The term "Dutch structuralism" is perhaps unfortunate. In English one finds the expressions "Dutch treat" (which isn't really a treat at all), "Dutch courage" (which at best may be viewed as synthetic courage), and "Dutch uncle" (which is a negation of the normal English associations of "unclesness"). Thus at an unconscious level the term "Dutch structuralism" may imply a structuralism that isn't really structuralism, an artificial structuralism, or indeed the negation of structuralism, and more important, by implication, that "real" structuralism is French structuralism. Faced with such a problem it seems best to resort to the normal anthropological solution, i.e., the use of the native term. It is significant, in this regard, that the literal translation of "Dutch structuralism" into Dutch, i.e., "Nederlands structuralisme", is rarely used. Instead one finds the expression "Leidse richting" used most often to refer to the study of structural phenomena in the Netherlands. The word "Leidse" is the adjectival form of the word "Leiden". And if one wants to be thoroughly pedantic one might argue that the word "Leidse" refers as much to the city of Leiden as it does to the University of Leiden, for in its formative days the "Leidse richting" was more closely associated with the National Museum of Ethnology (which, largely as a result of the efforts of J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong, is still situated in Leiden) than with the University. Now, however, the term "Leidse richting" is intimately associated with the study of anthropology at the University. Though this is the customary usage, this is not to say that all Dutch structuralists are or have been associated with Leiden. Just to name one exception, H.G. Schulte Nordholt, an important Dutch structuralist, studied at Utrecht under Fischer.

Though these remarks on the association of the practice of structural analysis in the Netherlands with Leiden are perhaps interesting, it is the use of the term "richting" that is significant and revealing. The normal meaning of the word "richting" is
“direction” or “trend”. But more significant is the use of this word instead of the more usual, and indeed stronger terms “school” (school) or “traditie” (tradition). As the usage implies, the study of structural and cognitive phenomena at Leiden has always avoided orthodoxy and pursued its work on a broad front. Thus the appearance of Lévi-Strauss’ Les Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté was welcomed at Leiden as fascinating and stimulating even though there were certain rather basic divergences with the views set forth by Lévi-Strauss. Though these differences of opinion existed and still exist one could argue that Lévi-Strauss’ work fits in with the broad spectrum represented by the “Leidse richting”. This is not to say, however, that it is impossible to distinguish Leiden structuralism from Paris structuralism.

One can denote several general characteristics of Leiden structuralists that distinguish them from their Parisian counterparts. First, until very recently the “Leidenaars” have been almost exclusively concerned with the analysis of Indonesian material. Furthermore, this regional interest rests on and is supported by an important analytical concept, i.e., the “ethnologisch studieveld” (usually translated as “field of ethnological study”). In accordance with this concept most Leidenaars have accepted that in the first instance the analysis of structural phenomena should be confined to a group of closely related cultures. In practical terms this has meant that the Leidenaars have tended not to seek out cultural universals as the Parisians have done. The Leiden view on the search for universals has tended to be that while such universals undoubtedly exist, it is more practical to begin with a closely defined regional field of study. Parenthetically, it is worth noting that the Leidenaars see in Lévi-Strauss’ preference for the material from Central Brazil and the Northwest Coast the tacit use of a “studieveld” concept.

Another important feature of the practice of structural analysis in Leiden is also directly related to the focus on Indonesian societies. Because many Indonesian societies are highly literate, one of the most obvious sources of data on these societies has been textual material, not only that collected and transcribed by Europeans but also texts written and composed by the local people in their own language. Many Leiden anthropologists have done their own philological and translation work in preparing these texts for analysis. This is due not only to familiarity with the indigenous languages but also to the sheer bulk of the available material. When translations and critical editions do exist, the
Leidenaars tend to check the original text as a matter of habit. Though it is difficult to assess the precise consequences of this use of texts and knowledge of native languages, it has given the work of the Leiden structuralists a certain pragmatic if not empirical cast.

The structural study of myth is one area in which the general characteristics distinguishing the Paris and Leiden approaches are specifically manifested. Firstly, there is an important difference in the nature of the material used by Lévi-Strauss on the one hand and P.E. de Josselin de Jong on the other. While Lévi-Strauss has dealt with New World myths, particularly those from Central Brazil and the Northwest Coast of North America, de Josselin de Jong (cf. especially 1965b and 1975) has worked with material from Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula (particularly Negri Sembilan). The New World material seems to deal with universalistic problems such as man’s relation to nature, cosmology, and the total social order. On the other hand, the Sumatran and Malay material often appears particularistic and focused on the location and definition of particular groups and individuals in the social order. Probably because of the influence of Islam considerably prior to the collection of ethnographic material the universalistic myth like that found in the New World is rare in Sumatra and the Peninsular region. One of the key differences between these two kinds of myths is that those studied by de Josselin de Jong seem to be more capable of being used by individuals in positions of political responsibility to legitimize their authority than those studied by Lévi-Strauss. Though I believe that the differences between the kinds of material studied by de Josselin de Jong and Lévi-Strauss are real and important, one could easily overestimate the significance of this difference, thereby disguising an important difference in emphasis as a mere difference in regional interest.

Though I do not believe that there are any major theoretical differences between the Leiden and Paris approaches, there are some interesting and significant differences in the pattern of argument. Lévi-Strauss tends to emphasize the global correspondence between the conceptual order and the social order. The conceptual model comes in the end to represent a kind of total world view of a particular society. On the other hand, the Leiden approach tends to emphasize particularistic correspondences between the conceptual and social orders. This emphasis means that the conceptual model is not so much an end in itself but it justifies itself to the Leiden anthropologists by its ability to
explain and clarify certain analytical problems in the observable social order (l'ordre vécu). Thus the Leiden approach tends to direct its attention towards the correspondences between the social and conceptual orders, while the Paris approach tends to focus on the global structure of the conceptual order. When these differences in emphasis become coupled with the differences in mythic material used by de Josselin de Jong and Lévi-Strauss respectively, one gets the very clear impression that we are dealing with two different kinds of myth. Those analysed by Lévi-Strauss seem to conform to Eliade’s definition: “Myth narrates a sacred history; it relates an event that took place in primordial Time, the fabled time of the ‘beginnings’. In other words, myth tells how, through the deeds of Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence, be it the whole of reality, the Cosmos, or only a fragment of reality—an island, a species of plant, a particular kind of human behavior, an institution” (Eliade 1963:5f.). Those analysed by de Josselin de Jong, on the other hand, have a distinctly secular nature and seem to take the form of a history (i.e. histoire) or a legend. Furthermore, in de Josselin de Jong’s analysis of the variations in the Hang Tuah story (1965) and of the dynastie myth of Negri Sembilan (1975), it is apparent that there is a demonstrable relation between the particular form of the myth and particular political attitudes and values. Though it seems that such an analysis comes perilously close to mixing structure and événement de Josselin de Jong provides a workable solution to the problem. In both cases he proceeds with the analysis as if there is a single Hang Tuah myth or a single dynastic myth. However, the variants of the myth are analysed as well and it is in the analysis of the variants that the direct link between the ordre conçu and the ordre vécu is established. Or in other words, the point or articulation between the socio-logical and sociological orders is between the variants of the myth and observable social reality.

**Pure myth versus political myth**

Thus I think that it is profitable at this point to make a distinction between two types of myth that is independent of the particular regions from which they might originate. It seems that those of the type most frequently analysed by Lévi-Strauss should be called pure myths. On the other hand, while those analysed by de Josselin de Jong might be called political myths, a more general term would be myths of social rationalization. The
ambiguity associated with the English word “rationalization” is ideal for our purposes. On the one hand, the word rationalize means to make logical or to explain something. On the other hand, the word rationalization is often used to refer to a justification or an explanation that serves to legitimize a group’s or an individual’s behaviour. Though one could proceed to build up a definition of these two kinds of myths in terms of Weberian “ideal types” I feel that this would be premature in that we are not fully aware of the full range of mythic variation and would consequently run the risk of developing a regionally specific typology. However, one could name certain specific myths that appear to be archetypes of these two kinds of myth. For the pure myth I would suggest that the Geste d’Asdiwal (Boas 1912:71-146; Lévi-Strauss 1967) be taken. For the myth of social rationalization the famous (or indeed infamous) Dolkstoss­legende seems eminently suitable.

Though the Geste d’Asdiwal is well known as Lévi-Strauss’ best analysis of a single myth, and as a demonstration of his method, the myth itself is an exciting and aesthetically pleasing example of “primitive literature”. This latter is so much the case that instead of accusing Lévi-Strauss, as has become fashionable, of finding things that do not exist, one would be closer to the mark in accusing him of not finding enough. On the other hand, the Dolkstoss­legende presents the essential aspects of a myth of social rationalization. This myth was used to explain or rational­ize the German defeat in the First World War. As early as 9 November 1918 the German general Schulenburg had said, “Our men will claim in any case that they were stabbed in the back by their comrades-at-arms, the navy, together with Jewish war profiteers and shirkers…” (Mann 1974:155). This myth explained to the German people how the defeat “really” took place. But at the same time it served to legitimize the actions of the military by laying the blame of the defeat elsewhere. Furthermore, this myth should serve as a reminder for certain theoretical oversights that those of us who have been interested in the analysis of myth have been guilty of. We have had the tendency to analyse myths in relation to a status quo. The myths that have been analysed tend to be backward looking, i.e., they explain the present in terms of the past. On the one hand, the pure myths explain the general structure of society and the universe in terms of the primeval past. On the other hand, myths of social rational­ization very frequently serve to legitimize the status quo. This latter is certainly not a chance phenomenon but is related to the
nature of political power. As Parsons points out in his interpretation of Weber, "The 'conservative' tendency among groups exercising political responsibility is heavily determined by their need for legitimation essentially because the use of power without regard to legitimation is possible only in the very short run. However, in the nature of the position of such groups, they are responsible for the more immediate consequences of their decisions. Hence, and this is a very crucial proposition, their general tendency is to rely upon established sources of legitimation. That is to say, their interest lies in attempting to stabilize, not necessarily their practical decisions, but the basis on which they can count on continuing in power and on relative freedom from the kind of internal opposition which would seriously impair their capacity to act" (Parsons 1963:xii).

But as seems implicit in this statement myths may not only legitimize a given state of affairs but also may legitimize a proposed course of action. And taking the argument one step further, like the Dolkstosslegende, the myth which began as an explanation, and legitimized a given state of affairs, can legitimize a course of action and indeed become an impetus for that course of action. To use another example from Weber, the ethic of innerworldly aesthetic Protestantism simultaneously legitimized a given course of action and served as an impetus for that action.

The continuation of progress in the analysis of myths of social rationalization would best be served by a combined approach by anthropologists, historians, historiographers, and literary scholars (cf. de Josselin de Jong 1975:305). Furthermore, for this combination of skill and backgrounds to be put to effective use a problem would have to be chosen which was intrinsically interesting and gave sufficient scope for the special insights of each of these fields. A potential candidate for such a problem would be the analysis of the manner in which Henry Tudor (Henry VII) established and legitimized the Tudor dynasty. When in 1485 Henry succeeded Richard III as king of England he had a de facto political right to be king. However, he had at best a very weak dynastic claim on the kingship. His father's mother was also the mother of Henry VI (1422-1461) and after Henry V's (king from 1413-1422) death she had married the Welshman Owen Tudor, Henry VII's father's father. The other "close" dynastic claim on the kingship was based on the fact that Henry VII's mother's father's father was the illegitimate son of Edward III (1327-1377). However, Henry Tudor married Elizabeth who was
the sister of Edward V (1483) who together with his brother Richard, Duke of York, had been murdered by Richard III (1483-1485), Edward V's father's brother. (It is worth noting that Richard III's memory was blackened in that monument of later Tudor propaganda, Shakespeare's play Richard III.) But even though Henry VII might have claimed the kingship via his marriage and assumed the role of Prince Consort he did not do so. He only married Elizabeth after his coronation and after his recognition by parliament. And she was not crowned queen until after he had weathered a serious rebellion. From a purely political point of view the problem is anthropologically interesting. However, Henry used and encouraged historical propaganda to legitimize his position. Perhaps the most interesting "historical" source was Geoffrey of Monmouth's Historia Regum Britanniae (± 1135 A.D.) (cf. Fussner 1970:7). But from the viewpoint of the structural analysis of myth it is especially interesting that Henry VII used and encouraged the Arthurian legend to bolster his image. And had it not been for his eldest son's early death, Henry VII would have been succeeded by a King Arthur. But complicating this picture is the fact that the most popular source of Arthurian tales, Malory's Morte D'Arthur, printed in 1485 by William Caxton, is also a classic of English literature, thus raising the old problem of historical versus anthropological versus literary analysis. Though the complexity of the problems raised by this case makes its resolution extremely difficult, it nonetheless seems that this would be an ideal case for further study of the problems associated with the structural analysis of myths of social rationalization.

The structural study of law

Compared to the structural study of myth, which has at least reached adolescence, the structural study of law is still in its infancy. My own work in this area has been confined to the analysis of legal texts from South Sumatra. In the final chapter of my monograph (Moyer 1975) I argued that it was necessary to maintain a distinction between recht and wet (droit et loi), and that the structural analysis of legal logic should be confined to laws (loi) as a closed system of formally organized categories. This involved the exclusion of the administration of justice from structural analysis. I still believe in the utility of this dialectical opposition in that it provides for a maximal separation of structure from événement.
Though a separation of *structure* from *événement* is an essential aspect of structural analysis, it is especially critical in the structural analysis of legal phenomena. For unlike pure myths, but in this respect similar to myths of social rationalization, laws must have a high degree of verisimilitude. They have to appear possible, plausible, and even true in their correspondences to the lived in social order (*l'ordre vécu*). Furthermore, and in this respect they are somewhat different than myths of social rationalization, they should appear "reasonable" in relation to the social domain in which they are operating. This second point is all the more problematical due to the presence of legal specialists. Though, in general, law must appear true, its reasonableness need only be apparent to a group of specialists. Be this as it may, the problem of the high degree of verisimilitude required of law makes the confusion of *structure* and *événement* a very real hazard. For the analyst may have difficulty in relation to a particular case in separating the points of fact from the points of law. This is especially so because the arguments may be phrased in terms of legal points that the adversaries see as advantageous to their own position. Thus the apparent logical relation (or opposition) between the legal points presented may be in fact determined by the interpretation of events and not by the internal logical consistency of a legal system as a system of social thought. Thus in relation to particular legal cases one runs the risk of basing one’s analysis on an *événement*-determined opposition instead of a genuine conceptual opposition. Even though there are serious difficulties, the manner of phrasing legal arguments (pleading) is perhaps one of the closest points of articulation between the *ordre conçu* and the *ordre vécu*. In the matter of actual decisions the difference may be even greater because in many cases the decision may be directly dependent upon political and social factors essentially external to the actual case involved. However, while the decision actually taken may be determined by political events the manner in which the legal specialist explains or rationalizes his decision may be very revealing from a structuralist point of view. Nonetheless, though there exist certain possibilities for discovering the structural patterns of the conceptual legal order in relation to the use of case material, there are serious difficulties associated with the separation of *structure* from *événement*.

In societies where one finds a tradition of written legal texts one also has the possibility of analysing the conceptual aspects of a legal system with a minimal risk of confusing the conceptual
and lived-in orders. Though written legal texts may often be influenced by particular case material, in certain circumstances this influence is minimal. For example, in the texts analysed in *The Logic of the Laws* (Moyer 1975), the material is relatively uninfluenced by case material because the copies of the texts used were very early ones, in most cases obtained within a few years after the text was written. This means, as I have demonstrated, that one can analyse the patterns involved in text creation and arrangement as a totality without having to cope with piecemeal additions made as a result of legal practice.

*The Undang Undang Melaka*

On the contrary, in the critical edition of the *Undang Undang Melaka* we are apparently dealing not with the analysis of a single creative situation but with the product of many emendations which were not related to a single overview of the work at hand but fine and detailed adjustments that were apparently not concerned with making the revised text a logical totality. Thus the edition presented by Liaw (1976) represents a reconstructed ascendant of the “best” copies extant. However, this ascendant seems to be substantially removed from the original creative act. Thus one gets many appendages that blur or distort what may have been an original logical structure. Hypothetically, this original logical structure was probably what Liaw meant when he refers to “its nucleus [which] must have been a decree issued by Sultan Muhammad Syah” (Liaw 1976:32). This is not to say that it is impossible to analyse the *Undang Undang Melaka* by the methods which I developed in *The Logic of the Laws*, but that the process of judicial emendation has greatly distorted whatever total structural image existed in the original text.

Having said this, it is perhaps useful to point out that the use of numerical structures to order the texts, and the relations between various payments which formed one of the most striking aspects of South Sumatran legal codes, are also to be found in the culturally more significant *Undang Undang Melaka*. First, there is the problem of the numerical structuring of the text as a whole, that is to say, in some cases the numbering of a fasal is sometimes related to the numbering of other fasals or there is a numerical relationship between a fasal’s number and its contents. In two of the texts analysed in *The Logic of the Laws* (i.e., “The Code of Laws” and “The Sungai Lemau Laws”) one finds extremely clear evidence of such numerical manipulation. At one time I thought
that such manipulation might have been due to one dynastic line in South Sumatra as the fasal numbering patterns are much more obvious in these two texts while relatively absent in other South Sumatran texts and the authorities associated with their composition were father and son respectively. However, evidence from the Undang Undang Melaka suggests that the phenomenon is more general.

In Fasal 21 of the Undang Undang Melaka one finds a long series of "rules concerning mischievous buffaloes or oxen". The first major section of this fasal deals with the activity of animals against men or other animals, e.g. what is to be done when a buffalo gores another animal or a man. The second major section deals with the activity of men against animals. The first specification of this section deals with what is to be done when a person stabs the animal of a high ranking dignitary. The third and final major section deals with the rewards to be paid when a man captures a stray wild buffalo. As is common in law texts from the region one can make an interesting comparison between the attitudes towards buffaloes and those toward slaves. The specifications concerning slaves roughly follow the pattern of the material on buffaloes. The first major section starts with the specification: "If a slave intends to kill his master and is seized by another person he (the slave) may be killed". The second major section begins with the specification, "if a royal slave has been killed . . ." However, there is an anomaly in the numbering of the fasals. The first major section of the material on slaves is to be found at the end of Fasal 6 while the rest of the material continues to the end of Fasal 7. Fasal 6 itself is a rather strange blend of specifications. The apparent title of this fasal is "On the rules governing people who run amuck, be they slaves or debt slaves". The first major section of the fasal deals, in fact, with people who run amuck. Then the subject is changed to deal with the six requirements for a minister. Next the subject returns to the killing of amucks and then back again to the consideration of public officials. This time the list is of those offences which may be pardoned by a judge. The link of the public officials mentioned previously in the fasal is made explicit by the fact that the fasal specifies that "all these offences cannot be pardoned by a minister but only the ruler (himself) can do so". And finally the fasal turns to the subject of a slave attempting to kill his master. Though this fasal appears to be a conglomeration of two notions one notices that the apparently unrelated material is structured according to an A-B-A-B-A pattern. The first four elements of
this pattern clearly interlock the A’s dealing with amucks and the B’s dealing with public officials. On the other hand, the third element of the A group can be seen as either an isolated element at the end of a tightly interlocking structure or as part of the structure, thus suggesting that a slave who attempts to kill his master must be crazy. Thus the section dealing with a slave who attempts to kill his master is partially but nonetheless distinctly integrated into the structure of Fasal 6. On the other hand, the parallel with Fasal 21 suggests that the final element of Fasal 6 “should be” part of Fasal 7.

However, numerical features help to explain why Fasal 7 begins where it does. The penalty for killing a royal slave is seven times seven the value of the slave. A sentence or two later indicates that this practice has been amended and that only seven times the value of the slave must be paid. Thus there is an extremely strong association between the first specification of Fasal 7 and the number 7. Given the structuring of Fasals 6 and 7 and the nature of the text in general, it is difficult to explain with any certainty the origins of the structure. However, several possibilities are indicated. First, the pattern may have been in the original. Secondly, the numbering of the fasal may have been altered later to draw attention to the seven rule. This alteration may have followed the emendation indicating that only seven times and not seven times seven times the value of the slave was to be paid. Because of the nature of the text as it stands, it is impossible to say with certainty the origin of this formal numerical manipulation. However, the above demonstration serves to indicate that the types of structures and patterns of numerical manipulation found in the legal codes of South Sumatra are not an isolated phenomenon in a region that must be viewed as somewhat peripheral to the centre of gravity of Malay culture.

Another phenomenon that I found in the legal codes of South Sumatra was the numerical structuring of the graduated sequence of fines. The most general pattern was based on the halving of the difference between successive intervals in the sequence. That is, in the sequence A, B, C the following relation applied when A > B > C: \( \frac{1}{2} (A-B) = (B-C) \). This was the general form and covered those cases in which \( \frac{1}{2} A = B \) and \( \frac{1}{2} B = C \). Also there was some evidence, especially in the calculation of interest and the payment of the compensation for homicide, indicating that the system of monetary units played an important role in numerical manipulations.

In the Undang Undang Melaka one finds a distinct but nonethe-
less similar pattern. The most commonly occurring amounts of fines are as follows: one kati + five tahil, five tahil + one paha, one tahil + one paha, ten emas, five emas with two tahil + one paha being another frequently occurring amount. From the text as a whole it is apparent that one kati + five tahil and one tahil + one paha are in some sense the basic amounts. Given the numerical relations between the various units of value (i.e., one kati = 20 tahil; 4 paha = 1 tahil; 16 emas = 1 tahil), one notices that these two basic amounts have the same structure, i.e., one unit of value + $\frac{1}{4}$ of that unit. Thus one kati + five tahil is actually $\frac{1}{4}$ kati and one tahil + 1 paha is actually $\frac{1}{4}$ tahil. However, the structuring of the sequences below each of these basic units is different. Below one tahil + one paha one finds a simple halving sequence. Since one tahil + one paha = (16 + 4) emas = 20 emas, the sequence becomes 20 emas, 10 emas, five emas. Notice that in this case the total value of the basic amount (i.e., one tahil plus one paha) is taken together and then halved. In the sequence starting with one kati + five tahil the relation is different. There the distinction between the first amount (i.e., the one kati) and the second amount (i.e., the five tahil) is maintained. In this sequence only the first amount is halved, i.e., one kati = 20 tahil, $\frac{1}{2}$ (20 tahil) = 10 tahil, and $\frac{1}{2}$ (10 tahil) = 5 tahil. The second amount on the other hand, is still specified as $\frac{1}{4}$ of the value of the unit of value of the larger amount. Thus for the first element of the sequence the value of the second amount is $\frac{1}{4}$ kati = $\frac{1}{4}$ (20 tahil) = 5 tahil, while for the second and third elements of the sequence the amount is $\frac{1}{4}$ tahil or one paha.

Significantly, both of these sequences, though using different rules, contain only three elements. This is exactly the same pattern as in South Sumatran legal texts. Though a given sequential relation occurred very frequently, it rarely applied to more than three elements. Interestingly the two sequential rules of the Undang Undang Melaka do not articulate. Thus if one extended the sequence starting with one kati + five tahil another step, one would get $\frac{1}{2}$ (5 tahil) + 1 paha = (2$\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{4}$) tahil = 2$\frac{3}{4}$ tahil. Applying the rule once more one would get $\frac{1}{2}$ (2$\frac{3}{4}$ tahil) + 1 paha = 1$\frac{1}{4}$ tahil + 1 paha = 1 tahil + 2 paha instead of one tahil + one paha. Similarly if one extends upward from one tahil + one paha by just inverting the descending rule one would get 2 tahil + 2 paha. Thus, the two sequences cannot be extended using their own internal rules in such a way that the two sequences meet at a given amount. In short, neither sequential system is a simple extension of the other. However, between the
lower limit of the upper sequence (i.e., five \textit{tahil} and one \textit{paha}) and the beginning of the lower sequence (i.e., one \textit{tahil} and one \textit{paha}), one finds one amount occurring more frequently than the others, i.e., two \textit{tahil} + one \textit{paha}. Curiously, this amount can be seen as an extension of the lower sequential system using an inverted version of the rule for the upper sequential system. Thus $2 \ (1 \ \textit{tahil}) + \frac{1}{4} \ \textit{tahil} = 2 \ \textit{tahil} + \textit{one \ paha}$.

The above material indicates several things. First, some of the features that I found in the legal codes of South Sumatra are also found in the \textit{Undang Undang Melaka}, thus verifying my own previous findings on a more general level. Secondly, because the method applied to these laws was essentially the same, I feel that the general utility of my method as a method is validated. I feel that this is especially important in that one does not need to revert to an ends-justifies-the-means type of argument. And thirdly, though I have imposed restrictions on my method by arguing that one should avoid using legal material that is closely related to particular applications of law this should not be seen as an inherent weakness of the method, but only as analytical caution. That is to say, when one is initially applying the procedures of structural analysis to a new domain such as law one should confine one's efforts to those areas where one is likely to find structures in their purest forms. This is essentially the view taken by Lévi-Strauss with regard to the analysis of myth, i.e., pure myths provide “better” material for analysis. However, as de Josselin de Jong's analyses of the myths of social rationalization have shown, it is possible to articulate the \textit{ordre vécu} with the \textit{ordre conçu} without confusing the two. At present, however, I feel that our knowledge of the legal \textit{ordre conçu} is so scanty that one must rigorously maintain the opposition between \textit{recht} and \textit{wet} (\textit{droit et loi}) until we are reasonably able to distinguish which is which and then proceed to analyse the modes of articulation.

An important feature of the various laws analysed to date (cf. Moyer 1975) and the myths of social rationalization discussed above is that they have a marked secular character. Indeed, the particularistic versus universalistic distinction that was applied to the opposition between myths of social rationalization and pure myths is also an opposition between secular and sacred, or more properly, between more secular and less sacred on the one hand and more sacred and less secular on the other. The type of law that I have been primarily concerned with has been largely secular law. This limitation has not been theoretical but is largely
a consequence of the kinds of problems I have been trying to solve and partly a consequence of the nature of the data involved. For one working with Indonesian texts a natural place to turn for an example of sacred law would seem, at first glance, to be Islamic law.

Unfortunately, though the structural analysis of Islamic law is a highly desirable goal, there are certain methodological problems that complicate the issue and thus make Islamic law a poor test case for the analysis of sacred law. In the first place Islamic law does not make a recognizably clear distinction between secular and sacred matters. While in itself this might not be too problematical, one would be deprived of the assistance that one might gain from an analogy with the differences between sacred and secular myths. But secondly, and indeed more critical from the viewpoint of a methodology for the structural analysis of law, Islamic law like Judaic law gives a fairly prominent place to the influence of judicial decisions in the formation and development of the law (cf. Weber 1972:480).

**Canon Law**

On both of these points, the Canon Law of the Western Church is eminently suitable. For as Weber points out: “it stood from the beginning in a relatively clear dualism — with a remarkably clear distinction between the fields of both sides, as nowhere else existed in this form — opposed to profane law.” (Und es stand ferner von Anfang an in relativ klarem Dualismus — mit leidlich deutlicher Scheidung der beiderseitigen Gebiete, wie sie in dieser Art anderwärts nirgends existiert hat — dem profanen Recht gegenüber. Weber 1972:480.) And secondly, largely as a result of the hierarchical and bureaucratic organization of the church, the law was not developed upon precedents and judicial decisions but upon decrees. However, this exclusion of judicial influence is not the only feature that makes Canon law interesting from a structural point of view. Canon law was and is extremely rational. Two aspects of the origins of this rationality are especially relevant. First, “Canon law inherited both the professional legal techniques of Roman law and the rigorous logic of ancient philosophy”. And secondly, “the structure of the university in Medieval Europe . . . facilitated the rationalization of canon law by separating the teaching of sacred law from the teaching of theology and secular law” (Bendix 1962:401). Furthermore, the development of the rationality of this law was relatively free
from mythological constraints for as Weber points out, "The New Testament contained only a minimum of formally binding norms of a ritual or judicial nature — a result of eschatological unworldliness — that even here the path was completely free for a purely rational structure" (Weber 1972:480).

Indeed not only is the path open but in terms of the mythological structure of the Bible one finds a certain degree of hostility to formal law in the New Testament. For example, in Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, one finds an opposition between the Laws of the Covenant of the Old Testament and the person of Christ in the New Testament. "Now before faith came, we were confined under the law, kept under restraint until faith should be revealed. So that the law was our custodian until Christ came, that we might be justified by faith. But now that faith has come, we are no longer under a custodian" (Galatians 2:23-25). Thus because of the theological and mythological structuring of the Biblical sources one need not expect any direct one to one correspondence between the Canon law and the Bible. In other words, the laws and the myths, though intimately related, are nonetheless to a large degree independent of each other in terms of their internal logical structure.

Thus in Canon law there seem to be grounds for optimism for the extension of the structural analysis of law. On the one hand, it is clearly distinct from secular law. And on the other, its own logical organization is not specifically constrained by the mythological structures of the myths to which it is intimately related. Thus hypothetically we can extend and develop the structural analysis of law parallel to the development of the structural study of myth by articulating the oppositions between pure myth and myths of social rationalization on the one hand and sacred law and secular law on the other.3

Conclusions

In conclusion, one can make several observations concerning the structural analysis of myth and law and its relation to the difference between the Paris and Leiden approaches to structural analysis. What at first glance appears to be only a difference in region and type of data is developing into a more general inquiry into the nature of the modes of articulation between the ordre conçu and the ordre vécu. One of the earliest works in this direction was P.E. de Josselin de Jong's (1956) analysis of how the people of Negri Sembilan (Malaysia) perceived their marriage
system which was based on MBD marriage, asymmetrical alliance, and double descent. The problem examined by de Josselin de Jong centred on providing an explanation of why the people 1. consciously perceived their system of double descent, 2. accepted that they usually married their mother’s brother’s daughter, when this had been pointed out to them, but 3. were unable to comprehend, even with repeated explanations, what asymmetrical alliance had to do with their social system. More recently de Josselin de Jong has examined the various relationships between myths and political legitimacy. This has not involved a notion of determinism in which the ordre vécu determines the patterns of the ordre conçu but has focused on the manner in which myths are used to rationalize and legitimize the social and political orders. My own work on the analysis of written legal codes from South Sumatra has focused on how a social elite conceptualized their own social system. The view taken of law here is not so much of a directly functioning system but that written laws by their very existence serve to explain and legitimize the social order. That is to say, written laws may legitimize a social order independent of any uses to which they might be put. There seems to be reason to be optimistic about the possibilities of producing a model that integrates the above viewpoints with the analysis of sacred law and is ultimately capable of dealing simultaneously with pure myths, myths of social rationalization, secular laws, and sacred laws. It is worth noting that at the same time such a model would involve a dynamic synthesis of the Paris-Leiden opposition with respect to the structural study of myth, the dimension par excellence of the cognitive realm.

NOTES

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2 The original article on “ethnological fields of study” was written by J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong in 1935. An example of the use of the concept in a more restricted sense (i.e. Eastern Indonesia) is to be found in van Wouden 1935 and in a more expanded sense (i.e. all of Indonesia) in Downs 1955. In 1965a P.E. de Josselin de Jong re-examined the concept in the context of making a comparison between Indonesian and Proto-Indochinese agricultural rituals.

3 E.S. Vestergaard and T.A. Vestergaard are exploring a similar but more
complex problem with regard to old Scandinavian religious and sociological structures. In particular their examination of the interrelationships of the logical structures of the Eddas, the Sagas, and Old Norse Law Texts will provide an opportunity for comparing the structures of differing conceptual frameworks within a single cultural context.

4 The primary implication of these observations is that at the individual level a person does not perceive the totality of his functioning social system. (Simonis 1968:62 makes a comment in a similar vein.) However, on the basis of this it would be precipitous to conclude that the unperceived structure constitutes the entirety of the essential structure of the system.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BKI Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
JMBRAS Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
VKI Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde