Berthold of Moosburg, Reader of Ulrich of Strassburg. On Natural Providence

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The present article focuses on the concept of “natural providence” in the *Expositio* of Berthold of Moosburg, stressing the role of Ulrich of Strassburg’s *De summo bono* in the theoretical elaboration and textual drafting of Berthold’s work. Indeed, the question of natural providence was discussed by many Dominican masters of Cologne during the 13th and 14th centuries. Berthold was no exception, and he referred not only to Dietrich of Freiberg’s works, as most modern scholars claim, but he also made use of a large portion of Ulrich’s *De summo bono*.

To understand the aim of this article, it is appropriate first to give a preliminary survey of the *status quaestionis* of critical studies. Indeed, a brief history of the historiography of this issue can provide us with some clues as to how and why scholars have traditionally emphasised Berthold’s reception of Dietrich more than Ulrich.¹ As Kurt Flasch stressed in his introduction to the critical edition of Berthold’s *Expositio*,² at the beginning of the 20th century Grabmann³ and Krebs⁴ were the first to draw attention to Berthold’s philosophical work. Rightly, they considered the medieval theologian to be one of the most important authors of the “German Dominican School” established by Albert the Great in Cologne during the 13th century.⁵ They assumed Berthold

- 1 This paper will not address the influence of Dietrich of Freiberg’s works on the *Expositio* of Berthold of Moosburg because this subject has already received extensive study from other scholars.
- 2 K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. xi–xxxix.
- 3 Cf. M. Grabmann, “Studien über Ulrich von Strassburg”, in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 29(1905), p. 626.
- 4 Cf. E. Krebs, *Meister Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1906), p. 50, n. 2.
- 5 The *Studium* of Cologne was founded in 1248 by Albert the Great (cf. *Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, ed. B.M. Reichert, vol. 3 [Roma / Stuttgart: Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica, 1898], 1 rec., p. 41). For the specific characteristics of this

to be the most important disciple of Dietrich of Freiberg.⁶ Grabmann was also the first to understand the particular “philosophical features” of the Cologne authors. In his opinion, Albert’s intellectual heritage divided itself into two different schools: the first one, established in Paris, was characterised by an Aristotelian influence and set the trend for Thomas Aquinas and his followers; the second one, established in Cologne, was characterised by a certain fidelity to Neoplatonic metaphysics and was the trend followed by Ulrich of Strassburg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Meister Eckhart, and Berthold of Moosburg. Klibansky accepted and defended this historical interpretation.⁷ The Anglo-German scholar played a particularly important role in the discussion surrounding Berthold’s role in the history of Proclus’ reception during the Middle Ages. Klibansky found that in no other late-medieval school did Proclus have such prominence as he did in Cologne and, moreover, that it was within this tradition that Berthold reached the summit of the medieval reception of Proclus.⁸ Indeed, the primacy of the Byzantine philosopher for Berthold is made perfectly clear in the *Expositio tituli*, where Berthold lists the reasons that led him to write a commentary on Proclus. According to Berthold, the virtues of the ancient philosopher are the capacity to reorder Plato’s doctrines and the ability to understand the nature of the First Principle as far as possible for a man, that is, by exclusively using his natural intellect:

Excellentia namque eius et praepollentia ad alios Platonicos evidenter apparet in hoc, quod ipsius Platonis theoremata ordinavit in praesenti libro et ordinata subtilissime declaravit. [...] Item in hoc apparet excellentia eius, quod per triplicem motum, [...] scilicet circularem, rectum et

Dominican “School of Cologne”, cf. L. Sturlese, “Proclo ed Ermete in Germania da Alberto Magno a Bertoldo di Moosburg. Per una prospettiva di ricerca sulla cultura filosofica tedesca nel secolo delle sue origini (1250–1359)”, in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 22–33.

- 6 We do not have much biographical information on Berthold of Moosburg: he entered the Dominican Order and studied at Oxford in 1315; he was also a lector at Regensburg in 1327 and, after this period, he worked in Cologne between 1335 and 1361, where he probably wrote his *Expositio* on Proclus’ *Elementatio theologica*. For a general introduction to Berthold of Moosburg’s philosophy and for his personal and intellectual relationship with Dietrich of Freiberg, cf. A. de Libera, *Introduzione alla mistica renana* (Milano: Jaca Book, 1998), p. 239–326.
- 7 Cf. R. Klibansky, *Ein Proklosfund und seine Bedeutung* (*Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. 1928/29, 5. Abhandlung*) (Heidelberg: Winter, 1929).
- 8 Berthold’s *Expositio* is one of the few known medieval commentaries on Proclus’ *Elementatio*, and it is certainly the most famous; this fact also stresses its significance for the history of philosophy in general.

obliquum, ascendendo pervenit, quantum fuit possibile homini mortali ductu luminis naturalis intellectus, in notitiam summi boni.⁹

According to Berthold, Proclus' masterpiece should be considered a purely philosophical work in which the author proves his excellence in understanding the Truth through the exclusive use of his natural intellect ("Proclus namque philosophus fuit auctor istius libri, unus de excellentissimis Platonis discipulis. [...] Ipse enim omnes Platonis sectatores procul excellebat et in philosophia sic omnibus praepollebat").¹⁰

Other important developments of Berthold studies took place in 1974, with Sturlese's edition of the *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli 184–211. De animabus*,¹¹ and in the 1980s, thanks to the impressive project of the *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi* started by Kurt Flasch and scholars of the "Bochumer Schule". Thanks to this initiative, the editions of the Cologne masters became available to researchers. The edition of Dietrich was already partially available at that time, so it was included as an integral part in the *Corpus* and was completed in 1985.¹² The first work edited in the *Corpus* properly speaking was the volume containing the first 13 *propositiones* of Berthold's commentary in 1984.¹³ This work was followed by the edition of *propositiones* 14 to 34 of the *Expositio* in 1986.¹⁴ It was during the 1980s that scholars began to study Berthold's thought more closely and, moreover, it was during this period that Dietrich's philosophical influence began to be recognised in the *Expositio*. Meanwhile, Ulrich of Strassburg still was not published and only a few very specific sections of the *De summo bono* were available to scholars.¹⁵ Moreover, at that time Ulrich was considered an unoriginal

9 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli, Expositio tituli A*, p. 37–38, l. 25–34.

10 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Exp. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 10–15.

11 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super elementationem theologicam Procli 184–211. De animabus*, ed. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974).

12 Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie*, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977); Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 2. Schriften zur Metaphysik und Theologie*, eds R. Imbach et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980); Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, eds J.-D. Cavignoli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983); Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 4. Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1985).

13 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*.

14 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986).

15 S.J. Seelman, *Procession and Spiration in the Trinitarian Doctrine of the Summa de Bono of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Edited text and Analysis*, MA thesis (University of Saint Joseph, 1973);

author, without real theoretical relevance, whose only merit was his having summarised Albert the Great.¹⁶ I think that these elements help to explain why scholars did not explore the importance of Ulrich's *De summo bono* and particularly, for our purposes, its textual and theoretical influence on Berthold's *Expositio*. Therefore, beginning in the 1980s, it became the established historical and hermeneutical trend to consider Berthold's *Expositio* primarily in relation to Dietrich's works. This is clear in some important volumes of critical literature, such as Alain de Libera's remarkable book *Introduction à la mystique rhénane*:

[...] non è dunque sufficiente dire che la dottrina di Bertoldo è la stessa di quella di Teodorico, è quasi alla lettera che il freibergense è rispettato [...] il *Commento* a Proclo proposto da Bertoldo è anche, per non dire in primo luogo, una valorizzazione delle dottrine più caratteristiche del pensiero di Teodorico di Freiberg [...] È inutile insistere di più, la noetica di Bertoldo è quella di Teodorico di Freiberg.¹⁷

S.J. Seleman., *Law and Justice in the Philosophical Doctrine of Ulrich of Strasbourg*. Edited text and Philosophical Study, PhD diss. (Fordham University, 1979); W.J. O'Callaghan, *The Constitution of Created Composite Being in Liber de summo bono (Book IV, Tract. II, 1–8), of Ulrich of Strasbourg*, O.P. Philosophical Study and Text, PhD diss. (Marquette University, 1970); F.J. Lescoe, *God as First Principle in Ulrich of Strasbourg*. Critical Text of Summa de Bono, IV, 1, Based on Hitherto Unpublished Mediaeval Manuscripts and philosophical study (New York: Alba House, 1979); L.B. Geoghegan, *Divine Generation, Its Nature and Limits, in the Summa de Bono of Ulrich of Strasbourg*. Philosophical Study and Text, MA thesis (University of Saint Joseph, 1974); C.J. Fagin, *The Doctrine of Divine Ideas in the Summa de Bono of Ulrich of Strasbourg*. Text and Philosophical Study, PhD diss. (University of Toronto, 1948); J. Daguillon, *Ulrich de Strasbourg, O.P., La Summa de bono, Livre I. Introduction et édition critique* (Paris: Vrin, 1930); J. Daguillon, "Ulrich de Strasbourg, prédicateur. Un sermon inedit du XIII^e siècle", in *La vie spirituelle* 27(1927), p. 84–98; F. Collingwood, *The Theory of Being in Summa de Bono, (Book II) of Ulrich of Strasbourg*. Philosophical Study and Text, PhD diss. (University of Toronto, 1952).

- 16 Cf. B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la philosophie scholastique* (Paris: Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, 1880), part II, vol. 2, p. 42; M. Grabmann, "Studien über Ulrich von Straßburg", in M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik* (München: Hueber, 1926), vol. 1, p. 147–221; G. Théry, "Originalité du plan de la *Summa de bono* d'Ulrich de Strasbourg", in *Revue thomiste* 27(1922), p. 376–397.
- 17 A. de Libera, *Introduzione alla mistica renana*, p. 258. Cf. also K. Flasch, "Einleitung", p. xi–xxxix; L. Sturlese, "*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds von Moosburg und die Probleme der nacheckhartschen Zeit", in K. Ruh (ed.), *Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), p. 145–161.

It was at the end of the 1980s that Book I of *De summo bono*, a part of Book II, and a part of Book IV become available in the *Corpus*.¹⁸ The edition of Ulrich's work was interrupted for fifteen years and it began again approximately twenty years ago with the publications of Palazzo, Beccarisi, Retucci, Sannino, and other scholars.¹⁹ The completion of the edition of *De summo bono* and the recent publication of some contributions which rediscovered Ulrich's philosophical relevance are opening up a new approach that stresses his theoretical prominence and his key role in the Dominican School of Cologne.²⁰ I would like to include my paper in this newer wave of scholarship, taking into account the fundamental question of natural providence in Berthold's *Expositio*.²¹

- 18 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 1*, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 1–4*, ed. A. de Libera (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 1–2,7*, ed. S. Pieperhoff (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987).
- 19 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 1–3*, ed. S. Tuzzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2004); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 3*, ed. A. Palazzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2005); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6*, ed. A. Beccarisi (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 4–5*, ed. S. Tuzzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 2,15–24*, eds B. Mojsisch, F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 6, Tractatus 1–3,6*, ed. S. Tuzzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 2,8–14*, ed. A. Palazzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2012); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 6, Tractatus 3,7–29*, ed. S. Ciancio (Hamburg: Meiner, 2015); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 6, Tractatus 4,1–15*, eds I. Zavattero, C. Colomba (Hamburg: Meiner, 2017).
- 20 Cf. A. Beccarisi, "La scientia divina dei filosofi nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Rivista di storia della filosofia* 61(2006), p. 137–63; A. Palazzo, "La sapientia nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Quaestio* 5(2005), p. 495–512; A. Palazzo, "Ulrico di Strasburgo, un maestro nel citare. Nuove evidenze del ricorso alle opere di Alberto il Grande in *De Summo Bono* IV, 2, 8–14", in F. Meroi (ed.), *Le parole del pensiero. Studi offerti a Nestore Pirillo* (Pisa: ETS, 2013), p. 49–75; B. Faes de Mottoni, "La distinzione tra causa agente e causa motrice nella *Summa de summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Studi medievali* 20(1979), p. 313–355; B. Mojsisch, A. de Libera, "Einleitung", in Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 1*, p. ix–xxviii; L. Malovini, "Noetica e teologia dell'immagine nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica* 90(1998), p. 28–50; C. Trottmann, "La théologie des théologiens et celle des philosophes", in *Revue thomiste* 98(1998), p. 531–561; A. de Libera, "Ulrich de Strasbourg, lecteur d'Albert le Grand", in R. Imbach, C. Flüeler (eds.), *Albert der Grosse und die deutsche Dominikanerschule* (Fribourg: Universitätsverlag, 1985), p. 105–136.
- 21 For a general introduction to the main topics of *Expositio* and for Berthold's methodological approach, cf. G.L. Potestà, "Per laboriosam investigationem ascendendo. L'edizione di Bertoldo di Moosburg", in *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 76/4(1984), p. 637–643. For a detailed study of Berthold's work and philosophy, cf. E. King, *Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli of Berthold von Moosburg*, PhD

According to the Dominican theologian, as he writes in the *Prologus*, Proclus' *Elementatio* explicitly deals with the *invisibilia Dei* according to the order of natural providence:

Ista sunt invisibilia Dei transitive accepta, de quibus in ista elementatione theologica subtilissime pertractatur, quantum pertinet ad providentiam naturalem.²²

The question concerning the *invisibilia Dei* (the divine ideas), can be examined in two different ways according to Berthold: *intransitive* and *transitive*.²³ The first one considers the eternal and immutable reasons (the *exemplaria*) existing in God and in the divine Word in their absoluteness; the second one considers the same reasons as models of all things in the cosmos. According to the *transitive* way, the divine ideas have the necessary function of explaining and making possible the passage from God to the world, that is, from the principle that pre-contains in itself the reasons of all things to the effects and individual entities. In Berthold's *Expositio* these *invisibilia Dei* are considered in their *transitive* way only – in relation to the world and according to their productive and regulative functions. Furthermore, this *transitive* way is considered exclusively *quantum pertinet ad providentiam naturalem*. The point of view of natural providence considers the world according to its causal relations; this kind of knowledge is a philosophical one and it is only attainable by assiduous study (*per laboriosam investigationem*):

Verum, quod per motum obliquum, qui proprius erat philosophorum et erat per laboriosam investigationem primi omnium existentium principii dividendo, definiendo, communibus principiis utendo, a notis ad ignota per ratiocinationem progrediendo, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia ascendendo et inter intelligibilia ab uno in aliud tendendo, quousque ad simpliciter ultimum perveniatur, ascenderit ipse Proclus in summi boni notitiam, apparet in praesenti libro, ubi in excelsum maximum ascendit per operum conditionem, conditorum gubernationem et contrariorum conciliationem.²⁴

diss. (University of Cambridge, 2016); E. King, "Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the One of the Soul", in *Dionysius* 36(2018), p. 184–199.

²² Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prologus* 5, p. 13, l. 264–266.

²³ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 2–7, p. 7, l. 77–p. 14, l. 292. See also Potestà, "Per laboriosam investigationem ascendendo", p. 640.

²⁴ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Exp. tit. D*, p. 40, l. 110–117.

In Berthold's *Expositio* the choice to deal with the *invisibilia Dei* according to the order of natural providence places Proclus among the "philosophers" and not among the "theologians". In fact, according to Berthold, the choice of a particular "point of view", between natural providence or voluntary providence, is what distinguishes theologians from philosophers. It concerns the method, not the object of research nor the goals. Indeed, the theologians deal with the same God as the philosophers and with the same divine ideas, but according to the order of voluntary providence. This is confirmed in a text of the *Expositio* in which the author explains that Dionysius belongs to the ranks of the theologians:

Sed dices, quod Dionysius loquitur ut theologus, qui solum considerat processum rerum a Deo secundum ordinem providentiae voluntariae, et ideo aliter est de processu rerum a Deo secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, ubi proceditur ab uno in multitudinem ordinate, de quo loquuntur philosophi theologizantes sive theologi philosophantes.²⁵

Dionysius is a theologian and not a philosopher because he considers the *processum rerum* according to the order of voluntary providence, unlike the *philosophi theologizantes* or *theologi philosophantes* to whom Proclus belongs. A philosopher connects all things to the First Cause and considers the universe according to the causal necessary order. He never goes beyond this rationally determinable order. The theologian, instead, uses the Holy Scriptures and examines all things according to the divine will, which is teleological and eschatological. Ultimately, the philosopher studies the determination of the rational order that rules the cosmos; the theologian, instead, considers everything that exists in accordance with divine revelation.

The question of the two providences has an absolute priority in the *Expositio* and it is so important that it establishes whether an author belongs to the group of philosophers or to the ranks of theologians. The two providences, as well as philosophy and theology, are not to be understood in opposition, but in continuity. This is evident in the *Expositio* not only from a theoretical point of view, but also from the methodological one: Berthold always tries to find the affinities between Proclus' philosophical thought and Dionysius' theological thought.²⁶ In the study of Proclus' *Expositio*, Berthold normally uses

25 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 116, 104–108.

26 For the general agreement between Dionysius and Proclus in Berthold's *Expositio* and for the textual references, cf. I. Zavattero, "La figura e il pensiero di Proclo in Bertoldo di Moosburg", in *ARKETE. Rivista di studi filosofici* 1(2005), p. 51–67.

the Christian authority of Dionysius who certifies philosophy and ensures its veracity.

In terms of historiography, the topic of the difference between the two providences is traced back to Augustine²⁷ from whom Dietrich took it up. Scholars²⁸ think that Dietrich was the first to deepen this matter, which was later transmitted to his pupil Berthold. This is traced back to a very well-known passage by Dietrich taken from *De subiecto theologiae*:

Scientia enim divina philosophorum considerat universitatem entium secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, quo videlicet res stant in sui natura et secundum suos modos et proprietates naturales gubernantur per principem universitatis, nec ultra hunc naturae ordinem aliquem ulteriorem finem attendit. Nostra autem divina sanctorum scientia attenditur in entibus, secundum quod stant et disponuntur sub ordine voluntariae providentiae, in quo attenditur ratio meriti et praemii et ea, quae attenduntur circa bonam et sanctam vitam et adeptionem aeternae beatitudinis et perventionem ad finem ulteriorem sive in bono sive in malo etiam post terminum huius mundi, quando scientia divina sapientium huius mundi destruetur, I *Cor.*, 13.²⁹

Dietrich divides philosophy from theology in a stronger manner than Berthold. In Dietrich's opinion this division is not only methodological, but also concerns the objectives and areas of pertinence: unlike Berthold, Dietrich does not distinguish between the *philosophi theologizantes* or *theologi philosophantes*. According to this passage, *providentia voluntaria* refers to the *nostra divina sanctorum scientia*: it concerns the goals, the merits and rewards that man can gain through a good and holy life in his search for eternal bliss. On the other hand, *providentia naturalis* belongs to the *divina scientia philosophorum* and takes into account the universe as a result of certain natural principles that can be determined rationally. This natural providence does not consider higher

27 Cf. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*, ed. J. Zycha (Praha / Wien / Leipzig: Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 1894), VIII.9, p. 243, l. 25–p. 244, l. 20.

28 Cf. L. Sturlese, "Il *De animatione caeli* di Teodorico di Freiberg", in R. Creyten, P. Künzle (eds), *Xenia Medii Aevi Historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppli O.P.* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1978), p. 183–197; L. Sturlese, *Storia della filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo. Il secolo XIII* (Firenze: Olschki, 1996), p. 208–209. K. Flasch, "Einleitung", p. xxxi–xxxii.

29 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, eds J.-D. Caviglioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 3.9, p. 281, l. 100–p. 282, l. 109.

aims or eschatological values (“nec ultra hunc naturae ordinem aliquem ulteriorem finem attendit”); it guarantees only a stable, coherent, and rationally determinable order of entities and events:

Aliud autem genus entium, scilicet corpora caelestia, procedunt a Deo in ordine naturalis providentiae secundum dispositionem naturae et naturalium proprietatum et motionum entium naturalium, in quibus naturalem connexionem inveniri necesse est.³⁰

The philosopher’s point of view is to consider the cosmos as a *conexio naturalis* that links different entities arranged in separate ontological orders, at the top of which there is the First Principle. In the same way, for Berthold the *conexio naturalis* is a philosophical manner of considering the action of the *invisibilia Dei* in their *transitive* aspect, that is, in their efficient causation on the world. Natural providence guarantees the ontological order in the universe, its stability, its harmony, and its intelligibility.

I would now like to reconsider Dietrich’s paternity of the theorem of these two providences in the School of Cologne. I intend to prove that this doctrine is already present in Ulrich’s *De summo bono*. I will also try to stress that Ulrich already conceived natural providence as a *conexio naturalis* before Dietrich. Finally, I aim to show the textual and philosophical debts of the *Expositio* towards the *De summo bono* on the matter of natural providence. This will also give me the opportunity to consider some methodological issues and to analyse the general assessment of philosophy’s cognitive limits in the works of the two thinkers. Indeed, I think that Berthold found in Ulrich’s *De summo bono* an idea more similar to his own proposal about the status of philosophical knowledge and its limits, than in Dietrich of Freiberg; and this could explain why the *Expositio* uses a large part of Ulrich’s work.

Seeking Berthold’s sources is a challenge, since he does not make quotations easy to distinguish or textual references recognizable.³¹ The only place where philosophers and the theologians are cited as sources is at the beginning of the *Expositio*, in two lists entitled *philosophi famosi* and *doctores ecclesiae*.³²

30 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De animatione caeli*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3. *Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, 20.3, p. 30, l. 92–95.

31 Barbara Faes de Mottoni shares also this opinion. See B. Faes de Mottoni, “Il commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all’*Elementatio theologica* di Proclo. Edizione delle proposizioni riguardanti il tempo e l’eternità”, in *Studi medievali* 12(1971), p. 417–61.

32 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologica Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, p. 3–4. There are actually three explicit mentions of Dietrich of Freiberg in the *Expositio*: two in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologica*

Ulrich is counted among the *doctores ecclesiae*, as are Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, and Dietrich of Freiberg. Proclus, instead, is included among the *philosophi famosi*, as are Plato, Aristotle, and Hermes Trismegistus. As far as Ulrich of Strassburg is concerned, in my research I have found at least 32 propositions (out of the 211) of the *Expositio* that are connected to the *De summo bono*.³³ On a purely quantitative level, without taking into account specific theoretical aspects, as much as 15% of the *Expositio*'s *propositiones* is clearly influenced by Ulrich's *De summo bono*. Indeed, in these propositions, Berthold copies extensive parts of Ulrich's work. Moreover, these quotations faithfully follow the text of the *De summo bono* while often keeping the original text unchanged. This suggests that Berthold found in Ulrich's work convincing arguments that can be reused without the need for any change.

Proclus deals with the topic of providence in Proposition 120 ("Omnis deus in sua existentia totis habet providere et primitus providere in diis") and in those immediately following in his *Elementatio*. I will take into consideration all those propositions in which Berthold refers to natural providence and, at the same time, all propositions in which he uses Ulrich's *De summo bono*. I would like to prove how, using only this comparison with Ulrich, we can properly analyse the doctrine of natural providence in Berthold. Therefore, I will refer to Proposition 120, but also to Propositions 114 ("Omnis deus unitas est per se perfecta et omnis per se perfecta unitas est deus"), 121 ("Omne divinum essentiam quidem habet bonitatem, potentiam autem unialem et cognitionem occultam et incomprehensibilem omnibus simul secundis"), 141 ("Omnis providentia deorum haec quidem est exempta ab his, quibus providetur, haec autem coordinatae"), and 144 ("Omnia entia et omnes entium dispositiones intantum processerunt in quantum et deorum ordinationes").³⁴ Propositions 114, 120, and 141 correspond to two specific chapters of *De summo bono*, Book II, treatise 5: chapters 16 ("De providentia divina et de hoc nomine Deus, quod est nomen providentiae") and 18 ("De fato et de his, quae ad eius notitiam requiruntur, quae sunt casus et fortuna, contingens et occasio et frustra et vanum et

Procli. *Propositiones* 66–107, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 107A, p. 246, l. 11 and p. 247, l. 58–59; one in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones* 136–159, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 143O, p. 73, l. 455. There is also one explicit mention of Albert the Great in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones* 108–135, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), 118A, p. 76, l. 55.

33 I refer to Propositions 5, 11, 12, 18, 23, 29, 57, 59, 108, 112, 114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 134, 140, 141, 144, 145, 149, 155, 164, 184, 185, 188, 200, 201, and 203 of the *Expositio*.

34 The relevant passages from Ulrich's *De summo bono* and Berthold's *Expositio* are included at the end of this paper.

otiosum"). These two chapters deal with divine providence and its definition through an analysis that reports the authoritative opinions of Boethius, John of Damascus, Dionysius, and Augustine. Here Ulrich studies the concept of "fate" and the causal principle that governs the activity of fate in the world. The fifth treatise of Book II of *De summo bono* is devoted to God's intellectual perfection: *sapientia*, *mens*, *ratio*, *veritas*, and *fides*. Proposition 121 refers to chapter 17 ("De aliis tribus nominibus pertinentibus ad providentiam, in qua est de legibus aeternis") of the same treatise, where Ulrich takes into consideration the concepts of *dominus*, *rex*, and *sanctus*: three names that proclaim God's kingship on the world and his ordering power. Finally, Berthold analyses Proposition 144, taking parts of Ulrich's chapter 15 ("De dispositione, in quo est de vestigio"), again in the fifth treatise of Book II. This chapter refers to the book of Wisdom, chapter 8, *Disponit omnia suaviter*, and concerns the nature of God's governance of creation. Providence is defined as "cura de omnibus et de illius vestigiis, quae sunt ordines rerum in se et in motibus suis et convenientia et permanentia, per quod scitur mundus regi sapientis providentia et non casu".³⁵ Therefore, when Berthold writes about providence in his analysis he has in mind and reports a very specific part of Ulrich's work, namely chapters 15, 16, 17, and 18 of the fifth treatise of Book II of *De summo bono*.

Proposition 114 presents the general characteristics of providence. The idea that Ulrich and Berthold try to prove is how, in the arrangement of the causes that comprise the ontological structure of the cosmos, all causes share the same perfection that the First Cause has in itself *simpliciter*. This is also the case for the name *Deus* considered in relation to *providentia*. Indeed, the name *Deus* is appropriate only to the First Cause, but it can also be communicated to other beings that participate in divine qualities:

Et per consequens hoc nomen 'Deus' convenit prime bono principaliformiter et sic incommunicabiliter, ut dictum est, communicatur autem per se bonitatibus, scilicet rebus divinis ordinem unialem constituentibus essentialiter [...]. Dicitur tamen hoc nomen 'deus' esse de participantibus aliquam proprietatem divinam, et hoc sive per naturam sive per gratiam secundum ordinem duplicis providentiae, naturalis videlicet et voluntariae, de quibus inferius disseretur.³⁶

Providence is the most appropriate name for God when God is no longer considered in himself, but in relation to something else, namely, according to his

35 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §15, p. 107, l. 346–349.

36 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114A, p. 43, l. 101–p. 44, l. 105 and l. 117–119.

regulatory and causal power on the cosmos. God in his perfection and infinity *est simplex et definiri non potest*³⁷ but we can know Him, although in an imperfect way, from his effects and from His causal action on the universe. From an ontological point of view, the effects connected to the First Principle through the name “God”, as in the case of providence (“quod hoc nomen ‘Deus’ quantum ad primum significatum, quod est ratio, a qua imponitur nomen, significat providentiam”),³⁸ are such because they share, although imperfectly, the same essence of the First Principle. We can know something of God through everything that exists, acts, and participates in divine qualities. Therefore, providence can be correctly defined as “God” when we consider the divine power over the cosmos, which is carried out through *prudencia, cura, bonitas*, and *providentiae circuitus*.³⁹ Berthold and Ulrich propose that providence should be understood as an *ordo qui cuncta complectitur*.⁴⁰ There is nothing outside of this *ordo* that holds everything together. In other words, there is nothing that can be outside of the power of God and subject to *casus*, as Ulrich and Berthold say (*temeritas in regno providentiae non licet*).⁴¹ Every entity exists because it is preserved in being by the power of its cause, but ultimately, every cause depends on the power of the First Universal Cause. Ulrich writes in a passage taken up identically by Berthold:

Quod vero res non conservantur nisi virtute suae causae, solum prime bonum, quod est prima et universalis causa omnium simpliciter, et est ultra omnium conservativa per providentiam propriae virtutis.⁴²

Ulrich stresses some of the main elements of providence here and it is important to underline its multiple philosophical implications. First of all, this providential order has an intellectual nature. Citing Boethius,⁴³ Berthold and Ulrich write: “Providentia est divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta,

37 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 79.

38 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, p. 108, l. 1–2; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 41, l. 41–42.

39 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §2, p. 108, l. 19–p. 109, l. 19; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 42, l. 63–67.

40 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, p. 108, l. 8–9; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 42, l. 53.

41 Cf. Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, p. 108, l. 8–10; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 42, l. 53–55.

42 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, p. 109, l. 49–51; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 85–87.

43 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, ed. C. Moreschini (München / Leipzig: Saur, 2005), lib. IV, pr. 6, §9, p. 122, l. 30–32.

quae cuncta disponit".⁴⁴ The intellectual nature of providence, its *divina ratio*, is recognised by Ulrich at the beginning of the fifth treatise of Book II of *De summo bono* in two fundamental texts:

Intellectum in Deo esse constat ex huius nominis significato, quod est prima omnium causa, et ex nominis ratione, quae secundum Damascenum consistit in universali providentia. Nec enim prima causa potest in causando ab alio regi, nec providentia potest esse sine intellectu, quia confert convenientiam ad consequendum finem [...]. Secundum rem est ipsa essentia divina, quae inter nomina exprimentia perfectionem naturae divinae sumpta a perfectionibus repertis in perfectioribus naturis creatis, propriissime nominatur nomine intellectus, quia haec est altior natura inter omnes.⁴⁵

Mens [...] dicitur de Deo ratione intellectus essentialiter et causaliter. Essentialiter quidem, quia intellectus secundum veram huius nominis rationem solius Dei est, quae vera ratio consistit in puritate lucis intellectualis, quae nihil de obumbratione possibilitatis et potentiae materialis habet admixtum. [...] Causaliter autem dicitur de Deo, inquantum ipse est causa mentis perfectae in angelis bonis et mentis participatae in natura rationali et mentis daemonum, inquantum est mens, et non inquantum est mens rationis depravatae, quia sic magis debet appellari casus a mente.⁴⁶

According to Ulrich, *intellectus* is the real first name of the divine being that is also considered *prima causa omnium* and *universalis providentia*. As Beccarisi points out,⁴⁷ Ulrich of Strassburg is really at the beginning of the formulation of the famous Dominican "theory of the intellect" of Cologne, especially because he is the first author to consider *intellectus* as the first of the proper transcendental names of God ("essentia divina [...] propriissime nominatur nomine intellectus"). Firstly, as Ulrich writes, this doctrine has an ontological and etiological implication: "Mens dicitur de Deo ratione intellectus essentialiter et

44 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §4, p. 100, l. 89–90; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120D, p. 98, l. 251–252.

45 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 1, §1, p. 1, l. 5–16. On this topic, see A. Beccarisi, "Einleitung", in Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6*, p. vii–xxi.

46 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 1, §1–2, p. 8, l. 2–6 and p. 9, l. 32–35.

47 A. Beccarisi, "La *scientia divina* dei filosofi", p. 137–63. On this topic, see I. Zavattero, "I principi costitutivi delle virtù nel *De Summo Bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds.), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der Mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), p. 111–126.

causaliter". The name "intellect" is appropriate to God because intellect alone guarantees the stability, the order, and the rationality that characterise the cosmos, the *causa prima* and *providentia* itself ("Nec enim prima causa potest in causando ab alio regi, nec providentia potest esse sine intellectu, quia confert convenientiam ad consequendum finem"). To these two ontological and etiological aspects of intellect, according to Ulrich and Berthold, there is added also a noetic one. Indeed, providence, which is an expression of God's essence and causality, is also the foundation of our natural knowledge of God: "Nam per opera providentiae primam accipimus Dei cognitionem naturalem".⁴⁸ A man through his natural reason can know the regulative reason of God because man's reason has the same intellectual nature that characterises the essence of God. Certainly, Ulrich hastens to affirm, in a passage that is not found in the *Expositio*, that "opera vero creationis et institutionis naturae potius per prophetiam quam per philosophiam cognoscuntur".⁴⁹ Ulrich seems to subordinate philosophical knowledge to a prophetic and Scriptural one, but this does not mean that rational knowledge cannot achieve its ultimate goal, which is the supreme Good. Ulrich, like Berthold, strongly believes in the cognitive power of natural reason, even if it analyses theological issues. Sometimes Ulrich seems almost to reserve more power for rational research than for revelation:

Et ex intellectu assimilativo fit intellectus divinus, scilicet cum in lumine intelligentiae recipimus lumen divinum, quia per lumen intelligentiae amplius cognoscentes divina et cognitione uniti Deo ab ipso illuminamur, et in hoc lumine cognoscimus Deum; nec dicimus hoc de lumine gratiae gratum facientis, sed de lumine, quo Deus "illuminat omnem hominem", *Ioann.* 1, et quo Deus illis, id est philosophis, revelavit, ut dicitur *Ad Rom.* 1.⁵⁰

And also:

In haec autem concordia philosophiae cum fidei veritate ideo sollicitè laboravimus, ut ipsam fidem rationabilem et acceptabilem faceremus his, qui in philosophia nutriti sciunt insolubilibus rationibus esse demonstratum caelum ab aliquo intellectu sibi intrinseco moveri.⁵¹

48 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, p. 109, l. 42–43; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 109, l. 82–83.

49 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, p. 109, l. 43–44.

50 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. I, tr. 1, c. 7, p. 19, l. 16–22.

51 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. IV, tr. 3, c. 1, §21, p. 13, l. 289–p. 14, l. 292.

It is now necessary to reflect on the general consideration of philosophy in the *Expositio* and in the *De summo bono*. These texts reveal the great importance that Ulrich attaches to philosophical inquiry, even in theological matters, and this leads us to reconsider the opinion of Berthold expressed in the *Expositio tituli* in reference to Proclus: a great man able to know God as far as possible for a mortal and only using the light of his natural intellect. The overlap between philosophy and theology typical of the *philosophi theologizantes* or the *theologi philosophantes* such as Proclus, which Berthold endorses and repurposes in his *Expositio*, seems to follow more closely the example of Ulrich than the example of Albert the Great or Dietrich of Freiberg. Indeed, Albert considered philosophy as something separate from theology (“Theologica autem non conveniunt cum philosophicis in principiis, quia fundantur super revelationem et inspirationem et non super rationem”)⁵² and Dietrich clearly divided the *scientia divina philosophorum* from *nostra divina sanctorum scientia*.⁵³ Ulrich instead frequently superimposes revealed theology and rational theology. He declares in the *De summo bono* that “the light of truth which is announced in the Gospel of John and which illuminates mankind is the light in which God revealed himself to philosophers,” not to Moses.⁵⁴ God reveals himself to philosophers through the light of the natural intellect, not only through the power of divine grace. Furthermore, when the agreement between philosophy and theology is not possible, it must be achieved by adapting the faith to the philosophical doctrine which is based on certain *insolubilibus rationibus*.⁵⁵ In Ulrich, philosophy can deal with theological and Scriptural matters and it has the same goals. In the *De summo bono* we find many philosophical questions superimposed or interposed on purely theological issues such as the Trinity, the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, the sacraments, grace, the gifts, virtues, beatitude, and so on.⁵⁶ All these questions, the theological as well as the philosophical ones, are pursued by the author using philosophical arguments, Biblical sources, and statements of the Fathers at the same time. This is

52 Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1964), lib. XI, tr. 3, c. 7, p. 542, l. 25–9.

53 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto*, 3.9, p. 281, l. 100–p. 282, l. 109.

54 Indeed, the revelation to Moses is *in caligine*, so it is covered by divine darkness (cf. Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. I, tr. 1, c. 6, p. 17, l. 50–p. 18, l. 60).

55 Cf. Beccarisi, “La *scientia divina* dei filosofi”, p. 137–63.

56 Every book of the *De summo bono* is focused on deepening of one of these topics: the first book focuses on the principles of the “supreme science” named theology; the second on the essence of the supreme Good and its properties; the third on the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit taken in their Unity; the fourth, fifth and sixth books respectively on the Father, the Son and his Incarnation, the Holy Spirit and the virtues; the seventh on the sacraments; the eighth on beatitude.

because Ulrich, unlike Dietrich and Albert, does not consider there to be a real difference in the object or aims of philosophy and theology.

Like Ulrich, there are several elements in Berthold's *Expositio* indicating the harmonic continuity between theological and philosophical discourses, although the author, unlike Ulrich, rarely uses Scriptural references in his work directly. Especially in the *Expositio*, Berthold advocated for the possibility of a philosophical investigation into theological issues. First of all, as mentioned earlier, there is the methodological attempt to harmonise Proclus with Dionysius in the *Expositio*. The juxtaposition of philosophical authorities with theological ones in the two initial lists is an attempt to announce the different authorities used by Berthold, who are in cooperation and not in conflict with each other. Secondly, the second point concerns Berthold's reason for choosing to comment on a Neoplatonic text (the *Elementatio theologica*) instead of an Aristotelian one. Berthold indicates that he found in Proclus the intention philosophically to analyse certain divine and theological themes lacking in Aristotle:

Ex praedictis evidenter apparet scientiam istam in suorum principiorum certitudine ratione principii cognitivi, per quod circa divina versatur, non solum omnibus particularibus scientiis, sed etiam metaphysicae Peripatetici, quae est de ente in eo, quod ens, incomparabiliter eminere.⁵⁷

Proclus deals with divine themes and goes beyond the limits of Aristotelian philosophy.⁵⁸ Precisely for this reason, he defines the *Elementatio* as *scientia divinissima* and its author as a philosopher-theologian inspired by God.⁵⁹ As Zavattero shows,⁶⁰ Proclus is presented by Berthold as a pagan touched by divine grace. Proclus is an enlightened man, a philosopher who studies divine themes, but also a prophet because he describes the divine in the same terms as Dionysius. The questions treated in the *Elementatio* concern the divine properties, the Supreme Good and beatitude:

57 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeambulum* C, p. 65, l. 422–425.

58 Cf. S. Gersh, "Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy", in J. Aersten, K. Emery Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 493–503; L. Sturlese, "Il dibattito sul Proclo latino nel Medioevo fra l'università di Parigi e lo *studium* di Colonia", in G. Boss, G. Seel (eds), *Proclus et son influence. Actes du colloque de Neuchâtel (juin 1985)* (Zürich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987), p. 261–285.

59 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 62, l. 327–328.

60 Zavattero, "La figura e il pensiero di Proclo in Bertoldo di Moosburg", p. 51–67.

Ex praemissis omnibus evidenter apparet, quod non solum per operationem et scientiam sicut per duo elementa, puta practicam et theoreticam, sed magis per elementationis theologiae altissimam philosophiam ascendendo redit homo ad suam perfectionem finalem, propter quam creatus est, scilicet felicitatem, immo, ut apertius dicam, beatitudinem.⁶¹

In this sense, Proclus' *Elementatio* seeks to bring about the deification of man and his salvation through philosophical reflection. This is also stressed in the *Praeambulum*, in which Berthold says that Proclus' philosophy is a "scientia veridica, certissima et ex hoc altissima".⁶² The divine science presented by Proclus, according to Berthold, is superior to Aristotelian metaphysics because it concerns the divine, the entities which participate in goodness and the principles that bring man to the absolute One ("ascenditur in prime unius et prime boni unitatis").⁶³ Berthold thinks that Proclus in the *Elementatio* ascended to knowledge of the divine in a philosophical way. So, for these reasons, the *Elementatio* can rightly be defined as "theological" because it truly recognises the possibility for philosophy to investigate divine realities.

Like Ulrich, therefore, Berthold strongly believes in the cognitive power of philosophy in divine themes. He constantly searches for the harmony between philosophers and theologians because he wants to deal with theological issues through a philosophical approach, following the example of the philosopher-theologians. In this way, I think the attitude and the intention of Berthold most resembles Ulrich's, who superimposes philosophical discourse with theological discourse and always tries to find a correspondence between philosophy and theology. Berthold certainly follows Dietrich of Freiberg on the division of natural providence and voluntary providence, but he seems to be very close to Ulrich's *De summo bono* on a textual, philosophical, and methodological level. Berthold and Ulrich consider that the difference between *providentia naturalis* and *providentia voluntaria* is only a question of method or different "points of view", but it does not really concern disparate objects of research, areas of competence, or goals. In fact, unlike Dietrich, Berthold and Ulrich think that philosophy and theology have the same purpose: the deification of man and the attainment of ultimate bliss.

After this digression on methodological issues, it is necessary to return to the principal topic of this article: providence, its intellectual nature, and the ontological characteristics of intellect. Natural providence has an intellectual essence and it concerns the causal action of God in the world. According to

61 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Exp. tit. I*, p. 51, l. 475–479.

62 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.*, p. 53, l. 3.

63 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb. C*, p. 68, l. 556.

Berthold and Ulrich, the divine perfections are communicated to the whole universe (*communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates*)⁶⁴ and, accordingly, creatures participate to the name of God (even if imperfectly):

Et secundum quod hoc nomen 'Deus' dicitur a providentia secundum perfectionem talis rationis, sic hoc nomen Deo adeo proprium est, quod nec communicari potest creaturae, sicut nec communicari ei potest, quod non sit a prima causa, quia, si aliquod contineret se vel alia propria et non dependente virtute, illud non esset ab aliquo causatum. [...] Inquantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet "per fatum" [Ulrich] / "per primordiales causas" [Berthold], sic actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per consequens nomen Dei.⁶⁵

This imperfection in the communication of the same name (and of the same nature) is due to the causal relationship between God and creatures, which is a connection by analogy. Indeed, the analogical cause contains in itself the perfections of its effect, not in a formal way (like the univocal cause), but in an eminent way or in a more perfect way:

[...] haec divisio non est univoca, quia nomen commune conveniret dividendibus aequaliter, nec etiam est divisio nominis aequivoci, quia tunc non esset in diversis nominibus respectus ad unam naturam, sed est divisio analogi, quia nomen Dei proprie et primo convenit ei, cui convenit substantialiter, et secundo convenit participantibus divinitatem.⁶⁶

The particular causal relationship, which connects God to creatures, allows the cause to communicate its own essence to the effect, but it also implies that the same nature is shared according to different degrees of perfection: in an excellent way in God (*eminentiori modo*) and in an imperfect way in creatures. The philosophical doctrine justifying this etiological connection is clearly that of essential causality, a central theme for the masters of Cologne. It is central in Dietrich,⁶⁷ who probably gave its best and classical formulation, but

64 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 256–262; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 97–98; 120E, p. 100, l. 298.

65 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 16, §4–5, p. 109–110, l. 52–61; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 85–95.

66 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 16, §5, p. 110, l. 67–71; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 45, l. 150–157.

67 Cf. B. Mojsisch, "Causa essentialis bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart", in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 106–14; T. Tsopurashvili, "Die causa essentialis-Theorie als Grundlage der Sprachtheorie?"

has a prominent role in Ulrich's *De summo bono*⁶⁸ and, of course, in Berthold's *Expositio*.⁶⁹ We can say that with Ulrich this etiological principle, which concerns intellectual causality, is expressed in the Cologne School for the first time. Essential causality is introduced here in two different terms. Ulrich uses the concept of *fatum* and Berthold uses the term *causa primordialis*:

Ulrich: Inquantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet "per fatum" sic actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per consequens nomen Dei.⁷⁰

Berthold: Inquantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet "per primordiales causas" sic actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per consequens nomen Dei.⁷¹

What fate is and its close connection to essential causality could be explained comparing Berthold's Propositions 120 and 141 with chapters 16 and 18 of the fifth treatise of Book 11 of *De summo bono*. In these passages the problem of the subdivision of providence into *providentia voluntaria* and *providentia naturalis* is addressed in priority. After the examination of the definitions given by Boethius and Dionysius, the quotation of Augustine, also used by Dietrich, is reported in both Ulrich and Berthold:

Et illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus VIII libro *Super Genesim*: Gemina operatio providentiae reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat lignis et herbis incrementum, partim voluntaria per operationem angelorum et hominum.⁷²

Sprachmodelle des Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckharts", in *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 18/1(2015), p. 108–129; V. Decaix, "Structure et fonction de la causalité essentielle chez Dietrich de Freiberg", in *Khôra. Revue d'études anciennes et médiévales* 12(2014), p. 171–88.

68 Cf. A. de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand* (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 189–206; A. de Libera, *Introduzione alla mistica renana*, p. 79–118.

69 Cf. E. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg* (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013); E. King, "Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes, Volume 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 394–437.

70 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 16, §5, p. 110, l. 60–61.

71 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 94–95.

72 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145–146, l. 256–262; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120E, p. 100, l. 300–302.

This passage is followed by two texts in Berthold and Ulrich, which differ in form, but not in their meaning:

Ulrich: Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, quem philosophi determinant, scilicet quod primo sunt causae universales, scilicet caelestia et motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae particulares. Cum ergo omnis artifex operans per instrumentum dispositionem artis instrumentis infundat, necessario dispositio divinae providentiae huic conexioni causarum infunditur. Haec ergo dispositio providentiae infusa toti isti conexioni causarum fatum vocatur, ut dicit Boethius, prout philosophi de fato loquuntur.⁷³

Berthold: Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum qui in hoc volumine exprimitur, quibus omnibus supereminet ipsae primordiales causae, quas auctor vocat deos.⁷⁴

According to Ulrich, the providence that refers to the *ordo naturalis* as *conexio causarum* is *providentia naturalis* and this providence is also called *fatum*. Fate, *quod est effectum providentiae voluntariae*⁷⁵ – meaning it depends on the free will of God – has an intellectual nature and it is the expression of a rational power which orders everything due to a connection of causes and entities governed by a First Principle. Therefore, Ulrich considers *fatum naturale* to be synonymous with *providentia naturalis* and judges that it has a prominent role in the order and movements of the heavens. *Fatum naturale* or *providentia naturalis* is an expression of the necessary order of the universe that appears as an unalterable connection of causes:

Dispositio autem fati naturalis primo habet esse in ordine et motu caelorum. Et ideo substantiae caelorum et ordo et motus non cadunt sub fatali dispositione, sed cadunt sub providentia, quia ab ipsa sunt causata et ab ipsa continentur et gubernantur.⁷⁶

Berthold in the *Expositio* generally does not use the expression *fatum*. He uses the concept of “primordial cause” as synonymous with “essential cause.” The lemma *fatum*, employed by Berthold in the same sense as Ulrich, that is, as

73 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 262–p. 146, l. 266.

74 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120E, p. 100, l. 303–305.

75 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §11, p. 114, l. 186–189.

76 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §14, p. 149, l. 361–364.

synonymous with *providentia naturalis*, can be found in the *Expositio* only in Proposition 141, in a long text copied from prose 6 of Book IV of Boethius' *Consolatio philosophiae* and from Proclus' *De providentia et fato*. Why does Berthold use the expression "fate" less frequently than Ulrich? Could it be that, for some philosophical or theological reason, he normally prefers to use other lemmas to refer to *providentia naturalis*? If so, why? I have not found a definitive answer to these questions. According to Berthold, the *causae primordiales* are the causes of the *invisibilia Dei* and they are organised in perfect orders, at the top of which there is God. They are also called by the Dominican master "infinitates, enter entia, vitae, intellectuales hypostases et animae totales et partiales et his participantia" and their determination is the responsibility of natural providence:

Et hoc de primis invisibilibus praedictis. Sunt praeterea invisibilia effectus primordialium causarum, et hoc sive per se perfecta sive in aliis subsistentiam habentia. Per se perfecta, puta infinitates, enter entia, vitae, intellectuales hypostases et animae totales et partiales et his participantia. De quibus (scilicet primordialibus causis et earum effectibus) sic dicit Dionysius 11 cap. et est supra allegatum: 'Et primo ipsorum (scilicet per se esse, per se virtutis etc.) bonus dicitur substantificator esse, postea totorum ipsorum (id est ordinum, quos causae primordiales instituunt: isti ordines dicuntur tota, quia per se perfecti), postea particularium ipsorum (scilicet singularium ipsorum ordinum), postea particulariter ipsis participantium (in quibus sunt perfectiones superiorum nec primo nec per se, sicut est intellectualitas in nobis hominibus et a nobis particulariter participata).' Ista sunt invisibilia Dei transitive accepta, de quibus in ista elementatione theologica subtilissime pertractatur, quantum pertinet ad providentiam naturalem.⁷⁷

Therefore, Ulrich's *fatum* and Berthold's *causae primordiales* refer to the same order of entities, serve the same purpose, and refer to the same etiological doctrine. I shall conclude my analysis with the mention of Proposition 144, but without going into details because in this proposition Berthold repeats the same issues discussed above. In this proposition, the harmony of creation is underlined once again starting from the Biblical expression, *Disponit omnia suaviter*.⁷⁸ Indeed, God orders everything *in mensura, numero, et*

⁷⁷ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 5, p. 13, l. 251–266.

⁷⁸ Wisdom 8:1.

*pondere*⁷⁹ and this disposition is a rational effect of providence. Once again, in the cosmological order there is no place for *casus*; everything is determined and this order is established by natural providence, which is the *conexio causarum*. Such providence, finally, “est divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit”.⁸⁰

Conclusions

In this paper, I have attempted to show how Berthold uses Ulrich's text and philosophy for the elaboration of the concept of *providentia naturalis*. Starting from the comparison between these two theologians, I have also tried to prove how in Ulrich's *De summo bono*, before Dietrich, we find a clear distinction between *providentia naturalis* and *providentia voluntaria*. *Providentia naturalis* is interpreted for the first time by Ulrich as the *conexio causarum* that orders the cosmos in a rational way. Both Ulrich and Berthold deepen the question of providential action, using an innovative theory of intellect and especially by employing the etiological doctrine of “essential causality”. In Ulrich we see the attempt to establish the conditions for the natural knowledge of God and of the providential order that rules the world. This attempt is justified by the rationality of the universe itself and by the causal relationship between the essence of God and everything that has the same intellectual nature, including man. The possibility of knowing God depends on the idea that providence is the development, in the world, of the same *invisibilia Dei*. In Ulrich, even before Dietrich, *providentia naturalis* is interpreted as a *conexio causarum* that rules the universe. This connection has its own origin in the First Cause, which analogically communicates its essence. This sharing is imperfect, such that there is an equality *secundum essentia* and a diversity *secundum esse* between the cause and its effect:

Tertio modo consideratur secundum relationem ad effectum, et sic est regula effectuum omnium et operum proveniens ex applicatione causarum ad effectus particulares. Et haec regula, ut est a prima causa et ut consideratur in sua essentia, et ut per esse est in causis vere necessariis,

79 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §1, p. 97, l. 4; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 144B, p. 75, l. 27.

80 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §4, p. 100, l. 89–90; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 144B, p. 76, l. 54–55.

est necessaria et immobilis, licet secundum esse, quod habet in proximis causis, mutetur.⁸¹

Ulrich is the first thinker in the entire Dominican School of Cologne who clearly identifies natural providence with the rational order of causes that links everything existing in the universe to the First Principle.⁸² This philosophical and doctrinal approach is also found in Berthold's *Expositio* and it seems to be very similar to Ulrich's. In this paper, I have tried to show the textual and theoretical dependence of the *Expositio* on the *De summo bono*: the *cura de omnibus* and the *ordo qui cuncta complectitur* constitute for Ulrich and Berthold the causal order that rules in the cosmos. This *ordo* holds everything together and it is the effect of the First Cause, which communicates its nature to creatures imperfectly, according to the doctrine of essential causality. Furthermore, for Berthold and Ulrich, natural providence is part of the rational investigation of philosophers and has an ontological, etiological, and noetic importance. Berthold found in the attitude of Ulrich, who combines philosophical and theological issues and uses philosophy for in the investigation of divine questions, a similar method to that of the *philosophi theologizantes sive theologi philosophantes*, groups that include Proclus and Berthold himself. In my opinion, this method differs both from Albert and Dietrich, who clearly divide the spheres of competence of philosophy and theology. All these aspects enable us to reconsider a continuity of ideas between Ulrich and Berthold, demonstrated by the textual dependence of the *Expositio* on the *De summo bono*. In my view, Berthold's careful and faithful use of the *De summo bono* presupposes a deep and shared approach to theoretical and methodological questions. Ultimately, through this paper, I have tried to show that the impact of Ulrich's *De summo bono* for the *Expositio* was unduly neglected, and that it deserves to be rediscovered for a better understanding not just of both Berthold's and Ulrich's philosophies, but also of the cultural context in which they lived and worked. Reconsidering the influence of the *De summo bono* on the subsequent generations of Dominican authors active in the *studia* beyond the Rhine could truly corroborate and enrich the epithet that Grabmann, at the beginning of the 20th century, prophetically assigned to Ulrich as a true "co-founder" of the Cologne School: a fundamental cornerstone for the entire Dominican tradition.

81 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §12, p. 148, l. 333–337.

82 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §14, p. 149, l. 361–364.

Appendix

Ulrich of Strassburg

Hoc nomen Deus quantum ad primum significatum, quod est ratio, a qua imponitur nomen, significat providentiam, quia, sicut dicit Maximus super 12 cap. Dionysii *De divinis nominibus*: “Hoc nomen ‘theos’, quod apud nos est Deus, duas habet derivationes apud Graecos, quia vel derivatur ab hoc verbo ‘theoro’, id est ‘video’ sive ‘contemplor’ sive ‘considero’, quia omnia circumspicit, vel ab hoc verbo ‘theo’, quod est ‘curro’, quia omnia providentia circuit” eo circuitu, de quo dicit Boethius in IV libro *De consolatione*: “Ordo”, inquit, “quidam cuncta complectitur, ut, quod assignata ordinis ratione decesserit, hoc licet in alium, tamen ordinem relabatur, ne quid in regno providentiae liceat temeritati”. Damascenus autem libro I cap. 12 dicit: “Post nomen ‘Qui est’, quod idem cum nomine boni est et est primum inter nomina Dei, hoc nomen Deus est nomen secundum, et est nomen operationis. Et dicitur hoc ‘theos’, id est Deus, vel ab ‘ethin’, id est curare vel fovere universa”, secundum illud *Gen.* 14: “Spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas”, id est incubabat et fovebat, ut dicit alia translatio. “Vel ab ethin, id est ardens”. Ut enim dicit *Deut.* 4 et *Hebr.* 13: Deus noster ignis consumens omnium malitiam est. “Vel a ‘theaste’, id est considerando omnia” secundum illud *Hebr.* 4: “Omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius” etc. (*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, p. 108, l. 1–18).

Berthold of Moosburg

De secundo sciendum, quod hoc nomen ‘Deus’ quantum ad primum significatum, quod est ratio, a qua imponitur nomen, significat providentiam, quia, sicut Maximus monachus super 12 cap. *De divinis nominibus* Dionysii tractans descriptionem deitatis, qua dicitur ibi: “Deitas autem, quae omnia videt providentia et bonitate perfecta, omnia circumspiciens et continens et se ipsa implens et excedens omnia providentia ipsa utentia”, hanc, inquam, descriptionem deitatis tractans sic dicit: Hoc nomen ‘theos’, quod apud nos est ‘Deus’, duas habet derivationes apud Graecos, quia vel derivatur ab hoc verbo ‘theoro’, id est ‘video’ sive ‘contemplor’ sive ‘considero’, quia omnia circumspicit, vel ab hoc verbo ‘theo’, quod est ‘curro’, quia omnia providentia sua circuit” (haec Maximus) eo circuitu, de quo dicit Boethius in IV libro *De consolatione* prosa 6 circa finem: “Sola est enim divina vis, cui quoque mala bona sint, cum eis competenter utendo alicuius boni elicit effectum. Ordo enim quidam est, qui cuncta complectitur, ut, quod ab assignata ordinis ratione discesserit, hoc licet in alium, tamen ordinem relabatur, ne quid in regno providentiae liceat temeritati”. Damascenus autem libro I cap. 12 dicit: “Sicut autem sanctus Dionysius ait, ‘bonum’ est principalius nomen eius. “Non enim est in Deo dicere primum esse, et ita bonum. Secundum vero nomen ‘theos’, id est ‘Deus’, quod dicitur vel ab eo, quod est ‘thetin’, id est currere vel fovere universa, vel ab ‘ethim’, id est ardens”. Et infra: “vel

a 'theaste', id est a considerando omnia. Nulla enim eum latent, immo omnium est contemplator". Haec Damascenus. (*Expositio*, 114B, p. 41–42, l. 41–62).

Ex quibus omnibus colligitur, quod hoc nomen quantum ad primum suum significatum est nomen providentiae Dei secundum quattuor eius opera, quae sunt: "prudencia, qua scit, quid unicuique congruit, et cura, qua bona conservat, et tertio bonitas, qua nocumenta repellit, et quarto providentiae circuitus, qua non solum bona, sed etiam mala, quae permittit, ordinat ad bonum. Et sic hoc nomen describit Dionysius 12 cap. *De divinis nominibus* dicens: "Deitas dicitur, quae omnia videt" prospectu regiminis, sicut frequenter dicitur in Scriptura: "Videat Dominus et iudicet", et *Gen.* 22: "Unde usque hodie dicitur: in monte Dominus videbit". Providentia curae, de qua *Sap.* 12: "Nec enim est alius Deus, quam tu, cui cura est de omnibus omnia circumspiciens", scilicet non solum bona, sed etiam mala circumspicione ordinis, quae, ut dictum est, cuncta complectitur. Et "bonitate perfecta", qua non solum placuit omnia fieri, sed etiam facta placent, ut conserventur, *Gen.* 1: "Vidit Deus cuncta, quae fecerat" etc., "omnia bona continens" consumenda mala, ne ipsa mala consumant bona. Sic enim continentur bona in sua natura, quam malum privat et corrumpit, "et se ipsa implens omnia" deducendo singula secundum suas capacitates in proprios fines, in quibus participant proportionaliter summum bonum ut finem ultimum, "et excedens omnia providentia

Ex quibus omnibus colligitur, quod hoc nomen 'Deus' quantum ad primum suum significatum est nomen providentiae ipsius quantum ad quattuor eius opera, quae sunt prudencia, qua scit, quid unicuique congruit, et cura, qua bona conservat, et tertio bonitas, qua nocumenta repellit, et quarto providentiae circuitus, qua non solum bona, sed etiam mala, quae permittit, ordinat ad bonum. Et sic hoc nomen 'deitas' describit Dionysius ubi supra dicens: "Deitas autem dicitur, quae omnia videt" prospectu regiminis; "providentia" curae "et bonitate perfecta", qua non solum diffundit se in omnium creatione, sed et platicorum conservatione "omnia circumspiciens", non solum bona, sed etiam mala circumspicione ordinis, qui, ut dictum est ex Boethio, "cuncta complectitur", omnia "continens" consumenda mala, ne consumant bona. Sic enim continentur bona in sua natura, quam naturam malum privat et corrumpit "et se ipsa implens" omnia deducendo singula secundum suas capacitates in proprios fines, in quibus participant proportionaliter summum bonum et ultimum finem "et excedens omnia providentia ipsa utentia", quia regit res ita, quod non commiscetur cum eis.

(*Expositio*, 114B, p. 42, l. 63–77).

ipsa utentia", quia regit res ita, quod non permiscetur cum eis.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §2, p. 108, l. 19–p. 109, l. 36).

Ex his patet bonitas huius definitionis, quia non est definitio rei significatae, quae simplex est et definiri non potest, sed est expositio nominis. Et ideo ponit quattuor actus, a quibus nomen hoc impositum est. Sed quantum ad id, cui impositum est nomen, quod est secundum eius significatum, significat ipsam naturam divinam prae omnibus aliis Dei nominibus quoad nos. Nam per opera providentiae primam accipimus Dei cognitionem naturalem. Opera vero creationis et institutionis naturae potius per prophetiam quam per philosophiam cognoscuntur. Unde hoc, quod scribitur *Gen.* 1, vocat Gregorius *Super Ezechielem*: "Prophetiam de praeterito". Propter quod potius argumentum, per quod in libro *De natura deorum* probatur, quod Deus sit, sumitur a providentia, a qua nomen Dei dicitur. Et sic vere dicit Ambrosius in libro *De Trinitate*, quod Deus nomen est naturae.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, p. 109, l. 37–48).

Quia vero res non conservatur nisi virtute suae causae, sola prima et universalis omnium causa est universaliter omnium conservativa per providentiam propriae virtutis. Et secundum quod hoc nomen 'Deus' dicitur a providentia secundum perfectionem talis rationis, sic hoc nomen Deo adeo proprium est, quod nec communicari potest creaturae, sicut

Ex his patet bonitas huius descriptionis, cum non sit definitio rei significatae, quae est simplex et definiri non potest, sed est expositio nominis. Et ideo ponit quattuor actus, a quibus hoc nomen 'Deus' impositum est. Sed quantum ad id, cui nomen impositum est, quod est secundum eius significatum, significat ipsam naturam, essentiam seu intentionem omnibus eminentissimam, quia per opera providentiae in cognitionem naturae prime devenimus. Unde et Deus dicitur et est nomen naturae. (*Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 78–84).

Quod vero res non conservantur nisi virtute suae causae, solum prime bonum, quod est prima et universalis causa omnium simpliciter, est ultra omnium conservativa per providentiam propriae virtutis. Et secundum quod hoc nomen dicitur a providentia secundum perfectionem talis rationis, sic hoc nomen 'Deus' prime bono adeo proprium est, quod inquantum huiusmodi

nec communicari ei potest, quod non sit a prima causa, quia, si aliquid contineret se vel alia propria et non dependente virtute, illud non esset ab aliquo causatum. Et sic ipse dicit *Deut.* 32: "Videte, quod ego sim solus et non sit alius Deus praeter me". Et probat hoc per opera providentiae dicens: "Ego occidam" etc. Ideo dicitur *Sap.* 14: "Incommunicabile nomen lapidibus et lignis imposuerunt". Inquantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet per fatum, sic actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per consequens nomen Dei.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §4–5, p. 109, l. 49–p. 110, l. 61).

Ad horum ergo intellectum consideremus primo, quid hoc nomine significetur. Deus omnia, quae causat, per providentiam causat eo, quod ipse operatur per intellectum et artem. Et quamvis per se principaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis non deesset universo, cui communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates naturaliter communicabiles, operatur etiam per secundas causas. Et illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 256–261).

Et patet, quod haec divisio non est univoca, quia nomen commune conveniret dividendibus aequaliter, nec etiam est divisio nominis aequivoci, quia tunc non esset in diversis nominibus respectus ad unam naturam, sed est divisio analogi, quia nomen Dei proprie et primo

nec ipsis per se bonitatibus communicari potest, sicut nec communicari eis potest, quod non sint a prime bono, quia, si aliquid contineret se vel alia propria et non dependente virtute, illud non esset ab alio causatum. Inquantum tamen prime bonum explet providentiam suam per primordiales causas, sic actus providentiae primitus est in diis, ut infra videbitur, et per consequens nomen Dei.

(*Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 85–95).

Ad cuius intellectum considerandum, quod prime bonum omnia, quae creat, per providentiam gubernat. Et quamvis per se principaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis non deesset universo, cui communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates naturaliter sibi communicabiles, ita, quod nullus gradus bonitatis sibi desit, cum prime boni opus sit perfectissimum, operatur etiam per primordiales causas et secundarias.

(*Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 95–100).

Ubi tamen sciendum, quod divisio divini nominis non est divisio nec univoci, quia nomen commune conveniret dividendibus aequaliter, nec est divisio nominis aequivoci, si proprie loquamur, quia tunc non esset universis nominibus respectus ad unam naturam, sed est divisio analogi, quia

convenit ei, cui convenit substantialiter, et secundario convenit participantibus divinitatem, sicut sunt sancti, ut dicit *Glossa* ibidem.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §5, p. 110, l. 67–72).

Definitur quoque providentia multipliciter. Damascenus 29 cap. 11 libri ponit duas definitiones. Prima est data per effectum, cum dicit: “Providentia est ea, quae ex Deo ad existentia fit cura”. Haec enim cura est fatum, quod est effectum providentiae. Secunda datur, secundum quod providentia tamquam practica scientia in se concipit voluntatem, cum dicit: “Providentia est voluntas Dei”, id est ratio recta cum voluntate. Unde ipse statim subdit: “Necesse est omnia, quae providentia fiunt, secundum rectam rationem fieri”, propter quam, scilicet voluntatem, omnia, quae sunt, quia effectus providentiae est circa entia, suscipiunt deductionem in suos fines. Boethius autem in IV libro *De consolatione* ponit alias duas definitiones. Prima datur de providentia, prout est scientia operativa. Unde dicit: “Providentia est divina ratio”, id est rationalis modus in divina intelligentia existens, quae multiplicem rebus regendis modum statuit, cum ipsa in se simplex sit “in summo omnium principe constituta”. Quia praedictus modus non refertur extra mentem divinam ad ea, quae movet atque disponit, tunc non providentia, sed fatum appellatur, quae scilicet ratio “cuncta” propter universalitatem providentiae “disponit” ordinando in finem. Secunda

nomen Dei causaliter et principaliformiter convenit ei, cui superessentialiter attribuitur et per consequens prime, primo autem et per se, quibus convenit essentialiter, et deinde participantibus proprietate divina secundum prius et posterius, sicut patet de nuncupative dictis diis, inferius apparebit. (*Expositio*, 114C–D, p. 45, l. 150–157).

Secundum vero quid rei definitur multipliciter. Damascenus enim ubi supra ponit duas definitiones. Prima est data per effectum, cum dicit: “Providentia est ea, quae ex Deo ad existentia fit cura”. Secunda datur, secundum quod providentia tamquam practica scientia in se concipit voluntatem, cum dicit: “Providentia est voluntas Dei, per quam omnia, quae sunt, suscipiunt deductionem” in suos fines. Boethius autem in IV libro *De consolatione* ponit alias duas definitiones. Quarum prima datur, prout est scientia operativa. Unde dicit: “Providentia est divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit”. Secunda vero est a causa. Unde dicit: Providentia est “simplex et immobilis forma rerum gerendarum”. (*Expositio*, 120D, p. 98, l. 245–254).

vero definitio est huius expositio. Dicit enim: "Providentia est forma simplex et immobilis forma rerum gerendarum".

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §11, p. 114, l. 186–203).

Sicut autem creatio instituit naturam, sic providentia res institutas deducit in congruos sibi fines. Et ideo dicit Dionysius 4 cap. *De divinis nominibus*: "Sicut providentia uniuscuiusque naturae est salvativa, per se mobilia providet ut per se mobilia et tota iuxta proprietatem totius et uniuscuiusque", scilicet est providentia, secundum quod "provisorum natura suscipit provisivas bonitates largissime providentiae proportionabiliter attributas unicuique". Et huius exemplum in naturalibus ponit Philosophus in XI *Metaphysicae* in patre familias magnae domus. Ibi enim regimen patris familias perfecte suscipiunt liberi per amorem patris nihil agentes licentiose. Servi autem suscipiunt illud imperfecte, quia ex timore suscipiunt et interdum delinquant. Bestiae vero semper ab eo errant, nisi inquantum violentia aguntur. Sic enim vult Philosophus, quod prima causa omnia ordinat in bonum suum, sed necessaria, quae sunt semper eodem modo sine exorbitatione, illam ordinationem servant ut filii. Ea autem, quae sunt frequenter, sunt sicut servi, et quia permixtas habent sibi malitias, non attingunt bonum universi, nisi inquantum reguntur ab his, quae sunt semper. Ea vero, quae raro fiunt, sunt sicut bestiae, et non diriguntur in bonum universi nisi quodam freno eorum, quae sunt semper et quae fiunt frequenter.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §8, p. 112, l. 119–135).

Dico autem unicuique, quia, ut dicit Dionysius 4 cap. *De divinis nominibus* circa finem, "providentia est uniuscuiusque naturae salvativa, per se mobilia providet ut per se mobilia et tota et particularia iuxta proprietatem totius et uniuscuiusque, inquantum provisorum natura suscipit totius et largissimae providentiae proportionaliter attributas unicuique provisivas bonitates". Haec Dionysius. Et huius exemplum in naturalibus ponit Aristoteles in XII *Metaphysicae* in patre familias magnae domus. Ibi enim regimen patris familias perfecte suscipiunt liberi propter amorem patris nihil agentes licentiose. Servi autem suscipiunt illud imperfecte, quia ex timore suscipiunt et ideo interdum delinquant. Bestiae vero semper ab eo errant, nisi inquantum violentia ab eo aguntur. Sic enim vult Aristoteles, quod prima causa omnia ordinat in bonum suum, sed necessaria, quae sunt semper eodem modo sine exorbitatione, illam ordinationem servant, ut filii. Ea autem, quae sunt frequenter, sicut servi, et permixtas habent sibi malitias et non attingunt bonum universi, nisi inquantum reguntur ab his, quae sunt semper. Ea vero, quae raro fiunt, sunt sicut bestiae, et non diriguntur in bonum universi, nisi quodam freno eorum, quae sunt semper et quae fiunt frequenter.

(*Expositio*, 120D, p. 99, l. 277–292).

Et quamvis per se principaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis non deesset universo, cui communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates naturaliter communicabiles, operatur etiam per secundas causas. Et illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus VIII libro *Super Genesim*: “Gemina operatio providentiae reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat lignis et herbis incrementum, partim voluntaria per operationem angelorum et hominum”. Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, quem philosophi determinant, scilicet quod primo sunt causae universales, scilicet caelestia et motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae particulares. Cum ergo omnis artifex operans per instrumentum dispositionem artis instrumentis infundat, necessario dispositio divinae providentiae huic connexioni causarum infunditur. Haec ergo dispositio providentiae infusa toti isti connexioni causarum fatum vocatur, ut dicit Boethius, prout philosophi de fato loquuntur.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 258–p. 146, l. 266).

Ad providentiam divinam tria concurrunt, a quibus Deus nominatur ratione providentiae, propter quod Dionysius 12 cap. *De divinis nominibus* haec tria nomina coniungit cum hoc nomine ‘Deus’. Unum est praesidentia, qua ad ipsum pertinet prospicere subiectis propter amorem, qui “superiora movet ad providentiam minus habentium”. Et sic est hoc nomen ‘dominus’.

Circa tertium sciendum, quod, licet prime bonum super omnia superbenedictus Deus per se principaliter omnia efficiat et per providentiam gubernet, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis, quae est divinissimum operum, non deesset universo, cui communicati sunt omnes gradus divinae bonitatis possibiles existere, operatur etiam per secundas causas a se, scilicet per primordiales. Et istae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae, quae distinguit Augustinus VIII *Hexaemeron* sui dicens, quod “gemina operatio providentiae invenitur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria”. Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum qui in hoc volumine exprimitur, quibus omnibus supererminent ipsae primordiales causae, quas auctor vocat deos.

(*Expositio*, 120E, p. 100, l. 295–305).

Superius ostensa est deorum providentia. Verum quia ad divinam providentiam tria concurrunt, scilicet praesidentia, qua ad ipsum pertinet prospicere subiectis propter amorem, qui “superiora movet ad providentiam minus habentium”, unde Dionysius sic dicit 4 cap. *De divinis nominibus*: “Ipse omnium causa pulchro et bono omnium amore per abundantiam amativae bonitatis extra se ipsum fit ad omnia

Secundum est ipse actus regiminis, quo Deus cuncta gubernat. Et sic est hoc nomen 'rex'. Tertium est modus regiminis, quo summus rex sic regit omnia quod non commiscetur cum eis. Tertium est modus regiminis, quo summus rex sic regit omnia quod non commiscetur cum eis. Et ideo nihil inquinatum incurrit in eum. Et sic est hoc nomen 'sanctus'. (*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 17, §1, p. 121, l. 1–10).

Ad horum ergo intellectum considerare primo, quid hoc nomine significetur Deus omnia, quae causat, per providentiam causat eo, quod ipse operatur per intellectum et artem. Et quamvis per se principaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis non deesset universo, cui communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates naturaliter communicabiles, operatur etiam per secundas causas. Et illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus VIII libro *Super Genesim*: "Gemina operatio providentiae reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat lignis et herbis incrementum, partim voluntaria per operationem angelorum et hominum". Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, quem philosophi determinant, scilicet quod primo sunt causae universales, scilicet caelestia et motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae particulares. Cum ergo omnis artifex operans per instrumentum dispositionem artis instrumentis infundat, necessario dispositio divinae providentiae huic conexioni causarum infunditur. Haec ergo

existentia providentiis". Secundum, quod concurrit ad providentiam, est actus regiminis, qui exit a potentia. Tertium est cognitionis eminentia, qua consideret, quid unicuique congruat. Et ideo auctor in praesenti elemento ostendit, qualis sit deorum essentia, potentia et scientia dicens: OMNE etc.

(*Expositio*, 121, p. 105, l. 5–13).

De primo sciendum, sicut aliquando dictum est super 120, duplex est providentia, naturalis scilicet et voluntaria. Et habetur ista distinctio ab Augustino VIII *Super Genesim ad litteram*, ubi dicit tractans illud verbum "ut operaretur et custodiret": "Hinc iam in ipsum mundum velut in quandam magnam arborem rerum oculus cogitationis attollitur atque in ipso quoque gemina operatio providentiae reperitur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria. Naturalis quidem per occultam Dei administrationem, quae et lignis et herbis dat incrementum, voluntaria vero per angelorum opera et hominum. Secundum illam primam caelestia superius ordinari inferiusque terrestria, lumina sideraque fulgere" – et infra – "et quidquid aliud in rebus interiore naturalique motu geritur. In hac autem altera signa dari, doceri et discere, agros coli, societates administrari, artes exerceri, et quaeque alia sive in superna societate aguntur sive in hac terrena atque mortali ita, ut bonis consolatur". Et infra: "Deus itaque super omnia, qui condidit omnia et regit omnia, omnes naturas bonus creat, omnes voluntates iustus ordinat". Haec Augustinus. Verum, quia in naturali providentia est ordo et conexio causarum

dispositio providentiae infusa toti isti conexioni causarum fatum vocatur, ut dicit Boethius, prout philosophi de fato loquuntur.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 256–p. 146, l. 266).

Dispositionem in Deo esse Scriptura testatur, *Sap.* 8: “Disponit omnia suaviter”. Et quod non solum in Deo sit sicut in causa dispositionis rerum, sed sicut in disponente per intellectum, probat Augustinus in libro *Super Genesim* tractans illud *Sap.* 11: “Omnia in mensura, numero et pondere disposuisti”, quia vel haec sunt in creaturis vel in creatore. Non in creaturis, quia sunt facta, et si omnia facta disposita sunt in his, ipsa etiam disposita sunt in se ipsis, quia, si in aliis essent disposita, non omnia Deus in his disposuit. Impossibile autem est rem disponi in se ipsa. Ergo reliquum membrum verum est, scilicet quod haec sunt extra creaturas in creatore et quod disposuisse “omnia in mensura” etc. et omnia disposuisse in se, qui est “mensura omni rei modum praefigens et numerus omni rei speciem praehabens et pondus omnem rem ad quietem trahens”.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §1, p. 97, l. 3–12).

Et licet dispositio divina, inquantum est practica, implicet divinam voluntatem, et inquantum scientia practica Dei est causa scitorum, implicet potentiam, tamen secundum principalem rationem nominis pertinet ad scientiam divinam, in qua secundum rationes exemplares omnia sunt praeordinata. Et quia hoc

essentialium et substantialium, ideo subdividitur in conditivam, contentivam et provisivam.

(*Expositio*, 141A, p. 45, l. 11–26).

De secundo notandum, quod dispositio multa significat. Aliquando enim dicit praedefinitionem simpliciter prime Dei, ut est in ipso praedefiniente secundum illud: “disponit omnia suaviter”. Et quod non solum in Deo sit sicut in causa dispositionis rerum, sed sicut in disponente per intellectum, probat Augustinus *Super Genesim* tractans illud: “omnia in mensura, numero et pondere disposuisti”, quia vel haec sunt in creaturis vel in creatore. Non in creaturis, quia sunt facta, et si omnia facta disposita sunt in his, ipsa etiam disposita sunt in his se ipsis, quia si in aliis essent disposita, non omnia Deus in his disposuisset. Impossibile autem est rem disponi in se ipsa: ergo reliquum membrum verum est, scilicet quod haec sunt extra creaturas in creatore et quod disposuisse “omnia in mensura” etc. est omnia disposuisse in se, qui est “mensura omni rei modum praefigens et numerus omni rei speciem praebens et pondus omnem rem ad quietem trahens”.

(*Expositio*, 144B, p. 75, l. 23–p. 76, l. 34).

Et licet talis dispositio divina implicet divinam voluntatem et, inquantum scientia practica Dei est causa scitorum, implicet potentiam, tamen secundum principalem rationem nominis pertinet ad scientiam divinam, in qua secundum rationes exemplares omnia sunt praeordinata. Et quia hoc attributum appropriatur Verbo divino,

attributum appropriatur Verbo divino, ideo dicit *Glossa* super principium *Genesis*, quod Deus uno modo operatur in Verbo omnia disponendo, “quoniam in ipso condita sunt universa”, *Col.* 1, et parum infra: “Omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt”, scilicet secundum quod conceptus rei res ipsa vocatur.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §3, p. 99, l. 75–82).

Ab hac dispositione efficientia ipsius vocatur dispositio, secundum quod tria distinguuntur opera Dei primo, scilicet creationis, dispositionis, ornatus, et ulterius ipse effectus huius efficientiae vocatur dispositio, *Sap.* 7, “ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum”, et tertio huius effectus habitualiter inserti in natura rerum productio ad actum et perfectionem est etiam dispositio, *Sap.* 8: “Disponit omnia suaviter”, et haec dispositio proprie est effectus providentiae. Unde Boethius in IV libro *De consolatione*: “Providentia est divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit”.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §4, p. 100, l. 83–90).

Ut autem id, quod auctoritate constat, ratione quoque firmetur, praecognoscendum est, quod dicitur per nomen. Natandum ergo, quod, sicut dicit Damascenus in libro II cap. 22, ordo est inter consilium, iudicium, dispositionem, electionem et operationem, quia primo de operandis est “consilium appetitus inquisitivus de his rebus, quae in nobis sunt”. Secundo est

ideo dicit *Glossa* super principium *Genesis*, quod Deus uno modo operatur “in Verbo omnia disponendo”, “quoniam in ipso condita sunt universa”, immo “omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt”, secundum quod conceptus rei vocatur res ipsa. Et ista est prima significatio dispositionis.

(*Expositio*, 144B, p. 76, l. 34–42).

Efficientia ipsius prime Dei, qua omnia in ipsis primordialibus causis et per eas in propriis naturis condidit, dicitur dispositio, secundum quod tria distinguuntur opera Dei prima, scilicet creationis, dispositionis et ornatus. Et sic ulterius quarto ipse effectus huius efficientiae vocatur dispositio *Sap.* 7: “Ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum”. Et quinto huius effectus habitualiter inserti in natura rerum. Productio ad actum et perfectionem est etiam dispositio, *Sap.* 8: “Disponit omnia suaviter”. Et haec dispositio proprie est effectus providentiae secundum illud Boethii IV *De consolatione*: “Providentia est divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit”.

(*Expositio*, 144B, p. 76, l. 46–55).

Verum, ut istud, quod iam dictum est et etiam quod supra de dispositione adductum est, in primis tribus significationibus dispositionis evidentius appareat, considerandum, quod, sicut dicit Damascenus II libro cap. 22, ordo est inter consilium, iudicium, dispositionem et electionem et operationem, quia primo de operandis est consilium, id est appetitus inquisitivus de his rebus, quae in nobis sunt, secundo est

iudicium, quo iudicamus, quid melius. Tertio est dispositio, qua quis disponit et amat, quod iudicatum est ex consilio, et vocatur sententia. Quarto est electio, cum duobus propositis hoc alteri praeoptamus, deinde fit impetus ad opus. Ex hoc patet, quod dispositio in nobis est sententia de aliquo faciendo, sicut consulte iudicatum est fieri. Cum ergo omnia, quae de Deo dicuntur secundum suam perfectionem sine imperfectione, quam habent in creaturis, sumantur, sic etiam est in proposito. Et ideo remoto omni eo, quod dicit dubitationem vel ignorantiam, dispositio Dei est practica praeconceptio in arte divina de rebus faciendis et de modo productionis, scilicet secundum congruitatem locorum et temporum et similium condicionum, et de modo cuiuslibet rei productae, scilicet ut sit in mensura et numero et pondere et in tali perfectione bonitatis, quod creatura sit vestigium creatoris. Nam secundum Augustinum in iv libro *Super Genesim* haec causaliter dicta sunt in solo creatore, sed formaliter dicta et inhaerenter sunt tantum in creaturis.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §1, p. 97, l. 13–p. 98, l. 31).

Sententia quoque dispositionis, licet in nobis dicat conclusionem practicam conclusam ex iudicio, quae est cum intentione affectus ad prosequendum id, quod consiliatum est, quia, ut dicit Damascenus, si iudicat et non diligit illud, quod iudicatum est, non dicitur sententia, tamen in Deo non sic sumitur, quia ipse non cognoscit unum ex alio, sed dicit in Deo infallibilem et immutabilem

iudicium, quo iudicamus quid melius, tertio est dispositio, quo quis disponit et amat, quod iudicatum est ex consilio, et vocatur sententia, quarto est electio, cum duobus propositis hoc alteri praeoptamus, deinde fit impetus ad opus. Ex hoc patet, quod dispositio in nobis est sententia de aliquo faciendo, sicut consulte iudicatum est fieri. Cum ergo omnia, quae de diis dicuntur, secundum suam perfectionem sine imperfectione, quam habent in entibus productis, sumantur, sic etiam est in proposito. Et ideo remoto omni eo, quod dicit dubitationem vel ignorantiam, dispositio deorum est practica praeconceptio in eorum arte de rebus faciendis et de modo productionis, scilicet secundum congruitatem ordinum et ordinatorum et similium condicionum, et de modo cuiuslibet rei productae, scilicet ut sit in mensura et numero et pondere, id est in tali perfectione bonitatis, quod cuiuslibet dei causatum sit vestigium suae causae primordialis.

(*Expositio*, 144E, p. 79, l. 132–148).

Ex praemissis apparet tertium, quod sententia dispositionis, licet in nobis dicat conclusionem practicam conclusam ex iudicio, quae est cum intentione affectus ad prosequendum id, quod consiliatum est – ut enim dicit Damascenus, si iudicat et non diligit illud, quod iudicatum est, non dicitur sententia –, tamen in diis non sic sumitur, cum non cognoscant unum ex alio, sed dicit in eis infallibilem

praeordinationem effectus, secundum quod per omnia congruit rationi iudicii divini. Haec est enim sententia mentalis secundum iudicium prudentiae. Unde sicut dicunt Avicenna et Isaac in libro *De definitionibus*: Sententia est conceptio definitiva et certissima alterius partis contradictionis. Alia vero est sententia Dei iudicialis secundum iudicium iustitiae, quam Deus per ora prophetarum promulgavit secundum ordinem causarum inferiorum. Et quia istae mutabiles sunt, ideo dicit Gregorius, quod Deus non mutat consilium, sed sententiam, ut patet *Is.* 38 et *Ezech.* 33 et *Ion.* 3. Electio vero, prout hic sumitur, non dicit praeordinationem comparisonis unius ad aliud nec etiam dicit illum specialem modum electionis, quo solo salvandi electi sunt aeternaliter a Deo, sed dicit propositum divinae voluntatis de quocumque faciendo, sicut dispositum est. Cum ergo Deus omnia operetur per artificialem intellectum et ab illo nihil possit fieri nisi cum dispositione praedicto modo sumpta, patet, quod necessaria ratione concluditur dispositionem esse in Deo. (*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §2, p. 99, l. 55–63).

et immutabilem praeordinationem effectus, secundum quod per omnia congruit rationi iudicii divini. Haec est enim sententia supermentaliter secundum iudicium prudentiae. Unde, sicut dicunt Avicenna et Isaac in libello *De definitionibus*, “sententia est conceptio definita et certissima” “alterius partis” contradictionis. Cum igitur dii omnia operentur per artificiales intellectus et ab illis nihil possit fieri nisi cum dispositione praedicto modo sumpta, patet, quod necessaria ratione concluditur dispositiones et praeordinationes esse in diis.

(*Expositio*, 144F, p. 79, l. 150–p. 80, l. 161).

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