‘A Mixing Cup of Piety and Learnedness’: Michael Psellos and Nicholas of Methone as Readers of Proclus’ Elements of Theology

This man [Origen] delved into our sacred courts from the perspective of Platonic and Aristotelian idle talk and thus dragged in from there all sorts of superfluous and pretentious discourse; and bywishing to seem to comprehend what is against and what is consistent with Christian teachings, and for this to be considered clever by the many, he corrupted and confused the holy Scripture in its entirety. I say this without accusing theman in every respect; for occasionally he gently severs the letter and reveals the spirit; however, inmost cases he is overtaken bywhateverwind is carrying him and is thus led astray from the main road and falls into the ditches. Don’t converse often with the man, but rather, if you wish to know divine things clearly, then enter deeply into the words of Gregory the Theologian. Forhe alone inmyopinion introducedallwisdom intohis discourses and prepared amixing cup of piety and learnedness, so that everyone can drink without satiety, while his cup is never exhausted.1 Michael Psellos, Theologica II, 4


Introduction2
In a well-known article by Gerhard Podskalsky,3 Nicholas of Methone's Refutation of Proclus' Elements of Theology served as indirect evidence that the interest in Proclus so abundantly evident in the works of Michael Psellos in the eleventh century had in fact persisted into the time of Nicholas, who died around 1166.4 Surely, the argument goes, such a refutation demonstrates a contemporary fashion for Proclus in Byzantium; Nicholas would scarcely have gone to such lengths to refute Proclus had he not regarded his influence as a continuing and contemporary problem. Indeed, in his prologue to the Refutation, Nicholas explains that he has chosen to write the work because he observes that the attraction of Proclus for some of his fellow Christians has led them into heresy. For this reason he has decided to show, chapter by chapter, the points at which Proclus' teaching and Christian doctrine are at odds. However, the absence of direct evidence for any substantial interest in Proclus' works in Byzantium in the mid-twelfth century might lead one to reconsider.5 Could one instead account for Nicholas' Refutation as a reaction to Psellos' use of Proclus in the previous century? Psellos' writings circulated widely in the twelfth century,6 and even if they had not, Nicholas would not be the first to engage in polemic with a long-departed threat. Cyril of Alexandria, for example, wrote his lengthy Contra Julianum more than half a century after Julian's death.7 Among Nicholas' primary aims, some announced explicitly in his prologue and some emerging only later in the Refutation, are to defend the doctrine of the Trinity against Proclus' unitary conception of the first principle, and to dis- tinguish strictly between the intra-trinitarian generations of the Son and the Spirit from the Father, on the one hand, and the Trinity's creative production of everything else on the other hand. In Nicholas' view, Proclus' hierarchical emanative structure cannot be applied to the persons of the Trinity, where the Son and the Spirit, though causally derivative, are consubstantial with the Father and thus equally divine. Nor is this emanative structure an adequate way to understand God's production of the world, since it seems to present a causal continuum in which the first principle is not the unique metaphysical cause, utterly distinct from its created effects. Instead, this causal continuum involves a series of metaphysical causes that seem to operate in the same manner as the first cause, even if each successive cause is more restricted in scope. Proclus' system is in Nicholas' view irredeemably polytheistic, both with its theory of henads and with its descending sequence of hypostases. With these issues in mind, I propose in this article to examine Psellos' use of the Elements, in order to discover whether he regarded these aspects of Proclus' thought with greater sympathy than Nicholas did, and thus whether Psellos' writings might help to explain why Nicholas wrote his Refutation.

Michael Psellos and the Elements of Theology
It has been recognized for some time that Psellos had an affinity for the Neoplatonists, and that Proclus in particular had a special significance for him.8 In a famous autobiographical passage of his Chronographia, Psellos describes the course of his own education and tells us how, starting from Aristotle and Plato, I completed a cycle, so to speak, by coming down to Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus. Then, continuing my voyage, I put in at the mighty harbor of the admirable Proclus, drawing from him all science and conceptual precision.9 8 On Psellos' philosophical interests, see Zervos 1920;Joannou 1956;O'Meara 1989O'Meara , 1998O'Meara and 2014Duffy 2002;Kaldellis 2007;Papaioannou 2013;Jenkins 2006 andPanagopoulos 2014;Lauritzen 2017;Miles 2017;Walter 2017. 9 Chronographia, VI, 38.1-5: ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ὁρμηθεὶς αὖθις ὥσπερ περίοδον ἐκπληρῶν, ἐς Πλωτίνους καὶ Πορφυρίους καὶ Ἰαμβλίχους κατῄειν. μεθ' οὓς ὁδῷ προβαίνων εἰς τὸν θαυμασιώτατον Πρόκλον ὡς ἐπὶ λιμένα μέγιστον κατασχὼν, πᾶσαν ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιστήμην τὲ καὶ νοήσεων ἀκρίβειαν ἔσπασα. O'Meara translates the passage and discusses it in detail (2014, p. 166-168): "From there, as if completing a cycle (periodon), I came to a Plotinus, a Porphyry and a Iamblichus, after which I progressed to the most admirable Proclus, as if arriving in a great haven, where I sought all science and accuracy of thoughts. After this, intending to ascend to first philosophy and Given the climactic position that Proclus occupied in the stages of Psellos' education, it seems reasonable to conclude that he played an important role in Psellos' mature thought. I will not attempt here to determine the exact significance of this passage within the Chronographia. Much has been written on the rhetorical dimensions of this work,10 and it is sometimes suggested that one cannot always take Psellos' writings at face value.11 For our purposes, however, it suffices to recognize that Psellos here unambiguously affirms his admiration for Proclus, and to take note of the specific benefit he derived from Proclus, namely "all science and conceptual precision (νοήσεων ἀκρίβειαν)."12 Even so, one must not exaggerate the role of Proclus in Psellos' texts, where many other authors are also cited, some with great frequency. In the first volume of the Theologica, for example, Psellos' citations of Proclus, including many from his commentary on the Timaeus, are nearly equalled in number by those of Dionysius, and are exceeded by those of Aristotle, Plato and Maximus the Confessor. Above all, Gregory of Nazianzus dominates the scene, and other authors, including Proclus, are usually introduced in order to elucidate passages from Gregory.13 Proclus' true significance for Psellos can only be judged by examining the way that he is used in each case.14 While Psellos cites multiple works by Proclus (and especially his commentary on the Timaeus), here we will consider only his use of the Elements of to be initiated to pure science, I took up first the knowledge of incorporeals in what is called mathematics, which have an intermediate rank between the nature that concerns bodies and the thought that is free of relation to bodies." Cf. Theologica I,[22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39], where Proclus is "chief of the most theological among the Greeks": οἱ τοίνυν θεολογικώτατοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὧν δὴ Πρόκλος κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ψῆφον τὸ κεφάλαιον. 10 See Lauritzen 2013. 11 See Kaldellis 1999. 12 See below [currently page 7]. 13 In Theologica II, citations of Gregory, Maximos and John of Damascus exceed those of Proclus; in Philosophica minora I, citations of Aristotle, Olympiodorus and Plotinus exceed those of Proclus; in Philosophica minora II, the citations of Proclus (mostly from the commentary on the Timaeus) far exceed all other authors. 14 See Miles 2017, p. 81: "The immense complexity of the philosophical, literary, rhetorical and religious traditions that Psellos, like other Byzantine thinkers, inherited, was such that it offered great scope for choosing one's own position, and for combining positions and ideas from previous authors in new ways. Of this kind of intellectual freedom, Psellos made considerable and brilliant use. This is becoming increasingly apparent in the newer scholarship on his work, and it may be said with some confidence that the way forward in Psellan studies lies in detailed and careful readings of his many texts, in particular with an eye to how these combinations, transformations and balancing acts are carried out in the context of specific discussions." There are a few scattered citations of the Elements of Theology in various published works of Psellos,16 but most of his citations of the Elements are found in five modern editions, namely the two volumes of the Philosophica minora, the De omnifaria doctrina, and the two volumes of the Theologica. Within these five volumes we can usefully distinguish at least two broadly different ways in which Psellos uses Proclus, namely in compilations or epitomes on the one hand, in which he summarizes or 'plagiarizes' with little or no comment, and in exegetical treatises on the other hand, in which he draws upon Proclus as a tool for understanding some other author's text. In the former genre, the object of attention is Proclus' text, sometimes simply recycled without comment, sometimes introduced or followed by brief comments from Psellos. In the latter genre, the object of attention is some other text (most often Gregory the Theologian), and Psellos introduces Proclus' teaching during the course of his explanation of this other text. The following discussion is structured according to this broad division, which corresponds roughly to the division between the De omnifaria doctrina and the two volumes of the Philosophica on the one hand, and the two volumes of the Theologica on the other.

Proclus in Compilation (1): Philosophica minora I and II
Within the two volumes of the Philosophica minora, the use of the Elements is more frequent in the second volume. There, according to the indices, the Ele- Phil. min. 10, On Intellect, provides us with a good example of pure compilation. Here Psellos simply strings together, without any comment, seventeen propositions from the extensive portion of the Elements of Theology that is concerned with intellect. He includes all but two of the propositions in the range beginning with Prop. 166 and ending with Prop. 183, and he introduces this material by saying that he will "sum up in an epitome" the teachings on intellect of "those who philosophize among the Greeks." In the next line, he refers to these teachings simply as "Hellenic opinions," and only at the end of the passage does he tell us that all of the material comes from Proclus. Evidently Proclus is here representative of Greek thought for Psellos.20 17 Michael Psellos,Philosophica minora II,[9][10][11]15,25,[34][35][36]. See also Philosophica minora I, 36. 18 As well as on four excerpts from Porphyry's Sententiae, one of which also corresponds closely to Proclean doctrine. 19 In Philosophica minora I, 36, which is an elaborate philosophical interpretation of the meaning of the letters of the alphabet, there is an interesting passage (lines 481-506) that I have not been able to examine thoroughly in context, in which Psellos summarizes various principles from the Elements of Theology (cf. Elements of Theology 117,124,125,131 and 160) in answer to the question "what are the phenomena of the divine?" and concludes the passage thus: "and the other things, so many as are not disregarded by the theologians and especially Dionysius, who philosophized altogether more precisely (ἀκριβέστερον) concerning these things." In II,[9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19] II,, but the connection is not precise. 20 The same might be said for Nicholas. In the prologue to the Refutation (3.15-17), he presents Proclus as the preeminent Greek thinker: "And not least in comparison to all, yea perhaps even more than all, was this mighty Proclus, who was zealous not to be sur-Similarly, in Phil min. II, 11, a short treatise titled On Soul, Psellos simply compiles twenty-four propositions from the last section of the Elements. In this case, however, he also includes brief comments on the acceptability of Proclus' teaching from a Christian point of view. "Behold I provide you the hellenic teachings concerning soul," he begins, "some of which agree with our scriptures," and then cautioning: "but the bitter among them is more than the sweet."21 The first proposition to which he refers is Prop. 184, "They say that every soul is either divine, or changes from intellect to non-intellect, or is between these, always intellecting, but inferior to divine souls," and then he comments: "And while this teaching is most absurd, what comes after is more mythological and sillier."22 "What comes after" in Psellos' compilation comprises all but one of the series of propositions ranging from Prop. 185 to Prop. 195. After quoting this series of propositions, he comments, "Perhaps then these teachings are not altogether absurd, but it would be better to say that they are ambiguous; the things that they say after these, however, are most laughable." The rest of the text, i.e. the material that he says is "most laughable," is mostly exact quotation from all but two of the remaining propositions in the Elements. Since a major topic of this section is Proclus' teaching on the "vehicle of the soul" or astral body, which might have struck Christian readers as particularly fantastical, this may account in part for Psellos' judgement here. 23 Psellos' compilation of this material clearly does not constitute an endorsement of Proclus' views on soul, nor can we conclude from his silence in the previous text (on intellect) that he agreed with everything in it. Yet it is clear that Psellos found this material interesting and useful-useful to himself perhaps, as a kind of condensation of what he had read and as an aid to memory, but probably also useful for his students.
In Phil. min. II, 35 Psellos takes a very different approach. In this text, rather than simply compiling numerous propositions (without their proofs) into a condensed presentation of Proclus' teaching on a given topic, Psellos instead quotes individual propositions with their proofs, commenting briefly on each. passed in pagan wisdom by even the most preeminent." Besides being a particular threat, Proclus stands for Hellenic wisdom as such. 21 Philosophica minora II, 11 (22.1-3). 22 Following St. Paul, γραώδεις is frequently applied to myths (cf. ITimothy 4:7: βεβήλους καὶ γραώδεις μύθους παραιτοῦ: refuse profane and old wives' fables); cf. also Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 28.8: ὃ καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρείων ἀτόμων ἀτοπώτερόν τε καὶ γραωδέστερον: "[the idea that God could be mixed with bodies] is a more absurd old wives tale than even the atoms of Epicurus." 23 Cf. Philosophica minora II, 15, where Psellos associates Origenism with such ideas.
The text is titled "On Theology and on the Distinctions among Greek Doctrines" (Περὶ θεολογίας καὶ διακρίσεως δογμάτων Ἑλληνικῶν). It is actually somewhat like Nicholas' Refutation in its form and aims, though much more modest in its scope; in it Psellos considers individually only six propositions from the Elements (35, 39, 81, 90, 103 and 109), stating in each case whether he considers the proposition in question to be acceptable from the standpoint of Christian doctrine.
The first text quoted is Prop. 35: "every effect remains in its cause and proceeds from it and returns to it." Psellos prefaces the text with the following comment: What is agreed upon by us concerning our theological teaching, i.e. the trinitarian consubstantiality, does not need other proofs or the establishment of proofs foreign to the discourse. But among the wise Greeks, reason (λόγος) is a highly productive component of their theological proofs, and it also contributes no small part to our own discourse [i.e., Christian theology] as regards the union and distinction of the Son in relation to the Father, where their union does not eliminate the distinction, nor does their distinction break apart the union.24 Psellos here recognizes that trinitarian doctrine is not established by philosophy, but belongs to a "discourse" rooted in revelation and tradition. He nevertheless asserts the common utility or productivity of reason for both 'Greek' and Christian theology. While Nicholas of Methone also recognizes the value of reason (implicitly if not explicitly), he regards Proclus' entire project as a presumptuous rationalism aiming to scale the heavens (like the Tower of Babel) by the power of human thought. This chapter alone of the Greek theology seems to me to have some contribution to our dogma; for in a manner involving neither time nor body, the only-begotten Word proceeds from the Father and remains in the Father and returns to the Begetter; although he has proceeded, he is not distinguished according to the principle of divinity, nor in returning was he separate, nor in remaining has he been confused with respect to the personal (ὑποστατικὴν) perfection.27 As Dominic O'Meara has noted,28 Psellos' application of Prop. 35 to the Trinity implies a greater degree of compatibility with Christian doctrine than Nicholas of Methone will allow. In his own commentary on the same proposition, Nicholas insists that one must strictly distinguish between the "productive procession" by which all things go forth from God creatively, and the "natural" or "supernatural procession," which he even calls an "unproceeding procession" (ἀπροΐτου προόδου).29 The consubstantially super-substantial persons, even if they proceed from the cause insofar as they are other persons than it, nevertheless do so without proceeding, since they do not differ at all from it in substance, nor indeed are they separated from it. For this reason, they do not desire, for how can they desire him with whom they are identical in substance? Nor do they revert, for how can they revert to him from whom they did not depart?30 27 Philosophica minora II,: τοῦτο δέ μοι καὶ μόνον τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς θεολογίας φαίνεταί τινα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡμέτερον δόγμα ἔχειν συντέλειαν· ὁ γὰρ μονογενὴς λόγος καὶ πρόεισιν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀχρόνως καὶ ἀσωμάτως καὶ μένει ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς τὸν γεννήτορα, καὶ οὔτε προϊὼν διακέκριται κατὰ τὸν τῆς θεότητος λόγον οὔτε ἐπιστρέφων διέστη οὔτε μένων συγκέχυται κατὰ τὴν ὑποστατικὴν τελειότητα.
Psellos' reaction here is similar to what one might call Nicholas' "Aristotelian" critique of Proclus' tendency (as Nicholas sees it) to give reality to abstractions: The divine is first limit and first infinity, the former since the one both unifies and holds together and limits all things, the latter since it is beyond all and neither bounded nor circumscribed, either by a certain being or by all at the same time; besides the divine there is no other limit or infinity that subsists itself in itself, but only these mere relations of reason and nonexistent imaginations that have a by-being (παρυφιστάμενα) in beings, and that tend more to non-being than to being. For the limit of something is neither that whole thing nor a part of it, but what remains beyond the whole, such as the point of the line and the line of the surface and the surface of the body. And how does non-being give subsistence to being? And infinity is the privation of limit, but no privation, qua privation, is subsistence-giver of something.40 Thus, Limit and Infinity are for Nicholas either divine names or mere abstractions; they are emphatically not independent productive principles.
Regarding Prop. 103, "all things are in all, but in a suitable way in each" (e.g. "in being are both life and intellect, and in life are being and knowing, but in one case noetically, in another case vitally, and in another case substantially"), Psellos states that he "accepts it as understood in the concept of the philosopher, because, since it holds neither falsely nor truly with our scriptures, it is cleansed from dirt."41 In other words, this Proclean principle is compatible with Christian teaching even though it is not stated in scripture. It is an aspect of Proclus' teaching that Psellos can appropriate without reservation, and (as we will see shortly) he employs this very proposition in one of his exegetical works.
Finally, Psellos rejects the last proposition in the treatise, Prop. 109, which concerns the way in which particulars on one level of reality can participate in the universal principle of the immediately superior level either through their own universal principle or through a particular member of the immediately superior level.42 "In our scriptures," Psellos says, "neither a universal soul nor In the case of the isolated short treatises discussed earlier, we saw that Psellos' compilation of Proclean doctrine did not necessarily indicate his full endorsement: such treatises could be understood in terms of pedagogical utility, without necessarily displaying Psellos' own philosophical commitments. For several reasons, however, it seems more difficult to argue for a non-committed use of Proclus in the case of Psellos' De omnifaria doctrina. First of all, the very fact of inclusion within a larger set of chapters confers greater significance on any chapter that contains Proclean material: this inclusion suggests both that this Proclean material is safe and that it merits a certain pedagogical prominence. Second, in certain chapters it is clear that Psellos definitely endorses universal principle Soul (which itself directly participates Intellect) or through the particular intellect with which it corresponds (and which also directly participates Intellect the Proclean material that is quoted or paraphrased, or even that this material serves as a hermeneutical framework for discussing Christian themes. The resulting impression is that Psellos' system, while simpler than that of Proclus, is more elaborate than the general Christian teaching of his day.

"To Interpret the Wise Things Wisely": Proclus as an Exegetical Resource
We turn now to Psellos' use of Proclus in the Theologica. Whereas Psellos' approach to Proclus' Elements in the passages from the Philosophica minora that we have considered may be described as quotation or compilation, sometimes with brief commentary, where Proclus' philosophy itself is the object of attention, by contrast, in the works collected as Theologica Proclus is not the focus, but is introduced into Psellos' exegesis of something else, whether scripture, liturgical poetry or Gregory of Nazianzus's orations. I turn now to several of these exegetical texts.
The two volumes of the Theologica contain a total of one hundred and fiftynine treatises, in seventeen of which, according to the indices, the Elements of Theology is quoted or paraphrased. Many of Psellos' citations of Proclus are quite brief and incidental, having an illustrative or corroborative function, but introduced only in passing and not dwelt upon or developed.46 Among those 46 Here I will summarize those not discussed in the body of this article. In Theologica I, 22 Psellos refers (lines 38-49) to Proclus' hierarchy of things eternal in both substance and activity, things temporal in both substance and activity, and the mediating level of things eternal in substance but temporal in activity (cf. Elements of Theology 29 and 55 In Theologica I, 7, an exegesis of the verse in Proverbs 9:1, "wisdom built for herself a house and supported it with seven pillars," Psellos brings in material from Propositions 103 and 195 as a way of explaining how it is that this verse in Proverbs, a book that Psellos regards as predominantly ethical, can nevertheless have cosmological and theological meanings as well. Thus, according to Psellos, the house that wisdom built may be understood (1) "ethically," as the soul in the scientific state, which is supported by the pillars of the sciences and arts, or (2) "naturally," as the cosmos built by the divine Logos, with the pillars symbolizing the quasi-perpetual stability of the cosmos, or (3) "theologically," as the human nature assumed by the divine Word and supported by the pillars of the virtues. The point of mentioning Proclus in this context is to offer a metaphysical principle with hermeneutical consequences, a principle that explains how a predominantly ethical text can have cosmological and theological significance as well. One the one hand, Psellos says, Solomon is a theologian in the Song, a physiologue in Ecclesiastes and simply a chastening teacher in the Proverbs.
Psellos' use of Proclus here contributes relatively little to the treatise, most of which is taken up with distinguishing the predominant qualities of the four books of Solomon and then with elaborating the sense of the verse in question on the three levels already mentioned. The principle from Proclus, "all things are in all things," serves as the hinge of the discourse at the transition to this latter task. Of course, it is a commonplace of the patristic tradition that a text may have multiple levels of meaning, and so one might reasonably wonder whether Psellos really needed Proclus at all here, given that in the Byzantine tradition the notion of multivalence in the scriptures is entirely standard. But in any case the passage shows the importance that Psellos ascribes to Proclus as an exegete and as a resource for hermeneutical principles.48 The next text to consider is Theol. I, 11,49 in which Psellos interprets a verse composed by John of Damascus, from the fifth ode of the canon for the feast of the Transfiguration: "O Christ, who with invisible hands have fashioned man in your image, you displayed your archetypal beauty in the body (or "created form" = πλάσματι), not as in an image, but as you yourself are according to substance, being both God and man."50 After quoting portions of this text, Psellos states: It is fitting to inquire what is the archetypal beauty, and how this is manifested in the created forms (πλάσμασι), sometimes being depicted in images, sometimes being shown according to substance, and how here, although the paradigm has come to be in the image, it is not manifested according to the existence of the image, but is shown according to the property of its own nature.51 It seems that Psellos wishes to understand the difference between the manifestation of divine beauty "in images," such as occurred in the Old Testament 48 See Papaioannou 2013, p. 35 and 55. 49 Cf. Lauritzen (2012), who asserts that Gautier has misidentified Psellos' citation of Proclus as Elements of Theology 103, whereas, according to Lauritzen, the better parallel would be Elements of Theology 71, which contains the terms ὑπέρτερα and ὑφείμενα. In fact, however, these particular terms are less relevant than the principle stated in Elements of Theology 103 that "All things are in all things, but in each according to its proper nature." Cf. also Proclus' application of this principle to the soul in Elements of Theology 195. 50 From Ode 5 of the Canon for the Transfiguration; text is in the Menaion (6 Aug), discussed in Louth 2002, p. 268-274. 51 Psellos, Theologica I, 11.7-11: καὶ ζητεῖται εἰκότως τί τὸ ἀρχέτυπον κάλλος, ὅπως δὲ τοῦτο ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τοῖς πλάσμασι, νῦν μὲν εἰκονιζόμενον, νῦν δὲ κατ' οὐσίαν δεικνύμενον, καὶ πῶς ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι γενόμενον τὸ παράδειγμα οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἰκόνος ἐμφαίνεται ὕπαρξιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως ἰδιότητα δείκνυται.
theophanies, and the manifestation of God in the Incarnation, the distinctiveness of which was made preeminently apparent in the transfiguration on Mt.
Tabor. Before attempting to answer the questions he has posed, Psellos introduces what he calls "two canons of philosophy" as interpretive tools that will aid in answering these questions. This passage thus involves explicit reflection by Psellos on his own hermeneutical method.
And so that we do not grasp the discourse in a careless way,52 and so that we interpret the wise things wisely, the discourse must be referred to the canons of philosophy, and from there must be contributed the solution to the problems under investigation; and I do not mean the philosophy that is involved in nature-nature with which place, time, body and motion co-subsist, nor do I mean that philosophy which has as its object the unmoved forms that lie in conceptual thinking, which they call mathematical, but I mean this philosophy of what lies above, which is unhypothetical and foundational,53 which exists in pure and unmoved and dimensionless forms; to it we who have geometrized must go, according to the divine inscription of Plato.54 But whereas he [Plato] sends the theologizer to it through the mathematical objects, Proclus, who received Plato's teachings, going beyond the mathematical itself,55 composed another Elements pertaining to theology. So he says somewhere in his chapters [τὰ κεφάλαια, i.e. the Elements of Theology] that the higher things are in the lower things and the lower things are in the higher things;56 but again, in the writings where he Chaldaizes, he speaks in another way, saying concerning the same things that on the one hand, the heavenly things are in the earth in an earthly way (on the one hand, the higher things are in the lower things as paradigms, and on the other hand, the lower things are in the higher things as images), but on the other hand, the earthly things are in heaven in a heavenly way. So then, following these two canons, we will show that the paradigms that come to be in the images show their own reflections in one way in relation to the nature of those [images], but subsist in another way according to their own substance.57 52 I.e., the opposite of ἀκρίβεια. 53 Or "dealing with first principles." 54 The inscription over the Academy: "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter." 55 E.g. Euclid's Elements. 56 Cf. Elements of Theology 103 and 195. 57 Psellos, Theologica I, 11.12-31: Καὶ ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶς τοῦ λόγου ἁψώμεθα, τὰ σοφὰ δὲ σοφῶς ἑρμηνεύσω μεν, ἐπὶ τοὺς τῆς φιλοσοφίας κανόνας ἀνακτέον τὸν λόγον κἀκεῖθεν τοῖς ζητήμασι τὴν λύσιν The "two canons" are the two statements from Proclus. They are not to be taken as two different principles, apparently, but as two statements (the second more elaborated) of the same principle concerning how a higher reality can be in a lower reality, and vice versa.
But the wording of the second "canon" requires several comments. First, I have provided here a slightly corrected text on the basis of the manuscript, changing Gautier's τὰ [δὲ] ὑψηλότερα to τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα: "on the one hand, the higher things."58 With the μὲν in place, it becomes easier to see that the order of the sentence is quite awkward. The first and last elements of the sentence ("the heavenly things are in the earth in an earthly way" and "the earthly things are in heaven in a heavenly way") are together a close paraphrase of a line in Proclus' De sacrificio et magica: […] θαυμάσαντες τῷ βλέπειν ἔν τε τοῖς πρώτοις τὰ ἔσχατα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις τὰ πρώτιστα, ἐν οὐρανῷ μὲν τὰ χθόνια κατ' αἰτίαν καὶ οὐρανίως, ἔν τε γῇ τὰ οὐράνια γηΐνως.
Furthermore, for those familiar with Proclus' thought it is clear that the middle two elements present Proclus as speaking in a way that he never speaks elsewhere: in other Proclean texts, "paradigmatically" (παραδειγματικῶς) always describes either how the lower "is in" the higher or how the higher "is" the lower; likewise, "iconically" (εἰκονικῶς) always describes either how the higher "is in" the lower or how the lower "is" the higher.60 In Psellos' citation, however, this usage has been inverted, and as a result, the passage gives the impression that Proclus is speaking of four distinct modes, i.e. two ways in which the higher can be in the lower, and two ways in which the lower can be in the higher.
How are we to explain this inversion of Proclus' terminology? We must reject the supposition that Psellos intentionally confused the terms or failed to grasp the distinction, for he is a careful student of Proclus. Either he overlooked the mistake, or (perhaps more likely) the text was corrupted at a later date. In any case, if we correct the middle two elements so that they conform to Proclus' usual usage, and then move them to the end on the assumption that they function as a gloss interrupting the outer two elements, then the whole becomes more comprehensible: grateful to Dominic O'Meara for the identification of this source, and for additional help in understanding this passage. 60 Cf. Elements of Theology 195, 170.4-5: "Every soul is all things, paradigmatically the things of sense, and iconically the intelligible things" (Πᾶσα ψυχὴ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα, παραδειγματικῶς μὲν τὰ αἰσθητά, εἰκονικῶς δὲ τὰ νοητά.). Note that here "paradigmatically" is used to describe the way that the higher "is" (not "is in") the lower, and "iconically" is used for the way the lower "is" (not "is in") the higher. On the other hand, when Proclus elsewhere speaks of one thing being "in" another "paradigmatically," he is speaking of the relation of the lower to the higher, and not, as it seems in Theologica I, 11, of the higher to the lower. For example, see In Tim. I, 8.19: "and in the mathematicals both exist, the firsts iconically, the thirds paradigmatically" (καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἀμφότερά ἐστιν, εἰκονικῶς μὲν τὰ πρῶτα, παραδειγματικῶς δὲ τὰ τρίτα), or again, see In Tim. I, 13.10: "the sensibles are in the intelligibles paradigmatically and the intelligibles are in the sensibles iconically" (διότι καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐστι παραδειγματικῶς καὶ τὰ νοητὰ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἰκονικῶς·). This is the opposite of how he speaks in the passage in Theologica I, 11 that we are considering. If one took Psellos' citation here for a model, one would expect Proclus to put it the other way round in his commentary on the Timaeus, and to say that "the intelligibles are in the sensibles paradigmatically." τὰ μὲν οὐράνια ἐν γῇ χθονίως εἰσί, [τὰ δὲ] χθόνια ἐν οὐρανῷ οὐρανίως. τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα εἰκονικῶς ἐν τοῖς καταδεεστέροις, τὰ δὲ ταπεινότερα παραδειγματικῶς ἐν τοῖς ὑπ [ερτέροις].61 on the one hand, the heavenly things are in the earth in an earthly way, and on the other hand, the earthly things are in heaven in a heavenly way; [for] on the one hand, the higher things are in the lower things as images, and on the other hand, the lower things are in the higher things as paradigms.
Neither this postponement of the middle elements nor the transposition of εἰκονικῶς and παραδειγματικῶς have any support in the manuscript; nevertheless this arrangement does seem to make the most sense of the text, and the transposition at least is necessary if this citation is to be consistent with Proclus' known writings. Fortunately for our purposes, Psellos' exegesis does not seem to depend upon the inversion of the two adverbs, nor, consequently, does my explanation of his exegesis depend on my proposed emendation, so long as it is clear that the second "canon," while more elaborate, still only involves two modes, namely that by which the higher is in the lower, and that by which the lower is in the higher. While Psellos' initial statement of the questions to be addressed might lead one to expect that he will enlist Proclus to explain the difference between manifestation "in an image" and manifestation "according to substance," it turns out that Psellos seems to employ the Proclean canons only in order to introduce the general principles of how archetypes or paradigms (higher realities) are manifested in images (lower realities) according to the mode or level of the images. Psellos uses Proclus' canons (or canon) in order to mark the distance between the paradigm and the image, so that, having done so, he may put into stark relief the distinctiveness of the Incarnation as that event in which the paradigm fully descends into the image.
Psellos wishes to show the difference between, on the one hand, the great variety of ways in which God manifested himself prior to the Incarnation, and on the other hand, the unique way in which he showed himself in the Incarnation, and specifically in the Transfiguration. He explains the former category first of all in terms of the universality of creaturely participation in God. This participation is diverse, according to the receptivity of the creature, and thus God may be manifest in one way to the angels and in another to human beings: For the illuminations sent from the One, being images of its substance, appear in one way in the higher orders but in another in the lower [orders]. And so, in all these the divine is beheld, not according to substance, but in certain images and in […] faint and obscure tracks, since there is no generated nature that is able to contain God's substance.62 Thus, if God is seen as shining amber or as a wheel (two of Psellos' examples), this is not because these images are adequate to God's essence, but rather, since the nature of the beholders was unable to contain the substance of the divine, it appeared to them in those forms which in fact they were able to see; for the diminishment of the images is not from the side of the nature of the divine, but from the weakness of the beholders […]. We depict God in images because he is not embodied so that he might be entirely visible to us [literally: "fall under our whole eyes"], but is wholly uncircumscribable and invisible.63 The point to grasp is that while these are genuine manifestations of the divine, they nevertheless involve a kind of diminution or transposition in accordance with creaturely capacity. The case is different with the Transfiguration, however, for when the Word of God became incarnate, he dwelt substantially with his own image, not shining his theophany on us, but making our nature subsist substantially with his own person. Henceforth therefore the pure beauty is hidden under the assumption, and since it was necessary that sometime this [beauty] be seen by the creature as 62 Theologica I, 11.41-47: αἱ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλλάμψεις πεμπόμεναι, εἰκόνες τῆς ἐκείνου οὐσίας τυγχάνουσαι, ἄλλως μὲν ταῖς ὑπερτέραις {οὐσίαις} ἰνδάλλονται τάξεσιν, ἄλλως δὲ ταῖς ὑφειμέναις. ἐν πάσαις γοῦν ταύταις οὐ κατ' οὐσίαν ὁρᾶται τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλ' ἐν εἰκόσι τισὶ καὶ ἐν [……] μασι καὶ λεπτοτάτοις καὶ ἀμυδροῖς ἴχνεσιν, ἐπεὶ μηδ' ἔστι τις γεννητὴ φύσις οὐσίαν χωρῆσαι δυναμένη θεοῦ. 63 Theologica I, 11.59-80: ἀλλ' ἐπειδήπερ ἡ τῶν θεωμένων φύσις χωρεῖν τοῦ θείου τὴν οὐσίαν ἀδύνατος ἦν, ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐμφαντάζεται ἃ δὴ καὶ ἰδεῖν δεδύνηνται· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ θείου φύσιν ἡ τῶν εἰκόνων ἐλάττωσις, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ὁρώντων ἀσθένειαν.
though from some mirror, he prepared Tabor as a limit for himself in relation to this […]. Moses and Elijah appear to him, who […] foreshadowed his descent iconically so that, what they saw in shadows, this also they might see shining truly.64 The "archetypal beauty," according to Psellos, is "the truly flashing of the pure hypostasis of the Son."65 […] having the whole divinity that is in the Father and in the Spirit, the Son came down, and hypostatizing our whole nature with his filial hypostasis through his body, by his divinity he mixed and joined together divided things, i.e. humanity and divinity, through his one hypostasis. For since the Son is one hypostasis, he had the divinity of Father and Spirit indivisibly in this [hypostasis], and he united man to his own hypostasis-not this or that man, but the whole nature-and in fact altogether united this with the divinity.66 It is as though the archetype descended to the level of its image, wholly uniting that image with itself. While one might have expected that Psellos would employ Proclus' 'canons' in order to explicate God's distinctive manifestation in the Incarnation, it seems that in fact the role of Proclus is limited here to elucidating the usual or 'normal' modes of divine manifestation, precisely so that the entirely new character of the Incarnation may be made plain. By elucidating the structure of manifestation "in images," Psellos shows how, in the usual order of things, images always fall far short of their paradigms. Theologica I, 11.98-99: ἀρχέτυπον δὲ κάλλος ἡ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ ὑποστάσεως ἀκήρατος τῷ ὄντι μαρμαρυγή. 66 Theologica I, 11.118-126: ὅλην γοῦν ἔχων τὴν θεότητα τὴν ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι κατελήλυθεν ὁ υἱός, καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει τῇ υἱικῇ ὅλην τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν διὰ τοῦ κυριακοῦ ὑποστησάμενος σώματος, κατέμιξε τῇ θεότητι καὶ συνῆψε τὰ διεστῶτα, ἀνθρωπότητά φημι καὶ θεότητα, διὰ τῆς μιᾶς αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσεως. ἐπεὶ γὰρ μία τυγχάνων ὑπόστασις ὁ υἱός, ἀμερίστως ἐν ταύτῃ τήν τε πατρικὴν εἶχε θεότητα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος, ἥνωσε δὲ καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστάσει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐ τόνδε ἢ τόνδε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, πάντως δήπου καὶ τῇ θεότητι τοῦτον συνήνωσε.
like a collapsing of this polarity: the paradigm (Christ the archetypal beauty) is united with its image (humanity) in such a way (namely, according to substance) that, nevertheless, no reduction of the paradigm has occurred. That this is so is the revelation of Tabor, showing forth Christ the eternal Son in all his glory.
In Theol. I, 11 Psellos thus seems to rely upon Proclus' precision in order to give an explanation in philosophical terms of a principle that is shared between Christianity and Neoplatonism, namely the image/paradigm relationship or (put in other terms) the fact that God is manifest in creation itself and in 'theophanies,' yet "through a glass darkly." Psellos does not confine himself to this common ground, however, but deals forthrightly with the mystery of the Incarnation, conceiving of it as a "substantial" descent of the archetype into the image, yet without raising the question of whether Proclus himself could have admitted this possibility. Theol. I, 11 thus represents a substantial (i.e. not merely incidental or ornamental) use of Proclus in which Psellos neither transgresses the bounds of orthodoxy nor sees a need to point out differences between Proclean and Christian teaching.
My remaining two examples, however, seem to involve genuine doctrinal conflict, partially acknowledged by Psellos in the first case, and unacknowledged in the second.
In Theol. I, 105 Psellos explicitly refers to Proclus' teaching on the doctrinal question being considered, but then explicitly rejects that teaching. The context is a discussion by Psellos of the two different senses that the adjective anarchos, "unoriginate," may have in Christian theology. Having noted that the Father is "unoriginate" in two senses, both as not begotten (ἀτέκτου) and as not generated (ἀγεννήτου),67 whereas the Son and Spirit are "unoriginate" only 67 Theologica I, 105, 416.75-84: " 'Father,' he says, 'the father and unoriginate; for [he is] not from something.' For the sense of anarchos is double, applied on the one hand to the atektos, and on the other to the agennetos. And the agennetos is, both according to the outside philosophers and according to us, what does not have an older hypostasis than its own existence; for in this way the philosopher Simplicius, interpreting the De caelo of Aristotle, defines the agennetos. Nothing therefore among beings is agennetos, except the One for them, and God for the Jews, and for us the triadic hypostasis commonly and the Father individually. For the others are generated (γεννᾶται), some from each other, some from the first cause, and so in this way Greeks produce (γεννῶσι) soul from intellect, and intellect from being, and being from the one." ('Πατήρ' φησίν 'ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἄναρχος· οὐ γὰρ ἔκ τινος' . διττὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀνάρχου σημασία, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀτέκτου φερομένη, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου. ἀγέννητον δέ ἐστι καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἔξω φιλοσόφους καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς τὸ μὴ ἔχον πρεσβυτέραν ὑπόστασιν τῆς ἰδίας ὑπάρξεως· οὕτω γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος Σιμπλίκιος τὴν Περὶ οὐρανοῦ πραγματείαν ἐξηγούμενος τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὡρίσατο τὸ ἀγέννητον. οὐδὲν οὖν τῶν ὄντων ἀγέννητον, εἰ μὴ παρ' ἐκείνοις τὸ ὂν [Gautier: scr. ἓν?] καὶ παρ' Ἰουδαίοις θεὸς καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν κοινῶς μὲν ἡ τριαδικὴ ὑπόστασις, in the second sense, as not generated, Psellos then cites an axiom from Porphyry's Sententiae that he had also considered and rejected in Phil. min. II, 35, namely the claim that "everything that generates generates something inferior to its own substance."68 He suggests that this claim derives from the assumption of a hierarchy in which "the One generates Being, Being generates Intellect, and Intellect generates Soul," and he summarizes part of Proclus' proof of the same claim (though expressed in different terms) in Prop. 7 of the Elements, calling him here "the most philosophical Proclus." Proclus had expressed Porphyry's claim as follows: "Every productive cause is superior to the nature of what is produced," and he began his proof with a tri-lemma that Psellos paraphrases: "for either […] things that generate will generate something similar to themselves or something inferior to themselves or something superior to themselves."69 Curiously, while Psellos reports Proclus' refutation of the possibility that one thing might generate something superior to itself, he conveniently ἰδίως δὲ ὁ πατήρ. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀλλήλων γεννᾶται, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου· οὕτω γοῦν Ἕλληνες ψυχὴν μὲν ἀπὸ νοῦ γεννῶσι, νοῦν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος, τὸ δὲ ὂν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνός.) It seems that Psellos' philosophical sources have led him to ignore the patristic convention, from around the time of Nicaea, of reserving agennetos (with two 'nu's) for the Father, in the sense of unbegotten, while agenetos (with one 'nu') could apply to the whole Trinity, as uncreated. The loss of this distinction here is perhaps a sympton of the difficulty in applying the features of an emanative system to the Christian vision of reality, where neither the idea of creation nor the intra-trinitarian relationships correspond exactly to the features of an emanative continuum. Cf. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, I: "Now, one ought to know that ἀγένητον written with one ν means that which has not been created, or, in other words, that which is unoriginated; while ἀγέννητον written with two ν's means that which has not been begotten. Therefore, the first meaning implies a difference in essence, for it means that one essence is uncreated, or ἀγένητος; with one ν, while some other is created, or originated. On the other hand, the second meaning does not imply any difference in essence, because the first individual substance of every species of living being is unbegotten but not unoriginated. For they were created by the Creator, being brought into existence by His Word. But they were certainly not begotten, because there was no other like substance pre-existing from which they might have been begotten. Thus, the first meaning applies to all three of the super-divine Persons of the sacred Godhead, for they are uncreated and of the same substance. On the other hand, the second meaning definitely does not apply to all three, because the Father alone is unbegotten in so far as He does not have His being from another person. And only the Son is begotten, for He is begotten of the substance of the Father without beginning and independently of time.
omits Proclus' denial that one thing could produce another that is like or equal to itself. Yet this in fact is precisely the position that Psellos, as an orthodox trinitarian, wishes to maintain, and so he asserts, just as Nicholas of Methone will, that Prop. 7 simply is not applicable to the Trinity: But in regard to the divine generation this philosophical theory is nonsense; for the Father has not begotten a Son who is inferior to himself, but one who is equal to himself. And if someone wishes to live philosophically by reason, he might say that this theological saying of the Greeks holds in the case of those things that generate and are generated where the one that generates is older by time than the one that is generated; but for us no age, still less time, intervenes between Father and Son, and because of this the Begotten is not inferior to the Father.70 Psellos certainly recognizes the problem that this fundamental Proclean principle raises vis-à-vis Christian doctrine, but he seems to avoid dealing with Proclus' argument in detail, dismissing the entire proposition as only pertinent to generation in time. This is perhaps disingenuous on his part, for he surely knows that Proclus' proposition intends to describe a non-temporal truth. Indeed, in an important sense, as Nicholas will later point out, it is demonstrably false that in time-bound generation the cause is superior to the effect, for it is characteristic of natural generation that the offspring are fully equal in nature or species to their progenitors: humans beget humans, horses beget horses, and so forth.71 I turn now to my final example of Psellos' use of Proclus' Elements. Whereas, in the passage just discussed, Psellos takes pains to limit the application of a Proclean principle so that it will not conflict with orthodox doctrine, in Theol. I, 62 we find that Psellos not only uses Proclus in a substantive way, but even thoroughly integrates problematic Proclean structures into his own exposition of the topic, doing so with no hint of disagreement.
The treatise concerns a line from Gregory of Nazianzus's Oration 14, "On the Love of the Poor," which I provide here in its context: What is this wisdom that concerns me? And what is this great mystery? Or is it God's will that we, who are a portion of God that has flowed down from above, not become exalted and lifted up on account of this dignity, and so despise our creator? Or is it not rather that, in our struggle and 70 Psellos battle with the body, we should always look to him, so that this very weakness that has been yoked to us might be an education concerning our dignity?72 Psellos is concerned with the phrase, "we who are a portion of God that has flowed down from above." He divides it into two parts, first considering the words, "portion of God," and later the words, "flowed down from above." Psellos imagines that someone might ask how we are "a portion of God," given the corporeal connotations of this language. He observes that while thinking of corporeal 'parts' of God might be consonant with the perspective of the Stoics, both the older Academy and the new [Academy] agree explicitly that the divine, whatever it is, is incorporeal, creator of bodies and souls and intellects. And our philosophy as well, following them in fact, lays it down clearly that nothing among beings is like it. How then does this great one, speaking concerning men, say that these are a portion of the greater?73 In effect, though without citing it explicitly, Psellos provides as an answer an extended meditation on Prop. 1 of the Elements: "Every manifold participates in some way the One." His eventual answer to the question posed is that we are a "portion" of God because we each after our fashion participate in the One, as do all things. "If someone would approach [the saying] philosophically," he begins, "using the division of Plato, then he would discover how the truth is hidden. That nothing among beings is purely one, then, philosophers and noble men are agreed." Psellos proceeds to argue in very Proclean terms that everything short of the unique and transcendent One is not purely one: not matter, not form, not soul, not intellect, not being, not unification, and not henads. It is a remarkable passage, worth quoting at length: […] for matter is immediately indefinite; for this reason you can keep on cutting it to infinity. And form, plunged into misery with matter and suf-72 Τίς ἡ περὶ ἐμὲ σοφία καὶ τί τὸ μέγα τοῦτο μυστήριον; ἢ βούλεται μοῖραν ἡμᾶς ὄντας Θεοῦ καὶ ἄνωθεν ῥεύσαντας, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐπαιρόμενοι καὶ μετεωριζόμενοι καταφρονῶμεν τοῦ κτίσαντος, ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα πάλῃ καὶ μάχῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀεὶ βλέπειν, καὶ τὴν συνεζευγμένην ἀσθένειαν παιδαγωγίαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀξιώματος; Trans. Constas 2014, p. 75. 73 Theologica I, 62.19-24: οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας τῆς τε πρεσβυτέρας καὶ τῆς νέας ἀσώματον διαρρήδην τὸ θεῖον, ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν, ὡμολόγησαν, σωμάτων καὶ ψυχῶν καὶ νόων δημιουργόν. τούτοις δὴ καὶ ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφία συνεπομένη αὐτά τε σαφῶς διατάττεται καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἐκείνῳ προσείκασται. πῶς οὖν οὗτος ὁ μέγας περὶ ἀνθρώπων διαλεγόμενος ἀπόμοιραν τούτους εἶπε τοῦ κρείττονος; fering all things through it, is changed from its name of being one. But in fact even soul, keeping itself beyond matter, has a confused and multipowered nature, but it is not free from separation; so it does not have the forms of beings in a concentrated form, but unrolls them, going from the premises to the conclusions. And the intellect has a certain reflection of the One, as also ancient philosophy says, not separated, and not seeing another through another intermediate, but it gathers the forms of beings together in itself in a compacted way. Yet it is also many; for the intellect is the beings themselves, which in fact are many, but it intellects itself, and in intellecting itself it intellects beings, and the beings are many; and therefore the intellect is many. But if it is many, then what else would exceed so as not to be many? Yes, he says, but being exceeds intellect; however far intellect extends, so too does being; but the converse is not the case, that however far being extends, so too does intellect. For as many things as are intellects or have an intellect, these are also beings; but as many things as are beings, not all of these also intellect (νοεῖ). But [then] the argument proceeds of itself; for if being has the power over many, then it is not in fact purely one, but even beyond these is unification, and unification is a union either of henads or of composites, so that this too is many. What then would someone say concerning the henads? For is not each of these one? How would a henad not be one? But because of this, O good man, it is not one, because it is a henad; for the One transcends; but that which something transcends is not purely that to which it is subordinated.74 74 Theologica I, 62.28-49: ἥ τε γὰρ ὕλη εὐθὺς ἄπειρος. διὸ καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ἐστὶν ἡ εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον τομή, τό τε εἶδος τῇ ὕλῃ συνδυαστὸν καὶ παντοπαθὲς διὰ ταύτην γενόμενον τῆς τοῦ ἓν εἶναι προσηγορίας ἀπήλλακται. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ψυχή, ὑπὲρ τὴν ὕλην ἑαυτὴν στήσασα, πολυμιγὴς καὶ πολυδύναμος πέφυκεν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἀπήλακται διαστάσεως· ὅθεν οὐδ' ἔχει τὰ εἴδη τῶν ὄντων συνεσπειραμένως, ἀλλ' ἀνελίττει ταῦτα, ἀπὸ τῶν προτάσεων χωροῦσα ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα. ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔχει μέν τινα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔμφασιν, ὡς καὶ ἡ ἀρχαία φιλοσοφία φησίν, οὐ διιστάμενος, οὐδὲ δι' ἄλλου μέσου ὁρῶν ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ συνεπτυγμένως τὰ τῶν ὄντων εἴδη ἐν ἑαυτῷ συλλαβών. πλὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος πολλά· αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ὁ νοῦς, ἃ δὴ πολλά εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οὗτος ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ, ἑαυτὸν δὲ νοῶν τὰ ὄντα νοεῖ, τὰ δὲ ὄντα πολλά· καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἄρα πολλά. εἰ δ' οὗτος πολλά, τί ἂν ἄλλο ὑπερβαίη ὥστε μὴ εἶναι πολλά; ναί, φησίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὂν τὸν νοῦν ὑπερπέπτωκεν· ἐφ' ἃ μὲν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐφ' ἃ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὁ νοῦς· ὅσα μὲν γὰρ νόες εἰσὶν ἢ νοῦν ἔχει, καὶ ὄντα εἰσίν· ὅσα δὲ ὄντα τυγχάνει, οὐ δήπου πάντα καὶ νοεῖ. ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν ὁ λόγος ἔρχεται· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν, οὐ δήπου ἕν ἐστι καθαρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων ἕνωσις, ἡ δ' ἕνωσις ἢ ἑνάδων ἢ συνθέτων συναθροισμός, ὥστε καὶ αὕτη πολλά. τί δ' ἂν εἴποι τις περὶ τῶν ἑνάδων; ἆρα γὰρ οὐδὲ τούτων ἑκάστη ἕν; πῶς οὖν ἑνάς; ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο, ὦ λῷστε, οὐχ ἕν, διότι ἑνάς· ὑπερβέβηκε γὰρ τὸ ἕν· ὃ δὲ ὑπερβέβηκέ τι, οὐ καθαρῶς ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν οὗ ὑφεῖται.
Psellos introduces the passage by speaking of "the division of Plato," and perhaps he has Plato's divided line in mind. But in fact Psellos here follows Proclus' Elements in several particulars, reflecting much of the content of Propositions 20-22 (especially 20), as regards the increasing causal scope in the ascending series: soul, intellect, being, one. It is a striking passage of philosophical ascent, but also surprising, for whereas Psellos often simplifies the Neoplatonic hierarchy, here it is notable and puzzling that Psellos retains the distinctive term "henads" without any explanation or qualification. Here if anywhere Psellos seems to be stepping outside the bounds of orthodoxy. He concludes the passage thus: So, since the divine is something other than beings, it is uniquely one, whereas being and intellect are called one according to secondary and tertiary senses. But on the one hand, being itself truly what it is called, it exists in an unmixed way in relation to the opposed; for it is purely one, and [is] being in the proper sense, and inviolate and blessed intellect.75 Psellos then gives the complementary conclusion as well: only the One is truly one, but for this very reason we must also affirm that all things participate in the One: but if something among other things is called one, then it is named one and is one by virtue of its participation in that One. And so, the great father here calls "portion" that which those who belong to the outside [i.e. pagan] philosophy called imparting and participation. For it seems to many that man has his subsistence from soul and body alone, and they say that he is "intellectual" because the intellect is the most sovereign part of the soul. But to me and those who rightly philosophized, the intellect both is and is called something other than the soul. And just as the body both lives and is moved by its participation in soul, so also the soul intellects by its participation in intellect; and where there is intellect, there also is being; and where there is being, there also is the One. The result is that although we subsist by participation in the One, nevertheless God is con- 75 Theologica I, 62.50-53: Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ θεῖον ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ ὄντα, ἕν ἐστι μόνως κατὰ δευτέρους καὶ τρίτους λόγους καὶ ὂν καὶ νοῦς καλούμενος. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μέν, αὐτὸ δὴ ὅπερ λέγεται, ἀμιγῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἀντίθετον· εἰλικρινῶς τε γάρ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ κυρίως ὂν καὶ νοῦς ἀκήρατος καὶ μακάριος […] This is more Dionysian than Proclean, insofar as Dionysius identifies the One, Being and Intellect in a transcendent sense in God, whereas Proclus preserves a hierarchy of the One over Being and Intellect. fessed as "One" properly speaking, so that we have acquired images and reflections of God in ourselves, because of which we are in fact "a portion of God." But we were once one, not in nature, but in identity of inclination and motion;76 for the one in us agrees with our being, and this agrees with the intellect, and this agrees with the soul, and this agrees with the body; or rather, so that I may speak more precisely, the body followed the soul, and this followed the things that went beyond it and the One itself, and by means of soul, intellect and being the body was led up to the One and was itself one by participation.77 "We were once one," but Psellos proceeds to recount the fragmenting effects of the Fall. This is how it was formerly; but when the soul cast off its iconic beauty, turning its back on the divine command, then the divine series itself was torn asunder, and because the impartations were not distributed according to the analogy of the existence, the parts were torn asunder, the wholeness became a part, and the commonality became a great quantity. Because of this Christ is named "corner stone," and he was unified by means of soul so that he might join together the extremes, i.e. One and body, and so that we might become spirit, intellect and god, with "death being swallowed up in" and giving way to "life."78 76 Cf. Gregory, Or. 29.2, when speaking of the Trinity: γνώμης σύμπνοια, καὶ ταὐτότης κινήσεως. 77 Theologica I, 62.53-72: τῶν δ' ἄλλων εἴ τι οὕτως λέγεται, κατὰ μετοχὴν ἐκείνου ἔστι τε καὶ ὀνομάζεται. ἣν οὖν οἱ τῆς ἔξω φιλοσοφίας μετάδοσιν καὶ μετοχὴν κατωνόμασαν, μοῖραν ἐνταῦθα ὁ μέγας πατὴρ προσηγόρευσε. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐκ ψυχῆς μόνης καὶ σώματος ὁ ἄνθρωπος δοκεῖ τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν· ἔννουν δὲ αὐτόν φασιν εἶναι, ὡς τοῦ νοῦ μέρους τοῦ κυριωτάτου τῆς ψυχῆς τυγχάνοντος. ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ τοῖς κυρίως φιλοσοφήσασιν ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ νοῦς ἔστι καὶ λέγεται. καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ σῶμα ψυχῆς μετουσίᾳ ζῇ τε καὶ κινεῖται, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ νοῦ παρουσίᾳ νοεῖ· ὅπου δὲ νοῦς, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ὄν· ἔνθα δὲ τὸ ὄν, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἕν. ὥστ' εἰ καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐν μετοχῇ καθέσταμεν, ἀλλ' ἓν κυρίως ὡμολόγηται ὁ θεός, ὥστε καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκόνας ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ἐμφάσεις κεκτήμεθα, δι' ἃ δὴ καὶ μοῖρα τυγχάνομεν τοῦ θεοῦ. Ἀλλ' ἦμεν ποτὲ ἓν οὐ τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταὐτότητα τῆς γνώμης καὶ τῶν κινήσεων· ὡμολόγει γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἓν τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς ὄντι, καὶ τοῦτο τῷ νῷ, καὶ οὗτος τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῷ σώματι· μᾶλλον δέ, ἵνα τἀκριβέστερον εἴπω, τὸ μὲν σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ εἵπετο, ἐκείνη δὲ τοῖς ὑπερβεβηκόσι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ ἑνί, διὰ δὲ μέσης ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ καὶ ὄντος καὶ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἀναγόμενον καὶ αὐτὸ ἓν ἦν κατὰ μετοχήν. 78 Theologica I, 62.70-77: ταῦτα μὲν πρότερον· ἀφ' οὗ δὲ τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα κάλλος ἡ ψυχὴ ἀπεβάλετο, κατὰ νώτου ἑαυτῆς τὸ θεῖον ποιησαμένη παράγγελμα, διεσπάσθη ἡ θεία αὕτη σειρά, καὶ τῶν μεταδόσεων μὴ διαδιδομένων κατ' ἀναλογίαν τῆς ὑποστάσεως, διεσπάσθη τὰ μέρη καὶ γέγονεν ἡ μὲν ὁλότης μέρος, ἡ δὲ κοινότης πολυπλήθεια. διὰ τοῦτο Χριστὸς 'ἀκρογωνιαῖος λίθος' ὠνόμασται καὶ ἡνώθη διὰ μέσης ψυχῆς, ἵνα τὰ ἄκρα συνάψῃ ἓν καὶ σῶμα καὶ γενώμεθα πνεῦμα καὶ νοῦς καὶ θεός, 'καταποθέντος ὑπὸ τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ θνητοῦ' τε καὶ ῥέοντος.
Psellos next traces, in a way that mirrors his earlier metaphysical statements, a corresponding course of redemptive personal unification: And observe how much force his phrase "and have flowed down from above" has; for the One is praised here, the One that the argument has in fact shown to be higher than our intellect and being; so truly we established the flowing down from above. For just as in the case of the Heraclean bonds (which in fact are customarily understood as magical in regard to comprehensive magic) if you destroy the beginning of the bond then the whole will be destroyed, in the same way in fact in the case of our series too, if you tear away the one of the bond, then straightway being, intellect, soul and body-the divine series itself-will also be torn apart and destroyed. It is necessary therefore that we, if we live in body alone, run back up to soul and discover from philosophy the bond by which we will bind and loose matter in relation to soul; and if we are "soulish men," on the one hand existing beyond bodies but on the other hand living a life fitting for a man, so that we are not able "to receive the things of the spirit," then it is necessary to ascend to the intellect; but not even this is being in the proper sense, and so from this it is necessary that we be assimilated to being, and then that we run up to the principle of our bond, the One, because in fact we are "a portion of God" according to this alone. For God is one properly speaking, but he is not intellect in the proper sense, since intellect is constitutive of forms, and a form is itself what is unmixed even with privations. But if God were intellect in the proper sense, then where would privations come from, unless we will understand somehow that they come from the demiurge and being? But because there are many privations, it is necessary that the unifications and the henads exist before the others; for this reason, in fact, the One is before all.79 79 Theologica I, 62.78-98: Σὺ δέ μοι ὅρα τὸ 'καὶ ἄνωθεν ῥεύσαντας' ὅσην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν· τὸ γὰρ ἓν ἐνταῦθα αἰνίττεται, ὃ δὴ ὁ λόγος ἀνωτέρω τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἀπέδειξεν· ἄνωθεν γοῦν ἀληθῆ ὑπέστημεν τὴν ῥοήν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν Ἡρακλείων δεσμῶν, οὓς δὴ νόμος τοὺς γόητας παραλαμβάνειν ἐπὶ τῶν συλληπτικῶν μαγειῶν, ἢν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ δεσμοῦ διαλύσῃς, τὸ πᾶν ἔσῃ διαλυσάμενος, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς σειρᾶς, ἢν τὸ ἓν ἀποσπάσῃς τοῦ δεσμοῦ, εὐθὺς καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἡ θεία αὕτη σειρὰ συνδιασπᾶται καὶ συνδιαλύεται. δεῖ οὖν ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὲν ζῶμεν σώματι μόνῳ, πρὸς ψυχὴν ἐπαναδραμεῖν καὶ τὸν δεσμὸν εὑρεῖν παρὰ φιλοσοφίας ὅτῳ τὴν ὕλην εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν συνδήσομέν τε καὶ ἀναλύσομεν· εἰ δὲ 'ψυχικοί' ἐσμεν 'ἄνθρωποι' , σωμάτων μὲν ὑπερκείμενοι, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσαν ζῶντες ζωήν, ὥστε 'μὴ' δύνασθαι 'δέξασθαι τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος' , ἐπανελθεῖν πρὸς τὸν νοῦν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οὗτος τὸ κυρίως ὄν, ἀπὸ γοῦν τούτου καὶ τῷ ὄντι προσεικασθῆναι ἡμᾶς χρεών, εἶτα πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κεφάλαιον τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς δεσμοῦ τὸ ἓν ἐπαναδραμεῖν, καθ' ὃ δὴ μόνον μοῖρα τυγχάνομεν τοῦ θεοῦ. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς κυρίως Theol. I, 62 is a good illustration of how thoroughly Psellos has absorbed Proclean structures into his own thought. The significance of 'henads' is not made clear here, but in Proclus' works the henads are, as Nicholas repeatedly points out, a polytheistic feature. The fact that without any explanation Psellos integrates 'henads' into his exposition of the participatory relation of all things to the One suggests either that he has lost sight of the boundaries of orthodoxy, or that he is not in this instance very concerned about these boundaries.

Conclusion
As we have seen, Psellos uses Proclus'Elements in different genres and in different ways. In some texts he simply quotes or paraphrases him without comment, in others he quotes passages from Proclus and appends brief comments on the compatibility of Proclus' philosophy with Christian teaching, and in others (most notably in his discussions of Gregory of Nazianzus), he uses Proclus as a hermeneutical tool. I suggest that this last way of using Proclus provides the clearest measure of Psellos' commitment to Proclus' philosophy, since his compilation of Proclean texts is not a proof of his own commitment to the ideas. On the other hand, it must be recognized that the large volume of Proclean material in Psellos' compilations, especially in the De omnifaria doctrina, and especially in light of his frequent use of Proclus in other non-compilatory texts, shows his deep investment in Proclus' thought. This is not surprising, given the prominence Psellos himself ascribes to Proclus when describing the course of his education. Furthermore, whether or not he endorses a given philosophical source, his high regard for the role of reason in theology makes him far more inclined to expect common ground with philosophical sources in the first place, and therefore to consult and employ them.80 The depth of Psellos' interest in Proclus, quite apart from particular doctrinal questions, probμὲν ἕν, οὐ κυρίως δὲ νοῦς· ὁ γὰρ νοῦς εἰδῶν ἐστιν ὑποστάτης, εἶδος αὐτὸς τυγχάνων τὸ ἀμιγές, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ τῶν στερήσεων. εἰ δὲ νοῦς κυρίως ὁ θεός, αἱ στερήσεις πόθεν; εἰ μή που τὸν δημιουργὸν καὶ ὄντα νοήσομεν. ἀλλ' αἱ στερήσεις πολλαί, δεῖ οὖν πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τὰς ἑνώσεις εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἑνάδας· διὸ δὴ πρὸ πάντων τὸ ἕν. 80 Regarding the different genres, Graeme Miles remarks (2017, p. 89): "The most immediately striking feature of Psellos' Theologica, for a reader acquainted also with his Philosophica Minora, is the continuity of the two. These lectures as a whole, whether designated philosophical or theological in recent editions, are parts of a continuous pedagogical and philosophical undertaking." ably would have troubled Nicholas of Methone, who also probably would have regarded Psellos as treading dangerously close to the 'rationalism' for which Nicholas criticizes Proclus.81 Psellos uses Proclus in a variety of ways in the exegetical works we have considered. Some of his citations of the Elements are inconsequential, some are doing real hermeneutical work but are entirely uncontroversial because they involve principles shared between Christianity and Neoplatonism, and finally, some seem to me to push the bounds of orthodoxy. Theol. I, 62 at least seems to be in this category, though I must add that the text is puzzling in several ways, and that Psellos' use of 'henads' here must be studied in relation to other texts where he uses this word.82 Michael Psellos and Nicholas of Methone thus have starkly contrasting attitudes towards the Elements of Theology. Psellos approaches it with great respect and sympathy, and on occasion this sympathy may lead him to see a greater common ground between Proclus' thought and Christian doctrine than actually exists, or even to transgress the bounds of orthodoxy. Yet such occasions are not as frequent as Psellos' reputation among scholars might lead one to expect, and in several cases Psellos quite clearly rejects aspects of Proclus' thought. For his part, Nicholas is so thoroughly devoted to the teaching of Dionysius that he shares more common ground with Proclus than he realizes: one finds him, for example, using emanative metaphors to characterize divine creation, even while criticizing aspects of Proclus' emanative system. Psellos in any case is in some passages clearly conscious that philosophy can lead into heresy. As the quotation at the head of this article indicates, learnedness must be mixed with piety, and Gregory of Nazianzus represents for Psellos the perfection of this mixture. It is difficult to think that anyone who admired Gregory as deeply as Psellos did could have been very offensive to Nicholas.
Despite their real differences in both substance and rhetoric regarding Proclus, it seems to me unlikely that Psellos' use of the Elements was a sufficient reason for Nicholas to write his Refutation. While Psellos does seem to push the bounds of what Nicholas would have found acceptable, he does not do so often 81 Whether Proclus should be considered a 'rationalist' is of course another matter, but if 'rationalism' in theology is understood as a confidence in the power of reason to understand transcendent reality, then it is clear that Nicholas regarded Proclus as a rationalist, and would surely have thought the same of Psellos in some instances. 82 In the texts by Psellos included in the TLG, the word ἑνάς occurs twenty-nine times in the singular and thirteen times in the plural. For plural uses see Theologica I, 20 (52) enough or to a sufficient extent to match plausibly Nicholas' description in his prologue of those who have been led into heresy by Proclus' teaching, especially since Nicholas presents them as his own contemporaries.83 Two alternatives remain then, as explanations for Nicholas' critique of Proclus: either it responds to a real enthusiasm for Proclus among his own contemporaries, enthusiasm inspired partly by Psellos himself, presumably, but more offensive because less nuanced and discriminating, or it is directed not so much at actual persons as at 'straw men' representing hypothetical appropriations of Proclus, appropriations anticipated in Psellos' use of Proclus, but now envisioned as more thorough and unambivalent, and thus more hostile to Christian teaching. In either case, I suggest, Nicholas' own twelfth-century context holds (hides?) the explanation for his assault upon Proclus' new tower of Babel.84 83 In this article I have limited myself to a consideration of Psellos' use of the Elements of Theology. A full assessment of Psellos' relationship to Proclus can of course only be made on the basis of a complete survey of all his citations of Proclus. 84 My reading of Psellos here takes for granted his sincerity, but as Anthony Kaldellis has argued (2012) there are reasons to doubt this in some contexts, if we consider his demonstrable tension with the ecclesial and especially monastic mainstream, and take account of the fact that he needed to appear to be orthodox even if and when he was not. This consideration must be taken seriously, but I have not yet read widely or deeply enough in Psellos to be able to factor this ambiguity into my account. If we stipulate that Psellos may indeed have been more heterodox than his writings explicitly show, then the question as regards Nicholas' Refutation would be, to what extent might Nicholas have 'seen through' Psellos' facade of orthodoxy? If Nicholas could see a greater threat in Psellos' works than lay on their surface, then Psellos may have played a greater role in provoking Nicholas than I have here argued. Whatever the case with Psellos, however, I am confident that we need not apply the same hermeneutic of suspicion to Nicholas himself, who shows no signs of wavering in his orthodoxy. Whatever Nicholas' reasons for writing a lengthy refutation, he was no doubt sincere in opposing Proclus, and did not engage merely in an elaborate 'display' of orthodoxy. For an account of Psellos that acknowledges the ambiguity of his persona and writings while nevertheless reading him as operating with established traditions of Christian reflection and scholarship, see Louth 2007, p. 334-343. Louth stresses, as I have, Psellos' great admiration for Gregory of Nazianzus. While this admiration was certainly based in large part on Gregory's rhetorical and stylistic abilities, it seems unlikely to me that Gregory's writings would have attracted such extensive engagement by Psellos had not both form and content interested him deeply.