INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the Jesuit specter and its mobilization for political purposes in imperial Germany. Anti-Jesuitism extended far beyond opposition to the activities of the 634 Jesuits who lived in Germany in the early days of the empire to include the rejection of “Jesuitism,” which consisted of the policies that the order’s opponents attributed to it—the creation of a universal empire led by the papacy, the subjugation of all Catholics to clerical authority, and the corruption of the Christian faith—and the practices they found characteristic of the order—strict internal discipline and utter unscrupulousness in choice of methods. Partly based on rational arguments that reflected genuine theological, cultural, and political differences, anti-Jesuitism in imperial Germany also had, as one historian put it, “something psychic” about it. Friedrich Heyer used the metaphor of the specter of Jesuitism to suggest as much.¹ So, too, did contemporaries. One anti-Jesuit observed: “Jesuitism has long haunted the German fatherland—and not just the church of Rome but the church of Wittenberg, too.”² The Berlin Catholic daily, Germania, likened anti-Jesuitism to a child’s fear of ghosts.³ The Jesuit of anti-Jesuit discourse had what might be called an uncanny quality: he was both subhuman and superhuman. Jesuits allegedly were so extreme in their submission to their order that they became like machines and, in their determination to achieve their goals, drew on powers unavailable to other men. The peculiar location of the Jesuit, at the boundaries of humanity, unsettled the producers and consumers of anti-Jesuit discourse. In this sense, the Jesuit specter haunted imperial Germany.

It did not haunt all Germans equally. In imperial Germany, anti-Jesuitism was primarily a bourgeois Protestant phenomenon. Besides small associations of liberal and national Catholics, the organizations most committed to anti-Jesuitism—

² Hugo Koch, Katholizismus und Jesuitismus (Munich: Mörke, 1913), 6.
³ Germania, 8 June 1902.
the Protestant Association (Protestantenverein) and the Protestant League for the Defense of German-Protestant Interests (Evangelischer Bund zur Wahrung deutsch-protestantischer Interessen)—were dominated by Protestants, most of them religiously observant. The majority of anti-Jesuits were liberal in theological and political matters, although the ideological fault line of anti-Jesuitism was unstable. While the Protestant Association was a liberal organization directed against conservatism, the Protestant League, which, apart from the trade unions, was the fourth largest voluntary association in the empire, included both conservatives and liberals. Socialists were notably absent. Common to all anti-Jesuits was a commitment to nationalism, which encompassed a desire for a unified cultural ethos for Germany as well as political unity, and in later years, territorial expansion. The members of these organizations were drawn largely from the Bildungsbürgertum or educated bourgeoisie. The official bodies of Protestant churches provided them with considerable support in their efforts. Individuals who took leading roles in anti-Jesuit agitation, whether by organizing petitions and protests, giving speeches, or writing pamphlets, were drawn from the same social and confessional base. Scholars and pastors were particularly strongly represented. As with most political agitators in imperial Germany, anti-Jesuits were overwhelmingly male. As a cultural elite, these Bildungsbürger claimed the authority to instruct Germans—Catholic and Protestant, male and female, rich and poor—in political, intellectual, and moral matters, and thus also in the Jesuit question—whether the Jesuits should be allowed to practice freely in Germany.

Feeling themselves haunted by Jesuits, anti-Jesuits revealed themselves to be less rational than they believed. Their perception of reality was skewed, not simply in their assessment of the threat posed by Jesuits, but also in their vision of themselves as victims in a society and polity in which they enjoyed a relatively privileged position. Protestants accounted for 62 percent of the population of the empire; Catholics for only 36 percent. While it would be unfair to call anti-Jesuits paranoid—otherwise they functioned quite normally—their anti-Jesuit discourse resembled, in certain respects, the “paranoid style” of politics identified by the American historian, Richard Hofstadter. As he insists, “it is the use of paranoid modes of expression by more or less normal people that

4 Helmut Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870–1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 136. The membership statistics upon which this claim is based are those of 1906. The Protestant League was smaller than the Veterans’ Associations, the People’s Association for Catholic Germany, and the Navy League, but far bigger than the Pan-German League, the Colonial League, the Imperial League against Social Democracy, and the Society for the Eastern Marches.

makes the phenomenon significant.”6 The anti-Jesuits’ vision of their enemy was
typical of the paranoid style: “a perfect model of malice, a kind of amoral
superman: sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving.”7 In imag­
ing the capacities of the Jesuits as superhuman, anti-Jesuitism also exhibited
the “heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy” that were
typical of the paranoid style.8 Anti-Jesuits were, moreover, drawn to the para­
noid style of politics for the same reasons as others. Hofstadter believes that
“the paranoid disposition is mobilized into action chiefly by social conflicts that
involve ultimate schemes of values and that bring fundamental fears and hatreds,
rather than negotiable interests, into political action.” 9 The unsettling effect of
the Jesuit Feindbild, or enemy image, combined with a sense that “Jesuitism”
was irreconcilable with all they represented—nationalism, personal autonomy,
and sincere religiosity—to make the paranoid style an appropriate idiom.

Because they involved fundamental values and long-standing animosities,
ethnic and religious conflicts, Hofstadter shows, were most likely to be expressed
in the paranoid style, and he cites anti-Catholic and anti-Jesuit agitation as
eamples in his survey of American political life. The anti-Jesuitism of impe­
rial Germany, too, had its roots in religious conflict. Anti-Jesuits saw Jesuits
as the leading representatives of reprehensible tendencies within Catholicism
as a whole, and the confessional antagonism so central to German life in the
nineteenth century nourished the struggle over the Jesuit question. They
understood confessional conflict as a zero-sum game, in which concessions to
Catholicism undermined Protestantism. Anti-Jesuits frequently condemned Jesuits
and their Catholic supporters for disturbing the “confessional peace.” In prac­
tice, “keeping the confessional peace” meant that Catholics were obliged to accept
the nation as anti-Jesuits defined it and laws that favored Protestants. Anti­
Jesuits also complained that Catholics failed to observe the rules of fair com­
petition, whether by using the clergy as whips for the Catholic Center Party
or taking advantage of their parliamentary strength to gain concessions on reli­
gious questions. Anti-Jesuitism was an attempt to neutralize the worst offend­
ers. Anti-Jesuits refused to take the actions of Catholics, and especially Jesuits,
at face value, believing their enemies were never quite what they seemed. As
Dietmar von Reeken has established for the northwest, Protestants met
Catholicism with a mixture of “open distrust” and “secret admiration.”10 In
using the language of fairness, anti-Jesuits drew on both liberal tradition and

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7 Ibid., 31–32.
8 Ibid., 3.
9 Ibid., 39.
10 Dietmar von Reeken, Kirchen im Umbruch zur Moderne: Milieubildungsprozesse im
nordwestdeutschen Protestantismus 1849–1914, Religiöse Kulturen der Moderne, no. 9
(Gütersloh: Kaiser, 1999), 347.
the Center’s own emphasis on parity, but in overlooking the advantages that they enjoyed as the confessional majority, they revealed the distorted reasoning typical of the paranoid style.

Anti-Jesuitism cannot be reduced to anti-Catholicism, however, or even antiultramontanism—opposition to the extension of the pope’s spiritual and temporal hold over Catholics.\textsuperscript{11} While Jesuits were the most effective agents of Jesuitism, theirs was not a monopoly. Jesuitism could be found in other quarters, too. For some liberal Protestants, it was evident among conservative Protestants who used their dominance of the church to discipline pastors who challenged orthodox doctrines. As August-Hermann Leugers has argued, the charges that Protestants made against Catholics echoed the criticisms they leveled, usually more moderately, against their rivals within the Protestant community: “In the realm of high politics, as in internal church affairs, polemics against Catholicism served nationalist and liberal Protestants as a means of combating conservative Protestants rather than winning over the Catholic electorate.”\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, anti-Jesuitism had relevance beyond the religious sphere. In its repudiation of Jesuit morality, it offered a code for family life; in its condemnation of Jesuit scholarship, a prescription for academic life. Anti-Jesuitism was sufficiently broad in its interests that it overlapped with many other contemporary discourses, such as anti-feminism or imperialism. Yet while it could serve as a vehicle for such concerns, at its core it was preoccupied with establishing the proper balance between freedom and authority. It emphasized the importance of individual freedom, in the realms of morality and intellectual life especially, within a framework that demanded loyalty to the nation-state and respect for the Protestant faith.

The paranoid quality of anti-Jesuitism in imperial Germany is not cited as evidence of a pathological flaw in the Protestant bourgeoisie. The paranoid style appeared in several contemporary discourses that appealed to different constituencies. Like anti-Jesuitism, these were products of religious and ethnic conflicts. With its demand for a reversal of Jewish emancipation and claims of an international Jewish conspiracy, anti-Semitism shared many of the qualities

\textsuperscript{11} For one, their constituencies were different. Catholics had a higher representation among antiultramontanes than among anti-Jesuits. See Norbert Schlossmacher, “Antiultramontanismus im Wilhelminischen Deutschland: Ein Versuch,” in Deutsche Katholizismus im Umbruch zur Moderne, ed. Wilfried Loth, Konfession und Gesellschaft, no. 3 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1991), 164–98. On the different concerns of each movement see Armin Müller-Dreier, Konfession in Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur des Kaiserreichs: der Evangelische Bund 1886–1914, Religiöse Kulturen der Moderne, no. 7 (Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser, 1998), 267.

of the paranoid style. And Catholics, not least Jesuits, adopted a similar alarmism in their attacks on socialism and Freemasonry.\textsuperscript{13}

The popularity of the paranoid style in imperial Germany is not meant to suggest that it was a German particularity either. Hofstadter’s essay draws primarily on examples from modern American political culture. Nor was anti-Jesuitism a hallmark of German state and society in the way that anti-Semitism became. Indeed, the church-state struggle known as the Kulturkampf, in which anti-Jesuitism played an important part, has been described as a European phenomenon.\textsuperscript{14} Anticlericals and anti-Catholics all over Europe were attacking Jesuits, some with more ferocity than in Germany. Anti-Jesuitism was most intense in countries where Jesuits had historically been very active, that is, in Catholic states such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France.\textsuperscript{15} Portugal expelled the Jesuits in 1910. Jesuits had suffered periodic restrictions in France and Spain in the nineteenth century and were banned entirely from Spain from 1868 to 1879 and from France in 1880.\textsuperscript{16} Jesuits had already been expelled from Italy in 1848, and Switzerland wrote a ban on the order into its constitution the same year. The Austrian Lower House voted to follow their example in the 1870s, passing bills for the order’s expulsion, or failing that, a ban on German Jesuit refugees, but was thwarted by the Upper House. In Catholic countries, anti-Jesuitism reflected the main political cleavages between right and left. Drawing on Jansenist and Gallican or Febronian traditions, liberals in France and Austria flocked to the anti-Jesuit movement, but formed part of a broader coalition. In France, they were joined by socialists; in Austria, by radical nationalists.\textsuperscript{17}

Nor does this book mean to suggest that the decades before World War I represented the high point of anti-Jesuitism in Germany or elsewhere. A better

\textsuperscript{13} On the enemies of the right see Johannes Rogalla von Bieberstein, Die These von der Verschwörung: Philosophen, Freimaurer, Juden, Liberalen und Sozialisten als Verschwörer gegen die Sozialordnung (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1978).


\textsuperscript{15} Martin Harney, The Jesuits in History: The Society of Jesus through Four Centuries (New York: The America Press, 1941), 366.


\textsuperscript{17} Protestants played a disproportionately large role in the movement in both Austria and France, but given their small representation generally, Catholics or erstwhile Catholics dominated the movement in each place. The Los von Rom movement in Austria had strong links to anti-Jesuitism, for instance, and Protestants such as Edgar Quinet and Jules Michelet were prominent in the movement in France. In neither place did the Protestant church play a strong role. The records of the Protestant church in Austria (Evangelische Kirche in Österreich, Kirchenamt A.B.) do not contain any substantial discussions about Jesuits.
case could be made for the mid-eighteenth century, when Jesuits were expelled from Portugal, France, Spain, and parts of Italy. Indeed, in 1773 Pope Clement XIV felt that hostility to the Jesuits was so great that he dissolved the order, which was not reconstituted until 1814.

Indeed, the anti-Jesuitism of imperial Germany fell short of the paranoid style in several respects. While it presumed "the existence of a vast, insidious, preternaturally effective international conspiratorial network designed to perpetrate acts of the most fiendish character," it did not see conspiracy as the motive force in history.18 Nor was it as spontaneous as the examples cited by Hofstadter. While the anti-Jesuits of imperial Germany were utterly sincere in their hostility to the Jesuits, they were not beyond exploiting it for political advantage.19 Categorized as demons or victims, the Jesuits enlivened a confessional debate normally characterized by abstract principles like Kultur and parity. The Protestant League saw anti-Jesuit agitation as a means of overcoming the political fragmentation of German Protestants and creating an effective bulwark against Catholicism, but also as an opportunity to gain new recruits and funds. For the order's defenders, the Jesuit question was an obvious one around which to rally Catholic voters, although the resolution of outstanding confessional inequities ultimately undermined the raison d'etre of the Center, which encompassed a wide variety of socio-economic interests.

Anti-Jesuits were also more realistic than most adherents of the paranoid style in setting their goals. They contented themselves with the expulsion of Jesuits from the German empire. This they achieved in the Jesuit Law of 1872, which required Jesuits to dissolve their houses in Germany, forbade members from exercising most of their religious functions, and allowed the authorities to deny residency to individual members of the order. Drawing on the anger provoked by perceptions of Catholic hesitancy in the wars of unification and the Declaration of Papal Infallibility in 1870, anti-Jesuits persuaded the Conservatives, Free Conservatives, National Liberals, and many Progressives to vote for a ban on the Jesuits, the supposed leaders of Catholic subversion. Himself skeptical about the loyalty of the empire's Catholics, Bismarck endorsed the Reichstag's demand. As the Kulturkampf abated and the "national" parties lost seats, however, the Reichstag changed its tune. From 1894 onwards a majority, composed of the Center, the Social Democrats, and regional minority parties, voted five times for repeal. Although still hostile to the Jesuits, the Prussian and imperial governments became increasingly amenable to the moderation, if not full repeal, of the law because of their reliance on the Center as a political ally, and the empire's upper house of parliament, the Bundesrat, removed some of the law's

18 Hofstadter, "Paranoid Style," 14 and 29.
19 Rogalla von Bieberstein acknowledges that c.t. can function as "a political and ideological weapon that is mobilized both in good faith and as a means of manipulation." Rogalla von Bieberstein, These von der Verschwörung, 11.
provisions in 1904. Anti-Jesuits remained convinced throughout, however, that
the law was an essential weapon in the struggle against Jesuitism and directed
directed their energies against repeal. Their efforts helped to stave off repeal until 1917,
when the implications of the *Burgfrieden* or “civil peace” and the urgent need
to boost Catholic morale overwhelmed concerns about anti-Jesuit anger.

The pragmatic approach of the Prussian government to the Jesuit Law occasion­ally made for clashes with anti-Jesuits. Geoff Eley has emphasized the dis­sonance between the goals of the imperial government and the nationalist
pressure groups that emerged in the last decades of the empire. At times, in
their fervor for foreign policy successes, in particular, these groups tried to push
the government beyond what it felt diplomatically viable. The same was true
for the Protestant League in its agitation against the repeal of the Jesuit Law.
There is no evidence that the government tried to manipulate it to its own
ends. Indeed, of all pressure groups, it had the least personal links to govern­ment, especially in its earliest decades. For this reason, the league lobbied the
government through public statements and in later decades through parlia­mentary deputies. While anti-Jesuits could draw on general hostility to Jesuits
among German Protestants, it had to grapple with the reality that the Protestants
upon whom it relied to object to repeal and the government whose support
was most crucial often had other priorities. The frustration engendered by this
discrepancy accounted in part for the paranoid quality of anti-Jesuitism in impe­rial Germany.

The anti-Jesuit movement was elastic, expanding at moments of danger, such
as in 1904, and contracting at times of relative peace. In their efforts to pass
and maintain the Jesuit Law, anti-Jesuits benefited from a pervasive hostility
to Jesuits in imperial Germany, especially among Protestants. The bookshelves
of the typical Protestant bourgeois household held several works that were crit­ical of the Jesuits. Most influential was probably Wilhelm Busch’s cartoon satire,
*Pater Filuzius*, whose eponymous Jesuit tried to persuade an elderly spinster to
bequeath him the family fortune. Satirical journals like *Kladderadatsch* and
*Simplicissimus* also featured anti-Jesuit cartoons. The Jesuit question translated
easily into several media, whether Jesuits were portrayed as characters in fiction
or figures in visual art. The Jesuits’ clerical garb, and especially their distinctive

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22 Written in 1872, it had reached a print run of thirty-nine thousand by 1894.
that it sold out at railway newstands and formed the basis for Busch’s popularity,
tricorn hat, provided an identifiable marker for political cartoons. Many more sober accounts, including ones in newspapers with large circulations, such as the *Berliner Tageblatt*, and popular German histories, supplemented these cartoons. These cultural products helped to make anti-Jesuitism part of the “common sense” of bourgeois Protestants in imperial Germany and allowed campaigners to gather significant support for the defense of the Jesuit Law. Signatures on anti-Jesuit petitions routinely ran into the hundreds of thousands and on one occasion, a repeal bill in 1890, exceeded one million. By contrast, the infamous anti-Semitic petition of 1880–1881 that demanded a ban on Jewish immigration, exclusion of Jews from the civil service and schools, and quotas in other professions amassed only 267,000 signatures.

Hostility to Jesuits and Jesuitism did not always translate into sympathy for the anti-Jesuit movement, however. Some who shared the basic precepts of anti-Jesuitism found the claims of anti-Jesuit agitators ridiculous and the provisions of the Jesuit Law excessive. Again identifying the spectral quality of anti-Jesuitism, the Jewish journalist, Maximilian Harden, felt that anti-Jesuits were pathetic: “Adults should be ashamed of themselves to believe the fairy tale, in which the sons of the great, pure, and the truly spiritual and noble Ignatius become a band of hypocrites and con men, rogues and assassins who appear as ghosts, even in the bright light of day. Is mighty Germany still afraid of a small pile of Jesuits?” Both conservative and liberal Protestants noted the gap between the Jesuits’ numbers and the acts ascribed them and worried about the law’s implications for civil rights. They complained that the law’s residency restrictions denied the Jesuits the right of all Germans to freedom of movement and that depriving Catholics of a portion of their clergy compromised their religious freedom. Some even endorsed repeal on the grounds that a legislative ban suggested that anti-Jesuits were unable to defeat their enemies in open debate. In admitting that Jesuit activity could be tolerated in Germany, they revealed a more moderate view of the Jesuit threat than anti-Jesuit agitators allowed. Some conservative Protestants went so far as to challenge the very precepts of anti-Jesuitism. If Jesuitism involved undermining true Christianity, they believed that liberals and socialists were greater culprits than Jesuits. Anti-Jesuits themselves were in part responsible for alienating potential supporters. Unwilling to address concerns about the erosion of Protestant doctrine and secularization, they offered little beyond anti-Catholicism to attract conservatives to their cause. Nor did they live up to their claims to promote an alternative, non-ultramontane Catholicism that might have appealed to liberal and national Catholics.

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24 *Die Zukunft* 3 (1912).
Ultimately, the opinions of the governments of the empire’s twenty-six states mattered most to anti-Jesuits. Through the Bundesrat, they had the ultimate power to pass and then to modify or repeal the Jesuit Law and, through each state’s administrative and police authorities, the responsibility to interpret and enforce the law. The views of the Prussian government were normally decisive. Not alone was Prussia the largest state in the empire. Its bureaucracy was also the source for most imperial officials. The Prussian king was the kaiser, and in all but one case, the Prussian minister-president was also imperial chancellor. As well as running ministries in their home state, Prussian ministers acted as imperial state secretaries with responsibility for the entire jurisdiction of the empire. Prussian and imperial officials were overwhelmingly Protestant and shared the anti-Jesuit prejudices of their fellow Protestants. The summus episcopus of the Prussian Protestant church, Kaiser Wilhelm II, called Jesuits “sons of hell” and “the devil’s brood.” After the Kulturkampf had ended, however, the need to conciliate Prussia’s large Catholic minority, found in its western provinces and in its Polish provinces to the east, led these officials to advocate a more lenient application of the law and its gradual dissolution. In this, Prussia was aided by states with substantial Catholic populations, especially Bavaria and Baden, and occasionally also Württemberg and Hessen. States with overwhelmingly Protestant populations, especially Saxony and the many small states scattered in central Germany, formed the core of support for the Jesuit Law in the Bundesrat. Although they, too, were acting in accordance with confessional demography, their stance on the Jesuit Law derived mainly from symbolic concerns. Given the paucity of Catholics in their states, the only basis for an influx of Jesuits was for the unlikely goal of mass conversion.

The states that consistently supported the law in the Bundesrat had a strong anti-Jesuit presence at home. There is no perfect index of the strength of anti-Jesuitism across the empire, but the membership rolls of the Protestant Association, Protestant League, and Old Catholics, as well as petitions against the Jesuits and individual anti-Jesuit agitators, allow an impressionistic assessment, at least. These suggest that anti-Jesuitism was strong in predominantly Protestant central Germany, especially the Kingdom of Saxony and the small Thuringian states. Anti-Jesuitism thrived on the historical associations of these regions with Martin Luther and the Reformation. It was an equally significant force, however, in confessionally mixed areas, such as the Prussian provinces of Westphalia,

25 Among the ninety most senior positions in the imperial government, Catholics held only eight, and two of these were alienated from the Roman church. Ronald Ross, Beleaguered Tower: The Dilemma of Political Catholicism in Wilhelmine Germany (Notre Dame: Indiana University, 1976), 20.

the Rhineland, and Silesia, as well as Württemberg and Hessen. In these places, the experience of daily confessional conflict among Protestants living close to Catholics inflamed anti-Jesuit feeling. Anti-Jesuitism was weakest in the overwhelmingly Protestant Hanseatic towns of the north and in overwhelmingly Catholic Bavaria.

Although the Jesuit question engaged a sizeable portion of the German population and the study of anti-Jesuitism deepens our understanding of the liberal Protestant Bildungsbürgertum, the political culture of imperial Germany, and the relations between the states, historians have awarded it little attention. Margaret Anderson noted this deficit when she called for an examination of the Jesuit Feindbild. Jesuits are virtually absent from general histories of imperial Germany, and existing analyses of anti-Jesuitism do not explore the phenomenon in any depth. Many accounts are simply attempts to refute the charges leveled by anti-Jesuits. This is especially true of those that appeared close to the time in question, although they all provide important information on the Jesuit Law. The first of these was Johannes Kissling’s study of the Kulturkampf, published in 1911. The multi-volume history of the Catholic Center Party by Karl Bachem, a member himself, includes sections on the legislative history of the Jesuit Law. While he provides an indispensable guide to the parliamentary deliberations over the law and insights into the Center’s repeal campaign, his account is compromised by a concern to defend the Jesuits against the charges leveled against them. Bernhard Duhr, a contemporary Jesuit, wrote extensively on the topic. The most popular of these works was his Jesuit Fables (Jesuitenfabeln), a work that refutes a long list of charges against the order. For his research he collected a vast amount of anti-Jesuit material, which remains in the order’s archive. A keen observer of contemporary confessional polemics, he suggestively compared anti-Jesuitism to a witch-hunt. Joseph Doyle’s more recent study of literary representations of Jesuits brings us little further than these older accounts. Conscious of the dangers of uncritical read-

28 Telling is the paucity of “Jesuits,” not to mention the complete absence of “anti-Jesuitism,” in the indexes to the major surveys of modern German history.
29 Johannes Kissling, *Geschichte des Kulturkampfes* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1911).
32 Duhr’s collection can be found under 73 in the old catalog, under Ig and Kg in the new catalog, in the Cologne archive.
33 Bernhard Duhr, *Das Jesuitengesetz, sein Abbau und seine Aufhebung; ein Beitrag zur Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit, nach den gleichzeitigen Quellen* (Freiburg: Herdersche Verlag, 1919), vi. The popular Catholic author, Alban Stolz, had used the same analogy in 1872.
INTRODUCTION

ings of anti-Jesuit texts, his analysis is confined to a repudiation of their claims. His only explanation for anti-Jesuitism is to see it as a product of ignorance and suspicion of Catholicism.\footnote{James Anthony Doyle, “The Image of the Society of Jesus in German Literature from Fischart to Hochhuth,” (Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 1976).} Works by contemporary historians are free of such apologetics. The study of the Center Party by Ellen Evans provides the best account of the political context for the imperial government’s negotiations with the Center over the law.\footnote{Ellen Evans, The German Center Party, 1870–1933: A Study in Political Catholicism (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981).} The most useful of all works on anti-Jesuitism is an essay by Friedrich Heyer that focuses on the phenomenon in the nineteenth century. The author recognized the challenge of explaining the discrepancy between the capacities of Jesuits and anti-Jesuit perceptions of them. While unable to explain the phenomenon adequately, he suggested fruitful lines of inquiry, such as the importance of nationalism.

The reasons for the neglect of anti-Jesuitism lie in both historical and historiographical developments. The decline in anti-Jesuitism after World War I and the absence of violence against Jesuits obscured the significance of the Jesuit Feindbild in imperial Germany. The relative restraint of anti-Jesuits in interactions with Jesuits also suggested that it was less important than other Feindbilder. Although violence had formed a feature of religious conflict in the past and re-emerged in the Kulturkampf and some Jesuits had been killed in France during the Paris Commune of 1870, no Jesuit died or suffered physical injury as a result of anti-Jesuitism in imperial Germany.\footnote{The Jesuits’ defenders, on the other hand, showed less restraint. In a report on 20 June 1913, the \textit{Hamburger Nachrichten} claimed that Catholics in Kamen in Westphalia assaulted Protestant pastors who had organized an anti-Jesuit meeting.} Anti-Jesuitism operated primarily at an abstract level as a critique of policies and practices. Anti-Jesuits showed little familiarity with contemporary Jesuits who had gained public prominence for their scholarship or preaching within the Catholic community and normally mentioned by name only those who violated the law.

In examining a phenomenon that split Germans on overwhelmingly confessional lines, this work confirms the importance of confessional identities in imperial Germany. Only in recent years have the depths of Germany’s confessional divisions been recognized.\footnote{Earlier exceptions are Christel Kohle-Hezinger, \textit{Evangelisch-katholisch: Untersuchungen zu konfessionellem Vorurteil und Konflikt im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert} vornehmlich am Beispiel Württembergs (Tübingen: Gulde, 1976). Etienne Frarnis did the same for Augsburg in the early modern period, \textit{Die unsichtbare Grenze: Protestanten und Katholiken in Augsburg 1648–1806} (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1991).} If the two major surveys of imperial Germany published in the 1980s by Thomas Nipperdey and Hans-Ulrich Wehler represented contrasting views, that of Nipperdey has emphatically triumphed. While Wehler assumed linear secularization and endorsed the ideological motives
behind the Kulturkampf, Nipperdey articulated many of the assumptions that informed the subsequent blossoming of research in the field: the vitality of religious belief and the centrality of confessional identity. The largely Protestant constituency of anti-Jesuitism in imperial Germany contrasted with earlier centuries and reflected the deep divisions between Catholics and Protestants at the time. But anti-Jesuitism was also a dynamic force, at times adding to these tensions by persuading Protestants that Jesuits represented in microcosm all the evils of Catholicism, at times moderating them by exaggerating these evils to such an extent that it provoked a backlash.

Helmut Walser Smith and Chris Clark have identified the main shortfall in the new wave of historiography on religion as the continued tendency to examine each confession in isolation from the other, thus neglecting the extent to which relations between the three main confessions—Protestants, Catholics, and Jews—shaped the identities of each. When addressed at all, relations between the confessions tend to be relegated to separate chapters rather than integrated into an overall assessment of identity formation. The study of anti-Jesuitism in imperial Germany is inevitably a study of the relations between Catholics and Protestants. Given the greater number of works on the Catholic campaign against the Jesuit Law, this author has chosen to focus on hostility towards Jesuits, rather than attempting to treat both sides of the Jesuit question equally. Thus, this book yields insights into Protestant anti-Catholicism rather than Catholic anti-Protestantism, which was also a reality in imperial Germany.

Not enough is known about the former phenomenon, whose significance has been noted by several senior historians. Admitting that he had previously underestimated Germany’s anti-Catholicism, Wolfgang Altgeld wrote: “Religious, cultural and political anti-Catholicism, in fact, shaped national political discussion in the German empire up to the outbreak of World War I much more deeply and weighed on it more heavily than the rising anti-Semitism, the seriousness


40 Smith points, among other things, to the Catholic pamphlet series, Flugschriften zur Wehr und Lehre, which responded to attacks from the Protestant League. Their titles alone indicate the force of their anti-Protestantism, The Boiling Blood, The Character of a Protestant Polemicist. Smith, German Nationalism, 74.
of which should by no means be discounted. 41 By contrast, anti-Catholicism in Britain has been subject to several analyses. 42

In addition to Nipperdey and Altgeld, Anderson and David Blackbourn have made important strides in addressing anti-Catholicism in Germany, as they sought to explain the relationship between Catholics' political assertiveness and experience of discrimination. Anderson has produced several incisive articles that reveal the anti-Catholic assumptions of nineteenth-century liberals in particular. Together with Kenneth Barkin, she has argued convincingly that the unquestioning acceptance by many German historians, particularly those of the Sonderweg school, of the values of nineteenth-century liberals has resulted in a skewed reading of political history. Their work suggests that once liberalism becomes valorized as progressive and Catholicism as reactionary, historians overlook the exclusionary aspects of liberalism. 43 In his seminal article, "Progress and Piety," and later in his Marpingen book, Blackbourn has emphasized the centrality of anti-Catholic prejudice to German liberalism. 44 A forthcoming book by Michael Gross also addresses the role of anti-Catholicism, including anti-Jesuitism, in mid-nineteenth-century liberalism, showing the perils of equating liberalism with tolerance and warning against imagining an ideal path for German history, had liberals continued their mid-century dominance. He insists that anti-Catholicism be seen as not only compatible with, but intrinsic to liberal principles. 45

Our understanding of anti-Catholicism has been hampered, however, by our relatively limited knowledge of Protestantism. 46 While the marginality of Catholics

46 Numerous historians have noted this deficit. See Wolfgang Schieder, "Introduction,"
in imperial Germany provoked an impressive range of monographs, the centrality of Protestantism obscured the need to investigate why and in what ways Protestantism shaped German politics and culture. The fact that secularization was more advanced within the Protestant community encouraged historians to regard the history of religion and the history of Catholicism as virtual synonyms. In addition to old studies by Bachem and Kissling, a range of newer works has provided a detailed treatment of political Catholicism. Some progress has been made in the understanding of Protestantism in the past decade. A shift to qualitative measures of religiosity has helped to show the continued relevance of Protestantism to the formation of cultural values and political attitudes. The result has been a more differentiated picture of Protestantism that emphasizes theological, political, and structural variations. The most important of these is that of Gangolf Hübinger on Kulturprotestantismus, or cultural Protestantism, which was characterized by optimism towards modernity, both in economic and cultural terms, and institutionally rooted in the Protestant Association, founded in 1863, and the Christliche Welt journal of Martin Rade. Hübinger explores the nexus of Protestant theology, liberal ideology, and Bildungsbürgertum ethos in the period after 1890. He has also illustrated the role of liberal values, such as commitment to democracy and personal autonomy, in creating hostility toward Catholicism. The Protestant League, which


47 For works on Catholicism, see the series Zeitgeschichte in Lebensbildern: Aus dem deutschen Katholizismus des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, edited by Anton Rauscher, Rudolf Morsey, and Jürgen Aretz, under the auspices of the Kommission für Zeitgeschichte, Bonn. Wehler devoted 10 pages to Catholicism, but only 8 to Protestantism in his Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 3: 1173–91.


50 See the series, Konfession und Gesellschaft, edited by Martin Greschat and published by Kohlhammer in Stuttgart and Berlin and the newer Religiöse Kulturen der Moderne, published by Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher Verlag in Gütersloh, which includes two that are particularly relevant to this study, Claudia Lepp, Protestantisch-liberaler Aufbruch in die Moderne: Der deutsche Protestantenverein in der Zeit der Reichsgründung und des Kulturkampfes, no. 3 (1996); Anne Christine Nagel, Martin Rade-Theologe und Politiker des Sozialen-Liberalismus: eine politische Biographie, no. 4 (1997).

was founded in 1886 and shared a similar ideology, but with a more popular approach, has received a comprehensive analysis by Armin Müller-Dreier, which has proven essential to this work.\textsuperscript{52}

But while much progress has been made on organizations and institutions, few historians have attempted to address the symbolic culture of Protestantism—how specific figures, sites, and slogans underpinned religious belief and confessional identity. The work done to date on what one might call Protestant cults has tended to focus on the heroes, rather than the enemies, of German Protestants. The Luther cult has attracted far more attention than any other, although Frederick the Great has also been studied.\textsuperscript{53} The recent dissertation by Kevin Cramer on the meaning of the Thirty Years' War for German Protestants and Catholics in the nineteenth century points in the right direction, in its examination of a more complex phenomenon that included experiences of victimization as well as triumph.\textsuperscript{54} It is hoped that the exploration of the Jesuit specter will add to our understanding of this symbolic culture.

Exploring both organizations and attitudes, Helmut Walser Smith's own research on the role of confessional conflict in German nationalism provides the broadest and most convincing analysis to date of confessional relations in imperial Germany, and it forms the essential backdrop to this study. He highlighted the very different understandings of the nation by Catholics and Protestants. The mainly liberal Protestants whom he examined in the Protestant League and the Los von Rom (Away from Rome) movement, which sought to convert ethnic Germans to Protestantism, infused the German nation with specifically Protestant values, which they then tried to coerce Catholics into accepting. He insists that these organizations, with their radical nationalist agenda and aggressive political tactics, were as much a part of contemporary Protestantism as the more familiar stories of the churches' support for the monarchical order and the Christian Social movement. The history of anti-Jesuitism shows, however, that concerns about Catholicism drove the churches, too, to criticize state and imperial governments. Their support for their governments was dependent on reciprocal respect for the rights of Protestants, in this case, the maintenance of the Jesuit Law. If normally more restrained in

\textsuperscript{52} Müller-Dreier, Konfession in Politik.


their rhetoric, the official bodies of the Protestant churches echoed the arguments of the more aggressive agitators in the Protestant League in the Jesuit question.

The role of the churches in anti-Jesuitism and the ideological breadth of the Protestant League show that liberals and conservatives could come together in opposition to the Jesuits. Those offended by the language and tactics of anti-Jesuitism could also come together in opposition to anti-Jesuits. In this sense, this study challenges the concept of milieus, which has become a fashionable means of approaching religion in imperial Germany. Originally seeking to explain the tenacity of voting patterns in the Weimar Republic, Rainer Lepsius defined social-moral milieus as “social units that are formed by the coincidence of several structural features such as religion, regional traditions, economic position, cultural orientation, class-specific constellations of intermediary groups.” He identified four milieus—Catholic, conservative Protestant, bourgeois Protestant and socialist—which provided institutional structures for values based on confession and ideology and which ensured a Verzweigung or pillarization in the political landscape. Anti-Jesuitism cut across these milieus, however, attracting both liberal Catholics, who have no place in Lepsius’s schema, and Protestants from both conservative and bourgeois milieus. Finding the “bourgeois Protestant” milieu too amorphous, Hübinger identified three Protestant milieus—moral, cultural, and national—in addition to the socialist one. While the moral Protestant milieu corresponds to Lepsius’s conservative one and the cultural one is exemplified by the subjects of Hübinger’s analysis, the national milieu is defined by attitudes towards the nation rather than theology or economics. In uniting liberals and conservatives behind nationalism, the last came closest to reflecting the anti-Jesuit constituency, but the notion of milieus suggests a stability that was absent from anti-Jesuitism.

The fluidity and elasticity of the anti-Jesuit constituency were closely related to its dependence on a Feindbild rather than a set of clearly enunciated principles. Despite the catastrophic mobilization of the Jewish Feindbild, surprisingly few works have been written on Feindbilder in German history, and these are suggestive rather than definitive. The editor of a volume on the medieval and early modern period, Franz Bosbach, makes the simple point that the Feindbild was a Selbstbild, in other words, the enemy provided a means of expressing one’s own identity. Echoing this claim, Lutz Hoffmann emphasizes

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56 Hübinger, “Confessionalism,” 166.

the relationship between the emergence of a national identity in the modern period—in the German case, the concept of the Volk—and the demonization of ethnic enemies, such as the French and the Jews. He also shows that apparent threats provoked continued hostility to these others and thus sustained this identity.\(^{58}\) Unfortunately, his brief account is highly abstract, does not make a distinction between the role of ethnically defined enemies and others, and does not explain the role of democratization in encouraging the mobilization of Feindbilder in domestic battles. An essay by Hans-Michael Bernhardt in a study of modern Feindbilder confirms their centrality to modern politics and notes their particular appeal in democratized societies as a means of political mobilization, but it provides only a vague psychological explanation for their emergence based on the alleged disorientation of modern life.\(^{59}\) Both these accounts suggest something pathological in German political culture that predisposed it to Feindbilder, without proving, at least for the period before Nazism, that this was actually the case. Interestingly, both historians work on anti-Semitism, which, unlike anti-Jesuitism, had its most extreme manifestation in Germany. Although also primarily a scholar of the Jewish experience, Omer Bartov has attempted to locate anti-Semitism within a broader political context. He argues convincingly that a friend-foe mentality evolved in the last decades of the nineteenth century, for which the state was partly responsible by its condemnation of minorities as Reichsfeinde or enemies of the empire. The bulk of his analysis deals with the Weimar period, however.\(^{60}\)

The work of scholars of nationalism, who have become more sensitive to the ways in which nations defined themselves against an ethnic other, has proven useful for this study of anti-Jesuitism. Exemplary in this respect is Linda Colley’s study of the emergence of a British nation as a consequence of wars with Catholic powers.\(^{61}\) The best example for Germany is Michael Jeismann’s examination of the mutual Feindbilder of the French and Germans from the period of the French Revolution to World War I. He counters claims by political scientists that the increased communication facilitated by modern technology diminished hostilities between different groups and argues that defining the nation against an other is not simply a response to a particular threat, but typical of nationalism. By highlighting the parallels between French and German

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views of the other, he shows that there was nothing pathological about the German case. Finally, he emphasizes that while hostility was often mobilized by elites for political or economic interests, it was also intrinsic to the process of self-definition.\footnote{62 Michael Jeismann, Das Vaterland der Feinde: Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich 1792–1918, Sprache und Geschichte no. 19 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992).}

This study of anti-Jesuitism echoes the claims that Feindbilder helped to define those who mobilized them. Anti-Jesuitism helped to articulate the values of the Protestant educated bourgeoisie and to boost its claims to hegemony in imperial Germany. It also suggests that Feindbilder were double-edged swords. The Jesuit Feindbild had the potential to dramatize a phenomenon and thus attract broad support, but it also had limits. Rarely was the mobilization of a Feindbild as complete and fateful as that of the Jew in the Nazi period. By definition clichéd and exaggerated, Feindbilder were open to ridicule. While the propagators of the Jesuit Feindbild could see no greater threat, its audience assessed the alleged threat from Jesuits in a context that included ideological principles, political expediency, and alternative sources of danger. Thus, the relatively peaceful international situation in 1904 made the Jesuit threat appear large; the prospect of defeat in World War I at the hands of other enemies made it seem negligible.

The examination of anti-Jesuitism, which is normally thought of as an early modern phenomenon, in a modern context reveals the extent to which Feindbilder, even religious ones, were at home in the modern era. Locating anti-Jesuitism in imperial Germany in the context of centuries-long antagonism towards the Jesuits, this study suggests that modern conditions contributed to the mobilization of Feindbilder, even those that had older roots. Firstly, the emergence of national voluntary associations and political parties, themselves a product of improved communications networks, lent a new coherence to the anti-Jesuit movement. Using its branches throughout the empire, the Protestant Association and the Protestant League were able to generate unprecedented numbers of signatures on petitions in support for their cause. Secondly, the extension of basic civil rights to all men and the temporary introduction of universal suffrage during the French Revolution created an expectation of inclusion on the part of all sections of society, such as Jews, workers, and women. Governments had to either admit them or formulate arguments to justify their continued exclusion. If governments opted for continued exclusion and found rational arguments not wholly persuasive, demonization helped to close the gap. Anti-Jesuits exploited the unsettling aspects of the Jesuit Feindbild to bolster their case for the Jesuits’ exemption from the process of emancipation enjoyed by most other German subjects.\footnote{63 For an examination of anti-Jesuitism in the context of the emergence of civil soci-}
This analysis of anti-Jesuitism aims to provide a comprehensive and imaginative explanation for the phenomenon. It makes its argument through an analysis of the Jesuit Feindbild and the legislative history of the Jesuit Law. It combines a close reading of political documents and speeches, petitions and manifestoes, as well as numerous pamphlets, with an analysis of the social, professional, and institutional structure of anti-Jesuitism to explain its meaning in imperial Germany. Chapter one examines the pre-history of anti-Jesuitism from the order’s foundation by Ignatius Loyola in 1540 in Spain to 1870, against which it is possible to measure the continuities and discontinuities in imperial Germany. It identifies the peculiarities of Jesuit iconography and the ways in which actions by Jesuits, contemporary confessional, political, and intellectual debates, and changing modes of political discourse shaped the meaning of anti-Jesuit discourse in each era. While the iconography changed little from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, this chapter argues that the rise of rationalism made the image of the Jesuit in the modern period more menacing and that democratization made anti-Jesuitism more popular and organized.

Chapter two describes how hostility to the Jesuits became crystallized in the Jesuit Law of 1872. It argues that the nationalist fervor of the wars of unification and the angry reaction to the Declaration of Papal Infallibility were crucial in creating a broad consensus in favor of banning the order. The Jesuits’ support for infallibility overwhelmed the evidence of their patriotic service in the wars. The general trend of anticlerical legislation of the 1860s and 1870s, as well as Bismarck’s anti-Catholic agenda, ensured the success of the initiative. Despite resistance by Catholics and Jesuits themselves, the law outlived the end of the Kulturkampf, because it had become emblematic of Protestant superiority. Chapter three addresses the campaign by the Center after 1890 to repeal the law. It accounts for the failure of repeal by pointing to anti-Jesuits’ interpretation of the law as a symbol of the superiority of Protestantism over Catholicism and their effective political organization. It shows how repeal bills generated a pattern of political mobilization, in which anti-Jesuit activists tried to persuade other Protestants to make confessional identity paramount in political decisions. The repeal in 1904 of a paragraph of the law reveals that the anti-Jesuits’ campaign was only a limited success, however.

The next three chapters dissect the case made against the Jesuits in imperial Germany into its three main themes—political, moral, and intellectual subversion. These rely not on legislative sources, but on the extensive pamphlet literature and journal articles generated by anti-Jesuits. Little information is available about their authors, besides those who were established scholars or...
prominent figures in the organizations associated with anti-Jesuitism. But while only a few authors can be identified a priori as liberal or conservative, their products normally reflected assumptions associated with liberalism, if only occasionally in terms that were explicit enough to deter conservatives. All their writings, even those by Catholics, were heavily indebted to Protestant views of the state and the nation.

Chapter four begins by examining the historical critique made by anti-Jesuits. Their depiction of Jesuit activities in the past was a variation on the Borussian narrative of German history, in which Jesuits, because of their alleged opposition to Protestantism, modernity, and nationalism, appeared to impede German national development. This narrative complemented the view that Jesuits acted as agents of disintegration in imperial Germany, suggesting that anti-Jesuits were unsure about the triumph of liberal Protestant values in the new state. Chapters five and six examine the moral and intellectual critiques of anti-Jesuits respectively, which relied heavily on the Protestant view that the private and public spheres should be sharply separated. In their critique of Jesuit moral theology and pastoral practice, anti-Jesuits claimed that Jesuits made inappropriate interventions in the private sphere. In this way, anti-Jesuits articulated the particular balance of authority and discipline that they themselves favored and revealed traditional views about the integrity of the family and obedience to state authority. In their critique of Jesuit scholarship and piety, anti-Jesuits complained that Jesuits failed to observe the objectivity required for the public sphere. They also emphasized their own commitment to reason, although the fantastic images and vocabulary in which they expressed their opposition to anti-Jesuitism suggested it had definite limits.

Chapter seven resumes the story of the Jesuit Law, explaining why the government finally conceded repeal in 1917. Partial repeal in 1904 was part of a broader trend of concessions to Catholics, based mainly on political considerations, but World War I was a necessary catalyst to full repeal. As in the Franco-Prussian War, Jesuit wartime service was less important than a shift in the general political situation, which now demanded confessional parity in order to sustain the war effort. Anti-Jesuits vented their anger, but their predictions of dire consequences sounded hollow in the context of the more immediate dangers faced on the battlefield.