The Gods and Causality. On Aquinas' Presence in Berthold's *Expositio*

Ezequiel Ludueña

Universidad de Buenos Aires

1 Introduction

Almost ten years ago, I decided to dedicate my attention to Berthold's massive commentary on Proclus' *Elementatio theologica*, a text considered to be a philosophical alternative to Thomism, a *summa ad mentem Platoniorum*, as Imbach wrote in the 1970s.¹ But, as I began my readings, I must confess I felt a little disappointed, for at that time I had the rather dismal impression that the myriad of quotations composing the *Expositio* would diminish its philosophical value. I was particularly interested in Berthold's interpretation of Proclus' henads, how he managed to present that concept to a Christian audience. And one day I noted a specific paragraph: it was compelling, coherent, brief, and best of all, it was not indicated by the editors as a quotation. Apparently, it was something Berthold himself had written. It became my favorite passage in the *Expositio*, at least until a few months later, when, while reading Aquinas' commentary on the *Liber de causis*, I came across the same paragraph: it was another fragment copied by Berthold, yet it had not been identified. This study is, somehow, a consequence of that rather painful incident.

Of course, Aquinas's citations in the *Expositio* are not many. And yet, I would argue that in regard to certain aspects some of them are quite important to Berthold. Here is a preliminary, surely imperfect, table of citations from Aquinas in Berthold's *Expositio*:

1 R. Imbach, "Le (néo-)platonisme medieval. Proclus latin et l'école dominicaine allemande", in *Revue de théologie et philosophie* 110(1978), p. 427–448, at p. 438. I am grateful to E. Butler and E. King for kindly helping me with my English writing. Also, I thank D. Calma and E. King for their extremely useful comments on the paper.

Thomas Aquinas

Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli^a

<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 26 / p. 128, l. 1–12	43D / p. 70, l. 165–173 [citation, modified]*
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 2 / p. 12, l. 1–6	52A / p. 117, l. 21–31 [citation, modified]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 19 / p. 105, l. 16–19	111C / p. 21, l. 64–67 [reformulation]*
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 19 / p. 106, l. 21–24	111C / p. 21, l. 67–69 [citation, modified]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 19 / p. 107, l. 2–3	111C / p. 21, l. 69–71 [reformulation]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 19 / p. 107, l. 3–11	111C / p. 21, l. 71–77 [citation, modified]
<i>Contra errores Graecorum</i> , c. 23 / p. 84a, l. 11–13	137E / p. 21, l. 216–217 [citation]
<i>Contra errores Graecorum</i> , c. 23 / p. 84a, l. 16–23	137E / p. 22, l. 222–226 [citation, modified]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 24 / p. 122, l. 19–p. 123, l. 4	142B / p. 55, l. 105–p. 56, l. 115 [citation, modified]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 24 / p. 122, l. 13–15	149A / p. 112, l. 41–43 [reformulation]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 24 / p. 122, l. 24–25	149A / p. 112, l. 45–46 [reformulation]*
<i>In De divinis nominibus</i> IV, lect. 18, §524 / p. 188	156A / p. 170, l. 33–38 [citation, modified]

a All citations of Berthold refer to the critical edition: Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 35–65*, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–135*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183*, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184–211*, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014). Citations of Aquinas marked with an asterisk are not listed in the *apparatus fontium* of the critical edition.

(cont.)

Thomas Aquinas

*Expositio super Elementationem
theologicam Procli*

<i>Super librum De causis</i> Expositio, lect. 18 / p. 102, l. 19–27	155A / p. 164, l. 33–39 [citation, modified]
<i>Quaestiones disputatae de veritate</i> , q. 1, a. 1 / ed. H.-F. Dondaine: p. 6, l. 186–187 ^b	179A / p. 204, l. 150–151 [reformulation?]
<i>Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei</i> , q. 3, a. 9 / ed. P.M. Pession: p. 65a–b	204A / p. 203, l. 100–116 [citation, modified]

- b The text in the *Expositio* reads: *Verum etiam circa intellectum idem patet, cum veritas sit adaequatio rei ad intellectum secundum Isaac*. In *De veritate*, a. 1, q. 1 (the source listed in the apparatus of the *Expositio*), Aquinas writes: *sic dicit Isaac quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*. Admittedly, we are dealing with a Thomistic commonplace (the definition of truth with the misattribution to Isaac Israeli), and the context of the passage in 179A offers no clues about Berthold's precise source. However, I think the following sentence of the anonymous *Summa totius logicae*, which was circulated with a misattribution to Aquinas, is a likely source since the phrasing is much closer to Berthold's: *Quantum ad primum sciendum, quod ut communiter dicitur, veritas est adaequatio rei ad intellectum, secundum Isaac, verum dicitur adaequatum, falsum vero non adaequatum* (tr. 6, c. 4, accessed online at corpusthomisticum.org).

If I am correct, between citations and reformulations we can count, for the moment, at least 15 instances of Aquinas' presence in the *Expositio*. In this chapter, I will focus my attention on two moments in the *Expositio* when Berthold has recourse to Aquinas' texts. Both cases relate to topics that, in my view, are central to Berthold's commentary project: the nature of Proclus' gods or *unitates* (what Berthold calls the *unum secundum essentiam*), and the relation between the causality of the *unitates* and the causality of the absolute One (*unum secundum causam*).

First of all, I offer a very brief presentation of Berthold's metaphysical scheme. Then, I will present Berthold's main concern regarding the Proclean gods, namely, to show that they are *per se subsistentes* not because they are uncreated, but on account of their simplicity. Here I consider a text by Aquinas that Berthold uses to make this point, and how he modifies it. Afterwards, I show how Berthold understands the way that the One's causality relates to the causality of the *unitates* or primordial causes in light of a text by Aquinas that Berthold cites precisely to explain how those modes of causation work

together. Also, in this same section, I consider the possibility that Berthold could have used, while not explicitly citing, another text by Aquinas on instrumental causality. Finally, I will share some concluding remarks.

2 The Three Ones

In the beginning of his *Expositio*, Berthold presents his interpretation of Proclus' metaphysical universe. The supreme Principle of reality is the One. The One, says Berthold, is an *unum quod non est in multis sive multitudine*. In a strict sense, is not unity but excess of unity. It is not an *unum* among others, but an *unum ante omne unum et multitudinem*,² an *unum non plurificabile*. And it is *omnium productivum*:³ it creates everything. It is not possible to know what it is in itself. But its product is unity. And for this reason, Berthold calls it the *unum secundum causam*. The One pre-contains every unity⁴ and every unity presupposes the One, but the One does not have its unity from another, but from itself. It is, then, *prime unum*. It is one in a way that is most simple, absolute, and limitless.⁵ According to Berthold, the One, and only the One, creates. Then there is a second one – an *unum quod est in multitudine sicut ab ea participatum*.⁶ This *unum* is *simplex*, but not *simpliciter simplex* (as is the

2 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 77, l. 232–233.

3 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2E, p. 88, ll. 244, 241.

4 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 65D, p. 203, l. 82–84: [...] *et sic prae habet omnia, in quibus ipsa eadem intentio contracta est vel contrahibilis, nobiliori, quia absolutiori modo, quam sint in se ipsis, et sic etiam dicitur prime* [...].

5 In this sense, the One is not one. It transcends unity because is limitless unity. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 160K, p. 8, l. 168–181: *De primo sciendum, quod [...] prime adverbium, quod secundum grammaticos est vi verbi adiectivum, modificat terminum, cui addicitur ad standum pro simplicissimo, absolutissimo et sic illimitatissimo intentionis seu proprietatis per terminum denotatae, verbi gratia prime intellectus stat pro simplicissimo, absolutissimo et illimitatissimo intellectu, qui non est aliud quam quod dicitur, cum sit monarcha totius intellectualis seyræ, et per consequens est unus solus [...] et extra omnem effectum [...]. Est autem duplex prime, vel simpliciter vel in determinata entium manerie. Primum est unum tantum, scilicet prime unum, quod solum et simpliciter est monarcha non unius maneriei entium, sed simpliciter totius universi [...]. Prime autem secundo modo acceptum adhuc est duplex, quia vel simpliciter principaliforme respectu alicuius determinatae maneriei entium totaliter vel respectu alicuius generis vel speciei entium intra determinatam maneriem conclusorum. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 136B, p. 5, l. 73–74: [...] *quod est per se, est limitatum et contractum in ipsa intentione, prime autem est illimitatum et incontractum et sic dignius limitato et contracto*. Cf. K. Flasch, "Einleitung", in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. xi–xxxviii, at p. xvii.*

6 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 77, l. 229–230.

One);⁷ it is a *quoddam unum*.⁸ Considered in itself, its essence is unity, and so Berthold calls it *unum secundum essentiam*. No composition, no division, no multiplicity can be found in it.⁹ Like the One, it is a cause, but it does not create: it determines. And, for this reason, because he understands it as a cause of determination, Berthold discerns in it six different principles. For he thinks that every determination can be ultimately reduced to six primordial determinations: possibility, being, life, intellect, soul, and corporality. And he identifies these six causes with Proclus' henads. Following William of Moerbeke's translation of the *Elementatio theologica*, Berthold calls them *unitates* or *bonitates*, and also "primordial causes".

In regard to their essence, the *unitates* are pure unity, in respect to multiplicity, they are principles of determination.¹⁰ From this point of view, they constitute a plurality of causes, the very first and supreme multiplicity *immediata ad ipsum prime unum*.¹¹ These the six *unitates* that originate all determination are:

1. <i>prime virtus</i> (or <i>infinitas</i>) 2. <i>prime entitas</i> 3. <i>prime vita</i> 4. <i>prime intellectualitas</i> 5. <i>prime animealitas</i> 6. <i>prime naturalitas</i>	}	<i>unum secundum essentiam</i>

7 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 59B, p. 165, l. 65–74: *Simplex primi [...] modi est simpliciter et absolute simplex, cuius simplicitas est omnimoda, in qua nulla est plica diversitatis secundum esse aliquo modo. Et hoc non convenit nisi prime bono, quod nulla plica habitudinis ad aliquid intra vel extra dependet secundum esse diversum a se ipso. Et hoc est simplex omnino et omnimode in fine simplicitatis, cuius simplicitas nulli causato convenire potest. Est et alia simplicitas, quae non habet plicam habitudinis secundum esse ad compositiones intra, cum non constet ex diversis intentionibus, licet habeat dependentiam ad causam extra, a qua accipit id, quod est. Et hoc non est omnino simplex, sed contractum ad determinatum modum et ex hoc conclusum intra ordinem partialem, scilicet unialem, et intra totalem ordinem universi.*

8 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2E, p. 88, l. 245–247: *Unum autem secundum essentiam est quoddam unum eo, quod deficit a superplenitudine simpliciter unius: tum quia est contractum, illud vero illimitatum, tum quia licet sit simplex, tamen non est simpliciter simplex [...].*

9 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 78, l. 236–237.

10 On determination, cf. E. King, *Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementationem theologica* Procli of Berthold von Moosburg, PhD diss. (University of Cambridge, 2016), part II, ch. 3.

11 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 116, l. 134–135.

The use of the adverb *prime* indicates that the *unitates* are, with regard to multiplicity, what the *prime unum* is with regard to everything else (including the *unitates*). They transcend the properties or intentions they confer, for they *are* those determinations in a most simple, absolute, and limitless way.¹² They mediate between the One and the multiplicity of differently determined things. Their causal action presupposes that of the One, i.e., it presupposes creation.

Finally, each determined thing (everything besides the One and the *unitates*) is one *secundum participationem*. This third one is found *in omni unito et multitudine* and is a one *ab alio sive per aliud*.¹³ That “other” (*aliud*) is the *unum secundum essentiam*, which is an *unum tantum*; whereas this third one is one – because everything created is one – but is not *unum tantum*. It is one and possible; or one, possible, and existing; or one, possible, existent, and alive, etc. In other words, it is the result of composition.

Thus, Berthold’s metaphysical scheme is as follows: an absolutely simple *unum*, a simple (but not absolutely simple) *unum*, and an *unum* by participation (and this means composition).

3 The *unitates* as *per se subsistentes*

While explaining the Proclean doctrine of self-constituted principles, Berthold says that there are two ways in which an intellectual nature can be called *per se subsistens* or *antipostatton*. An intellectual nature converts upon itself *intentionaliter* or *essentialiter*.¹⁴ The first case is that of the possible intellect.¹⁵ The second is the case of many substances (like the *animae totales*, the agent intellect, the intellectual hypostases), but the main examples of them are the *prime unum* and the *unitates*. They convert upon themselves *se totis totaliter* because they subsist in just one intention, the *intentio unius*. They represent the supreme instances of the *antipostata* – according to Berthold, the absolute One is also *antipostatton*.¹⁶

Now a question that occurs here and there in the *Expositio* is what it means to be *per se subsistens* in the case of the *unitates*. It is obvious that the absolute One is *per se subsistens* because its existence is not the effect of some

¹² See note 7, above.

¹³ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 77, l. 229–230 and 234.

¹⁴ See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43A, p. 66, l. 14–20; 43C, p. 69, l. 132–p. 70, l. 141.

¹⁵ On this point, see Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43B, p. 67, l. 57–p. 69, l. 133.

¹⁶ Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43C, p. 70, l. 142–153.

external, superior cause. But are the *unitates per se subsistentes* for the same reason? Berthold's answer is that they, like everything else besides the absolute One, participate in the One, but their mode of participation is peculiar. He addresses the question while commenting on the second proposition of the *Elementatio*. He explains that the mode in which the *unitates* participate in the One is unique: each *unitas* is one with what it essentially participates, both *in re* and *in intentione*.¹⁷ To illustrate this, he has recourse to the *Clavis physicae*, where it is said that the primordial causes are *per se* because they participate in the *causa omnium* by themselves, not through something else, whereas everything else participates in the *causa omnium* through them:

Summae ac verae naturae est prima consideratio, qua intelligitur summa ac vera bonitas, quae nullius particeps per se bonitas est, cuius prima donatione et participatione est per se ipsam bonitas, cuius item participatione bona sunt, quaecumque bona sunt. Quae ideo per se ipsam bonitas dicitur, quia per se ipsam summum bonum participat, cetera autem bona non per se ipsa summum et substantiale bonum participant, sed per eam, quae est per se ipsam summi boni participatio. Similiter dicendum de reliquis primordialibus causis, quod sint principales eo, quod per se ipsas sunt participantes unius omnium causae, quae Deus est, alia autem omnia illarum participatione sunt, quod sunt.¹⁸

The primordial causes, which Berthold identifies with Proclus' *unitates*, occupy the highest metaphysical position after the first principle. Their relation to it is immediate, and so they participate in it immediately, by themselves. And yet,

¹⁷ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2B, p. 84, l. 97–9.

¹⁸ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2B, p. 82, l. 16–25. Cf. Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, ed. P. Lucentini (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), c. 118, p. 88, l. 4–14: *Summe ac vere nature prima consideratio est qua intelligitur summa ac vera bonitas, quae nullius particeps per se ipsam bonitas est, cuius prima donatione et participatione est per se ipsam bonitas, cuius item participatione bona sunt quaecumque bona sunt. Quae ideo per se ipsam bonitas dicitur quia per se ipsam summum bonum participat, cetera autem bona non per se ipsa summum substantiale bonum participant, sed per eam quae est per se ipsam summi boni participatio. Similiter dicendum de reliquis primordialibus causis quod sint principales eo quod per se ipsas sunt participantes unius omnium cause quae Deus est, alia autem omnia illarum participatione sunt quod sunt.* For an analysis of this passage, see S. Gersh, "Remarks on the Method and Content of the *Clavis physicae*", in W. Beierwaltes (ed.), *Eriugena redivivus* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1987), p. 162–173, at p. 167. Cf. also S. Gersh, "Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy", in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 493–503, at p. 497.

Berthold understands that each *unitas*, each primordial cause, is one *secundum essentiam*, not *secundum participationem*. A few pages later he deals with this issue directly:

Nec obstat, quod supra dixi tale unum esse participans uno et modo dico ipsum esse unum per essentiam seu per se, quia alio respectu dicitur participare, alio vero per essentiam esse unum. Cum enim deficiat a superplenitudine et superexcessu simpliciter unius, ideo dicitur ipso quasi extrinseco participare [...]. Sed quia unum, quod est sua propria essentia, non est per aliud unum formaliter, sed se ipso, ideo dicitur per essentiam esse unum, cum ratione suae simplicitatis non sit distinguere in ipso inter participans et participatum, sicut distinguitur in omni unito [...].¹⁹

There is no contradiction in saying that each *unitas* is an *unum secundum essentiam* and that it participates in the One. Because the *unum secundum essentiam* is not the One, given that it cannot match its *superplenitudo*, it participates in the One *quasi extrinseco*. However, when Berthold says that each *unitas* is an *unum secundum essentiam* he means that *formaliter* an *unitas* is not an *unum per aliud* other than itself. It is its essence; it is simple.

To formulate this point, Berthold quotes a text from Albert's *Summa theologiae* which makes a reference to the Boethian distinction between *quo est* and *quod est*. As we see in the next citation, according to Albert, only of God it is possible to say that there is no such distinction, for only God is simple. But for Berthold, the simplicity expressed by the refusal of any distinction between *quo est* and *quod est* also characterizes the primordial causes. As we saw, for him, the absolute One is *supersimplex*, while each *unitas*, i.e., each primordial cause, is *simplex*. This means that in the case of the *unitates* too there is no distinction between *quo est* and *quod est*. This explains the following modification of Albert's text introduced by Berthold:²⁰

19 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2E, p. 89, l. 253–261. See also *Expositio*, Prologus 4, p. 12, l. 243–p. 13, l. 250. I owe this reference to E. King.

20 A similar modification occurs in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 149A, p. 112, l. 41–43 with Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002), lect. 24, p. 122, l. 13–15.

Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae* Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*

Et hoc etiam dicit Boethius in libro
De Trinitate, quod ‘vere unum est, in
quo nullus est numerus, nullum in
eo aliud praeter id quod est’. In omni
autem quod est citra primum, aliud
est id ‘quod est’, et aliud ‘quo est’,
et propter hoc non vere simplex
est [...].²¹

[...] nullum secundorum est vere sim-
plex. In omnibus enim, quae sunt
citra primordiales causas, aliud est
id, quod est, et aliud, quo est, et prop-
ter hoc nullum eorum vere simplex
est [...].²²

The distinction between *quod est* and *quo est* does not apply to the *unitates* or primordial causes. On account of its simplicity, therefore, each *unitas*, is one *secundum essentiam*, not *secundum participationem*. Elsewhere, Berthold explains the nature of the *unum secundum essentiam* by making a distinction between two manners of speaking: *efficienter* and *formaliter*. Each *unitas* is one *secundum* or *per essentiam*, not *efficienter* but *formaliter*:

non dicitur per se unum, quod careat simpliciter efficiente, sed quia
non est unum per participationem, sed per essentiam se ipso, scilicet
formaliter.²³

The *unitates* exist by themselves:

formaliter, non efficienter, quia causaliter effective nihil gignit se ipsum
[...] licet formaliter et procedat a se ipso et convertatur ad se ipsum.²⁴

Berthold clarifies the exact meaning of the adverb *formaliter* when he deals with Proclus’ propositions about the *antipostata*. There, he avails himself of the concept of *forma*. To illuminate the sense of Proposition 43, he explains what an *antipostatōn* (i.e., something *per se subsistens*) is, and he observes:

21 Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. Libri I, pars I, quaestiones 1–50A*, ed. D. Siedler (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), pars I, tr. 4, q. 20, c. 2, p. 101, l. 61–65.

22 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 127B, p. 162, l. 49–51.

23 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 4F, p. 111, l. 362–364.

24 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 9B, p. 170, l. 108–112. *Unum [...] secundum essentiam [...] licet nulli innitatur formaliter, innitatur tamen prime uni causaliter, quod solum est unum universaliter*. See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2D, p. 87, l. 183–188.

[...] cum haec praepositio 'per' denotet causam, illud dicitur per se stare sive subsistere, quod non habet causam essendi aliam nisi se ipsum. Est autem duplex causa essendi, scilicet forma, per quam aliquid actu est, et agens, quod facit actu esse. Si igitur dicatur stans per se ipsum, quod non dependet ab agente superiori, sic stare per se ipsum convenit solum prime bono et uni, ut inferior apparebit. Si autem dicatur per se stans illud, quod non formatur per aliquid aliud, sed ipsummet est sibi forma, sic esse stans per se ipsum convenit omnibus rebus immaterialibus. Substantia enim composita ex materia et forma non est stans per se ipsam nisi ratione partium.²⁵

The preposition *per* designates two kinds of *causa essendi*: agent (*quod facit actu esse*) and formal (*per quam aliquid actu est*). The absolute One is *per se subsistens* because its being does not depend on a superior agent. But all immaterial things can also be called *per se subsistentes* because they are their form. This means that they are simple.

If I am correct, this is another, more developed, way of explaining how the *unitates* are an *unum per essentiam* even if they participate in the absolute One. The notion of *forma* plays a key role in this analysis: *ipsummet est sibi forma*. Now, the text mentioned above is in fact a quotation from Aquinas' commentary on the *Liber de causis*:

Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis*
Expositio

Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*

[...] considerandum est quod cum praepositio 'per' denotet causam, illud dicitur «per se» stare sive subsistere quod non habet aliam causam essendi nisi seipsum. Est autem duplex causa essendi, scilicet: forma per quam aliquid actu est et agens quod facit actu esse. Si ergo dicatur stans per seipsum quod non dependet a superiori agente, sic stare per seipsum convenit soli Deo qui est prima causa agens a qua omnes secundae causae dependent, ut ex superioribus patet.

Sed cum haec praepositio 'per' denotet causam, illud dicitur per se stare sive subsistere, quod non habet causam essendi aliam nisi se ipsum. Est autem duplex causa essendi, scilicet forma, per quam aliquid actu est, et agens, quod facit actu esse. Si igitur dicatur stans per se ipsum, quod non dependet ab agente superiori, sic stare per se ipsum convenit solum prime bono et uni, ut inferior apparebit.

25 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43D, p. 70, l. 165–173.

Si autem dicatur «per se» stans illud quod non formatur per aliquid aliud, sed ipsummet est forma, sic esse stans per seipsum convenit omnibus **substantiis** immaterialibus. Substantia enim, composita ex materia et forma, non est ‘stans per seipsam’ nisi ratione partium [...].²⁶

Si autem dicatur per se stans illud, quod non formatur per aliquid aliud, sed ipsummet est **sibi** forma, sic esse stans per se ipsum convenit omnibus **rebus** immaterialibus. Substantia enim composita ex materia et forma non est stans per se ipsam nisi ratione partium.²⁷

The formula *per se*, Aquinas says, can be predicated of all immaterial substances because their form is independent from matter.²⁸ An immaterial substance does not need anything else *ad sui formationem*; it is its own form.²⁹ Consequently, what is *per se* is a *substantia stans per essentiam suam*,³⁰ although this does not mean its being is uncaused – *quasi non dependeat ex alia causa superiori*.³¹

In his commentary on the *De divinis nominibus*, in order to explain Dionysius’ critique of the separate hypostasis of the pagans, Aquinas mentions the *Platonici philosophi* and their doctrine of separate forms,³² which they considered “dii existentium et creatores, quasi per se operantes ad rerum productionem”.³³ He affirms that Dionysius did not think of, for example, “Life itself” as a certain deity that causes life (*quamdam deitatem causativam vitae*), as if it were something different from the life of the supreme God. Only God’s

26 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 26, p. 128, l. 1–12.

27 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43D, p. 70, l. 165–173.

28 On this topic, cf. Th. Scarpelli Cory, “*Reditio completa, reditio incompleta*. Aquinas and the *Liber de causis*, prop. 15, on Reflexivity and Incorporeality”, in A. Fidora, N. Polloni (eds), *Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism. Philosophical and Theological Exchanges between the Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Intellectual Traditions* (Barcelona / Roma: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2017), p. 185–229.

29 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 25, p. 126, l. 2–4.

30 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 25, p. 124, l. 28–p. 125, l. 2.

31 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 25, p. 126, l. 14.

32 Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, ed. C. Pera (Torino / Roma: Marietti, 1950), c. 11, lect. 4, §931, p. 346: *Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod Platonici, ponentes ideas rerum separatas, omnia quae sic in abstracto dicuntur, posuerunt in abstracto subsistere causas secundum ordinem quemdam; ita scilicet quod primum rerum principium dicebant esse per se bonitatem et per se unitatem et hoc primum principium, quod est essentialiter bonum et unum, dicebant esse summum Deum*. Cf. L. Sturlese, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli Propositiones 136–159*, p. ix–xv, at p. ix–x.

33 Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. 11, lect. 4, §933, p. 346.

life is the cause of everything that is alive (*causa omnium quae vivunt*).³⁴ There are no separated essences or hypostases that are “creative” principles of beings: “non dicimus esse aliquas essentias et hypostases separatas quae sint principia rerum et creatrices earum.”³⁵ Now, in the *Liber de causis*, intelligences are said to be substances *stantes per seipsas*. Thus Aquinas, in his commentary on the *Liber*, through his double interpretation of the formula *per se*, tried to show that the doctrine of the *Liber* is not that of the *Platonici*.

When Berthold cites Aquinas’ text, however, he makes several changes to fit the explanation to his own terminology and his own metaphysical scheme. The formula *per se subsistens* indicates, first of all, something whose being does not depend on a superior agent. According to this meaning, only the *prime bonum et unum* can be said to be *per se subsistens*. But *per se subsistens* can also designate something whose constitution does not depend on something else because it itself is form for itself: *ipsummet est sibi forma*, and *forma* is that *per quam aliquid actu est*. When a thing’s simplicity lies in an identity of form and being, it can also be called *per se subsistens*. So not only the *prime unum* is *per se subsistens*: every immaterial thing (*res*) can be said to be *per se subsistens*.

Of all things that are *per se subsistentes*, Berthold affirms, the *prime unum* and the *unitates* (or *bonitates*) merit the name most of all.³⁶

[...] sciendum, quod rerum [...] separatarum quaedam stant in una intentione tantum. Et hoc dupliciter, sive simpliciter, ut prime unum, sive contracte, ut bonitates. Et istae cum prime uno proprie et principaliter dicuntur antipostatton sicut stantes se ipsis totis et totaliter sub absoluta formali independentia ad omnem aliam intentionem.³⁷

Like the *prime unum*, the *unitates* return to or reflect on themselves *se ipsis totis et totaliter*, determining themselves *sub absoluta formali independentia*. Even if they depend on the *prime unum*, formally they subsist by themselves.³⁸

34 Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. 11, lect. 4, §932, p. 346.

35 Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. 11, lect. 4, §933, p. 346.

36 Unlike Proclus, Berthold thinks that the *prime unum* is self-constituted. Its triadic structure is the expression of its reflexivity. Cf. E. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia* (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013), p. 150–154.

37 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43E, p. 71, l. 177–181.

38 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 9B, p. 170, l. 108–113.

Therefore, Berthold applies the notion of *per se subsistens* as Aquinas understood it to a realm Aquinas rejects, that of Proclus' gods.³⁹ For, according to Aquinas, the *Platonici* postulated an *ordinem formarum separatarum*. He indicates that they called these forms "gods", and that they posited them above the domain of separate intellects and below the supreme God.⁴⁰ But Christians, says Aquinas, "non ponimus alias formas separatas supra intellectuum ordinem, sed ipsum bonum separatum ad quod totum universum ordinatur sicut ad bonum extrinsecum".⁴¹ In other words, he accepts the domain of separate intellects, which he identifies with the angels, but rejects the existence of a plurality of gods. As de Libera observed: "Thomas substitue au rapport formes-intellects la structure Dieu-anges".⁴² This means that Aquinas accepts the Proclean notion of *per se subsistens*, but used it only to describe God or the angelic intellectual nature, whereas for Berthold it applies *proprie et principaliter* to God and to the *unitates*, i.e., to those Platonic gods Aquinas rejects.⁴³

The idea expressed in Aquinas' commentary plays an important role in the *Expositio*. As we have seen, Berthold has two ways to introduce the Proclean gods to his readers. The first is to identify them with the *causae primordiales* of Eriugena (*quas Pater in Filio fecit*, according to the Irish thinker). He takes this path already in the *Prologus*.⁴⁴ The second is to establish their simplicity. He does this through Boethius and through Aquinas' interpretation of the formula *per se subsistens*. Because of their simplicity, one cannot distinguish in the gods between participant and participated, whereas one can in the case of what is *unum secundum participationem*.⁴⁵ A principle "perfect by itself" possesses its unity and goodness eternally in virtue of its own nature, even if it has its nature by virtue of being produced by something prior to it.

39 Indeed, Aquinas rejects the existence of a realm of gods if they are understood as something else than an erroneous interpretation of Christian angels, i.e. as a sphere beyond being and intellect. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis*, c. 1.

40 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 3, p. 18, l. 8–p. 20, l. 4.

41 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 10, p. 67, l. 27–29.

42 A. de Libera, "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin interprètes du *Liber de causis*", in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 74(1990), p. 347–378, at p. 370.

43 Furthermore, Aquinas understands that these Platonic gods are *secundum se intelligibiles*. See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 3, p. 18, l. 24. Even if Berthold speaks once about the intellectual nature of the *unitates* (cf. 43A and C), he does it in the broadest sense possible (*generalissime*), as when he predicates *ens* of the *prime unum*. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 14A, p. 3, l. 20–21, and E. Ludueña, "Eriúgena en el siglo XIV. Su presencia en la *Expositio* de Bertoldo de Moosburg", in *Scintilla* 10(2013), p. 99–154, at p. 124–125.

44 Cf. Ludueña, "Eriúgena en el siglo XIV".

45 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2E, p. 89, l. 253–262.

Finally, we should note that Berthold could have quoted Albert the Great's clarification of the formula *per se*. In his commentary on chapter 11 of *De divinis nominibus*, Albert seeks to determine if there is some *per se* Life made by God. He indicates that *per se* can be understood in two ways: as opposed to *per accidens* or as opposed to *per aliud*. In the first case, it is the opposite of *illud praedicatum quod ponitur in diffinitione*. In the second, Albert makes a further distinction: *per aliud* can mean either (a) that something proceeds from another as from a cause or (b) that something occurs through another thing.⁴⁶ Albert writes that, understood as the opposite to this last sense of *per aliud*, there is a *per-se-vita*.

Albert's interpretation of the meaning of *per se*, we may note, coincides with that expressed in the *Clavis physicae*: the *causae primordiales* are *per se* because they participate in the *causa omnium* immediately, "not through another thing". Berthold knew Albert's text. He could have used it, but he had already stated the same idea by quoting the *Clavis*. It seems Aquinas offered him another point of view by bringing the concept of form into the discussion.

4 The *prime unum*, the *unitates*, and Their Modes of Causation

Another recurring issue concerning the gods is their mode of causation, namely: (1) the nature of their causal action and (2) how their causation relates to that of the absolute One.

Berthold reads the *Elementatio* through the *Liber de causis*. As I have said, the *prime unum*, the First Cause of the *Liber*, creates, while the *unitates* or gods cause *per modum formae*. They determine or inform the product of creation: the *unum tantum*. Now, Berthold adopts Albert the Great's reading of the *Liber*, according to which, "si secundum ulterius fluat vel influat [...] non fluit nisi virtute primi".⁴⁷ In other words, the creative act is exclusive to the One, and the gods do not create; furthermore, even their activity (to determine or to inform) is only possible because of the *virtus* granted to them by the One. The One, like the First Cause of the *Liber*, does everything the gods do in a more eminent way (*eminentiori modo*). Berthold affirms this by quoting a passage by Ulrich

46 Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1972), c. 11, §26, p. 424, l. 15–28.

47 Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. 1, tr. 4, c. 2, p. 44, l. 37–48: *Si quaeritur vero, cum dicitur 'influere', in qua sit continentia importata, per praepositionem, dicendum quod in possibilitate rei, cui fit influxus. Quae possibilitas rei est ex seipsa. [...] Ex quo patet, quod si secundum ulterius fluat vel influat, quod non fluit nisi virtute primi.*

of Strassburg, which is itself a paraphrase from Albert's *De causis*.⁴⁸ Berthold modifies the text he quotes, as he prefers the verb *derivare* to *fluere*.

Albert the Great, <i>De causis et processu universitatis</i>	Ulrich of Strassburg, <i>De summo bono</i>	Berthold of Moosburg, <i>Expositio</i>
<i>Si quaeritur vero, cum dicitur 'influere', in qua sit continentia importata, per praepositionem, dicendum quod in possibilitate rei, cui fit influxus. Quae possibilitas rei est ex seipsa. [...] Ex quo patet, quod si</i>	<i>[...] cum secundum ex se nihil habeat nisi receptionem, si ipsum</i>	<i>[...] cum secundum ex se nihil habeat nisi receptionem, si ipsum est der-</i>
<i>secundum ulterius fluat fluit, hoc non facit nisi vel influat, quod non fluit nisi virtute primi.</i>	<i>virtute primi.⁴⁹</i>	<i>ivans esse aliis, hoc non facit nisi virtute primi derivantis.⁵⁰</i>

Modified in this way, the text suits the terminology of the *Elementatio*, because William of Moerbeke used *derivo* to render the Greek χορηγέω – thus, proposition 18 reads: “omne derivans esse aliis ipsum prime est hoc, quod tradit recipientibus derivationem”. Berthold links Ulrich's (and, by extension, Albert's) theory of *fluxus* with Proclus' text, but also, simultaneously, to the Eriugenian doctrine of theophany. Even if their modes of causation differ, both the action of the *prime unum* and that of the *unitates* are some kind of *derivatio*.⁵¹ Because of this, and based on the way Berthold edits his materials, we can say that, within the *Expositio*, the Eriugenian doctrine of *theophania* is equivalent to the doctrine of the *Liber*'s first Proposition on the *virtus* of the first cause. Berthold himself suggests this equivalency, since to explain Proposition 18 he cites the following text from the *Clavis physicae*:

48 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4. Tractatus 1–2,7*, ed. S. Pieperhoff (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), lib. iv, tr. 1, c. 5, §8, p. 30, l. 88–90.

49 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. iv, tr. 1, c. 5, §8, p. 30, l. 88–90.

50 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18C, p. 51, l. 273–275.

51 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18F, p. 55, l. 411–416: [...] *omne derivans esse aliis est prime hoc, quod tradit. Cum enim sit fontale seu primordiale principium, et hoc sive simpliciter et absolute sive respectu determinatae maneriei entium, et sit causa sive superessentialis sive essentialis omnium sub universalitate intentionis suae contentorum, necessarium est ipsum absolutius et eminentius esse omnibus suis effectibus et esse fontaliter et originaliter hoc, quod tradit.*

'Nihil ergo est participatio nisi ex superiori essentia secundae post eam essentiae **derivatio** et ab ea, quae primum habet esse, secundae, ut sit, distributio. Sicut ex fonte totum flumen principaliter manat et per eius alveum aqua, quae primum surgit in fonte, in quantamcumque longitudinem protendatur, semper ac sine ulla intermissione diffunditur, sic divina bonitas et essentia et vita et sapientia et omnia, quae in fonte omnium sunt, primo in primordiales causas defluunt et eas esse faciunt, deinde per primordiales causas in earum effectus ineffabili modo per convenientes sibi universitatis ordines decurrunt per superiora semper ad inferiora profluentia iterumque per secretissimos naturae poros occultissimo meatu ad fontem suum redeunt. Inde enim omne bonum, omnis essentia, omnis vita, omnis sensus, omnis ratio, omnis sapientia, omne genus, omnis species, omnis plenitudo, omnis ordo, omnis unitas, omnis aequalitas, omnis differentia, omne tempus, omnis locus et omne, quod est, et omne, quod non est, et omne, quod intelligitur, et omne, quod sentitur, et omne, quod superat sensum et intellectum'. Haec Theodorus.⁵²

In a certain way, the *prime unum* has an immediate relation with every effect in every sense, precisely because all the subordinate causes act *in sua virtute* – or, in Eriugenian terms, because God is not only the beginning and end of all things but is also the *medium*, for he flows through everything. The *prime unum* can claim the authorship of the causal operation of every subordinate cause, just like the artificer is responsible for what the instrument does. In fact, in several places, Berthold speaks of the *unitates* or *causae primordiales* as an instrument. He affirms, for example, that:

52 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18B, p. 47, 107–122, citing Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, c. 126–127, p. 93, l. 7–p. 94, l. 7. The last part (not identified as such by the editor) is quoted once again in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 119B, p. 84, l. 45–57: *Gaudium ergo etc., quia omne gaudium, quod est diffusio rei, in conceptione boni est. Si vero est a summo bono et potissimo est, potissimum autem est in ratione omnium causalium rationum omnis seyræ sive ordinis totorum et, sicut dictum est, ambit omne bonum. 'Inde enim est omne bonum, omnis essentia, omnis vita', omne intellectus, 'omne genus, omnis species, omnis plenitudo, omnis ordo, omnis unitas, omnis aequalitas, omnis differentia' 'et omne, quod est, et omne, quod non est, et omne, quod intelligitur, et omne, quod sentitur, et omne, quod superat sensum et intellectum'. Sic ergo gaudium veritatis, non vanitatis, omnis essentiae est sua vita, quam habet a bono et uno. Et quia omnis vita stat in unione sicut et mors in separatione, necessarium est, quod omnis vita est ab unitate. Haec quidem enim est ab interiori indivisione. Quanto igitur aliquid est magis unum, magis vivit, ergo, quod est sua unitas, est summa vita. Cum itaque bonum prime sit simpliciter sine omni divisione, ipsum erit infinitas virtutum, qua nihil potest melius cogitari.*

omnis unitas constituit cum prime uno determinatam maneriem boni compositi cooperatrix et instrumentum ipsius prime unius simpliciter omnia producentis.⁵³

Similarly, we read that:

omne inferius est quasi instrumentum superioris causae, quanto enim aliquid est altius, tanto intimius ingreditur in effectum, et per consequens inferius non propria virtute, sed magis virtute principalis agentis pertingit ad effectum.⁵⁴

This allows Berthold to say that the *prime unum* not only creates, but even determines its effects in and through the *unitates* or *causae primordiales*: “the *prime deus* determines his own causality in and through them, using them like an instrument of his own operation.”⁵⁵ The absolute God brings order to everything, even if *per medias causas*, as it is said in the following text:

Prime autem Deus [...] existens causa simpliciter omnium omnia ordinat per se ipsum, licet **per causas medias**, in quibus et cum quibus operatur per 57, exequatur. Et in ipsa executione quodammodo immediate se habet ad omnes effectus, inquantum omnes **causae mediae** sibi subordinatae agunt in sua virtute, ut quodammodo ipsum primum in omnibus agere videatur et omnia opera secundarum causarum ei possunt attribui eminentius per 56, sicut artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti. Item etiam habet se immediate ad omnes res, inquantum ipsum solum per se est causa boni sive secundum essentiam sive secundum participationem. Item, quia omnia ab ipso conservantur seu continentur in sua existentia.⁵⁶

53 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 137F, p. 22, l. 243–245.

54 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 75A, p. 59, l. 16–18.

55 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 176C, p. 164, l. 211–212.

56 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 142B, p. 55, l. 83–94. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 103F, p. 225, l. 103–p. 226, l. 108: [...] *ergo prime bonum est causa immediata non solum creationis et conservationis rerum, sed etiam cuiuslibet operis creaturae, et cum hoc etiam est causa mediata, quia illa una numero operatio causatur a natura creata operante virtute prime causae, qualiter prime bonum est eius causa mediata, sicut efficiens per instrumentum, et nihilominus ipsa operatio causatur a prime bono per se operante, qualiter ipsum est causa immediata. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 103F, p. 226, l. 125–134: [...] dupliciter dicitur aliquid operari per aliud sive mediante alio. Uno modo sicut mediante instrumento cooperante, et sic tam prime bonum quam etiam primordiales causae immediate operantur quaelibet suo modo, inquantum sua praesentia sunt in effectibus, ut iam dictum est; unde sic operans est principale, et medium est secundarium. Alio modo operator aliquid*

Several times in his paraphrase of the *De causis*, Albert the Great employs the example of the artificer and the instrument through which he accomplishes his work. The *forma* in the mind of the artificer preserves its essential identity all through the process of production – flowing from the mind to the *spiritus*, from it to the *organa membrorum*, and then to the *instrumenta*, to flow finally into the *materia exterioris*. It flows through all these instances without losing its identity; only its mode of being changes.⁵⁷ However, the point Albert is trying to make regards the identity maintained throughout the causal process, not the problem of immediacy or mediation. At this stage of my research, it seems to me that, whenever Berthold speaks of the primordial causes as instruments, he rather has in mind a distinction made by Aquinas in his commentary on the first proposition of the *Liber*. There Thomas says that a series of causes can be ordered (*ordinari*) in either of two ways: *per se* or *per accidens*.

Per se quidem quando intentio primae causae respicit usque ad ultimum effectum **per omnes medias causas**, sicut cum ars fabrilis movet manum, manus martellum qui ferrum percussura extendit, ad quod fertur intentio artis. Per accidens autem quando intentio causae non procedit nisi ad proximum effectum; quod autem ab illo effectui efficiatur iterum aliud, est praeter intentionem primi efficientis, sicut cum aliquis accendit candela, praeter intentionem eius est quod iterum accensa candela accendat aliam et illa aliam; quod autem praeter intentionem est, dicimus esse per accidens. In causis igitur per se ordinatis haec propositio habet veritatem, in quibus causa prima movet **omnes causas medias** ad effectum; in causis autem ordinatis per accidens est e converso, nam effectus qui per se producit a causa proxima, per accidens producit a causa prima, praeter intentionem eius existens. Quod autem est per se potius est eo quod est per accidens, et propter hoc signanter dicit: causa universalis, quae est causa per se.⁵⁸

per aliud, scilicet mediante virtute alterius, et sic in quolibet ordine causarum sola prima causa est causa immediata, quia propria virtute causat et non per alicuius alterius virtutem sibi communicatam per 99 et 100, et omnes sequentes causae sunt causae mediatæ causantes mediante virtute causae primae ab eis omnibus participata.

57 Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. 1, tr. 4, c. 6, p. 50, l. 2–11: *Et forma, qua fluit primum, magis et magis determinatur et coarctatur, secundum quod fluit in secundo vel tertio vel deinceps. Sicut in exemplo diximus de arte, quae a mente artificis fluit in spiritum, de spiritu in organa membrorum, de organis in instrumenta et de instrumentis in materiam exteriorem. In omnibus enim his idem est quod fluit, licet secundum aliud esse sit in primo, et secundum aliud in secundo et secundum aliud in tertio et sic deinceps.*

58 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 1, p. 9, l. 29–p. 10, l. 15.

In fact, it seems possible that Berthold often has this text in mind while commenting on other topics of the *Elementatio*. In two places (commenting on Propositions 129 and 201), for example, he has recourse to the distinction between *per se* and *per accidens* regarding the concepts of part and whole.⁵⁹ And while dealing with the content of Proposition 199, he observes: “Artifex enim, puta faber, nec esse nec actum artis habet a martello, sed tamen per martellum inducit formam artis in materiam artificiatam”.⁶⁰ My sense is that in those passages Berthold is following Aquinas’ observations.⁶¹ I would not consider this a citation of Aquinas, but rather a utilization of a certain line of thought or, better, a genuine appropriation by Berthold – something, perhaps, even more important than a citation. However, be that as it may, it is certain that Berthold cites at least one text by Aquinas to deal with the articulation of the causation of the *prime unum* and the *unitates*.

The commentary on Proposition 137 of the *Elementatio* shows “omnem unitatem productam in producendo praesupponere causalitatem prime unius, cui cooperatur in suum causatum constituendo”. In the second point of the *propositum*, Berthold refers to “primarii in omnibus secundariis operationem et nihilominus secundariorum primario comparationem”. To this end, he brings in a passage from Aquinas’ *Contra errores Graecorum*:

59 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129F, p. 181, l. 259–270: *Qualiter autem divinae animae deificentur per suspensionem earum ad proprios intellectus, considerandum. Et ut exemplariter educatur, sciendum, quod intellectus substantialis in anima partiali habet modum partis, pars autem, quia habet quodammodo modum substantiae completae, potest agere vel pati. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo per modum instrumenti, et sic agere et pati convenit toti per se, parti autem per accidens, ut si dicatur: ‘oculus videt’. Alio modo potest intelligi aliqua pars totius agere vel pati per se. Et hoc dupliciter: uno modo, ut tantum ipsa pars agat vel patiatur, ita videlicet, quod talis actio et passio partis non communicetur toti. Et secundum hoc convenit agere et pati toti per accidens et parti per se. Alio modo, ut talis actio et passio partis communicetur toti, et tunc primo et per se convenit talis actio vel passio parti, per se autem, sed non primo modo, convenit ipsi toti. See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 201E, p. 178, l. 196–204: [...] *pars dicitur operari dupliciter: uno modo per modum instrumenti – et sic operari convenit toti per se, parti vero per accidens, sicut visio est oculi sicut instrumenti et per accidens, hominis autem per se –, alio modo intelligitur pars operari per se, et hoc dupliciter: uno modo, ut tantum ipsa pars agat sive operetur, ita videlicet, ut talis operatio non communicetur toti, et sic ipsa operatio convenit parti per se, toti vero per accidens, sicut manus in frigidans aliquid, cui apponitur; alio modo, ut talis operatio partis communicetur toti, et tunc primo et per se convenit talis operatio parti, per se autem, sed non primo convenit ipsi toti.**

60 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 199D, p. 159, l. 254–267.

61 Moreover, for Aquinas, an instrumental cause cannot create, it can only inform (or determine). See J.-L. Solère, “Duns Scotus versus Thomas Aquinas on Instrumental Causality”, in *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy* 7(2019), p. 147–185, at p. 158. This is exactly the case for the *unitates* in Berthold’s *Expositio*.

Thomas Aquinas, *Contra errores Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio Graecorum*

... **sciendum**, quod aliquid dicitur cooperari alicui dupliciter. Uno modo, quia operatur ad eundem effectum, sed per aliam virtutem; **sicut minister cooperatur domino, dum eius praeceptis obedit, et instrumentum artificis, a quo movetur.**

Alio modo dicitur aliquid cooperari alicui, inquantum operatur eandem operationem cum ipso: sicut si diceretur de duobus **portantibus aliquod pondus, vel de pluribus trahentibus navem**, quod unus alteri cooperetur.

Secundum ergo primum modum creatura potest dici creatori cooperari quantum ad aliquos effectus, qui fiunt mediante creatura ...⁶²

[...] licet prime unum solum perfecte operetur in omnibus, tamen per hoc non excludit subordinata sibi principia activa rerum constitutiva, quorum nulum aspirat ad puritatem actionis cum prime uno, cum omnis causa et ante causatum operetur et cum ipso et post ipsum plurimum sit substitutiva per 57. **Unde notandum**, quod aliquid dicitur alicui cooperari dupliciter. Uno modo, quia operatur ad effectum eundem, sed per aliam virtutem. **Et hoc est dupliciter, vel inquantum superius operatur ad effectum inferioris virtute eminentiori, et sic prime unum cooperatur omnibus nec actio eius excluditur in cuiuscumque operantis operatione vel inquantum inferius per virtutem, quam habet a superiori, cooperatur ipsi superiori, et sic divinissimum operum est esse cooperatorem Dei secundum Dionysium.** Alio modo dicitur aliquid cooperari alicui, inquantum operatur eandem operationem cum ipso, sicut si diceretur de duobus **trahentibus navim**, quod unus alteri cooperetur, **et sic nulla creatura cuiuscumque eminentiae cooperatur prime uni, sed solum** secundum primum modum creatura dicitur cooperari prime uni quantum ad illos effectus, qui fiunt mediante creatura.⁶³

62 Thomas Aquinas, *Contra errores Graecorum*, ed. Commissio Leonina, vol. 40A (Roma: Santa Sabina, 1967), pars I, c. 23, p. 84, l. 11–23.

63 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 137E, p. 21, l. 212–p. 22, l. 226.

According to Aquinas, a creature can cooperate with God only if it does so with regard to the same effect but through another *virtus*. Berthold copies the passage but makes a further distinction. He adds that cooperation can happen in two ways: either (a) when something superior cooperates *virtute eminentiori* with something inferior, or (b) when something inferior cooperates with something superior. In the first case (a), the *prime unum* can be said to cooperate with everything – “nec actio eius excluditur in cuiuscumque operantis operatione”. In the second case (b), the inferior cooperates with the superior through the *virtus* conferred upon it by the superior.

Berthold expands Aquinas's distinction by making room for the affirmation that the absolute One can cooperate with the *unitates*. Interestingly, he does not retain the example of the artificer and his instrument. Instead, he indicates that the *unitates* cooperate with the absolute One through the *virtus* the One itself gave them. In this regard, he is consistent with the idea expressed elsewhere in the *Expositio*: the *unitates* are used by the One as an instrument. The additions made by Berthold redefine or even correct the idea expressed by Aquinas. For Berthold focuses on an expression used by Aquinas, namely, *per aliam virtutem*, and he warns us that such a *virtus* is not exactly *alia*. The One grants the *unitates* their *virtus agendi*.⁶⁴

64 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 75A, p. 58, l. 13–18: *Item sciendum, quod in essentialiter ordinatis priora et ex hoc causaliora agunt in submissis, tum quia dant eis esse et virtutem agendi, tum quia datam conservant, tum quia applicant virtutes secundorum ad agendum, tum etiam quia omne inferius est quasi instrumentum superioris causae, quanto enim aliquid est altius, tanto intimius ingreditur in effectum, et per consequens inferius non propria virtute, sed magis virtute principalis agentis pertingit ad effectum*. See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 57F, p. 153, l. 180–188: *Et quia omne, quod a secundis seu causatis producitur, eminentius producitur a prime causa per praemissis, necessarium est etiam prime bonum operari cum omni et in omni suo causato, si tale causatum fuerit etiam causa, tum quia causaliora agunt in submissis, ut dictum est, tum quia dant eis et quod sunt et per consequens agendi virtutem, tum quia datam virtutem conservant, tum quia applicant virtutes secundorum ad agendum, tum etiam quia omne inferius est quasi instrumentum superioris, quia, quanto agens est altius et actualius, tanto intimius ingreditur in effectum. Instrumentum autem non propria virtute, sed virtute principalis agentis pertingit ad effectum ipsius agentis*. It is worth noting that the verb *aplico* appears also in Aquinas' treatments of instrumental causality. See Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7: *sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum*; id., *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. III, c. 67: *quicquid applicat virtutem activam ad agendum, dicitur esse causa illius actionis: artifex enim applicans virtutem rei naturalis ad aliquam actionem, dicitur esse causa illius actionis, sicut coquus decoctionis, quae est per ignem. Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad operationem est principaliter et primo a Deo. Applicantur enim virtutes operativae ad proprias operationes per aliquem motum vel corporis, vel animae. Primum autem principium utriusque motus est Deus. Est enim primum*

One cannot but help noting a certain friction between the idea of the self-constitution of the *unitates*, their metaphysical excellence, and their being reduced to mere instruments of the action of the *prime unum*. One can say, with Eugenia Paschetto, that “per Bertoldo solo la causa prima e veramente tale: le altre al contrario non sono che mezzi attraverso cui si esplica, sotto altre forme, l'azione della causa prima; tanto e vero che Bertoldo alluderà ad esse come *instrumenta nature*”.⁶⁵

5 Concluding Remarks

I have shown that Berthold used at least two texts by Aquinas to address two important issues regarding the presentation of Proclus' gods: their simple self-constituted nature, and their mode of causation and its relation to the creative causality of the One. I also suggested that he may have relied as well on yet another text by Aquinas, which helped him to define the role played by the *unitates* in the process of determination of the *tantum unum*, which is the product of creation: they do not create, they determine, and, in doing so, they cooperate with the absolute One like an instrument cooperates with an artificer. In this sense, Berthold can say the One creates and *determinat suam causalitatem*.

Thirty-seven years ago, in order to draw a clear line between the teachings of Aquinas and Berthold, Kurt Flasch pointed out that for Thomas admitting *creaturas per se subsistentes* would be a blasphemy.⁶⁶ I think the relation between Berthold and Aquinas might be more complex than this.

Furthermore, there are other aspects of Aquinas' influence in the *Expositio*, which I have not focused on. For example, there is a passage from Aquinas' commentary on Dionysius quoted in the *Expositio*, in which Aquinas explains how angels participate in intellectual light. Berthold uses it to show that what happens in the case of the angels (which come immediately after the Creator according to the order of voluntary providence) happens *a fortiori* in the case

movens omnino immobile, ut supra ostensum est. I take these references from Solère, “Duns Scotus versus Thomas Aquinas”, p. 157, n. 20, and p. 162.

65 E. Paschetto, “L'*Elementatio theologica* di Proclo e il commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg. Alcuni aspetti della nozione de causa”, in *Filosofia* 27(1976), p. 353–378, at p. 367.

66 K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, p. xvii–xviii: “Das Autarke ist nach Berthold per se subsistens (Expos. prop. 9E Pagnoni-Sturlese 173,240; vgl. prop. 3B Sturlese 94,74–75: *creaturae per se subsistentes!*), was, auf Geschaffenes bezogen, im Sinne der thomistischen Terminologie eine Blasphemie wäre, bei Berthold aber die Transzendenz des höchsten Gutes nicht antastet, gleichwohl einen Wertzuwachs kreatürlicher Instanzen zum Ausdruck bringt.”

of the *unitates* (which immediately follow the *prime unum* according to the order of natural providence).⁶⁷

Another interesting case concerns a passage from Aquinas' *Expositio*, which Berthold uses at least twice. On Proposition XXIII(XXIV) of the *Liber de causis* ("causa prima existit in rebus omnibus secundum dispositionem unam"), Aquinas explains that divine action is double: God creates and God governs creation. In the first case, God is the efficient cause of all diversity. Otherwise, there would be things not created by God. But in the second case, diversity arises entirely from the recipients, not from God. Berthold endorses this statement in 142B, and he has recourse to it once again in 149A. In 149A, he points out that certain people (who can certainly be identified with Eriugenians, including Dionysius and the author of the *Clavis physicae*) would not agree with this distinction: they would argue that diversity arises from the recipients in both governance and creation.⁶⁸ This view holds that creation, understood as *participatio unius*, does not require a pre-existing *participans*, whereas all subsequent participation (*informatio* or *determinatio*) does imply a pre-existing *participans*.

If not in quantitative terms, I would say that Aquinas deserves more of our attention as a source of the *Expositio*. In any case, we can confirm, with Dragos Calma, the enduring relevance of Thomas Aquinas, and his *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, with respect to "the medieval understanding of Greek Neoplatonism".⁶⁹

67 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 156A, p. 169, l. 12–p. 170, l. 52. We can also think of 111C. There Berthold cites Aquinas once on the way the different orders of intellects participate in God and he even adopts Aquinas' reading of Dionysius. These are just examples to show that Berthold knew his Aquinas, and especially the *Super Librum de causis Expositio*. In fact, as Evan King pointed out to me, further research would likely reveal that Berthold often made recourse to Aquinas' commentary to glean what he could from the Angelic Doctor's remarks on Proclus' propositions.

68 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 24, p. 122, l. 13–p. 123, l. 4. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 142B, p. 55, l. 104–p. 56, l. 116, and 149A, p. 112, l. 40–44.

69 D. Calma, "The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism. Considerations on a Recently Discovered Corpus of Texts", in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. Vol. 1 New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250–1350)*, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 11–41, at p. 11. Also, on the basis of what has been said, we may think about Aquinas himself, and consider a suggestion recently made by Scarpelli Cory, "*Reditio completa, reditio incompleta*", p. 192: "for Aquinas, the translation of Proclus's *Elements* provided indisputable confirmation of a long-dawning intuition: namely, that the various principles of his (Aquinas's) own unified philosophical system might actually be rooted in different metaphysical traditions that he had originally conceived as fundamentally in tension with each other." Cf. L. Sturlese, "Homo divino (Il commento a Proclo di Bertoldo di Moosburg)", in L. Sturlese, *Eckhart, Tauler, Suso. Filosofi e mistici nella Germania medievale* (Firenze: Le

Bibliography

Primary Sources

- Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, ed. P. Simon, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1972.
- Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. Libri I, pars I, quaestiones 1–50A*, ed. D. Siedler, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1978.
- Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, ed. W. Fauser, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1993.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, eds. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese, Hamburg, Meiner, 1984.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds. L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch, Hamburg, Meiner, 1986.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 35–65*, ed. A. Sannino, Hamburg, Meiner, 2001.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero, Hamburg, Meiner, 2003.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–135*, ed. F. Retucci, Hamburg, Meiner, 2011.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci, Hamburg, Meiner, 2007.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183*, eds. U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz, Hamburg, Meiner, 2003.
- Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184–211*, ed. L. Sturlese, Hamburg, Meiner, 2014.
- Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, ed. P. Lucentini, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974.
- Liber de causis*, ed. A. Pattin, in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28(1966), p. 90–203.
- Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E.R. Dodds, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971².
- Proclus, *Elementatio theologica, translata a Guillelmo de Moerbecca*, ed. H. Boese, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1987.
- Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, ed. C. Pera, Torino / Roma, Marietti, 1950.

Lettere, 2010), p. 237–257, at p. 249; and R. Imbach, “Au-delà de la métaphysique. Notule sur l’importance du *Commentaire* de Berthold de Moosburg ou sur les *Éléments de théologie*”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2019), p. 376–393, at p. 389.

- Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, in *Quaestiones disputatae*, eds P. Bazzi et al., vol. 2, Torino / Roma, Marietti, 1965.
- Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, ed. Leonina, vols 13–15, Rome, Typis Riccardi Garroni, 1918–1930.
- Thomas Aquinas, *Contra errores Graecorum*, ed. Leonina, vol. 40A, Roma, Santa Sabina, 1967.
- Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, ed. H.D. Saffrey, Paris, Vrin, 2002.
- Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4. Tractatus 1–2,7*, ed. S. Pieperhoff, Hamburg, Meiner, 1987.

Secondary Sources

- Calma, D., “The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism. Considerations on a Recently Discovered Corpus of Texts”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages*, vol. 1, Turnhout, Brepols, 2016, p. 11–41.
- De Libera, A., “Albert le Grand et Thomas d’Aquin interprètes du *Liber de causis*”, in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 74(1990), p. 347–78.
- Flasch, K., “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese, Hamburg, Meiner, 1984, p. xi–xxxviii.
- Führer, M., Gersh, S., “Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg”, in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 299–317.
- Gersh, S., “Remarks on the Method and Content of the *Clavis physicae*”, in W. Beierwaltes (ed.), *Eriugena redivivus*, Heidelberg, Winter, 1987, p. 162–173.
- Gersh, S., “Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, Berlin / New York, De Gruyter, 2001, p. 493–503.
- Imbach, R., “Le (néo-)platonisme medieval. Proclus latin et l’école dominicaine allemande”, in *Revue de théologie et philosophie* 110(1978), p. 427–448.
- Imbach, R., “Au-delà de la métaphysique. Notule sur l’importance du *Commentaire* de Berthold de Moosburg OP sur les *Éléments de théologie*”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates*, Leiden / Boston, Brill, 2019, p. 376–393.
- King, E., “Supersapientia. A Study of the *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli of Berthold von Moosburg*”, PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 2016.
- Ludueña, E., *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia*, Saarbrücken, Publicia, 2013.
- Ludueña, E., “Eriúgena en el siglo XIV. Su presencia en la *Expositio* de Bertoldo de Moosburg”, in *Scintilla* 10(2013), p. 99–154.

- Paschetto, E., “L’*Elementatio theologica* di Proclo e il commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg. Alcuni aspetti della nozione de causa”, in *Filosofia* 27(1976), p. 353–378.
- Scarpelli Cory, Th., “*Reditio completa, reditio incompleta*. Aquinas and the *Liber de causis*, prop. 15, on Reflexivity and Incorporeality”, in A. Fidora, N. Polloni (eds), *Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism. Philosophical and Theological Exchanges between the Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Intellectual Traditions*, Barcelona / Roma, Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2017, p. 185–229.
- Solère, J.-L., “Duns Scotus versus Thomas Aquinas on Instrumental Causality”, in *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy* 7(2019), p. 147–185.
- Sturlese, L., “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci, Hamburg, Meiner, 2007, p. ix–xv.
- Sturlese, L., “Homo divino (Il commento a Proclo di Bertoldo di Moosburg)”, in L. Sturlese, *Eckhart, Tauler, Suso. Filosofi e mistici nella Germania medievale*, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2010, p. 237–257.