Notes on the Presence of the Elements of Theology in Ficino’s Commentary on the Philebus

This short essay is intended to partly discuss how Proclus’ Elements of Theology radically shaped Marsilio Ficino’s Commentary on the Philebus . Without enter-ing into the debate about the latter’s significant influence over Ficino’s ‘original’ philosophical works,1 it shall present certain corresponding passages between the Elements of Theology and the Commentary on the Philebus . Moreover, apart from the effort to unearth philological or doctrinal affinities between these texts, there is an ongoing scholarly discussion, on which I shall not focus here, about Ficino’s translation of the Elements of Theology .2 Although it does not aspire to be exhaustive, this essay serves, however, three objectives: first, it starts with certain introductory remarks that bring out Ficino’s reception of the Philebus and the context of his preoccupation with this late platonic dialogue; second, it proceeds with a comparison of selected passages of the Elements of Theology and the Commentary on the Philebus on a purely textual and philological basis, hence Moerbeke’s Latin translation was preferred to Proclus’ Greek text; finally, it attempts to concisely offer some suggestions concerning the philosophical significance of some of the affinities and discrepancies between the excerpts under comparison.


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The Philebus' Significance for Ficino Except for translating and successively commenting on the Philebus (in 1466-1467 according to Steel3 or in 14694 according to Allen, and also in 1491 and 1492 for its second and third version respectively), Ficino also lectured on it publicly, these lectures providing the basis for the Commentary on the Philebus,5 serving as an introduction to Platonism6 and even aiming to uplift the moral and political status of his fellow Florentines. The fact that Ficino resorts to the Philebus (a radically unpolitical dialogue) for 'political' purposes allows us to better conceive of the intellectual and philosophical challenges he faced, since it sheds further light on his endorsement of a 'medical model' for philosophy and provides us with a fuller picture of how the enterprise of reviving Platonism came to be the historical role and task Ficino invented for himself.7 However, all this vivid interest in an unquestionably abstruse dialogue is not understandable by itself, but if one considers the continuous commentary tradition preceding it. Contrary to what is currently the case, since the Philebus "if it is studied at all, it is reserved for the arcane discussions of graduate seminars or for specialists in late Platonic philosophy",8 the Neoplatonic tradition held it in high esteem. One may discern here two fundamental aspects. a) Given that Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics enjoyed wide acceptance and dominated the philosophical milieu, in his Commentary on the Philebus, Ficino made good use of Damascius' In Philebum9 and explicitly argued for a pleasure in ipso cognitionis actu,10 whereby he enriched Plato's replenishment model11 and gave a thorough account of the way in which the reversion towards the One (that is, the Good and God), which satisfies our God-oriented appetitus, can be fully rewarding and pleasurable. b) While in the Republic Plato hesitantly offered his readers a rather reserved account of the Good and Socrates restricted himself to certain cryptic and insufficiently illuminating formulations, the Philebus was thought by Neoplatonism as much more promising in this respect.12 The three 'fea- 3 Steel 2013, p. 69. 4 Marsilio Ficino, The Philebus Commentary, p. 52. 5 Hankins 1990, p. 484. 6 Marsilio Ficino, The Philebus Commentary, p 1. 7 Hankins 1990, p. 288. 8 Frede 1993 In Damascius, Commentaire sur le Philèbe de Platon, p. clxxxvi. 10 Marsilio Ficino,The Philebus Commentary,p. 327. 11 Gerd Van Riel 2000, p. 2, 7-42. 12 Gerd Van Riel 1997, p. 31-32. tures' of the Good, introduced in 20d (translated by Ficino as sufficiens, expetendeum, perfectum) along with the unity of beauty, proportion and truth (65a) that secures the stability of the final mixture of the good life are all interpreted in connection with the Christian God.13 Ficino was thus in position to reconstruct a robust platonic theory of the Good, much more convincing and detailed than that in the Republic,14 and then subtly Christianize it in order to publicly argue for it in Florence. On top of that, he saw a decisive complementarity between the Philebus and the Parmenides, for the identification of the human good in the former15 depends, according to him, on the specification of the One or the Absolute Good in the latter.16 3

Elements of Theology and the Commentary on the Philebus: Existing Evidence and New Suggestions
In one of his impressive contributions, Carlos Steel masterfully established that in articulating this metaphysical system, Ficino systematically draws from Proclus' Elements of Theology (and from his Parmenides Commentary, to which I shall not focus here). The evidence he adduces is overwhelming and proves that Ficino literally uses numerous and lengthy passages from the Elements of Theology.17 The following annexes include some passages that seem to have been equally inspired by the Elements of Theology. That their degree of correspondence with the latter significantly varies (from passages taken almost literally to freely adapted or slightly modified ones) shall not make us underestimate the extent to which the most principal philosophical starting points of the Commentary on the Philebus are of a Proclian origin.
13 Marsilio Ficino,The Philebus Commentary, The idea that the Philebus adduces further arguments concerning the nature of the Good and thereby continues the relevant discussion of the Republic may also explain why Plato reintroduces Socrates in the Philebus; it seems more plausible that Socrates is back in order to accompany us ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις (64c) and not just because of the dialogue's moral character. Cf. Delcomminette 2006, p. 12-13. 15 Robichaud 2018 Ficino's digression (id totum … mentis degenerat) interrupts the direct quotation of prop. 20 of the Elements of Theology (on p. 99 of the edition).18 Here, as we can see, he implements another strategy, gathering and unifying material and insights from scattered Proclian passages in the Elements of Theology. Thus, he restates the successive ontological levels explaining how passivity, matter, corporeality, divisibility and quantity impede action. Though his exposition is compatible with the Elements of Theology, we should note Ficino's high sensitivity and accuracy when describing the connection of the incorporeal soul with the body. So as not to jeopardize the former's superiority, he cautiously avoids Proclus' risky formulation, according to which an incorporeal being can assume partibilem naturam (prop. 80) but also remain impartibile secundum sui substantiam. From a doctrinal point of view, his argument is much more safeguarded and moderate: the soul's essence is not threatened as long as the soul is not mixed with or dispersed through the body. In fact, it runs counter to Proclus' term condivisa (συνδιαιρούμενα), which implies that the incorporeal and the corporeal are unified and form a certain kind of 'mixture' . Ficino argues here for a more clear-cut distinction and his very emphasis on the fact that the soul is non commixta with and non dispersa through the body reveals his alertness to properly modify and even reject Proclus' formulations. "From God to God"-here is how one could summarize the philosophical core of the above passages. Indeed, the appetitus, which impels us to turn back to our cause and thus finally gain felicity and pleasure, is described by Ficino as totally manipulated by God, that is, the principle of nature.19 'Preprogrammed' , as it were, this reversion shall culminate in our possession of Him, which signifies the accomplishment of a circular movement on our part as well as three interwoven kinds of perfection: our ontological perfection, for we now 'possess' or are identified with the highest possible ontological level; our ethical perfection, for it would be inconsistent to 'possess' the absolute Good without being in an ethically equally good state; our epistemological perfection, since God or the absolute Good is the highest possible object of cognition, the limit, as it were, of what we may aspire to know. The above excerpts could also be taken to constitute a brief summary of the whole Marsilio Ficino's Commentary on the Philebus in that they include all its crucial conceptual tools and anticipate Ficino's conceptualization of felicity and, by extension, of pleasure. He suggests a worldview, wherein felicity is somehow 'obligatory' and 'imposed' by our very nature, since the latter represents and executes a divine plan that excludes no one. Additionally, one can easily discern how skillfully Ficino blends ethics and metaphysics. Since "natura" is informed by God's will, the modern distinction between a normatively neutral and merely descriptive realm that belongs to nature and another that includes moral and value considerations is still untenable. The Commentary on the Philebus exemplifies the idea that the way things "are" is already instilled with the seed of how they "ought to be". In this respect, the attainment of felicity is dependent on our eagerness to facilitate the deployment of our nature. omnes ad unitatem. Unum ergo omnium est principium.
See also: Ideo corpora in quibus terrea conditio praevalet, tanquam ineptissima luci, lumen nullum intus accipiunt. Non quia sit impotens lumen ad penetrandum. (De sole, ch. 9). 1) One pinpoints here: a) the idea that the divine light stems from a caring, ontologically superior, principle spreading itself top-down, in order to illuminate what stands in a lower level of reality and is in need of illumination. In order to Christianize this picture, Ficino intentionally complicates this procedure by arguing not just for the divine light, but for its grace, through which he underlines the 'personal' commitment of the higher principle to the salvation of the lower levels of reality, b) the responsibility of the ontologically inferior beings to be light-friendly and vigilant, that is, to develop a certain readiness and prepare themselves for its reception.
As for the latter, it depends on a robust sense of potency, while an equally uncompromising disapproval of impotence is advocated in both texts. 2) The relation between the higher level, wherein God and the divine light are to be situated, and the various lower ones, is depicted by Proclus in terms of participation, while Ficino resorts rather to the notions of imago and dependence; what is needed is the highest possible light receptivity, which varies pro captu of each being to attain the image of the Good. However different metaphors they may use, both Proclus and Ficino make the case for a transformation ad optimum.
3) The verbs subsisto and excipio bear a remarkable expressive potential. The first emphatically brings out how deteriora experience the gripping influence of the presence of gods, while the second underlines the challenge confronted by the recipient when receiving the divine light. Both of them can be taken to depict a certain backward movement, a subtle retreat.
In the first case, this movement underlines the 'ethical distance' or the gap separating deteriora from gods. In the second case, it serves to bridge the gap and is made only to facilitate the light's reception; the recipient, 'aware' , as it were, of the ontological superiority of what is going to be provided with, subtly retreats in order to fully embrace the gift coming from above. 4) One should not overlook here a crucial difference between Dodd's and Moerbeke's text. The former's accusative δοκοῦν (line 18) has as its subject the ἄλλο τι (line 15), while the latter's genitive putantis (line 9) the participantis (line 8). At first sight, this divergence does not touch upon the light reception procedure, since regardless of whether the ἄλλο τι or the participans (if we follow Moerbeke's choice) has the appearance of "revolting against the divine form of illumination", as Dodds translates, the result remains the same: the divine light does not "assume dominion". These alternatives, however, do result in a radically different philosophical picture. If it is this ἄλλο τι that has the appearance of "revolting against the divine form of illumination", then the emphasis is put rather on the obstacles and the external enemies confronted by the participant; what is underlined in this case is that a certain seemingly powerful being or entity, an anonymous factor, impedes the divine light's downward movement, while in reality the problem lies in the recipient's incompetence and overall ontological disablement. If, on the other hand, it is the participant that has the appearance of "revolting against the divine form of illumination", as Moerbeke's translation indicates, then the overall impression bears certain quasi-religious and sin-related connotations in that the resistance to the divine light implies that the recipient of the divine gift forcefully rejects it. Our attention is thus turned from its deficiency to a certain sense of distorted conversion, since the participant turns towards its cause not in order to thankfully embrace it, but aiming only to reject it. In this case, therefore, the participant is described not only as predominantly responsible for its overall condition, but is also charged for light-resistance and an 'intentional' ontological stagnation. The terminological and philosophical continuity between the Elements of Theology and the Commentary on the Philebus is again easily identifiable. Ficino's philosophical intention is to show that the deployment of God's creative potential does not require any kind of movement. Since the adjective sufficiens comes from Plato's Philebus (ἱκανὸν in 20d), where it is attributed to the good within a radically different context, Proclus is probably the pagan mediator and authority that facilitates this (unacknowledged) transition. Also, it is noteworthy that Ficino's scope is, as usually, much more restricted than that of Proclus. The former argues for certain 'features' of one specific entity, that is, the Christian God, while the latter aims for universality, for the relevant propositions start with omnis causa productiva and omne producens respectively.

Conclusion
Dedicated to the relation between the Elements of Theology and the Commentary on the Philebus, this short essay suggested some similarities and parallel motifs between these texts. The above annexes suffice to prove Ficino's peculiar creativity; they indicate that he does not simply reproduce ideas and texts, but takes pains to substantially rephrase (and even contradict) his sources or, when borrowing a whole proposition or a lengthy passage, to reorder the structure of the argument. They also bring out the fact that almost all of the crucial concepts grounding the Commentary on the Philebus are expounded in Proclian terms. What is most important, however, is to acknowledge how skillfully he exploits the potential of pagan arguments in order to promote Christian insights and ponder over Ficino's reasons for resorting so systematically to Proclus. Part of the answer may reside in his understanding that Proclus' writing, with all its impressive sense of impersonal authority and irrefutability resulting from its geometric model of presentation, accorded his Commentary on the Philebus the majestic and persuasive tone that was indispensable for his philosophical endeavor. In grounding the whole commentary on Proclus' axiomatic formulations (and not so much as one might expect on Dionysius' attractive, but suspicion-arousing, eloquence), Ficino provided his audience with a seemingly unquestionable and solid system of thought that, despite its pagan character, could easily be presented as the basis of a Christian worldview.