Peter of Ireland and Berthold of Moosburg on First Being, First Life, and First Mind

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1 Premises

In his “Introduction” to the first volume of the edition of Berthold of Moosburg’s *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, Kurt Flasch refers to the fact that, already at the beginning of the 20th century, writers such as Martin Grabmann and Engelbert Krebs had noted that Berthold’s work was within the tradition of the German Dominican School, ultimately leading back to Albert the Great, which gave rise to a strong Neoplatonic tradition with Ulrich of Strassburg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Meister Eckhart and then the high point of the reception of Proclus with Berthold.¹ Grabmann, Flasch points out, had noted the contrast between this Neoplatonic tendency and the more thoroughgoing Aristotelian approach stemming from Albert’s other pupil, Thomas Aquinas. In an article by Grabmann, one was led to the conclusion that this divergence between Thomas and Ulrich of Strassburg was perhaps also due to the influence of Aquinas’ other teacher, Master Peter of Ireland.²

1 See K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, Prologus, Propositiones 1–13, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. xi: “Gleich zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts lenkten Martin Grabmann und Engelbert Krebs die Aufmerksamkeit auf Berthold; sie stellten ihn vor als einen charakteristischen Autor der deutschen Dominikanerschule, insbesondere als einen Erben Dietrichs von Freiberg. Grabmann sah, daß man in der deutschen Albertschule eine mehr aristotelisierende, eher an Thomas anknüpfende Richtung von einer stärker neuplatonischen Strömung unterscheiden müsse, für die er Ulrich von Straßburg, Dietrich von Freiberg, Meister Eckhart und eben Berthold als charakteristisch ansah.”

2 See M. Grabmann, “Thomas von Aquin und Petrus von Hibernia”, in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 33(1920), p. 347–362. Grabmann, while referring to the research Clemens Baeumker had already carried out on Peter of Ireland, states (p. 360): “Für diese Prägung des Thomistischen Aristotelismus war es, wie Baeumker weiterhin ausführt, vielleicht doch von Bedeutung, daß Thomas, ehe er zu dem Deutschen Albert kam, schon bei Petrus von Hibernia die entscheidende Richtung auf Aristoteles bereits vorgefunden und auf sich hatte wirken lassen. Jedenfalls hat Ulrich Engelberti, der ureigenste Schüler Alberts des Großen, von seinem großen Lehrer eine ganz andere Art der Scholastik ererbt als Thomas von Aquin. Zwischen

Keeping these two distinct but related traditions in mind, what I wish to do here is to make a comparison by concentrating on Proposition 102 of the *Elements* of Proclus and the version known to Peter from Proposition XVII (XVIII) of the *Liber de causis* in order to compare the approaches of Peter of Ireland and Berthold of Moosburg, while at the same time using Aquinas's *Lectio XVIII* of his *Commentary on the Book of Causes* as a bridge between the two traditions.

On the surface, our topic here centres on the classic triad of Being-Life-Intellect which for Plotinus were conceptual distinctions that defined the one hypostasis of *Nous*; Proclus then sees each as hypostases and in precisely that order. This is clarified and the order established already by Proclus in Proposition 101:

All things which participate intelligence are preceded by the unparticipated Intelligence, those which participate life by Life, and those which participate being by Being; and of these three unparticipated principles Being is prior to Life and Life to Intelligence.

For in the first place, because in each order of existence unparticipated terms precede the participated (Prop. 100), there must be Intelligence prior to things being intelligent, Life prior to living things, and Being prior to things which are. And secondly, since the cause of more numerous effects precedes the cause of fewer (Prop. 60), among these principles Being will stand foremost; for it is present to all things which have life and intelligence (since whatever lives and has intellection necessarily exists), but the converse is not true (since not all that exists lives and exercises intelligence). Life has the second place; for what shares in intelligence shares in life, but not conversely, since many things are alive but remain devoid of knowledge. The third principle is Intelligence; for whatever is in any measure capable of knowledge both lives and exists. If, then, Being gives rise to a number of effects, Life to fewer, and Intelligence to yet fewer, Being stands foremost, next to it Life, and then Intelligence.³

der neuplatonisch gerichteten *Summa* Ulrichs und der *Summa theologiae* des Aquinaten bestehen so durchgreifende Unterschiede, daß man für beide nicht den gleichen Lehrer und die gleiche Schule vermuten möchte." See also C. Baeumker, "Petrus de Hibernia. Der Jugendlehrer des Thomas von Aquino und seine Disputation vor König Manfred", Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos.-philolog. und hist. Klasse. Heft 8(1920), p. 41–49. For a different point of view, see A.A. Robiglio, "Neapolitan Gold: A Note on William of Tocco and Peter of Ireland", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 44(2002), p. 107–111.

- 3 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 101, p. 211–216, Latin text at p. 215; English translation by E.R. Dodds in Proclus, *The Elements of Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963²), p. 91.

In fact the triad Being-Life-Intelligence are developed in Propositions 101, 102, and 103 but for the reasons which will become clear below, here we will focus on Proposition 102.

2 Peter of Ireland

Peter of Ireland (Petrus de Hibernia, de Ybernia) was active as a teacher and writer at the University of Naples from perhaps as early as the 1240s until at least the mid-1260s. Born in Ireland sometime towards the beginning of the 13th century, the fact of his career taking place in the South of Italy, with its Norman links with Ireland and England, would make his being of Gaelic origin less probable than his being of an Anglo-Irish family. The lack of a University in Ireland meant that, like Richard FitzRalph a century later, he probably left Ireland at around fifteen years of age to pursue his studies abroad. We do not know at which university he studied but the most likely candidate is Oxford. The historical records we do have place him at the world's first state university at Naples as Professor of Logic and Natural Philosophy in the middle part of the 13th century.

The initial interest of scholars in Peter of Ireland was mainly due to the fact that he was held to be a teacher of the young Thomas Aquinas at Naples University from 1239–44, introducing Thomas to the study of Aristotle and perhaps also to the commentaries of Avicenna and Averroes. However, based upon internal evidence, the surviving works of Peter would seem to date from at least a decade later, and to relate to lectures given in the 1250s and 1260s.⁴

Peter was one of those authors towards the mid-thirteenth century who explored and taught the new learning which had arrived with the translations of Aristotle's works and his Arabic commentators (at a time when these works were forbidden to be taught at the University of Paris). Again, we know from Rabbi Moses ben Solomon of Salerno that he met with Peter of Ireland, whom he called "that wise Christian," and some others in the 1250s to discuss the leading doctrines of Maimonides.⁵ An Aristotelian influence is clear in the way in which Peter did philosophy, where, like his student Thomas Aquinas,

4 Peter of Ireland, *Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, ed. M. Dunne (Louvain-la-Neuve / Paris: Peeters / Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1993); Peter of Ireland, *Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis*, ed. M. Dunne (Louvain-la-Neuve / Paris: Peeters / Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1996).

5 See G. Sermoneta, *Un glossario filosofico ebraico italiano del XIII secolo* (Firenze: Olschki, 1969), p. 45.

a clear distinction between philosophy and theology is maintained. In terms of his philosophical approach he seems to consciously eschew the Christian Neoplatonic tradition.⁶ However, the influence of Arabic Neoplatonism is present in his work especially through his use of Avicenna. The only reference to Plato I have found is in his *Determinatio magistralis*:

Et propter hoc dicit Philosophus: sumus et nos finis omnium, non finis propter quem omnia sunt, sed ut illud cuius dicunt esse omnia propter aliquam utilitatem; sed omnia sunt propter unum motorem omnium, primum scilicet. Et dicitur bonum distinctum, propter quod sunt omnia. Et propter hoc, si sustinentur indiuidua unius speciei per indiuidua alterius speciei uel generis, hoc non est contra naturam ordinantem, sed totum est de bonitate ordinis et de sollicitudine ordinantis datum. Et non est inconueniens quod magis appareat beniuolencia nature in una specie quam in alia, quamuis ex se natura habet equaliter ad influendum, tamen non est equaliter res sunt preparate ad recipiendum influenciam; unde relegata est inuidia ex toto a primo, sicut ait Plato.⁷ Bonum ergo quod dicitur bonum ordinis non inuenitur nisi secundum magis et minus, secundum prius et posterius, et secundum nobilius et uilius; et semper posterius est propter prius, et uilius propter nobilius, et imperfectius propter perfectius, et materia propter formam et motus propter motorem.⁸

The Commentary on the *De longitudine et breuitate vitae* contains extensive quotations from writings by Aristotle, *Physics*, *De caelo*, *De generatione et corruptione*, the fourth book of the *Meteorologia*, *De anima*, *Parua Naturalia*, *De animalibus* and also from the available medical authors, Constantine the

6 The exception being the opening of the *De longitudine* commentary, beginning as it does with the *Liber de causis*, or the *Liber de pura bonitate* as Peter terms it, the original title as translated from the Arabic *Kalām fī maḥd al-khair*. The text is based on the *Elementatio theologica* of Proclus with commentaries by an unknown Arabic author. Peter like many of his contemporaries presumably thought that it was a work of Aristotle although some held it to be by al-Fārābī.

7 Plato, *Timaeus*, ed. J.H. Waszink, *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus* (London / Leiden: The Warburg Institute / Brill, 1962), 29e, p. 22, l. 18: *Optimus erat, ab optimo porro inuidia longe relegata est*.

8 The text of the *Determinatio magistralis* was republished from the 1920 edition of Baeumker in Peter of Ireland, *Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis*, p. 245–250, here p. 248.

African, Galen, Haly Abbas, Isaac Israeli, Nicolaus Damacenus, and al-Rāzī. Peter is aiming at making a conscious attempt to reconstruct Aristotle's philosophy of life by looking at and exploring all of the pertinent sources and not just the text of the *De longitudine*. There are the conventional references to *Physics* v, *Meteorologica* iv, the *De generatione*; but Peter is unusual in giving many references to the *De plantis*, and especially in his extended references to the *De animalibus*. In fact, in style and content Peter is quite close to the more extended treatment of Peter of Spain in his *Questiones super libro De animalibus*.⁹ However, one thing that Peter did not find in his sources listed above was a philosophical discussion of the origin of life and for this he turned in his Prologue to the *Liber de causis*.

The Prologue to the commentary on the *De longitudine* does not deal with Aristotle's text but is, instead, an extended version of a *divisio scientiae* which as a literary form serves to give an idea of the nature and subject of the science which studies the problem in question – life and death – and the reasons why life is short or long. The prologue opens with a long quotation from Proposition xvii(xviii) of *De causis* (inspired by Proposition 102 of the *Elementatio theologica*). In fact, in this short prologue Peter gives two titles for the work, the *Liber de pura bonitate* and the *Liber de causis*. As the subject matter of the commentary will refer to life, its length or shortness, and its contrary death, it is only natural to examine the ultimate origin of life first.

According to Aquinas the purpose of Proposition xvii(xviii) of the *De causis* is to show the universal dependence of all things upon the First Being which is God:

Postquam ostensum est quod res omnes dependent a primo secundum suam virtutem, hic ostendit quod dependent omnia a primo secundum suam naturam. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit universalem dependentiam rerum a primo secundum omnia quae pertinent ad naturam vel substantiam earum, secundo ostendit diversum gradum appropinquationis ad primum a quo dependent, sicut et de dependentia virtutis dixerat, et hoc 19^a propositione, ibi: *Ex intelligentiis est* etc.¹⁰

9 Peter of Spain, *Questiones super libro De animalibus*, ed. F. Navarro Sanchez (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).

10 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002), Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 1–8.

Now let us compare Peter's quotation with that of St Thomas:

Peter of Ireland

*Sicut habetur in libro De pura bonitate: res omnes habent essenciam propter ens primum et res uiue sunt mote per essenciam suam propter uitam primam.*¹¹

Thomas Aquinas

*Primo ergo ponit talem propositionem: res omnes habent essentiam per ens primum, et res vivae omnes sunt motae per essentiam suam propter vitam primam, et res intelligibiles omnes habent scientiam propter intelligentiam primam.*¹²

From the above, it is immediately clear that Peter is selective in his use of the quotation; he is interested in the dependence of beings upon the First Being and of life upon the First Life and excludes those passages in the commentary which refer to knowledge and understanding (*scientia/intelligentia*).

Of course, Peter did not know of the text of Proclus and was not able to make the comparison which Aquinas makes between the two texts.¹³ Aquinas is clear, as distinct from Peter, that in order to understand Proposition XVII (XVIII) we must grasp that all grades of things can be led back to three: being, living and understanding:

*Ad huius autem propositionis intellectum primo quidem considerandum est quod omnes rerum gradus ad tria videtur reducere quae sunt esse, vivere et intelligere. Et hoc ideo quia unaquaeque res tripliciter potest considerari: primo quidem secundum se, et sic convenit ei esse, secundo prout tendit in aliquid aliud, et sic convenit ei moveri, tertio secundum quod alia in se habet, et sic convenit ei cognoscere quia secundum hoc cognitio perficitur quod cognitum est in cognoscente non quidem materialiter sed formaliter.*¹⁴

The question is, why does Peter not refer to the First Intelligence? We cannot be sure but there are a number of reasons, of course, which one might consider. The text of Aristotle which he is commenting on concerns length and shortness

11 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, Prologue, p. 67.

12 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 8–12.

13 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 12–101, l. 3.

14 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 101, l. 8–16.

of life and, as he will show, it is the task of natural philosophy (*physica*) to consider this. It is not, however the task of natural philosophy to consider how the known is in the knower, not materially, but formally, as Aquinas puts it: “cognitum est in cognoscente non quidem materialiter sed formaliter”.¹⁵ Perhaps another reason might have been to avoid certain contemporary debates on the relationship between *intelligentia* and *intellectus*. He condemns the Averroistic doctrine of a single intellect in his commentary on the *Peryermenias*.¹⁶

The *De causis* introduces a distinction with regard to being, life and intelligence, namely, that being is by way of causation, life, and intellect by way of information. St Thomas, following Aristotle and the Ps. Dionysius understands all three to be one and the same as God.¹⁷ Peter, however, in beginning his

15 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 101, l. 15–16. See also, Aquinas, *De sensu et sensato*, p. 5, l. 68–79, where he says that Aristotle never wrote a treatise on intellect *per se*, and that if he had it would have belonged to metaphysics and not the science of nature (referred to in S. Donati, “Albert the Great’s Treatise *De intellectu et intelligibili*. A Study of the Manuscript and Printed Tradition”, in *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 30[2019], p. 162, n. 15). I am grateful to Evan King for drawing my attention to this.

16 Peter of Ireland, *Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis*, I, lect. 1, q. 5, p. 24: *Per distinctionem huius “anime” [16a 6–7] communiter loquentes solvunt hic istud, quod intellectus sunt idem apud omnes, id est quod intellectus conceptus de re apud unum consentiens sit intellectui concepto de re apud alterum et non interimit conceptio unius conceptionem alterius. Set illud est vulgare, primum est sophisticum.*

17 Aquinas quotes this proposition in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 1 c: *Et propter hoc ex nihilo aliquid facere potest; et haec eius actio vocatur creatio. Et inde est quod in Libro de causis, dicitur, quod esse eius est per creationem, vivere vero, et caetera huiusmodi, per informationem. Causalitates enim entis absolute reducuntur in primam causam universalem; causalitas vero aliorum quae ad esse superadduntur; vel quibus esse specificatur, pertinet ad causas secundas, quae agunt per informationem, quasi supposito effectui causae universalis: et inde etiam est quod nulla res dat esse, nisi in quantum est in ea participatio divinae virtutis. Propter quod etiam dicitur in Libro de causis, quod anima nobilis habet operationem divinam in quantum dat esse.* Aquinas also presupposes it in *Quodlibet* III, q. 3, a. 1 c: *Respondeo. Dicendum, quod impossibile est, id quod per creationem producitur, ab alio causari quam a prima omnium causa; cuius ratio est, secundum Platonicos, quia quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto eius causalitas ad plura se extendit. Unde oportet ut in effectibus id quod ad plura se habet, ad superiorem causam referatur. Manifestum est autem quod in ordine principiorum essentialium quanto aliqua forma est posterior, tanto est magis contracta, et ad pauciora se extendit. Quanto autem forma est prior, et propinquior subiecto primo, tanto oportet quod ad plura se extendat. Sequitur ergo quod formae posteriores sunt ab inferioribus agentibus; priores vero et communiores a superioribus. Et sic relinquatur quod id quod est primum subsistens in unoquoque, sit a prima omnium causa. Quaelibet ergo alia causa praeter primam, oportet quod agat praesupposito subiecto, quod est effectus causae primae. Nulla ergo causa alia potest creare nisi prima causa quae est Deus; nam creare est producere aliquid non praesupposito subiecto. Quaecumque ergo non possunt produci in esse nisi per creationem, a solo Deo creantur. Haec autem sunt illa quae, cum sint subsistentia, vel*

Prologue on life as such has to turn to the *Liber de causis* to explain how the plurality of things requires a first. Although Peter does not justify this in the text, Aquinas does so in his commentary:

Secundo considerandum est quod in unoquoque genere est causa illud quod est primum in genere illo, a quo omnia quae sunt illius generis in illo genere constituuntur, sicut inter elementaria corpora ignis est primum calidum a quo omnia caliditatem sortiuntur; non est autem in aliquo rerum ordine in infinitum procedere. Oportet igitur in ordine entium esse aliquod primum quod dat omnibus esse, et hoc est quod dicit quod *res omnes habent essentiam per ens primum*.¹⁸

Similarly, not only being, but life derives from a first:

Similiter oportet in genere viventium esse aliquod primum, et ab hoc omnia viventia habent quod vivant; et quia viventis proprium est quod sit suiipsius motivum, ideo dicit quod *res vivae omnes sunt motae per essentiam suam*, id est sunt moventes seipsas, *propter vitam primam*; unde et in libro Procli dicitur: *omnia viventia suiipsorum motiva sunt propter vitam primam*. Et quod movere seipsum procedit a prima vita, probat subdens: *quoniam vita est processio procedens ex ente primo quieto sempiterno*.¹⁹

non sunt composita ex materia et forma, sed sunt formae in suo esse subsistentes, sicut sunt angeli; vel sunt ea quae si sint composita ex materia et forma, tamen materia eorum non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut est in corporibus caelestibus; utraque enim haec producantur absque productione primi subsistentis in eis. Possunt autem produci in actum absque productione primi subiecti tam composita ex materia et forma, quorum materia est in potentia ad diversas formas, et sic in eadem materia possunt sibi diversae formae succedere; tam etiam formae quae non sunt subsistentes in suo esse, quae quidem non dicuntur esse quia ipsae habeant esse, sed quia subiecta habent aliquid esse secundum eas; unde nec ipsae secundum se dicuntur fieri vel corrumpi, sed in quantum subiecta fiunt entia in actu vel non entia secundum ipsas. Anima autem rationalis est subsistens in suo esse, alioquin non posset habere operationem absque communione suae materiae. Unde relinquitur quod anima rationalis non possit produci in esse nisi per creationem. Et ita patet quod angelus nullo modo sit causa eius, sed solum Deus.

18 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 102, l. 4–11.

19 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 102, l. 11–19.

This first according to Aquinas is as follows:

Sicut autem supra dictum est,²⁰ secundum Platonicos primum ens, quod est idea entis, est aliquid supra primam vitam, id est supra ideam vitae, et prima vita est aliquid supra primum intellectum idealem; sed secundum Dionysium primum ens et prima vita et primus intellectus sunt unum et idem quod est Deus; unde et Aristoteles in *XII^o Metaphysicae* primo principio attribuit quod sit intellectus et quod suum intelligere sit vita, et secundum hoc ab eo omnia habent esse et vivere et intelligere.²¹

Peter, of course, is not aware of the *Elements*, nor does he ever make reference to the Ps. Dionysius. The only slightly parallel notion which I can find in his writings comes from the *Peryermenias* commentary (I, lect. 16, q. 1) when he is making a quite unusual (for him) theological point²² against the Stoics and Epicureans:

Set contra istos [Stoics and Epicureans] sunt ratiocinationes manifeste, quia non est possibile causam primam intelligere aliquid eorum que sunt hic secundum quod hic; nec est dubium quin intelligat et uiuat, cum sit intellectus purus, sicut probatur in naturalibus; intellectus autem purus, qui nullo modo est in potencia semper intelligit; intelligere autem uiuere est [...] si intelligeret res que sunt hic sicut homo intelligit sua scientia, esset per receptionem et esset in potencia intelligens quandoque; set nulla potencia cadit in eo, sicut probatur in naturalibus. Et quia intelligibile est perfectio intelligentis, quia ducit ipsum in actum, patet quoniam nichil intelligit extra se: quod enim esset ducens ipsum in actum, esset

20 Aquinas refers here to his remarks on Prop. 12 of the *De causis* which is actually Prop. 103 of the *Elements*, where Proclus speaks of the first triad of hypotheses, being, life, and intelligence and the three basic relations to which they give rise: causal, essential, and participative.

21 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 103, l. 16–23.

22 According to James McEvoy the entire Christian Neoplatonic tradition is absent from his writings; Boethius is mentioned but only insofar as he is a commentator on Aristotle's logic and remarkably Augustine is entirely absent. Peter maintains a thorough going Aristotelianism and apart from a few comments, there is nothing which would identify him as a Christian. See J.J. McEvoy, "Maître Pierre d'Irlande, professeur in naturalibus à l'université de Naples", in J. Follon, J.J. McEvoy (eds), *Actualité de la pensée médiévale* (Louvain-la-Neuve / Paris: Peeters / Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1994), p. 146–158.

enim tunc aliquid nobilius Deo, et esset ille Deus magis quam primus, et quis esset ille Deus? Patet ergo demonstratiue quoniam nichil intelligit extra se; intelligit ergo se solum per se et primo; sua autem essentia semper sibi est presens; ergo semper intelligit, et sunt in eo quod intelligit et quo intelligit et intelligens idem. Et hec est Trinitas personarum, ad cuius cognitionem omnes aspirabant; sua ergo essentia est sua actio, et actio sua est sua uoluntas [...].²³

3 Berthold of Moosburg

When we turn to Berthold, we see immediately that his concerns at the beginning of the commentary on Prop. 102 are quite different from those of Peter of Ireland. His focus is on the unparticipated (the *amethecta*), the participants, and what is participated. He writes: “having shown the priority of the *amethecta* in respect both of all participants and also in respect of each other, now Proclus indicates the property of some participants, as having its origin in its causes [...]”.²⁴ If we compare Proposition XVII(XVIII) of the *De causis* with Proposition 102 of the *Elements* (the text which Berthold had *prae oculis*) we can note some differences, of course:

Res omnes habent essentiam per ens primum, et res vivae sunt motae per essentiam suam propter vitam primam, et res intelligibiles omnes habent scientiam propter intelligentiam primam. [*Liber de causis*, Prop. XVII(XVIII)]²⁵

Omnia quidem qualitercumque entia ex fine sunt et infinito propter prime ens; omnia autem viventia sui ipsorum motiva sunt propter vitam primam; omnia autem cognitiva cognitione participant propter intellectum primum. [*Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 102].²⁶

Two notions stand out in the text of the *Elementatio* which are not in the *De causis*, namely, “limit and infinite” and “participates” and which will be much of the focus of Berthold’s *Expositio*. In the first part of his commentary (of three parts) he begins with an argument based on intensive and extensive infinity:

²³ Peter of Ireland, *Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis*, I, lect. 16, q. 16, p. 123.

²⁴ See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102, p. 217, l. 7–9: *Postquam ostensa est prioritas amethectorum et ad omnia participantia et inter se, nunc auctor ostendit participantium quorundam proprietatem ex origine suarum causarum dicens*: Omnia.

²⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 9–12.

²⁶ Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, p. 93; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102, p. 217, l. 1–5.

De primo sciendum, quod, sicut apparet prima facie, quod non omnia qualitercumque entia sunt ex fine et infinito. Sive finis accipiatur intensive et infinitas extensive, licet enim omne productum sive principiatum inquantum huiusmodi [...] sit limitatum et finitum in essentia sua saltem respectu superioris, scilicet producentis sive principiantis per 93, non tamen omne tale est infinitum sive participans infinitate extensiva, quia aliquando ens non est nullatenus ens, et sic est qualitercumque ente participans, sed non est infinitae potentiae durationis [...].²⁷

In the second part of the first part, Berthold offers his solution:

Et ideo secundum hoc videtur ipsum elementum quoad primam partem sic debere distingui, quod omnia qualitercumque entia sive existentia ex fine et infinito, cuiusmodi sunt enter entia per 89, sunt talem proprietatem participantia propter prime ens. Quod sic videtur intelligendum, quia, cum omnis causa et ante causatum operetur et cum ipso et post ipsum plurimum est institutiva per 57, ideo, licet prime ens inquantum amethectum non sit ab alia causa, sed ingenitum per 99, tamen, inquantum est unitas quaedam intra ordinem unialem conclusa, procedit a duabus causis, scilicet principali et concausa. Principali, quod est prime unum, quod etiam directe est causa et totalis ipsius prime entis. Concausa, scilicet prima unitate intra ordinem, scilicet prime infinitate, quae est intermedia prime unius et prime entis per 92 in commento. Et per consequens, cum prime unum sit finitas et primo unum infinitas, quae quidem infinitas, licet directe sub ratione infinitatis non agat in ipsum prime ens, inquantum est unitas, cum producat effectus suos secundum gradum determinatae distantiae ad prime unum per declarationem 57 et 59, tamen relinquit in eo vestigium infinitatis.

Et sic prime ens, licet sit unitas, tamen quasi compositum est ex finitate ratione prime unius et infinitate ratione secundo unius, scilicet prime infinitatis, quae in ipso prime ente et cum ipso agunt, derivat enter entibus non solum entitatem ratione propriae intentionis, in qua est prime, sed etiam finitatem et infinitatem, inquantum agit in ratione superiorum. Et sic omnia qualitercumque existentia ex fine et infinito sunt propter prime ens.²⁸

²⁷ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102A, p. 217, l. 14–21.

²⁸ Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102B, p. 217, l. 28–p. 218, l. 48.

Aquinas on this point is more succinct:

Et hoc idem dicitur in libro Procli cII propositione, sub his verbis: *omnia quidem qualitercumque entia ex fine sunt et infinito, propter prime ens. Omnia autem viventia suiipsorum motiva sunt propter vitam primam. Omnia autem cognitiva cognitione participant propter intellectum primum. Dicit autem quod omnia sunt ex fine et infinito propter prime ens quia, ut supra habitum est in 4 propositione, ens creatum compositum est ex finito et infinito.*²⁹

In fact, Aquinas had clarified this before in his exposition of Proposition 4:

Quam quidem compositionem etiam Proclus ponit LXXXIX^a propositione, dicens: *Omne enter ens ex fine est et infinito*. Quod quidem secundum ipsum sic exponitur: Omne enim immobiliter ens infinitum est secundum potentiam essendi; si enim quod potest magis durare in esse est maioris potentiae, quod potest in infinitum durare in esse est, quantum ad hoc, infinitae potentiae. Unde ipse praemisit in LXXXVI^a propositione: *omne enter ens infinitum est, non secundum multitudinem, neque secundum magnitudinem, sed secundum potentiam solam, scilicet existendi*, ut ipse exponit. Si autem aliquid sic haberet infinitam virtutem essendi quod non participaret esse ab alio, tunc esset solum infinitum; et tale est Deus, ut dicitur infra in 16^a propositione. Sed, si sit aliquid quod habeat infinitam virtutem ad essendum secundum esse participatum ab alio, secundum hoc quod esse participat est finitum, quia quod participatur non recipitur in participante secundum totam suam infinitatem sed particulariter. In tantum igitur intelligentia est composita in suo esse ex finito et infinito, in quantum natura intelligentiae infinita dicitur secundum potentiam essendi; et ipsum esse quod recipit, est finitum. Et ex hoc sequitur quod esse intelligentiae multiplicari possit in quantum est esse participatum: hoc enim significat compositio ex finito et infinito.³⁰

In the second part, Berthold concludes:

Cum ergo prime ens sit quodammodo et finitum et infinitum, necessarium est omnia qualitercumque entia participare eadem proprietate per 97, fine scilicet et infinitate. Cum ergo diversus sit modus participandi, et omnia entia participant finitate, et quaedam participant infinitate

29 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 12–101, l. 7.

30 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 4, p. 30, l. 8–30.

et intensiva et extensiva semper et connaturaliter, necessarium videtur omnia entia esse ex fine et participare saltem aliqualem illustrationem infinitatis, cum infinitas in plus se habeat entitate. Et sic omne ens est aliquid infinitum, sed non e converso.³¹

4 First Being and First Life

Now let us return to Peter of Ireland and to the opening text of his Prologue where Peter gives a suitably magisterial overview of the ultimate origin of all being and life from the First Being and First Life:

*Sicut habetur in libro De Pura Bonitate: res omnes habent essenciam propter ens primum et res uiue sunt mote per essenciam suam propter uitam primam, et hoc est sicut dicit ibi commentator, quia omnis causa dat aliquid suo causato, unde ens primum dat causatis suis esse et uita prima dat causatis suis motum. Vnde dicit quod uita est processio procedens ab ente primo, quieto et sempiterno. Et quamuis ens primum det causatis suis esse et uita prima dat hiis que sub ipsa sunt uitam, non tamen eodem modo, quia ens primum dat esse per modum creacionis, set uita prima non dat uitam per modum creacionis, set per modum forme.*³²

Now life consists in some kind of capacity to initiate movement or change, but not everything has such a capacity; not all things which are have the perfection of living, yet it is being which is common to all existing things, living or otherwise. What is meant, then, by the statement that being is given *per modum creationis* and life *per modum formae*? Aquinas distinguishes between two modes of causality: the first is when something comes to be *praesupposito altero* and this is called *feri aliquid per informationem* (Peter uses the term *infusio*) because that which comes afterwards *se habet ad id quod presupponitur per modum formae*; the second type of causality is when something comes to be *nullo praesupposito*, and this is what is called creation.

Aquinas explains it this way:

Tertio considerandum quod ista tria diversimode causantur in rebus, sive a diversis principiis secundum Platonicos, sive ab eodem principio secundum fidei doctrinam et Aristotelis. Est enim duplex modus causandi: unus quidem quo aliquid fit praesupposito altero, et hoc modo

³¹ See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102C, p. 218, l. 55–61.

³² Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, Prologus, p. 67.

dicatur fieri aliquid per informationem, quia illud quod posterius advenit se habet ad illud quod praesupponebatur per modum formae; alio modo causatur aliquid nullo praesupposito, et hoc modo dicitur aliquid fieri per creationem. Quia ergo intelligere praesupponit vivere et vivere praesupponit esse, esse autem non praesupponit aliquid aliud prius; inde est quod *primum ens dat esse omnibus per modum creationis. Prima autem vita*, quaecumque sit illa, *non dat vivere per modum creationis, sed per modum formae*, id est informationis; et similiter dicendum est de *intelligentia*. Ex quo patet quod, cum supra dixit intelligentiam esse causam animae, non intellexit quod esset causa eius per modum creationis, sed solum per modum informationis, ut supra expositum est.³³

One term which Aquinas does not address here is the concept of *processio* / *procedere*, found of course in the text of the *De causis* and *Elementatio*. Peter uses the term only once apart from quoting the *De causis* and in quite a different context:

Vnde, credendo quod uita celi non sit processio sui motus a primo motore separato, <s>et a motore coniuncto, necesse est ponere duplicem motorem primi mobilis, coniunctum et separatum.

Avicenna and Algazel assigned two movers to each heaven, a conjoined mover or soul, and a separated mover or Intelligence. The Intelligences impart motion to the heavens whereas the soul is the substantial form of the heavens. Thinkers such as Aquinas identify the Intelligences with Angels but there is no sign of such an identification here. Peter seems to reject the emanationist theory that life is a procession from the First Separate Mover (God) but instead assigns two movers to the *primum mobile*.³⁴

One can interpret *processio* to mean that the One, like any other reality which produces something else, does so because of its perfection and abundance of power. The activity of procession does not diminish the One or lessen its perfection. Nor is procession a transition such that what is produced is something completely different from that which produces it. Procession, rather, is a process by which the One produces a multiplication of itself through its power – what proceeds is, therefore, similar to what produces it, with the producer remaining more perfect than the produced. The produced has the same nature as the producer but not in the same way. Thus, the *vita prima* contains the

33 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 104, l. 1–17.

34 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, Prologus, p. 69.

forms in itself in an infinitely perfect way whereas the forms in the produced are such in a similar but, in relation to the One, imperfect way.

The terminology which Peter uses in the Prologue is, as I have mentioned, quite unique compared with the rest of his texts, which is to be expected. *Processio* I have already mentioned, but the same is true of *creo/-are* and *creatus*, *-a -um* – all the occurrences with one exception are to be found in the Prologue. The occurrences of the word *forma* are also heavily concentrated here, with 19 out of a total of 33 occurrences found in the few opening pages.

Peter's conclusion from the *De causis* is that life is to be found in living things in the way of a form and not in the way of a created thing and, secondly, that life does not become actual, does not go out into being (*exire in esse*), by means of creation but only in the way that form does, that is, by infusion. A living thing exists as a result of both activities / modes of procession.³⁵

The next two paragraphs of Peter's text consist of a series of syllogisms which reduce being (contingent), life, and substance to their formal cause and brings both Boethius and Aristotle into line with the *Liber de causis*. As can be seen, Peter's central focus is upon the notion of form as the source of life. In the first paragraph, Peter makes use of two phrases, the first from Boethius and the second from Aristotle, almost as if they were sayings (confirmed by their use also by Albert the Great).³⁶ The first is drawn from the *De Trinitate* of Boethius³⁷ and states that every being derives from form. All being then is dependent on

35 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, Prologus, p. 67: *Quod potest intelligi dupliciter: quod uita sit in uiuentibus per modum forme et non per modum rei create; non enim forma est creata, sicut iam ostendetur. Vnde potest sic intelligi quod uita non exit in esse per uiam creacionis, set per uiam per quam exit forma, scilicet per infusionem et utroque modo uiuum.*

36 See also Albert the Great, *De Morte et vita*, ed. A. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, vol. 9 (Paris: Vivès, 1890), p. 346–347: *His ergo sic praelibatis, accipiamus ex probatis a nobis in physicis libris, quod vita est actus primus et essentialis et continuus animae in corpus, non per modum somni, sed per modum vigiliae existens ab anima in ipsum. Dico autem actum perfectionem quam endelechiam Graeci vocant. Sicut enim cuiuslibet essentiae formalis quae dat esse et rationem ei in quo est, proprius et primus actus est esse quod dat ei cuius est forma: ita formae determinatae et specificatae quae ultima est et convertibilis, est dare determinatum et specificatum esse quod est ab ea essentialiter, sicut actus lucere essentialiter convenit luci. Cum ergo anima sit quaedam formarum specificantium, sibi essentialiter convenit dare animato corpori specificatum et determinatum esse. Et hoc esse vocatur vita in viventibus: et ideo egregie dictum est, quod vivere viventibus est esse.*

37 Boethius, *De Trinitate*, ed. C. Moreschini, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica* (München / Leipzig: Saur, 2005²), c. 2, p. 169, l. 79–83: [...] *in divinis intellectualiter versari oportebit neque ducere ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae vere forma neque imago est et quae ipsum esse est ex qua esse est. Omne namque esse ex forma est [...].*

that form which is being itself and from which being derives. Now, Peter continues, the being of living things is being, therefore the being of living things is from form.³⁸ The second argument comes from Aristotle (*De anima*, 11 iv): life in living things is “to be” (*esse*); therefore to live is from form; but to live is life; therefore, life is from form.

In the next paragraph, the same argument of Aristotle is taken up again:

Item, argumentum Aristotilis est: *uiuere uiuentibus est esse; set nichil est causa esse nisi substantia*; ergo substantia est causa uiuere; set uita est causa uiuere; ergo uita est substantia; set non materia, non compositum; ergo forma.³⁹

Life in living things is existence, but the cause of existence in all things is substance; therefore, substance is the cause of living. However, life comes from the life which is the cause of living; therefore, life is from substance; but not matter or the composite, therefore from form. However, what kind of form? Peter now suggests that forms are not created and provides the reasons why:

Quod autem forma non sit creata, patet: quia omne quod est creatum est hoc aliquid; forma non est hoc aliquid; ergo non est creata. Quod autem forma non sit hoc aliquid, patet, quia omne quod est hoc aliquid est id quod est; forma non est id quod est; ergo non est hoc aliquid.

Probatio assumptionis: id quo est unumquodque quod est, non est id quod est; forma autem est quo est unumquodque quod est; ergo forma non est id quod est. Immo uidetur quod ita debeat formari: id quo est unumquodque quod est, non est id quod est; forma est quo est unumquodque quod est, ergo non est id quod est.

Item, quod forma non sit hoc aliquid patet per Aristotelem in principio secundi *De Anima*: ibi enim dicit quod *forma est secundum quam unumquodque est hoc aliquid*, nam forma non est creata set infusa, uita uero infusa et non creata.⁴⁰

38 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et breuitate vitae*, Prologus, p. 67: *Quod patet hoc modo: omne enim esse est a forma; esse uiuentium est esse; ergo esse uiuentium est a forma. Set uiuere uiuentibus est esse; ergo uiuere est a forma; set uiuere est uita; ergo uita est a forma.*

39 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et breuitate vitae*, Prologus, p. 67.

40 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et breuitate vitae*, Prologus, p. 67–68.

Since everything which is created is a certain determined thing (*hoc aliquid*), form cannot be said to belong to this category because it is not a certain thing. Thus, together with the reasons which we have already seen, it can be affirmed that form is not something which has been created. In order to explain this, Peter introduces the real distinction, found in Boethius (but ultimately drawn from Aristotle), between *id quod est* and *id quo est*. The form is the *id quo est* of the *id quod est* since it causes the *id quod est* to be; it is the reason for its being. The argument is reinforced by the quotation drawn from Aristotle where he says that form is that according to which something is a certain individual thing. Thus, Peter brings the introductory part of the Prologue to an end, concluding that the forms or perfections of things are not created but are infused, and since life is a form, it is not created but infused, it seems, by procession. Peter affirms this by quoting the text of the “commentary” of the *De causis*: “the first life gives life to those who are under it, not by way of creation, but by way of form”. Aquinas, as we have seen, concludes in a similar way.⁴¹

The rest of Peter’s text deals with some *dubia* such as whether the life of the heavens is the same as life in the sublunary world; whether the soul is a mover; and whether natural philosophy is the right part of philosophy to deal with length and shortness of life. It is interesting to note that Peter dwells on the different kinds of motion but also the differing kinds of life as Berthold will also do as we shall see below.

Whereas Berthold’s classification will be quite original, Peter’s overview of the world of living things is strictly Aristotelian:

Viure ergo quod est ab anima dicitur multipliciter: quod testatur Aristotiles in libro *De Anima* dicens: uiuere dicto multipliciter, et⟨si⟩ secundum unumquodque alicui inest ipsum uiuere dicimus, ut intellectum, ⟨sensum⟩, motum secundum locum uoluntarie, secundum alimentum, crementum, detrimentum. Ex quo patet quod non solum animalia uiuunt, set eciam plante: habent enim potenciam et principium motus in se, secundum quem per alimentum sussiunt crementum et detrimentum. Sic ergo concludit Aristotiles quod plante uiuunt. Vnumquodque enim uiuit in fine quousque accipiat alimentum, et cum non possit sucipere alimentum, non amplius natum est uiuere. Et ita potencia uegetatiua in mortalibus est causa uite. Vnde alibi dicit Aristotiles quod uegetatiua est communissima potencia anime,

41 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 104, l. 12–17. See note 33, above.

secundum quam inest uiuere omnibus uiuentibus. Ista enim potencia potest separari ab omnibus aliis in mortalibus, alie uero nullo modo ab ista: quedam enim animalia uiuunt uegetacione et sensu et non habent motum uoluntarium secundum locum, sicut sunt animalia que uiuunt per adherenciam, et hec non sunt perfecta animalia, immo sunt medium inter animalia perfecta et plantas. Viuunt enim per adherenciam sicut plante, set addunt aliquid super uitam plante: uita enim plante non est nisi uita occulta, set sensus est illustracio uite, sicut habetur ab Aristotile in principio primi *De Vegetabilibus*. Primus autem sensus, scilicet tactus, separabilis est ab omnibus aliis, set alii omnes nequaquam separantur ab ipso. Maxime autem dicitur uiuere quod habet in se omnem causam uite, scilicet intellectum, sensum, motum secundum locum et cetera. Vnde dicitur in *6 Principiis* quod rationale animancius est bruto.⁴²

5 First Life and First Mind

In the second part of his commentary, Berthold looks firstly at the different kinds of movement and secondly, at the different motions of those living things which move themselves.

He begins with a long quotation from Dionysius, *De diuinis nominibus* 9.9:

Moveri ipsum religiose aestimandum est non secundum portationem aut mutationem aut alterationem aut modalem aut localem motum, non directum, non circularem, non est ambobus, non intelligibilem, non animale, non naturalem, sed eo, quod ad substantiam agat Deus, et contineat omnia et totaliter omnia provideat et eo, quod assit omnibus, omnium circuitu et ad existentia omnia provisivis processibus et operationibus. Set et motus Dei immobilis, si decet Deum laudari sermone, permittitur, et rectum quidem intelligere convenit neque declinabilem et inflexibilem processum operationum et ex ipsa totorum generationem, obliquum autem stabilem processum et generativum statum, secundum circulum autem identitatem et media et extrema circumdantia et circumdata continere et conversionem ad ipsum eorum, quae ab ipso processerunt.⁴³

42 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, Prologus, p. 69–70.

43 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102D, p. 219, l. 68–79.

This allows Berthold to distinguish between different kinds of motion:⁴⁴

Motus portationis qui est motus per accidens, sicut anima movetur motu corporis, et, cum sint quattuor species motus violenti – pulsio, tractio, vectio, vertigo – positus unus fuit pro omnibus.

Motus scilicet mutatio substantialis per quam res substantialiter mutatur.

Motus alterationis: secundum quamcumque formam accidentalem.

Motus modalis quo res se habet aliter quam prius.

Motus modalis qui est ad ubi, licet causaliter sit ad formam.

Motus intelligibilis: de potentia habituali ad habitum et imperfectum et perfectum et de habitu ad actum.

Motus animalis, qui est secundum passiones animalium, quae dicuntur animales motus et sunt coniuncti.

Motus naturalis: perficit per principia naturalia et modo naturali sui quoad motum naturae, qui est ad unum. Item est motus rectus, circularis et obliquus.

Motus vitalis qui tamen est in intelligibili, animali et naturali comprehenditur.

In 102E,⁴⁵ Berthold begins by stating that a living thing is said to share in life, and so it differs from a non-living thing by having within itself the principle of its own motion, and consequently that everything which has in itself the principle of its own motion is said to be alive, whether such a principle is distinguished either in reality and intention because there is a part of living – as in animals, or by reason only as in partial and complete souls, of which some is life and living, and in intellects which although they live, yet are not properly life. And thus living is said to differ from life, which is “the way and movement from the steadfast substance of being” (Prop. 102 comm.) or from the unmoving being.

Berthold now lists different levels of life:⁴⁶

*Vita essentialis: quaedam incessabilis ebullitio sive scaturrigo manens in propria identitate inegressibiliter.*⁴⁷

44 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102D, p. 219, l. 80–94.

45 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102E, p. 219, l. 96–p. 220, l. 116.

46 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102E, p. 220, l. 104–116.

47 See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 100D, p. 206, l. 108: *fontana scaturrigo*; Prop. 131E, p. 196, l. 176–186: *In intellectibus etiam invenitur transfusio, quo aliud fluat in aliud [...]. Similiter se habet in aliis substantiis separatis, quae sunt entia ut simpliciter et*

Vita intellectualis: esse intellectuale seu entitas intellectualis, conueritur in se ipsam, et sic se tota se totam penetrat.

Vita animae totalis: etiam est esse ipsius, est motus intellectus practici, qui est esse mobilis, inquantum est mobile [see Prop. 102 D]

Vita immortalitas: est fortis et indeclinabilis et sempiterni motus [cf. De div. nom. 6.1]

Vita intellectus: coniuncta potentiis organicis est motiva per inclinationem suam, quae vocatur voluntas.

Vita materialis et organica: movet per appetitum sensibilem, animalis secundum locum et secundum affectiones.

Vita imperfectam cognitionem sensitivam habens: movet secundum constrictionem et dilationem in eodem loco.

Ultima vita: secundum ultimam resonantiam habet vivere, est motus consequens naturam nutritibilis generis.

Berthold concludes this second part by stating that every living thing moves itself by means of a vital movement. And since every property existing in living things, inasmuch as they participate in life, are necessarily led back to something first as such, the conclusion is that all living things are self-moving on account of the first life.

The third part allows Berthold to distinguish between the different kinds of knowers in general.⁴⁸

Sensitivum: sensitivum exterior quod etiam est quintuplex in perfectis animalis non orbatis; sensitivum communis quod sequitur imaginativum et hoc cogitativum.

Ratiocinativum: opinativum, creditivum and scientificum.

Intellectivum: infimum, medium, and supremum.

Superintellectivum: super quae omnia secundum suos gradus.

secundum speciem. Et in hoc consistit quaedam ebullitio sive fontana scaturrigo talis substantiae in causando aliquid extra et ita est redundans in aliquid aliud extra se; cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. B. Mojsisch, Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), 1.8.1–2, p. 141, l. 46–p. 142, l. 71. See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 167B, p. 59, l. 40–41: Verum primus intellectus, scilicet secundum causam, principalformiter est fontana scaturrigo omnis intellectualitatis [...].

48 See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102G, p. 220, l. 129–135.

Next, a long quotation from the *De providentia* allows Berthold to distinguish between the various ways in which the various knowers participate in knowing:⁴⁹

Cognitivum per essentiam, scilicet intellectuales hypostases, in quibus idem est cognitivum, cognitio, cognitum et ratio essendi.

Cognitivum quod semper et connaturaliter cognitione participat sicut sunt animae totales et huiusmodi.

Quod quandoque cognitione participat, sicut sunt animae, et hoc sive intellectuali sive rationali sive sensitiva.

This allows Berthold to reach his conclusion in 102I, that all things which share in knowing are such because of the first intellect, which is the summit of all cognition.⁵⁰

This is something Aquinas himself had confirmed:

[...] unde et in libro Procli dicitur quod *omnia cognitiva cognitionem participant propter intellectum primum*. Et ratio huius assignatur quia *omnis scientia radicaliter non est nisi intelligentia*; intelligentia enim est summitas quaedam, ut Proclus dicit, *omnis cognitionis*; unde *intelligentia est primum cognoscens et influens cognitionem supra omnia cognoscentia*.⁵¹

6 Conclusion

This brief examination of how three medieval authors in chronological order dealt with a text, originally written by Proclus, reworked and made known as a ps.-Aristotelian work before being 'returned' to its original author, is revealing of and revealed by how our three authors were challenged and rose to that interpretative challenge in different and innovative ways. The focus shifts between the 'Aristotelian' interpretation of Peter of Ireland, the mediation of Thomas Aquinas who Janus-like looks back and then forward to the thoroughgoing Platonic approach of Berthold of Moosburg.

49 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102H, p. 221, l. 155–162.

50 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102I, p. 221, l. 164–166: *Ex praemissis satis habetur tertium, scilicet quod omnia, quae cognitione participant, sunt huiusmodi propter prime intellectum, qui est summitas omnis cognitionis*.

51 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 103, l. 10–15.

Peter of Ireland does, however, make one final reference to Proposition 102/18 at the end of his *Prologue* as he concludes his *divisio scientiae* as a justification of why he, as a teacher of natural philosophy, is dealing with the topic of life. Here is what he has to say:

Vnde quamuis uita non sit corpus neque a corpore proprie loquendo, saluatur tamen per ea que sunt in corpore, ut per calidum et humidum et cetera; et quia physice per se est considerare causam saluacionis uite in uiuente, propter hoc sciencia de uita et de eius opposito ad ipsam pertinet. Alio tamen modo considerando uitam secundum eius causam efficientem primam, non pertinet ad physicam considerare secundum quod sic diffinitur in libro *De Causis*: uita est processio procedens ab ente primo, quieto et sempiterno. Sic ergo patet de quo sit ista sciencia, quia de passione concomitante ipsam animam uegetabilem in corpore, de qua demonstrat aliam passionem, scilicet longitudinem et breuitatem. Vnde proprie intendit in hac sciencia inquirere causam longitudinis et breuitatis uite. Omnia autem mensurantur periodo, non tamen eodem, sicut habetur in physicis, quia quedam mensurantur reuolucione que fit una die, quedam autem reuolucione que attenditur secundum reuolucionem lune, quedam autem secundum reuolucionem solis; et ita quedam uiuunt per unam diem, quedam per plures, quedam per mensem, et sic deinceps. Etsi causa huius diuersitatis longitudinis et breuitatis uite sit diuersitas reuolucionum corporum supercelestium, tamen hanc diuersitatem non attendit hic primo et per se, set diuersitatem que attenditur secundum principia materialia uiuentis, secundum tamen quod regulatur a superioribus.⁵²

By way of conclusion, Peter as a natural philosopher, will walk a different path than that of Proclus' triad of Being-Life-Intellect but maybe while accepting that the way of Proclus is perhaps a higher path.

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⁵² Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et breuitate vitae*, p. 71–72.

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