Introduction

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1 The Elements of Theology in the Latin West (Revisited)*

18 May 1268. An important medieval manuscript (Vat. Lat. 2419, f. 105va)¹ registers this date as the last day of William of Moerbeke's work on the first-ever Latin translation of Proclus' *Στοιχείωσις θεολογική* (*Elementatio theologica*).² Another important manuscript confirms both the date and the translator, and

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1 MS Vat. lat. 2419, f. 105va: *Procli dyadochy lycii platonici philosophi Elementatario (!) theologica explicit capitulum 21. Completa fuit translatio huius operis Viterbii a fratre G(uillelmo) de Morbecca ordinis fratrum predicatorum XV Kalendis Iunii anno domini millesimo CC°LX°octavo*. The same colophon can be read in MS Cambridge, Peterhouse, 121, f. 202rb. Cf. L. Miolo, "Le *Liber de causis* et l'*Elementatio theologica* dans deux bibliothèques anglaises: Merton College (Oxford) et Peterhouse (Cambridge)", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Vol. 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 120–150.

2 It is worth recalling that there are (at least) four other translations into Latin of the *Elements of Theology*: one by Franciscus Patricius (*Procli Lycii diadochi platonici philosophi eminentissimi Elementa theologica, et physica opus omnis admiratione prosequendum*, Ferrara, Apud Dominicum Mamarellum, 1583); one by Aemilius Portus, who published it together with the Greek text, preceded by the bilingual (Latin-Greek) texts of the *Theologia platonica* and Marinus' *Vita*, and followed by the 55 *Conclusiones* on the *Elements* by Pico della Mirandola (*Procli successoris platonici philosophi Institutio Theologica quae continet capita 21* [Hamburg: Apud Rulandios, 1618], p. 415–502). The bilingual edition and translation of Aemilius Portus is reprinted (with adjustments) and dedicated to Hegel by F. Creuzer in 1823 (Frankfurt a.M.: In officina Broenneriana). One should also consider that the *Elements* is extensively cited by Nicholas of Methone in his *Refutation*, which was translated into Latin twice: by an anonymous translator from the sixteenth century (MS Milan, Ambr. Lat., P 63) and by Bonaventura Vulcanius (d. ca. 1614), the autograph being preserved in MS Leiden, B.P.L., 47. Marsilio Ficino famously claimed that he translated the *Elements*, but there is no clear evidence for it. On this topic see D. Robichaud, "Fragments of Marsilio Ficino's Translations and Use of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* and *Elements of Physics*: Evidence and Study", in *Vivarium* 54/1(2016), p. 46–107; S.-A. Kiosoglou, "Notes on the Presence of the *Elements of Theology* in Ficino's Commentary on the *Philebus*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Vol. 2. Translations and Acculturations* (Leiden: Brill, 2020), p. 391–403.

adds: the fourth year of the Pontificate of Clement IV.³ The manuscript, offered to the above-mentioned Pope, was copied in Moerbeke's inner circle most probably in the late 1270s.⁴ It contains the *Book of Causes* and the *Elements of Theology*, copied one after the other, which shows that Aquinas' exquisite proof of the relationship between the two texts was already accepted, although it is not unusual to find that his arguments were often reduced to clichés: the medieval scribes either attributed the *Book of Causes* to Proclus or simply mistook it with the *Elements of Theology*.⁵ And yet Aquinas shows, although rarely in explicit ways, that there are differences between the two texts.⁶ For

3 MS Toledo, Biblioteca Catedral, Ms. 97–1, f. 93v: *Procli diadochi licii platonici philosophi Elementatio theologica. Explicit. Capitula CII (!) completa fuit translatio huius operis Viterbii a fratre G<uillelmo> de Morbecca ordinis fratrum predicatorum XV Kalendis Iunii anno Christi M^oCC^o sexagesimo octavo pontificatus domini Clementitis (!) Pape IIII Anno IIII.*

4 Dates confirmed by Patricia Stirnemann, to whom I am grateful.

5 The manuscript Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA 2^o 331, transmits the commentary on the *Book of Causes* by Giles of Rome; on the guard-leaf, one reads: *commentum venerabilis Egidii Romani cum questionibus optimis super libro Aristotelis*, but on f. 3v: *Super De causis Procli Egidii Romanus* (by the hand who copied the text), and on f. 8v: *Egidius super De causis Procli* (by the rubricator). The unusual attributions of the *Elements of Theology* in Berlin, Staatsbibl., Ms. Lat. Fol. 568, f. 1r: *Iste liber potest vocari liber de Procli (!) Causis in loyca, in philosophia sive in sacra theologia vel in moralibus*; f. 38r: *Procli dyadochi Platonici philosophi Elementatio theologica explicit*; and Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA 2^o 40^o, f. 32a: *Incipit Proclus platonius de causis*. Aquinas establishes the relationship between the two texts already in the prologue of his commentary. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002), *Prooemium*, p. 3, l. 7–10: *unde videtur ab aliquo philosophorum arabum ex praedicto libro Procli excerptus, praesertim quia omnia quae in hoc libro continentur, multo plenius et diffusius continentur in illo*. Giles of Rome, who often compares these two texts independently from Aquinas, is seduced by the idea, but uses the Neoplatonic concept of emanation in order to describe the relationship between them, and thus acknowledges Aquinas' proof: *In Greco autem habentur propositiones Procli a quibus hee propositiones emanaverunt et sunt acceptae; ut enim apparet scientibus, hic liber emanavit ab illo*. (MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16122, f. 2ra). The idea that the *Book of Causes* is nothing more than a shorter version of the *Elements of Theology* is still widespread in contemporary scholarship: R. Taylor deplores it in a recent paper. Cf. R. Taylor, "Contextualizing the *Kalām fī maḥd al-khair* / *Liber de causis*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes*. Vol. 2, p. 211–232, at p. 211. The Western reception of Aquinas' commentary on the *Book of Causes* needs to be studied in depth.

6 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 7, p. 51, l. 9–13: *Et haec quidem est expositio huius propositionis [i.e. Prop. 7 Libri de causis] secundum quod ex verbis hic positae apparet. Sed sciendum est verba hic posita ex vitio translationis esse corrupta, ut patet per litteram Procli, quae talis est: 'Si enim est sine magnitudine [...]'. And also, Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 12, p. 78, l. 27–79, l. 10: *Addit autem Proclus in sua propositione expositionem modi quo unum horum sit in alio, dicens: 'Sed alicubi quidem intellectualiter, alicubi autem vitaliter, alicubi vero enter' (id est per modum entis) 'entia omnia; quasi dicat quod omnia tria praedicta sunt in intellectu intellectualiter, in vita vitaliter, in esse**

Aquinas, the *Platonici*, to whom Proclus belongs, departed from the teaching of the Christian Fathers, whereas Aristotle often professes a consonant doctrine.⁷ Dionysius the ps.-Areopagite, the faithful disciple of St. Paul, is called to correct Proclus, and at times is “followed” by the author of *Book of Causes*.⁸

Unlike the *Book of Causes* and the (authentic) Aristotelian works, there is no evidence that the *Elements of Theology* was part of the *curricula* of European universities. There might be evidence of its teaching in the second half of the 14th century in the German mendicant *studia*, with the purpose to introduce novices to philosophy, as one can deduce by studying the diffusion of John Krosbein's commentaries, or rather paraphrases, on all the Aristotelian works, as well as on the *Book of Causes* and the *Elements of Theology*.⁹ The anonymous

essentialiter. Sed hoc quod ponitur loco huius in hoc libro, videtur esse corruptum et malum intellectum habere. Sequitur enim: 'Verumtamen esse et vita in intelligentia sunt duae intelligentiae', debet enim intelligi quod ista duo, scilicet esse et vita, sunt in intelligentia intellectualiter (...). Si autem intelligatur secundum quod verba sonant, falsum continent intellectum. Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, Prop. 16, p. 93, l. 20–94, l. 3: Haec autem secunda propositionis pars in omnibus libris videtur esse corrupta; deberet enim singulariter dici: non quia ipsa sit acquisita, fixa, stans in rebus entibus, immo est virtus etc., ut referatur hoc ad 'virtutem virtutum'. Et hoc patet ex libro Procli cuius propositio XCII talis est: 'Omnis multitudo infinitarum potentiarum' (...).

- 7 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 12, l. 12–17: *Quaecumque igitur res cum indeficientia essendi habet immobilitatem et est absque temporali successione, potest dici aeterna, et secundum hunc modum substantias immateriales separatas Platonici et Peripatetici aeternas dicebant, superaddentes ad rationem aeternitatis quod semper esse habuit, quod fidei Christianae non est consonum.* Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 10, p. 67, l. 19–68, l. 1: *Circa primum igitur considerandum est quod, sicut supra iam diximus, Platonici, ponentes formas rerum separatas, sub harum formarum ordine ponebant ordinem intellectuum. (...) Sed quia, secundum sententiam Aristotelis quae circa hoc est magis consona fidei Christianae, non ponimus alias formas separatas supra intellectuum ordinem, sed ipsum bonum separatum ad quod totum universum ordinatur sicut ad bonum extrinsecum, ut dicitur in XII Metaphysicae (...).*
- 8 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 20, l. 5–6: *Hanc autem positionem corrigit Dionysius quantum ad hoc quod ponebant ordinatim diversas formas separatas quas 'deos' dicebant (...).* Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 4, p. 33, l. 5–12: *Circa primum considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, Platonici ponebant formas rerum separatas per quarum participationem intellectus fierent intelligentes actu, sicut per earum participationem materia corporalis constituitur in hac vel illa specie. Et idem sequitur si non ponamus plures formas separatas, sed, loco omnium illarum, ponamus unam primam formam ex qua omnia deriventur, sicut supra dictum est secundum sententiam Dionysii, quam videtur sequi auctor huius libri nullam distinctionem ponens in esse divino.*
- 9 F. Retucci, “Sententia Procli alti philosophi. Notes on an Anonymous Commentary on Proclus' *Elementatio theologica*”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II. New Commentaries on Liber de causis and Elementatio theologica (ca. 1350–1500)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 99–180; D. Calma, “A Medieval Companion to Aristotle: John Krosbein's Paraphrase on *Liber de causis*”, in Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II*, p. 11–98.

commentary preserved in the Ms Vat. lat. 4567¹⁰ is also a paraphrase of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, chapter by chapter, which does not seem to have had a significant diffusion.

In 1936, Martin Grabmann, with his incomparable effort to unearth previously ignored texts, discussed a relatively short text,¹¹ certainly incomplete, preserved in the manuscript Paris, BnF, lat. 16096, f. 172va–174va. Although the manuscript is important and well known to scholars – it contains numerous important works and belonged to Godfrey of Fontaines, who bequeathed it to the library of the Collège de Sorbonne –,¹² this short text remained unpublished until 1991. Lambertus Maria De Rijk's editorial efforts¹³ still did not attract enough consideration from scholars. Yet it might be one of the very first Latin commentaries on Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, composed (or at least copied) in Paris in the last quarter of the 13th century. Godfrey left numerous marginal notes in this manuscript, but not on the folios that interest us. It is certain that some parts of the manuscript have been copied by one of Godfrey's secretaries: one can recognize the same hand in BnF, lat. 16080 and in the famous BnF, lat. 16297. The short text edited by De Rijk bears in the margins the title *Questiones super librum Posteriorum*, and most catalogues and descriptions of the manuscript (with the notable exception of Concetta Luna)¹⁴ refer to it with this title.

10 Evan King is currently preparing the critical edition of this text.

11 M. Grabmann, "Die Proklosübersetzungen des Wilhelm von Moerbeke und ihre Verwertung in der lateinischen Literatur", in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 30/1(1929/1930), p. 78–87 (repr. in M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik. Bd. II* [München: Hueber, 1936], p. 413–423).

12 Ms Paris, BnF, lat. 16096 transmits notably Avicenna's *Liber de philosophia prima* (f. 1r–71rb), Algazel's *Logica* (f. 74rb–83va), *Metaphysica* (f. 83vb–107rb) and *Physica* (f. 108ra–120vb), an incomplete *Dux neutrorum* by Maimonides (f. 124ra–137v), the *Liber de fato* by Alexander of Aphrodisias (f. 138ra–149ra), Giles of Rome's commentaries on the *Liber de bona fortuna* (f. 122ra–123vb) and on *De generatione et corruptione* (incomplete, f. 162ra–172va), and fragments of Albert the Great's *Summa theologiae* (f. 237ra–252rb). It is known also for its supposed link with the condemnation of 1277; cf. R. Wielockx, "Le ms. Paris Nat. lat. 16096 et la condamnation du 7 mars 1277", in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 48(1981), p. 227–237. It also contains an anonymous commentary on the *De anima*; cf. D. Calma, "La connaissance réflexive de l'intellect agent. Dietrich de Freiberg et le 'premier averroïsme'", in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), p. 63–105.

13 L.M. de Rijk, "Two Short Questions on Proclean Metaphysics in Paris, B.N. lat. 16096", in *Vivarium* 29/1(1991), p. 1–12.

14 Giles of Rome, *Opera Omnia, I.1/3***, *Catalogo dei manoscritti: Francia (Parigi)*, ed. C. Luna (Firenze: Olschki, 1988), p. 206–211.

The two short *questiones* edited by De Rijk following one another in the MS BnF, lat. 16096 are written by the same author and belong to one single, larger text (the copy preserved ends abruptly). The author himself refers to the *questiones* according to their specific topics: the first is *De ente ipso* and the second *De uno*. The first discusses the status of the first being according to Plato, the *Pitagoreici*, and Aristotle, and begins with: *queritur utrum sit aliquid sic ens quod sit ipsum esse solum et cuius ratio sit ratio essendi solum sine appositione*. The second *questio* has four explicit references to Proclus (to Prop. 1, 2, 18), and several references to Plato, the *Platonici*, and Aristotle. The *Book of Causes* and Dionysius are never mentioned, nor any other theological source. It is difficult to understand the institutional context and the purpose of this acephalous text, but it is clear that the anonymous author does not refer to the *Elements of Theology* as to an external authority; rather, he refers to it as the present treatise (*presens tractatus*) without naming it explicitly and with the intention to describe its metaphysical outline:

scimus igitur ex presenti tractatu duo. Primum est quod est prime Unum ab omni multitudine exemptum. Quod non est unum et non-unum nec Multitudine participat. Secundum est quod omne quod participat Uno, est unum et non-unum seu unum aliquantulum plurificatum.¹⁵

He also refers generally to the *probatio Procli* (p. 11) and alludes to the *propositio que dicit quod omne quod non est Unum ipsum est unum et non-unum non est usquam vera* (p. 10). These are manifest proofs that the reader (or the public?) already knows that the author comments on the *Elements of Theology*. The questions have arguments *pro* and *contra*, and solutions. It gives the impression of a commentary *per modum questionis*, typical of the late 13th-century Parisian fashion. Yet, the details of the composition of these two questions remain unclear: in what context were they written (*hec scripta*)? If it was for the students, under what circumstances? Or were they written in order to satisfy a circumstantial request? The author notes that he does not give too much weight to his considerations on Proclus, and pretends that his own text was written without much reflection.¹⁶ If this is not a rhetorical expression either faking modesty or hiding incomprehension, we should trust him. However, we must note that these anonymous questions are soaked in typical Proclean concepts or syntagms (rarely identified in the *apparatus fontium*) such as *prime*

¹⁵ De Rijk, "Two Short Questions", p. 12.

¹⁶ De Rijk, "Two Short Questions", p. 12: *Hec scripta fuerunt leviter et sine multa consideratione. Credo tamen quod vera.*

ens, maxime ens, prime Unum (p. 4, 10, 11 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 13, 22, 65, 73, 102, 127, etc.); *ens imparticipatum quod omnibus irradiat* (p. 4 and 7 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 23, 24, 69, 162), which equally appears in the Moerbeke's translation of Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides*,¹⁷ *primum deificatorum est ens* (p. 7 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 138, 153); *Unum prime* (p. 8 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 13); *neque Unum multum neque multitudo Unum* (p. 9 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 5, 163, 164, 165); *divinus intellectus* (p. 9 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 129, 182).

Despite his evident interest in Proclean metaphysics, the anonymous author is not persuaded by the arguments on Being and One. About the former he argues that it is impossible to conceive an absolutely simple being, without *quia*, *quantum* or *quale*.¹⁸ About the latter he expresses his doubts about the distinction between *Ipsum Unum* and *prime Unum*.¹⁹

This anonymous text must be included in any updated narration about the Western reception of the *Elements of Theology*. It represents yet another proof that Proclus was read in Paris in the last quarter of the 13th century, in a time when not only Godfrey of Fontaines, who owned (and even requested the copy of?) these *questiones*, but also Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, and Dietrich of Freiberg were either students or masters of the same university.

A half century later, the Latin West would know the first complete and overwhelmingly positive reception of Proclus, which coincides with an original and still largely underestimated intellectual project arguing that Aristotle's metaphysics is limited in its objectives and methods. This was Berthold of Moosburg's daring project.

17 Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria* III, ed. C. Steel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), lib. VII, p. 284, l. 8–9.

18 De Rijk, "Two Short Questions", p. 5: *Dicendum est quod aliquid non est ens quod sit Esse ipsum solum et cuius ratio sit essendi ratio solum sine appositione et determinatione. Et hoc apparet dupliciter. Prima quia ratio essendi non est ratio preter esse 'quid', 'quantum', aut 'quale'. etc.*

19 De Rijk, "Two Short Questions", p. 12: *Et quod videtur dubium in predictis, esset qualiter ab ipso Uno seu Unius abstracta vel absoluta ratione sit differre non per non-unum admixtum. Hoc autem non est necesse, quia si Unum Ipsum solum est tale ratione, non quia sic existat, tunc differret prime Unum ab ipso per aliter intelligi 'unum existere', non quia prime Unum ad 'unius' rationem addat aliquam multitudinem. Bene tamen est verum quod illud quod non est Ipsum Unum, est aliquid aliud existens quam Unum Ipsum secundum rationem <m>, precipue supponendo <utrumque> unius esse generis seu substantie <et> secundum aliquem eius modum habere rationem 'unius'. Sed hec hactenus.*

2 Berthold of Moosburg

Berthold of Moosburg was born in Bavaria, probably before 1290.²⁰ This can be inferred from the earliest report of his activities in 1315, when the Dominican chapter meeting held in Friesach dispatched him to Oxford, presumably for his advanced theological studies in the *studium generale*.²¹ If his education followed the protocols of the order, by that time he would have been trained in the Dominican schools of logic and natural philosophy for about five years, and perhaps had already lectured in the schools of logic for two to three years.

In Oxford, Berthold would have studied with scholars like the Dominican master of theology Nicholas Trevet (1257/65–c. 1334), whose commentaries on ancient literature, philosophy, and theology locate him in a group of writers now known as the “classicising” friars.²² Oxford was a tumultuous place for the Dominicans at this time, due to a conflict between the mendicant and secular clergy that began in 1303 as to whether, among other things, a dispensation from the University was required in every case for a student to proceed directly to the theology doctorate after studying arts outside the University. Between 1312 and 1320 the fallout between the friars and the University had escalated so far that the regular stream of Dominican friars to the *studium* was often substantially interrupted.²³ In 1314, the English Dominicans appealed to King Edward II, and again in 1317 to Pope John XXII, requesting the repeal of the Statute of 1253 which resolved “the affair of Thomas of York”, a Franciscan whose exceptional case had set the precedent for the contested arrangement.²⁴

20 For more literature on Berthold's life and the traces of his library, see L. Sturlese, “Introduzione”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 184–211. De animabus*, ed. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), p. xv–lxxxiii; E. King, *Supersapientia. Berthold of Moosburg and the Divine Science of the Platonists* (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2021).

21 Th. Kaeppli, “Ein Fragment der Akten des in Friesach 1315 gefeierten Kapitels der Provinz Teutonia”, in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 48(1978), p. 71–75, at p. 72: [...] *guerrarum strepitum, quibus quasi tota ian<vensis> provincia affligitur et gravatur. Hoc anno intermisimus studia artium et philosophiae, volumus <tamen> et inponimus prioribus universis qui in suis conventibus habent aliquos juvenes ap<tos et> habiles ad profectum, quod ipsis aliquem fratrem preficiant qui eis aliquid de naturis <...>bus legere teneatur, quos etiam volumus a discursibus suportari. [...] Mictimus <in Ang>liam fr. Berchtoldum de Mospurg.*

22 B. Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960).

23 A.B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957–59), p. 95 and p. 987.

24 See the literature cited in F. Retucci, J. Goering, “The *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York, OFM. The Fortunes and Misfortunes of a Critical Edition”, in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 52(2010), p. 133–155.

Over these years Berthold mostly likely discovered the *Sapientiale* of the same Thomas of York (c. 1220–d. before 1269), a metaphysical summa which became for Berthold a sort of *vade mecum* of classical and Arabic philosophy.²⁵

Brief glosses on Dietrich of Freiberg's *De iride et radialibus impressionibus* indicate that Berthold gave a commentary on Aristotle's *Meteorology* III.5 (on the pole of the rainbow) in 1318, while also relying on Dietrich's calculations.²⁶ Along with Berthold's own, more extensive glosses on Macrobius' *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, most of which can be dated to before 1323, these suggest that Berthold was tasked with teaching natural philosophy after leaving Oxford.²⁷ These glosses on Macrobius demonstrate Berthold's familiarity with texts on philosophical theology, astronomy, arithmetic, and harmonics, and above all with the *Elements of Theology*, which he cited ten times. Shortly after writing these glosses, Berthold made his first in-depth study of the *Tria opuscula* of Proclus.²⁸ These showed him a Platonic criticism of Aristotle's metaphysics that argued for a superior and more ancient anthropological theory ("the one of the soul" above intellect) that would be decisive for his understanding of the rationale and higher purpose of the *Elements of Theology*.

In 1327, Berthold appears as a lector in the Dominican convent in Regensburg, where he may have been teaching theology. Then, from 1335 to 1361, we find him named four times in the city records of Cologne, which identify him as an executor to the will of a beguine named Bela Hardevust. At some point in this period, perhaps nearer to 1335, he taught theology at the *studium generale* in Cologne. Berthold perhaps worked on his *Expositio super Elementationem*

25 For the most recent synthesis on Thomas' pervasive influence on the *Expositio*, see Fiorella Retucci's contribution to this volume.

26 MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.30, f. 56v–57r. See L. Sturlese, "Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P., scienziato e filosofo", in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), p. 249–259, at p. 250: *Descriptio figurae, in qua explicatur intentio Philosophi in III Meteororum, cum textus expositione inventa a fratre Bertoldo de Mosburch ordinis praedicatorum anno Christi 1318*.

27 MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 1r–44r. On this manuscript, see L. Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xxiv–xlii; L. Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen zu Leben und Werke Dietrichs von Freiberg* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 73–76; H. Boese, *Wilhelm von Moerbeke als Übersetzer der Stoiheiosis theologike des Proclus. Untersuchungen und Texte zur Überlieferung der Elementatio theologica* (Birkenau: Bitsch, 1985), p. 76–77.

28 Berthold's text of the *Tria opuscula* was later bound with his copy of Macrobius. See MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31: f. 46r–59r (*De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*); f. 59v–68v (*De providentia et fato*); f. 70r–82va (*De malorum subsistentia*). For a critical edition of these treatises, see Proclus, *Tria opuscula (De providentia, libertate, malo). Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeke vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta*, ed. H. Boese (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960).

theologicam Procli over this period, but it is equally possible that he began his project after reading the *Tria opuscula* in the early 1320s.

In 1348, we find Berthold in Nuremberg, where he is identified as a vicar to the province of Bavaria. This coincided with the expulsion of the Dominicans from Cologne (1346–1351). During this period, Berthold would have been in contact with the community of Dominican nuns in Engelthal, which was a major centre of vernacular spiritual literature in the 14th century. The writings from Engelthal contain at least one, possibly three, trace(s) of his pastoral activities there, and suggest that his relationship with this community in his home province antedated his vicariate.

Berthold resigned his executorship of Bela Hardevust's will in Cologne in 1361. Since the texts it seems he bequeathed to the Dominican library in Cologne began to disperse around the feast of Pentecost in 1363, we may assume that he died sometime between 1361–1363. Berthold of Moosburg's only extant work is his *Expositio*, which is now preserved in two 15th-century manuscripts (Mss Oxford, Balliol College Library, 224B; Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2192).

3 Worldly Philosophy

Berthold's rigorous and constant method of interpreting the *Elements*, with a *suppositum*, *propositum* et *commentum* applied to virtually all of its 211 propositions is unique and impressive. So too is the use of sources throughout the entire text: he never wearied of citing author after author, always choosing what seemed most appropriate for his own purposes. Each of Berthold's choices, to cite some authors and ignore others, was significant. One could argue that these can be explained by his context: the libraries in Cologne or Regensburg or wherever he worked on his text did not always have the same texts – that is a fact that nobody will contest. However, the *Expositio* gives the impression that Berthold went from Proclus to the sources and not from the sources to Proclus. His regularity in citing the same sources throughout the *Expositio* gives the impression that he carefully planned his commentary. One could assume that he had a good knowledge of the *Elements of Theology*, and that he prepared thematic files with citations for each of the 211 propositions. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that he discovered each of the propositions of the *Elements* while he was commenting on them or that he wrote such an extensive text without preliminary preparation. Being the first in the Latin world to undertake such a project, he did not have a model to copy: he came with a method, a structure, and a plan. There is also the Index of terms that he seems

to have produced himself in order facilitate a clearer and rapid access to the content of the *Expositio*.

One of the most fascinating and also complex ways to approach Berthold's *Expositio* is to unfold his understanding of *theologia*. Each of the three introductions to the *Expositio* (the *Prologus*, the *Expositio tituli*, and the *Praeambulum*) opens with a reflection on *theologia* or the *theologus*. Like a Platonic dialogue, the opening lines of the *Prologus* set the entire framework – and in this case, it is a line pronounced by St. Paul, the highest theologian of the divinizing wisdom, regarding the sages of worldly philosophy: “*summus divinalis sapientiae theologus Paulus loquens de mundanae philosophiae sapientibus*”. St. Paul, after acquiring *in raptu* the knowledge of God's mysteries, concedes (Rom. 1:19–20):

[Q]uia quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis: Deus enim illis manifestavit [Berthold: revelavit]. Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque eius virtus et divinitas [...].

Immediately thereafter, Berthold introduces a choir of authorities – Christian (Western and Eastern), Jewish, and Muslim alike – that unfolds and supports Paul's verdict in a polyphonic orchestration: Ambrose, Gundissalinus, Dionysius the p.s.-Areopagite, Algazel, Maimonides, John of Damascus, Peter Lombard, the *Glossa ordinaria*, Hugh of St. Victor, Augustine, Alfarabi, Thomas Gallus, and Maximus the Confessor (rather: what Berthold believed to be Maximus the Confessor). Berthold's intention is to produce a *symphonia*, that is a concord of Hellenic philosophy with Christian revelation. And that is manifest not only in these opening lines, but throughout the entire text. This constant quest for concord is the key for interpreting the *Expositio*. Building bridges is the quintessence of Berthold's intellectual project, and justly could it be linked to a tradition originated in the 2nd century with Clement of Alexandria and even earlier with Justin Martyr of Neapolis, born in the city of Marinus, Proclus' disciple and biographer.

In the three introductory texts of the *Expositio*, Berthold sets a tension between theology and metaphysics, not (as a hasty reading might conclude) between theology and philosophy. *Theologia* for Berthold is a true science – that is nevertheless based on believed or trusted principles – about the *invisibilia Dei*, about beings beyond the senses and the intellect.

Cum enim Aristoteles [...] non ducat nos sursum in cognitivis et cognitionibus animae nostrae nisi usque ad intellectum et intellectualem operationem et nihil ultra hanc insinuet, Plato autem et ante Platonem

theologi laudant cognitionem supra intellectum, quam divulgant esse divinam maniam, et dicunt ipsam talem cognitionem esse unum animae.

Praeambulum C, p. 66

or

[E]x praedictis evidenter apparet scientiam istam in suorum principiorum certitudine ratione principii cognitivi, per quod circa divina versatur, non solum de omnibus particularibus scientiis, sed etiam metaphysicae Peripatetici, que est de ente in eo, quod ens, incomparabiliter eminere.

Praeambulum, p. 64–65

or

Ex dictis evidens est eminentia habitus supersapientialis scientiae Platonicae ad habitum sapientialem metaphysicae.

Praeambulum, p. 68

Aristotelian metaphysics offers, according to Berthold, a narrow understanding of reality. It limits objects to being as such (*ens inquantum ens*) and all knowledge to intellect. But principles beyond being as such are beyond sense, and therefore beyond the cogitative power, beyond the possible intellect, and beyond discourse.²⁹ The only language applicable to these invisible realities (*invisibilia*) is the language of *superiorities* used by St. Paul's "disciple" Dionysius the Areopagite (*scientia supersapientialis, exellentissima, divinis-sima, difficilima* etc.). And the only way to access these superior levels of reality is by ascending through reasoning, following Platonic principles, to intellect, and finally beyond intellect to the *unum animae*. To refrain from accessing this higher rung of realities, to refrain even from positing them, is to fail to fulfil the aim for which we have been created. That is not an intellectual option, one among others; it is a choice that goes beyond intellect and transforms the very nature of the human being.

Does Berthold oppose a *Plato Christianus* to an *Aristoteles Arabus*? One should resist the temptation to reduce Berthold's project to this simple equation. And one could immediately add: it is even irrelevant inasmuch as many of Berthold's borrowings from Peripatetic philosophy (Arabic or not) are already "altered" by the nuanced readings of Dietrich of Freiberg, Ulrich of Strassburg,

29 Berthold's criticisms echo Proclus' own critical remarks against Aristotle (*De providentia et fato*, c. 8).

and Albert the Great. However, one must note that for Berthold, the *Book of Causes* is not a reasonable alternative. For him, unlike numerous other medieval authors (as previously mentioned), the *Book of Causes* is not a shorter or abridged version of the *Elements of Theology*. They are different in their method and in their object:

Ex praemissis summatim colligitur et forma seu modus procedendi in hoc libro et ratio nominis ipsius, quod a forma imponitur, scilicet elementationis theologiae, et quare non vocatur “prima philosophia” seu “metaphysica” aut “de pura bonitate” aut “de lumine luminum” vel “de causis causarum” aut “de floribus divinorum”, sicut quidam alii consimilem tractantes materiam, sed in excelsum dissimiliter a praesenti auctore suas editiones vocare curarunt.

Expos. tit. K, p. 48–49

The *Book of Causes* offers a science about superior causes analysed according to their functionality (that is, in relation to their effects); as such it is too remote from Proclus’ own interest which is to elevate the intellect toward the divine. Yet it is what is beyond the senses that one needs to understand, not the actuality or the act of being analysed in the *Book of Causes*, as Berthold expresses it clearly when discussing its famous fourth proposition (“the first of created things is being”):

[Q]uem quidam firmati in existentibus et non opinantibus aliquid esse super entia dicunt fore esse, sicut dicit auctor *De causis*: “prima rerum creaturarum est esse”. Esse autem est actus entis. Sed tales vocat Dionysius indoctos, in 1 cap. *De mystica theologia*, ubi dicit sic: “Istos autem dico (subaudi: indoctos), qui in existentibus sunt firmati nihil super existentia supersubstantialiter esse opinantes”.

Expositio, 71D, p. 35

It is an interesting interpretation of the fourth proposition, not only because he cites Dionysius (a reminiscence of Albert?) but because Berthold understands this first created thing as existence or the act of being. Interestingly, he does not comment on the links between Proclus’ Prop. 138 and the fourth proposition of the *Book of Causes*.

It is true that Berthold opposes Plato or Platonism (*Plato et ante Platonem theologi* – an expression taken for Proclus – or the *theologia divinalis Platoniorum*) to Aristotle or Aristotelianism. Nevertheless, he copies massively from and refers explicitly to Aristotelian texts: for example, he copies,

wittingly or not, Albert's commentary on the *De causis* through Ulrich of Strassburg; he also possessed and read Albert's autograph commentaries on Aristotelian texts, such as his commentary on *De animalibus*. He also reads and copies astrological texts from Peripatetic philosophers. Berthold's project is theological in the broad sense, it is about *invisibilia Dei transitive accepta* on which both Pagan and Christian authors have written, and which has all the characteristics of a science. It is a *scientia Platonica*, under every aspect superior to Aristotle's metaphysics, which nevertheless remains a *philosophia prima* or, as Ruedi Imbach puts it in a recent article,³⁰ an "Agatho-theology", given Berthold's tendency to accentuate the priority of Good over the One in his interpretation of Proclus.

4 Retrieving Berthold of Moosburg

This volume and the three days of conference proceedings that preceded it³¹ are equally a tribute to Loris Sturlese and to the team of researchers formed by him over the years who edited Berthold's lengthy commentary. Loris Sturlese's work began with his PhD thesis, published in 1974, consisting in an analysis of the manuscripts, the historical context, and a partial edition of Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio*. Gradually connecting Bochum and Lecce, he joined the editorial project around the work of Dietrich of Freiberg, formed collaborators, and coordinated the publication of the entire commentary within the series *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevii*, now comprising thirty-eight volumes. The entire text of Berthold's *Expositio* is now published, but the last volume, comprising the index of sources, is still in preparation. We considered that it was important, indeed necessary, to celebrate this work of over forty years and to encourage further studies on Berthold.

Paul Hellmeier provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of Berthold's use of biblical authorities in the *Expositio*, and argues that these citations have a profound significance for understanding Berthold on the relation between pagan philosophy and Christian revelation. Hellmeier first establishes the precise number of references to Scripture in the *Expositio* (194 citations). He finds

30 R. Imbach, "Au-delà de la métaphysique. Notule sur l'importance du Commentaire de Berthold de Moosburg OP sur les *Éléments de théologie*", in Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes*. Vol. 1, p. 376–393.

31 Conference organized by D. Calma and E. King at University College Dublin, on October 23–25, 2019, with the support of the ERC NeopLAT CoG Grant (771640), the School of Philosophy (UCD) and the Museum of Literature Ireland, Dublin.

that the biblical texts most frequently cited by Berthold were, from the Old Testament, the book of Wisdom and the Psalms, and, from the New Testament, the Pauline Epistles. The distribution of biblical citations in the *Expositio* is uneven. Almost half in the entire commentary occur in the *Prologue* (73 citations). Almost all of these, as Hellmeier's appendix to his study shows, were Berthold's additions to the text and were not incorporated from other direct sources. It was otherwise for the Scriptural citations in the main body of the commentary itself, where most of the biblical citations in the *Expositio* were taken over indirectly and through another source (mostly Honorius Augustodunensis, Dionysius, Thomas of York, or Augustine). These citations cluster around the propositions of the *Elements of Theology* devoted to the gods (Propositions 115–159) and those concerning the soul, contemplation, and the spiritual body (Propositions 184–211).

All these citations are considered by Hellmeier in his thematic case studies of Berthold's use of the Bible on the transcendence of the One, the primordial causes, the Trinity, contemplation, and the Resurrection. The way Berthold used Scripture for these central doctrines in the *Expositio*, Hellmeier argues, indicates that we should not speak of "an equal coexistence of pagan wisdom and the Christian concept of revelation" in the *Expositio*, but rather a synthesis of pagan and Christian wisdom "formed under the clear auspices of Christian doctrine" (p. 47).

Alessandra Beccarisi unveils the importance of Avicbron's *Fons vitae* for Berthold's theory of essential causality. Beccarisi emphasizes that Berthold's *Expositio* represents not only the most extensive medieval reception of Eriugena (as King and Ludueña have shown elsewhere), but also of Avicbron (p. 62).

Berthold's lengthy discussions of essential causality while commenting on Propositions 18 and 172 show that he borrows three key features from Avicbron's metaphysics. (1) "God does not give himself, but what He has *apud se*, that is *forma universalis*", which acts by necessity (p. 63), an action that proceeds from the God through the mediation of God's Will. (2) "Only *radii et vires* [i.e. perfections] of the substances are communicated" (p. 64) to the inferior realities, not the substances themselves, otherwise one would have to admit that created substances can create from nothing. (3) God's Will, different from His Intellect, "is the link between God and creation, a first hypostasis of the divinity that is – at the same time – a hypostasis external to God (...) and an aspect of the divine essence" (p. 65). From Dietrich, Berthold borrows notably the idea that the agent intellect (*intellectus in actu*) is an essential cause and that it contains its own effects. He then distinguishes, like Dietrich, between essential and accidental causes, and between essential and substantial causes. However, unlike Dietrich, Berthold applies the definition of

essential cause exclusively to the agent intellect, excluding God and the celestial souls. It is, according to Beccarisi, a significant difference between the two authors, enabling us to understand the role of Avicbron. Berthold argues that God (*prime Deus*) is beyond the intellect, and we can know only His will (*voluntas Dei*) identified with Proclus' *prime bonum*. The creative flow pouring out of God's essence is neither an impersonal nor a necessary act, but the result of God's creative will. Through the essential chain of emanating forms, we can turn to the noblest intellectual object: *voluntas Dei*.

Fiorella Retucci's main goal is to show that both Berthold of Moosburg and Thomas of York "converge on two points: first, the attempt to recover the classical and ancient heritage, aimed at founding self-sufficient philosophical wisdom and, second, the emphasis on the continuity of the Platonic tradition" (p. 89). According to Thomas, the truth can manifest itself either through Scripture or through rational inquiry. The former allows a broader participation of human being in wisdom, whereas the latter is accessible to very few due to its inherent difficulty. However, Thomas establishes a hierarchy between these fields by attributing a greater value to rational investigation than to belief. Human beings can "emancipate themselves from bestiality and, by their own effort, obtain the dignity of humanity"; they "alone are responsible for the perfection of their own nature" (p. 92), and can ultimately be assimilated to God.

Berthold endorses Thomas' views and equally argues that "divine revelation is not necessarily needed for the well-exercised human intellect" (p. 94). The philosophers' specific way of attaining the knowledge of God is through an oblique vision (*per motum obliquum*), and this knowledge is partial. They can also enjoy a direct vision (*rectus motus*) which is not an alternative to philosophy, but it is given to those who have previously searched to obtain an oblique vision. "The idea of God is, in fact, naturally present in the human intellect", hence "no human being is (...) deprived of the knowledge of God" with all His particular qualities (i.e. unity, trinity etc.) (p. 95). Thomas and Berthold agree on this view, and they found in Platonism a confirmation of their intuition. Considered as such, as a "perfect and self-sufficient wisdom", philosophy, and more broadly pagan wisdom, is neither subordinated to theology nor integrated in a system of revelation. They legitimately coexist autonomously and independently of each other. More specifically, the Platonic tradition is for both Thomas and Berthold the only philosophical "valid science of the divine" (p. 101), in all aspects superior and closer to truth than the Aristotelian tradition. Retucci provides in the Appendix a list of all citations from Thomas' *Sapientiale* in the *Expositio*.

Henryk Anzulewicz argues that Albert the Great's thought is a key element in the understanding of Berthold's intellectual project. First Anzulewicz

reassesses the previous historiographical research on Berthold, observing a certain tendency in scholarship to underestimate the role of revealed theology in respect to natural or immanent philosophy. It is undisputable that the core of Berthold's work is the idea that Proclean metaphysics in particular, and Platonism in general, is the summum of philosophical theology. Yet one major question remained unanswered: is this philosophical theology a philosophical revelation? Anzulewicz argues that the solution lies in Berthold's theory of intellect, which depends extensively on Albert the Great (without denying the role of Dietrich). Anzulewicz argues that the influence of Albert is stronger than has been previously acknowledged, notably in respect to the Peripatetic doctrine of *intellectus adeptus* that represents the foundational layer for Berthold's views on the divinization of man, upon which the Proclean concept of *unum animae* is grafted.

The first aspect discussed is Berthold's tripartite typology of the divine intellect (*secundum causam, secundum existentiam, secundum participationem unitatis*). Albert used the same concept already in his early works, such as the *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, primarily on the basis of Dionysius the ps.-Areopagite and the *Book of Causes*, but it soon became part of his intellectual speculation used throughout his entire career. Berthold's twofold distinction between the *intellectus separatus simpliciter* and the *intellectus non-proprie separatus* depends on both Proclus and Dietrich, yet one must also note ideas and even passages tacitly copied from Albert's *Commentary on the Metaphysics*. A third aspect where one can recognise the influence of Albert's noetics is the description of the six intellects involved in any cognitive process (*intellectus speculativus / contemplativus, practicus / operativus, adeptus, possibilis, formalis, universaliter agens*). However, Berthold, unlike Albert, distinguishes between these intellects according to their theoretical or practical goal. These differences do not rule out that Berthold was inspired by Albert. On the contrary: as Anzulewicz points out, Albert the Great is for Berthold the model to interpret the *littera Procli*.

Ezequiel Ludueña brings to light new citations of Thomas Aquinas in the *Expositio* and argues for their importance in Berthold's metaphysics. At the present state of research, the quantitative presence of Aquinas seems limited. Ludueña identifies three new citations of Thomas in the *Expositio*, bringing the total to 15 citations. Nevertheless, Ludueña argues that Berthold drew upon Aquinas for two aspects of his distinctive interpretation of Proclus' gods (their ontological status and their causal function).

According to Berthold, there are six gods or unities, which are principles immediately subordinate to the One. These six gods, presupposing the absolute and creative influence of the One, are the origins of the universal formal

determinations of power, being, life, intellect, soul, and nature. Unlike every other entity created by the One, each god originates its own formal series and exists as determinate unity without being composite. In other words, each god, considered as a formal cause, is a “simple one” and is *per se* subsistent. Ludueña shows that Berthold used Aquinas’ commentary on the *Book of Causes* for “another, more developed, way of explaining how the *unitates* are an *unum per essentiam* even if they participate in the absolute One” (p. 187), even though Aquinas had rejected the Platonic doctrine of separate forms or gods. He also proposes that Berthold was inspired by Aquinas’ account of instrumental causality in his frequent descriptions of the gods as “instruments” of the One, and in his explanation of how the gods “cooperate” with the One through its causal power.

Ludueña suggests that there may be a lingering tension between these two aspects of Berthold’s interpretation of the gods, that is, between their status as self-constituted formal principles and as instruments of God’s efficient causality. Berthold’s recourse to Aquinas on the *Book of Causes* for these central metaphysical questions, he concludes, is proof that Berthold read the *Elements of Theology* through an interpretative tradition thoroughly formed by the *Book of Causes*.

Tommaso Ferro revisits the question concerning the extent of Berthold’s debt to his German Dominican predecessors. Scholars now take for granted that Albert the Great and Dietrich of Freiberg had an enormous influence on Berthold’s metaphysics, his theory of intellect, and his methods for establishing the relationship between pagan philosophy and Christian theology. Ferro argues that Berthold’s interpretation of the Augustinian distinction of natural providence (*providentia naturalis*) and voluntary providence (*providentia voluntaria*), which was fundamental to the *Expositio*, was inspired by Ulrich of Strassburg’s *De summo bono*.

Berthold’s primary concern with distinguishing the methods of “the philosophizing theologians or theologizing philosophers” and the theologians, rather than their aims or objects, Ferro maintains, has more in common with Ulrich, who frequently superimposes the objects of revealed theology and natural philosophy, than with Albert or Dietrich, for whom the separation is stricter. Proclus’ status in Berthold as a pagan touched by divine grace (*apud* I. Zavettero, p. 219) is more intelligible within the framework of the *De summo bono*, where philosophical and theological questions are considered (Trinitarian theology, grace, the sacraments, etc.). Ferro then examines certain overlooked passages in the *Expositio* devoted to the nature of the divine intellect, its causality, and providence (Propositions 114, 121, 141, 144). In all these cases, Berthold relied on Ulrich’s principles to explain why “Intellect” is

the most proper name for God and how the essential causality of the divine intellect – its providence – grounds the stability, order, and intelligibility of the cosmos. The doctrine of natural providence thus accounts for the possibility of knowing “the invisible things of God from the creation of the world” (Rom. 1:20). Berthold’s reliance on Ulrich for these pivotal doctrines is evidence, Ferro contends, that Martin Grabmann was correct to call Ulrich the “co-founder” of the Dominican school in Cologne.

Evan King’s aim is twofold: on the one hand, to provide an overview of the presence of Dietrich of Freiberg in Berthold’s *Expositio*; and on the other hand, to examine the similarities and differences between the two Dominicans. King emphasizes that, on average, Berthold cites Dietrich twice in each commented proposition. In the *Expositio*, there are only two explicit references to Dietrich, yet Berthold’s familiarity with the latter’s thought is astonishing, as it becomes clear from the very useful table presented by King: the *Expositio* contains, in 228 sections of the text, 464 citations from almost all of Dietrich’s known works.

King equally examines the doctrinal impact of Dietrich on Berthold’s theories of transcendentals, of time and eternity, of the doctrine of causality, and of theology as a science. The last is unexpected inasmuch as, according to King, it bares the traces of one of Dietrich’s lost works: the *De theologia, quod sit scientia secundum perfectam rationem scientiae*. A careful examination of the terminology and a patient reconstruction of the polemical context of the late 13th-century University of Paris, notably the debate between Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, enable King to conclude that one can see in the *Praeambulum* the reflection of Dietrich’s endorsement of Godfrey’s distinction between the certitude of evidence and the certitude of adhesion. The aim of Berthold’s own position is to show that “Platonic philosophy (...) both meets and exceeds the Aristotelian criteria for demonstrative scientific procedure” (p. 266), by substituting Platonic philosophy for Dietrich’s revealed theology. Platonic wisdom “has the same scientific structure, proportionately speaking, as the other genuine sciences, except the purely mathematical”. Berthold and Dietrich have different agendas, echoing their diverse understanding of the relation between pagan and Christian rational traditions. For Dietrich, the difference between these two traditions would only be overcome in the end of time, whereas for Berthold, they have already been overcome in the Golden Age of ancient Platonism.

Loris Sturlese analyzes Berthold’s theory of deification in its historical context. For Sturlese, Berthold’s discovery of the hierarchy of immutable causes in Proclus had a precise anthropological significance that addressed a debate concerning the dignity of the individual human soul, which occupied writers of Latin and German literature in the 14th century.

According to Berthold, following Thomas of York, the intellectual ascent to God occurs in three ways, corresponding to “the three movements” of angels and souls described by Dionysius. Sturlese finds that Berthold modified Dionysius to emphasize that the vision of God is a prerogative of the “oblique” movement, which corresponds to the soul’s ascent through discursive, philosophical reason. Berthold then focalized this theory on Proclus’ own perfect realization of all three intellectual movements. This not only makes Proclus a prototype of the divine man (*homo divinus*), it also makes his anthropology of the one of the soul (*unum animae*), with its concomitant metaphysics of the One and Good beyond Being, the benchmark for philosophical wisdom. Here Dionysius was being assimilated to Proclus: Berthold judged Proclus’ formulation of the *unum animae* “clearer” than Dionysius’, Sturlese proposes, because Proclus had rationally demonstrated that the soul’s sensible and intellectual activities depend on a principle that grounds the division of knower and known. If the human condition for Berthold is precisely “that of living in the unawareness of bearing within oneself a secret vestige of the One” (p. 295), then, in one sense, the rational awareness of this dignity is the fruit of the discursive reflection Berthold so valued in Proclus. Compared to Dietrich of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart, Berthold’s notion of a principle beyond intellect, and his citations of the *Mystical Theology* of Dionysius, placed a greater emphasis on the possibility (and difficulty) of experiencing a transitory union with God in this life. Berthold thus united the two orders of natural and voluntary providence, metaphysics and eschatological merit, in his theory of the *unum animae*. Sturlese concludes by asking whether there is still a lingering tension between these two sides of deification in Berthold, that is, between the soul’s natural, metaphysical condition as divine and its realization of union with God in becoming.

Wouter Goris compares the views of Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strassburg and Berthold of Moosburg on the first principle’s freedom (to act) in relation to its will (*voluntas*) and omnipotence (*omnipotentia*). Goris underlines that Aristotle’s definition of “the free” as *causa sui* inspired Plotinus’ *Enneads* VI.8, whereas Proclus, who does not mention it in the *Elements of Theology*, discusses the concepts of the self-sufficient (*autarkes*) and the self-constituted (*authupostaton*). The author of the *Book of Causes* does not want to cut the ties with the Aristotelian tradition and preserves the notion of *causa sui ipsius*.

Goris emphasizes the structural differences between Albert’s and Berthold’s views on freedom (which echo the more general aims of their intellectual projects): the former tries to harmonize the Platonic and the Aristotelian traditions, while the latter accentuates the contrast between them, clearly preferring one over the other. Albert, faithful to the Aristotelian concept of *causa sui*, “introduces necessity into the concept of freedom he attributes to the first

principle" (p. 311) yet argues in favor of a Platonic concept of absolute freedom, compatible with the freedom of choice. Ulrich of Strassburg transforms Albert's discussion by stressing the compatibility of freedom and necessity; hence, the Aristotelian concept of freedom, still very important in Albert, "is reduced to a mere afterthought" in Ulrich. This tendency becomes even more salient in Berthold who relies on the Proclean triad *imparticipatum* – *participatum* – *participans*, and who insists on the notion of freedom in relation to what acts *per esse* (which Goris calls "the essence of a Platonic concept of freedom"), whereas both Albert and Ulrich discussed it in relation to *agere et non agere*. In the *Expositio* there is no room for the Aristotelian concept and vocabulary of freedom: *causa sui*, a self-refuting and self-contradictory concept according to Berthold, is replaced by *gratia sui* or *sui ipsius existens*. The only acceptable meaning of this concept of *causa sui* is in terms of formal and essential causality: "freedom is essential self-constitution" (p. 317).

Theo Kobusch situates Berthold's view on double providence in relation to the major figures of the long tradition of Neoplatonism (both Latin and Hellenic). According to Berthold, natural or essential providence enables us to know, through philosophically grounded propositions, more than the Aristotelian *ens inquantum ens*: they enable us to know God. Voluntary providence speaks about God according to the principles of the Christian faith through the hierarchies (angelic and human) endowed with free will, in which the divine retribution of rewards and punishments is manifested. These two modes of theologizing are neither contradictory nor mutually complementary; rather, voluntary providence is a complement, an aid to natural reasoning, a part that renders the whole perfect. Kobusch claims that the real original contribution of both Berthold and Dietrich to the history of Western philosophy consists in their effort to reverse the relationship of servitude: revealed theology loses its primacy in respect to all domains pertaining to philosophical theology (a view that could find echoes among contemporary Catholic theologians).

The Hellenic origin of this problematic cannot be overlooked. The topic is present in Porphyry, Proclus, Hermias, Hierocles of Alexandria, Simplicius, and is transmitted to Philoponus and John of Damascus. Kobusch emphasizes that, for the Neoplatonists, divine providence in its broadest understanding, as governance of the entire universe, is the subject of first philosophy, and it pertains to the metaphysician (understood as a theologian) to discuss necessity and contingency, freedom, ethics, and education. However, the major difference between the Neoplatonic and Christian understanding of double providence is the concept of care: for the former, divine providence does not contain any

form of direct or personal relation to individuals, whereas for the latter, divine providence is essentially turned toward humans. For example, unlike the former, the latter consider that through free choice (i.e., repentance) anyone can obtain divine forgiveness, and thus modify the retributions for their moral misconducts.

Alessandro Palazzo focuses on the central theme of natural providence in the *Expositio*, and considers how it arose from Berthold's reflection on the theory of providence and fate he found in Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy* and, most importantly, Proclus' three works on providence (*Tria opuscula*). Palazzo argues that there are two complementary approaches to the notion of providence in Berthold, one that is naturalistic and *a posteriori*, and another that is metaphysical-theological and *a priori*. Regarding the first, he observes that the only time the crucial passage from Augustine on twofold providence is cited in the *Expositio* is in Proposition 141A, which the Index (*Tabula contentorum*) identifies as a discussion of the distinction between providence and fate. This reflects Augustine's description of natural providence as what presides over physical phenomena (celestial motions and terrestrial causes). Palazzo then shows how Berthold builds on Ulrich of Strassburg, first with Boethius, and then with Proclus, who provides the clearest account of the hierarchical relation of the realms (*regna*) of providence (the presence of all things in the divine mind) and fate (the unfolding of that content in time, space, and the chain of causes). For Berthold, Proclus' approach autonomized the realm of nature, which can be studied according to its own laws and without reference to a higher level of reality. The top-down view of natural providence emerges in Proposition 121, where Berthold uses Proclus' notion of an essential order to establish that providence exists in God "causally" and in the gods or primordial causes "essentially" and "participatively". Palazzo insists that the dynamic relation between fate and providence should not be overlooked when considering the meaning of natural providence in the *Expositio*: it explains the presence of the extensive discussions of nature (Proposition 34) and celestial phenomena (Proposition 198) in the commentary and, therefore, it provides a more complete picture of Berthold's understanding of how the soul ascends to share in God's "providential cognition" through philosophical reason.

Sylvain Roudaut considers Berthold's complex views on forms, arguing that he developed an original theory of formal causality by adjusting doctrines inherited from various sources to the *Elements of Theology*. Roudaut shows that in the *Expositio*, light is not a metaphor (for creation) but has a metaphysical meaning and it is defined as the first (emanated) form. Light is a theoretical model allowing one to understand the diffusion of essence from the

divine unity to created beings. Indeed, Berthold claims that all divine unities (in Proclean terms: the gods following the One) are essentially identical and can be called uniform. “The Gods are constituted by a single formal intention, just like light in the physical real is the purest form” (p. 409)

Berthold's view on “universal essence” (as Roudaut calls the theory of an essence, emanating in the intellectual light, and capable of different modes of being) is fundamental for his “theory of generation of natural forms at the lowest level of matter”. Roudaut equally indicates that Berthold's distinction between *essentia* (characterizing *entia secundum speciem*) and *substantia* (characterizing celestial bodies and beings from the sublunar world) is echoed in the distinction between *forma essentialis* and *forma substantialis*. The former “refers to a form that does not inhere in a subject (...), an intention that more truly informs a subject without becoming one with it”, and the latter “refers to a part of the compound substance (...) restricted to designate the part of the hylomorphic compound” (p. 406). A second major conceptual distinction, equally deriving from the dichotomy previously explained, underlines the difference between *species* and *forma* (or *idea*). *Species* refers to specific reasons “that express intelligible features possessing a universal mode of being devoid of individual character”, whereas *forma* / *idea* refer “to the model from which an individual entity comes to being” (p. 407). Berthold inherits key-concepts from his German Dominican predecessors, but equally finds inspiration in Avicbron. His extraordinary capacity to combine sources enables him to innovate and to extend this heritage to themes absent both in Proclus and in the Latin tradition.

Michael Dunne compares Peter of Ireland (and marginally Thomas Aquinas) with Berthold of Moosburg on the so-called noetic triad: Being-Life-Intellect. The content of Proclus' Proposition 102 of the *Elements* was known to Aquinas' first master of philosophy, Peter of Ireland, through chapter XVII (XVIII) of the *Book of Causes*, that Peter cites at length in the prologue of his commentary on the *De longitudine et brevitate vitae*. However, as Dunne observes, Peter of Ireland is selective in his use of the quotation: he excludes those passages in the secondary propositions of the chapter XVII (XVIII) that refer to *scientia* and *intelligentia*, and preserves only those presenting the dependence of beings upon the First Being and of life upon the First Life. Peter explains that being is given *per modum creationis* and life *per modum formae*, inasmuch as, firstly, “life is to be found in living things in the way of a form and not in the way of a created thing” and, secondly, “life does not become actual, does not go out into being, by means of creation but only [...] by infusion” as any form does (p. 443). Berthold, while commenting on Proposition 102 of the *Elements*, distinguishes between life and living, and introduces the example of intellects

which, although they live, are not properly life. Berthold distinguishes eight levels of life, from *vita essentialis* and *vita intellectualis* to *ultima vita* which presupposes only vital movement (of nutrition).

Stephen Gersh's comparison of Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino documents the subtle transformations that constitute medieval and Renaissance Platonism. These three great representatives of the Platonic tradition share a common philosophical method and goal: in various ways, each thinker held that doxography (a reflection on the history of philosophy) was integral to the pursuit of philosophy itself. They also strove to demonstrate the profound compatibility of Platonism and Christian doctrine by appealing to the authority of Augustine and invoking the example of Dionysius the Areopagite. To illustrate the numerous important differences in these Christian Platonisms, Gersh provides a wealth of information in a series of case-studies of the authors' attitudes toward Hermes Trismegistus, Pythagoras, Plato, the Latin Platonists, Proclus, and, finally with Ficino, Plotinus and the Greek Platonists. In most instances, Gersh finds a shift from "the medieval phase" of Platonism, which includes Berthold and Cusanus, to "the Renaissance phase", represented in Ficino. In the broadest sense, these terms denote an author's access to new sources, with Cusanus regarded as a "transitional" figure by his use of humanist translations of Plato and Proclus, and Ficino's translations of Plato (published in 1484) and Plotinus (completed in 1490) inaugurating a turning point in the Platonic tradition in the West. What emerges from Gersh's analysis is that Proclus, as the author of the axiomatic *Elements of Theology* (Berthold), is eclipsed by Proclus, the commentator on the dialectical *Parmenides* (Cusanus), and finally by Plotinus, as the pre-eminent interpreter of Plato (Ficino), inasmuch as Proclus' polytheism was subjected to increased criticism.

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The studies reunited here are not meant to provide an exhaustive panorama of Berthold's thought. Nevertheless, singly and in concert with one another, these contributions open paths for further investigation. We now can better appreciate the importance of vital sources for the *Expositio*, such as the Scriptures for Berthold's conception of the relationship between paganism and Christianity, Avicbron on the doctrine of *fluxus* and essential causality, and Thomas Aquinas' analyses of Proclus in his *Super Librum de causis Expositio*. How does Berthold's interpretations of Avicbron on essential causality and the doctrine of forms compare to those of Thomas of York, whose massive influence on the *Expositio* we are now in a position to gauge? Does his positive reception of

the *Fons vitae*, which departs so strikingly from Albert the Great's rebuttal of Avicbron's metaphysics, mark an original synthesis between the Franciscan philosophies from Oxford and the Albertist traditions of Cologne? In his reading of Proclus and Dionysius on contemplative felicity and even deification, was Berthold inspired more by the *Sapientiale* or by Albert, by Ulrich of Strassburg or by Dietrich of Freiberg? Much more remains to be done to measure the extent of Berthold's debt to his Dominican predecessors. Berthold was certainly reliant upon Albert, Ulrich, and Dietrich in numerous fundamental ways – in his conception of freedom, in his noetics, in his understanding of theology itself. Nevertheless, his modifications of and departures from his sources is even more striking and decisive. Have the boundaries of the historiography of the “German Dominican school” been confirmed or undermined? The impact of other Dominicans was previously overlooked, but there are now good proofs that further studies should be undertaken on the influence of Aquinas on Berthold.

The doctrine of natural and voluntary providence has received considerable attention in this volume. This is not, however, disproportionate to its weight in the *Expositio*. While not pretending to achieve unanimity on a subject that permeates every facet of the commentary, each study has nevertheless brought to light new aspects of the theory. We see how Berthold's project responded to a perennial question of the Neoplatonic tradition relating to divine care and the place of the human within the universal order. Moreover, Berthold's conception of natural providence served not only to demarcate the domain of philosophical inquiry relative to Christian theology, but also to lay the foundation for Berthold's philosophy of nature. Key influences on Berthold's interpretation of Augustine's notion of “twin providence” have also been reassessed (Proclus' *De providentia et fato*, Albert the Great, Dietrich of Freiberg) or highlighted for the first time (Ulrich of Strassburg). Berthold's endorsement of Proclean Platonism was unprecedented in the Middle Ages and, undoubtedly, scholars will continue to weigh the precise balance between pagan philosophy and Christianity in the *Expositio*, as we come to a clearer sense of how this remarkable synthesis of these traditions arose within its context.

Understanding Berthold's Christian Platonism also requires us to move from the *Expositio*'s immediate context, and the problematics it answered, to comparing it with other great syntheses of Platonism and Christian doctrine. The “medieval” features of Berthold's reception of Proclus come into much sharper relief when they are compared to the Platonisms of Nicholas of Cusa and Masilio Ficino. Further comparisons of Berthold's *Expositio* with the major receptions of Proclus in the Georgian commentary on the *Elements* by Ioane Petritsi (12th c.) and the Greek *Anaptyxis* (*Refutation*) of the *Elements* by

Nicholas of Methone (d. c. 1166) may yet help us to appreciate the distinctive features of these branches of the Platonic tradition.

Can one consider Berthold's project in terms of a renewal of medieval metaphysics? We would firmly respond with the affirmative, not because we need to justify the choice of the title of this volume but because the *Expositio* sets the plan of a different metaphysics, outside universities, outside the stream of the Aristotelian tradition, in a context and with a purpose that still remain to be explored. These papers bring forth numerous and solid arguments that Berthold's *Expositio* should not be ignored by any serious history of Western metaphysics.