamented, are strangers to it.\(^2\) Tauler perfectly expressed the cultural ramifications of Berthold's extension of the dignity of faith to Platonic *supersapientia*. For Berthold, this was nothing else but the consequence of his realisation that the *De mystica theologia* of Dionysius and the *Tria opuscula*

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81  John Tauler, *Predigt 60d* (Trinity Sunday), p. 300, l. 25-28: *Also verre sich der mensche in den grunt liesse und kerte, do wirt die genode geborn und anders nütt eigenlich in der hoesten wisen. – Hievon sprach ein heidenscher meister Proculus [...]*. 

82  Cf. John Tauler, *Predigt 61* (Nativity of John the Baptist), p. 332, l. 16-21: *Der nu in sinen innigen grunt dicke kerte und dem heimlich were, dem würde manig edel blik von dem inwendigen grunde, der im noch klarer und offenbarer were (das Got ist) denne sinen liplichen ougen die materieliche sunne. Disem grunde waren die heiden heimlich und versmochten zo mole zergengklche ding und giengen disem grunde nach. (“Whoever turns often into his inner ground and becomes familiar with it, will receive many noble sightings of the inner ground, which will reveal to him that God exists in a clearer and more manifest way than the material sun is present to his bodily eyes. The pagans were familiar with this ground and they abstained from material things and pursued this ground.”) For the rest of the passage, see Part One, n. 6, above.
of Proclus transmitted the same doctrine of divinising wisdom (*sapientia divinalis*) that proceeds "not according to ourselves, but our whole selves placed outside our whole selves and deified wholly".

As for the way of faith, if the sermons of Tauler can still serve as a guide, it would follow the more immediate but no less difficult path of reaching the divinity of the incarnate Word, whose lower and higher powers were constantly tending to the Father,\(^83\) by a dispossessive conformity to his humanity, by humility, and by the recognition of one's own nothingness.\(^84\) In both paths, we might say, the propensity of the old Adam for appropriation and familiarity is gradually curbed as one begins to live by God's life (*dispensat mundum cum dis; vivit divina vita*), through whom the soul's many works become a single work (*so ein guot werk mag heissen alle die manigvaltikeit*).

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\(^83\) John Tauler, *Predigt 39* (Fifth Sunday after Trinity), ed. F. Vetter, p. 157, l. 13 – p. 158, l. 23: *Die edele minnekliche sele, unser herre Jhesus Christus, die was nach iren obersten kreften ane alle underlos gekert fürwürflichen in die gotheit, [...] und was denne aber als selig und gebruchlich als si ietzunt ist. [...] Die im aller gelichest nu nachvolgent an den goetlichen fürwürfen, in dem wirken und gebruchen ein wirt, die süllent im aller glichest her nach sin in weselichem gebruchen eweklichen. [...] Also tuot der inwendige verklerte mensche: der ist inwendig in sinem gebruchende, und mit dem liechte siner redelicheit so übersicht er geheelingen die uswendi gebruche und berichtet die zuo irem würlichem amte, und inwendig ist er versunken und versmolzen in sinem gebruchlichen anhanginge an Gotte, und bliet in siner friheit ungehindert sins werkes. Doch disen inwendigen dienent alle die uswendigen werk, das enkein so klein werk enist, es diene alles her zuo. So ein guot werk mag heissen alle die manigvaltikeit. ("The noble and adorable soul, our Lord Jesus Christ, which was in its higher powers without interruption objectively turned toward the divinity, [...] was then as blessed and joyful then as it is now. [...] Those who now follow him in all things as closely as possible in their objective orientation to the divine, in whom to act and to enjoy are one – these people should be as close to him as possible in essential and eternal joy. [...] This is what an inwardly illumined person does: he is inward in his enjoyment, and with the light of his discernment he thus surveys at once the outer powers and directs each of them to their task, and inwardly he is engulfed and melted away in his joyful dependency on God, and remains in his freedom unhindered by his works. Rather, all these outward works serve the inward joy, such that there is no work so small that it does not contribute to all. Thus, one may call all the multiplicity one good work.")

\(^84\) John Tauler, *Predigt 45* (Thirteenth Sunday after Trinity), ed. F. Vetter, p. 197, l. 1-2: *Das eine das ist das du bekennest din nicht, das din eigen ist, was du bist und wer du bist von dir selber. ("The one thing necessary is that you recognise your nothing, which is proper to you, is what you are, and is who you are in yourself."