ST PAUL ON SOUL, SPIRIT AND THE INNER MAN

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Introduction

In this paper I shall address the issue of whether St Paul had a Jewish or a Greek understanding of the human soul, regardless of his views on the status of the body.¹ I shall argue that, despite some distinctively Jewish features—which Paul shares with his contemporary fellow-Jews Philo of Alexandria and Flavius Josephus—, his conceptuality of the soul is basically Greek, even to a greater extent than is commonly thought.

Until the present day, many biblical scholars continue to emphasize the distinctively Jewish or distinctively Pauline aspects of Paul's psychology and anthropology. To demonstrate the Jewish essence of his psychology, they point to the preponderance of allegedly Semitic concepts such as heart (καρδία) and flesh (σάρξ), often choosing to ignore the more 'noetic' language (e.g. νοῦς) which Paul also employs.² Similarly, they call attention to the Semitic expressions which have left their mark on the Greek translation of the Jewish bible, the Septuagint: the so-called Septuagintisms. Paul's use of the very word ψυχή, for instance, can be reduced to a mere Septuagintism if one focuses on such expressions as 'every soul' (πᾶσα ψυχή) which only function, it is

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² See, e.g., U. Schnelle, *The Human Condition: Anthropology in the Teachings of Jesus, Paul, and John* (trans. by O. C. Dean, Jr, (Edinburgh, 1996) (trans. of *Neutestamentliche Anthropologie: Jesus–Paulus–Johannes* [Biblisch-theologische Studien 18], Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1991), chap. 3 on Pauline anthropology, esp. chap. 3.7, pp. 59–63 on σάρξ and chap. 3.13, pp. 102–107, esp. pp. 102–104 on καρδία and pp. 104–105 on ψυχή.

supposed, as a Semitic way of referring to each individual person. And to highlight the distinctiveness of Paul's own thoughts about the human soul, distinct from both Jewish and Greek thought, they highlight the antitheses which Paul forges between spirit (πνεῦμα) and flesh (σάρξ), for instance, and between spirit (πνεῦμα) and body (σῶμα).

My own position is that one should not be too quick to assume that Paul uses distinctively Jewish-Semitic concepts when writing Greek. Although σάρξ is an important concept in the Jewish scripture, in non-Jewish Greek, too, it can denote the flesh as the seat of the affections and lusts, the fleshly nature,³ or man in his vulnerability (LSJ 1585 σάρξ II.1). The word is employed in this sense by Philo in a passage which otherwise develops a genuinely Greek psychology, as we shall see shortly. Seen in this light, there is nothing *distinctively* Jewish about Paul's use of σάρξ, nor anything *specifically* Pauline about his antithesis between σάρξ and πνεῦμα.

If this is true of the concept of flesh, the same applies to Paul's use of the term ψυχή. I will start with a discussion of the latter in §1, before focusing on the triadic expression πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα in §2 and moving to the broader context of Paul's psychology, which is consistent with a Greek understanding of ψυχή, in §§3–4. In my discussion I hope to do justice both to Paul's Jewish colouring of his discourse of the soul, and to his own theological emphasis. Neither the Jewish nor the Pauline angle to this discourse should come as a surprise, as normally every thinker contextualizes 'general' topics within his or her own train of thought. In essence, however, Paul's discussion of the soul is inseparable from its larger setting in the Graeco-Roman period.

1. *The ψυχή in Paul*

There are certainly some instances of Septuagintisms in Paul's use of ψυχή. At the beginning of his *Letter to the Romans*, for example, Paul warns both Greek and Jews:

for those who are self-seeking and who obey not the truth but wickedness, there will be wrath and fury. There will be anguish and distress for

³ H. G. Liddell, R. Scott & H. S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, (Oxford, 1996) (= LSJ), 1585 s.v. σάρξ II.1.

every soul of man (ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου) who does evil, the Jew first and also the Greek (*Rom* 2.8–9 NRSV).⁴

The expression ‘every soul of man’ occurs only in the Septuagint (*Numbers* 19.11; *Isaiah* 13.7) and not in any other extant Greek literature.⁵ In a periphrastic way, it refers to every individual human being, ‘everyone’. Yet, one should not overemphasize the Semitic background of this Septuagintism, since in non-Jewish Greek, too, similar periphrastic descriptions of individual human beings do exist. Plato, for instance, in his *Laws*, speaks of ‘every soul of all citizens’ (πᾶσα ψυχὴ πολίτου παντός), clearly denoting each individual citizen, as the context makes clear:

when *the soul of every citizen* (πᾶσα ψυχὴ πολίτου παντός) hangs upon this [i.e. upon his own private property], it is incapable of attending to matters other than daily gain. Whatsoever science or pursuit leads to this, every man individually (ἰδίᾳ πᾶς) is most ready to learn and to practise; but all else he laughs to scorn (*Laws* 831C).

The resemblance between Paul’s use of ψυχή and general Greek usage is even closer when Paul just speaks about ‘each soul’ (πᾶσα ψυχὴ), without further qualification, in *Rom* 13.1; there are many parallels in the Septuagint, but at the same time the phrase frequently occurs in non-Jewish Greek literature, especially in Plato and Aristotle and in literature dependent upon them, and not always in a strictly technical sense. This should warn us against stressing the Semitic background of Paul’s alleged Septuagintisms too much. At the very least, it is clear that these Septuagintisms were not incomprehensible in a non-Jewish Greek context and, more importantly, did not preclude Paul from developing a Greek understanding of the soul, as I hope to demonstrate.

There are some peculiar Septuagintisms, but their number is limited indeed. The most important example consists of a Septuagint quotation which entails the expression ‘seek one’s soul’ (ζητεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν τινος; *Rom* 11.3 quoting *1 Kings* 19.10 LXX), which in the Septuagint stands for the intention of murdering someone. This particular meaning seems

⁴ Translations from the Bible are normally taken from the New Revised Standard Version, with small alterations where necessary, and those from Classical authors are normally derived from the Loeb Classical Library, again with occasional changes.

⁵ Observations with regard to the occurrence of particular linguistic terms in this section are based on consultation of the Online Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Digital Library (TLG®).

to be absent from Classical Greek, where it means rather the opposite (see, e.g., Plato, *Phaedrus* 252E: ‘The followers of Zeus *desire the soul* of him whom they love to be like Zeus’—οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς δῖόν τινα εἶναι ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὑφ’ αὐτῶν ἐρώμενον).

An interesting case is the expression ‘risking one’s soul’ in Paul’s *Letter to the Philippians* 2.30: παραβολευσάμενος τῇ ψυχῇ. This expression is not common in Greek, but is not found in the Septuagint either, so that its meaning seems rather to be dependent on the context, and to be a Pauline adaptation of the phrase’s general Greek meaning of ‘exposing oneself in one’s soul’, i.e. risking one’s life.

Further instances of ψυχή in Paul can also be understood in the word’s Greek meaning of ψυχή as ‘life’ (LSJ 2026 ψυχή I) or ‘the conscious self or personality as centre of emotions, desires, and affections’ (LSJ 2027 ψυχή IV), rather than in its philosophical meaning of ‘the immaterial and immortal soul’ (LSJ 2027 ψυχή III). Thus, particular fellow-workers of Paul’s are said to have risked their own necks ‘for my life’ (ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς μου; *Rom* 16.4); Paul calls God for a witness ‘to my own self’ (ἐπὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν; *2 Cor* 1.23); he tells the Corinthians that he will gladly spend and be spent ‘for your lives’ (ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν; *2 Cor* 12.15) and, as he and his co-authors tell the Thessalonians, ‘to impart their own soul and life to them’ (μεταδοῦναι ὑμῖν... τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχάς; *1 Thess* 2.8).

In short, one should allow the possibility that various Greek meanings of ψυχή are present in Paul, including non-technical ones, rather than concluding that Paul employs this terminology in Septuagintist or idiosyncratic ways.

Paul also uses common Greek expressions which contain the word ψυχή or some cognate terms when he talks about (a) ‘striving with one soul’ (μιᾷ ψυχῇ; *Philipp* 1.27, from which he seems to develop the neologism σύμψυχοι in 2.2); (b) ‘being of good courage’ (εὐψυχεῖν; *Philipp* 2.19); (c) ‘being of equal spirit, of like soul or mind’ (ἰσόψυχος; *Philipp* 2.20); or about (d) τὰ ἄψυχα, the soulless, lifeless, material things (*1 Cor* 14.7), a term which, in the Septuagint, occurs only once in *The Wisdom of Solomon* (13.17; 14.29), a writing from the Hellenistic period. Later Pauline writings also speak of working, or of doing the will of God ἐκ ψυχῆς (*Col* 3.23; *Eph* 6.6), ‘of one’s own self’, an expression which does not occur only in the Septuagint but is abundant in Greek literature. In ‘Semiticizing’ translations of these writings, this expression is wrongly translated as ‘from the heart’ or ‘heartily’.

If we review all the $\psi\chi$ -passages in Paul, there are only a few examples of terms which are limited to the Septuagint and its subsequent Christian adaptation, probably the best example being the term $\delta\lambda\iota\gamma\acute{o}\psi\upsilon\chi\omicron\varsigma$, faint-hearted or feeble-minded; this occurs in the Septuagint and is predominantly used in the Christian tradition and hardly at all in pagan Greek literature. Paul uses it in his exhortation to ‘encourage *the faint-hearted*, support the weak, and be patient toward all’ (1 *Thess* 5.14). These exceptions only serve to emphasize our findings that, as a rule, Paul’s use of the term $\psi\chi\eta$ reflects its broad application in Greek.

Paul is less idiosyncratic than is often assumed, as will become particularly clear from a few $\psi\chi$ -passages which will be discussed now. Although we shall see in these instances that the language is indeed coloured by specific Pauline and Jewish concerns and predilections, they also show that these are merely shades and tints in an otherwise Greek picture of man. In his discussion of the future resurrection of the body in 1 *Cor* 15, for example, Paul argues that the future human body will be characterized as a $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$, a pneumatic body, whereas the present body, which will be buried, is a ‘psychical body’, a $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$. Although the latter expression seems to be a neologism, forged by Paul, the former expression, $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$, is a term which is applied in Stoicism to characterize the abiding nature of God. Whereas God, insofar as he is material, is perishable and liable and subject to change, as becomes clear in the process of conflagration, the authoritative part of God’s soul ($\tau\acute{o}$ $\eta\gamma\epsilon\mu\omicron\nu\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$), the governing part of the universe, is a $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$, a pneumatic and ether-like body (SVF 1054; = Origen, *Commentary on John* 13.21.128). As Origen puts it: the Stoics ‘are not ashamed to say that since God is a body he is also subject to corruption, but they say his body is pneumatic and like ether, especially in the reasoning capacity of his soul’— $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\kappa$ $\alpha\iota\delta\omicron\upsilon\eta\tau\alpha\iota$ $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$ $\acute{\omicron}\tau\iota$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\phi\theta\alpha\rho\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ $\acute{\omicron}\nu$, $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ $\delta\grave{\epsilon}$ $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\alpha\iota\theta\epsilon\rho\acute{\omega}\delta\epsilon\varsigma$, $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{o}$ $\eta\gamma\epsilon\mu\omicron\nu\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$.⁶ Although it is just possible that the terminology of $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ is due to Origen, who preserved this passage, I regard it as an authentic Greek expression, as it is also

⁶ Trans.: R. E. Heine, *Origen: Commentary on the Gospel according to John*, vol. 2: *Books 13–32* (The Fathers of the Church 89), (Washington, D.C., 1993, 94, with a small alteration.)

attested elsewhere.⁷ Paul regards this term as suitable to express the specific corporeality of the future, post-resurrection body.

This Stoic term is now placed in antithesis to σῶμα ψυχικόν, which combination Paul seems to have constructed himself. It is still possible to see where he derived his inspiration from, as his antithesis is followed by a quotation from *Gen* 2.7 LXX: ‘So also it is written: “The first man, Adam, became a living soul”’—οὕτως καὶ γέγραπται, Ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν (*1 Cor* 15.45). As we shall see shortly, this text was also interpreted by fellow-Jews such as Philo and Josephus as a passage about the human soul. The contrast between a σῶμα πνευματικόν and a σῶμα ψυχικόν is developed by Paul to differentiate between (a) a life which is so dominated by the πνεῦμα that even the body becomes spiritual, and (b) a life dominated by the ψυχή, which is the entity—as we shall see in the next section—in the middle between body and spirit.

In the context of his discussion about the corporeality of the resurrection in *1 Cor* 15, Paul understandably focuses on the σῶμα and distinguishes between a pneumatic *body* and a psychic *body*. But the implied antithesis between πνεῦμα and ψυχή, which now manifests itself at the level of adjectives qualifying the sort of body involved, already comes to the fore in *1 Cor* 2 where, already in the present life, Paul distinguishes between two groups: on the one hand, there are the ψυχικοί (2.14)—whom we may assume to live only by their ψυχή and who are, therefore, effectively only σαρκίνοι (3.1) as their soul is lacking any guiding principle and gives in to the flesh; on the other hand, there are the πνευματικοί (2.15; 3.1; cf. *Gal* 6.1), who are able to receive and inquire into the things of God’s πνεῦμα and possess the ‘mind (νοῦς) of Christ’ (2.16).

2. The Trichotomy Between πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα

This differentiation between πνεῦμα and ψυχή is, I believe, already expressed in Paul’s *First Letter to the Thessalonians*, where Paul exhorts his readers to preserve their entire πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα so that they

⁷ Comarius (1st cent. AD?), *De lapide philosophorum* 2.290; cf. also Zosimus (3rd/4th cent. AD), Ζωσίμου τοῦ Πανοπολίτου γνησία γραφή περὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ θείας τέχνης, τῆς του χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου ποιήσεως κατ’ ἐπιτομὴν κεφαλαϊώδη 2.146; and Damascius (5th/6th cent. AD), *In Phaedonem* (versio 1) 551.

may remain sound and perfect (5.23).⁸ As I shall argue, this trichotomy seems to be the Jewish adaptation of the general Greek distinction between νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα, which we find also in Greek philosophers contemporary with Paul, such as Plutarch.⁹ As we have just seen at the end of §1, within *1 Cor* 2.14–16 Paul's wording switches easily from terms with πνεῦμα to the term νοῦς; they seem to be synonymous. I shall first demonstrate that in Jewish authors such as Philo and Josephus πνεῦμα is distinguished from ψυχή, and subsequently that, in Philo, the trichotomy between πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα occurs alongside the differentiation between νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα. Finally, it will be shown, in §§3–4, that the trichotomy Paul mentions in *1 Thess* is in line with his broader anthropological reflections, especially his views on God's image, the inner man, and the human νοῦς.

In Philo, the distinction between πνεῦμα and ψυχή is made clearly in his treatise *Quis rerum divinarum heres* 55–57. Because this entire passage is crucial, I give it first, signalling the relevant Greek key-terms between brackets:

We use 'soul' (ψυχή) in two senses, both for the whole soul (ἡ τε ὅλη) and also for its dominant part (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), which properly speaking is the soul's soul (ψυχή ψυχῆς)... And therefore the lawgiver held that the substance of the soul is twofold, blood being that of the soul as a whole, and the divine breath or spirit (πνεῦμα) that of its most dominant part. Thus he says plainly 'the soul of every flesh is the blood': ψυχή πάσης σαρκὸς αἷμά ἐστιν (*Lev* 17.11 LXX). He does well in assigning the blood with its flowing stream to the riot of the manifold flesh (σάρξ), for each is akin to the other. On the other hand he did not make the substance of the mind (νοῦς) depend on anything created, but represented it as breathed upon by God (ὑπὸ θεοῦ καταπνευσθεῖσαν). For the Maker of all, he says, 'blew into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul': ἐνεφύσησε... εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν (*Gen* 2.7 LXX); just as we are also told that he was fashioned after the image (κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα) of his Maker (*Gen* 1.27 LXX). So we have two kinds of men, one that of those who live by

⁸ Cf. A. J. Festugière, *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile* (Études bibliques), 2nd ed. (Paris, 1932), Appendix B: 'La division corps—âme—esprit de 1 Thessal. 5.23 et la philosophie grecque', pp. 196–220. For a detailed discussion of the trichotomy of πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα in Philo and Paul, see van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology in Context*, chap. 5: 'The Two Types of Man in Philo and Paul: The Anthropological Trichotomy of Spirit, Soul and Body', pp. 269–312.

⁹ On the Greek philosophical trichotomy, see J. Dillon, 'Plutarch and the Separable Intellect', in: A. Pérez Jiménez & F. Casadesús (eds), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Misticismo y Religiones Místicas en la Obra de Plutarco*, (Madrid-Málaga, 2001), pp. 35–44.

reason, the divine inbreathing (τὸ μὲν θείῳ πνεύματι λογισμῷ βιούντων), the other of those who live by blood and the pleasure of the flesh (τὸ δὲ αἵματι καὶ σαρκὸς ἡδονῇ ζώντων). This last is a moulded clod of earth, the other is the faithful impress of the divine image (*Quis rerum divinarum heres* 55–57).

In this passage, Philo distinguishes the ψυχή from the soul proper, the ἡγεμονικόν, whose substance he identifies with πνεῦμα. Whereas the soul, in the broad sense, is associated with the flesh (σάρξ) and with hedonistic pleasure (ἡδονή), the πνεῦμα is characterized as mind (νοῦς) and as an impress of the divine image, and is regarded as the direct result of God's breathing upon man. Even though the Septuagint text of *Gen* 2.7 does not state this explicitly, God's πνεῦμα is taken to be implied when it is said that God ἐνεφύσησε...πνοὴν ζωῆς, breathed a breath of life. In passing, I briefly note that Philo's antithesis between πνεῦμα and σάρξ resembles, or is in fact identical with, Paul's. The most important observation, however, is that Philo's antithesis between πνεῦμα and ψυχή is made on the basis of *Gen* 2.7, in which it is thought to be implied.

Elsewhere, too, Philo emphasizes this contrast between πνεῦμα and ψυχή on the basis of *Gen* 2.7 (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 80–84). As in the previous passage, Philo sets out to reconcile two contradictory anthropological statements in the Pentateuch, one asserting that 'the life (ψυχή) of all flesh is the blood' (*Lev* 17.11), the other, that God 'breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul (ψυχή)' (*Gen* 2.7). According to Philo, Moses would not,

having already said that the essence of life (ψυχή) is πνεῦμα (*Gen* 2.7 LXX), have said further on that it is some different substance, namely blood (*Lev* 17.11 LXX), had he not been bringing the matter under some most vital and essential principle. (...) Each of us (...) is two in number, an animal and a man. To either of these has been allotted an inner power akin to the qualities of their respective life-principles, to one the power of vitality, in virtue of which we are alive, to the other the power of reasoning, in virtue of which we are reasoning beings. Of the power of vitality the irrational creatures partake with us; of the power of reasoning God is, not indeed partaker, but originator, being the fountain of archetypal reason. To the faculty which we have in common with the irrational creatures blood has been given as its essence; but to the faculty which streams forth from the fountain of reason πνεῦμα has been assigned (...). This is why he says that the blood is the life (ψυχή) of the flesh, being aware that the fleshly nature has received no share of mind (νοῦς), but partakes of vitality just as the whole of our body (σῶμα) does; but man's life (ψυχή)

he names πνεῦμα, giving the title of ‘man’ not to the composite mass (...), but to that God-like creation with which we reason (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 81–84).

The distinction between πνεῦμα and ψυχή is not only applied in the narrative of the creation of man, but also in narratives about virtuous men such as Abraham: ‘the divine spirit (πνεῦμα) which was breathed upon him (καταπνευσθέν) from on high made its lodging in his soul (ψυχή), and invested his body (σῶμα) with singular beauty’ (*De virtutibus* 217). This shows that the distinction between πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα is considered to be of ongoing relevance.

Josephus also interprets *Gen* 2.7 in terms of the dichotomy of πνεῦμα and ψυχή. In the retelling of the Pentateuch in his *Jewish Antiquities*, Josephus even explicitly inserts the term πνεῦμα in his alleged quotation of *Gen* 2.7: ‘Moses begins to interpret nature, writing on the formation of man in these terms: “God fashioned man by taking dust from the earth and instilled into him πνεῦμα and ψυχή.” Now this man was called Adam’ (1.34; cf. 3.260).

Against this background of Jewish-Hellenistic interpretations of *Gen* 2.7, it becomes clear that Paul, in distinguishing between πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα in *1 Thess* 5.23, is following Jewish practice, as attested in Philo and Josephus. Yet, at the same time, Philo renders it clear that this trichotomy is simply the Jewish adaptation of the general Greek differentiation between νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα. As I shall now show, in Philo’s writings many passages indicate that he uses *both* trichotomies and equates the God-inbreathed human spirit (πνεῦμα) with the mind (νοῦς).

According to Philo, the νοῦς is the ruler of the entire ψυχή (*De opificio mundi* 30); it is the sovereign element of the ψυχή (69); ‘what the νοῦς is in the ψυχή, this the eye is in the body; for each of them sees, one the things of the mind (τὰ νοητά), the other the things of sense’ (53). Or, using a different metaphor, the νοῦς is said to be ‘the ruler of the flock, taking the flock of the ψυχή in hand’ (*De agricultura* 66). As he describes it clearly in *Legum allegoriarum* 1.39:

the νοῦς (is) the dominant element of the ψυχή: into this only does God breathe, whereas He does not see fit to do so with the other parts (...); for these are secondary in capacity. By what, then were these also inspired? By the νοῦς, evidently. For the νοῦς imparts to the portion of the ψυχή that is devoid of reason a share of that which it has received from God, so that the νοῦς was be-souled by God, but the unreasoning part by the

νοῦς. For the νοῦς is, so to speak, God of the unreasoning part. (...) The νοῦς that was made after the image and original might be said to partake of πνεῦμα (*Legum allegoriarum* 1.39).

It is 'the wholly purified νοῦς which disregards not only the σῶμα, but that other section of the ψυχή which is devoid of reason and steeped in blood, aflame with seething passions and burning lusts' (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 64). This differentiation between νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα also clearly comes to the fore when the wise man is called 'the first of the human race (...), as a ψυχή in a σῶμα and a νοῦς in a ψυχή, or once more heaven in the world or God in heaven' (*De Abrahamo* 272).

These examples will suffice to show that in Philo both trichotomies occur, the triad πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα as well as the triad νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα, and that in fact the former is the specifically Jewish adaptation (inspired by *Gen* 2.7 LXX) of the latter, general ancient philosophical trichotomy. I shall not discuss the Greek background of the differentiation between νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα any further here. The point I want to emphasize now is that Paul clearly resembles Philo and Josephus in distinguishing between πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα, and that he, too, will have understood this in a Greek way.

My analysis differs notably from the interpretation of *1 Thess* 5.23 offered in one of the most recent, rare comprehensive treatments of Paul's anthropology, that of Udo Schnelle:

The trichotomous sounding phrase τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχή καὶ τὸ σῶμα reflects *no* Hellenistic anthropology according to which a person is divided into body, soul, and spirit. Paul is *merely* emphasizing that the sanctifying work of God concerns the whole person. This interpretation is suggested (...) by the observation that in *1 Thessalonians* πνεῦμα is for Paul not a component of the human essence but the expression and sign of the new creative activity of God in humankind. With ψυχή and σῶμα Paul is *only* adding what constitutes each person as an individual. What is actually new and determinative is the Spirit of God. With his use of ψυχή Paul stands in Old Testament tradition, where *nephesh* designates the whole person.¹⁰

This interpretation ignores the similarities between Paul and his contemporaries Philo and Josephus, who show incontrovertibly that they are acquainted with trichotomous Hellenistic anthropology.

¹⁰ Schnelle, *The Human Condition*, pp. 104–5 (italics mine).

As further support of my interpretation of Paul, I wish to point to the broader context of his anthropology, in which terms such as *metamorphosis* into God's image and within one's νοῦς, and the notion of the 'inner man' (ὁ ἔσω or ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος) play an important role. In Paul, the 'inner man' (2 Cor 4.16; Rom 7.22) is synonymous with the νοῦς (Rom 12.2), which—as in Philo—is in turn identical with the Jewish notion of the God-inbreathed human πνεῦμα.¹¹ I shall now demonstrate the importance of such anthropological notions in Paul's Corinthian correspondence (§3) and in his *Letter to the Romans* (§4).

3. Paul's Second Letter to the Corinthians (2 Cor)

Paul's 2 Cor has been transmitted as a composite letter; the part I am currently interested in runs from 2 Cor 2.14 to 7.4 and constitutes a clearly distinguishable text fragment within 2 Cor. It is clear from the outset that Paul is involved in a philosophical discussion with his Corinthian public. According to Paul, he himself is intent on spreading the knowledge of God throughout the Eastern Mediterranean (2.14), but he flatly denies that his working methods are comparable with the practices of those 'who sell the word of God by retail': οὐ γὰρ ἔσμεν ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ (2.17).

Paul's language clearly echoes the warnings of Socrates in Plato's *Protagoras* against buying knowledge from the sophist Protagoras. Socrates urges Hippocrates:

we must see that the sophist in commending his wares does not deceive us, like the wholesaler and the retailer who deal in food for the body. (...) So too those who take the various subjects of knowledge from city to city, and sell them by retail (οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες) to whoever wants them, commend everything that they have for sale (*Protagoras* 313D–E).

In his letter, Paul has to face accusations that he himself behaves like itinerant sophists who demand money for their instruction, though he falls short of their standards of rhetoric and performance.

As Bruce Winter has shown, in his Corinthian community Paul is confronted with a sophistic movement among Jewish Christians, who

¹¹ For πνεῦμα, see 1 Cor 2.11; for νοῦς, see 1 Cor 1.10; 14.14–15, 14.19.

are critical of Paul as orator and debater.¹² Apparently, Paul deliberately distances himself from the sophist movement by drawing on Platonic criticism of the sophists and characterizing their activity as *καπηλεύειν*. This shows that the setting of Paul's text under discussion is philosophical from the very beginning. He himself claims to speak not for financial gain, but with sincerity (*εὐλικρινεῖα*). Paul stresses that he is not interested in using letters of recommendation (3.1). Rather than using an outward, rhetorical *modus operandi* in communicating with his public, he is bent on their inner transformation. 'We all', Paul says, 'who, with uncovered faces, behold as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the very one image': ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος (3.18)—the image, that is, of Christ, who is the image of God: εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ (4.4).¹³

Soon Paul underpins this line of thought by drawing on the notion of the 'inner man', and it is there that the closest parallels between Paul and Platonist philosophers are found. According to Paul, rather than being occupied with shallow rhetoric, man should experience *metamorphosis* towards God, and acquire a new form within.

In a similar passage in his *Letter to the Romans*, Paul points out that this transformation takes place by renewing one's νοῦς, one's mind: μεταμορφουσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός (*Rom* 12.2). According to Paul, this renders Christian religion into a λογικὴ λατρεία, an intellectual, non-cultic, ethical worship of God (*Rom* 12.1–2). In *2 Cor*, this transformation of one's mind is said to take place when it is modelled on God's image. The underlying thought is, of course, that by being transformed into God's image, man starts to partake of God himself.

Having pointed to the need to experience inner transformation, Paul concludes that, on account of this ontological change, and because of his involvement in spreading this message, he will not lose heart, despite

¹² B. W. Winter, *Philo and Paul among the Sophists: Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2002), esp. p. 91 and pp. 167–8 with reference to Plato, *Protagoras* 313. Whereas Winter focuses predominantly on *1 Cor* 1–4 and *2 Cor* 10–13, my exploration takes its starting point in *2 Cor* 2.14–7.4 and, accepting Winter's reconstruction of Paul's critique of his sophistic opponents, deals less with this critique and more explicitly with Paul's alternative to sophism, i.e. with his view on the 'inner man' and man's transformation into God's image.

¹³ Cf. van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology in Context*, chap. 6, pp. 313–339.

the controversy which he faces (4.1). He once again emphasizes that he does not disguise God's message (4.2), like the Jewish-Christian sophists, by selling the word of God by retail (2.17). He claims to reveal the truth and not to make use of letters of recommendation, recommending himself instead to the consciousness or conscience (συνείδησις) of all men (4.2)—quite the opposite of mere sophistic rhetorical strategies. Despite his circumstances, Paul indeed does not lose heart, since if the 'outer man' is destroyed, he says, 'the inner man (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος) is renewed day by day' (4.16). Paul now uses the Platonic notion of the 'inner man' (Plato, *Republic* IX 589A–B) to support his line of thought.¹⁴

The same antithesis between the outer and inner man is present in Plotinus. My choosing to compare Paul with Plotinus, who flourished about two hundred years later, may be justified by the vast corpus of Plotinus' writings, which facilitates a careful analysis between philosophical-Platonic and Pauline anthropology. Of course, Plotinus himself contributed to the further development of Platonic thought, yet the significant terminological similarities between Paul and Plotinus must be due, in no small part, to a shared philosophical heritage. This heritage includes their extensive reflections on the Platonic 'inner man'. In Plotinus' view,

it is not the soul within (ἡ ἐνδον ψυχὴ) but the outside shadow of man (ἡ ἔξω ἀνθρώπου σκιά) which cries and moans and carries on in every sort of way on a stage which is the whole earth where men have in many places set up their stages. Doings like these belong to a man who knows how to live only the lower and external life (τὰ κάτω καὶ τὰ ἔξω μόνον ᾗ; III.2.15).

'And even if Socrates, too,' Plotinus adds, 'may play sometimes, it is by the outer Socrates (ὁ ἔξω Σωκράτης) that he plays' (III.2.15). Paul seems

¹⁴ On this notion, see Th. K. Heckel, *Der Innere Mensch: Die paulinische Verarbeitung eines platonischen Motivs* (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament II.53), (Tübingen, 1993); C. Marksches, 'Die platonische Metapher vom "inneren Menschen": Eine Brücke zwischen antiker Philosophie und altchristlicher Theologie', *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 105 (1994), pp. 1–17 (also published in: *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 1.3 [1995], pp. 3–18); cf. also 'Innerer Mensch', in: *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, vol. 18, (Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 266–312; W. Burkert, 'Towards Plato and Paul: The "Inner" Human Being', in: A. Y. Collins (ed.), *Ancient and Modern Perspectives on the Bible and Culture. Essays in Honor of Hans Dieter Betz*, (Atlanta, GA, 1998), pp. 59–82; and H. D. Betz, 'The Concept of the "Inner Human Being" (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος) in the Anthropology of Paul', *New Testament Studies* 46.3 (2000), pp. 315–341. See also van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology in Context*, chap. 7.2.2: 'The inner man—the history of a concept', pp. 358–370.

to employ this notion of the 'inner man' because it is very suitable as a supplement to his criticism of the sophists' outer *modus operandi*; as a matter of fact, it substantiates his criticism of their position. For him it expresses, in a positive, emphatic, and constructive way, what the Christian message is about.

4. *The Inner Man and His Vices—Paul's Letter to the Romans*

Comparison with Plotinus shows very clearly that Paul has a genuine command of the notion of the inner man and does not use this terminology only superficially. Both Paul and Plotinus appear to dwell on the question of how the inner man relates to virtues and sin. I shall first focus on Plotinus' view on this relation, in order to provide a context in which Paul's reflections on the inner man can be appreciated more clearly. To this end, we shall now first address the question of what Plotinus thinks of the vices which, despite the process of becoming god-like, remain in man. Plotinus devotes much discussion to this specific topic, and his deliberations help us to understand the ins and outs of the notion of the 'inner man'. As we shall see subsequently, it is highly remarkable that this topic is also discussed in Paul, in an extensive passage in the *Letter to the Romans*, which Paul wrote during his final stay in Corinth.

(a) *Plotinus on the Inner Man, Virtues and Sin*

According to Plotinus, the real, proper virtues, which belong to the sphere of intellect, have their seat in the 'true man' (ὁ ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος), the 'inner man'/the 'man within' (ὁ ἐνδον ἄνθρωπος), or the 'separate soul', as he also calls it—that which transcends the human life and is different from the body and its affections. The other, lesser virtues, however, which result from habit and training, are located in what Plotinus calls 'the joint entity'; this entity is also the seat of the vices (I.1.10). The proper virtues are those which effect the purification of the soul and make it similar to God (I.2.3). Plotinus is interested in the question of how this purification deals with 'passion and desire and all the rest (...), and how far separation from the body is possible'. In his view, the soul 'gets rid of passion as completely as possible, altogether if it can', but the reason why it cannot lies in 'the involuntary impulse' (τὸ ἀπροαίρετον). This impulse, which is not under the

control of will, belongs to something other than the soul, and is small and weak (I.2.5).

On the one hand, Plotinus is optimistic about the soul's possibility to be pure and to achieve its aim of making the irrational part, too, pure. This part profits from the soul's purification,

just as a man living next door to a sage would profit by the sage's neighbourhood, either by becoming like him or by regarding him with such respect as not to dare to do anything of which the good man would not approve (I.2.5).

Insofar as this is the case, the soul is sinless. Yet Plotinus stresses that he is not obsessed, in a negative way, by trying to avoid sin. Rather, his concern, in a positive way, is to become god-like, to be a god. Nevertheless, although Plotinus is optimistic about the soul's potential, he does have to concede that there may still be an element of involuntary impulse in man, which causes him to be not *simply god* (θεὸς μόνον), but 'a god or spirit who is *double*' (διπλοῦς)¹⁵ (I.2.6).

As Plotinus says elsewhere, one can argue that the soul is sinless if one assumes the soul to be 'a single completely simple thing and identifies soul and essential soulness'. Yet, the soul is regarded to be sinful if one 'interweaves with it and adds to it another form of soul (...): so the soul itself becomes compound (...) and is affected as a whole, and it is the compound which sins'. This 'other form of soul' is also called the soul's image (εἰδωλον). In order to illustrate his views on the compound soul, Plotinus uses two metaphors, one drawn from Plato, the other from Homer.

The first image relates to the sea-god Glaucus, who is likened to the soul because its real nature is only seen if one knocks off its encrustations (Plato, *Republic* X 611D–612A). Similarly, the soul's image—the other, added, encrusted form of soul—is abandoned and 'no longer exists when the whole soul is looking to the intelligible world'.

The other image, taken from Homer, concerns the figure of Heracles: 'The poet seems to be separating the image with regard to Heracles when he says that his *shade* is in Hades, but he *himself* among the gods' (Homer, *Odyssey* 11.601–602). Heracles is above inasmuch as he is a contemplative person, but, insofar he is an active person, 'there is

¹⁵ Cf. also 'the other form of soul' in I.1.12 and 'the two souls' in IV.3. Perhaps the notion of a 'double soul' also occurs in *The Letter of James*, which speaks of διψυχος in 1.8 and 4.8.

also still a part of him below' (I.1.12; cf. IV.3.27 and VI.4.16). In this respect, Plotinus also speaks of 'the two souls' (IV.3.27).¹⁶

(b) *St Paul on the Inner Man and Sin*

It is highly remarkable that this specific discussion in Plotinus about the relation between the 'inner man' and his vices, which do not belong to the 'inner man' but to something else, and about the 'involuntary impulse' which causes these vices, also seems to occur in Paul's *Letter to the Romans*.¹⁷ According to Paul, man is 'fleshly', exported for sale under sin (7.14). The word 'exported for sale' (πεπραμμένος) is usually used of deporting captives to foreign parts for sale as slaves (LSJ 1394 πέρνημι) and it is difficult to neglect the overtones of deportation from the heavenly fatherland.

Being deported, Paul does not acknowledge his actions as his own, because what he does is not what he wants to do, but what he detests (7.15). He acts against his will, and for this reason, Paul does not regard himself as the one who performs the action, but rather the sin that dwells in him (7.16–17):

¹⁶ For a bibliography on this interpretation of Heracles, see A. H. Armstrong, *Plotinus: Ennead IV* (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge, Mass./London, p. 121 note 2. Cf. also R. Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition* (The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 9), (Berkeley, Calif, 1986), pp. 100–103.

¹⁷ For an analysis of *Rom* 7 against the background of Graeco-Roman culture and philosophy, see also T. Engberg-Pedersen, 'The Reception of Graeco-Roman Culture in the New Testament: The Case of Romans 7.7–25', in: M. Müller & H. Tronier (eds), *The New Testament as Reception* (Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series 230; Copenhagen International Seminar 11), (London, 2002), pp. 32–57; and R. von Bendemann, 'Die kritische Diastase von Wissen, Wollen und Handeln: Traditionsgeschichtliche Spurensuche eines hellenistischen Topos in Römer 7', *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der Älteren Kirche* 95 (2004), pp. 35–63, esp. pp. 55–61 on Epictetus. Von Bendemann, however, scarcely mentions the 'inner man' (see briefly pp. 52, 59, 61–62) and does not refer to Plotinus' discussion of the inner man and the involuntary impulse within man. An excellent approach is undertaken by E. Wasserman, 'The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Revisiting Paul's Anthropology in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology', *Journal of Biblical Literature* 126 (2007), pp. 793–816. Wasserman argues that 'Romans 7 appropriates a Platonic discourse about the nature of the soul and describes what happens to its reasoning part when the bad passions and appetites get the upper hand' (Wasserman, 'The Death of the Soul', 800). See also E. Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death, and the Law in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology* (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament II.256), (Tübingen, 2008).

For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me (7.18–20).

These ideas clearly share Plotinus' insistence that it is the compound soul which sins, and not the inner man; if this compound soul does sin, it does so involuntarily. Like Plotinus, Paul contrasts the 'flesh', his 'unspiritual self', with the 'inner man', which is regarded as sinless:

In the inner man (κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον), I delight in the law of God (συνήδουμαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ), but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind (νοῦς), making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members. (...) (...) So then, with my mind (νοῦς) I am a slave to the law of God, but with my flesh I am a slave to the law of sin (7.22–23, 25b).

Although Paul puts it in a more dramatic fashion, he and Plotinus basically seem to agree that the true self, the inner man, is sinless and rejoices in God's law. This compliance with divine law is also brought out in Plotinus. According to him,

when a man (...) comes to the divine, it stands over him and sees to it that he is man; that is, that he lives by the law (νόμος) of providence, which means doing everything that its law says (ὃ δὴ ἐστὶ πράττοντα ὅσα ὁ νόμος αὐτῆς λέγει). But it says that those who have become good shall have a good life, now, and laid up for them hereafter as well, and the wicked the opposite (III.2.9).

There is fundamental agreement between Plotinus and Paul about the ethical purpose of the notion of the 'inner man', and of the real possibility that man rejoices in God's law, the law of providence. To acknowledge that there is still an involuntary impulse operative in man is, for them, not to justify unethical conduct. Quite the opposite, since the driving force behind the notion of 'inner man' is the idea that man should be transformed into God's image and become as god-like as possible: Plato's notion of the ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (*Theaetetus* 176B).¹⁸ The Lutheran interpretation of Paul's view on man as 'simul

¹⁸ On this notion, see D. Sedley, 'The Ideal of Godlikeness', in: G. Fine (ed.), *Plato*, vol. 2: *Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul* (Oxford Readings in Philosophy), (Oxford, 1999), chap. 14, pp. 309–328; J. Annas, *Platonic Ethics, Old and New* (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 57), (Ithaca, N.Y., 1999), chap. 3: 'Becoming Like Gods: Ethics, Human Nature, and the Divine', pp. 52–71; and van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology in Context*, chap. 2.2: 'The "image of God" and "being made like God": The traditions of *homoioōsis*

iustus et peccator', as if this were a steady, static mixture, leads to a severe misunderstanding of Paul's anthropology.¹⁹ Paul and Plotinus regard the 'inner man' as progressive in nature: 'The soul gets rid of passions *as completely as possible*, altogether if it can, but if it cannot, at least it does not share its emotional excitement' (I.2.5); 'we are being transformed into God's image *with ever-increasing glory*' (2 Cor 3.18), and 'the inner man is renewed *day by day*' (4.16).

Paul's deliberations in chapter 7 of his *Letter to the Romans* about the relation between the 'inner man' and the vices which involuntarily remain in man show that he is indeed very well acquainted with the Platonic notion of the 'inner man'. Later on in this letter, Paul's line of thought again closely resembles the ideas already expressed in 2 Cor. Man is destined to acquire the same form as the image of God's Son, so that he becomes συμμορφος τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ (Rom 8.29). As is the case in 2 Cor, this form (μορφή) is the result of his transformation. This transformation is effected by the renewing of one's mind, Paul explains in Rom 12. There, Paul exhorts his readers to be transformed by the renewing of the mind (μεταμορφουσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός), so that they can examine the will of God, which—as in Plato's *Euthyphro*—is not arbitrary, but is characterized as that which is good, pleasant and perfect: μεταμορφουσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός, εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον (12.2).

According to Paul, this inward transformation is in fact—as we have already seen—a λογικὴ λατρεία, a 'logical', intellectual, i.e. non-cultic worship of God (12.1).²⁰ That this transformation is effected within

theōi in Greek philosophy from Plato to Plotinus', pp. 124–181. On its importance in Middle Platonism, contemporarily with Paul, see J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220—Revised edition with new afterword*, London, 1996 (1977¹), Index, s.v. 'Likeness to God'.

¹⁹ For this Lutheran interpretation, see H. Lichtenberger, *Das Ich Adams und das Ich der Menschheit: Studien zum Menschenbild in Römer 7* (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 164), (Tübingen, 2004), chap. 3.3, pp. 24–28, esp. 27.

²⁰ For Paul's polemical purpose behind this passage, and behind the beginning of his letter in Rom 1, see G. H. van Kooten, 'Pagan and Jewish Monotheism according to Varro, Plutarch and St Paul: The Aniconic, Monotheistic Beginnings of Rome's Pagan Cult—Romans 1:19–25 in a Roman Context', in: A. Hilhorst, É. Puech & E. Tigchelaar (eds), *Flores Florentino: Dead Sea Scrolls and Other Early Jewish Studies in Honour of Florentino García Martínez* (Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 122), (Leiden/Boston, 2007), pp. 633–651 (= van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology in Context*, chap. 7.1, pp. 343–356).

the mind (νοῦς) is consistent with Paul's view, expressed earlier in the letter, that the 'inner man' is located within the mind. This follows from Paul's saying that he rejoices in the law of God κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, in the inner man (7.22), and serves God's law τῷ μὲν νοῷ, with the mind (7.25).

5. Concluding Observations

The passages from the Pauline epistles adduced above seem to demonstrate that in Paul, as in Philo, πνεῦμα—in the trichotomy πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα—is identified with νοῦς. Philo's and Paul's anthropology of tripartite man is very similar. One might ask whether there is in fact any difference between their anthropology and pagan trichotomous counterparts. Inasmuch as Philo and Paul refer to the highest part of man not only as νοῦς but preferably (on account of their exegesis of *Gen* 2.7) as πνεῦμα, one might also suggest that they stress the identical, pneumatic nature of God and man in a far more egalitarian and accessible way than is the case in the Greek equivalent anthropology. In order to experience fellowship with God, man does not have to improve the intellectual abilities of his νοῦς but is connected through the πνεῦμα. In Plutarch, as John Dillon explains, the highest class of people, who possess νοῦς, is rather restricted: 'Intellect [νοῦς] thus becomes something rather special, not readily accessible to the mass of humankind.'²¹ Both Philo and Paul make transition from νοῦς to πνεῦμα. According to Festugière: 'Du νοῦς au πνεῦμα, voilà toute la différence, ce qui (...) distingue spécifiquement le christianisme.'²² More than in pagan philosophy, participation in God himself is open to all:

Notre âme est déjà son πνεῦμα. Tout naturellement, dès lors, elle devient siège de la grâce, Ἡ χάρις μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν,—ainsi s'achèvent les lettres aux Galates, VI, 18, aux Philippiens IV, 23, à Philémon 25,—habitation de l' ἅγιον πνεῦμα, du saint-Esprit. (...) Ainsi, grâce à Paul, grâce au christianisme, ce qu'il y eut de meilleur dans l'âme païenne trouve enfin son vrai sens. (...) L'intelligence devient esprit.²³

²¹ Dillon, 'Plutarch and the Separable Intellect', p. 44.

²² Festugière, *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile*, p. 217.

²³ Festugière, *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile*, pp. 219–220.

The free accessibility of this pneumatic identity is an aspect of Paul's 'Adam Christology', as James Dunn calls it.²⁴ By participating in Christ's death and resurrection in baptism (*Rom* 6.3–11), the human identity starts to fuse with that of Christ, the second Adam, the second man who, in contrast to the first man, is from heaven. Whereas man still bears the image of the first, earthly Adam (*1 Cor* 15.49), Christians increasingly bear the image of the heavenly man and are increasingly transformed into his likeness (*2 Cor* 3.18). In this way their πνεῦμα is restored and they again turn into trichotomous human beings, *pneumatikoi*. For this reason, they can boldly claim to possess the νοῦς of Christ (*1 Cor* 2.15–16), the νοῦς of the heavenly, archetypal man. Whereas for Plutarch the highest class of human beings, the possessors of νοῦς, is sparsely populated, for Paul, this possession is within reach for all Christians. The more they share in the πνεῦμα and νοῦς, the more their outer man decreases and their inner man, the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, develops. Despite this significant difference in emphasis, at the same time Paul's anthropology appears to be highly Greek-philosophical in nature; it entails the trichotomous differentiation between πνεῦμα / νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα / σάρξ, and builds upon reflections on the inner man.

²⁴ See J. D. G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*, (Edinburgh, 1998), chaps 4, 8.6, 10.2. The principle passages containing Adam Christology are *Rom* 5.12–6.11; *1 Cor* 15.20–28; *1 Cor* 15.45–49.