Many governors, no province
The struggle for a province in the Luwu-Tana Toraja area in South Sulawesi

Introduction

Pemekaran, or administrative fragmentation, formed an integral part of the process of decentralization and regional autonomy which unfolded in Indonesia since 1999.1 Pemekaran, which was specified in Government Regulation no. 129/2000, has created new opportunities for political actors in provinces, districts, sub-districts and municipalities. In 2000 alone, the Department of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy received requests for 13 new provinces and 44 districts.2

Decentralization and pemekaran are, too often, seen as unproblematic mechanisms of administrative reform, part of a transition towards predetermined structures of governance, contributing to development, democracy, civil society and good governance (see Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Turner et al. 2003; World Bank 2003). Similarly, political actors themselves tend to phrase such complex and contingent processes in terms of mechanistic routines based, of course, on a developmental ‘vision and mission’ (visi dan misi) and rooted in the ‘aspirations of the people’ (aspirasi masyarakat).

Others are more critical. Hadiz (2003b) criticizes mainstream decentralization thinking as belonging to a depoliticizing neo-institutionalist approach to development. Many authors stress that the outcome could also be more chaos, local power play, localized corruption, disintegration, and the emergence of ‘little kings’ (Hadiz 2003b; Kingsbury and Aveling 2003; McCarthy

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2004). They recognize the importance of analyzing such processes in their specific socio-cultural, political, economic and other contexts (Sakai 2002; Schulte Nordholt 2003). Only in this way a-priori assumptions about purpose, direction, or outcome of pemekaran can be avoided.

In this chapter I discuss the struggle for a new province in the Luwu-Tana Toraja region in South Sulawesi. Similar movements elsewhere in Indonesia have been remarkably successful. Bangka-Belitung and Gorontalo, for instance, quickly gained autonomy, while West Sulawesi was ratified in 2004. Other autonomy movements are still struggling, with uncertain outcome. This is also the case with the struggle for Luwu (Raya) Province, which has generated a variety of lobbying activities, proposals, committees, meetings, press briefings, and (self-appointed) spokesmen, but all in vain. The province seems to be more distant than ever before. ‘There are many governors, but no province’, concluded one of the people involved. Recently the process was compared to ‘pushing a broken-down car’ (Palopo Pos 11-9-2004).

The Luwu (Raya) case is complex: political and economic power and control of strategic resources merge with differing perceptions of history and identity, defined along lines of religious affiliation or customary traditions and relationships. Elizabeth Morrell (2002) and M. Nathan (2003) have analysed the case. Morell is critical of the proliferation of autonomy movements, and regards them as symptoms of dissatisfaction that need to be taken (more) seriously. Nathan (2003:38) approaches pemekaran in terms of the ‘original goal’ of ‘bringing the government closer to the people’ and is too optimistic about decentralization, pemekaran, and the role of local elites in these processes.

Based on the Luwu case I will stress three points. First, pemekaran cannot be simply interpreted as the next step in a process of establishing a more democratic, transparent and development-oriented society. The struggle for a separate province is a multi-dimensional power struggle involving different actors and interests. Second, pemekaran should not be approached in an a-historical manner by isolating it from its socio-historical context. Instead, it should be analysed as a continuation of long-term processes of socio-political change under the new political conditions created by Reformasi. Third, the struggle for a province is not exclusively about political and economic power but is also related to processes of ethno-religious identification. These form legitimizing arguments in such power struggles but have, at the same time, their own social and historical meaning and dynamic. In the following section I will sketch the socio-historical context of the case and discuss earlier attempts to establish a province. Then I describe and analyse the recent emergence of a movement for Luwu (Raya) Province and two contending

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factions operating within it. In the next section I discuss the dynamic interaction between different agendas for administrative change both at district and provincial level. Finally, I zoom in on the hidden agendas of the conflict between the two factions in the movement and discuss the role of ethno-religious interests.

South Sulawesi, Luwu and Tana Toraja: a short history

South Sulawesi Province covers the south-western peninsula of Sulawesi. In 2003 it covered 62,482 km² (42% of Sulawesi) with a population of 8 million. It harbours four major ethnic groups: Bugis, Makassarese, Toraja and Mandarese. With more than six million people Bugis and Makassarese are the largest groups who live primarily in the southern part of the province. Mandarese live in the northwest and Toraja in the northeast of the province. In the course of history, religion became a crucial ethnic marker. Common adherence to Islam among Bugis and Makassarese created an increasingly common identity. Bugis and Toraja identities, on the other hand, were deeply influenced by the different paths of socio-cultural change. The Toraja remained largely animist until the establishment of colonial rule and the arrival of Dutch Protestant Reformed Mission (Gereformeerde Zendingsbond) in the early twentieth century, and then massively converted to Christianity. Since many centuries Islam became a major formative element of Bugis-Makassarese identity. Relationships between Bugis and Toraja became dichotomized in terms of a contrast between ‘pagan’ and ‘primitive’ upland Toraja and Islamized and ‘civilized’ inhabitants of the Bugis lowland, and later of Christian Toraja and Islamic Bugis (Bigalke 2005; Pelras 1996; Volkman 1985).

Until 1959 Luwu was a kingdom governed by a datu (king) and is widely regarded as the cradle of Bugis culture. Though associated through myth and history with the Bugis world, Luwu is not an exclusive Bugis area. Court culture and language in Luwu was Bugis, but the majority of the population of Luwu speak Tae’, the Toraja language. Based on kinship and shifting political alliances rather than on fixed territoriality, Luwu’s relationships with other areas were dynamic and flexible. Luwu used to cover large parts of current Central Sulawesi (Poso), Southeast Sulawesi (Kolaka) and South Sulawesi (including parts of current Tana Toraja District and the southern Bugis lowland). Around 1605 the Luwu nobility converted to Islam and from the seventeenth century onwards the power of the kingdom declined.

Recent migration has changed these patterns. The Mandarese in West Sulawesi are no longer part of the province of South Sulawesi.
Map 5. South Sulawesi
Luwu and the Sa’dan highlands (current Tana Toraja District) are connected through sociocultural, political, and economic ties. The character and scope of these ties – expressed in myths of the divine and common origin of the early kingdoms of South Sulawesi: Luwu, Goa (Makassar) and Sangalla – varied between regions and historical periods. However, Luwu’s claims of power over the highland population were not recognized everywhere (Bigalke 2005; Volkman 1985; see below). In 1905 Luwu was subdued by the Dutch and became a ‘self-governing territory’ (zelfbesturend landschap) under colonial administration. The kingdom was deeply affected by these changes: some existing ties with other regions were severed (for example with Wajo in the South and Poso in Central Sulawesi), while others were artificially created or strengthened. The Sa’dan (Toraja) highlands were incorporated into Luwu and divided into the sub-districts Makale and Rantepao. Thus, the Dutch had frozen the dynamic and shifting power relations in the area into a fixed structure of territorially defined administrative units.

In the 1940s and 1950s the administrative status of ‘Makale-Rantepao’ had shifted between greater dependence on and relative autonomy from Luwu. In the 1950s the area had lost its previous autonomous status. The tensions between Luwu and the highlands were sharpened by the outbreak of the Darul Islam rebellion. Under the leadership of Luwu-born Kahar Muzakkar, Darul Islam developed into a separatist revolt that held South Sulawesi in thrall between 1950 and 1965. From 1953, the movement shifted from a communist towards an Islamic ideology. The killing of Kahar in 1965 marked the end of the movement (Van Dijk 1981; Harvey 1974; Velthoen 2004). Recent developments in South and Central Sulawesi, like the spread of Islamic extremism, the entry of Kahar’s sons into politics, and the emergence of the sharia movement indicate a possible link between the 1950s and recent developments of decentralization and pemekaran.

From 1953 onwards, tensions between the mainly Christian highlands and Islamic lowland increased and formed the context in which a broadly supported movement in the Toraja highlands demanded autonomy from the Luwu Kingdom. Highland autonomy from Luwu was finally granted in 1957 and effectuated in 1959.⁵ Luwu and Tana Toraja emerged from this process as separate districts (kabupaten) of South Sulawesi.

Luwu has a special position in South Sulawesi. It is characterized by a complex mix of socio-cultural influences and ethnic identifications. Administratively it belongs to the Bugis-Makassarese world of South Sulawesi and is widely regarded as a Bugis area. However, historical ties with the highlands of current Tana Toraja have also formed Luwu culture, language and identity. Economically, Luwu is important for South Sulawesi.

⁵ Emergency Law no. 3/1957.
Before Luwu was split up in 1999, it was the largest of 21 South Sulawesi districts, covering almost 25% of the province. It is relatively sparsely populated, but rich in natural resources for agriculture, fisheries, forestry and extractive industries. These resources have attracted many migrants: Bugis and Makassarese from the lowlands and Toraja from the highlands.

A major cash earner in (East) Luwu is PT International Nickel Indonesia (PT INCO). In 1968 it was given a 218.529 hectare concession, more than 50% of which is situated in South Sulawesi while the remainder is located in Central and Southeast Sulawesi. In 1996 the contract was extended until 2025. In 2003 the company produced 70,000 tons of nickel. With a growing world demand its economic prospects are bright. The regional income generated by INCO is a major trophy in connection with the politics of pemekaran. Currently the proceeds flow to South Sulawesi. However, if Luwu becomes a province, INCO proceeds will stick there. It will be clear that the province of South Sulawesi is not very enthusiastic about this prospect.

During pemekaran of Luwu District, the nickel mines changed hands several times. In 1999 North Luwu split off from Luwu, gaining control over INCO. In 2003, East Luwu split off from North Luwu, taking over the mines (Nathan 2003). Mining, with INCO as the largest contributor by far, provided a considerable share of the Gross Regional Domestic Product (PDRB) of North Luwu in 2001: 57.86%. In the same year, INCO contributed Rp 4.8 billion in taxes. Morrell (2002) mentions a Rp 10 billion contribution to the South Sulawesi economy from INCO royalties in 2001. Though an estimated 60% flew back to North Luwu (where the mines were located then), the remainder was still of considerable importance.

In contrast, Tana Toraja is economically not as important as Luwu, but it is the main symbol of South Sulawesi culture to the outside world, and the main reason for tourists to visit South Sulawesi.

**Decentralization and pemekaran**

Government Regulation no. 129/2000 stipulates the criteria for administrative change in the framework of regional autonomy. Formal objectives are: better government service, democratization, regional economic develop-

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7 Morrell 2002; Nathan 2003. Nathan puts the importance of mining in perspective. In 2002, North Luwu received 20% of its revenues from local resources (90% of which INCO taxes and revenues). Central government allocations (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU) contributed almost 60% of district revenues (Nathan 2003).
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ment, better use of regional capacity, more security, and more harmonious relationships between centre and regions. It also mentions the preconditions for such changes according to various categories: economic, regional capacity, socio-cultural, socio-political, population, geographic area, and ‘other considerations’. It specifies that a new province should consist of minimally three districts and/or municipalities (kotamadya). A new district should consist of minimally three sub-districts.

Recently, Law no. 22 and Law no. 25/1999, as well as Government Regulation no. 129/2000 have been revised and replaced with Law no. 32 and Law no. 33/2004. Throughout Indonesia lobbying movements emerged for new administrative regions, which were driven by the ambitions of local elites and did not automatically result in good governance. By posing stricter criteria, the revised Law no. 32/2004 reaffirms central control by throwing up barricades to this seemingly unlimited process of pemekaran. It does so by increasing the number of districts and/or municipalities minimally required for establishing a province (five), and the number of sub-districts required for establishing a new district. It also sets new time limits to prevent the acceleration of pemekaran: new provinces may split up after ten years, new districts after seven and sub-districts after five years.

These quantitative criteria cause pemekaran processes at various levels to be interdependent and interlocked. Thus, pemekaran of sub-districts create the necessary conditions for district pemekaran. Increase in the number of districts can, in turn, form the basis for a new province. The dynamic interaction between these processes at various levels is also crucial in understanding the shifting political options, preferences, and choices in the struggle for a province in the Luwu-Tana Toraja area.

Sulawesi was also deeply affected by pemekaran. In 2000, Gorontalo Province split off from North Sulawesi, while in South Sulawesi several movements for regional autonomy emerged. The strongest demands came from the north-western and north-eastern parts of this province. In 1999, the districts of Mamuju, Majene and Polewali-Mamasa demanded autonomy from South Sulawesi and aimed to establish a separate West Sulawesi Province. Around this time, the movement for establishing a province in the Luwu-Tana Toraja area also started making its demands.

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9 Law no. 32/2004, chapter II, articles 4-5. Law no. 32/2004 was ratified on 15 October 2004. On the other hand, the law provides the new possibility for regions (whether province, district, or municipality) to attain the administrative status of kawasan khusus (special region).
12 Morrell 2002. Formally ratified by the national parliament on 22 September 2004. With more than one million inhabitants, it covers 16,796 km², 26.87% of the original province (Kompas 23-9-2004, 25-9-2004). Other initiatives emerged in the southern part of the province: Sulawesi Timur and Ajatappareng (Morrell 2002, 2005) ‘Sulawesi Timur’ was coined by three different
Luwu and Tana Toraja were also affected by *pemekaran*. In 1999, North Luwu District (Kabupaten Luwu Utara) split off from Luwu. The new, reduced district of Luwu, with Palopo as capital, covers 3,247.77 km² with a population of 403,931 in 2001. North Luwu, with Masamba as capital, covered 14,447.46 km² with a population of 442,267. In 2002, Palopo gained the administrative status of municipality (*kotamadya*). Shortly after the establishment of North Luwu, lobbying started to establish a separate district of East Luwu (Kabupaten Luwu Timur) in the north-eastern part of the initial district. In 2003 this district split off from North Luwu and currently harbours INCO.

Even relatively small Tana Toraja (3,205 km²; 400,000 inhabitants) became the object of demands for *pemekaran*. Panitia Pembentukan Kabupaten Toraja Utara (PPKTU, Committee for Establishment of North Toraja District), representing seven sub-districts in north Tana Toraja, was formed in 2002. In September 2002, the request for a district was supported by the district head and parliament of Tana Toraja. This initiative was soon followed by political lobbying for yet another district: West Toraja (Toraja Barat). Under the revised law of 2004, the outcome of these initiatives is uncertain.

When Luwu started splitting up, the movement for a separate province emerged. In 1999 demonstrations for Tana Luwu or Luwu Raya Province were held in Luwu. According to press statements, Luwu (Raya) Province was intended to unify the area covered by pre-1999 Luwu and Tana Toraja. Unification of these areas would create a province covering 20,901 km² with a population of 1,189,757. The emergence of this movement did not signify tensions between Jakarta and the regions but rather between the districts involved and the province of South Sulawesi (Morrell 2002).

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13 Law no. 13/1999.
14 The capital of Luwu will shift to Belopa. Palopo is the intended provincial capital.
15 Law no. 11/2002 (10-4-2002).
16 Law no. 7/2003 (3-5-2003).
18 The land of Luwu; Greater Luwu Province.
19 This equals 33.45% of South Sulawesi (62,482.54 km²) before the establishment of West Sulawesi, and 15.56% of its 7,647,492 population. Badan Koordinasi Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu (BKPLL) Jakarta, Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu Raya, 2000.
Earlier provincial ambitions: Toraja Raya and Lutat

The current struggle for a province in the Luwu-Tana Toraja region and the various competing options involved did not simply fall out of the blue. Political ideals of establishing a province have a history that goes back to the colonial period. The recent political processes can only be understood if they are placed within this broader regional historical context. In this respect, two political movements stand out: Toraja Raya (Greater Toraja) and Lutat.20

Toraja Raya refers to political ambitions emerging in the context of changes related with the colonial period, revolution and decolonization, Darul Islam, the demise of the Luwu Kingdom and the fixation of administrative boundaries that remained in place until the late 1990s. Toraja Raya had its roots in colonial transformations in the Luwu-Tana Toraja area, especially in connection with the Dutch Reformed Mission (Gereformeerde Zendingsbond). While lowland Luwu had been under Islamic influence since the early seventeenth century, the highlands of current South and Central Sulawesi had an animist population. The colonial government stimulated missionary activity in the highlands out of fear for ‘advancing’ Islam, which required the formation of a Christian ‘buffer’ (Bigalke 2005). Such a buffer zone was established through an administrative unit covering the highlands of current South and Central Sulawesi called Grooter Toradja (Greater Toraja). From the 1930s, this idea took root among a Dutch-educated, Christianized section of the population of current Tana Toraja, who increasingly identified as ‘Toraja people’. Gradually, they took up positions in the colonial and post-colonial administrative system and became politically active. Affiliated to the Toraja Church (Gereja Toraja) and the regional branch of the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), they were active propagators of a Toraja identity. In the 1950s, the political ideal of Greater Toraja continued to influence regional politics. In its post-colonial form, ‘Toraja Raya’ was also an expansive movement associated with the search for Lebensraum, or land for densely populated Tana Toraja, and greater political influence in Luwu. Another major political objective was (mainly Christian) highland autonomy from (mainly Islamic) Bugis southern Sulawesi domination (Bigalke 2005; Roth 2002, 2003, 2004).

Lutat refers to attempts in the early 1960s to establish a province combining Luwu and Tana Toraja. The Lutat concept had been developed by Java-based intellectuals from these districts. Its political objective was also gaining provincial autonomy from South Sulawesi. It was based on a similar awareness of the mutually supportive and complementary resources of Luwu (land, other resources) and Tana Toraja (labour, educated people). However, where Toraja Raya had been the product of processes of ethnic identification

along the dividing line of religion, Lutat stressed common socio-cultural and historical ties between highland and lowland populations across existing administrative boundaries. The Jakarta-based people behind Lutat were of a younger generation and less influenced by Lebensraum-politics.

Lutat enjoyed broad support among the Luwu and Toraja elites. In the early 1960s the movement mobilized ample political support from the region and resolutions supporting Lutat were prepared in both districts. The movement stressed the non-separatist character of Lutat and clearly distinguished the movement from regionalist movements like Darul Islam. Andi Jemma, last Datu of Luwu and pahlawan (hero) during the revolution, became the figure head of this movement. In 1963, President Sukarno had even expressed his sympathy and support. However, Lutat did not materialize, due to the political turmoil of the 1960s and probably also because of South Sulawesi’s resistance (Roth 2002, 2003, 2004).

Luwu (Raya) Province: shared political ideal or bone of contention?

The political changes after 1998 sparked off provincial ambitions in Luwu. But the boundaries of the new province were highly contested and the movement was eventually deeply divided. The issue of inclusion or exclusion of Tana Toraja was the cause of this disagreement, and I will analyse the organizations lobbying for one option or the other at different locations: Jakarta, Makassar, Luwu and Tana Toraja. I will also discuss the contrasting narratives used to legitimize the different options for the province and relate them to the regional context.

According to a Luwu newspaper, Luwu Raya should encompass Luwu, North Luwu and Tana Toraja as ‘these three districts form from a cultural-historical point of view still a unity. In geographical terms, the districts were once united in the Luwu Kingdom.’ The newspaper also stressed that demography, human potential and natural resources support its formation (Sawerigading Pos 1-11-1999). Early 2000, the Front Penuntut Pemekaran Kabupaten dan Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu Raya (FPPDP-LR, Front for the Demand of District Autonomy and Formation of Luwu Raya Province) was established in Palopo. It stressed the need for pemekaran and the formation of Luwu Raya within the old boundaries of the former Luwu Kingdom. The document refers to earlier attempts by Andi Jemma in the 1950s to establish a special area (daerah istimewa), and in the 1960s to form a province. It says that Luwu Raya should comprise the districts emerging from pemekaran of pre-

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1999 Luwu. In a formal request for provincial autonomy FPPDP-LR defines the province as ‘consisting of the districts of Luwu and North Luwu, and the Municipality of Palopo, separated from South Sulawesi but still under protection of the beloved unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia’. The proposal also contains several letters of support. One ‘Deklarasi Provinsi Tanah Luwu’ is signed by the Makassar-based chairman of the Kerukunan Keluarga Luwu (KKL, Association of Luwu People) and Ikatan Pelajar Mahasiswa Indonesia Luwu (IPMIL, Indonesian Association of Luwu Students). Another one, which uses the term ‘Luwu Raya’ rather than ‘Tanah Luwu’, is signed by the Datu, the district heads of Luwu and North Luwu, the chairmen of the Luwu and North Luwu parliaments, and (again) the chairman of KKL in Makassar. The letter states that the former Luwu kingdom, defined as covering pre-1999 Luwu, should be the basis of Luwu Raya. Other letters, in the name of political parties, NGOs and other organizations in Luwu also base their support for ‘Luwu Raya’ on this ‘narrow’ interpretation. The regional press also regularly covered the campaign for a new province. Usually it defined the province as consisting of post-pemekaran Luwu and North Luwu, and East Luwu and Palopo (the latter two still to be formed then) (Fajar 4-11-1999, 7-2-2000; Palopo Pos 1-5-2000).

Thus, Tana Toraja was hardly mentioned in the first statements which favoured the new province (Kompas 26-2-2001). Luwu had just been split up into two districts, and the province stood a real chance under the new political conditions. The first priority for reaching this objective was to further increase the number of districts. Primary candidates were East Luwu and Palopo. At this stage, the struggle for a province and lobbying for another new district and a municipality were mutually supportive dimensions of the political agenda of FPPDP-LR. The pemekaran of Luwu was assumed to create ideal conditions for establishment of Luwu Province.

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22 Letter 27-1-2000. In this letter and another one dated 27-4-2000, Tana Toraja is not part of the plans.

23 Letter FPPDP-LR-Palopo dated 1-7-2000. Tana Toraja was not part of the proposed province.

24 The KKL chairman became closely associated with the movement that rejects Tana Toraja (see below). IPMIL is a political lobbying organization with an Islamic identity in which Makassar-based Luwu students are organized.

25 The name of the Datu under a letter giving this narrow interpretation is remarkable. Attempts to replace it with a broader one including Tana Toraja led to a conflict within the movement; see below (letter 22-1-2000).


27 Later, contradictory interests became visible; see below.
The Jakarta-based movement

A different conceptualization of the province was being developed in Jakarta. As in the 1960s, Luwu Raya was buzzing around among the Jakarta-based Luwu and Toraja communities after 1998. The older generation is still quite prominent: some of the current political activists had also been involved in the Lutat movement. The Luwu and Toraja elites in Jakarta were mainly guided by a vision of a province that resembled Lutat: a vision that included Tana Toraja. The Jakarta-based movement became organized in the Badan Koordinasi Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu-Raya (BKPPLR, Coordinating Body for the Formation of Luwu Raya Province).\(^{28}\)

In 2001 the Jakarta group presented its plans for Luwu Raya (including Tana Toraja) (Suara Pembaruan 1-4-2001; Media Indonesia 1-4-2001). The declaration, on behalf of the Datu, was historically legitimized by reference to the Luwu Kingdom as an administrative unit under colonial rule which included current Tana Toraja and the historical ties between the areas. Further, it stressed that the movement emerged from the aspirations of the people of Luwu, North Luwu and Tana Toraja. The new province was to comprise of six districts and municipalities.\(^{29}\) If realized, it would combine a high potential of natural and human resources with other economic assets like tourism. It would have (in 2001) a locally raised revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah, PAD) of Rp 45 billion, cover 20,901 km\(^2\) (33.5% of South Sulawesi), and have a 1.189,775 population (15% of its 2001 population). A Jakarta-based spokesman with a Luwu background stated:

The source of inspiration for Luwu Raya is the history of the Luwu Kingdom and the dedication of its Datu, Andi Jemma, to the ideal of turning Luwu into a special region or a province. He wanted to keep the kingdom together as much as possible. Even in the fifties he had conveyed his ideal to the president. Later, the Lutat-movement continued this struggle in the name of Andi Jemma. With the existing districts and municipalities we can create a province to make this come true. Another ideal of Andi Jemma, a nationalist, was not to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or religion. If we want a province based on former afdeeling Luwu, both Luwu and Tana Toraja should be included.

In Jakarta there was a more broadly shared vision among Luwu and Toraja people. Consensus had more or less been reached on issues like the name,

\(^{28}\) Formally the coordinating body of the regional organizations in Makassar, Luwu, Tana Toraja and North Luwu. Its working programme assumed establishment in December 2001.

capital, and regional background of the first governor of the province. But even here such issues proved to be sensitive. Like in South Sulawesi, competition between Luwu and Tana Toraja and anxieties associated with religious identities played a role in the capital as well. According to one person ‘it took us a year to reach an agreement about the name of a province, which was still beyond reach’.

The region: Tudang Sipulung

On 17 October 2001 a so-called Tudang Sipulung meeting was held in the ‘palace of the king of Luwu’ in Palopo. It was attended by district heads and other government representatives of Luwu, North Luwu and Tana Toraja, chairmen of the parliaments, and representatives of various groups in society, NGOs, students and youth organizations. Some Jakarta-based supporters were also present. The Datu opened the meeting:

Afdeeling (the administrative unit) Luwu covered part of Southeast Sulawesi (Kolaka) and Central Sulawesi (Poso). In South Sulawesi, it covered current Luwu, North Luwu and Tana Toraja. Law no. 22/1999 and Government Regulation no. 129/2000 give as a criterion for the formation of a province a minimum of three districts or municipalities. Consisting of Luwu, Luwu Utara and Tana Toraja, former afdeeling Luwu certainly fulfils these criteria [...] That is why three district heads and chairmen of the regional parliaments of the districts that cover the area [...] are present at this Tudang Sipulung to sit together in a familiar atmosphere of togetherness and equality, and discuss the strategic steps to promote the idea of the formation of a province. As a person who feels the pulse of struggle, I do not want the land of Luwu to be torn into pieces only because of certain group interests.

Though most participants were in favour of including Tana Toraja, some youngsters openly voiced their objections. One young attendant objected because of the Christian background of the Toraja population. According to some participants, the opponents had been instructed by the Makassar-based group struggling for Luwu Province, and were students of Makassar universities, known as tukang protes (protest experts). Despite these critical voices, the document summarizing the decisions states, among others, that agreement has been reached on formation of Luwu Raya Province consisting

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30 Naming options: ‘Lutat’ expresses inclusion of Tana Toraja. ‘Luwu Raya’ can be interpreted in contradictory ways (Greater Luwu/Luwu Toraya). ‘Luwu’ is Luwu-biased. Geographical names create confusion (for example Sulawesi Timur).
31 Tudang Sipulung is Buginese for ‘sit and discuss together’.
of Luwu, Luwu Utara, and Tana Toraja.\footnote{Tudang Sipulung rakyat Luwu Raya (rakyat Luwu, Tana Toraja dan Luwu Utara); Keputusan musyawarah, Palopo, 17-10-2001.}

A similar meeting had been held in Tana Toraja. In June 2001, a statement had been sent to the Tana Toraja parliament, mentioning socio-cultural and historical arguments (Lutat; the Toraja as one of twelve ethnicities of the Luwu kingdom) in favour of the formation of a province together with Luwu and Luwu Utara.\footnote{Badan Koordinasi Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu Raya Wilayah Tana Toraja, 3-6-2001. See also Musyawarah Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu Raya; Aspirasi masyarakat Kabupaten Tana Toraja tentang pembentukan propinsi baru ‘Luwu Raya’, Tana Toraja, 15-10-2001.} It also pleaded for a name that clearly reflects the role of Tana Toraja. It mentioned two possibilities: first, Luwu-Tana Toraja (Lutat); second, Luwu Raya, in which the ‘Raya’ stands for Tana Toraja.\footnote{The document stresses that “‘Raya’ is a recognition of the existence of Toraya’.

\textbf{Kompas} 26-2-2001. Though called ‘central’, KP3L is Makassar-based.}

Thus, the Tudang Sipulung process yielded a widely but not fully supported decision about Luwu and Tana Toraja merging into Luwu Raya Province. Point of departure was a specific vision of the history of the kingdom under colonial rule, as an administrative division that included current Tana Toraja.

\textit{Heading for conflict: ‘Committee’ and ‘Front’}

Around 2001, struggle for the establishment of the province was taken up by a group of Makassar-based people with a Luwu background, mainly intellectuals active in KKL (see above). At the initiative of the KKL, a Makassar-based committee was established: Komite Pusat Pembentukan Provinsi Luwu (KP3L, Central Committee for the Formation of Luwu Province).\footnote{\textit{Kompas} 26-2-2001; \textit{Tempo} 28-4-2001. The Luwu-based section of KP3L is the Komite Pembentukan Provinsi Luwu (KP2L). In 2003 another section was formed in Palopo, also supporting exclusion of Tana Toraja. Panitia Deklarasi Provinsi Luwu, Palopo, 28-6-2003.}

A spokesman stressed in this context the specific Luwu ethnic and cultural values, and the need to protect them. Another spokesman, closely affiliated to KKL and rector of the Universitas Muslim Indonesia (UMI, Muslim University of Indonesia), also stressed the Luwu identity of the new province and added that ‘from a socio-cultural point of view, the people of Luwu are indeed disappointed with South Sulawesi’.\footnote{\textit{Kompas} 26-2-2001; \textit{Tempo} 28-4-2001. The Luwu-based section of KP3L is the Komite Pembentukan Provinsi Luwu (KP2L). In 2003 another section was formed in Palopo, also supporting exclusion of Tana Toraja. Panitia Deklarasi Provinsi Luwu, Palopo, 28-6-2003.}

So, the issue whether to include or exclude Tana Toraja started to divide the movement. The establishment of KP3L was a turning point for it no longer assumed a role for Tana Toraja as its spokesmen tend to use the terms ‘Propinsi Luwu’, ‘Tana(h) Luwu’ or ‘Wija To Luwu’ (the people of Luwu) rather than
‘Luwu Raya’ (which is used by those who want to include Tana Toraja). In reaction to the emergence of the Makassar group (‘the Committee’), the Front Perjuangan Pembentukan Provinsi Luwu, (FP3L, Front for the Struggle for Formation of Luwu Province or ‘the Front’) was established in Palopo in 2003, in support of a province that includes Tana Toraja.38 Here follow accounts of a Makassar-based KP3L representative, a Luwu-based Committee spokesman, and a Front spokesman. First the Makassar based KP3L member:

Our point of view has to do with the past. In the fifties, the Toraja separated themselves off from Luwu. Now the Luwu people do not want to join with them. Representing the aspirations of the people, we have to listen to their opinion. In Jakarta it is different: they broadly agree that Luwu has to join with Tana Toraja [...]. We have already discussed the issue with the people in Luwu, and they simply do not want it. They say ‘Luwu is Luwu only’ [...] For the old generation, Luwu and Tana Toraja are indeed one. But for younger generations things are quite different. It is a pity that there is this political background, of the Toraja stabbing their own brothers. Though we are regarded as ethnically the same, the people have a different perception of that as well. But it is not a religious problem.

The Luwu-based spokesman of the Committee:

Looking at the history of Luwu [...] we must stress that its name was the Luwu kingdom. This must also be the basis for the new province, there is no alternative. We must consider Luwu’s possible future as a province, and its advantages [...]. But the process should not only involve people associated with the kingdom and its past. This should be a more comprehensive discussion, involving religious leaders, leading persons in society and politicians. Nobody has more rights to speak than others; the spirit of change and struggle for the province are shared by all. The Front bases itself on the Tudang Sipulung, but this meeting did not accommodate all components. The Committee has gone down to the grassroots [...] Luwu should be the basis of the province. Luwu can build a province on its own. We are four now: three districts and a municipality. Later, if they wish to join the province, let them apply. Did anyone order them to separate themselves off from Luwu in 1957? We did not tell them to do so; it was their own wish to leave us!

A Palopo-based Front member:

The Committee stresses that three districts is enough for a province. But there are other reasons and motivations behind it. The difference in religion is very important. The issue of religion, though never openly mentioned, was introduced by the Makassar-based Committee and their Luwu-based supporters. Further, those who support the Committee are afraid that well-educated people from Tana Toraja will beat them in the competition for power, positions and resources. Counting the number of Toraja people in Tana Toraja and Luwu, they fear Toraja political victories in future elections for crucial positions in the province.

38 Front Perjuangan Pembentukan Propinsi Luwu (FP3L), Palopo, 9-8-2003.
Thus, a fission emerged between Committee and Front. There is common ground in the use of historical arguments to legitimize a new province, whether including or excluding Tana Toraja: the glorious past of the kingdom, promises by President Sukarno, and the role of Andi Jemma. A respected nationalist, he represents the kingdom, nationalist values, and the ideal of Luwu Province. The stress on his nationalist spirit and values is crucial in the current struggle. It is no coincidence that the lobbying for formal recognition of Andi Jemma as a national hero (*pahlawan nasional*) coincided with the struggle for a province. Presenting regional political ideals in a nationalist spirit of cooperation with other provinces and Jakarta rather than in terms of separatism is crucial, especially for South Sulawesi and Luwu, former basis of Darul Islam and current setting of Islamic political and military activism.

Another shared historical argument in favour of a new province concerns the neglect, exploitation and discrimination by South Sulawesi. While Luwu contributes considerably to the provincial income, little has been done for its development. Educated people from Luwu and Tana Toraja are never given a chance to develop a government career and climb to leading positions in Makassar (see Nathan 2003). These problems are largely blamed to ‘BOSOWA’, the regionally powerful political and economic elites of the Bugis areas in South Sulawesi. The new province would create new opportunities for the population and speed up development by shortening the lines of governance.

Beyond these general legitimizing and, to some extent, unifying stories, the differences between Committee and Front stand out. Both parties actively engage in inventing and re-inventing history. The Front bases its view on the Luwu Kingdom as a colonial administrative unit that included Tana Toraja. Thus, the colonial definition of the kingdom, once resisted in the highlands, is now idealized and mobilized to support Luwu Raya. The Committee, however, stresses not so much common bonds and shared values, but rather factors that have come to divide both areas and their populations. Arguments about differences in culture and a history of competition for resources merge with an interpretation of history in which the struggle for administrative autonomy of Tana Toraja from Luwu in the 1950s is presented as a stab in the back of the Luwu people.

Early 2004, the Badan Koordinasi Perjuangan Pembentukan Provinsi Luwu (BAKOR-P3L, Coordinating Body for the Formation of Luwu Province) was established in Palopo to bridge the gap between Front and Committee.

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40  BOSOWA stands for Bone Soppeng Wajo, Bugis districts in South Sulawesi.
Little has changed since then, and no serious steps towards reconciliation have been taken. The BAKOR-P3L clearly awaited the new government regulations for pemekaran. Its chairman stresses that the cultural and historical relations between Luwu and Tana Toraja should be taken into account in discussions about the province, if only because otherwise the movement would lose support from the Jakarta-based group.

In October 2004, the revised law on regional autonomy was ratified. The BAKOR-P3L took a pragmatic stance, adapting to these new legal realities. Recently, Fajar quoted its chairman stressing the need for unification of the two contending groups into one organization representing all parties, including Tana Toraja. He pleaded for a re-opening of discussions between Front and Committee (Fajar 1-12-2004). Towards the end of 2004 it seemed that the integrative vision was gaining ground. The chairman was quoted stating: ‘The problem whether Toraja joins or not needs not to be debated any longer. It has already been solved. Toraja is part of Luwu, and therefore it cannot be separated from the province’ (Palopo Pos 25-11-2004). However, the future prospects of the province remain highly uncertain (Fajar 23-1-2005).

Keeping all options open

Luwu (Raya) was not the only regional option for a province. Spokesmen in Tana Toraja stress that they are not willing to join Luwu at any price. In 2000, the Badan Perjuangan Pemekaran Propinsi Sulawesi Timur (BP3ST, Body for the Struggle for Pemekaran of East Sulawesi Province) was established to lobby for a province encompassing Luwu, North Luwu, Tana Toraja and Enrekang (a district bordering on southern Tana Toraja and Luwu). Political activists in Tana Toraja and Enrekang formed the core of the movement, which was to expand to Luwu and Luwu Utara. The plans of the movement created not only political controversies but also confusion about the name of the province (Palopo Pos 3-11-2000; see note 12).

At that time the movement for a separate province of West Sulawesi emerged. When discussions about Luwu Raya were stagnating, for people in Tana Toraja West Sulawesi became an attractive alternative, and talks between representatives of West Sulawesi and Tana Toraja were initiated. In Luwu,
there was much resistance against the idea of merging Luwu and North Luwu with Tana Toraja and Enrekang into a province of East Sulawesi which implied the disappearance of the name ‘Luwu Raya’. Initiators of the East Sulawesi plan, who had also made eyes at a part of the intended province of West Sulawesi that has close socio-cultural links with Tana Toraja, were accused of having too strong ties with Tana Toraja. One Luwu politician expressed the fear that the difference in natural resource endowments between Luwu and North Luwu on one hand, and Tana Toraja and Enrekang on the other, would lead to ‘increased exploitation of the natural resources of Luwu by the strong human resources from those areas’. East Sulawesi received a cool reception in Luwu and was also rejected by the Enrekang elites.43

Thus, although many prefer Luwu Raya, debates in Tana Toraja about pemekaran were not restricted to this option only. Some older-generation Toraja even nostalgically mention ‘Toraja Raya’ as an alternative choice, which does not stand a great chance but most closely matches an identification with Toraja. After ratification of Law no. 32/2004, Tana Toraja can even pursue a new option: acquiring the status of special region (kawasan khusus) on the basis of its cultural heritage and potential for tourism.44

Legitimizing pemekaran

Debates on splitting up Tana Toraja were rooted in the different histories of its northern, southern and western parts. The issue gained in importance in connection with the possible formation of a new province in 2001. Toraja political actors stressed that the bargaining position of Tana Toraja would be stronger if it had more districts and political leaders, adat leaders, and youth organizations started to discuss pemekaran. After discussions in seven northern sub-districts, the Committee for Establishment of North Toraja District (PPKTU) was formed. In October 2004, proposal and positive recommendations by the district head, parliament and governor were awaiting the installation of a new parliament of the province of South Sulawesi in order to continue the procedures.45

A similar movement started demanding pemekaran of West Toraja. This demand will almost certainly not make it beyond the first feasibility studies. Its establishment would probably become an economic burden rather than

an opportunity for development. Some people expressed the fear that pemekaran may even lead to the breakdown of Tana Toraja. According to such a scenario, West Toraja could join West Sulawesi, while South Toraja and North Toraja could either stay with South Sulawesi or join Luwu Raya. Especially the Tana Toraja elites in Jakarta regard this as a disaster. Apart from creating economically weak administrative units, it would mean the disappearance of Tana Toraja as the administrative unit that represents Toraja identity. Instead many Toraja in Jakarta prefer incorporation of Tana Toraja into Luwu Raya.

**District pemekaran versus provincial interests**

Pemekaran is an extremely sensitive political process that may involve contradictory interests at various levels. Tana Toraja has not yet been affected by pemekaran so far. However, it could become a key area in connection with the establishment of a new province. In the sensitive relationship between South Sulawesi and the Luwu-Tana Toraja region economic interests are important. South Sulawesi risks losing income and strategic resources. Therefore, it wants to block the formation of new provinces. Formally, there are no restrictions to pemekaran as long as the preconditions specified in the law are fulfilled; pemekaran is based on ‘the aspirations of the people’. However, the North Toraja case shows that lower-level political interests in district formation can be played off against higher-level interests in establishing a province.

Demands for pemekaran are dependent on the willingness of higher authorities to deal with them. Therefore, relationships of dependence and power differences are crucial. This contradicts simplistic views of pemekaran as facilitated and stimulated at all levels of governance to create a more democratic society based on ‘the aspirations of the people’. However, in the case of pemekaran of North Toraja the South Sulawesi governor demanded a formal statement from the Tana Toraja parliament stating that pemekaran will not be used as a basis for the formation of another province.\(^{46}\) However, nobody regarded the document as a constraint on future political choices for joining any provincial movement.

**Contradictory interests in Luwu**

\(^{46}\) Keputusan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Kabupaten Tana Toraja Nomor: 1/kep/DPRD/I/2004 tentang pernyataan sehubungan dengan pemekaran Kabupaten Tana Toraja, Makale, 8-1-2004. It says: ‘The parliament of Tana Toraja states that pemekaran of Tana Toraja is in no way related, and will not lead, to the formation of a new province’. Though the statement is not specific about which province is meant, people commenting upon it primarily associated it with the possible contribution of new districts to Luwu Raya.
Another example of the complex ways in which the agendas at district and provincial levels can be competitive is the establishment of East Luwu District. North Luwu came primarily into being as a result of frictions between two candidates for the position of district head in Luwu in 1999: Kamrul Kasim and Luthfi A. Mutti. Luthfi had the support of Andi Hasan, a member of the eastern Luwu elite, who had built a strong power base as Golkar leader in Luwu during the New Order. His support for Luthfi was in vain: Kasim won by default because of a split in the votes (see Nathan 2003) and became the new district head. Andi Hasan was disappointed and started putting his political bets on North Luwu.

*Pemekaran* of North Luwu in 1999 had not caused great political tension, though it drained Luwu from the most qualified part of its administrative apparatus. *Pemekaran* had (passive) support among the North Luwu population. However, it was the product of the political lobbying of elite networks rather than of participation and democratic processes. Luthfi, its first district head, was closely related to the Directorate General of Regional Autonomy through Ryaas Rasyid. This seems to have been an important factor in establishing North Luwu. According to one account, ‘after the Luwu district head election had been lost by Luthfi, Rasyid just decided to divide Luwu. It happened in a few months, without a local political movement, mass pressure, or much NGO influence. One could say that Luthfi was given his own district and dropped there.’ Despite all this personal lobbying, there were important and widely recognized improvements in North Luwu under the Luthfi administration (*Fajar* 26-4-2005; Nathan 2003).

The elites from northeastern Luwu had supported the establishment of North Luwu and Luthfi’s appointment as district head. However, they also had their own agenda of *pemekaran*. The ink of the signatures under the document that formalized North Luwu was still wet when they started demanding the formation of a separate district of East Luwu (Nathan 2003). As Luthfi was initially unwilling to give up this resource-rich part of his new district, the issue generated much tension and even threatened to escalate into violent conflict in 2001 and 2002. According to sources in Luwu, violence between supporters of Luthfi and groups demanding the new East Luwu district could barely be avoided by mobilizing the kinship networks through which the contending elites are all related.

The establishment of North Luwu in 1999 and, later, East Luwu and Palopo brought the formation of a new province within reach. In this context the participation of Tana Toraja was no longer indispensable. However, rather than speeding up the formation of a province, *pemekaran* in Luwu generated contradictory interests. When the movement for a province emerged, North Luwu had already been established but East Luwu had not yet been ratified.
Andi Hasan represented the northeastern elite with its interests to control the INCO mines through the establishment of East Luwu District. The plans for Luwu Province were not very popular with either the former or with the current governor of South Sulawesi (Fajar 27-6-2003, 16-2-2004).

As the fate of East Luwu was still dependent on cooperativeness of the governor, it was not in the interest of the elites from eastern Luwu to support the plans for a new province at that moment.

In late 2004, when the Luwu movement was in dire straits and the law revised, blame for postponement of Luwu Province was laid with the North Luwu parliament and especially its former chairman, Andi Hasan from East Luwu, who had failed to issue a recommendation.47

Hidden agendas? Politics of religious and ethnic identity

Contested control over resources explains processes of pemekaran in Luwu only to some extent. It does not clarify the rift in the movement for a new province and the fault lines along which this has become manifest. In order to understand why the movement split, we should focus on processes of ethno-religious identification and the ways ethno-religious sentiments are mobilized.

The history of Luwu and Tana Toraja relationships and especially earlier attempts to establish a province bear witness of the sensitive role of ethno-religious identifications. During the 1940s and 1950s tensions increased as a result of decolonization and the Darul Islam movement, when ethnic and religious frictions determined the dividing lines along which conflicts unfolded. Though never openly debated under the New Order, these tensions never disappeared, and often played a mobilizing role in violent conflicts between migrants from Tana Toraja and the local population in lowland Luwu.48 These tensions also informed the struggle for a new province.

After the fall of the Suharto regime, Sulawesi was hit by Islamic radicalism and inter-religious violence. From 1998 onwards, massive violence between Christians and Muslims struck Central Sulawesi (ICG 2001a, 2004) while several bomb attacks hit Makassar in 2002. Luwu experienced communal conflicts (Roth 2002; Nathan 2003). As before, some of these conflicts took shape along ethno-religious lines dividing people from Luwu and Toraja. In addition, Luwu also had its share of Islamic extremist violence as illustrated

by a bomb attack in Palopo early 2004.\textsuperscript{49} Arrests of suspects of the Makassar bomb attacks even yielded evidence for the existence of military training camps in Luwu.\textsuperscript{50}

The establishment of the Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI, Preparatory Committee for the Upholding of Islamic Law) in 2000 caused unrest in Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{51} Its main objective was special autonomy for South Sulawesi in order to facilitate the introduction of sharia law. In December 2001 KPPSI announced a draft law on the introduction of sharia in South Sulawesi, and proposed to give the province a status similar to Aceh. The political agenda of KPPSI and the links with extremist Islam have given rise to a growing concern about the ambitions of political Islam in Sulawesi (ICG 2002a; Dias Pradadimara and Burhaman Junedding 2002). The Makassar meeting of KPPSI was strictly guarded by a paramilitary group called Laskar Jundullah (Army of God), which had become the regular security force of KPPSI.\textsuperscript{52} When linkages between Laskar Jundullah and violent Islam extremism became publicly known, KPPSI distanced itself from the organization.\textsuperscript{53}

The emergence of three children of the legendary Luwu-born Darul Islam leader Kahar Muzakkar on the regional political scene is in this respect interesting, as they are also involved in debates on the administrative status of Luwu. This fits in with a revival of the political agenda of Darul Islam and Kahar (Velthoen 2004), which is referred to as neo-Kaharisme. These developments are closely related to the emergence of KPPSI in South Sulawesi politics. A KPPSI spokesman has stated that many members regard this movement as a continuation of Darul Islam by constitutional means (ICG 2002a:17).

Dias Pradadimara and Burhanam Junedding (2002) have identified the social basis of the movement that supports KPPSI as male, urban (Makassar)-based, highly educated. Members tend to support Golkar and a New Order


\textsuperscript{50} ICG 2003a, 2004. Near Enrekang and in East Luwu. Another camp was in Central Sulawesi (ICG 2004).

\textsuperscript{51} KPPSI was founded after introduction of the regional autonomy laws in 1999. It was formally established during a meeting of the Islamic Congress in Makassar in October 2000, after an earlier congress in Yogyakarta of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Council of Mujahedeen for Islamic Law Enforcement). Later, KPPSI became KPSI.

\textsuperscript{52} Headed by Agus Dwikarna, it had been established in Makassar in September 2000. Dwikarna was member of the executive committee of MMI. He was arrested in the Philippines in 2002 on the charge of possessing explosives and belonging to an Al Qaeda-related network (ICG 2002a; Kompas 20-3-2002).

\textsuperscript{53} ICG 2003a, 2004; Dias Pradadimara and Burhanam Junedding 2002; see Van Bruinessen 2002. Laskar Jundullah is also associated with the military training camps found in Luwu and Central Sulawesi, and has been accused of recruiting Muslim troops for and bringing weapons into Poso. Laskar Jundullah also executed violent ‘sweepings’ in Makassar (ICG 2001a; Jakarta Post 22-4-2002).
Many governors, no province

Many governors, no province

Many governors, no province

Many governors, no province

type of modernization, and are often affiliated to universities. Through their academic networks they mobilize support for political Islam, especially from young South Sulawesi males.

There are strong links between KPPSI and the Makassar-based Committee that advocates a Luwu province. Important activists of the Committee are Islamic people with a Luwu background, who are affiliated to a Makassar university. They are closely linked to other Makassar-based organizations like KKL and KPPSI. The chairman of KKL and leading figure and main spokesmen of the Committee is also member of the advisory board of KPPSI. The secretary general of KPPSI is also secretary of KKL, actively involved in the Committee and one of its spokesmen. The secretary of the Committee, one of the sons of Kahar Muzakkar, is a vocal supporter of KPPSI in Sulawesi Selatan. The chairman of KPPSI has an advisory function in the Committee. There are also Committee linkages to Luwu. A Luwu-based spokesman for the Committee, who recently died, former rector of Andi Jemma University in Palopo, was also affiliated to KPPSI. Other active Committee members in Palopo, among which the rector of the Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (STAIN, National Islamic High School) and secretary of the Palopo branch of the Committee, are also members of the advisory board of KPPSI in Makassar. Thus religious identity plays an important role in the struggle for Luwu Province. A Committee spokesman:

The Committee wants to build something with a specifically Luwu identity. Luwu will get lost in a province with Tana Toraja. We must defend the specific characteristics and values of Luwu and Luwu-ness (keluwuan). That is the ideology of the Committee. There are people who cry out ‘that is Islamization’ but that is not true. Our basis is idealism for Luwu, not only religious idealism. This is a struggle for the people of Luwu; an ethnic, not a religious struggle.

This opinion is criticized by an Islamic member of the Jakarta-based group from Luwu:

Some people have a narrow-minded opinion on the province. If you ask them about their stance they stress that they are ‘nationalists’ and want good relationships between religions. But practice is different: they discriminate along lines of religion and ethnic identity. They use vague arguments about history, cultural differences or habits like drinking and gambling, but what they mean is differences in religion. They differ widely from those who want to include Tana Toraja in the new province, and who know the history of the kingdom. People from the Luwu nobility are much more tolerant towards other religions. The group of intolerant

This does, however, not imply that there is a link with radical Islam. Several people have stressed that, whatever struggle may be involved, it will be a constitutional and legal one (Republika 1-4-2005).
people is small but potentially dangerous. They never speak their minds, and get mad if you call them extremists. But they do not accept a province which comprises of Christians and Muslims. What will this extremist thinking lead to? It damages our religion and obstructs the province movement.

The province as a symbol of Luwu ethnic identity

The struggle for a new province has turned into a struggle about ethnoreligious identity in which ethnicity and religion are intertwined. There is no formally recognized ethnic group, or ‘suku Luwu’. The term ‘Luwu Raya’ refers to a province including Tana Toraja, whereas the terms ‘Tana Luwu’ and ‘Provinsi Luwu’ exclude Tana Toraja. Terms like ‘Wija To Luwu’ (the people of Luwu), ‘keluwuan’ (‘Luwu-ness’) and ‘kejayaan Luwu’ (the greatness of Luwu) denote attempts to construct a specifically Luwu identity that contrasts rather than overlaps with Toraja identity, and that ties Luwu to South Sulawesi or legitimizes a separate administrative status. This discourse is used by the Committee.

Attempts to construct a distinct Luwu ethnic identity are not new. During the late New Order the (re-)construction of Luwu identity was expressed in terms of the history of the Luwu kingdom – the heritage of Andi Jemma and Lutat – and manifested in the ‘royal palace’ in Palopo. In this reconstruction of ‘the kingdom’ ties with Tana Toraja took a prominent place. And this representation of history was propagated by the Front in its struggles for Luwu Raya.

In opposition to the Front, a restricted conception of Luwu-ness is advocated by the Committee. Many motives are involved here: the wish to give the new province an Islamic identity (to facilitate the introduction of sharia), fear among the Luwu elite for well educated and dynamic Toraja who might occupy key positions in the new province, and the ambition to reinforce a Luwu identity that has been marginalized by Toraja who have successfully put their own culture on the map and attracted tourists, while the memory of the glorious past of the Luwu kingdom withered away.

History, again, serves as source of legitimacy. On 23 January 2004, Luwu celebrated its 737th birthday (Hari Jadi Luwu) with military and adat ceremonies. The day vaguely refers to a mix of anti-colonial struggle, the coming of Islam (stressing the Islamic character of Luwu identity), and the origins of Luwu kingship. The celebration emphasizes the unity of Wija To Luwu and the mayor of Palopo stressed in his speech that Tana Luwu still forms
Many governors, no province

an inseparable unity and that ‘its glue is the circulation of the blood of the people of Luwu’.

Conspiracy theories surround the province struggle as well. It is said that the Committee is an instrument of the South Sulawesi political elites to divide the Luwu movement in order to obstruct the formation of a new province. This theory was underscored by the close relationship between Jusuf Kalla (a Buginese, and known to be not very enthusiastic about pemekaran) and prominent Committee members, but further evidence is lacking. A competing Buginese definition of Luwu identity, which represents the political interests of the current province of South Sulawesi, focuses on Luwu as the core of Bugis culture, implying that Luwu belongs to South Sulawesi and that restoring the greatness of Luwu as a kingdom (kejayaan Luwu) within the confines of South Sulawesi is more important than province politics. According to the governor of South Sulawesi, Amin Syam,

the formation of Luwu Province […] will mean separation from South Sulawesi […] During his speech […] he asked elements of Luwu society to restore the greatness of Luwu when it was a kingdom, hundreds of years ago. In front of thousands of inhabitants of Luwu […] Amin recalled the past greatness of Luwu. He mentioned Sawerigading as the human figure able to turn Luwu into a cultural barometer of South Sulawesi. Presently, according to the governor, Luwu will be able to rediscover its greatness [...]. Yet the governor did not spend a word on Luwu Province, he only talked about ‘restoring the greatness of Luwu’. (Fajar 14-2-2004.)

In this section I have related the province struggle to issues of ethno-religious identity in Luwu and South Sulawesi. The characteristics and affiliations of key actors in the Committee against the background of South Sulawesi politics and the conflict about Tana Toraja make it likely that the province struggle merges with, and is captured by, broader agendas and objectives of political Islam. The province movement is also related to attempts to construct specific images of Luwu and to use these either as the basis for a new province or to legitimize the status quo.

56  Fajar 23-1-2005. In the late Suharto period, when it was introduced, the district government tried to increase its legitimacy by using such symbols of Luwu’s past. After pemekaran the celebration ceremony reflects fragmentation by exhibiting dances from the new administrative regions: Luwu, North Luwu, East Luwu and Palopo.

57  Hero of the I La Galigo epic which relates the origin of the Luwu Kingdom and Bugis culture.
Conclusion

In the preceding pages I have described the struggle for Luwu (Raya) Province and the conflicts it has generated. Supporters of the restricted option are organized in the Committee, while those favouring the inclusion of Tana Toraja have formed the Front. While the Luwu and Toraja communities in Jakarta tend to support the Front, the Committee reigns in Makassar. At the district level, Front views are prominent in Tana Toraja, while Committee and Front are competing for power in Luwu. A mixture of motives and interests play a role, including competition for political positions and economic resources, ethno-religious identity politics, historical nostalgia for the old kingdom, and resentment against South Sulawesi, as well as a genuine concern for a more equitable, socially just, and democratic society.

Until now the province has not materialized. This does not mean that there are only losers, because the winners are South Sulawesi Province and the provincial elites in Makassar with an interest in the status quo. Two factors came in handy: first, the rift in the Luwu movement, and second the revised Law no. 32/2004 which created a new blockade.

The failure to establish a new province clearly illustrates the three points mentioned in the Introduction. First, rather than a pre-planned turn to democracy, transparency and good governance, pemekaran is a struggle for power, influence and resources between elite groups. ‘New’ values like ‘aspirations of the people’ and ‘development from below’ are not the driving forces but merely legitimizing arguments. The rift between Front and Committee shows that processes of pemekaran can be captured by particular interest groups.

Second, to understand these processes it is crucial to take the historical context into account. The re-awakening of the province movement, the rift between Front and Committee, the historical arguments used to legitimize conflicting viewpoints, and the sensitive relationships between the districts and Makassar as well as between Luwu and Tana Toraja can only be understood in a broader socio-historical perspective. Pemekaran is, to a large extent, the continuation of a long history of changing administrative relationships between Luwu, Tana Toraja, and Makassar, and of shifting boundaries and identifications.

Third, the role of ethno-religious identifications is important. It is not possible to accord to the factors of ethnicity and religion the place of either merely ideology and legitimizing narratives, or of one of the ‘real interests’ in the struggle. While acknowledging the crucial role of political control over

Note that, in a way, pemekaran is counter-developmental, as it usually involves redistribution of resources from poorer to richer areas.
strategic positions and resources, I would not go as far as seeing issues of identity merely as legitimizing language that hides the ‘real’ interests, as Vedi Hadiz (2003b:13) seems to imply. Rather than merely being secondary to strategic material interests, identity politics became a major issue that has even caused the movement to split. Perhaps we have identified the main root of the struggle: conflicting views of the moral and normative basis of society.