1 Introduction

The problematic rivalry between (or among) the siblings (2, 3 or 7, where 7 means several) is a common narrative in the myths of Indonesia and New Guinea (Seixas, 2010). Siblings should be considered as lineages or lineages-to-be that have the same origin or ... have had the same origin imposed in a certain moment in time. In a 'status' society, lineages develop through the attachment of new members: women and their offspring, slaves, subordinates, or adopted members ... and, eventually, by including other families or lineages as a whole. This latter possibility requires a duality, even a diarchy that establishes the 'older' and the 'younger' siblings. It is possible to imagine (through an inference from the present-day rituals like weddings, metaphors of that relation), that this diarchy is not a simple one but rather a complex net of duties and rights, which establish, in some cases, the dominance of a side, and, in other cases, the inversion of that dominance.

In terms of social structure, the diarchy that divides power and authority, relating to the secular and sacred, also overlays the siblings' duality. Furthermore, the language itself, which is based on a genealogy of lexical parallel structures, crosscuts those different dualities. Rituals (particularly weddings and funerals) are often embedded in a kind of ‘war of words’ ritual language (Van Engelenhoven, 2008). This war of words performs those dualities, which reflect the open-ended negotiation process of those diarchies. Even war (‘funu’ in Timor-Leste) is, in many cases, conceived as a ritual war: in a sense, a way to get to terms with the dualities as part of a unitary imagination: for instance, by trying to turn the ‘Other’ into a young sibling from the same origin.

We need to raise a set of questions; could it be that all the discourses addressing the ‘Other’, even the political ones that, in Timor-Leste, have the State as their origin, are still part of, or resonate with, the ‘war of words’ of the ritual language? Are political discourses today conceivable as a metaphor for the rivalry of siblings in the myth of origin? And what may they represent? Could it be...
the times immemorial cultural conflict problem of everything between tradition and modernity, as, in the case of Timor-Leste, between the old siblings/the ones of the land, and the young siblings/the newcomers/the ones from the sea? Are political discourses a way to solve the problem of how the ‘Other’ from overseas is transformed (or not) into a ‘young siblings’ from the same origin? Can the new ‘young siblings’ who emerge in a globalization context like China, ASEAN, CPLP, Pacific Forum, or the Commonwealth, be included within this framework? If so, could it be that Timor-Leste is now continuing its endless search for what we refer to as a ‘New Overseas Younger Sibling’? Could it be that some countries, or even international regions, are imagined as possible Younger Siblings?

For elaborating further on this research, we consider that translation, and, particularly, cultural translation, is a conceptualization that should be brought to the fore. This research proposal depends on a culture in which the past is understandable as layers that become part of the present: diachrony turns into synchrony and patterns of translating the past into the present are always there as ‘charter myths’: as the proper ways to do things. Therefore, in the next section, we will focus on culture of translation, and culture as translation, as the core tradition in Timor-Leste, in order to understand how past stories emerge in present-day politics.

This chapter has four sections: first, we will present the conceptual framework of anthropology as cultural translation. Thereafter, we will demonstrate the case study of Timor-Leste as a pertinent ground of action. Followed by this, we will scan the story of the several ‘Otherings’ over time, and their relationship with unitary imaginations. In the last section, we present the ecumenic ambition of Timor-Leste through its political role in times of globalization, as a quest for ‘New Overseas Younger Sibling(s)’.

2 Anthropology as Cultural Translation

Following Derrida, to conceive culture as translation, and the world as cultures in continuous translation, is, probably, the only way of overcoming the two human curses: imperialism and continuous war through cultural clashes. The paradigm of Culture as Translation rejects the unilateral translation of the Others, turning the dialogic into the root itself of the paradigm. It implies that the breaches of culture are for internal and external interpretation but, more than that, the quest for elements and cultural complexities in each culture reflects these breaches, once it is assumed that culture is a translation dynamic conceived as the core of Human Culture. Culture as Translation is also a form of vigorous struggling for a ‘Politics of Peace and Hope’, in new geopolitics of ‘Dialogue and Alliance of Cultures and Civilizations’. Therefore, social sciences.
The endless search for new (overseas) younger brother(s)? (and particularly Anthropology and Sociology) have a new loci, neither the analysis of mere differences, nor the study of similarities but, instead, the focus is on relativity by translation. In other words, Social Sciences are meant to describe the problematic of conviviality as structure and cultural translation as the dynamic of societies and cultures (Seixas, 2010).

The idea of Translation has already a non-underestimated tradition in Anthropology, more evident in interpretative and post-modern trends. Anthropological science and its translating cultural regimes were, in fact, conceived through these trends, as in the center of western politics (Said, 1978; Clifford, 1997). Translation, both as problem and tool, is at the core of anthropological thinking since the linguistic turn in Anthropology, when culture became a network of shared signs and meanings. Since then, Anthropology has become a process of writing cultural dynamics, and the anthropologists themselves mainly writers (Geertz, 1989; Clifford & Marcus, 1986). In fact, throughout the last decades, the scattering of anthropological thinking in cultural studies, feminist and gender studies, as well as race, and post-colonial studies, are evidence both of the relevance of the political problem of translation, and of different perspectives, and perspectives towards perspectives, as methodology – in short, multiple translation, in cultural analysis.

Translation is core to definitions of culture. It is an open process, understandable as ‘diasporas and counter-diasporas’ (Hall, 2003), as ‘Multi-sited narratives’ (Marcus, 1995), as ‘Travel’ (Clifford, 1992 & 1997), as ‘contact zones’ (Pratt, 1991), as ‘disjunctures and conjunctures’ (Appadurai, 2004), etc. As a result, identity is also increasingly becoming understandable as ‘frontier’ and ‘in-betweenness’ (Hall, 2003), as ‘mediation’ and ‘hybridism’ (Bhabha, 1994), as cultural brokerage (Hannerz, 1996), in which individuals and groups see themselves as in between at least two conflicting as well as ambiguous sets of values. This leads to a model of, as well as a model for, culture defined through ‘third space’ (Lefebvre, 1974) or ‘other space’ or heterotopy (Foucault, 1986): as a ‘bridge space’ (Del Valle, 1997), as ‘third cultures’ (Featherstone, 1999), as ‘syncretism’ (Cannevacci, 1996), as ‘cosmopolitanism’ (Hannerz, 1996), etc.

Translation is thus, for many reasons, a ‘metaphor of contemporary times’ (Ribeiro, 2005) and Anthropology is part of the problem in the translated wor(l)ds (Ingold, 1994) we construct over time, being necessary to focus on the meanings of ‘Cultural Translation’ (Asad, 1986; Jordan, 2002).

3 Timor-Leste: Culture of/as Translation

Firstly, we have to question what cultural translation is. In a simple way, we may say this research states that it is worth looking for translations (construction of relativities), rather than looking for what the differences are from one
culture to another (construction of singularities) or what is common to several cultures (construction of similarities). Therefore, instead of attaining to a particular singularity in writing cultures, Anthropology should rather have an ecumenic gaze (focusing on an inhabited realm of differences and cultural exchanges), and look for anthropological structures or structures of difference (the otherings and its dynamics), which are the basis of any cultural process. In another text, five theoretical perspectives on cultural translation were presented: Anthropological, the Cultural Studies, the Translations Studies, the Cognitive Studies and, finally, a tradition of Culture as Translation (Seixas, 2010).

Cultural translation is communication. This means locating something in common between two or among several persons/families/lineages. Once it becomes impossible to find something in common without a mediation (a medium and a message), communication is always intermediation and negotiation. Thus, cultural translation is intermediation. This means inserting someone/something as a third part between two, or among several persons/families/lineages, to introduce a different form of a kind of flowing. It means that usually a ‘translation artifact’ is needed (Seixas, 2011a & 2011b). This ‘translation artifact’ role may be played by several empirical elements (a stone, an animal, a cloth, oral and written discourses, and so forth), which symbolize a bridge and a compromise between parts, for unity. The third part is the cultural focus of the ‘translations artifact’ and what it represents (meanings about gestures, movement, elements, language, architecture, international agreements or any semiotic complex), and this is complexified throughout time being itself in translation, constantly adding new meanings to old topologies of culture (Seixas, 2011a).

The main general presupposition of this chapter is that cultural diversity and unity in Timor-Leste could be understandable through the central idea of translation: Translation as core heritage in Timor-Leste (Seixas, 2007, 2007a, 2010). Main references to this analysis are, firstly, James Fox’s school and its focus on Dualism in Southeast Asia. Sherman Forman, Brigitte Clamagirand, Elizabeth Traube, Dionisio Babo Soares, Andrew MacWilliam, Tom Therik and other disciples of Fox are main references for this proposal. Furthermore, the idea of translation concerning Timor-Leste, in one way or another, appears in texts of other authors such as Henri and Maria Olimpia Campagnolo, Aone Engelenhoven, Daniel Simião and Paulo Castro Seixas. Below, we highlight the existence of a grammar translation method, and characterize some of the structures of translation built on ethnographic arguments. Hence, in the next section we will focus on specific ‘anthropological structures’ or ‘structures of difference’ in Timor-Leste.
Translation is central in an ethnolinguistic sense, either on an inter-ethnic, or an intra-ethnic scale. In the macro-scale, the 32 ethnolinguistic groups in Timor-Leste relate to one another through auto- and hetero-classifications, which has in itself a pertinent cultural significance. On another scale – district; ethnic; clanic; knua – language is also important, as well as an ethnographic map of territorial and kinship processual classification. Different language status (ritual language; common intra-ethnic language; vehicular inter-ethnic language; national language; commercial language; modernity language; international language ...), grammatical convergence in multilingual social contexts, and social language performances (depending on social situational variables) are very important aspects.

Diglossia, Lexical Parallelism, Multilingualism, Sprachbund, Language Status and Performances are central aspects to this concern, but all these aspects must be related to territorial references, social relations, and cultural norms and ideologies.

Translation is central, in a social sense, both in an intra-ethnic, and on an inter-ethnic scale. Van Wouden, followed by James Fox, focused his attention on the pertinence of alliance processes in Southeast Asia as central social rituals through which different societies could be compared. A central issue is the existence of an extensive dual social classification, which is comparable in different societies. On a macro-level analysis, several dualities may be considered: a) the mountain (foho), vs. plain lands (tetuk) where towns/civilizations are grounded; b) the East (sunrise lands) where people are near to the sacred icon, vs. the West (loromonu – sunset lands) where people are near to the sacred land (Ramelau); c) South side (taci-feto – female-sea), and north side (taci-mane – male sea), as central identifications. Regarding a micro-level analysis, the following needs to be taken into consideration as central identifications: a) life-cycle rituals from birth until death (from earth and back); b) marriage-alliance rituals (understood as the most important by Van Wouden), and mortuary rituals (understood as the most important by Forman); c) wife-giver and wife-taker clans; d) the feminine and the masculine half of

**TABLE 4.1 Translation in a linguistic sense**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro level:</th>
<th>Micro level:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– Auto and hetero ethnic classifications</td>
<td>– Grammatical Convergence in multilingual contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Auto and hetero territorial mapping</td>
<td>– Social language performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and classification</td>
<td>– Different Language Status</td>
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</table>
Thus, life-cycle, kinship, kingship, and territorial positions and over-positions are understandable through a complementary dualism, balancing power and authority, secular and sacred poles, which are central aspects of concern.

Translation is central in a strict cultural sense, both in an intra-ethnic and on an inter-ethnic scale. Forman referred to that exchange as symbolic, ideological, and pragmatic for the idiom of life, a core issue for the understanding of culture in Timor-Leste. On a macro level, there are a number of ‘universes of meaning’ which seem to crosscut Timor-Leste's cultures, and through which people are able to understand themselves and others. These ‘structures of translation’ are in the form of myths: understanding the relation between Earth and Sky; the earth-as-the-world (raiklaran) and its partition; the crocodile (avô) travel; the center (laran; hun) of the land; and the elder and younger siblings and their significative travel. There are a number of myths on a micro-scale such as the origin of each clan; the stories about the clan land (rai); what is said (and what cannot be said) in each life-cycle rite (birth, marriage, death); and what the sacred officiants’ (matandók) say in particular rituals (e.g. illness or situations of crime). These myths are also ‘universes of meaning’ which enable each person to be socially engaged, and have the power for social and cultural translation, although not everyone has the authority to perform the translation itself. Therefore, remembering and forgetting, spoken and unspoken wor(l)ds, day-by-day rumors and sacred myths, are all central aspects.

Staging translation as a main hypothesis, language, territory, social relations and cultural ideologies are connected in a kind of prismatic cultural configuration. At the same time, this enhances several distinct potential belongings, which are competences/possibilities to understand (and to be engaged with) a) a particular clan; b) alliances between clans; c) ethnolinguistic groups;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro level:</th>
<th>Micro level:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mountain (foho) vs. plain lands (tetuk)/towns/civilization</td>
<td>Life-cycle rituals, from birth till dead (from earth and back);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East (sunrise lands), vs. West (loromonu – sunset lands);</td>
<td>Marriage-alliance rituals and mortuary rituals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South side (taci-feto – female-sea) and north side (Taci-mane – male sea)</td>
<td>Wife-givers and wife-taker clans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>feminine and masculine part of the clan; women and men; brothers and elders</td>
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The endless search for new (overseas) younger brother(s)?

Table 4.3 Translations in a strict cultural sense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro level:</th>
<th>Micro level:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– Earth and Sky relation myths;</td>
<td>– each clan origin myth;</td>
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<tr>
<td>– the earth-as-the-world (raiklaran) and</td>
<td>– the stories about the clan land (rai);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– its partition myths;</td>
<td>– what is said (and what can not be said) in each life-cycle rite (birth, marriage, dead);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– the crocodile (avô) travel myth;</td>
<td>– what the sacred officiants (matandók) say in particular rituals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– the center (laran; hun) of the land myths;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>– the elder and young brother</td>
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</table>

d) social contexts (e.g. districts) with several ethnolinguistic groups; e) nation or nationalism; and so forth. Nevertheless, the feature of ‘traditional’/oral Timorese culture contextualizes all these cross-cultural and historical translations in a specific way, hence the coming of ‘modernity’/written-urban culture has presented critical challenges. Continuity and change and all consequent hybridisms are known outputs of the colonial contact but became more complex in a post-colonial context. Modernity in Timor-Leste produced, firstly, a core urban brokerage area (Manatuto-Dili) with the Timorese elite trained in the Soibada College (Manatuto) and engaged in colonial Portuguese administration and army (in Dili); secondly, political parties such as Fretilin, and afterwards, an army of its own – Falintil. Then, in the 1999 referendum, the massacre and the international intervention brought Timor-Leste to the global brokerage arena, which may be interpreted as an intermezzo of the cultural translations as traditional-oral Timorese processes. Nevertheless, since 2002, all these ancestral structures of translation became again fully active, and modernity(ies) – the colonial times; the Fretilin/Falintil; the UN transitional period; the several counter-diasporas – interpreted each other and became interpreted through those ancestral structures. The crisis of 2006 was the peak of this trend. It can be understood as clashes among differences, which interpreted each other, meaning that the core problems (besides oil and other foreign interests) are the structures and the grammatic of translation itself (Seixas, 2007a). There were too many modernities and, at the same time, tradition(s) still was the language of the majority. Funu (war) also has been a translation dispositive which both precedes and accompanies words themselves. Violence is not bad in itself and needs to be interpreted as a way of restructuring the grammatical structures of translation by the effect of these prismatic traditions and clash of modernities.
Anthropological research should be understood as a useful tool to clarify the complexities referred to previously, as well as the prismatic war between the ‘traditional’ majority and the ‘modern’ minorities. We propose that anthropological research could bring words for a lost in translation time and this could enhance new translation possibilities, both in a diachronic and in a synchronic axis.

Translation is central in a diachronic sense. Historical oral translation processes, since the Wehali empire and Luca kingdom (Tetum), Dili and Manatuto (Portuguese) including other post-colonial attempts at creating a rai-klaran (Aileu through Maubere denomination and Manatuto through Kafir denomination) (Seixas, 2006a), represent very important quests for an origin, a center, a source (hun), which explains life itself and legitimates social and cultural order. Since the 1970s, this historical oral order has been challenged by several modernities. The modern bureaucratic written State order (with its ideological counter-diasporic differences) does not explain life, and doesn't have to, having a completely different way of conceiving social and cultural order. Also, although the modern messengers are a minority and conceive themselves as democratic, they seem to forget (or at least to underestimate) the way of thinking of the majority. Consequently, the time gap of the transition (1999–2002) was expected to be compensated for by the ‘Timorisation of the independence time’, yet, this hasn't been the case. The modern order did not fulfill the ‘translation processes’, and the links between ancestral contexts and Dili as the new capital have been made instead throughout families and their networks. There is a quest for these diachronic translation processes, to which this chapter responds anthropologically.

The synchronic of translation in traditional oral cultures depends on the interpretation of the diachronic sense. For instance, if a man wants to marry a woman and there is no known relation between both clans, it is necessary that the katuas (elders) evoke memory in order to see if there is any obstacle (meaning if there was a murder that included persons from both clans). Therefore, diachronic translation precedes synchronic translation in the oral traditional order, although this doesn't happen in the modern state bureaucratic order. The invention or discovery of a middle ground is required to create situations for the encounter of the synchronic opposites, and there should be an ancestral reference to legitimate prospective action. Encounters between elders and youngers, between the feminine and masculine of a clan, between wife-giver and wife-taker clans, between ethnolinguistic groups, between regions; all are of central importance to reactivate translation processes. For anthropologically understanding these processes in fieldwork, we should be able to promote...
some of those encounters because translations are more than structures, they are performative social and cultural actions.

In order to understand how state politics is part of a synchronic translation process, which includes elements of a diachronic one, a proposed history of identity and difference in Timor-Leste should be presented, supported by bibliographic research, as well as oral history collected through fieldwork. In the following section we will present the several ‘Otherings’ and how they were the basis for the unitary imaginations in Timor-Leste history.

4 History of Timor-Leste as a Search for Younger Siblings: The ‘Otherings’, Unitary Imaginations, and the Ecumenic Ambition

A culture is always a ‘structure of difference’ or an ‘anthropological structure’ (Seixas, 2008). This means that there is always a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ to be found. Although there may be several ‘Others’ and thus several structures of difference as a kind of ‘cultural formation’, it is expected that in each era, a particular structure of difference is highlighted.

The Timorese ‘Otherings’, the anthropological structures, which present the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, were built because of Timor-Leste being the center of a confluence of different cultural regions as well as a consequence of centuries of colonization. We state that the cultural memory of all these anthropological structures is active in present times, and that translation plays a central role in these processes enhancing a plurality of meanings. An anthropological history of the ‘Otherings’ in Timor-Leste is needed for exploring generative important meanings, which support the socio-ideological framework of present times. Anyway, we need to consider that Timor-Leste was colonized at least four times. The presence of relevant ‘Others’ resulted in generative consequences in the present sociocultural and political-institutional framework, meaning that each clash created some particular ‘Othering/s’.

Timor-Leste was (and still is) in between two cultural regions: On the one hand, taken at large as Asia and the Pacific, and in a more regional sense, Indonesia and Melanesia; and, on the other, in a Timorese sense, Austronesian ethnolinguistic groups and Papuas ethnolinguistic groups. This ‘in-betweenness’ of the island of Timor was already referred to, both in historical terms (Wallace, 2015), and in present times, as a ‘Clash of Civilizations’ (Gunn, 2001). Besides,

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1 We use ‘cultural formation’ whilst considering the Marxist concept of social formation, meaning the complex of several modes of production. Although, a particular one is highlighted.
in this in-betweenness, China was, and still is, of great importance to that particular region, and, in a certain moment of history, perhaps, so was the Mongol empire. With the coming of Europeans to the region as a long trend situation, Europe became, in a way, the third cultural region to be taken into consideration in a generative narrative of present times in Timor-Leste. Furthermore, both Europeans (Portuguese), and Africans came to Timor-Leste complexifying the cultural exchange of the inhabited space (the ecumene): Timor-Leste was therefore always a kind of global window.

Although Timor-Leste may be considered as fragments of differences emphasized by the plurality of ethnolinguistic realities (around 32 languages and dialects), over time there were several attempts at unity in reaction to ‘Otherings’. In more recent times, these attempts have the Nation as a referent. A nation, following western dogma, is an “invention of [modern] tradition” (Hobsbawn, 1990) based on “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1992). Timor-Leste is a country where territorial integrity is fragile. It became a colony in 1914 and only at the end of the colonial period, did the idea of a nation seem real, when a generation of Timorese began school education, and were able to “imagine” Timor as a nation (Taylor, 1999). For others, the idea of a nation developed when the first group of Timorese was enlisted in the Portuguese Armed Forces. This perception was reinforced when FRETILIN deserted in October 1975 (Gunn, 2001, p. 22). Furthermore, Timor-Leste was only able to “imagine” itself as a nation after the Indonesian invasion, and could not see itself as involved in it (Anderson, 1993). Timor-Leste was colonized for only sixty or seventy of the 400 years of Portuguese occupation. It was a fragile colonialism in which the colonial administration coexisted with a pluralism of local cultures (Thomaz, 2000, p. 34). In this scenario, it is still possible to follow the trail of inventions of tradition through imagined communities related to a history of nations. This enables us to follow the different attempts to create a territorial integrity, or the (re)production of ethnicities during colonial and neocolonial periods. Indeed, the “convergences and divergences” (Campagnolo, 1992), resulting from those imagined ethnicities, and also from the ‘nation’ that goes on being imagined, configure the current challenge for the entry into the 21st Century.

Although, on the one hand, it is possible to trace the imagined ethnicities and the imagined genesis of the nation as oral memory, and, on the other hand, as written memory of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the main question in the construction of the Timorese Nation and State probably is not exactly whether East Timor is a Nation, but what types of Nation and State are (want to be and can be) created in East Timor. A nation can be created having as its basis an abstraction, supported by a “hegemony”, legitimated by the power of state administrative organs. In this way, the myth of the nation
is (re)produced without a concrete historical density – part of the work that was carried on by the UN, particularly from 2000 to 2002 (Seixas, 2003). Yet, a nation can also be created by accepting plural societies and assuming its almost immemorial historical density, which is, obviously, a greater challenge. This important choice, which does not exclude the “or and also” possibility, may be understood as a kind of historical “ritual process” (Turner, 1974), or a “broadening ritual dispositiv e” (Augé, 1994). Following the post-colonial history of Timor-Leste will reveal the arguments for understanding the chosen path. By analyzing the results of the fieldwork that has already been done, a clear balance between these two positions can be demonstrated:

Timorese consciously grasp the invention of the new Nation’s tradition (the origin is generally said to be 1974–75), and the imagined community of the “Timor Oan” (the offspring of Timor). This current expression replaces “Maubere People” (“Povo Maubere” in Portuguese), which stopped being used in the postcolonial period. Although, the strength of a divided dimension (which is not verbally expressed, but is definitely prevalent both in actions and languages) remains, even, as a sort of “Nativism” (Parry, 1994), or a “return to rituals” strategy.

The Timorese Nation may be considered both through its invented tradition processes and its imagined communities, and through the Timorese divisions/ethnicities with its own invented traditions and imagined communities. These two processes, concomitant with the current post-colonial period, are crossed by “universes of meaning”, such as the colonialist memory, the resistance memory, the transnational modernization, the diaspora experience, the quasi-nativism, the economical neocolonialism, postcolonial deconstructivism; in a constant temporal serendipity between constructing/inventing the future and looking to/supported by the past. The main argument that follows is that there were five great attempts of unitary imagination over Timor, whereas an ethnic dichotomy (beyond plural ethnic imagination) was always present, having resisted the defeat of unitary imaginations. In all cases, the relation between outsiders and insiders is at stake.

These inside-outside relations are evident in traditional myths (like the myth of the center or laran or hun or rai-klaran – previously analyzed by Fox; the myth of the Crocodile, and the myth of the older and the younger sibling – referred by Traube, Hohe and Gomes) that cross-cut Timorese society from East to West. These myths are not just stories, but frame the social and political thinking which serves to create perspectives and to take positions and support decisions in present times as ‘charter myths’. These three stories are well known in many areas of Timor-Leste, although a thorough analysis of the areas where the story is known as well as its variants is still to be done. All of these stories
reveal the problem of the relation between insiders and outsiders as well as its possible outcomes. Following, we will briefly present the three stories.

The world (rai-klaran) is, also, the “middle-of-the-earth” or the “center-of-the-earth” (rai + klaran), and is always in motion, depending on the scale we are using: the clan, the village, the country or even the planet. And, depending on who we are, where we are, and what the symbolic referent is, a translation itinerary is constituted. The idea that Timor (the entire island) is identified with center-earth and with the planet itself derives from a legend that says that the first island was like a large, round, full moon. Over time, pieces of this moon were separated and gave rise to the other nations of the world, while what remained was the current island: Timor. Because Timor can be understood as “the mother-of-all-nations” or the center-of-the-earth, it always allows for an interpretation in relation to any contact that Timor-Leste has with the outside. Such a contact is always understood as the return of a “younger sibling”, obviously implying an acceptance of the “older sibling” (Seixas, 2006, pp. 465–466).

A crocodile who dreams of growing up is trapped in scalding sand, almost dying: in ‘undifferentiation’. A child appears and helps it, putting it back into the swamp. Reciprocity takes place through the exchange of dreams when the crocodile offers to take the boy on a journey over the sea, as this was the boy’s great dream. We know from the first two sentences of the myth that the crocodile that lived in the swamp dreams of growing to ‘have a phenomenal size’, the dream of full ‘undifferentiation’. Thus, the ritual journey that is processed is full of signs of tension: the undifferentiation of the ‘wild’ and ‘cannibal’ that the crocodile represents constantly threatens the possibility of human existence, and, therefore, of culture and peace that the boy represents. It is well known that the dreams of the boy and of the crocodile are different; and yet, both agree to make the journey. It is thus an agreement and a reciprocity filled with tension between the new (the boy) and the old (the crocodile), between the human possibility and the cannibal savagery, between the culture/the difference and the undifferentiation. In fact, the myth refers to a long journey in which the little boy accepts riding the crocodile on the water, an obvious metaphor for a fragile human existence, at the beginning of culture (boy) on the dual undifferentiation (in the beginning, the crocodile is like the shadow of the first undifferentiation of the flood or of the swamp, and in the end, of water). The crocodile dominates the first undifferentiation but the boy is still dependent on the crocodile – at least until its death. In the myth, basically, the crocodile, old and fragile, desists from eating the child who is on its back, preferring to die. The crocodile becomes a founding sacrifice because its body is transformed into the island that is Timor, enabling the child’s existence and the continuation of his dream as a possibility for a social and cultural stable
construction. This myth says a lot about the ecumenic ambition of Timor (the old crocodile) and about the continuous tension between the youngsters who come from the sea and the elders who are from the land: the former may always be merged into the latter or, eventually, if they survive the journey, live off them ... (see Seixas, 2007; 2010).

There is another extremely important myth among the Mambai registered by Elizabeth Traube (1997), among the Kemaq by Tanja Hohe (2000), among the Fataluco by Azevedo Gomes (1972), and also noted in the field by one of us (Seixas, 2010). At first there were the “siblings”, in numbers of two (Mambai), three (Kemaq) or seven sons and seven daughters (Fataluku), and the division between the oldest sibling and the youngest is established. This seems only to take on specific physical features in Mambai’s version, once the youngest is dipped into white water that leaves him clean, while the oldest is dipped into dark water, becoming neither white nor clean. However, in all three versions of the myth, siblings are distinguished by receiving specific objects. In the Mambai myth, Father Sky granted the oldest the sacred stone and trunk as elements that validate authority over the cosmos, while he gave the pen and the book to the youngest, as representatives of European identity. In the case of the Kemaq version, a sword and a crowbar are given to the two oldest, while the youngest, in contrast, received a pen and paper to write. In the Fataluku’s version the ancestor gives machetes to each of his six oldest children, and to the youngest one a pen to write, representing a symbol of wisdom. In another version, the ancestor gives everyone a pen and paper, which the six older ones throw away, and only the youngest keeps. In the second part of this myth, the youngest sibling embarks on a trip overseas. In the Mambai version, the youngest sibling steals the objects not specified other than the ancestor placed them in the ‘home of origin’. Finally, the youngest sibling crossed the waters of the sea to go to the land of Portugal. In the Kemaq version, the reference is vague, but Hohe considers it as similar behavior. In the Fataluku version, the ancestor commands the youngest sibling: “Look, get a boat and go and learn, and study the world beyond. When you become wise, return to rule us. Meanwhile we stay and cultivate the land, worshipping the tei and defending the brothers-in-law”. (Gomes, 1972, p. 49).

There is a difference here that is established between the land/inland and the sea/coast, and also between the east-west axis and the north-south axis. In this second stage of the myth, the societies of those who stay (land/inland, east-west axis) suffer from instability, with fights among the oldest siblings and with no respect for authority. However, instability is evident only in the Kemaq and Mambai versions, while in the Fataluku versions, there is a silence.
Finally, there is a third stage: in the Mambai version, it is the oldest sibling who makes a ‘long and arduous’ journey overseas to bring back the youngest sibling from Portugal; in the Kemaq version the youngest sibling, understood as the Portuguese, then returns after having departed from his origin, to establish a relationship with the oldest siblings; in Fataluku’s version, only “Benjamin gathered all the science in the world and returned to rule”. (Seixas, 2007, 2010). Resonances of these three myths will be clarified by the following presentation of the four ‘Otherings’ through which we conceive a short history of Timor-Leste.

4.1 1st Othering (Malay)

Timor was Papuan/Melanesian before passing through a ‘civilizational shock’ supposedly taking place between Papuan/Melanesian and Malay/Indonesian from the year 3000 BC to the year 1000 BC. It is possible that in the division Firaku-Kaladi (a regional-ethnic division within Timor-Leste), the term ‘malae’ (meaning foreigner, derived from ‘Malay’), and the name of the island itself (Timor from Timur, which means East) are reminiscent of this civilizational shock; and also of the Malay/Indonesian relevance, eventually a dominant presence.

Ambiguously, ‘Malae’ or ‘Malai’ is the name by which any foreigner is referred to in Timor-Leste. At any one time, the name could have been synonymous with Lord (or even king), Mister, or Bapa, or could be ‘just foreigner’. The clan, which considers itself to be the first in Timor-Leste, ‘Tutuala ratu’, also calls itself ‘Malai ratu’, meaning ‘Lord/king of the foreigners’ or ‘Lord/king of the lords/kings’. In fact, ‘malae’ is also the name given to Timorese people who have come ‘from the outside’, ‘from the sea’, in relation to the ‘ones who stayed’, the ‘ones from the land’, and also to ‘mestizos’ (in ‘malae-china’, ‘malae-zapão’, etc.). For instance, some ethnolinguistic groups carry the name ‘malae’ as a surname, and the Tetum group considered themselves, at least in a certain period,
as ‘malae’ or ‘malae metan’ (black foreigners) in relation to the Portuguese, who were ‘malae mutin’ (white foreigners). Therefore, ‘Malae’ is a complex noun that is used both to identify the Other, and to show how a cultural memory of a former clash of cultures between Asia and Pacific regions, Indonesia and Melanesia, malays and papuas, still influences present distinctions locally and nationally. We may assert that this was the ‘first’ colonization because it seems that it was the first one not to produce a ‘generalized Other’. Instead, a ‘generalized-expecting Other’ was produced: the ‘malae’, as well as a sense of identity.

What is certain is that the island of Timor was a place of abundant cultural encounters, and that the scattered local challenge would be to create agreements between foreigners/strangers and grounded clans. If we are able to make any inferences from the pragmatics of ‘malae’, it seems that there were ‘males’ who were just foreigners and ‘males’ who made their own way to become partisans, eventually even lords. The processes that make one or another outcome possible are not accessible to us. Even so, the three stories – of the world as a scattered moon, the crocodile and the boy, and the siblings, give us some clues about the possibilities.

4.2 2nd Othering (Firaku and Kaladi)
It is as Province of Belos that the first imagined precolonial territorial unity is known, in opposition to the Province of Servião in Western Timor. The Belu, Belun or Belos ‘Empire’, with an administrative center in Béhali or Wehale, tried to subjugate the other ethnic groups by inserting the datos (noble) Belos and the Tetum language as main domination instruments. However, this was not completely successful. Before the ‘Portuguese time’ (as Timorese refer to it), there was a Belo-Tetum colonization with its center in Wehali-wehiku. Tetum people from Viqueque and Luca (important references to Tetum colonization
in the east part of the island) refer to themselves as ‘people from the plain’ (tetuk means plain), in opposition to the ones from the mountain (Macassai and Mambai peoples). It is possible that Tetum people used local classifications (usually with a positive or at least neutral intention) in order to identify mountain people, yet applied with negative implications. Firaku (Macassai) and Kaladi (Mambai) are the negative classifications for the ‘mountain people’, basically referring to them as culturally retarded, non-civilized people. Since there is no negative classification for the Tetum people, and both negative ones concern ‘mountain people’, which refers to the biggest ethnolinguistic groups (Macassai and Mambai), we conclude that it was the Tetum people themselves who created these classifications.

Although there is almost a total lack of reference to such terms in the bibliography about Timor prior to the year 2000, there can be found a reference in the Tetum Language Manual for East Timor by Geoffrey Hull, under “Firaku, Eastern East Timorese” and “Kaladi, Western East Timorese” (2000, pp. 68–74). In the Tetum-Portuguese Dictionary (Portuguese-Tetum Dictionary 2000) by Luís Costa, such terms have the following meanings: “Firaku: adj. Born in the region of the mountains of the Eastern and Northeastern parts of the island”; “ema firaku: inhabitant of this region”; “Kaladi: n. Born in the Timorese mountains”. Therefore, both Firaku and Kaladi could only mean “the person who was born in the mountains”!

A bibliographic review of all the material that has been written about Timor in recent years, and even key works on Timorese History or Anthropology, reveals few references to these terms, turning these representations and their historical, sociocultural, and political effectiveness into an enigma of the (re)construction of the Timorese Nation and State. In post-colonial literature about Timor-Leste (and before the crisis of 2006 when these classifications became quite well known), only a few references could be located, that addressed this dichotomy. In 2004, Seixas had researched this scientific issue; nevertheless, since it had been published in Portuguese, its distribution was limited. Before that, it was only mentioned in texts written by Timorese, Australian, Indonesian, and American researchers. In January 2000, an Australian foreign reporter became acquainted with the Timorese East-West division, and interpreted it inaccurately as a division of urban gangs composed of youngsters from the East and West Side of Dili.3 In contrast, in 2000, the

3 “Battered society on the brink” was the headline of The Sydney Morning Herald on January 20, 2000. It said: “Tensions are rising as the rebuilding of East Timor begins, Conor O’Clery writes from Dili”. In the body of the text: “Dili has two youth gangs, the Firaco on the east side and the Kaladi on the west. Before liberation, Indonesian repression and a night curfew
anthropologist James Fox reported that “on the streets of Dili, among local East Timorese, there is a popular distinction made between talkative Easterners (Firaku) and more taciturn Westerners (Kaladi)” (Fox, 2000, p. 22). Fox also added that the ethnolinguistic group Mambai is the model found as the basis for the Kaladi stereotype. This same ethnolinguistic group was also the model for the term ‘Maubere’.

In November of 2001, Fox (2001, p. 7) referred to the first FDTL battalion, whose recruitment had finished in January of that year, as being predominantly Firaku. This fact was noticed specifically by the Kaladi, Timorese from the western districts. The relation Firaku-Kaladi and its political pertinence were explored in other studies on East Timor. Anthony Smith from The Southeast Asian Studies of Singapore states: “The East Timorese themselves are often divided into two subgroups: the eastern Firaku account for around 30% of the population, while the western Kaladi form 50%”, and he also added: “Independence support in Indonesian times was stronger in the Firaku regions” (Smith, 2002); Dwight King from the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Northern Illinois University, having analyzed the elections for the Constituent Assembly of 2001 and the presidential elections of 2002, found “three political cleavages, one generational and two regional – one that divides the eastern from the western region, and one that distinguishes the central

kept rivalry in check. Now the youths chase around on motorcycles. ‘What city in the world doesn't have gang fights?’ a UN worker said. ‘You could even call it normal. But if there's no work soon, it could get out of hand’. (In http://www.asia-pacific-action.org/southeastasia/indonesia/netnews/2000/and03_v4.htm#East%20Timorese%20demonstrate).
mountain region from the rest of the country”, (King, 2002), a reference that may be considered indirect but pertinent.

Summing up, we could say that Firaku and Kaladi were shadowed as ‘Otherings’ for a long time, particularly by Portuguese and Timor-Timur (Indonesian) ‘Otherings’. The postcolonial re-emergence of this dichotomy grew in intensity until the crisis of 2006 when it bloomed in all its resonances. Considering that Timorese people built their own identity in relation to Malae as the constructed generalized-expecting Other, in the second colonization (by the Tetum-Belo), the Timorese identity was shadowed by a dichotomization. Through this process the Firaku and Kaladi (indistinctively autochthonous or not) were turned into the ‘Other’.

4.3 3rd Othering (Portuguese)

In the twentieth century, up until the thirties, Portugal was concerned with imagining a ‘Timor da Insulindia’; and, from the thirties to the seventies, a ‘Portuguese Timor’; whereas, during the period the country ruled this territory, the (re)production of an ethnic dichotomy Firaku-Kaladi became stronger. Portuguese colonial imagination finishes in 1974 with the episode on the 25th of April and the decolonization process.

There is a universe of meanings in translation that envelopes the Portuguese in Timor-Leste. Portuguese people may be considered as just malae (foreigners), or malae with status (as lords or even kings that come from the outside), eventually as malae mutin connected to status with some locals (e.g. Tetum people as malae metan). In a deep lulik (sacred) way, Portuguese people may be considered Timorese siblings, returning from the other side of the world, closing a big circle of temporality, initiated by the fragmentation of Timor island as a big moon (a middle ground: raiklaran), which was supposedly the origin of all nations. Therefore, Portuguese people may be seen as the younger brother who left, the younger brother who is returning, just a brother from outside, or, eventually, just a foreigner.

Differences between kingships were used by the Portuguese, while, at the same time, these kingships used the Portuguese ruling or order to gain power. Internal divisions within Timor-Leste with its origin in past ‘Otherings’ (Firaku and Kaladi classificatory) became, in the cultural memory, of Portuguese origin, built from Portuguese expressions (‘vira-cu’ – ‘turning the back’ and ‘calado’ – ‘quiet’) which, by a translation to Tetum, became Firaku and Kaladi. This story is not convincing since both words existed before the Portuguese time. Firaku has been a Makassai word (Makassai is from the Papua language), meaning ‘we are comrades’, ‘we, the friends’; and Kaladi has been a Malay word (Keladi) meaning ‘Yam’. Therefore, translation eventually happened the other way around: local nouns were translated into Portuguese, identifying Portuguese
expressions with the negative meaning, which was already ascribed to those particular people. It seems that Portuguese and Tetum people created a colonial ‘Othering’ working consensus, and, if it is true that there is no evidence of a war pattern between East and West, it is also true that Portuguese rulers in the ‘pacification war’ used East people against the West revolution led by D. Boaventura.

The interpretation of the Portuguese presence in Timor-Leste as a process that was supposed to occur leading to a unitary outcome, is a narrative that is still available in postcolonial times. Seixas transcribed a fieldwork conversation in 2000 with the Liurai (chief) of Luro (Los Palos) where he put the question that continues to be important for Timorese identity: “Why did the Portuguese come to Timor? They already had Madeira, the Azores, then Cape Verde, Guinea, Angola; they then passed the Cape of Good Hope and reached India. So why did they still want to go as far as Timor? It wasn’t to explore. It was to coordinate us and join the kingdoms into one nation. It was between the kingdom of Portugal and the kingdom of Belos, to coordinate Timor”. (Seixas, 2002).

4.4 4th Othering: Timor-Timur

Still in 1974, a new unitary imagination, “Maubere People”, arises, created by FRETILIN. Within the resistance, the following idea was constantly repeated: ‘from taci-feto to taci-mane, from Lorosae to Loromono, One only People, One only Nation’ (from the female-sea to the male-seas, from the sun-rising to the sunset, One only People, One only Nation). For many Timorese, Loromono was synonymous with the ‘great door of invasion’ and of ‘collaborationism’; while, in contrast, Lorosae was synonymous with ‘real warriors’ and ‘resistants’. Simultaneously, and in contradiction with this quite disseminated background assumption, the expression used from the resistant nation, ‘Maubere People’, coined by Ramos Horta, had its origin in Loromono (Aileu, Ermera and Maubisse). Eventually the creation of this new unitary attempt had no
relation whatsoever with the Firaku-Kaladi dichotomy. Maubere had a very precise colonial meaning: it was used by the Portuguese to refer to the poorest of the poor; the Timorese ‘pé descalço’ (barefoot). Curiously, although the noun, Maubere, emerges as a critic to Portuguese colonialism, it was raised against Timor-Timur, the 27th province of Indonesia, into which Timor-Leste was transformed.

Anyway, the Maubere classification eventually created a renovation of the dichotomy Firaku-Kaladi, now understandable as Firaku-Maubere, which was connected, in a rather complex way, with Democracy vs. Communism (Mauberism). Nevertheless, this dichotomy was partly hidden because, on the one hand, Maubere had somehow been turned into a national emblem (‘Maubere People’) in the struggle facing a common enemy; and, on the other, Aileu was, in many traditional narratives, the Center-of-the-Earth (Rai-Klaran) or the belly of the crocodile. For others, it was even the origin of the world (hun) giving a certain legitimacy to a nationalist narrative. Anyway, it was not before CNRM (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere) turned to CNRT (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense), changing the ‘Maubere’ to ‘Timorese’, that all the several Timorese parties accepted belonging to that particular structure.

In the following year, 1975, from the Indonesian invasion on, a fourth ‘Othering’ appeared, which designated Timor as the 27th Indonesian Province – “Timor-Timur” or “Tim-Tim”. The Maubere unitary imagination ended in 1998 (with the transmutation of CNRM into CNRT); the Timor-Timur ended in 1999 with the referendum. During this period, the dichotomic relation Firaku-Kaladi was kept, even under the name of Firaku-Maubere, hidden by the predominant Resistant-Collaborationist relation. From the year 2000 on, with the “timorization” of the country (which culminated with the exit of UNMISET on the 20th of May, 2004), the relation Firaku-Kaladi has emerged again. In the postcolonial threshold in which Timor lies, the past became the present, and the present is future under construction. As a consequence, negotiation on both imaginations (ethnic and unitary), were ongoing, opening up to plural national imaginations.

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<th>Table 4.7</th>
<th>Universe of meanings – Maubere</th>
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<td><strong>First man, old brother</strong></td>
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4.5 5th Othering (UN)

Through the UNTAET period, all the complexities of the Timorese past were oversimplified as the struggle of the Maubere People against Indonesians, and, although there was the knowledge of divisions within Timorese, those divisions were basically related to independence or autonomy. These were thought to be as old as the political parties themselves and, consequently, the referendum and independence should put an end to those problems. The creole elite who came from abroad (Portugal, Mozambique), as well as a supposed transitional period, were eventually the main reasons why the past of divisions were hidden from the foreigners. The majority of the cooperants (‘expats’), even when they were there for some years, never heard about lorosae and loro-mono. Resistance conflicts, outsiders (returnees) versus the ones who stayed, as well as gender divisions were much more visible. The creole elite had difficulties (and perhaps still have) in understanding the possibilities enhanced by cultural memory for the production of the pasts, and created the idea that Timor-Leste was on its path towards Modernity.

This idea was well accepted by the UN as well as by Portugal and Australia. The common Timorese citizens had no idea about the problems as were too immersed in them, but they did know that translation of the past created an open field of possibilities. With the UN presence, a fifth unitary imagination emerged: the ‘Timor Oan’ (offspring of Timor). There is a resonance in this latter expression regarding the three stories referred to in the last section: it resonates with the counter-diaspora of the island of Timor fragments, and it resonates with the young boy who survives until the death of the ‘granpa’ crocodile; it resonates with the presence, at last, of the younger sibling!

5 Final Considerations

There is a key aspect that comes from ethnographic research in the transforming of the ‘Other’ into a ‘sibling’: the ‘Other’ has to recognize the older sibling as, indeed, a ‘sibling’ in order to be accepted. Thus, the ‘Other’ needs to present him/herself as a ‘sibling’ wanting to belong and to create a ‘bridge’. Wealth is measured by the relevance of the offspring/descending, the women within the group, and by the influence of a family in other families in which the geographic scope also plays a relevant role. Nations through the gaze of primordialism perspectives are nothing but big families. Even the planet may be nothing but a big family. As a consequence, the sentence does not apply only to traditional contexts, but, instead, to the whole world: the agreements
between nations and states and even the multilateral relations in international relations may be seen as a way for adopting new families within a particular sphere of influence.

Conceiving the world as a context – and if we consider that focusing on translation is crucial in globalization times – then it is necessary to highlight the role of states and cities as brokerage devices. As Hannerz refers, when flows, boundaries, and hybrids become keywords, diffusionism is on stage again, although through other metaphors (Hannerz, 1996). Urban studies, based on the world system theory, revealed the importance of some particular world cities as centers of economic and financial flows. Although this economic-financial model is a basis for a network of cities, we acknowledge that other variables also play their roles and design specific global networks (e.g., tourism and cultural circuits; global heritage, and so forth). With the managing of imagination, economy management models gave place to flows in an urban archipelago in permanent and more constructivist change. It seems that cities are considered, one way or another, main stages where the several agencies become involved in a complex interconnectedness and brokerage work, most of the times without a proper awareness of its own role and complexities. Yet, a story is still to be made on how the peripheries of the world consider their own cities as brokerage devices within the global realm.

Cities were always translation centers, yet, probably, not in so elastic a way as in the current era of globalization. Things tend to be more complex when it is required from a particular city, in a particular moment of history, to play a role of multiple brokerages concerning several inside-outside relations. That’s what happens to Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste:

i. to do the brokerage between traditional lineage communities and a national society. This is done through a few ‘Dili families’ that create a bridge between the ‘foho’ (Mountain) understood as the ‘trunk’/’old siblings’ and their partisans in the capital, understood as the ‘branches’/’young siblings’ which are conceived as representants near ‘Governu’.

ii. to do the brokerage between a national society in the making and other national societies and global demands. The referred ‘Dili Families’ play the role of the ‘older sibling’ (struggling among themselves) to have political influence and even to gain a status of overseas influence. This is done by the competition of a tiny group for being the ones who create bridges with the exterior, eventually searching for other nations/international regions to play the role of the ‘younger siblings’.

In this sense, Dili is somehow a city where everything comes together. Dili became the center for three modernization processes in which it was required that Timor-Leste changed from a lineage/tribal society to a state society; from
a rural society to an urban one; and from a local/national society to a transnational one. Dili is a particularly good expression of the time-space compression: in a very short period of time, past became present, and the local became global. The new Ecumene is the global inhabited world, and the potential new younger siblings are, potentially, all the nations and international regions that relate with Timor-Leste.

References


