One

INTRODUCTION

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An initial bit of explaining may be helpful to readers who are unfamiliar with Robert S. Hartman's unique and highly creative approach to value theory. In early fall of each year, the Department of Philosophy at The University of Tennessee in Knoxville is temporarily invaded by "Hartmaniacs" as they sometimes call themselves, though "Hartmaneans" is preferred, who are attending the annual meeting of the *Robert S. Hartman Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology*. Robert S. Hartman was a Research Professor of Philosophy at The University of Tennessee from 1968 until his untimely death in 1973. During that period, his thinking about values had an enormous impact on many of his graduate students and a few of his younger colleagues, who formed the *R. S. Hartman Institute* and who, with others attracted to his work, have continued over the years to apply and further develop Hartman's formalistic perspective on values.

Annual meetings of the *Institute* are held regularly at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, since this is where Hartman last taught in the United States, and his papers are in the University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, thanks to the generosity of Mrs. Rita Hartman. From 30 to 40 persons usually attend the annual *Institute* meetings. Some Hartmaniacs are philosophers, some psychologists, some business consultants, some college professors or administrators, and so on. About a third of the active members are Hartman's former students or colleagues. Many of his former students have developed flourishing consulting businesses based upon the personality test, the Hartman Value Profile [HVP], which Hartman developed. Hartmaniacs consider both the psychological and philosophical aspects of Hartman's work. Several Hartmaneans have developed prosperous investment businesses applying the intensional logic which they learned from Hartman to stock and commodities markets. Hartmaneans come from as far away as Sweden, Mexico, and Spain to attend the annual meetings.

Very few of the present faculty and graduate students in Philosophy at The University of Tennessee seem to understand what the *R. S. Hartman Institute* is all about. Each Hartmaniac is regarded, perhaps, in something

resembling the way that Nathaniel Hawthorne viewed the Transcendentalist in the early 19th Century--as a "terrible giant" who:

...makes it his business to seize upon honest travellers and fatten them for his table with plentiful meals of smoke, mist, moonshine, raw potatoes, and sawdust. He is a German by birth, and is called Giant Transcendentalist [or Giant Hartmaniac, perhaps]; but as to his form, his features, his substance, and his nature generally, it is the chief peculiarity of this huge miscreant that neither he for himself, nor anybody for him, has ever been able to describe them...[He looks] somewhat like an ill-proportioned figure, but considerably more like a heap of fog and duskiness. He shouted after us, but in so strange a phraseology that we knew not what he meant, nor whether to be encouraged or affrightened.¹

Let me try to make Robert S. Hartman, his ideas, and the members of the *Robert S. Hartman Institute* a bit less mysterious. Robert S. Hartman was a German by birth, forced to flee for his life from Nazi Germany in 1933. His fascinating autobiography, *Freedom to Live: The Robert Hartman Story*, edited by Art Ellis, was published in 1994.²

Throughout this short introduction to Hartman's formal axiology and its applications, I must greatly oversimplify. Let me begin with a few of Hartman's most important and original ideas. First, unlike most 20th-Century moral philosophers, Hartman believed that a science of values could be developed. It would be a formal science, akin to logic and mathematics, rather than a natural or empirical science, like biology and astronomy. The Axiom of this formal science is: Value is concept (or standard) fulfillment.

The meaning of this axiom, and how it applies in practice, is best understood in relation to another fundamental Hartmanian notion, the Hierarchy of Value. The Hierarchy of Value is very simple and commonsensical. It says, basically, that people are more important than things, and that things are more important than ideas or blueprints of things. Hartman incorporated these simple and obvious substantive value commitments into an incredibly powerful and profound philosophical (or scientific) system of axiology. Hartman recognized three kinds of value, intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic, which he often symbolized as I, E, and S respectively. Individual people are intrinsic values; useful things, actions, and social roles in public spacetime are extrinsic values; and conceptual constructs like mathematics, logic, moral rules, cultural conventions, institutional structures,

philosophical ideas, religious dogmas, and all thoughts as such, are systemic values. Degree of value depends on richness in properties, Hartman thought; unique persons are richer in properties than things and social roles, and things and social roles are richer in properties than ideas about them, or any ideas as such. Thus, in the hierarchy of values, people (intrinsic values) rank first; things, actions, and social roles (extrinsic values) rank next; and ideas, rules, constructs (systemic values) rank last.

How does the Hierarchy of Values relate to Hartman's basic Axiom? There are three kinds of concepts that may or may not be fulfilled—Singular Concepts or Unicepts of unique individuals, Analytic or Empirical Concepts abstracted from things, processes, actions, and social roles, and Constructed Concepts of a great variety of systemic objects and relations. Concepts or meanings are the standards by which valued objects or entities are measured. Using "thing" broadly to mean any kind of entity, we can say that: *Good* things completely fulfill their concepts; *fair* things mostly fulfill their concepts; *average* things are fifty fifty; *poor* things fulfill less than half of their meanings; and *no good* things hardly fulfill their meanings at all.

For example, a really good car has all the good-making properties that we could want in a car—a fuel-efficient engine, adequate power, an automatic transmission, cruise control, good brakes, many safety features, ample room for passengers and luggage, a stylish and pleasingly colored body, an AM-FM radio/cassette system, and so on; and everything works. A fair car has almost all of these; an average car has enough properties to get by; a poor car with very few desirable properties is very troublesome; and a no good one is a junker. A no good car can be a very good junker! If an automobile is defined as "a vehicle used for passenger transportation with its own engine," then an entity must exemplify the definitional properties of being a vehicle, being capable of transporting passengers, and having its own engine, in order to be a car at all; but if it has *only* the definitional properties, it is not much of a car. To be a *good* car, it must have all of the additional expositional properties just mentioned—and then some. Hartman thought that we can measure the goodness, fairness, poorness, or no-goodness of things by determining the degree to which they measure up to the normative set of their expositional properties.

Consider our own Singular Concepts of ourselves as unique individuals. Our intrinsic goodness consists in living up to, or being true to, the concepts that we have of ourselves. Conscience, that part of ourselves that sets standards for ourselves, is the normative core of our self-concept. We are true to ourselves, true to authentic conscience—as opposed to socially or personally distorted conscience—in varying degrees. Thus, we may fulfill,

or fail to fulfill, concepts of self in varying degrees. The Hierarchy of Value is the universal substantive normative core of conscience, Hartman thought. Some Hartmaniacs today give this insight an interesting empirical twist and argue that the long course of human evolution selects for individuals who put people first, things, acts, and roles second, and ideas and constructed forms third; and evolution selects against individuals who do not accept and live by this natural value hierarchy.³ Extensive cross cultural studies of human subjects in many cultures provide powerful support for this evolutionary hypothesis,⁴ but how can such things be measured?

The degree to which individual persons, and groups of persons, exhibit the Hierarchy of Values can be measured precisely with one of Hartman's most fruitful discoveries—a personality test based upon the Hierarchy of Values—The Hartman Value Profile or [HVP]. Hartman discerned that the structure of a person's values is the real key to the structure of that individual's personality; and he developed the HVP to measure the degree of conformity to or deviation from the Hierarchy of Values.

The HVP measures this conformity or deviation in two different dimensions, Self and World. To what extent do people value themselves in their total uniqueness, or in their possessions, products, actions, and roles, or in their cognitive or conceptual capacities? To what extent do they value such things in their own social, physical, and conceptual environment, and to what extent do they value them in other people? To answer these questions, test subjects are asked to rank from best to worst two sets of eighteen carefully constructed items that manifest the Hierarchy in both the Self and World dimensions.

The three basic items in the Hierarchy (persons, things, and constructs) may be combined with one another in inexhaustible variety, both positively and negatively. Hartman called positive combinations that enhance value "Compositions;" and negative combinations that detract from value are "Transpositions." For example, newborn babies may be given a number that matches the number on their mothers' identification bracelets; and the result is the positive combination of the baby, an intrinsic value— I , or $\aleph_1$, with a number, a systemic value— S , or n . This combination can be symbolized as I^n ; and it has the numerical value in transfinite set theory of $\aleph_1^n$. Or convicts (intrinsic values) may be given both numbers (systemic values) and striped clothing (extrinsic values— E , or k) to debase their worth. This can be symbolized as I_{E_k} ; value combinations can be endlessly complex. The eighteen items on both Self and World parts of the HVP differ from these illustrations, but they represent all possible positive and

negative binary combinations of basic intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic values. The HVP measures the test subject's rankings against the ideal or objective rankings dictated by the system.

Ideally, test subjects should manifest the objective value order rankings in both Self and World dimensions. Deviations in either or both dimensions indicate personality and performance deficiencies; and if these are sufficiently severe, deviations are diagnostic of particular mental illnesses or personality disorders. For example, persons who consistently regard and treat other persons (intrinsic values) as mere things (extrinsic values) are psychopaths, or schizophrenics; those who are well developed in the Self dimension but poorly developed in the World dimension are "atychal" or accident prone; and persons poorly developed in the Self dimension have low self-esteem that may manifest itself in drug and alcohol abuse, or in excessively docile, dependent, or conventional behaviors.⁵ Evolution selects for development and balance in both Self and World dimensions.⁶

Since the HVP was developed, it has been, and continues to be, extensively verified and used for many interesting purposes. In the hands of clinical psychologists, it is an invaluable tool for diagnosis, for setting therapeutic goals, and for measuring therapeutic progress. Clinicians and counselors use it to determine compatibility or incompatibility and weaknesses and strengths in social relations like marriage or employment. Studies of jail and prison inmates have identified personality types likely to engage in criminal behaviors like murder, rape, and pedophilia. Business consultants use the test to determine if potential employees match job descriptions and requirements, or whether present employees should be moved or promoted into new positions, and in designing training programs to compensate for employees' weaknesses. In the medical setting, the HVP is used to measure personality and value changes associated with serious or even terminal diagnoses and illnesses. During 1995, the test is being employed to study terminally ill patients who have had near death experiences, with patients not having these experiences serving in control or contrast groups. Patients who have had unexplained spontaneous remissions from terminal illnesses will also be studied. These studies should reveal something very important about the personalities and values of persons who find themselves in such circumstances. The potential for putting the HVP to good uses is limited only by the human imagination! More detailed information about the Hartman Value Profile and many other aspects of Hartman's work is available in the book on formal published in 1991 by a number of Hartmaniacs titled *Forms of Value and Valuation: Theory and Applications*, edited by Rem B. Edwards and John W. Davis.⁷

Needless to say, Hartman's work is also extremely fruitful in dealing with philosophical approaches to value theory. The emphases, strengths, and weaknesses of philosophical ethical theories may now be assessed and measured, given the conceptual framework of formal axiology. For example, Kant and other deontologists overvalue the systemic (rules); the Stoics undervalued the extrinsic; and almost all philosophers undervalue concrete individual persons in favor of abstractions like pleasures, desires, volitions, rationality, or constructs like society, the state, truth, beauty, duty for duty's sake, and so on.

Hartman promised that a logical calculus of values could be developed from his seminal ideas; but his tragic premature death prevented him from fulfilling that promise. In recent years, Hartmaniacs have made giant strides in carrying this project to completion. One of the most controversial features of Hartman's formal axiology is his correlation of the Hierarchy of Values with transfinite mathematics and set theory. Intrinsic values, persons, have a non-denumerable infinity of properties, Hartman argued, so their characteristic number is Aleph-sub-one ($\aleph_1$); extrinsic values, things, roles, and so on, have a denumerable infinity of properties, so their characteristic number is Aleph-sub-zero ($\aleph_0$), although this becomes k (for finite but indeterminate) in Frank G. Forrest's development of the formal axiological calculus; and conceptual constructs have a finite number of properties, so their characteristic number is n . When rules of inference in transfinite mathematics are brought to bear upon combinations of these numbers, a calculus of value results that can be used to determine, among other things, which choices and courses of actions will bring about the most (or the least) value. An applied value calculus using transfinite mathematics was finally worked out by Frank G. Forrest, an exceptional Hartmaniac, and published in 1994 in his book entitled *Valuometrics[®]: The Science of Personal and Professional Ethics*.⁸

Hartmaniacs are now assessing the strengths and the weaknesses of this approach, as the essays in Part II of this book will illustrate. An alternative finitistic calculus of values, also centered on the Hierarchy of Value, involves the mathematics of quantum wave mechanics. This calculus was developed recently by Dr. Mark A. Moore. His article, "A Quantum Wave Model of Value Theory," is published in Part II.

Hartmaniacs are making steady progress in the development of formal axiology. Soon we will know whether it is all just smoke, mist, moonshine, raw potatoes, sawdust, fog, and duskiness—and whether we should be encouraged or affrightened.

ENDNOTES

1. Nathaniel Hawthorne, *The Works of Nathaniel Hawthorne*, Vol. II, (New York: Houghton & Mifflin, 1882), p. 224.
2. Robert S. Hartman, *Freedom to Live: The Robert Hartman Story*, ed. by Arthur Ellis, (Amsterdam - Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1994).
3. See: Leon Pomeroy and Arthur R. Ellis, "Psychology and Value Theory," p. 298, and Leon Pomeroy and Richard Bishop, "Behavioral Axiology: Cross Cultural Study of Values," pp. 315-318, 325-326, in Rem B. Edwards and John W. Davis, eds., *Forms of Value and Valuation: Theory and Applications*, (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991).
4. Pomeroy and Bishop, "Behavioral Axiology: Cross Cultural Study of Values."
5. Pomeroy and Ellis, "Psychology and Value Theory," pp. 300-309.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 298.
7. Rem B. Edwards and John W. Davis, eds., *Forms of Value and Valuation: Theory and Applications*, (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991).
8. Frank G. Forrest, *Valuometrics*: The Science of Personal and Professional Ethics*, (Amsterdam - Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1994).