CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

PHILOSTRATUS

T.J.G. WHITMARSH

The Philostratean corpus¹ is large and varied, but only one work stands out for its narratologically rich handling of time. *In honour of Apollonius of Tyana* is, at one level, a biography of the eponymous holy man (hence its most common mistitling as *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana*). Its narrative spans the life of its protagonist, progressing (mostly) chronologically, and its focus is almost exclusively upon him and his actions. Even so, it is crucially not a conventional biography—for Apollonius is not a conventional biographical subject, but a holy man, a *theios anēr*, operating in the grey area between mortal, hero and god. Just as Apollonius conflates different categories (mortal, divine, heroic),² so Philostratus' work exceeds the received boundaries of genre, sloping from biography into encomium, even hymn. The representation and manipulation of time is a crucial vehicle for Philostratus' strategy. As we shall see, the ability to slip between multiple time-frames—shared by narrator and subject alike—is emblematic of the potent otherness of this extraordinary text.

Time awareness

The central role of time in the narrative presentation of *In honour of Apollonius of Tyana* (henceforth *Apollonius*) is visible from the very start, where the narrator promises programmatically to 'give an accurate account (*exakribōsai*) of the man and the times (*tois khronois*) when he said or did this or that' (1.2). Like the claim to 'accuracy' (*akribēia*), the emphasis upon strict chronology looks to Thucydides (→), an important

¹ On questions of authorship and attribution see de Lannoy 1997.

² On problems of categorisation of Apollonius see esp. Jones 2004.

narratorial (and indeed stylistic) model for this text.³ Chronological progression is, indeed, the guiding narrative principle throughout.

The narrative is also presented subsequently. The narrator gives considerable emphasis to his chronological posterity to events. Thus, when introducing Apollonius for the first time, he comments that the former ‘lived in times (*khronous*) neither ancient nor recent’ (1.2). The narrator also displays prominently his status as a ‘rewriter’ (cf. *metagrapσαι*, 1.3) of the transmitted sources on the life of Apollonius, particularly Damis.⁴ The attention paid to the narrator’s activity qua narrator, handling his sources, recalls Herodotus (→) and Herodian (→), and presents a special version of the ‘reference to the narrator’s own time’ motif.

On several occasions, the narrator intervenes to corroborate the transmitted account based on his own experience: here, present tenses such as ‘I know’ (*oida*) or ‘I think’ (*hēgoumai*) transport us out of the past-tense narrative.⁵ In the most explicit acknowledgement of this, the narrator claims at one point that there was more love of gladiatorial games in Athens at the time of Apollonius ‘than now (*nun*) in Corinth’ (4.22), an example of the ‘reference to the narrator’s own time’ motif that goes back via Herodotus (→) to Homer (→).

Time also has an abstract, ineffable, mystic quality about it, eluding the comprehension of mere mortals. Apollonius—who, we are told, himself had a prodigious memory—sang a hymn to memory, in which he said that everything withers through time (*khronos*), but thanks to memory time (*khronos*) itself is ageless and undying (1.14). When arraigned before Domitian, he was asked by the emperor who was his advocate: ‘Time (*khronos*)’, he replied, ‘the spirit of the gods, and the love of wisdom’ (3.34). This evokes the traditional⁶ Greek language of time as the great arbiter of justice (and hints self-referentially at the sage’s final vindication through the narrative we are reading); but it also demonstrates Apollonius’ otherworldly attention to the *longue durée* rather than the immediate surroundings. Apollonius perceives time from a more detached perspective than the humans around him.

This is also expressed in the different chronological frameworks employed within the narrative. Apollonius himself, like his teachers, the

³ For Thucydides’ emphasis upon chronology see Th. 2.1; for the importance of Thucydidean *akribeia* to Philostratus in *Apollonius* see *SAGN* 1:425–426.

⁴ *SAGN* 1:424–430.

⁵ 2.2, 7, 18; 3.8, 41; 4.13; 5.2; 6.27; 7.1; 8.31.

⁶ Particularly in tragedy: cf. in general de Romilly 1968.

Brahmans (3.30; and also the Ethiopian sages, 6.4), is said to have been preternaturally long-lived (8.29; cf. 1.14). During this long period, we encounter numerous Roman emperors. Apollonius interacted directly with Nero, Vespasian, Titus, Domitian and Nerva, but he is in fact already active under Tiberius (1.15): if we count Claudius, Galba, Otho and Vitellius too (each of whom Apollonius knew well enough to criticise them, 5.32), then the fabula spans ten reigns. In other literature too, of course, time can be quantified imperially: this is how Suetonius (in his *Lives of the Caesars*) and Plutarch proceed, and also later historians such as Philostratus' contemporary Cassius Dio (and the slightly later → Herodian). In *Apollonius*, however, emperors are said to have come and gone with seeming rapidity (and sometimes without direct impact on the main narrative), as though they were bit-players in the macro-narrative of Apollonius' ministry.

Even so, imperial chronology of one kind plays an important subterranean role. The Apollonian fabula spans the period from Tiberius to Nerva,⁷ a significant phase in the history of the Roman empire. Now it might of course be argued that the fabula was determined by historical reality. It is not, however, clear that our narrator—who ponders the question whether Apollonius died aged 90 or 100, or indeed died at all (8.29)—knows any exact historical dates for him. The traditions surrounding Apollonius' birth and death were no doubt overlain with contradictory mythicism as quickly as those about Jesus.⁸ The choice of the Tiberius-to-Nerva fabula is better explained as a strategic one: this means that the backdrop for Apollonius' actions is always Roman political turbulence. Behind the apparent disregard for politics ('no polity concerns me', said the sage, 'for I live under the gods' command', 5.35), *Apollonius* reflects a conventional narrative (found in, for example, Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio Chrysostom) of first-century politics: Tiberius was the author of decline (explicitly stated by Apollonius at 5.32), and Trajan (implicitly) was the restorer of the 'new age' of liberty.

Roman politics also affect the presentation of time in another way. Datable events almost always concern Rome,⁹ and more particularly the emperor. Thus we read of the opening of Nero's gymnasium (4.42), the imprisonment of Musonius Rufus (4.46; M. Rufus in gaol). Nero's

⁷ Nerva's death coincides, at least approximately, with Apollonius' (8.27).

⁸ E.g. Lane Fox 1992.

⁹ The exceptions are natural disasters, such as the famine at Ephesus and the earthquakes in the eastern Mediterranean (4.4).

tour of Greece and ban on philosophers (4.47), Vindex' revolt (5.10), the year of the four emperors (5.11; 69 CE), Titus' capture of Jerusalem (6.29), Domitian's vine edict (6.42), the purifying of the Vestal cult (7.6), the murder of Sabinus (7.7), the relegation of Orphinus and Rufus (7.8), Domitian's murder (8.25).¹⁰

Time in Greece, on the other hand, operates in a different way.¹¹ Here, the only time-markers are annually recurrent, namely festivals (the Epidaurian, 4.17–18; the Athenian Dionysia, in the month of Anthesterion, 4.21) and the traditional league meeting of the Amphictyonic Council (4.23). Whereas Rome is the site of development and change, Greece is dominated by cyclical repetition. Indeed, much of Apollonius' labour is devoted to restoring Hellenic temples, customs and manners to the way they were.¹² Time at Rome expresses change; time in Greece preserves things as they were. The two temporal systems, Roman and Greek, collide when Nero shifts the Olympic games to coincide with his visit to Greece in CE 67. Apollonius, predictably, disapproves: 'I predict he will win *in* Olympia, for who is foolhardy enough to stand against him? But he will not win *the* Olympia [viz. the Olympic games], since they are not holding them at the right time' (5.7).¹³

Apollonius, however, is not a straightforward ambassador of traditional Hellenism. His own temporal routine is derived from mystical oriental ritual, and is built around the natural cycles of the day. In India, a number of prescriptions surround time: strangers are only allowed in Taxila for three days at a time (2.23); the king is not allowed

¹⁰ Domitian's particular attempts to control time will be discussed below, in the section on books 7 and 8.

¹¹ For different constructions of time within the same cultural unit see Csapo & Miller 1998: in classical Athens, aristocratic time is 'experienced simultaneously as unity, continuity, and eternal repetition' (97; cf. 97–100 *passim*); democratic-imperial time, on the other hand, is a linear construct privileging change and the potentiality for development (100–104).

¹² 1.2; 4.5 (Lucullus); 4.16 (statue of Palamedes); 4.21 (emphasis on the glorious Athenian past); 4.22 (gladiatorial games decried); 4.23 (tomb of Leonidas); 4.27 (Spartans exhorted to the ancient ways); 4.32 (another Spartan); 5.20 (an Athenian is rebuked by comparison with ancestors). Nero is also implicitly praised for allowing the cities to be rejuvenated (5.21). Both Apollonius (e.g. 3.31; 6.21) and the narrator (e.g. 1.1; 7.1, 21) use positive examples drawn from the Greek past. Cf. e.g. Swain 1996: 387–388. Interestingly, not all archaism is good: *arkhaia* is used as insult to the backward Baeticans (5.9).

¹³ We do, however, find Domitian celebrating the festival of Adonis (7.32): cf. below, section on books 7 and 8.

to spend time with the Brahmins for more than one day (3.34); and, in particular, the Brahmins perform their religious rituals at significant times, namely midnight, midday, daybreak (3.33). The Ethiopian gymnosophists also worship at midday (6.14); and it is thus no surprise to find Apollonius reverencing the sun at this time (7.10). We also find him undertaking significant activity at daybreak (5.31; 6.6).

Overall, then, the representation of time plays a crucial role in the articulation of religious and cultural meaning in this text. There are at least three different temporal systems at work in *Apollonius*: the Roman, the Greek, and the mystic-oriental. These different temporalities operate in different contexts and registers: the Roman is primarily political, the Greek primarily civic-religious, and the mystic-oriental follows the natural patterns of the sun.

Structure and segmentation

The *Apollonius* is a variety of biography. In chronological terms, the narrative as a whole is structured around the life of one individual. Yet it is not simply one of birth-to-death. Birth is not mentioned until 1.5; we open, rather, with a discussion of Pythagoras, who is compared less favourably to Apollonius (Socrates is also mentioned). Apollonius is thus inserted into a larger sequence, the history of Greek holy men. This sense that our subject is part of a larger, self-renewing tradition of Greek philosophy is underlined elsewhere: at 7.1–3, he is also inserted into a series of philosophers who opposed tyrannical rule.

If birth is not exactly the beginning, then neither is death exactly the end. For a start, the narrator equivocates between the traditions as to his age at death (90 or 100?, 8.29).¹⁴ More pertinently, a radical uncertainty surrounds Apollonius' end: 'as for the way he died, if he did die at all, there are many stories, but none is given by Damis [the narrator's principal source]' (8.29). If he did die, he certainly continued to practise and communicate philosophy afterwards (8.31). The normal temporal limits of biography, then, do not apply in this case: Apollonius' story begins before he was born and continues after his death.

¹⁴ Although near the start he *is* said to have been 100 at death (1.14).

The internal architecture of the work—what Don Fowler calls its ‘segmentation’, its division into coherent sense-making units¹⁵—is determined by a number of features, not all of them temporal. The most conspicuous segmental device is of course the book structure, which is evidently built around geography. Thus book 1 focuses upon Apollonius’ childhood, early development and voyage to Parthia; books 2 and 3 with the eastern limits of the world, that is, India and the Brahmans; book 4 with Greece, Ionia and Neronian Rome; book 5 with the western limits of the world (Gadeira), and the interview at Alexandria with Vespasian; book 6 with the southern limits, Ethiopia and the gymnosophists; books 7 and 8 with Domitian and Rome. There is, of course, a temporal dimension corresponding to the geographical and thematic unity of the books, but it is not especially stressed. Only the beginnings of books 2 and 8 use temporal markers: the former opens (in the → Thucydidean fashion) with a reference to the following summer (2.1), while the latter refers to the dawning of the day of Apollonius’ trial (8.1).

There are, however, further strategies of segmentation at work in the text, marking different sequences off from each other. Occasionally, temporal change indicates such transitions. A strong example comes at 4.17, where arrival at Athens coincides with autumn (*metopōron*). By far the most prominent device for moving to a different phase is (as indeed we also find in the previous example) geographical relocation. Thus, for example, at 4.11: ‘Having cleansed the disease from the Ephesians, and having had enough of matters in Ionia, he set off for Greece’. In such transitional phases, time operates straightforwardly (and almost imperceptibly) to mark linear sequence.

Yet different phases of the narrative do have distinctive temporal qualities. I identify three types of narrative temporality. Firstly, we have sequences of what I shall call ‘regular’ narrative, where events follow one another in a logically and temporally consecutive chain. Secondly, we have long stretches of ‘paradigmatic’ narrative (in contrast to the syntagmatic, chronological linking of regular narrative): here selected anecdotes are relayed in order to exemplify aspects of Apollonius’ wisdom. Such episodes are still part of the narrative, but chronology is looser, sometimes explicitly so. A good example comes at 4.32: ‘around this time’ (*peri ton khronon touton*),¹⁶ a descendant of Callicratidas was

¹⁵ Fowler 1997.

¹⁶ The same phrase is used at 4.46.

charged with affront to traditional Spartan ways by Apollonius and corrected. The action is neither motivated by anything beforehand nor does it affect anything afterwards: it simply contributes to the aggregate body of evidence for his devotion to Greek tradition. Elsewhere, anecdotes illustrating similar points may be introduced with the phrase ‘and this too’ (4.33, 45; 6.40): the episodes are linked by philosophical rather than temporal considerations.

Finally, we have chunks of ‘narratorial digression’, where the narrator offers his own generalised excursions on history, botany, ethnography and so forth. These tend to be concentrated at the beginnings of books: for example, book 3 begins ‘About the Hyphasis, its size as it crosses India and its remarkable features, one should know the following ...’ (see also the openings of 1.1–3; 3.1.1–2.1; 5.1–4; 6.1; 7.1.1–3.2).¹⁷ These thus function as pauses, waymarking the narrative; they also underline the narrator’s intellectual authority.¹⁸ There is, however, an occasional ambiguity about such passages, in cases where the narrator’s own ruminations are interwoven with reports of Damis’ observations. For example, ‘They [Damis and Apollonius] claim to have seen there trees of a kind that exist nowhere else on earth, and are called Geryon’s. They are two in number, and grow from the grave that holds Geryon ...’ (5.5.1). Is the second sentence here, and the long discussion that follows it, to be credited to the primary narrator or the reported narrator, his ‘source’ Damis? Is it, consequently, a narratorial digression or part of the regular narrative of Damis’ and Apollonius’ experience in Cadiz?

I want to focus for the remainder of this section, however, upon the relationship between regular and paradigmatic narrative (narratorial digression is less widespread, and serves primarily to segment the narrative). These two forms interact in interesting, dynamic ways. Regular narrative is dominated by decisive events, often temporally pinpointed, narrated in chronological order. Paradigmatic narrative, however, is fundamentally achronical: it is dominated by Apollonius’ discourses and sayings, and it has its own distinctive feel. The narrator presents

¹⁷ Unsurprisingly, the Indian books 2 and 3 also contain a significant amount of narratorial digression of a geographic or ethnographic nature: this is clustered at the beginning of the two books, but interleaved with regular narrative. Cf. 2.3 (Prometheus); 2.9 (Dionysus); 2.13 (on elephants); 2.18 (the Indus); 2.21 (Poros); 3.4 (cinnamon and pepper trees); 3.5 (Ganges plain); 3.6–8 (dragons). There is also a ‘digression from the narrative’ (*ektropē tou logou*) at 7.39, in the form of a disquisition on wizardry. Rommel 1923: 1–59 shows that the material for these digressions is all traditional.

¹⁸ A technique that may look to Herodotus: cf. *SAGN* 1:105–106.

himself as distilling the most ‘memorable’,¹⁹ ‘worthy of telling’,²⁰ or ‘important’²¹ sayings or episodes from a larger stock (sometimes identified with Damis’ book). Such passages are characterised by markers of iterative presentation, suggesting that the anecdote exemplifies, metonymically, Apollonius’ consistent and unchanging nature, rather than taking its precise place in a narrative chain of events. For example, ‘he said many such things (*polla toiauta*) to the king’ (1.39); ‘of this kind (*toiauta*) were the events on the boat’ (4.17); ‘delivering discourses of this kind (*toiauta*)’ (6.3).²²

It might be initially tempting to take regular narrative as the substance of the narrative, and downplay the significance of paradigmatic narrative, as mere filler: this, indeed, is implicitly what I did above when I characterised the thematics of individual books or pairs.²³ Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that the narrator privileges regular narrative. The most concentrated and memorable phase comes in books 7 and 8, where the narrator employs a variety of techniques to assimilate Apollonius’ confrontation with Domitian to an exciting, suspense-filled narrative. Here considerable attention is given to the passing of time, to different modes of measuring it, and to the importance of achieving tasks within given timeframes. The narrative as a whole thus builds to a climax in this thrilling account of the confrontation between emperor and philosopher.

If we do take regular narrative as most important, then we can identify two ancillary roles played by paradigmatic narrative. Firstly, a segmental function: it marks transitional periods between important episodes.²⁴ Thus, for example, after his miraculous reappearance to Demetrius and Damis after the trial, Apollonius is said to have sailed to Olympia and discoursed there on a variety of topics (8.15–18), a classic case of paradigmatic narrative. There is little identification of time internal to this phase,²⁵ and no sense at all that the order of events is

¹⁹ *axion epimnēsthēnai* and related: 5.9; 6.35, 39, 40.

²⁰ *axion eipein* and related: 1.19; 2.4, 16; 5.7; 6.23.

²¹ *spoudaios* and related: 4.22; 6.35; 7.28.

²² For further examples see 1.11, 12, 14, 16, 40; 2.16; 3.40, 50; 4.22; 5.7, 20, 24; 6.35, 43.

²³ An excellent example of succumbing to this temptation is Jones 1970, a strategically abridged translation.

²⁴ Regular narrative transitions can occur without ‘buffering’, though: cf. 6.28, where we pass quickly and unfussily from the Ethiopian episode to Apollonius’ relations with Titus.

²⁵ Only a single reference to a promise to act ‘tomorrow’ (8.17).

significant, or indeed chronologically accurate. The phase as a whole, however, is carefully marked out: they sailed to Olympia in autumn (8.15), and the stay lasted forty days (8.19). The paradigmatic sequence works at two levels: (1) the events *internal* to it contribute achronologically to the stock of wonderful stories about Apollonius; (2) from the perspective of the larger narrative in which it is embedded, this unit of time provides a buffer between the trial and the final sequence of the narrative, the deaths of Domitian and Apollonius himself. This segmental role is also indicated by demonstrative pronouns: a phrase like ‘of this kind (*toiauta*) were the events on the boat’ (4.17) also serves to conclude a phase of paradigmatic narrative, allowing a fresh phase to begin.

The second ancillary role played by paradigmatic narrative is to signify the passing of longer periods of time within regular narrative. The Indian episode is particularly interesting in this respect, because it slips gradually from regular into paradigmatic narrative. When Apollonius and Damis first arrive in India, the temporal rhythm is relatively compact, as introductions are made, and visitors come and go. After a while, however, we reach a series of markers of transition to a more general description, tied to a slacker chronology: ‘filling themselves with these things (*toutōn*) they were amazed at the men [the Brahmins], and day after day (*hoshēmerai*) they asked all kinds of (*pampollous*) questions about their wisdom on all topics (*es panta*), and they themselves were asked many questions in return’ (3.40). After narrating a series of discussions of diverse topics, the narrator caps the section: ‘such (*toiaide*) were the conversations Apollonius held with the sages over the four months there ...’ (3.50). The Indian sojourn is now over: Apollonius and Damis return westwards. The paradigmatic phase has served to loosen up the rhythm, so that the narrative can convey four months’ activity without having to describe every day’s events.

Paradigmatic narrative, then, is an important way of internally articulating the narrative: it also allows for variations in narrative rhythm, which serve to draw more attention to the major events in the regular narrative. I want to conclude this section, though, by adverting to a rather different hypothesis as to the relationship between these two phases. We have been presuming that the regular narrative is most important, and paradigmatic narrative ancillary. If *Apollonius* teaches us one thing, however, it is that change and flux at the worldly level is nothing as to the magnificent eternal truths of the cosmos. After his journey to India, at any rate, Apollonius is serenely impervious to mun-

dane influences. Modern scholarship has tended to privilege narrative action over philosophical discourse (even likening the text to a novel).²⁶ It is hard, however, to avoid the conclusion that for Apollonius himself this would appear to be misplaced emphasis on the worldly at the expense of philosophical discourse.²⁷ If this is accepted, then we can take the narrator's manipulation of rhythm as a form of challenge to the narratee to read as Apollonius himself would: we should prefer to focus upon the timeless, edifying material rather than the pacy narrative around it.

Rhythm

In 'regular' narrative the story-time tends to coincide with the fabula-time. This is particularly evident in books 7 and 8, which are dominated by the clash between Apollonius and Domitian. Indeed, whereas most books open with narratorial digression, book 8 begins with a flamboyant convergence between the two time systems. 'Let us now go', the narrator exhorts the narratee, 'to the court-room to hear the man's defence against the charge: for it is already sunrise, and the entrance is open to the select audience' (8.1). We are invited to submit to the chronology of the narrative: it is, so the conceit suggests, sunrise for us as well as for Apollonius.

This desire to mimic fabula-time leads to a certain self-consciousness over the handling of narrative rhythm. The narrator's biggest concern is with acceleration and slow-down. In the work's first paragraph, he cuts short a discussion of Pythagoras, so as to 'hurry' (*speudonta*) on to the task he has set himself. This pattern is repeated throughout.²⁸ In particular, the narrator agonises over questions of ellipsis—or *paralipsis*, as he refers to it. The following is a striking example:

For the sake of accuracy [*akribologias*] and avoiding ellipsis [*mēden paraleiphthai moi*] of any of the things Damis wrote of, I would have liked to have spoken of the important events [*ta spoudasthenta*] that took place while they journeyed through barbarian lands, but my narrative [*logos*] drives me on [*xunelaunei*] to greater and more wondrous topics. (1.20)

²⁶ E.L. Bowie 1978; E.L. Bowie 1994.

²⁷ Cf. e.g. *SAGN* 1:433–435, on Apollonius' immunity to *thauma* ('awe') before opulence and exotic sights.

²⁸ Apollonius too is capable of impatience: cf. esp. 1.39 ('we have stayed here for a longer time (*khronou*) than we should have done').

The narrative urgency identified at the outset manifests itself once again: the *logos* drives the narrator along his path, faster than the travellers themselves journeyed in fabula-time. There are indeed other examples in the text of this desire to focus upon the ‘important’ (*spoudaios*) material, so as to avoid narrative ‘length’ (*mēkos*, 4.34; 6.35). On other occasions, however, the narrator acknowledges his inability to practice *paralipsis* owing to the importance of the topic (1.9; 2.21, 28; 3.45), or apologises for extending (*mēkunein*) his narrative (*logos*) (4.25; 7.2). In sum, the narrator wants to be seen as exercising a careful and judicious control over the rhythm of his narrative. He might well be offering an implicit endorsement of Apollonius’ claim that the abilities to speak at length (*makrologein*) and to speak concisely (*brakhulogein*) are complementary virtues (8.2).²⁹

Narratorial anachrony

Because regular narrative follows fabula-time so closely, anachrony is relatively rare, and strictly tactical. On two occasions, complexities in the transmission of the narrative enforce a certain disorder. At 1.26, we read of Apollonius’ interview with the magi. Since Damis (the narrator’s source for this episode) was not party to these discussions, the narrator cannot reveal the contents. We are told, however, that he ‘once’ (*pote*) asked Apollonius about them, and was told that ‘they are wise, but not completely’. We immediately return from this prolepsis to the chronology of the narrative again, with the phrase ‘this will come later’ (*tauti men husteron*, 1.27).³⁰ A less conspicuous example comes at 4.16, where Apollonius’ interview with Achilles is reported in direct speech after the event, since Damis was not present at the original.

Narratorial prolepsis is much more common in the account of Apollonius’ childhood than elsewhere. This sequence is predominantly paradigmatic narrative, inserted loosely into the overall chronological framework of Apollonius’ aging (Apollonius was fourteen, 1.7; Apollonius was sixteen, 1.7; his father died, his brother was twenty-three, 1.23). In this phase, prolepsis demonstrates Apollonius’ embodiment,

²⁹ Alluding to Pl. *Grg.* 449c, where Gorgias claims equal competence in *brakhulogein* as in *makrologein*.

³⁰ It is not clear to me to which later point the narrator is referring. We may be dealing with an unintentional slip or a conscious unfulfilled prolepsis.

even at this early stage, of the qualities he would show as an adult.³¹ Thus despite Proteus' comments in a dream to his mother, he was more of a prophet than Proteus, 'as my forthcoming narrative will show' (1.4); a comment about Apollonius later became apophthegmatic (1.8); Apollonius stared at the ground 'as he was accustomed to do when he had grown older' (1.10); his amazing memory would stay with him till he was 100 (1.14). At one point, this strategy is deliberately marked. Noting that not even Euphrates in later life accused him of sexual impropriety, the narrator reins himself in: 'but I must defer these matters to their proper time (*khronous*)' (1.13). These prolepses all serve to emphasise the point that even as a child Apollonius already shows himself a philosopher: in a telling simile, the narrator compares him to an eaglet that flies with its parents at first, but outsoars them when he fully fledged (1.7).

Occasionally, the narrator will deviate from strict chronology to pursue proleptically Apollonius' relationship with an individual. Thus at 5.39, we are told that the interview with Vespasian was the cause of the quarrel with Euphrates: several accusations later made by the latter are cited, as is an anecdote about him nearly hitting Apollonius with a stick.³² After the same scene, the remainder of Apollonius' relations with Vespasian are narrated together proleptically (5.41). The reasons for both anachronies no doubt lie in the particular narrative circumstances: the narrator is tying up loose threads before the end of book 5, and the transition from the Egyptian to the Ethiopian episode. For similar tying up see Hesiod (→). The final type of prolepsis comes in the form of portents, which cluster at the beginning and the end, predicting Apollonius' birth and death (1.4; cf. 1.5; 8.23). These evidently serve to underline the cosmic significance of the protagonist.

Narratorial analepsis is also relatively uncommon, and again has a particular tactical role to play. Sometimes (e.g. 5.19) the narrator will remind us of an earlier prophecy of Apollonius' at the point at which it is fulfilled. On two occasions, figures are introduced whose prior acquaintance with Apollonius is now narrated for the first time (Demetrius, 4.42; Aelian, 6.16). Because the narrative focuses so relentlessly upon Apollonius, there is little opportunity to develop parallel

³¹ A device also found in Plutarch (→).

³² The phrase 'I must leave the man alone' (*emoi de aphektea tou andros*) looks like a promise to abstain from further treatment of Euphrates, but in fact he resurfaces periodically (6.7, 28; 7.9, 36).

storylines concerning other figures: these analepses are in this respect directly analogous to the prolepses adverted to in the previous paragraph, in that in both cases indispensable narrative dealing with (non-Apollonian) individuals is condensed anachronically and presented at the point where the individuals in question encounter Apollonius.

There are two occasions, however, on which parallel storylines are indeed cultivated. The first comes at 6.7, where Euphrates is said to have mandated a certain Thrasybulus to preempt Apollonius' visit to Ethiopia, and to slander him. The second is more dramatic. After the description of the trial, the narrator switches from Rome to Dicaearchia, where Demetrius and Damis were waiting for news of Apollonius. The segue between the two parallel storylines is effected by means of a brief analepsis: 'on the previous day' (i.e. previous to the day of the trial, which has just been narrated) Damis arrived and discussed events with Demetrius (8.11). This analepsis is only tolerated for a brief moment. Chronology 'catches up' in the following sentence: 'and again on the following day Demetrius asked him about the same subject ...'. The analepsis here thus marks the shift of focus away from Apollonius, which is pretty much unparallelled in the rest of the narrative. It is, moreover, almost instantaneously revoked, thanks to the epiphany in the following chapter (8.12). This exceptional deviation from regular practice is mitigated by the condensed brevity of the scene: as Demetrius explicitly observed, Apollonius reappears after a miraculously short period of time (8.12). The use of parallel storylines here focuses attention upon the anxieties and fears of acolytes.

The narrator's approach to anachrony is, thus, ambiguous. On the one hand, the tendency to focus exclusively upon Apollonius, 'to give an accurate account (*exakribōsai*) of the man and the times (*tois khronois*) when he said or did this or that' (1.2), militates against deviation from the temporal order of the fabula. On the other hand, the narrator takes pleasure in demonstrating his full control over the narrative, and makes creative use of prolepsis, analepsis and parallel storylines at tactical moments. We should make two further observations. Firstly, reference to the postponement of material in narratorial digressions³³ is, strictly speaking, no prolepsis (since digressions float above the chronology of narrated time); but it does play the same role, of buttressing the sense of the narrator's control over his material. Secondly, there are the

³³ Cf. esp. 2.17, where the account of snakes is explicitly deferred until the dragon narrative (3.6–8).

references to the writings of Apollonius and Damis, for example: ‘That he [Apollonius] really did visit Cissa he himself acknowledges in a letter which he wrote to the sophist of Clazomenae; for he was so kind and loyal that when he saw the Eretrians, he remembered the sophist and wrote to him an account of what he had seen’ (1.34).³⁴ When exactly in the fabula Damis and Apollonius write down such memoirs is not indicated, but the references are inserted at the appropriate place in the story, that is, at the moment the event which the memoir will cover took place. Again, it would be far-fetched to call such references prolepsis, but they certainly are a form of anachrony.

Actorial anachrony

Prolepsis of one kind plays an absolutely fundamental role in the *Apollonius*. If Apollonius’ wisdom is embodied in one skill, it is prophecy. This was a quality enhanced by his time with the Indian Brahmins (3.10, 16, 40; cf. 6.13), and he discusses it at length with them (3.42); but even beforehand he was to be found predicting the length of his stay with the Persian king Vardanes (1.22), and extolling the teetotal life as conducive to prophecy (2.37). It is the master discipline, from which others flow (notably medicine, 3.44). Apollonius wrote a book on the subject (3.41). It is upon his prophetic powers that the Roman suspicion of wizardry was based (4.44; 7.11, 20; 8.5, 7 (ix)); the narrator provides a vigorous defence in a narratorial digression (5.12). Apollonius visited oracular sites (4.14; 8.19), his arrival in Ionia was predicted by Didyma and Colophon (4.1); he is even compared directly to an oracle (5.33). Even Damis was capable of prophecy of a sort, which he comically compares to the powers of an old beggar woman (3.43). Given this, it is unsurprising to find a huge number of predictions that turn out to be true. These thus are actorial prolepses which primarily function to illustrate character.³⁵

³⁴ For example, Damis: 1.19, 24, 34; 3.17, 45; 4.25; 5.26; 6.4, 7, 22, 32; 7.42; Apollonius: 1.24; 3.2, 15; 4.19; 6.33 (letter); both: 1.26, 32; 2.4, 8, 19, 20; 3.3, 9, 12, 54–56; 5.5–6.

³⁵ 1.22; 3.33; 4.4, 6, 18 (proven true at 5.19), 24, 34; 5.7, 10, 11, 13, 18, 24, 30; 6.32, 39; 7.10, 41; 8.14, 23, 27. We might also take the Homeric quotation uttered to Domitian—‘you shall not kill me, for I am not mortal’—as a prediction (8.5, = Hom. *Il.* 22.13; cf. 8.8, 12).

Actorial analepses are varied in their use. Aside from banal cases where previous events are recalled simply to make an ethical point,³⁶ we do find ‘flashback’ direct speech used to fill out new characters, such as the Indian king (2.30–32) and Nilus the Egyptian acolyte (6.16). Here, actorial analepsis allows the primary narrator to introduce new figures into the narrative without having to divert attention from Apollonius and Apollonian chronology. Occasionally also we find the device of a character ‘remembering’ an earlier occurrence: at 3.18, for example, Apollonius remembered Phraotes saying that the Brahmins begin their training by understanding themselves, which allows him to understand why Iarchas dismisses the Greek emphasis upon self-knowledge. Cases like this serve to germinate a narrative ‘seed’ planted earlier in the text.

One form of actorial analepsis is highly distinctive to this narrative: the mystical ability to recall events to which one has not been consciously party. Apollonius repeatedly solved riddles by bringing to bear his preternatural insight into the past (1.10; 6.5, 43). An extreme example is the ability to recall previous existences. This is a particular skill of the Brahmins (3.19–22), and Apollonius presently follows suit (3.23–24). The Brahmin Iarchas was also wise enough to be able to know Apollonius’ past in this life, which he duly recapped (3.16). This form of actorial analepsis is directly parallel to the cases of prophecy we discussed above as a form of actorial prolepsis: it contributes nothing substantial to the plot (as conventionally understood), except to characterise the amazing sages in question.³⁷ That said, one part of Iarchas’ recollection of his previous life did indeed prove significant, namely the account of the Ethiopians’ expulsion from India (3.20): Apollonius’ awareness of this overshadowed his visit to the gymnosophists in book 6.

The ability of sages intellectually to range freely over time, both forward and backwards, is thus a highly significant aspect of this narrative, and generates a number of intriguing effects. Take, for example, the case of a character who recalled a prophecy now validated by the present event (1.29; 7.18; 8.12). Clearly at one level this is actorial analepsis; but it is also an analepsis of a prophecy that predicted

³⁶ E.g. 2.5, 14.

³⁷ This is not to say that the contents of such analepses are insignificant. That Iarchas was in a previous life the great Indian king Ganges and Apollonius a humble Egyptian sailor constructs a clear hierarchy between the two. A different form of actorial analepsis comes at 6.14, where we find Apollonius summarising his life story (in this incarnation) to Nilus and Thespion: the point of this is to show the latter’s conversion to Apollonius’ point of view, and to his admiration for the Indians.

the ‘present’ moment. Time is viewed as a complex, but magnificently coherent system, at least to the sages whose cosmic understanding is emblematised by their mastery of it.

In several respects, then, Apollonius’ intellectual command of time and space makes him into a kind of ‘omniscient’ narrator. He is, indeed, implicitly assimilated to the narrator of *Apollonius*,³⁸ whose predominant focus upon Apollonius and the chronological progression of time is occasionally subverted as he ranges more freely. A particularly striking illustration of the similarities between narrator and hero as regards their ability to anticipate the future comes right at the beginning, in a dream experienced by Apollonius’ mother (1.4). The dream visitor is Proteus, who prophesies that she will give birth to (a) Proteus. ‘We must recall Proteus’, the narrator comments, ‘particularly when my story as it unfurls will show the man to be more of a prophet than Proteus ...’. There are three levels of prognosis alluded to here: Proteus’ prophecy about Apollonius’ birth, Apollonius’ superlative skill in prognostication, and the narrator’s proleptic reference to that skill.

That said, there is one case of false actorial prolepsis on Apollonius’ part, and it is significant. Usually it was Apollonius who confounded the expectations of others,³⁹ but the Brahmins replied ‘contrary to his anticipation’ to his question on the subject of self-knowledge (3.18). This reinforces the sense of hierarchy between Indian and Apollonian wisdom. Comparably, Apollonius is normally the object, not the subject of ‘wonder’ (*thauma*), but he does wonder at the Brahmins.⁴⁰

There is, however, one further, intriguing case of limitations in Apollonius’ knowledge. When Apollonius visited the Ethiopian gymnosophists, Euphrates sent Thrasybulus ahead to slander him. The narrator reveals this (6.7), but—fascinatingly—it seems to have occurred unbeknownst to Apollonius. It was left to Damis to work out the truth when he heard Timasion’s analeptic account of his meeting with Thrasybulus (6.9). Apollonius, however, found himself ‘momentarily astonished’ (*ekplageis ... pros brakhū*) by Thespesion’s accusations against him (based upon the slanders), ‘because he had not yet heard the truth about Thrasybulus and Euphrates’ (6.13). On this occasion, it seems, his pow-

³⁸ For stylistic assimilation of the two see *SAGN* 1:424.

³⁹ Thus at 7.32 Domitian mistakenly looked forward to hearing Apollonius’ confession of conspiracy with Nerva; at 8.8, the expectation of the court-room audience that Domitian will hunt after Apollonius was frustrated (Demetrius expressed a similar expectation at 8.13).

⁴⁰ *SAGN* 1:433–435.

ers of omniscience deserted him, even though ‘he guessed what had happened, as he usually did’ (6.13). In this instance, the demands of the plot (for a narrative of secret connivance) seem to outweigh the demands for consistent characterisation of Apollonius as omniscient.

This exception, however, only points up the general rule, that Apollonius is characterised as omniscient, and thus as possessing an awesome ability with prolepsis and analepsis.

Suspense

I want to conclude with a brief discussion of the narrative technique of suspense, used most vividly in books 7 and 8, and the trial of Apollonius before Domitian. This is framed, at the beginning of book 7 (1–2), with an account (in the narratorial digression mode) of a series of famous philosophers who confronted tyrants. This sets the framework of expectations for what will follow: a contest between two forms of power, intellectual-spiritual and political. The narrator tells us explicitly (7.1, 2) that Apollonius outdid each of these, and so the narratee is led to expect success. But there is no explicit statement at this point of the form that this success will take: victory in law, or noble martyrdom? Will Apollonius survive the confrontation with the most impressive figure in Rome’s gallery of brutal and despotic tyrants?

The tension between foreknowledge and ignorance is manipulated throughout this episode. Apollonius foresaw his arrest, but keeps his intentions secret even from Damis (7.10). What is he planning to do? Demetrius and Damis are said to have tried to dissuade him from going to Rome by offering plausible excuses, and this cues a certain level of anxiety on the narratee’s part; Apollonius predictably resists (7.11–14). The anxious anticipation of Damis and Demetrius is a recurrent theme, and serves as a kind of false actorial prolepsis (7.38; 8.11, 13). They represent a certain kind of reading of the future, built around the axiomatic assumption of regular human society: the emperor always wins. Apollonius teaches us otherwise, but without ever thinking to allay their (or indeed our) fears.

When Apollonius was arrested, the emperor gained total control over his time. He and Damis were told to wait until he was ready (7.22); they were forewarned that they would see him on the following day (7.28); they are summoned to the court ‘at the time of the filling of the market-place’ (*peri plēthousan agoran*, 7.29; also 7.31); Apollonius

eventually achieved his private hearing only when the emperor was at leisure (*skholē*), in the midst of the ritual time of a festival of Adonis (7.32). Subsequently, Apollonius was held for five days (7.40). When he entered court, attention is given to the length of time for which he is to speak, and to the priming of the clock (8.2).

So, the scene is set for a confrontation between two masters of time, one with the power to tell the future and the past, the other with the power to hold others in temporal rhythms of his own choosing. Before we reach the court, however, the narrator punctures the suspense: in a moment of narratorial digression discussing the sources for the court scene, he lets slip that ‘he won his case and quit the court-room’ (7.35). This narratorial prolepsis is marked by a characteristic statement of restraint and return to narrated time: ‘but we are not yet in the court-room ...’. It is too late, however, and the tension is gone. This is not, however, a moment of narrative failure, but a carefully controlled affront to our received sense of genre. It reminds us that we are not reading a conventionally exciting narrative. Of course we know—as if we ever doubted it—that Apollonius would win in the end. The *Apollonius* throughout hooks the reader’s expectation of conventional, linear story-telling, but ultimately offers us a new form of narrative in which future and past (as well as parallel events) are all instantaneously knowable, at least to the avatars of cosmic wisdom.