PART 4

The Commemorative Stage
CHAPTER 14

Memory Theatre: Remembering the Peace after Three Hundred Years

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Act I—Theatres of Memory

In his De oratore, Cicero recounts the famous story of the poet, Simonides of Ceos, who, having been present at a banquet in honour of a nobleman of Thessaly, was fortunate enough to have been called out of the hall before the roof of the building caved in, crushing everyone to death. Because of his prodigious memory, Simonides was able to recall exactly where each of the guests had been seated and could thus assist with the identification of the mangled bodies. The tale introduces Cicero's discussion of the ‘art of memory’ in his treatise on rhetoric; there he writes that, as a result of his experience, Simonides ‘inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty [memory] must select places and form mental images of the things they wish to remember and store those images in the places, so that the order of the places will preserve the order of the things’.¹ Thus was born the idea of the ‘memory theatre,’ made famous in the Renaissance by Giulio Camillo, Giordano Bruno, and Robert Fludd, and still operative in the early modern scientific work of Bacon, Descartes, and Leibniz.² Arguments and information deposited in orderly fashion in strategic locations around a central ‘stage’ could be summoned forth, ‘found’, or ‘invented’ (from the Latin invenio) for a specific occasion and in a specific way, to build a compelling speech, present a focused argument, or sustain a particular claim.

The conceit of the memory theatre is a useful one in the context of a volume entitled Performances of Peace, in which the contributors, using a diverse set of methods and texts, examine the various ‘stages’—both literal and figurative—on which the Peace of Utrecht was enacted. The rich array of political, social, and cultural issues, the myriad locations and occasions discussed, and the diverse methodologies employed by the authors suggest not only the


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considerable heft that ‘Utrecht’ had in its original historical ‘performance’, but also the degree to which scholarly memories of the past are also always already determined by and for specific audiences to meet specific (disciplinary) needs. As De Bruin et al. argue in their ‘Introduction’ to the present volume, ‘performance’ is a capaciously ‘porous’ concept which certainly includes the act of recollection itself, with the one or the other version of a local or global, a socio-historical or cultural past either called forth or left to languish in the wings, depending on the memorializer’s needs. Jubilee years naturally stage memory in particularly arresting ways. The essays collected here, all originally presented at a 2013 conference commemorating Utrecht’s tercentenary, ask us to consider the question of what the modern world might have inherited from Utrecht and thus which present-day conundrums could be said to have found their origins there. In each case, we are either implicitly or directly asked to reflect on how future generations will look back at the various tercentenary commemorations as ‘performative acts’ (de Bruin et al.)—from the ‘Performances of Peace’ conference documented here to the ‘Colonial Legacy’ conference sponsored by the University of Utrecht’s Centre for the Humanities, to the fireworks, concerts, and museum exhibits sponsored by the city of Utrecht and Arts Holland, also in 2013—as they become objects of analysis in turn, just as interesting as the historical events they take as their subject.

From a scholarly perspective, the memory work performed by these essays is in no small part shaped by many of the same questions that interest what has come to be called the New Diplomatic History, which, as John Watkins writes, consists in the ‘multidisciplinary reevaluation’3 of the periodization schemes, geographical imaginaries, gendered knowledges, and economies of political scale that have limited how international relations in earlier periods have been studied to date. Such limitations have also restricted the sources, including literary and art historical ones, that can be used to tell the complex stories of earlier periods (for a related initiative, see also ‘Textual Ambassadors’ at http://www.textualambassadors.org). Like this new ‘inter-discipline,’ whose re-invention is both long overdue and timely in a postmodern, ‘globalized’ world that resembles its early modern twin in so many ways, the present volume calls attention to a theatre of politics understood in this more expansive way. The essays consider how ‘Utrecht’ was ‘performed’ below, at, and beyond the level of the nation-state (Frey and Frey and Onnekink) while also calling attention to the fraught economic and social legacies of empire and colonialism in a simultaneously ever more internationalizing and ever more local,

particularized world (Olivas, Bély, and McCluskey) not unlike our own. As we read, we also catch sight of the important role of the media in ‘producing’ political events, then as now, with media understood broadly here to include fireworks and public spectacles and rituals, diplomatic correspondence and historiographic accounts, print and image journalism and the periodical press, as well as occasional poetry, public theatre and ‘peep show’ plays (see Frijhoff, Farguson, van der Haven, Goldwyn/van Dijk, Al-Shayban, Jackson, Jensen, and Duchhardt). The essays thus summon forth the events and the ‘achievements’ of 1713 not only because of that year’s importance as the alleged origin of various forms of political modernity, such as the balance of power and the international acceptance and regulation of the slave trade, and the political instrumentalization (Frijhoff) of public culture, but also because of the optic that such inquiries provide for re-considering the legacies of this modernity that lie at the heart of contemporary theoretical and literary-historical as well as historiographic debates. Taken together they thus pose the question of how to use cultural artefacts, social history, and an expanded sense of the archive to tell in new ways the (hi)story of a specific moment and set of events long considered to reside only within the purview of International Relations theorists and historians of international law.

Thinking a thickly described past of peace-making and our present together suggests the importance of understanding the many ways that the early modern and the post-modern are always already locked in a complex embrace. In closing this volume, I would like to challenge its readers to reflect on the different kinds of rhetorical-political work that the ‘performances’ of memory involved in this particular tercentenary celebration are doing for us. My question is a simple one, namely: How will the future read the memories of 1713 as they were constructed in 2013? What will the future say, that is, about how the early twenty-first century conceived of the early eighteenth-century theatres of both peace and war? Indeed, in the language of the Introduction by de Bruin et al., what kinds of ‘identity’ are constructed—and for whom—by the memories of ‘Utrecht’ performed here? By way of considering how any number of answers to such questions might be framed, I turn to another three-hundredth-year anniversary of a companion early modern peace-making event, namely, the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, as it was recalled in its tercentenary year (1948). A number of commemorations of Westphalia took place in that year; I will deal with only two of the most salient of them, one that occurred in post-1945 Germany and one that occurred in post-1945 France. The complex and multi-layered nature of these two performances of treaty memory is not surprising. For, as much as the actual treaties of Westphalia—like most such instruments of peace—may have enjoined their signatories to ‘forget’ the conflicts they had
been convened to put to rest, it was only by strategically recalling the details of a lengthy war that the conflict could be claimed to have been brought to an end. By definition, then, there is never 'oblivion' when it comes to creating peace but, rather, only differential performances of memories of war and thus competing notions of what stands to be gained (or lost) by signing on. The two tercentenary commemorations of Westphalia that I describe are good examples of this kind of duelling memory work. Occurring in the direct aftermath of a war that, for many of the mid-twentieth century actors involved, had been just as devastating as the one that Westphalia brought to an end, the French and German memories of 1648 were staged in instrumentalizing ways that corresponded to their respective present-day needs. The general metaphor of memory as theatre takes on an additionally specific form in this case, since the question of genre—whether the 1948 celebrations of Westphalia were comedies or tragedies—looms large. Again, looking back at how 1648 was staged three hundred years on is simply one way of wondering aloud how future generations will look back at the recollections of ‘Utrecht’ in its three-hundredth jubilee year as they are 'performed' here.

Act II—The Archive as Arsenal / France Celebrates Westphalia after Three Hundred Years

Given how much we now actually know about the differential scale and identities of the plenipotentiaries treating at Münster and Osnabrück between 1643–44 and 1648, when representatives from both large and smaller-scale territorial states rubbed shoulders with representatives of urban polities, for example, as well as with papal nuncios, imperial emissaries, and many more, and in light of the persistence after 1648 of several important imperial institutions on whose continuing existence its agreements in point of fact relied, it is ironic how uniformly the Treaty of Westphalia is remembered as the origin of a political modernity organized more or less exclusively around the rise of the territorially-bounded sovereign state. In this story, Westphalia functions as


what Heinz Duchhardt has called a ‘Denkfigur’,⁶ which shapes the narrative of
the signing of the Treaty in the wake of the century of religious wars arising out
of the Reformation and the resulting gutting of the universal orders of the Holy
Roman Empire and the Holy See into a story of the birth and subsequent rise
of modern statism as such, with its most modern form, the nation-state, as the
hero. Knowing no sovereign instance above itself (even a divine one), this state
holds the exclusive power to deny ‘external actors’ the possibility of interfer-
ence in affairs within its territorial boundaries, on the one hand, and, also via
that sovereignty, the power to ‘determine [all] domestic authority structures’,
including the ones related to those all-too-divisive matters of belief, on the
other.⁷ When Westphalia is remembered in this way as the origin of what event-
ually became the secularism triumphans of an internally homogeneous and
secure (nation) state, the Treaty is invested with the power to have (thankfully)
closed the door on the age of devastating pan-European religious wars. But this
version of the tale also lays at Westphalia’s feet the responsibility for having
sanctioned precisely the proto-totalitarian authoritarianism associated with
the state’s right to both pre-emptive aggression against potential foes from the
outside and to normative ‘domestic jurisdiction’ within as well.⁸ Seen from
this perspective, the inauguration of the ‘modern’ era of territorially-organized
political culture in 1648 may appear to us today to have been something of a
mixed blessing.

In 1948 and in France, however, the memory of an earlier time when the
integrity of a state’s borders and the possibility of self-rule were perceived as
the norm was something to celebrate; the nationalist thrust of memory here is
reminiscent of the celebrations of ‘Utrecht’, which, as a number of the essays
make clear (Frijhoff, Olivas, and Farguson, for example), were also designed
for local consumption. Still traumatized, that is, by the German occupation
of 1940 to 1944 and by the more or less literal splintering of the nation into
the two sub-national and regionally identified Occupied and Vichy parts, and
then by the shattering of post-war solidarity by waves of retributive justice
after 1945, the official French public sphere was more than happy to engage

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⁶ Heinz Duchhardt, ‘Peace Treaties from Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era,’ in Peace Treaties
and International Law in European History, ed. Randall C.H. Lesaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 46 (note 3).

⁷ See Richard Falk, ‘Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia,’ The Journal of Ethics

⁸ See Falk, ‘Revisiting Westphalia’; Beaulac, ‘The Westphalian Model’ and Andreas Osiander,
The States System of Europe, 1640–1990. Peacemaking and the Conditions of International
in the commemoration of an earlier time when the nation-state was allegedly still intact. The early modern France of the Westphalian and post-Westphalian eras, with a glorious ‘most Christian King’ at the helm, was obviously a good candidate for a celebration of this sort—especially if one strategically elided the years of the Fronde—since it could be made to represent not only national political harmony, but also a moment of territorial enlargement that would make the nation whole again and secure. For it was via the Treaty signed in Münster in 1648 that the much disputed ‘three bishoprics,’ les Trois-Évêchés, as well as Alsace and the French cities of Brisach and Pignerol were officially realigned with France.9 In this context, and in light of the aptness of invoking an earlier moment of French solidarity with itself and territorial autonomy too, the French ‘Parlement’ and the ‘gouvernement de la République’ voted on 11 September 1947 to fund tercentenary celebrations of Westphalia throughout the nation and to introduce materials about the Treaty into all French schools.10

Beginning, naturally, in the once again reclaimed region of Alsace, and then followed by festivities in Paris, the quintessential capital of the modern centralized state, these commemorative performances were the products of considerable work. A grand tercentenary exhibit was mounted in Strasbourg at Le Château des Rohan, which opened on 13 June 1948, after a number of learned conferences on the topic had already occurred. The unmistakably localist thrust of the Strasbourg event is audible in the title of the exhibit: ‘L’Alsace française, 1648–1948’, and was also visible in the choreography of the show, at which, alongside the treaties and a variety of war-related portraits, maps, and artefacts, an array of Alsatian paintings as well as examples of the local industries of gold- and silver-smithery (‘orfèvrerie’), for which the city was so well known, were on view. The people of Strasbourg and visiting dignitaries alike were treated to spectacular fireworks on the evening of the 3rd of July; dancing in local Alsatian costumes took place on the main square the following day.11

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All of this was, of course, far more than just provincial entertainment, since, as in 1648, so too in 1948, the reclaiming of Alsace from Germany was one of the centrepieces of the post-war settlement and thus also of considerable trans-regional patriotic significance and national pride. Remembering Westphalia in Alsace after three hundred years was thus as instrumentalizing as the original celebrations of the Treaty themselves.

It was Paris's turn to take up the baton of the nation's memory-work three months later, celebrating the anniversary of Westphalia with a perhaps more historically oriented, although not entirely de-provincialized exhibit. The exhibit, ‘La Paix de Westphalie. 1648’, opened at the Parisian Hôtel de Rohan, where the French National Archives were and are housed, on 26 October, just two days after the actual anniversary of the day on which the treaties were historically signed on 24 October 1648.12 The curator of the Paris exhibit was the recently appointed director of the French National Archives, Charles Braibant. Braibant is remembered now as a middling novelist and, more importantly, as the man who centralized and systematized the country’s scattered archives in the difficult post-war years; his purpose in so doing can be heard in his famous description of the archive’s task. ‘Les archives sont l’arsenal de l’administration avant d’être le grenier de l’histoire’.13 Braibant penned a rousing preface to the slim exhibition catalogue that accompanied the Paris show; both his words and the selection of items displayed speak volumes about which memory of Westphalia the French ‘administration’ wanted to produce at the time.

Braibant opens his ‘Préface’ to the exhibition catalogue with a brisk, four-page account of France’s long, yet almost organically pre-determined ‘progress’ toward the Rhine.14 Beginning in the thirteenth century and continuing up through Francis I’s valiant efforts against the enemy Habsburgs—with the ‘support’ of course of ‘des princes protestants d’Allemagne en lutte contre l’empereur’15—and culminating in the efforts of ‘le grand cardinal’ Richelieu on behalf of ‘nôtre pays’,16 France became ‘complete’, its natural self, once the Three Bishoprics, Brisach, and of course Alsace were re-secured for the crown at the signing of the Treaty at Münster in 1648.17 ‘L’Alsace étant française’,

14 Braibant, La Paix de Westphalie, 5.
15 Ibid., 7.
16 Ibid., 7.
17 Ibid., 8.
Braibant writes, ‘la France est faite’. The Westphalian achievement was thus commemorated in Paris, as it had already been in Strasbourg, not as the beginning of a peaceful Europe-wide international system-of-states but, rather, as the triumph of the expansion and re-securing of a single nation-state’s borders. Braibant may have wanted to avoid appearing to be only the patriotic partisan that he was for he goes on to explain that, in light of the ‘crucial stage’ (‘étape decisive’) that Westphalia represented in the constitution of ‘les grandes concentrations nationales’ of ‘une Europe nouvelle’, he had early on invited the museums of France’s two greatest allies in the Thirty Years’ War, the Low Countries and Sweden, to contribute pieces to his exhibit. There had been tercentenary exhibits already in Delft and Stockholm, with one hundred thousand and three hundred thousand visitors respectively, he notes. In acts of modern solidarity that matched those noble efforts of arms in the past, France’s ‘deux grands alliés’ had generously complied by lending a variety of objects. After thanking any number of colleagues and institutions for their help, Braibant closes his preface by recalling that the exhibit’s title—‘La Paix de Westphalie’—underscores not the conflicts of both the more distant and nearer past but, rather, the long wished-for peace. He writes: ‘La paix: les hommes d’aujourd’hui sentent par expérience le poids divin de ce mot. Encore la guerre de Trente ans dépasse-t-elle en cruauté et en horreur les deux catastrophes que les présentes générations ont subies’. ‘La paix: en 1948 les hommes de toute l’Europe n’en ont-ils pas la même soif que leurs pères et leurs mères de 1648? Pax optima rerum’, he declaims. Gesturing toward the opening meetings of the United Nations in Paris at approximately the same time, Braibant concludes with a somewhat perplexingly doubled cosmopolitanist and nationalistic wish: ‘Est-il vain de souhaiter que les traits en gestation à cette heure, s’ils ne peuvent donner à notre pays autant de gloire et puissance que ceux dont les instruments figurent à l’hôtel de Rohan, de moins ne soient pas une trêve passagère’.

In their Introduction, de Bruin et al. argue that performative acts must be ‘public’ in order to exist. It is useful to consider the public nature of the exhibit in Paris in these terms. For example, the militaristically inflected vocabulary that Braibant uses (‘trêve’ as both armistice and cease-fire as well as pause or recess) and the catalogue of the ‘La Paix de Westphalie’ exhibit itself suggest

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18 Ibid., 9.
19 Ibid., 10.
20 Ibid., 14–15.
21 Ibid., 10.
22 Ibid., 15–16.
the kind of rich memory-palace experience (575 items were displayed) that visitors to the exhibit in post-war Paris would have been swept up into as a collective as they entered. The first seventy-seven items—various versions of the treaties and portraits of the major participants in the lengthy negotiations that finally came to fruition on that October day—work hard to convince the viewing public that the exhibit’s intention was to perform a memory of peace. We may nevertheless be forgiven, after considering the entire catalogue, for thinking that its overwhelming agenda was, rather, to appeal to a public with a taste for the tools and machinery of war. Perhaps displacing their memories of a more recent conflict by looking at one in the past, or perhaps, just as plausibly, recalling via the juxtaposition that, for all the brief ‘armistices’, or respites, from violence, what human history teaches is that war never really goes away, the exhibit may have been not just educational but also troubling for the Parisian public during its Fall run. The 286 war-related items that were displayed—four times the number of ‘peace’ items—create a somewhat different impression than Braibant’s opening praise of peace, in other words. Countless fine engravings of famous battles and sieges and military encampments were included, only occasionally interrupted by a number of ‘personal’, yet still battlefield-related items, including the armour and equipment of several of the better-known combatants, such as the sword and pourpoint, or padded shirt worn under the heavy armour, of Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, and a picture of the garb worn on formal occasions by his horse. Visitors could also admire the armour of the great and brutal French general, Turenne, even as they shrank back from his scowling portrait. This part of the show thus clearly relied on and endorsed the more or less magisterial version of the peace as a national military victory recounted by the winners.

It would be unfair not to note that the 1948 ‘La Paix de Westphalie’ exhibit did also feature a smallish selection of items, numbering just seven, that included several imprints from Callot’s famous etching series, ‘Les petites’ and ‘Les grandes Misères de la Guerre’ (1636 and 1633, respectively) displayed as items #344 and #345, thereby nodding ever so briefly in the direction of the truth of the matter, namely, that in wartime, it is the citizenry and unprotected who suffer. But these testimonies to the ‘miseries of war’ are dwarfed by the rest of the objects in both size and number as the exhibit barrels ahead, with a breathtaking matter-of-factness, to its final 210 objects, which celebrate what was to remain the real achievement of Westphalia in the French mind, again, the reacquisition of Alsace for ‘la France’. These final objects include maps and battle plans and city vistas of Metz, Verdun, and Strasbourg, with its mighty fortifications, which teach visitors over and over again that it was the expansion of the nation’s territorial borders that was the real point of the peace. The
underlying logic of the exhibit is unmistakable in the crowning shout-out to the enlarged nation represented by the final object displayed, Pierre du Val’s ‘Les Acquisitions de la France par la paix’, which catalogues the serial acquisition of territory by France up until the Treaty of Nijmegen of 1679 in detail. As it was ‘performed’ in Paris at the Hôtel de Rohan in 1948, then, the memory of the Peace of Westphalia was, well, Westphalian in the extreme, when Westphalianism is defined as the origin of the legitimacy of waging war when the borders of the sovereign territorial state must be secured. This was, of course, properly the case for France after its occupation by the Germans. But the nonchalant triumphalism of its ‘performance’ of memory is troubling all the same.

Act III—Westphalia in the Ruins / Germany Remembers 1648 after Three Hundred Years

The tone that governed the celebrations among the rubble in German Münster, the city where the Treaty of Westphalia between France’s ‘Most Christian King’ and the Holy Roman Empire had originally been signed, was decidedly different than the one that informed Braibant’s tercentenary exhibit in Paris. For example, on the poster designed by Joseph Faßbaender to announce the parallel German exhibit at the Münster Landesmuseum in 1948 the angel of peace, with her centrally placed trumpet, appears to call for a unifying reconciliation of peoples rather than for either Germany or France to (post-Potsdam) hunker down behind realigned borders.23 If the Münster exhibit may not have intentionally been designed to offer a metaphorical version of the literal olive branch that the angel holds in her left hand (which interestingly obscures the faintly Nazified imperial eagle of the Habsburg Empire beneath it in the image), it was clearly meant as a meditation on the way that Germany was going to rejoin the ‘family of nations’ that Westphalia was taken to signify24 after the defeat of a National Socialist state (a state that, after 1933, had of course endorsed a Westphalianism of a particularly ugly and destructive sort). It is in any case difficult to look at this poster or the pictures that survive of the ceremonial events that took place in Münster in October of 1948, including parades against the backdrop of still bombed-out buildings (91% of the centre of Münster had been destroyed by air bombardment in 1944–45) and ‘open-air’ lectures held

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24 Ibid., 85.
inside the museum, since the roof had not yet been repaired, and not see a performance of memory equally as ‘identity-forming’ as the one enacted in Paris, a performance that was, of course, also in clear contrast to Braibant’s exhibit, with its celebration of a victorious France.

Heinz Duchhardt has analysed the several different political economies visible in both the planning of the Münster exhibit and the attendant commemorative events in great detail. Depending on where one looks, one finds evidence for several differential memories of how Westphalia lived on for the Germans after the war. On the one hand, the original impetus for the tercentenary celebrations in Münster had come from the German office of the internationalist Union Européene des Fédéralistes (UEF), which was committed to a confederative model of a post-war ‘United States of Europe’ of a decidedly westward-leaning cast. Taken together, the other events of that year, including the London Six-Power Conference on (Western) Germany’s future as a composite occupied zone, the Blockade of Berlin (June 1948 to May 1949), and the 1948 currency reform, created a context within which remembering Westphalia as the founding moment of a peaceful international system of cooperating states could have been designed to signal Germany’s—and the Germans’—willingness to engage peacefully, if in a subordinate position, with its and their (Western) partners on equal footing. The ceremonies that opened on 24 October 1948 in the reassembled historical Hall of Peace (Friedenssaal) in the Münster City Hall (it had been dismantled and stored outside the city during the bombings), where the Treaty of Westphalia had originally been signed, and then moved into the museum for the official opening of the exhibit, in fact began with a greeting by Minister-President of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia Arnold, a ‘committed ‘European’ devoted to the (Catholic) Christian idea of a continent-spanning ‘Occident’ (‘Abendland’); the claim was, of course, somewhat at odds with the idea of Westphalia as having inaugurated the secular era of autonomous territorial states. Still and all, as Duchhardt reports, the idea of celebrating 1648 as the end of thirty years of divisive intra-European war and as the beginning of an era of inter-state cooperation was confirmed by a Dutch representative of Union Européene des Fédéralistes, one Dr. W. Kerkrade, who announced in his speech the publication of a ‘peace manifesto’ by the UEF that would be signed by local dignitaries and then brought via horse-relay (!) to The Hague. As in the case of English performances of Handel’s *Te Deum* on the occasion of Utrecht jubilees described in the Introduction, music played

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25 Ibid., 91, 93.
26 Ibid., 85–108.
27 Romberg-Jaschinski, cited in Ibid., 89.
a central role; a concert featuring Beethoven’s Ninth, followed by a massive peace demonstration in the centre of the city said to have drawn some twenty to thirty thousand people, at which more speeches celebrating the peace were followed by an evening of fireworks (perhaps uncomfortably reminiscent of the rain of bombs that many survivors had probably not yet forgotten), closed out a day on which Westphalia was remembered somewhat differently than in Paris, not as a celebration of the triumph of a single, re-consolidated, even expanded nation, in other words, but, rather, as a sober moment of recalling the historical creation of an international system of states that should have prevented the more recent intra-European conflict, perhaps even as a way of confirming that the newly formed United Nations (formally established, interestingly, on 24 October 1945), alongside the many other political and economic forms of European cooperation that were emerging, ought now to take the lead.

On the other hand, the ‘internationalist’ version of Westphalia remembered by Arnold and Kerkrade et al. was not the only one in circulation in Münster in 1948 and for good reason, since there was already a lengthy history in Germany, beginning soon after the ink on the Treaty was dry and building to a crescendo over the course of the nineteenth century and especially after Versailles, of seeing Westphalia as the origin of what can only be understood as the nation’s subsequent political tragedy, its subsequent failures (and horrifying successes as well) as a modern nation-state. While this longer history of the historiography of the Treaty had itself been a kind of battlefield, as Bernd Schönemann has shown, a clear narrative had begun to emerge between the end of the Old Reich in 1806 and the establishing of the new one in 1871. Bernhard Erdmannsdörffer’s ‘Zur Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges’ (1865) belongs to the tradition of the ‘klein-Deutschland’-affiliated side of these memories; it tells the tale of the Westphalian peace as catastrophic for Germany not only because the Treaty permitted foreign states (Sweden and France) to throw the dice that shaped Germany’s political future but also because it at least in theory allowed the old Reich (the Holy Roman one) to continue as a political actor. Both moves delayed for an unpardonably long time the emergence of the ‘real’ (e.g. post-1871) German Reich out of its original princely territorial (e.g. Brandenburg-Prussian) roots to its rightful position as an independent state. Somewhat earlier, the opposing ‘Großdeutschland’-position had been articulated by one Onno Klopp in his Der König Friedrich II. von Preussen und

die deutsche Nation (1860). According to Klopp, it was as a result of the Treaty’s ‘sacrifice’ of the ‘ancient’ German ‘Stände und Corporationen’ (estates and corporations) to ‘dem Willen [von] Territorialfürsten’ (the will of territorial princes), both large and small, that rulers like Frederick II could eventually came to power, only to undertake the splintering apart of ‘das Reich’ in a deliberate way when he did so. The effect—according to Klopp—was to consign to its political grave the only form of state organization (the imperial, all-encompassing one that included Austria-Hungary) that could have defended a truly universal German ‘Nationalgeist’ (national spirit) with success. The period of the Great War of 1914–18 and Germany’s defeat had thus already been understood as a particularly painful revival of Westphalia, with the German Reich forced yet again to submit to the jurisdiction of foreign powers and rendered incapable of protecting not only ‘ancient’ but modern German rights as well. In spite of the Congress of Vienna, this same Westphalian dispensation, the devolution of power to the level of the individual sovereign state, that is, had permitted political and military adventures on the part of autonomous secular polities unconstrained by any limiting powers of an inter- or transnational sort, thereby granting permission, as it were, to those very same bellicose states, including Germany, to go to war in 1914. This same logic then went on to permit the rise of Nazi Germany and the ensuing defeat a second time around just three years before the celebrations at Münster took place.

A tradition of negative memories of Westphalia of such vehemence and depth would have been difficult to suppress; indeed, as Duchhardt has shown, at least two of the eminences featured on 24 October 1948, the first a professor from the University of Münster, Kurt von Raumer, the second an invited speaker from Bonn University, Professor Max Braubach, solidly endorsed it. Raumer’s article, entitled ‘Overcoming the Peace of Westphalia’ (‘Die Überwindung des Westfälischen Friedens’), appeared in a special edition of the local newspaper, Westfälische Nachrichten, published on that day; in it, he articulates a ‘Großdeutschland’-position, whereby the Treaty is said to have been responsible for the destruction of Germany’s primal unity. Although Raumer does not appear to have mentioned it, the de facto partitioning of the country into an Allied and a Soviet zone that the Currency Reform of 1948 more or less guaranteed meant that this same ‘tragedy’ would be performed again in the here-and-now; the resulting absorption of Germany into a Europe-wide ‘occidental’ West made the revival of a true German unity even less likely. For his part, Braubach, in his speech at the commemorative event, which was also published that year, likewise characterized the Treaty of Westphalia as a ‘fatefully

29 Cf. Duchhardt, Das Feiern des Friedens, 94–95.
mistaken decision’ (‘eine verhängnisvolle Fehlentscheidung’) that permitted ‘self-interested neighbours’ (France) to dominate Germany, which, as a result, became ‘a lifeless ruin’, an ‘insubstantial shadow [of itself] with no hope for healing or reform’.30 One can only wonder how the audience responded to such downbeat ‘celebrations’ of peace, which were part of what Duchhardt calls an ‘exculpatory’ campaign31 designed to explain (if not explain away) Germany’s fall into National Socialism as the perverse result of the nation’s political belatedness, its desperate attempt to assert a sovereign self.

The actual tercentenary exhibit mounted at the Münster Landesmuseum nevertheless seems to have taken a somewhat different tack or at least presented its public with an opportunity to engage in acts of memory that revised (or could even resist) these kinds of inherited narratives by participating in a more present-, if not also future-oriented, project of critical remembering.32 No catalogue survives, but of its some five hundred items (described in an essay published by Paul Pieper a year after the exhibit closed), a certain number were of primarily local interest, including Gerard Terborch’s 1646 painting of the arrival of the Dutch ambassador, Adrian Pauw, in Münster for the Treaty negotiations. Citizens were thus to recall not only that it was in their home town that the peace had originally been performed—and was thus necessarily to be performed again by them—but also that it was in all likelihood to be at the level of the local (rather than the national) that a new German identity would have to be sought. Duchhardt notes that there was a surprising lack of glossing interpretations or re-enactment dioramas of either the war’s deadly battles or the treaty negotiations and signing. Rather, the viewing public was exposed to ‘original’ materials from the period and left to draw their own conclusions, perhaps even to debate the significance of the historical events to which they referred. Most interesting is the fact that the final room of the exhibit, mounted in a museum where the majority of the rooms had yet to be rebuilt, was devoted to documenting a second time and place that thus appears to have been just as much on the organizers’ minds as the Treaty signing itself, namely, the so-called ‘negotiations regarding the implementation of the peace’ (the ‘Friedensexekutionsverhandlungen’) that took place in Nuremberg in 1649–50. As vexed as the historical wrangling over the payment of reparations and debts and the stationing or withdrawal of occupying troops may have been in early modern Nuremberg in ways that would have clearly had post-

30 Ctd. in Ibid., 95–6.
31 Ibid., 99.
32 See Ibid., 102.
1945 parallels, Duchhardt speculates that it may have been the intention of the exhibit to suggest that even this kind of not-entirely-‘optimal’ peace was to be preferred to the continuation of the war that had left their city in ruins. In any case, the Münster exhibit ended with a quite different sense of the future that Westphalia had produced for their country than the one Braibant curated in Paris. Acknowledging the realities of occupation rather than of enlargement and based on a clear-eyed presentation of the pros and cons of war and peace instead of a rousing patriotic show, the German tercentenary memory theatre in Münster thus ‘invented’ a 1648 that suited its own post-war sensibilities and political-ideological needs.

Epilogue

Looking now at some distance at the ways in which the memory of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia travelled into the present in its tercentenary year of 1948 may prompt us to consider how the ways in which the 1713 Peace of Utrecht was called onto centre stage in 2013 will themselves be remembered, perhaps also allegorically, by future generations. It remains open whether the two-act ‘play’ about the several afterlives of Westphalia that I have staged here reveals performances that were more comic or more tragic, whether, that is, the various historical actors, after apparent conflicts, might themselves have understood the need for and embraced harmony at the end, or whether it is only we, as a latter-day spectator audience in the privileged position of having observed their division into two or more camps, can leave the theatre of history understanding these positions’ essential similarity and much better equipped to find our own new identity by playing a third, more peaceful role. As for the Peace of Utrecht: Here too it remains open which of the many memories of Utrecht staged in the present volume will be the ones that will be said to have figured early twenty-first century conditions and concerns. What is clear, however, is that as we remember, so will we be remembered in turn.

34 Duchhardt, Das Feiern des Friedens, 102.