CHAPTER 1

“Killed the Pilgrims and Persecuted Them”: Portuguese Estado da India’s Encounters with the Hajj in the Sixteenth Century

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Urumi (Santosh Sivan, August Cinema, 2011) is a South Indian film, which tells a story of a boy named Kēlu, who sought to kill Vasco da Gama, one of the earliest European navigators to arrive in the Indian subcontinent. He took an oath upon witnessing a massacre of Hajj-pilgrims by the Portuguese legates. As the voice-over in the background narrates, in his second voyage in 1502, Gama anchored fifteen warships in the waters of Ezimala at the Malabar Coast. He encountered and subsequently captured a ship returning from Mecca, which contained four-hundred pilgrims including women and children. The ship’s Captain, Khwaja al-Faqi, offered him four shiploads of pepper and gold in exchange for their freedom. Gama declined the offer. In an attempt to release the pilgrims, the local ruler Cirakkal Kottuvāḷ sent his son Kēlu along with a Brahmin priest to Gama’s ship in the hope that he would not attack an unarmed child and priest. Gama had expected the arrival of the chief-rulers Zamorins or Kōlattiris for negotiations, hence their presence was not welcomed. He moreover despised them and their customs. He cut off the priest’s tongue and ears, wounded the boy’s cheek, and opened fire on the pilgrim-ship. Upon detecting this attack, Kottuvāḷ travelled to Gama’s ship, rescued Kēlu, cut Gama’s finger and attempted to kill him. Kottuvāḷ was subsequently captured by other Portuguese men on board and was beheaded by Gama. Kēlu swam to the shore, where he encountered numerous corpses of pilgrims lying on the coastline. Among the corpses was a mother who lay dying. To Kēlu, she extended the same jewels that she had offered Gama in exchange for the lives of herself and her child. Taking these jewels, he sculpted a golden weapon (called Urumi) to fight against the growth of Portuguese power in the Malabar Coast. There he took an oath to kill Gama, and the film progresses with a variety of dramatic twists and chronological whirlpools.

This film is a historical imagination stating that it “is inspired by actual events; all the incidents, characters and timelines have been changed for dramatic purposes.” Beyond the historical imagination and fictional adaptation, the historical accuracy of the events is something that I will revisit below. For
now, suffice it to say that the portrayal of the massacre of Hajj-pilgrims by the Portuguese three-four years after Gama’s ‘great voyage’ to India is a recurrent theme in South Asian regional memories and are revealed through such popular narratives as films, fictions, songs and ballads. Rhetorical accounts of this attack with multiple variations and alterations intermittently appear whenever an indigenous narrative of the Portuguese arrival in the subcontinent is made.1 This chapter enquires into the historical events in which the “rhetoric of torture” and the earliest European encounters with the Hajj collide in the Indian Ocean waters.

Despite its social, economic and political dimensions, the Hajj is primarily a religious event in which Muslims from across the world gathered annually to perform particular rituals at the arid zones in and around Mecca. Hence, the Portuguese voyagers who had principally economic motivations had no direct prerequisites to intercept such a ritual undertaken by different religious groups. Whilst many historians have made this claim, the entanglement of “secular” Portuguese against the “religious” performance of Hajj is merely a notion taken-for-granted of which the sheath has to be peeled to understand the historical core. It was deeply rooted in the long-tradition of encounters between Europe and the East, with significant religious undertones. The collision between Christian Europe and the Islamic world intensified through the centuries-long crusades. This continued in the waters of the Indian Ocean, in which rituals such as the Hajj became a hot-issue of unmasking the economic interests against religious ventures. In this way, the Portuguese had a special attentiveness towards the Hajj in the sixteenth century. It was fuelled by contemporary developments in Europe on one hand, and in the Indian Ocean on the other. The new Jesuit missionary associated with the Portuguese undertakings brought another dimension as they thought that the rigorous religious movement of the Hajj would constantly counter their dreams of Christianising Asian terrains.

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Few scholars have paid special attention to Portuguese entanglements with the Hajj, which can be considered one of the earliest European encounters with this Muslim pilgrimage in the age of empires. Michael Pearson's groundbreaking study published in 1994 provided a remarkable early modern narrative with its religious, political and economic dimensions. He rejects the idea of the secular Portuguese having a religious tinge in their encounters with the Hajj by arguing that they had only political and economic interests. As we shall see, this argument is unwarrantable upon looking into the Asian or Islamic narratives in contrast to the Portuguese versions. In the same year, Suraiya Faroqhi shed light on the Ottoman engagements with Portuguese interruptions in maritime routes. Sanjay Subrahmanyan's article on Persians, pilgrims, and the Portuguese in the context of the eastern coast of South Asia is another noteworthy investigation, though Pearson has questioned its factual data. Subrahmanyan's monograph on Vasco da Gama also provides some passing references to the theme.

The existing studies on early modern South Asia are mostly Mughal-centric in the treatment of the Portuguese-Hajj interactions, mainly because of the fact that the “Muslim” Mughals were the prominent political entity in the subcontinent. Farooqi, Pearson, and Digby have written about the Mughal felicitations towards the Hajj primarily engaging with the elite experiences of pilgrims belonging to royal family, military or bureaucratic strands, from the empire and its subordinate kingdoms. Though Pearson tried to go beyond such ‘elitist’ or

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2 This is not to forget the literatures on the Hajj during the early modern centuries with different thematic concerns. For example, see F.E. Peters, *The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 206–248.

3 Michael Pearson, *Pious Passengers: The Hajj in Earlier Times* (Delhi: Sterling Publishers; London: C. Hurst and Co., 1994). In this chapter, I have primarily depended on Pearson’s work for many Portuguese sources. Unless otherwise mentioned, the Portuguese sources and translations are from him.


upper middle-class layers, the lack of source-materials has impeded him. This Mughal-centred narrative would not help us to explore the Portuguese encounters with the Hajj, as the Mughal Empire confronted them only nominally at certain ports in the western and eastern coasts. The Portuguese dealt with the coastal belts, which was not of much interest to the Empire as its focus was on the agricultural systems and overland mercantile networks. The chain of minor kingdoms in the Coromandel Coast in the east and in Malabar-Konkan coasts in the south-west encountered them more than any other hinterland monarchies. Their concords with the Hajj against the Portuguese inflictions have been neglected in the historiography, with the exception of the aforementioned article of Subrahmanyam which geographically goes beyond the epicentre of Mughal world into the Coromandel Coast, although its main focus is not on the sixteenth century.

Against this background, this chapter enquires as to the extent of Portuguese encounters with the Hajj which turned out to be a matter that incited a religious community of South Asia to fight against the Estado da India for almost a century. I argue that the claim of “secular” Portuguese not interfering in the “religious” Hajj is erroneous, and both the Estado officials and their Jesuit allies tried their best to interrupt the pilgrimage. As an antithesis, this has led to the production of many polemics on the south-westerly coast of the Indian subcontinent, a region that never fell under the Mughal realm. I analyse these encounters and counter-encounters by briefly contextualizing them in the Iberian Peninsula’s familiarities with the Hajj. From there I move into South Asia and there I focus on Malabar, which was the prime locus of early European engagements with Asia. I explore how and why the Portuguese attacked the Hajj-pilgrims; and how it provoked the “organic intellectuals” of Malabar to call for holy-wars against the “cross-worshipping,” “foreign” Europeans.

**Early Phases of Encounters**

The European engagement with the Hajj in the late medieval and early modern centuries had multiple layers, as it was mediated through societal, individual, administrative, and missionary echelons varying from imaginings to

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direct interactions. The early encounters occasionally operated in overlapping forms, connecting the European religious interests in the Islamic world and its customs and practices, intertwined with political, economic and ethnic dispositions.

The then Muslim minority of Europe and the Christian majority had two contrasting acquaintances with the Hajj. Regarding the Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula we have clear evidence of their Hajj-journeys differing from the personal accounts to the administrative standpoints. During and after the Reconquista, the free movement and lives of Muslims (Moriscos or Mudéjars, as they were called) were hindered by the administrative and military authorities. However, there were some independent political entities in which Muslims were comparatively unrestricted and were allowed to act upon their religious beliefs, of which the Pyrenean Kingdom of Navarre is one example. We also have interesting source-materials that explicate the Morisco-pilgrimage in different ways such as fatwas, travel accounts, etc. All such works were reserved only for Muslims as they were written in the so-called Aljamiado literature—Spanish written in Arabic script—which intentionally prevented Christian Europeans from understanding it. For this clandestine characteristic of Muslim intellectual engagements in Spain and many other reasons, the medieval European public sphere had many misconceptions about the Hajj and Ḥijāz even though they had hajis so close to them. They misunderstood the Hajj as a pilgrimage to the tomb of the Prophet Muḥammad, which they believed to be situated in Mecca, hanging in the air. Some who claimed to have visited these places asserted such delusions.

This was changed only partially, as such beliefs existed even until the twentieth century, after the appearance of accounts of European Christians who made their way into Mecca. The journeys conducted by Ludovico di Varthema and by an unknown Portuguese person are remarkable in this regard. Many scholars

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have discussed their accounts in detail, though not specifically problematizing such early individual encounters of Europeans with the Hajj. Varthema, the Italian traveller, aristocrat, and soldier in the Mamluk sultans’ army who entered Mecca in May 1504, not only provided descriptions about the religious facets of pilgrimage, but also described the economic and political aspects of Mecca, Jeddah, and Medina.\footnote{Ludovico di Varthema, \textit{The Travels of Ludovico di Varthema in Egypt, Syria, Arabia Diserta and Arabia Felix, in Persia, India and Ethiopia}, A.D. 1502 to 1508, trans. John Winter Jones, ed. with an intro. George Percy Badger (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1863).} Affonso de Albuquerque, the Portuguese general and empire-builder, also provided similar narratives in the early sixteenth century. He observed that Mecca was reliant on Jeddah for food-supplies, which itself depended on imports from other Red Sea expanses. On the commercial aspects of Jeddah he noted that there was a very immense traffic of merchandise including jewels and spices.\footnote{Affonso de Albuquerque, \textit{Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque seguidas de documentos que as elucidam} (Lisbon: Typographia da Academia Real das Sciencias, 1884–1935), 7 vols, vol. i: 223.} Another Portuguese report in the early sixteenth century sheds light on political and economic aspects, such as the local rulers and the Sharifs of Mecca as well as heavy taxation of pilgrim caravans and the fact that the pilgrims used to complain about it.\footnote{Joao de Barros, \textit{Da Asia: Dos Feitos, Que os Portuguese Fizeram no Descubrimento, e Conquista dos Mares, e Terras do Oriente} (Lisbon: Regia Officina Typografica, 1777), vol. ii: ii: 6. According to this, a caravan from Cairo alone had to pay 12,000 cruzados.} An unknown Portuguese author also provides historically accurate descriptions about the pilgrimage, but it was not well-known in its manuscript form until its rediscovery in the twentieth century.\footnote{This document has been translated and analysed by G. Levi Della Vida, “A Portuguese Pilgrim at Mecca in the Sixteenth Century,” \textit{The Muslim World} 32 (1942): 283–297.} However, even such individual accounts and first-hand descriptions about the pilgrimage did not alter the wider European misconceptions of the time, for reasons such as limited circulation and reception.

The rise of the Portuguese maritime empire gave another dimension to the early European encounters with the Hajj. The Estado introduced an official \textit{cartaz} (pass)-system for all ships. Any ship sailing without this pass was captured, attacked, and/or sunk in the sea. Turkish and Arab ships, many of which carried Hajj-pilgrims, were the main victims of this new regulation. Pearson writes that the Portuguese attacked or sunk such ships along with the pilgrims as it was difficult to differentiate between the pilgrims and soldiers or sailors, thus the pilgrims became the victims of such measures only indirectly.\footnote{Pearson, \textit{Pious Passengers}, 89–95.} How-
ever, the ships containing pilgrims did not engage in an open encounter with the Portuguese unless the problem of cartazes was raised. The first reported Portuguese attack on Muslim-ships was a pilgrim-ship that Gama attacked even after he had known that it was a pilgrim-ship, as discussed below. Apart from the cartazes, there were other administrative measures that directly countered the free movement of pilgrims through the Indian Ocean, such as prohibiting the pilgrim-ships from entering certain ports under Portuguese control, preparing for attacks on the port-towns adjacent to Mecca like Jeddah, and threatening sea pathways near the Red Sea and the pilgrimage routes to Mecca.15

Another European altercation with the Hajj was instigated by the Jesuit missionaries who accompanied the Portuguese entrepreneurship in Asia. They intentionally generated a hostile attitude towards the Hajj pilgrims, representing another layer of old European combats of crusades against the Muslim world. From the first half of the sixteenth century, missionaries were trying to put the Estado under pressure to take various prohibitive actions against the Muslim pilgrims, as we shall see. It was not only missionaries who had an explicit religious interest against the Hajj but also administrative and mercantile units of the Estado demonstrated similar undertones in their use of power and machinery.

Ports, Routes and Pilgrims: South Asia as an Epitome

Since the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean—the most important maritime highway for pilgrims travelling by sea—the western coast of the Indian subcontinent began to be a crucial locale that expounded European encounters with the Hajj. Contemporary sources manifest representations of religious, political, and economic aspirations of the Portuguese and Muslims, which collided in the grounds of Hajj. Beyond the Mughal Empire, several minor kingdoms, especially the ones on the south-western coasts of Malabar and Konkan, played crucial roles in Portuguese confrontations with the pilgrims. Until the sixteenth century, the Malabari merchants and pilgrims went directly from Calicut or other adjacent ports to Jeddah, as well as the Arab-Persian merchants. Returning pilgrims voyaged straight into the Arabian Sea.

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and anchored at Calicut. Though this was interrupted by constant blockades of the Portuguese, the Malabari merchants and pilgrims tried to outplay the Portuguese control in different ways. The effectiveness of this blockade had diminished by the mid-sixteenth century. Malabari merchandises were transported in large numbers into the Red Sea and to the Inner Asian and Mediterranean markets, which also facilitated the movement of pilgrims directly from Calicut to Jeddah.\textsuperscript{16}

The direct mercantile and cultural linkage between Calicut and Jeddah is the most important component in this regard. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Malabar had developed trade-connections with East Asia and Southeast Asia, as well as with West Asia in which the port of Jeddah had an important role. The Portuguese historian of the early sixteenth century Fernão Lopes de Castanheda has written about this mercantile connection in which Malabari spices from Calicut were traded by the merchants of Arabia, Egypt and Venice via Jeddah. Out of this trade, Arab merchants and rulers and the Venetians made huge profits, as Castanheda estimates it up to eight times.\textsuperscript{17} This close association of Malabaris with Jeddah and the Portuguese distress towards this commercial interconnection were well explicated in a letter written to King John III (1502–1557) in 1538. In the letter, the Portuguese officials requested permission from the king to build a fort at the mouth of the Red Sea in order to seal off the Indian influence over the area and to secure the dominance to the king. With this the Portuguese primarily targeted the Malabaris so that “they have no life outside their trade with Jeddah (Judaa).”\textsuperscript{18} Even if it might be an exaggeration, it shows the bondage between Malabar and Jeddah even after the Portuguese arrival. This to and fro direct shipping route between the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea also facilitated direct pilgrimage-voyages without depending on the celebrated “Indian Hajj-port” of Surat (the Gujarat coast), which was often identified as \textit{bāb al-makkah} (the gateway of Mecca), \textit{bandar-i mubārak} (the blessed port or the auspicious harbour), and ‘the door to the House of God.’

We also have references to the satellite ports of Calicut such as Ponnāni—which interestingly was called Little Mecca—facilitating pilgrimage-ships; and we have evidence of Muslims in the region sending alms to be distributed in Mecca. From Ponnāni and Calicut, Muslim traders and other laypersons

\begin{thebibliography}
\bibitem{16} Pearson, \textit{Pious Passengers}, 155.
\bibitem{17} Fernão Castanheda, \textit{Historia do descobrimento e conquista da India pelos Portugueses, 1552–1561: 11} (Lisbon, Typographia Rollandiana, 1833).
\end{thebibliography}
annually sent charitable supplies prior to, and sometimes following, the Portuguese disruptions.\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Fath al-mu‘īn}, a celebrated Shāfi‘īte legal text written in sixteenth-century Malabar, frequently clarifies rulings related to the complexities of sending donations to Mecca.\textsuperscript{20} Some Malabaris even constructed hospices in Mecca for the convenience of pilgrims. Such initiatives were undertaken with the protective help and permission of the rulers, who in this case were Hindus.

The rulers’ support of the pilgrimage and related matters had economic motivations, though some had political and religious aspirations as partially was the case with the sultans of Gujarat and Bijapur. Many kingdoms made notable profit from the Hajj. Ashin Das Gupta suggests that the trade and pilgrimage were closely linked in the context of Gujarat, since around fifty percent of gross profits that the region made from the Red Sea trade depended on the annual pilgrimage. Thus the Hajj, as a “clement one”, helped the growth of the largest market of the Indian Ocean merchant, as two-thirds of Gujarati exports to the Red Sea were sold at Mecca.\textsuperscript{21} Pearson casts doubts on this, but he agrees that there certainly were trade goods on pilgrimage ships.\textsuperscript{22} The Golconda Sultan also sent subsidised ships with multiple purposes by exploiting the transoceanic markets for the products from his kingdom. He moreover got permission to distribute alms in his name among the people in Mecca. He also requested an easy passage not only for the Hajj-pilgrims, but also for the Arab-Persian immigrants to his kingdom.\textsuperscript{23} In the contexts of Malabar and Konkan coasts interests were not different. It was not just these local rulers who had economic interests in the pilgrimages and related trade. The mighty Muslim dynasties had similar interests, since they were actively partaking in the on-going commercial activities. Thus any attack on the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{22} Pearson, \textit{Pious Passengers}, 138.
\bibitem{23} Subrahmanyam, “Persians, Pilgrims and the Portuguese,” 505.
\end{thebibliography}
pilgrims and traders of Malabar invoked not only the political and economic interests of kingdoms of the Indian subcontinent, but also had wider relevance as the local rulers managed to attract the support from outside worlds such as the Ottomans and Mamluks as well as from their own aristocratic and mercantile groups.

**Portuguese Interruptions: Beyond Economy**

The Portuguese maritime empire is said to have been secular in its attitude due to sole interests in economic facets and its facilitative political and social structures. However, Christian missionaries wanted to take action against Muslim pilgrimage.\(^{24}\) This argument is not sustainable on the basis of some recent studies that explained how the Portuguese, or the Iberian maritime entrepreneurs in general, kept a “crusading” spirit in their commercial partialities.\(^{25}\) Taking cue from them, I also argue that besides the Portuguese ambitions to gain commercial benefits, their dealings with the Hajj had a religious inner-layer that disrupted the movements of Muslim pilgrims in the sixteenth century.

The arrival and presence of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean generated a fear among the indigenous mercantile and political communities in general, and among the Muslim pilgrims in particular. Especially, the introduction of cartaz-pass and the actions of capturing, attacking and/or sinking the ships travelling without it had wider implications in the minds of both traders and pilgrims. For example, *Akbar Nama*, written by the Mughal court-historian Abul Fazl (1551–1602) informs us about the fear that pilgrims as well as political entities had when members of the royal family wanted to set out for Hajj. When Gulbadan Begum—daughter of Babur who established the Mughal empire—decided to go for pilgrimage in the middle of 1570s, her nephew and the then emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605) was worried about the possible attacks by the Portuguese due to widespread rumours. A higher official named Qilich Khan was then sent to Surat to authorize the safety and dangers in setting voyage at that time. Only after he confirmed safety by securing permission through negotiating the price with the Portuguese could Gulbadan Begum start her pilgrimage journey along with numerous other members of the royal family.

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and court in two ships. Bayazid Beg Turkman, another Mughal official, also described the disruptions that the Portuguese caused to his pilgrimage to Mecca when he set off to the Hijáz from Surat in 1578.

In the particular cases of Malabar and Bijapur the scenario was the same. Attacks and fears can be traced back to the sixteenth-century historical sources. The first known and reported Portuguese onslaught on the pilgrims in the Indian Ocean occurred in the waters of Malabar, as the aforementioned film tried to imagine. Its basic historical content, if not the narrative and reconstructions, corresponds with some actual events that happened in the early sixteenth century. Near Calicut, as early as 1502, Vasco da Gama seized a big Mamluk royal-owned ship named the *Meri*, which had left Calicut with much merchandise; and “because it was so large and secure, many honoured Muslims travelled on it on pilgrimage to their abomination of Mecca, and it returned with these pilgrims and also a very rich cargo.” In his *Da Asia*, Joao de Barros stated that Gama and his associates captured the ship and burned it along with the pilgrims and merchants even though they offered a large payoff to the Portuguese. One captain of the ship was rescued due to his expertise and some twenty children were captured in order to convert them to Christianity. More interestingly, we have an underutilized narrative from the ship of Gama itself by an anonymous Dutch voyager who had travelled with Gama all the way from Lisbon to Calicut. In his account, he wrote about the burning of the pilgrims' ship:

> On the 11th day of September we arrived in a kingdom called Cannaer [Cannanore], and it is situated [sic] near a chain of mountains called Montebyl [Mount Eli or Ezhimala], and there we watched the ships of Meccha, and they are ships which carry the spices which come to our country, and we spoiled the woods, so that the King of Portugal alone would get spices from there. But it was impossible for us to accomplish our design. Nevertheless, at the same time we took a Meccha ship, on board of which were 380 men and many women and children, and we took from it at least 12,000 ducats and at least 10,000 more worth of goods; and we burnt the ship and all the people on board with gun powder, on the first day of October.

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28 Joao de Barros, *Da Asia*, 1, vi: 3.
29 Anonymous, *Calcoen: A Dutch Narrative of the Second Voyage of Vasco Da Gama to Calicut*
This narrative not only tells us about the burning of a pilgrim-ship but also refers to the presence of many more ships of Mecca. Similar blitzes over the pilgrims were repeated at various points of time in the sixteenth century.

Such particular attacks and general hostilities by the Portuguese towards the mercantile communities of Calicut had its wider psychological sways over the public consciousness of pilgrimage and physical impacts on the entrepreneur-ships. The place of Malabar in the Hajj-network with direct linkages between Calicut and Jeddah was unsettled in the early sixteenth century when the Portuguese wanted to disrupt the existing trade- and pilgrimage-routes controlled by the Muslims or Arabs. The Portuguese commenced to block the Red Sea for Muslim-ships and attacked any unrecognized entrants. Naturally the merchants and pilgrims from Calicut had to either avoid their direct journeys from Calicut to Jeddah, to sail more cautiously and unhurriedly outplaying the Portuguese eyes, or to anchor at Aden in order to watch out for Portuguese presence in the nearby seas. Gradually Aden became a crucial centre of trade and transhipment for them; and the Malabari ships often did not dare to go beyond that to Jeddah. These developments significantly disrupted the linkage between Malabar and Jeddah, as much as it affected Mecca itself. According to Faroqhi, the Portuguese incursions into the Red Sea generated panic and uncontrolled price-hikes and led the Sharif of Mecca to send his young son to the Ottoman Sultan in Cairo offering the suzerainty of Hijāz in order to save the region from poverty and insecurity.30 This also naturally intensified the troubles of pilgrims from the southern parts of the Indian subcontinent. In the case of Malabar, there were around twenty-five ships annually, or ten to fifteen ships


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30 On the transfer of Mecca to the Ottoman hands, see ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Ḥusayn ʿIṣāmī, Samṣ al-nujūm al-ʿawālī fi anbāʾ al-awāʾil wa al-tawālī (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Salafiyya wa-Maktabatuhā, 1960/61), vol. 4, 94; Muhammad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Abī al-Surūr, al-Minaḥ al-Raḥmāniyya fi al-dawla al-ʿUthmāniyya: wa-dhayluh, al-Laṭāʾif al-Rabbāniyya ʿalā al-minaḥ al-Raḥmāniyya (Damascus: Dār al-Bashāʾir, 1995), 185–202. Faroqhi (Pilgrims and Sultans, 147) says: “the Meccan food supply closely depended on the arrival of grains from Egypt. [...] Before these accursed unbelievers [the Portuguese] arrived, a tuman of grain sold for 20 ashrafi coins. When the news arrived, the price increased to 30 on the very same day, and to 40 a day later. It still continues to rise, and people say that it will reach 100.’ This was the report of the Ottoman naval commander Selman Reʾis from Jeddah, and it explains why the Hejaz submitted to Ottoman domination without a shot being fired.” Compare this with an economic historical analysis by Richard T. Mortel, “Prices in Mecca during the Mamluk Period,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 32 (1989): 279–334.
intermittently, leaving Calicut for the Red Sea in the early sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{31} This number diminished to eleven or twelve ships by the 1560s.\textsuperscript{32} Nevertheless, this disruption of the direct cruise between Malabar and Jeddah gradually became ineffective for different reasons: a) the Portuguese blockade of the Red Sea was loosened by the 1540s, and b) the Malabari voyagers were clever enough to circumvent Portuguese control.

In the latter case, we have references to the mode of Malabaris setting voyage carefully, watching out for any possible Portuguese attacks. Genevieve Buchon writes about the \textit{sambuks} from Malabar heading to the Red Sea, escorted to the high seas by the \textit{paraos} well-equipped with 20–30 oarsmen, more than one hundred archers or harquebusiers, and three or four pieces of artillery in each. Though Malabaris harassed the Portuguese armadas in the waters close to the coasts, they tried to avoid any encounters in the open sea where their weaponries were ineffective at reaching the high-sided Portuguese ships.\textsuperscript{33} Such sambuk carried not only merchandise, but also the pilgrims and alms to distribute in Mecca during the high-seasons of Hajj. These ships sailed without any cartaz; and even if the Portuguese knew about it, they were incapable of extinguishing it. One letter from the Portuguese Crown written towards the end of the sixteenth century asked the viceroy to withdraw his moves to erect a fort at Ponnâni in southern Malabar and instructed him “to utilize the funds for raising a fleet to combat the corsairs whose ships were still sailing to Mecca without Portuguese cartazes.”\textsuperscript{34}

The decisions and actions of the Portuguese administrative and commercial offices were ignited by constant religious incitements from the Jesuit missionary and the Catholic Church. Pearson writes that the “Church of course was most open and most vehement in its opposition to Islam, and especially to the pilgrimage,” which was translated in “a series of anti-Muslim decrees” by the Provincial Councils held at Goa.\textsuperscript{35} Among many anti-Muslim statements of the Provincial Council held in 1567 under the presidency of first archbishop of Goa

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Pearson, \textit{Pious Passengers}, citing ANTTCC, 1–106–50.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Pearson, \textit{Pious Passengers}, 98.
\end{itemize}
(Gaspar de Leão Pereira, d. 1576), decree 35 particularly dealt with the issue of Muslim pilgrims:

Many Muslims and other infidels come to our ports with books of their sects, and their false relics that they bring from the House of Mecca, and other places they hold to be holy, and they pass through our territories with these things to their own areas. The officials of the customs houses are ordered that when these books and relics are seen, they should not be cleared but rather the prelates or vicars should be informed and they should examine them and if they find them to be such, should burn them.36

Almost two decades later, the Third Provincial Council held in 1585 was enraged over the Hajj-problem by declaring that cartazes must not be given to go on pilgrimage to “the house of Mecca or to the pagodas of the gentiles.” A decree clearly specified: “This Synod, in conformity with the Vienna Council, declares that cartazes and licenses, either verbal or written, must not be given to Muslims so that they can go on pilgrimage to the house of Mecca to their false Muḥammad ...”37 Furthermore, it instructed the captains of Hormuz in Persia and all higher officials in charge of fortresses in India to observe such prohibition, “as one would hope from good Christians zealous in the faith.” All these decrees and resolutions from the side of Church were motivated by its own religious interests and its fear towards the spread of Islam across the Indian Ocean world.38

Despite such significant decrees from the Provincial Councils, Pearson argues that the effectiveness of such resolutions was very minimal as they did not have a sway over economy which was mostly secular. In his view, although the religious/missionary authorities wanted to be strict and intolerant to pilgrims and the importation of Muslim religious books or relics or “traffic in idolatry,” the so-called secular authorities were generally more relaxed and less strict, tempering the religious opposition with economic realities.39 Such a differentiation between religious groups and secularly economic and political structures

38 Pearson, Pious Passengers, 99.
is difficult to incorporate into the contemporary societal diasporic levels of the Indian Ocean in which one aspect was not devoid of the other. Notwithstanding the close association of religion, politics and economy in Iberian Peninsula, the same approaches operated concomitantly and inseparably in the Indian Ocean contexts too. Pearson himself describes elsewhere that religion was not merely “a sacral coating on the hard and fundamental economic motivation.” In addition, he confirms that “most Portuguese were God-fearing, did try to follow their religion as they saw it, and could be swayed by appeals from their priests.”

Even supposing that the “secular” Portuguese of Estado were not influenced by the ongoing political and economic measures back in the Iberian Peninsula against Muslims and their pilgrimages through *Reconquista* and inquisitions, at least in Malabar’s context it is plausible to argue that political-economic groups and religious entities functioned inseparably or at least in parallel. According to one treaty signed by Portuguese representatives with the Zamorin of Calicut in 1599, the latter agreed to cease persecuting Christians. He allowed the establishment of Catholic churches in Malabar and supported the Synod of Diamper on the banishment of the customs and practices followed by the St. Thomas Christians. Moreover, the treaty requested the release of all Portuguese and Christian prisoners. In return, political officials offered many cartazes for his ships bound to Jeddah, Bengal, Aceh and Canara. This treaty, like many others, clearly explicates that delineation of economy and religion in the Portuguese dealings is superficial. Assuming that they were only disconnected in the case of Muslim pilgrimage would be rather injudicious, especially when we have examples of Portuguese capture of around twenty Muslim children from the aforesaid pilgrim-ship in order to convert them into Christianity, while all other pilgrims were massacred and their ship was burnt in 1502.

Furthermore, a sharp distinction between “secular” and “religious” Portuguese interests during this era is an outcome of exclusive use of Portuguese frames and sources without paying attention to the side of indigenous people who had certainly perceived both the Jesuit missionaries and Portuguese traders as the same *ifranj* and foreign Christians. The Portuguese continued attacking pilgrims on various grounds, while the Muslim public sentiments vehemently responded to the attacks in their religious responses and physi-
cal actions. The Muslims of Malabar launched jihad against many Portuguese interruptions, including into their journeys to the Holy Cities.

Counter-Interruptions: Hajj Intertwines with Jihad

Portuguese attacks on the Hajj-pilgrims provoked the local Muslims to respond in an obvious way. The ‘ulamā’ of Ponnāni (the prominent religious educational centre in Malabar by the sixteenth century) came up with various fatwās, religious sermons, and texts summoning the Muslim community to unite against Portuguese atrocities. They also sought support through their treatises and envoys from prominent Muslim Mamluk and Ottoman rulers. While one treatise was dedicated to the sultan of Bijapur, another one appreciated the Hindu ruler of Calicut. We do not have any text talking about the Mughals in this respect. This illustrates the mutual alliance among the “victims” of coastal belts as well as their contacts from distant lands, such as the Mamluks and Ottomans around the maritime scape of the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, in contrast to the hinterland-centric Mughals. In constructing a transoceanic bondage, the pilgrimage set a starting point for allying against what had been perceived as Portuguese “cruelties.”
The incitements against the Portuguese had their foundations in religious sentiments calling for jihad against the “cross- and image-worshipping” Christian Portuguese, who were said to have inflicted troubles on the comfort-zones of the Muslims’ social and religious mobility. In South Asia (ruled by the Mughal Empire and many other local kingdoms who mainly were Muslims), the case of Malabar is exceptional, since it was reigned by the Hindu kingdoms. It is worth noting that such calls for jihad and jihadi literatures were produced in this region, but in this case not against the Hindu rulers. Instead, they were directed against the Christian Portuguese interlopers who made their social and religious lives troublesome. The foundational motives of such calls were added up with the discriminative facts that “Muslim shippers in the Indian Ocean were more affected than Hindus or members of other religious groups, as Portuguese officials were accustomed to regarding Muslims of whatever background as their principal enemies.”

From a wider South Asian perspective, we do not have enough historical evidence from the Muslim scholars, aristocrats, or rulers invoking any religious sentiment of holy-war against the Portuguese, for they hinder the pilgrimage alone. We have, however, partial references to the resentments of the Mughal emperors towards the Portuguese atrocities: when Akbar heard about the Portuguese ravages and blockades of pilgrimage during his aunt’s intended pilgrimage to Mecca. He is said to have raged against the Portuguese verbally. Yet, he did not take any action against them. Instead of going to a direct encounter, he ensured a temporal security and safety for the journey of his royal family members and courtiers. However, other Muslims such as Makhdūm al-Mulk Mullah ʿAbd Allāh (d. 1582), the Shaykh al-Islām of Akbar, asked the rulers to ensure safety for their pilgrimage to Mecca on their way through the land-routes controlled by the “heretical” Shiʿite Persians or the sea-routes dominated by the Christian Portuguese. It is reported that “Akbar came to an understanding with the Portuguese and permitted the pilgrims (under a Mīr Hajj) to go on land or sea with their expenses being borne by the state.” Later, Akbar preferred the maritime route for pilgrims over the land route. When he was advised to make alliances against Persia in order to remove difficulties of the pilgrims in

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42 Suraiya Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans, 132–133.
the land-route, he did not agree. He said that the conquest of Gujarat and thus the control over the port of Surat had opened another route for pilgrimage.\footnote{Sarkar, “Asian Balance of Power,” 204.}

Also, in the second half of the seventeenth century such verbal fulminations came from the emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707), who is quoted to have said: “Moderation will not work. Severity and harshness are required” against the Europeans who attack pilgrims and traders.\footnote{Farooqi, “Moguls, Ottomans, and Pilgrims,” 198; Pearson, Pious Passengers, 120.} Since such verbal outbursts were not followed up by any action, some historians have argued that “the Portuguese were no real threat to the Hajj.”\footnote{Pearson, Pious Passengers, 123.} It might ring true in the case of the pilgrim-ships sent by the rulers such as the Mughals, who had always appointed a Mīr Hajj and many soldiers to each ship, but not in the case of many other ships and people from regions like Malabar who went for Hajj without such massive state-support. The Portuguese would not have dared to attack those well-armed and organized Mughal ships in order to become a “real threat,” but they did attack the small groups of pilgrims, which historians tend to underestimate.

The ideological setting for an anti-Portuguese jihad was fixed by the ‘ulamā’, educated at the religious educational centres of Mecca and Cairo, in various religious decrees and sermons. Such anti-Portuguese works were unprecedented in the hitherto Muslim world, as they attended to the classical Islamic literatures and medieval jihadi texts by situating the Portuguese in the broader context of Christianity versus Islam.

We have five monographs from sixteenth-century Malabar produced by the ‘ulamā’ of Ponnāni against the Portuguese in the context of their attacks on pilgrims and others: 

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Taḥrīḍ ahl al-īmān};
\item \textit{Qaṣīdat al-jihādiyyat};
\item \textit{Khuṭbatal-jihādiyyat};
\item \textit{Fath al-mubīn};
\item \textit{Tuḥfat al-mujāhidīn}.
\end{itemize}

These monographs all narrate the atrocities of the Portuguese against the Muslims in Malabar in particular and other parts of the Indian Ocean world in general. The attack on Hajj-pilgrims is a constant atrocity that most of these works incite. Before moving further into such details, if we problematize these texts in terms of source-criticisms, we can easily understand that they have a general characteristic of medieval Arabic/Islamic texts which do not give the details of author(s), date of writing, etc.—as elaborated by J. Pedersen in the Arab-Islamic contexts and by Ronit Ricci in South- and Southeast-Asian cases.\footnote{J. Pedersen, The Arabic Book (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Ronit Ricci, Islam Translated: Literature, Conversion, and the Arabic Cosmopolis of South and Southeast Asia (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011).}
Taḥrīḍ ahl al-ʾīmānʿalā jihādʿ abadat al-ṣulbān (The Enticement of the People of Faith to launch Jihad against the Worshippers of Crosses; henceforth Taḥrīḍ) is probably the first among these texts. This is a long-poem in Arabic written by Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn Senior (d. 1522), who migrated from Cochin to Ponnāni in the late fifteenth century. Though we do not know when exactly this work was written, the fact that the author passed away on 1522 and the references to the early stages of Portuguese presence in Malabar, though very scarce and scattered, lead us to assume that it was written before the 1520s. Taḥrīḍ set a paradigm for the jihadi texts in Malabar as we can see the same narrative style and invocations, incitation and polemics in the later monographs too, though those do not acknowledge or refer to it.

After the introductory invocations and supplications to God, the author enlists various cruelties inflicted by the Portuguese on the Muslims like looting possessions, devastating cities, burning mosques, desecrating Qurʾān, violating chastity of women, “it is an exhausting job for a human tongue to list them all.” Such descriptions of various ferocities are followed by a description on the attacks on the pilgrims:

We feel aggrieved by the hardships meted out by The Portuguese, who worship the cross and images. They transgressed in God’s country in multiple ways, Spreading everywhere trouble’s tentacles. They unleashed in Malabar a series of violence, Mischiefs and troubles of varying hues, [.....] By blocking pilgrims of the Holy Hajj, Impeding their journeys to the best of the countries, By killing the pilgrims and other believers Persecuting and mutilating them in numerous ways, By flogging and amputating those who utter ‘Muḥammad’


51 al-Fannānī al-Malaybārī, Taḥrīḍ ahl al-ʾīmān, 92; cf. Zainuddin Makhdoom 1, Taḥrīḍ ahl al-ʾīmān, 33—depended on this translation with minor betterments.
The author is repeatedly grieved by the attacks on the freedom of movement of Muslims. It not only addresses the attacks on the ships of pilgrims at seas but also refers to the blockade of travellers, destruction of seaports and commercial hubs, and ill-treatment and robbery of the passengers—which all were hardly heard of in the hitherto customs and traditions of the mercantile scapes of the Indian Ocean. In the early decades of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese captains and admirals who followed Gama, such as Pedro Alvares Cabral, Afonso de Albuquerque, and Lourenço de Almeida, were infamous for their atrocities, similar to Gama himself. They frequently unleashed onslaughts on Muslim settlements, mercantile hubs, and journeys which in reverse must have motivated the author to write against them. He talks about the capture or massacre of the Muslims who set out on voyages either for pilgrimage or other purposes by the Portuguese:

[They unleashed violence] By keeping the captives shackled in heavy manacles
And persecuting them with fire sans kindness,
By slapping the captives with slippers on their faces,
Particularly, if they sanitise with water they received lashes,
By herding the captives and pulling them together,
As if they were pitiable cattle, in narrow cells,
By dragging them in the street up for sale, kept in chains,
And torturing them there to attract better prices,
By forcing them to do what they are incapable to do
And threatening them, if they defy, with persecutions,
By inducing them to worship the cross
And intimidating them into becoming apostates.
They ridiculed Islam and Muslims
And laughed loudly at pedestrians.52

After recounting such various “brutalities” of the Portuguese, the author calls the Muslims for engaging in jihad by referring to numerous merits and advantages that a holy warrior would get in this world and the afterlife. By recurrently referring to Qurʾān, the Prophetic traditions and the Islamic law of war, he writes:

Fighting against them [the Portuguese] is incumbent on each Muslim
Who is healthy and equipped with provisions;
Even on a servant without master’s permission,
And also on children and healthy husbands;
Even on travellers who enjoy the privileges to shorten prayers,
If it is not sufficient without their presence.
For, they entered the houses of Muslims
And incarcerated Islamic Sharia’s followers.\(^{53}\)

This call for jihad and “poignant” descriptions about the advantages and merits
a martyr will obtain in the hereafter had its influences over the community.
The prominent mercantile-military family of Kuññāli Marakkārs had moved
their locus of operation from Cochin to Ponnāni, where religious sentiments
were much more potent due to the presence of Zayn al-Dīn himself and the
educational institution. The Kuññālis were one of the many Muslim mercantile
families who lost their earlier commercial prospects due to the monopolizing
attempts of the Portuguese. The ruling Zamorins appointed them as naval
captains. Thus, the heavenly promises invoked by the ‘ulamā’ and the worldly
assurances given by the rulers must have motivated them to undertake a holy-
war against the Portuguese.

While \textit{Tahrīḍ} is written in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the other
four works we have were probably written in and around the last quarter. \textit{Tuḥfat al-mujāhidīn fi ba’ḍ akhbār al-Burtughāliyyīn} (The Gift of Warriors in some
Accounts about the Portuguese; henceforward \textit{Tuḥfat}) could be the last among
them, as indicated by a lot of contextual evidence.\(^{54}\) All other three works are
written, probably a decade before \textit{Tuḥfat}, by Qāḍī Muḥammad bin Qāḍī ‘Abd
al-‘Azīz (d. 1617) who was educated at Ponnāni and became a qāḍī at Calicut.
At this time, the political situation was tauter as the Portuguese had acquired
more power and wealth through their commercial enterprises across the Indian
Ocean from East Africa to East Asia. Besides, the Portuguese kingdom was ready
to support any initiatives for the further strengthening of the \textit{Estado da India}.
On the other hand, the long battles had diminished the wealth and capacity
of the Zamorins to a great extent, and many supporters from neighbouring

\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) For a chronology and social contexts of \textit{Tuḥfat}'s inscribing, see A.I. Vilayathullah, “Short
Biography of Shaykh Zainuddin” in \textit{Shaykh Zainuddin Makhdum’s Tuḥfat al-Mujāhidīn: A
Historical Epic of the Sixteenth Century}, trans. S. Muhammad Husayn Nainar (Kuala
regions had allied with the Portuguese. In such an overwrought situation, the Zamorins badly needed any emotional and physical support. For the Muslims in Malabar, the mighty Portuguese were still continuing to target the community at various levels including pilgrimage, trade, or travel. Thus, when the tightened situation urged the Zamorins to attack the Portuguese with possible maximum power, the ‘ulamā’ must have tried to support the former by writing such treatises one after another.

We cannot clearly put Qāḍī Muḥammad’s three works in a chronological order because we do not know the exact dates of writing, except the assumption of certain time periods for each text. The Khuṭbat al-jihādiyyat (The Sermon of Jihad; hereafter Khuṭbat) must be written prior to the 1570s, while Qaṣīdat al-jihādiyyat (The Poem of Jihad; hereinafter Qaṣīdat) and Fatḥ al-mubīn (The Manifest Victory, henceforth Fatḥ) must be after that. The first two texts, a poem and a sermon correspondingly, were sent to the Cāliyaṃ Fort and were later circulated in Malabar to be read out in religious sermons in mosques. Both texts address the Portuguese brutalities against Muslims, including their assaults on the pilgrims and travellers. In Khuṭbat, the author stresses the urgency of jihad against Portuguese cruelties. A noteworthy statement in this text is an exaltation of jihad over Hajj from an Islamic point of view:

I encourage you to fight at sea. A military expedition by sea is more meritorious than ten expeditions by land. For the superiority of the war at sea, suffice a Prophetic saying: whoever missed a war with me, [he may] fight at sea. Whoever crossed the sea [for war] is equal to one who crossed mountain-valleys on his feet [for Hajj]; the seasick is like one who gets drenched in his own blood in the land.55

By referring to the above-mentioned Prophetic tradition, we can understand the author’s keenness to motivate his Muslim “brethren” to prioritize jihad in such particular contexts over Hajj. Towards the end of this treatise he also tried to persuade Muslims to participate in the ribāṭ (Ar. lit. “tied up”; “hospice”, “fortification”) by urging them to watch and safeguard the borders of their lands

55 Qāḍī Muḥammad, Khuṭbat. This is in reference to a ḥadīth narrated in Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad Ṭabarānī, al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr; idem, al-Mu‘jam al-Awsat. It says:

‘Abd Allāh bin ‘Amr bin al-‘Āṣ narrates: “God’s Messenger said: ‘A pilgrimage [Hajj] for whoever has not performed it yet is better than ten wars. A war for whoever has performed it is better than ten pilgrimages. A war by sea is better than ten wars by land. Whoever crossed the sea is equal to one who crossed all the mountain-valleys. The seasick is like one who gets drenched in his own blood.”
at the coastal lines against the enemies. It is interesting to note that the concept and practice of *ribāṭ*, found in the early histories of Islamic expansion, were re-invoked in this South Asian context against Portuguese battles.\(^{56}\)

*Qaṣīdat* sums up similar topics mentioned in the *Khutbat*. It also condemns piracy and similar crimes committed by Muslims. It is a short poem with only forty-three lines written as an appendix to the *Khutbat*. The author does not enter into the detailed narrations of the Portuguese mayhems about the pilgrims in particular, or Muslims in general. These two works must have been written before 1571 when the peoples of Malabar were fighting against a Portuguese fort at Cāliyaṃ, near Calicut. Muslims achieved victory in that war, which motivated the author to express his joyfulness in coining the title of his next book as *Fatḥ*. It also gives similar narratives regarding the attacks over pilgrims along with other malevolence. Identical to the *Tuhfat*, this work also gives hints to historical descriptions, which are related in mythical traditions with reference to some accurate Hijri (Islamic Calendar) dates. However, an obnoxious and xenophobic depiction of the Portuguese and their attitudes against the indigenous people are also mentioned:

The Frank\(^{57}\) who worships the cross and prostrates before pictures and idols.

Of ugly appearance and form, blue-eyed like that of Gorillas (Ghous). He is cunning, disobedient, deceitul and filthiest of all creatures of God.

[... ] But along with the rise in the construction of the Fort, he (Frank) began to show his inimical attitude and evil intentions.

And when its construction was completed he wished to use it (as a means) for oppressing the people.

And he began to demand titches on the elephants and similar things which are not proper.

And he forbade ships to set sail for Mecca (Perhaps ships of pilgrims) and this was the worst of the calamity.\(^{58}\)

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\(^{57}\) The Franks (Arabic: *ifrānj*) in this context indicates the Portuguese. He uses this term interchangeably with many other terms, such as cross- and image-worshippers and Christians.

\(^{58}\) M.A. Muid Khan, “Indo-Portuguese Struggle for Maritime Supremacy (As gleaned from an
He harshly attacked the cartaz-system introduced by the Portuguese which he considered more abusive to Muslim religious sentiments. The following lines indicate that Muslim pilgrims, merchants, and travellers became hesitant to take the Portuguese passes, not merely for economic reasons, but for other religious reasons:

Thus, he [Raja of Cochin] started war on land and the Franks at sea.
And he [Frank(s)] restricted vessels from sailing on the sea, especially the vessels of greater and lesser pilgrimages.
He began to burn the cities and mosques and made people like slaves to him.
And he erected a fort in Koṭuṅṅallūra as a barrier like a wall.
Whoever travelled in a vessel without taking his letter of permission or pass he tortured him severely.
He mentioned in the pass, all that the vessel contained even the arms and number of people or the chief of those in it.
The wording of his letters is such as to show that the Muslims are his owned slaves (come to help) O! ye Muslims.
And the premier object is either to convert Muslims to his religion or to kill them (so come for rescue) O! ye Muslims!\(^5^9\)

The above lines indicate how Muslims perceived the cartaz-system, and why the ‘ulamā’ stood against it by motivating their coreligionists not to take the pass in their pilgrimage-route. Other South Asian sources also help us understand such comforted Muslim mentalities towards the cartazes. Abul Fazl writes in 1575 that the Shaykh al-Islām of Emperor Akbar issued a fatwā stating that the ordinance of pilgrimage was no longer binding, but even hurtful. The reason for that legal decree was simply because the two roads to Mecca via land and sea had become unusable as Hajj-routes anymore. The land route via Persia was controlled by the Qizilbashes or the Shi’ite militia from whom the Indian Sunnī pilgrims suffered harassment, whereas in their sea-routes: “they had to put up with indignities from the Portuguese whose ship-tickets had pic-

tures of Mary and Jesus stamped on them. To make use, therefore, of the latter alternative would mean to countenance idolatry.”

Remarkably, among the jihadi texts discussed so far *Fatḥ* is the only text that praises the local Hindu rulers, the Zamorins. Both in the opening and concluding parts of the poem we find detailed lines that appreciate their religious tolerance and attitudes. The poet invited the attention of the people, especially from the Arab Muslim world, to the courage and bravery of the Zamorins: “who loves our religion of Islam and the Muslims from among all his mankind; who is helper of our religion and executor of our Islamic law to the extent that he has even allowed an address (to be recited in the name of our Caliph).” He further stated that when an “infidel” oppressed a Muslim, the Zamorins waged war against him on behalf of the Muslims. These lines are crucial as the author emphasized the support and security Muslims enjoyed from the non-believer ruler during the attacks over Muslims. He even requested Muslims to pray for him as “he is fighting against [infidels] in spite of his disbelief, while a Muslim king does not do so.” On the other side, though the Zamorins’ motivations to engage in the war with the Portuguese were principally political and economic as many scholars have demonstrated, they were successful in gaining trust among Muslims to partake in the battles with a more religious frame.

The fifth text *Tuḥfat* was written around 1580, as evident from many historical events it described. It is also a widely translated and well-known piece of work among historians of Portuguese expanses in South Asia. The author is Zayn al-Din Junior (d. 1581?), grandson of the afore-mentioned Zayn al-Din Senior, the author of *Tahriḍ*. *Tuḥfat* did not only provide descriptions of the Portuguese attack on the Muslim pilgrims, but also called for jihad by exalting it over Hajj in a similar line with the contents of *Tahriḍ* and *Khutbat*. It also describes the Portuguese atrocities against the Muslims of Malabar and on the Hajj-pilgrims. In a chapter entitled “Certain Shameful Deeds of the Portuguese,” Zayn al-Din Junior writes:

> The Portuguese scoffed at the Muslims and held them up to scorn. They harassed them for no reason; insulted them; humiliated them; forced them to carry them on their back to cross filthy, muddy tracts as they toured around the countryside; spat at them and on their faces; obstructed their journeys especially the Hajj journeys; plundered their wealth; seized


their vehicles; set fire to their houses and mosques; trampled under feet and burned the Holy Qurʾān and other religious books.\(^{62}\)

In the same chapter, he provides the following description:

... [the Portuguese] killed the Hajj-pilgrims and persecuted them with all kinds of cruelties; captured them and kept them bound in heavy chains on their feet or kept them handcuffed dragging them around in the streets and markets to sell them as slaves; and whenever anybody ventured to liberate them out of sympathy, flogged them mercilessly to exact bigger prices; captured them and kept them confined in filthy and stinky, overcrowded dark rooms in dangerous conditions; beat them with sandals and branded them with burning sticks for using water to clean themselves after execration, etc.; captured Muslims and sold some, enslaved some; forced them to do all kinds of hard labour without any compensation.\(^{63}\)

Zayn al-Dīn dwelled on many Qurʾānic verses and Prophetic sayings highlighting the merits and necessity of engaging in jihad as a way of persuading the believers to fight against the Portuguese. Two of these Prophetic sayings place the merits of jihad above the pilgrimage.\(^{64}\) This act of citation with a prioritization of jihad over the Hajj has its significance in that particular historical context. He further clarified this standpoint:

The situation of the one who takes part in the holy struggle is much different from that of a Hajj pilgrim. The warrior in the cause of Allah is setting out on a journey to Allah renouncing his self and his wealth. The benefit of his engaging in war is for the society as a whole. This is

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\(^{63}\) *Makhdum’s Tuḥfat*, 57.

how one hour fighting in the cause of Allah becomes more virtuous than performing Hajj fifteen times.65

These works show how Hajj and jihad intertwined among Muslims in the sixteenth century in their struggle against the Portuguese undertakings in the waters of the Indian Ocean. In their articulation of the merits of jihad and martyrdom (shahādat), the authors repeatedly cited one specific ḥadīth that exalted jihad above performing Hajj ten times. Besides the religious tone in these works, they reflect the agony of some Muslims for their inability to perform Hajj as they were aware of frequent stories of massacring the pilgrims. Following the legal textual tradition of the Shāfiʿī school of Islamic law, Zayn al-Din Junior was convinced that if the infidels entered “our land” and unleashed attacks on the Muslims, it would be a communal obligation (fard kifāyat) to wage war against them—a statement which had certain currency in the context of pilgrim-massacres and other attacks on the Muslims of Malabar.66 The incitement of merits of shahādat during jihad above the Hajj frequently appeared in the juridical, mystical, and theological texts produced in Ponnāni’s educational religious centres.

Between the appearance of the first treatise and the last four, there is a long gap of at least fifty years during which we scarcely find any anti-Portuguese writings. This does not mean that such jihadi texts were never produced, since the manuscripts of Qaṣīdat, Fath and Khutbat were discovered only recently. Despite the lack of jihadi texts to provide evidence, it is highly probable that battles took place between the Kuññālis under the auspice of the Zamorins and the Portuguese during this time—as various sources suggest.

These five monographs were written in Arabic, and not in Malayalam, the local language in Malabar, in order to make them more accessible to a wider Muslim audience outside the domain of Malabar. The authors were most likely eager to create an abode of Islam/safety (dār al-Islām/al-amn) by means of collaborating with the Muslim sultanates within the Indian subcontinent, such as in Bijapur and outside, by sending a message to Muslims in the Ottoman Empire.67 The authors primarily wanted to spread their works throughout

65 Makhdum’s Tuḥfat, 25.
67 Many of these ‘ulamāʾ were well-versed in the local language, as Qāḍī Muḥammad wrote a
Malabar as well as other places by conveying them to religious scholars who usually were well-versed in Arabic. Qāḍī Muḥammad’s *Khutbat* was formulated in the form of a sermon to be read out at mosques during the Friday prayers. It is possible that such works were primarily intended to address the religious elites rather than lay Muslims because Arabic was not a medium of communication among them in the region. In that sense, the message was further transmitted from the pulpit to the common people, including the (aspirant) pilgrims.

Their attempts to attract wider attention through this “Arabic cosmopolis” had remarkable relevance as compared to the anti-Portuguese Muslim sentiments that prevailed in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean worlds from the late-fifteenth century. In the wake of the Portuguese expansion in the North and West African regions, the ‘ulamā’ instigated the necessity for an immediate engagement in jihad against the Portuguese by using such writings and legal clarifications in other writings. An example of these is *al-Jawāhir al-mukhtārāt* by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn al-Ḥasan al-Zayyātī (d. 1645). The Ḥaḍramī chronicles from sixteenth-century Southern Arabia also provide classical exemplifications related to the pilgrimage in the coasts of the Indian subcontinent. A chronicle, *Tārikh al-Shihrī*, describes an encounter of the Gujarat sultan Bahadur Shah (d. 1537) with the Portuguese that led to his murder. It reads:

... they [the Franks] reproached him [Sultan] for sending the sailing-ships to Jeddah as already mentioned, (maintaining) that all he (really) intended was to incite the Turks against them. He (for his part) absolved himself, saying: ‘My intention was merely to go on the pilgrimage in them, but nobody apart from the minister and some of my family consented to go on the pilgrimage.’ They would not, however, believe him, and when he left them they sent two grabs in pursuit of him, but he fought them bravely till he and the ministers accompanying him were slain, all except the Khawadja Safar, for him they spared.

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68 Hence one could ask: was it read out in Arabic alone, was it translated into the local language, or were both done simultaneously? With the lack of evidences, it is hard to come to a conclusive answer.


We could see even more Ḥaḍramī chronicle-descriptions describing concern about the attacks on Muslim pilgrims, merchants, travellers, institutions, and settlements in the South Asian coastlines and in Malabar in particular. Thus, the Malabari ‘ulamā’ had a clear sense about their choice of writing in Arabic during the ongoing wars, being aware that their literature on jihad would be immediately recognized in the Arabian or Mediterranean regions.

Conclusion

Besides various misconceptions about Mecca, pilgrimage, and the tomb of Muḥammad prevailing in the pre-modern West, European encounters of the Hajj resulted in violence in the sixteenth century. This historical rupture tells us how an unfamiliar ritual of a different culture became a matter of hostile engagement in the early stages of European expansion. The differentiation between the secular and religious spheres within European expanses becomes irrelevant in the eyes of indigenous counter-moves. I do not argue that fights between the coastal communities of western Indian Ocean and the Portuguese were solely motivated by the Hajj. On the basis of what we have demonstrated so far, it is clear that the Portuguese had a hostile approach towards Muslim traders that took many forms including aggressions on the Hajj. The economic motivations in such attacks were intertwined with religious reasons, as a Portuguese historian of that time put it: “As much to annoy and vituperate the Muslims as to make profits for the Portuguese state.” Many objects seized from pilgrims or ships were reused by the Portuguese as presents to local kings. For example, Albuquerque sent an envoy in 1511 to eastern Malacca with gifts including certain high-quality Meccan velvets that the Portuguese had taken from a ship near Calicut. The division between the “secular” Portuguese officials and the “religious” Jesuits would not work once we analyse their entanglement with the Hajj.

On the other hand, Muslims stood against the attacks by depicting the Portuguese as a monolithic entity of Christian, cross- and image-worshipping infidels. The indigenous political structures, militia and lay people also supported such a move. Whatever motivations the Portuguese had to attack the pilgrims,

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71 For example, see Serjeant, The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast, 46.
73 Similar events are continuous throughout the century. For a Bengal-Portuguese embassy case in 1533, see Pearson, Pious Passengers, 100.
their “cruel” interventions generated a rhetorical memory in South Asia that was transmitted through generations, enabling its audience to stand against Portuguese imperialism as well as colonialism in general. Subrahmanyam argues that Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn’s vision of jihad between the Muslims and infidel Portuguese was more an ideal than reality. He falls into such an incorrect conclusion because he thinks that only Tuhfat was written in Malabar in the 1580s when the ideal calls for jihad were not materialized in the following decades. But such an argument is implausible when we look at the long history of jihadi literature, such as Tahrīd written in the region before the 1520s as well as at the wars that took place throughout the century. Also, many Malabari ‘ulamā’ had participated in the battles against the Portuguese as is explicit in the battle of 1571 in which many scholars like Qāḍi ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, Shaykh Muḥammad Shattārī and Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz were in commanding roles.

My focus here was only on the sixteenth century; and it therefore concentrated on Portuguese involvements in the Hajj. In later centuries, mainly in the seventeenth century when other European mercantile entrepreneurs began to have strong presence in the waters of the Indian Ocean, we notice that the Dutch and English also began to be interested in the Muslim pilgrimage. Although the Portuguese power decreased after the sixteenth century, they continued to attack pilgrim ships, as we see in 1650 when they attacked 109 pilgrims in the Red Sea and captured their goods. In Southeast Asia, the Dutch encounter with pilgrims has been well analysed by many scholars such as Eric Tagliacozzo’s pioneering study. The English also captured many pilgrim-ships in the seventeenth century, and they continued to do so until the twentieth century with multiple diplomatic and political underpinnings.

75 Serjeant, The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast, 115.
77 In 1695, the English pirates captured a very large state pilgrim ship which had Rs. 5,200,000 in cash alone on board. Khafi Khan, Khafi Khan’s History of Alamgir: Being an English Translation of the Relevant Portions of ‘Muntaḥab al-‘Ubāb’ with Notes and an Introduction, trans. S. Moinul Haqq (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1975), 419–420.
Bibliography

Sources


**Studies**


