In South Sulawesi (Celebes) a rebellion against the Indonesian Republic broke out shortly after the formal recognition of Indonesian independence. In the initial stages it was simply a rising of former guerilla fighters who were disgruntled at the mode of their incorporation into the Republic Army, or partial demobilization. After several years the rebels linked up with Kartosuwirjo’s Islamic State of Indonesia, however. The rebellion in Sulawesi was led by Kahar Muzakkar.¹ It was to affect large parts of South and Southeast Sulawesi for many years.

1. Kahar Muzakkar and the Struggle for Independence

Abdul Kahar Muzakkar, who in his youth was named La Domeng, was born in the village of Lanipa, near Palopo, on the north-west coast of Bone Bay, on March 24th, 1921. He was the son of a farmer who was reasonably well-off and belonged to the low aristocracy (Andaya 1976:2). At the age of seventeen he was sent to Surakarta to study at the Perguruan Islam, a Muhammadiyah college. Before completing his education here he returned in 1941 to Palopo, where for a short while he taught at a Muhammadiyah school. He also became one of the local leaders of the Pemuda Muhammadiyah, or Muhammadiyah Youth, and of the Hizbul Wathon, the Muhammadiyah boy scout movement. At the beginning of the Japanese occupation he worked for a brief period for the Japanese at Ujungpandang (Makassar).²

Soon Kahar Muzakkar came into conflict with the local adat chiefs. Why he provoked their hostility is not fully known. Kahar Muzakkar in any case “was accused of sedition” against the adat chiefs (Tjatatan 1950:17). He is even said to have gone further and to have “denounced the existing feudal system in South Sulawesi and advocated the abolishing of the aristocracy” (Harvey 1974:182). Banned from the island, or to be more precise, ostracized³ for life, Kahar Muzakkar returned to Sura-
karta in 1942, where he set up as a trader. He remained in Java, where he took an active part in the armed struggle for independence, for about ten years.

From the descriptions of him, Kahar Muzakkar emerges as a brave man with great personal appeal. He is attributed with "reckless bravery in combat, unmatched skill in the use of arms and in sports, and a piercing intelligence, coupled with brilliant daring initiatives", while "his ability to move men by his speeches is compared favourably with that of Sukarno's..." (Andaya 1976:6–7).

Kahar Muzakkar participated in the struggle for independence from its very beginning, one might say. He was a member of Soekarno’s bodyguards when the latter gave one of his first mass speeches on Freedom Square in Jakarta on September 19th, 1945. About this meeting Kahar Muzakkar himself boasts that he was the only person (armed with a machette) prepared to protect Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta against the bayonets of the Japanese soldiers who tried to disperse the meeting and who encircled the car in which Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta were driving (Muzakkar n.d.:8).

After the proclamation of independence he became one of the co-founders of the Movement of Young Indonesians from Sulawesi living in Java, the Gerakan Pemuda Indonesia Sulawesi (GEPIS). As early as October 21st, 1945, the GEPIS merged with another guerilla organization made up of youths from Sulawesi, namely the Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia Sulawesi, or APIS. The resultant new organization was named Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi (KRIS), i.e., Devotion of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi. The majority of the youth joining the KRIS, according to Harvey (1974:173) even all of them, came from Minahasa, the north-eastern Peninsula of Sulawesi. A large proportion of the people from Minahasa and Manado were Christian and belonged to one or other of the ethnic groups from which before the Second World War the Dutch East Indies Colonial Army, or KNIL, had recruited many of its soldiers. Because of this association with the Dutch colonial regime the Minahasans and Manadonese were generally suspected of being pro-Dutch and of working as Dutch agents. In Java, in the territory of the Indonesian Republic, they thus found themselves in a hostile environment. Hence the KRIS was formed by them with a view to defending themselves and showing their willingness to fight against the Dutch on the side of the Republic. Similar organizations were founded for similar reasons by people from...
Ambon living in Java, such as the API (Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia) Ambon and the PIM (Pasukan Indonesia Maluku). The KRIS in particular because of its KNIL association had a reputation as a well organized and disciplined military unit.

Kahar Muzakkar was made first secretary of the KRIS, in which capacity he was assigned the task of setting up branches in Central and East Java. There were KRIS units fighting against the Dutch in Java alongside the Republican Army, and, as in the case of other guerilla units, conflicts arose between them and the official Republican Army. Republican Army attempts to incorporate and thus control the irregular units resulted in among other things the disarming of KRIS troops at Karawang and in Rengasdengklok at the beginning of 1947 (ANP-Aneta 30-4-1947).

Kahar Muzakkar did not confine himself to setting up KRIS branches in Java. Upon leaving the KRIS, he played an important part in the foundation of the Batalyon Kesatuan Indonesia at the end of 1945 and in organizing the infiltration of Sulawesi — where the Dutch had re-established their control — by proa from Java. The core of the Batalyon Kesatuan Indonesia, or Indonesian Unity Battalion, was formed by prisoners from the Nusakambangan and Cilacap prisons originating from the Outer Islands. At Kahar Muzakkar’s intercession these prisoners were released and subsequently given a brief military training. The Batalyon is said to have served as escort for President Soekarno at the Republican Government’s transfer from Jakarta to Yogyakarta, and to have been turned into “the shock-troops for the Special Military Intelligence Unit (PMC — Penjelidik Militer Chusus) of Colonel Zulkifli Lubis” in Yogyakarta (Harvey 1974:174). This was for only a few months, however. In March 1946 the Batalyon Kesatuan Indonesia became the core of the Tentara Republik Indonesia Persiapan Sulawesi, i.e., Indonesian Republican Army for the Preparation [of the Liberation] of Sulawesi. It was commonly referred to as TRI Persiapan Sulawesi or TRIP(E)S. This TRIPES was formed by Kahar Muzakkar on being assigned the task of preparing the formation of a Republican Army in Sulawesi by Sudirman, the commander of the Republican Army, on March 24th, 1946.

To accomplish this task Kahar Muzakkar set out to organize the above-mentioned infiltration of South Sulawesi by proa from Java. At first things worked out quite well. By his own account about 1,200 soldiers were sent to Sulawesi in the course of 1948 (Bardosono 1956:88) and more than ten expeditions were dis-
patched from Java by the TRIPES. Particularly the fourth and sixth of these expeditions were of importance for the later course of history. In the course of these expeditions Mohammad Saleh Lahade and Andi Mattalatta, who had come to Java to discuss the coordination and consolidation of the guerilla movement in Sulawesi at the end of 1945, returned to Sulawesi (Nasution 1977 III:607). It had been as a result of the latter's contacts with Soekarno and Sudirman that the idea of forming the Batalyon Kesatuan Indonesia had been born. Although the idea had not originated with him, Kahar Muzakkar had nevertheless become the battalion's commander, while Mohammad Saleh Lahade was appointed its Chief of Staff and Andi Mattalatta vice-commander. After their return to Sulawesi, the latter founded the Hasanuddin Division, with himself as commander and Mohammad Saleh Lahade as Chief of Staff, on January 21st, 1947 (Harvey 1974:178).

After 1946, however, the infiltration activities virtually came to a standstill. From that year onwards the outlook for the Republican forces in Sulawesi was rather gloomy. The effects of the infiltration were soon brought to naught by Dutch counter-insurgency tactics as applied by Westerling. Most of the guerilla fighters who had come from Java were either captured or killed. The rest returned to Java.

The local guerillas, who had never been away from Sulawesi, were struck a heavy blow by Westerling's actions, too. It took them many years to recover. This was the more serious because it had taken so much effort to build up a guerilla force that had some strength and posed something of a threat to the Dutch. But then the entire guerilla struggle of South Sulawesi suffered many ups and downs. In the first months after August 1945 the proclamation of independence had been hailed with enthusiasm by the population here. Initially the local nobility, including, for instance, the Prince of Bone, Andi Mappanjuki (Mappanjuki), and the chiefs of Luwu – Kahar Muzakkar's area of origin – and of Bonthain, had also given it their support. At that time anti-Dutch feeling had been so strong that one Dutch civil servant concludes a report with the words that "one might conclude that the situation in South Sulawesi is beyond hope, and as a result of Japanese influence or for whatever reason the feeling is generally anti-Dutch", quickly modifying this remark by adding that this is not altogether true, and that, although there are many people who are anti-Dutch, there are also many who are not (NIB, I:518). Within a short time things changed for the better for the
Dutch, however. As early as December 1945 another high Dutch official was able to write that “the political sky of this region, which before looked rather gloomy and threatening, over the past few days has cleared considerably because the ‘autonomous’ governments of Bone, Wajo Soppeng and Luwu, as well as the principal Arus from the subdistricts of Sinjai and Bulukumba, have declared their readiness to cooperate with the Nica [Netherlands Indies Civil Administration]” (NIB II:222).10

In spite of the initial support from part of the nobility and the population, it had taken some time for the Republican forces in South Sulawesi to organize local resistance. The principal reason why the efforts in this direction had been so slow to take effect had been the failure of the Republican leaders in South Sulawesi to take full advantage of the situation arising immediately after the proclamation of independence. They had let the opportunity provided by the circumstance that the first Allied troops set foot on Sulawesi only at the end of September 1945 simply go by. In contrast to Java and Aceh, for instance, there had been no attempts to seize Japanese arms, while there was furthermore a lack of men with sufficient military training to be able to assume the leadership of any anti-Dutch actions. During the Japanese occupation Sulawesi had had no indigenous Japanese-sponsored force comparable to the Peta. Moreover, those in South Sulawesi who had received some military training as members of the Heiho auxiliary forces or of the Seinendan Youth Corps had failed to form into revolutionary groups to oppose the Dutch troops, but had simply gone home (Said n.d.:1).

Of course some guerilla groups had sprung up, notably around Ujungpandang. In Polongbangkang, to the south of the latter city, a regional Republican movement, the Gerakan Muda Bajeng, or Bajeng Youth Movement, had been formed on the initiative of the karaeng (prince), Haji Pajonga Daeng Ngalle. This also had a military branch, the Lipang Bajeng, made up of former Heiho members, some former KNIL soldiers, and other youths.11 It was at this headquarters that the Lasykar Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia (LAPRIS), or Revolutionary Militia of the Indonesian Republic, comprising 17 guerilla groups in the region12, was formed in July 1946. The latter was chaired by the karaeng’s secretary, while one of the most famous guerilla leaders of Sulawesi, Wolter Mongisidi – who after being captured by Dutch troops was executed in September 1949 – was appointed its secretary-general, and Ranggong Daeng Romo, who headed the Lipang Bajeng, became its military commander.
Westerling’s counter-insurgency program thus left the local guerrillas in disarray, in particular after the troops which had re-infiltrated from Java were virtually eliminated. The many local groups did continue fighting for an independent Indonesian Republic, but on a smaller scale. They included the Barisan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia, the KRIS Muda, and the Pasukan or Lasykar Harimau Indonesia (Indonesian Tigers), a unit founded by Wolter Mongisidi and Muhmmadsjah (Muhmmadsyah) (or Muhammad Dimar) after the occupation of the LAPRIS headquarters by Dutch troops and the latter’s dispersal of the guerilla troops. Seriously weakened and operating among a population which was too afraid to give them much active support, they no longer posed a real threat to the Dutch or the Dutch-sponsored State of East Indonesia, however. It was this State of East Indonesia, constituted at the end of 1946, which reaped the fruits of Westerling’s actions. It was able to erect and maintain an administrative structure without too much harassment from resistance activities until the end of 1949.

In Java, meanwhile, people from Sulawesi continued to participate in the fight against the Dutch. In the course of the struggle the name and status of the TRIPES changed several times. Shortly after the Linggarjati agreement of November 1946 it was renamed Lasykar Sulawesi. Around this same time Kahar Muzakkar constituted his own shock troops, the Barisan Berani Mati, or “dare-devil troops”, while he and his men were in Madiun. They were made up of the best TRIPES soldiers, and in theory also had a branch in Sulawesi (Mattulada 1978:179). As a lasykar, the Lasykar Sulawesi was integrated into the Biro Perjuangan of the Ministry of Defence, and a few months later became the Hasanuddin Regiment. This incorporation in the Biro Perjuangan implied that the control of the Lasykar Sulawesi or Hasanuddin Regiment ultimately lay with the Ministry of Defence, not with the commander of the Republican Army. When in June 1947 the latter was renamed the National Army of Indonesia (TNI), all irregular units were obliged to merge with it. As a consequence the Hasanuddin Regiment became the Brigade II.X. Together with the other lasykars from the Outer Islands fighting in Java, sometimes also referred to as the Pasukan Seberang, or Overseas Troops, the Brigade formed part of the KRU-X (Kesatuan Reserve Umum, or General Reserve). The then Indonesian Army Chief of Staff for Operations, A.H. Nasution, intended the KRU-X to become a well integrated unit of all lasykars from the Outer Islands operating in Java. Initially the
scheme failed, mainly because of hostility and distrust among the lassenard commanders and because each group wanted to preserve its own identity. For some time each region or island in fact continued to have its own brigade. The next year, 1948, however, the fusion became a fact and a new brigade, the Brigade XVI, was born (Nasution 1968:210–211). Its major components were Kahar Muzakkar’s Brigade IX and the Brigade IX commanded by J. (Jopie) F. Warouw, who now also became the commander of the new Brigade XVI, with Kahar Muzakkar as second in command, while H.N. Ventje Sumual (Vence Sumual) was appointed Chief of Staff. 14

Soon conflict arose between J.F. Warouw and Kahar Muzakkar. After the second Dutch “military action” their troops even split up. Kahar Muzakkar and his men, after operating in East Java, now went to Yogyakarta, while J.F. Warouw and his soldiers remained in East Java. In Central Java Kahar Muzakkar again came into conflict with one of his commanding officers, this time Lieutenant-Colonel Soeharto. Kahar Muzakkar was thereupon reprimanded and degraded. After the re-occupation of Yogyakarta by Republican troops, he and his men were forbidden to enter that city (Mussaffa 1951 n. 1). To ease the tension Kahar Muzakkar was given a new assignment. In October 1949 he became commander of the Komando Grup Seberang, the Overseas Commando Group. His transfer did not solve all the problems, however. In November internal fighting broke out as units of the Brigade XVI operating in the region around Lawang, between Surabaya and Malang, renounced their allegiance to the Republic. These units were allegedly communist, and may possibly have tried to link up with other Republican units in the area, namely those commanded by Abdullah, which were likewise suspected of communist “contamination”. J.F. Warouw was given orders to take action against these latter units, but because he was unable to “find a peaceful solution”, Dutch troops were eventually brought in (M 16-11-1949, 19-11-1949, 28-11-1949). 15

In his new capacity Kahar Muzakkar, who by this time had been promoted to the rank of “acting” lieutenant-colonel, was put in charge of the coordination of the guerilla units in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the Moluccas and Nusa Tenggara – in fact, the entire Seberang area. Besides, he was charged with the task of building up a military cadre in these areas, the attempt at this in the years 1946 and 1947 having failed because of the Westerling actions. Kahar Muzakkar had made a modest start with this by sending two of his staff officers – Saleh Sjahban (Saleh Syahban)
and Bahar Mattaliu — to Sulawesi to establish contact with the remaining guerilla forces there even before his October appointment.

2. The Republican Army, the KNIL and the Guerillas in Sulawesi

Around 1950 the political and military situation in Sulawesi was affected to a great extent by the issue of whether there was to be a federal or a unitary Republic of Indonesia. Sulawesi, or to be more precise South Sulawesi, constituted the military and administrative centre of the State of East Indonesia. This State — created as early as December 1946 as one of a number of states which were planned by the Dutch Government to comprise the federal United States of Indonesia in the near future — experienced a fairly favourable development up to 1950. Militarily the Republican guerillas, who were virtually annihilated after the actions of Westerling and his troops, constituted no threat. Politically there was no opposition of any significance — a few internal government scandals aside — after the pro-Republican fraction walked out of Parliament in early 1947. Economically the State of East Indonesia prospered because of the demand for its products (Alers 1956:143–152).

Perhaps the most important factor contributing to its apparent prosperity during the Indonesian struggle for independence was its isolation from other parts of Indonesia. When in 1950 the federal state structure of Indonesia was put to the test and this particular State was lifted out of its Dutch-backed isolation, the hitherto repressed differences came into the open and by the end of a few months the State of East Indonesia had crumbled. This was the first time pro-Republican forces, demanding the revocation of the State and the incorporation of its territory into the Republic of Indonesia, were able to act as free agents in Sulawesi. Their demands were voiced in Parliament as well as in public declarations and in demonstrations staged by mass organizations here. In some instances the expression of these demands assumed a more violent nature. A proportion of the former guerilla fighters refused to comply with the resolutions of the Round Table Conference, and continued attacking the military force of the State of East Indonesia, comprising former KNIL units which in theory now were their allies. These guerilla organizations included the Harimau Indonesia and the Gerilya Pengikut Proklamasi (cf. Bardosono 1956:83–97).
Aside from the trouble with former guerilla units, a bitter conflict broke out about the degree of autonomy of the State of East Indonesia. Essentially the dispute revolved around the question of whether or not troops of the United States of Indonesia, really meaning troops from Java, were to be allowed to be stationed in the territory of the State of East Indonesia. In early 1950 the issue culminated in an armed confrontation between the Government of the United States of Indonesia and former KNIL units in Sulawesi.

The immediate cause of the conflict was provided by the dispatch of troops from Java to Sulawesi. The Government of the United States of Indonesia in which the Republic of Indonesia played a prominent part, took the decision to station troops in South Sulawesi early in 1950, against the express wishes of the Government of its largest member-state, the State of East Indonesia. The latter warned that the dispatch of troops from Java might provoke hostilities and argued that the KNIL was quite capable of maintaining law and order in the area by itself. It on the other hand, agreed to the proposal that the territorial commander of East Indonesia should be someone who had served in the Republican Army. This function was subsequently given to Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Mokoginta (A.Y. Mokoginta), who, however, was obliged to accept the assistance of Major Nanlohy of the KNIL and of Ir. Putuhena, the later Prime Minister and head of a pro-Republican Cabinet of the State of East Indonesia.

The objective of the dispatch of troops was a strengthening of the position of the Republic of Indonesia, in particular of its Army. In the period immediately following the formal recognition of Indonesian independence the number of Republican soldiers in South Sulawesi was quite small. Apart from the few local guerilla bands operating in the area, which were difficult even for the Republican Government to control, a handful of staff officers and a small Military Police unit of about 80 men constituted the entire Republic of Indonesia force in the region. This handful of soldiers was no match for the relatively large KNIL unit. To achieve a better balance more troops hence had to be shipped from Java to Sulawesi. These were accordingly to provide a counterbalance for the KNIL troops, which might, if left unchecked, assume an important role in the State of East Indonesia’s resistance against incorporation into the projected unitary Republic of Indonesia.

The plans for sending troops to Sulawesi had been conceived as early as the end of 1949. The units considered best fitted for the
task were a number of contingents of the Brigade XVI. The latter itself was disbanded in February 1950 and its commander, Warouw, stationed at Army headquarters in Jakarta. The part of the Brigade commanded by Colonel H.V. Worang was singled out for dispatch to Sulawesi. To justify the move, the rumour was circulated that President Soekarno intended to pay a visit to East Indonesia, but that the troops of the United States of Indonesia — meaning Republican troops — had to be stationed there first to guarantee his safety (BI 19-12-1949, 15-2-1950, 1-3-1950; M 18-2-1950).16

On April 5th two ships, the Waikelo and the Bontekoe, carrying about one thousand soldiers, arrived at Ujungpandang. Here former KNIL units prevented the troop’s disembarkament. These rebellious KNIL units, which had been incorporated into the Army of the United States of Indonesia less than a week before, were led by Captain Andi Abdul Azis. They styled themselves the Pasukan Bebas, or Free Troops. Besides sealing off the harbour, Andi Abdul Azis took prisoner all the Republican soldiers already in Ujungpandang. One of these was Lieutenant-Colonel Mokoginta, who had come here to set up the Military Administration of the State of East Indonesia at the end of 1949.17 He was released again within a day, however, after Andi Abdul Azis had conferred with the President of the State of East Indonesia, Sukawati. Later, in the course of his trial, Andi Abdul Azis repeatedly stressed that he and his men had acted as members of the Army of the United States of Indonesia, and not as KNIL soldiers. Their aim had been simply to prevent fighting between the (former) KNIL soldiers, who were infuriated at the dispatch of troops from Java, and the Republican troops (PR 18-3-1953, 2-4-1953).

The Government of the United States of Indonesia in Jakarta nevertheless considered Andi Abdul Azis’ move an unequivocal act of rebellion. On April 7th it accordingly issued orders for him to report in Jakarta within three days to answer for his behaviour. He ignored the order, however, only arriving in the capital on April 16th. He claimed that he had been prevented from reporting earlier because of the tenseness of the situation at Ujungpandang.18

That there would be trouble had been foreseeable. KNIL soldiers at Ujungpandang had publicly protested against the stationing of troops from Java as early as January. In a motion concerning their integration into the Armed Forces of the United States of Indonesia they had agreed only to a conditional
voluntary integration. One of the conditions was that they would be commanded by KNIL officers, another that they would not be combined with Republican troops for at least a year. When this condition had come up for discussion again on March 27th, a statement was added saying that the KNIL soldiers were embarrassed (*malu*) at the dispatch of troops from Java, as the KNIL had shown itself perfectly capable of maintaining order over the past two years (IB 23-1-1950, 6-4-1950).

Andi Abdul Azis provided the Central Government with a perfect excuse not only for sending the Worang Battalion to South Sulawesi, but also for extending its military presence there even further. It decided to send a military expedition to South Sulawesi while his rebellion was still in progress, which decision it did not, however, reverse after his surrender. This expedition ushered in the subsequent build-up of Republican troops comprising soldiers originating from Java in the area. It constituted the first instance of the stationing of the three post-war Javanese divisions in Sulawesi.

The expedition was commanded by Colonel Kawilarang, whose sub-commanders were Lieutenant-Colonels J.F. Warouw and Soeharto. Warouw had the co-command of the Mobile Brigade from East Java which formed part of the expeditionary force. Soeharto was in command of the *Mataram* Brigade of the *Diponegoro* Division. Kahar Muzakkar did not take part in the expedition. He had been ordered back to Sulawesi just after the outbreak of Andi Abdul Azis' rebellion and had boarded the corvette Hang Tuah, which had been sent to Ujungpandang by the Indonesian Government, as a passenger, arriving in South Sulawesi on April 9th. He was recalled to Jakarta on April 16th, after Andi Abdul Azis' surrender, and more than a week before the military expedition set foot on Sulawesi.

After the said surrender, preparations for the expedition nevertheless continued, as was indicated above. This was prompted partly by suspicions about the political reliability of the former KNIL units in South Sulawesi, and partly by the determination of the Government of the United States of Indonesia in Jakarta to show that the ultimate authority over the whole of the territory of Indonesia lay with it. Upon its disembarkation the expeditionary force indeed came to blows with the (former) KNIL troops. Fighting occurred between them on May 15th and August 5th, 1950. Notably the latter encounter was quite serious, with a fierce battle continuing for days. According to official figures, over one thousand civilians were killed in the
course of this, and 350 houses were destroyed. The Indonesian troops emerged victorious. On August 9th a cease-fire was declared and the KNIL units involved were compelled to leave South Sulawesi. Within a fortnight all former KNIL soldiers received orders directing them to places outside South Sulawesi. Those originating from Manado were sent there. The remainder was transported to Java, where they were stationed in Surabaya, Semarang, Bandung and Jakarta (N 1-9-1950, 25-9-1950, 14-12-1950). Colonel Kawilarang was subsequently appointed territorial commander of East Indonesia. With the departure of the KNIL, there was no longer anything to obstruct the dissolution of the State of East Indonesia. On August 17th 1950, the unitary Republic of Indonesia was officially proclaimed, putting an end to the brief existence of the federal United States of Indonesia.

Following the defeat of the KNIL units the Indonesian Republican Government was still left with the problem of the guerilla fighters in South Sulawesi to solve. In its efforts to deal with this problem it was able to use the attempts at coordination by the guerillas themselves as point of departure. Even before Kahar Muzakkar’s appointment as commander of the Komando Grup Seberang, in April 1949, two of his staff officers, Saleh Sjahban and Bahar Mattaliu, had gone back to South Sulawesi for the special purpose of co-ordinating the guerilla struggle. On August 17th, 1949, the South Sulawesi Guerilla Unit, or Kesatuan Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan (KGSS), had thereupon been founded by Saleh Sjahban, with the aim of uniting the multitude of scattered and isolated guerilla bands operating independently in the area. Saleh Sjahban himself became co-ordinator of the KGSS, with Bahar Mattaliu as his secretary.

The Indonesian Government made an attempt to gain control of the guerilla units of South Celebes through the KGSS in the first month after the formal recognition of independence. Its aim in this was twofold. First, it wanted to establish control over the guerillas here so as not to experience any obstacles in “its confrontation with the guerilla troops” (Bardosono 1956:84). Secondly, and connected with the first aim, the KGSS was envisaged as an instrument in effecting the “return of the guerillas to society”, in other words in demobilization (Cuplikan 1972:254).

The guerillas had soon grown disappointed at the Indonesian Government’s policies. They had disagreed with the declaration of an armistice between Indonesian and Dutch troops, and continued fighting the KNIL also after 1949. This in turn had
brought them into conflict with the Republican troops. What they opposed in particular was the incorporation of large KNIL units into the Republican Army, while a request by themselves to be incorporated _en bloc_ had been rejected. The conflict about incorporation was exacerbated by the guerilla fighters' having the fact that they were not wanted by the Republican Army brought home to them for a second time. Many of them had come to Sulawesi after being shown plainly by a Republican Army reorganization and the dissolution of the Brigade XVI in early 1950 that there was no room for them in the Army of the United States of Indonesia. The Brigade XVI, as we saw above, was dissolved in January 1950. A battalion under the command of Andi Mattalatta and the Worang troops were all that was left of it. Some of its men were further sent to Kalimantan to form part of the Military Police there, or were stationed at Army headquarters (Said n.d.:8; Harvey 1974:188). An additional point at issue was the place of the Minahasans in the Government of the State of East Indonesia. The American anthropologist Raymond Kennedy (1953:24) noted in the course of a visit to Ujungpandang in August 1949, for instance, that the town "is full of ministries and they in turn are full of Minahasans", adding that he "had heard that bad feeling is growing between the Minahasans and the local Makassarese-Buginese over the former's taking over control here". In the Republican Army in South Sulawesi as well those appointed to the highest positions were Minahasans, e.g., A.J. Mokoginta, J.F. Warouw and Kawilarang (though the latter two had been born in Java).

So the guerillas in the interior continued their struggle. Freed from the threat of interference by the KNIL, and with the Republican Army still tied down in Ujungpandang, they occupied Bonthain, Bulukumba, Sinjai, Parepare, Sengkang, Palopo, and Watangsoppeng in April. Their usual procedure was to collect all the arms they could lay their hands on and to dismiss all government officials they considered reactionary or whom they knew to have collaborated with the State of East Indonesia, including the rulers of small principalities (M 28-4-1950, 4-5-1950, 10-6-1950).

In this atmosphere Kahar Muzakkar returned on the scene. The formal recognition of independence by the Dutch had put an end to his command of the _Komando Grup Seberang_. For months after this he was an unemployed officer — as he himself puts it in a letter dated April 30th, 1950, and addressed to the Central Government and Army Command — only returning to
Sulawesi for a short interval at the time of Andi Abdul Azis’ rebellion. As reasons for his forced inactivity the same letter mentions the distrust in which he was held by the Armed Forces Command, and the general view of him as a trouble-maker and agitator bent on sowing sedition within the Army. In this letter he also puts forward a number of recommendations for the improvement of the situation in Sulawesi, including a suggestion to incorporate all former guerilla fighters into the Republican Army as a separate territorial unit. Only after the recognition of these guerillas as soldiers would it be possible to make a start with their gradual reintegration into society.

Kahar Muzakkar did not at this stage claim for himself the command of such a unit. He writes that he personally, “as an officer who is not trusted by his superiors, might at best be given some harmless function, for example in the Information Department for East Indonesia” (Bardosono 1956:68–80). In spite of this show of modesty, Kahar Muzakkar was soon thereafter, in fact, to become the former guerillas’ leader in their struggle for recognition by the Republican Army. Unable to keep the former freedom fighters under control, the Central Army Command ordered him back to Sulawesi once more.²⁰

Kahar Muzakkar had good reason to call himself an unemployed officer held in distrust in the Army. His assignment in South Sulawesi in effect may have been envisaged as his last commission as a soldier. Mohammad Saleh Lahade, the then Army information officer in South Sulawesi, in point of fact stated a year later that Kahar Muzakkar had come to South Sulawesi with his notice of dismissal in his pocket. Before being sent back to civilian life he had had to accomplish one last task and explain the Government’s policy with regard to the guerillas to them (IM 13-10-1951). If this is true it can hardly be called a wise move, and may explain much of Kahar Muzakkar’s later behaviour. His mission to South Sulawesi was, moreover, strongly censured by senior officers such as Kawilarang and Soeharto, the latter of whom warned that “Kahar Muzakkar never kept his promises” . . . and that he . . . “would only create more unrest in the region” (Roeder 1976:213).

Kahar Muzakkar arrived at Ujungpandang on June 22nd. For the first few days after his arrival he lent the representatives of the Indonesian Government and Army his full cooperation. After an interview with Kawilarang, who had replaced A.J. Mokoginta in April 1950 as territorial commander for East Indonesia, he made a short tour of South Sulawesi to try and persuade the
guerillas to accept the condition proposed by the Republican Army that “they should be recognized as soldiers first, and that there should only be rationalization after that” (Tjatatan 1950:12). This condition, according to Harvey (1974:219), was in line with a compromise earlier advanced by the leaders of the KGSS themselves. On his return from his tour Kahar Muzakkar, however, put forward a counterproposal made by the guerillas. They insisted that the number of guerillas to be admitted to the Indonesian Army should run to at least the strength of a brigade. Kahar Muzakkar and the guerillas moreover wanted these men to form a separate brigade, instead of being spread over a number of different units. This brigade should then be named the Hasanuddin Brigade, after the 17th-century ruler of Goa who for a time successfully opposed Dutch penetration. So the guerillas stipulated that “in South Sulawesi a National Army of Indonesia brigade consisting of former South Sulawesi guerillas be formed under the name Hasanuddin Brigade” (Sulawesi 1953:337). They agreed to the remainder of the guerillas, for whom there was no place in this brigade, being put in a special “depot” battalion, where they would be able to prepare themselves for their return to society.

The guerillas had formulated these demands first at a conference of their leaders at Maros. It was stated by one of their spokesmen later, at the end of October, that they had originally considered the idea of the formation of a Hasanuddin Division. However, after considering “several facts”, as it was put, the guerillas themselves had “rationalized” the strength of this unit down to that of a brigade (I 19-9-1950, 1-11-1950).

Kawilarang, at a meeting with Kahar Muzakkar on July 1st, 1950, rejected the guerillas’ demands. He issued a decree liquidating the Kesatuan Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan and prohibiting all further activities in pursuit of this unit’s objectives on the same day. No new guerilla organizations were to be instituted, because, as Kawilarang put it, the period of integration of the guerillas into the Army had ended. In August Kawilarang claimed that 70% of the guerillas had entered the Army, and that only 30% had refused to do so. Against the latter the Army would take action, he hereupon warned (I 6-7-1950, 24-8-1950).

Kahar Muzakkar, on hearing Kawilarang’s reaction to the proposals he had brought back with him, resigned from the Army and handed over his insignia to the commander. A few days later he took to the forest. In actual fact, he was kidnapped by the KGSS, on the initiative of Andi Sose, although it is very likely
that the latter was acting on the orders, or at least with the tacit consent of Kahar Muzakkar himself.\textsuperscript{21}

In the attitude adopted by Kawilarang, Kahar Muzakkar could not but see confirmation of his suspicion that, the promise that the guerillas were to be recognized as soldiers first notwithstanding, the Army was in reality only aiming at the liquidation of the former guerilla units. They would not constitute a separate unit, and there were no guarantees about the number of guerillas to be admitted. Indonesian books on the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion admit that Kahar Muzakkar had some justification in withdrawing into the jungle, and that the demands of the former guerilla fighters were not unreasonable.

Tiardjono (1959), for instance, points out in explanation of Kahar Muzakkar's behaviour that while he was exerting himself to persuade his men to enter the Republican Army, the latter was showing signs of a determination to destroy the KGSS. According to this same author (1959:59), “several battalions of his men were disbanded and disarmed by the TNI, while those who surrendered were simply sent back into society”. A monograph on Sulawesi published by the Department of Information (Sulawesi 1953:337–338) states three reasons for the demands of the former guerillas. Firstly, it points out, there were brigades, and even whole divisions, made up of men from the relevant region in other parts of Indonesia as well. Secondly, it argues, the number of guerilla fighters in South Sulawesi was high enough — a figure of 15,000 is quoted — to make up at least one division meeting the conditions of entry into the Armed Forces, even after thorough selection. Thirdly, it asserts it was only reasonable that the guerillas should have been treated in the same way as the former KNIL units, which were admitted to the Republican Army without much fuss and red tape at all.

Kahar Muzakkar had the other rebels ignored the ban on the KGSS. The latter continued functioning, though now as an illegal organization. The whole situation became the more ironical as in August the guerillas went to the Republican Army's assistance in the fighting that broke out with former KNIL units in Ujungpandang which had been confined within the so-called KNIL zone at Mariso since the May incidents. This was the third occasion on which the guerillas helped the Army. At the time of Andi Abdul Azis' rebellion they had ensured the Worang Battalion a safe landing-place, and at the outbreak of fighting in Ujungpandang in May KGSS troops had entered the city — which had been re-occupied by the KNIL — to assist the Army. And so the same
thing happened again on Sunday, August 6th, 1950, when troops of the KGSS — which under Kawilarang’s decree of July 1st was considered as having been dissolved — on hearing that there was once again heavy fighting in Ujungpandang, attacked the city from several directions (Sulawesi 1953:312). Even in the midst of this fighting, however, an incident between guerilla fighters and Republican soldiers occurred. At a meeting between the guerillas and Republican units commanded by Captain Latief of the Mataram Brigade, two guerilla leaders, Arief Rate and Abbas Bangsawan, commander and Chief of Staff of the Mobile Battalion Ratulangie (MBR) respectively, came under fire and were killed along with a number of their men. Arief Rate’s contingent, furthermore, was wiped out after some very serious fighting. The shooting was alleged to have started by the Republicans with the intention of getting rid of the troublesome guerillas. According to Roeder, Soeharto’s biographer, Captain Latief had acted contrary Soeharto’s orders. Roeder even so admits that the fighting “aroused the population’s hatred against ‘the Javanese’” (Roeder 1976:213). This hatred continued for many years, and was to be a valuable asset to Kahar Muzakkar in his rebellion against the Republic.

3. Guerilla War

After the fighting at Ujungpandang the guerilla troops quickly returned to the jungle. They were afraid that, if they remained a moment longer in Ujungpandang, they might be disarmed by the Republican Army. There now developed what can best be described as a full-scale war between the latter and the guerillas. Trees were cut down and bridges destroyed all over South Sulawesi, with the exception of Bonthain, to block communications. All the roads from Ujungpandang to Watanpone, from Watanpone via Senkang to Siwa, and from Sengkang to Tanrutedong were obstructed, while the guerillas put up barricades of cut down trees to impede the progress of the Republican Army along the roads the Enrekang and from Parepare to Majene. Only the roads in Bonthain, and as a consequence that from Ujungpandang to Watanpone via Bonthain, Bulukumba and Sinjai, remained open. Because this brought lumbering in the area to a virtual standstill, the financial losses inflicted by the guerillas were considerable. In October the regional head of the Civil Administration of South Sulawesi estimated these losses at Rp. 1 million per day (I 12-10-1950).
Besides, the guerillas made continual attempts to attack and disarm Republican units. In reply the Army, which had tried bringing the guerillas to heel before, reiterated its decree of July 1st, with Kawilarang stressing that the Army had not changed its attitude and warning that it would continue its operations against the guerillas (N 10-10-1950). The Republican Army accordingly began a cleaning-up operation, clearing the roads and rebuilding the bridges that had been destroyed. It also engaged in military actions with the rebellious guerillas, and on October 12th, after a four-hour battle, occupied one of the rebels' principal headquarters at Siwa. Three days later it occupied Tanrutedong, Kahar Muzakkar's headquarters, in which operation it met with no resistance. Kahar Muzakkar and his troops had left before the Army's arrival.

According to the official Army explanation put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel Kokasih, Republican Army Chief of Staff for South Sulawesi, the Army decided to launch an offensive against the guerillas at the end of the year because their ranks had been infiltrated by bandits. Kokasih here distinguished four categories of guerillas. The first, and to his mind the only good one, was made up of what he called true, patriotic guerilla fighters, who had already been active before the Army's arrival in South Sulawesi, and hence before 1950. He claimed that of this group seventy percent had already entered the Army. There were, however, three other categories, against which the Army was obliged to take action, namely: (a) those guerillas who wantonly disturbed the peace, (b) bandits, robbers and the like, and (c) opportunists lacking a firm conviction of their own who thus were easily influenced by the enemy. These latter three categories, Kokasih alleged, consisted of men who claimed to be true patriots, but who in reality were puppets manipulated by other elements. He concluded rather cryptically by saying that although they, too, had a country, this was not the Indonesian Republic but some other state (N 29-12-1950). At the time of Kokasih's statement there existed as yet no links between Kahar Muzakkar or other guerillas and the Islamic State of Indonesia. Kokasih may therefore have been implying that the guerillas in fact were siding with the Dutch, an accusation which at that time was often made with a view to bringing into discredit anyone who did not agree with the policies of the Republic and continued to defy the latter. By dividing the guerillas into the above four categories he was moreover reducing the number of guerillas who were eligible for admission to the Republican Army. This
classification would in the years to come account for the many different estimates of the strength of the guerilla bands, as well as for the Army claim that seventy percent of the guerillas had already entered the Army. Although there were of course bandits among the guerillas, the estimates were highly exaggerated.

The severe and uncompromising Army attitude was not shared by civilians either in South Sulawesi itself or in Jakarta. Contrary to Kokasih and his officers, who harboured a profound distrust of the guerillas and were inclined to regard them as mere bandits and no-good riffians, they were convinced of the latter’s good faith and patriotism. In South Sulawesi there was actually much more sympathy for the guerillas, who were given food by the people from whose midst they sprang, than for the Republican Army, made up as it was in part of strangers. About this support from the local population Andaya (1976:6, 8) writes: “From the very beginning Kahar and the guerillas received overwhelming support from the local people who exhibited great empathy with the plight of these men”, and, “They regarded the ever increasing presence of Javanese troops, government leaders, and cultural elements within their shores as an insult to the people of Sulawesi who had contributed so much and suffered so dearly to gain independence from the Dutch”.

Moreover, there were strong indications that it was much more the Republican Army that was to blame for the fighting because of its occupation of guerilla bases. This strengthened the distrust of the rebels, who for their part intimated that they had retreated into the bush to avoid bloodshed, and that they would only fight back in an emergency. The guerillas showed themselves still prepared to work out a compromise. In September Kahar Muzakkar made it known that the demand for a Hasanuddin Brigade, with himself as commander, was not an unconditional demand. In the event of the admission of himself and his men into the Army, he was quite prepared to leave it to the latter to decide exactly how many and who should stay and who should be demobilized. This position was underscored once more by a guerilla spokesman at the end of October. The latter stressed that the difference between the Republican Army and the guerillas was not one of principle or ideology. The only problem which remained to be solved, in his view, was that of the integration of the Hasanuddin Brigade into the Republican Army. Once this was cleared out of the way, he pointed out, the guerillas would be prepared to enter a “depot” battalion and would obey the orders of their superiors like loyal soldiers (I 1-10-1950).
The fact that the guerillas had come to the Army's assistance in May and August was seen as a clear sign of their loyalty. There were pleas from many sides to try and find a peaceful solution. A resolution urging the Government to refrain from the use of violence was passed by twenty-two South Sulawesi political parties and organizations, as well as the regional Parliament, on the initiative of the *Kerakyatan* (People's) fraction (N 9-9-1950). On August 18th, moreover, a Committee of Good Services was formed by prominent local residents. This Committee was headed by Jusuf Bauti, a member of the Governing Council of South Sulawesi, and included as one of its most active members Mrs. Salawati Daud, the wife of a government official at Maros, one of the rebel strongholds.

Mrs. Salawati Daud went to Jakarta a number of times to plead the guerillas' cause with the President and senior government officials. In September she persuaded them to send the Minister of Defence, Dr. A. Halim of the Natsir Cabinet, to Ujungpan-dang to study the problem on the spot. In October the heads of the Civil Administration of South Sulawesi and of Parepare flew to Jakarta to see the Minister of Defence and ask him to do his utmost to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between the Army and the guerillas. In the event of such an outbreak the guerillas were unlikely to be completely beaten for at least several decades, they maintained. They further asserted that the guerillas had only started fighting after the Republican Army had occupied some of their bases and so had aroused their distrust (I 12-10-1950).

In return a parliamentary mission went to Sulawesi to conduct an investigation. This mission consisted of eight persons headed by PNI member Sunarjo (Sunaryo). They arrived at Ujungpan-dang in early November and from there made a five-day trip into the interior. The mission did not, as it had hoped, get to see Kahar Muzakkar, however, and so returned to Jakarta without having achieved its purpose at the end of about ten days. This mission had been received with much distrust by the military of South Sulawesi. The Army officers did not want meddlers prying about and did all they could to frustrate the mission's efforts. Upon the latter's making clear its intention of travelling north to meet Kahar Muzakkar, no facilities for this journey into the interior of South Sulawesi had been provided.

The mission for its part on its return wrote a report containing scathing criticism of the Army, which it even went so far as accusing of fascist behaviour. It sympathized completely with the
guerillas in the bush, recommending to the Government that it recognize the latter and create the requested Hasanuddin Brigade, and appoint Kahar Muzakkar as commander in the rank of major. It also urged the Government to forget everything that had happened during the conflicts between the Army and the guerillas in the past and to grant Kahar Muzakkar and his troops a general amnesty. Another of its recommendations — which was to crop up from time to time again in the future — was that, if West Irian was not handed over to the Republic by the Dutch, the guerillas earmarked for demobilization should be formed into a voluntary corps for West Irian’s liberation.

As was said above, the mission was extremely critical in its evaluation of the Republican Army in South Sulawesi. Without mentioning specific names it accused some of its members of fascist behaviour, and observed that the Army as a whole suffered from a superiority complex, its behaviour being experienced by the people of South Sulawesi as that of an occupying force. As a result the relation between the Army and the local population had become strained, while the latter’s sympathy for the guerillas had increased. The mission particularly deplored the Army’s habit of commandeering private cars on the pretext that it needed these for its actions against the Andi Abdul Azis, KNIL and RMS rebels. About Kawilarang’s decree and the declaration of the guerillas as enemies of the state it claimed that this had been inspired by a “biased attitude” arising from personal feuds in the past. With respect to the guerillas themselves the mission noted that because they were mainly of noble families, leaders of society and peasants, their ties with the local people were generally very strong (N 11-12-1950).²⁵

The mission’s report was ignored by the Army. The Minister of Defence confined himself to a brief statement in which he observed that the Army would not engage in a debate with Parliament and so would not give a detailed rejoinder to the report, which it described as containing many mistakes and falsehoods (N 13-12-1950). The parliamentary mission’s remarks were, in fact, rather superfluous. Its criticism of the Army and indication of the people’s sympathy for the guerillas nevertheless had some use, as it made for a more favourable political climate for the rebellious guerillas. On the whole, however, the suggestions it made fell flat.

The new Central Government headed by Natsir, only two months in office, on the other hand, was very quick to act. It published its own views on the matter, which as it turned out
were initially acceptable to Kahar Muzakkar and his men while the parliamentary mission was still in South Sulawesi. The Natsir Cabinet, in its efforts to find a solution, followed a different course with respect to South Sulawesi from that pursued for Java. In Java all guerillas reporting with the authorities were granted a pardon and, if they met the standards, a place in the Army, this being calculated as an appeal to small independent groups. In Sulawesi the Government had to take into account the fact that the guerillas formed a much more integrated whole requiring a dominant place in the military organization of the region.

The Government’s position in this connection was outlined in a decree issued by Prime Minister Natsir in November. The principles advanced here provided some scope for at least a temporary agreement. For it stipulated that the former guerillas, described as “national fighters in South Sulawesi”, should be admitted to the Republican Army as part of the National Reserve Corps, or Korps Cadangan Nasional, to ultimately form part of a Hasanuddin Brigade. To facilitate the transition from the status of irregular guerilla to regular soldier, training battalions should be formed, which, after completion of the training, should be recognized as army infantry battalions. Then, if later a Hasanuddin Brigade was in actual fact constituted, these battalions should become part of it. It further emphasized that during the training period the guerilla leaders should remain in command of their own troops.

A few days after the issuing of this decree the Natsir Cabinet’s general amnesty offer was made public. After initially outlining a special solution for Sulawesi, the offer now made applied to the whole of Indonesia with the exclusion of South Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The guerillas in the latter regions, who felt discriminated against by the Government in Jakarta as it was, must have been indeed unpleasantly surprised at such an exception being again made for them.

In his decree for South Sulawesi Natsir made no mention of the general amnesty, nor did it specify the number of guerilla eventually to be admitted to the Army. More information on these points was provided at the end of November, when Makmun Sumadipradja, chairman of a special interdepartmental committee former for solving the guerilla problem in South Sulawesi, set out for Ujungpandang to further work out the decree. On his departure from Jakarta it was announced that no legal measures would be taken against the guerillas, while at the same time it
was stressed again that the former guerillas would only form part of a Hasanuddin Brigade, in contradiction with the wishes of Kahar Muzakkar and his fellow-guerillas, who wanted to form a separate brigade. This latter idea in turn was unacceptable to the Government because of the possible dangers of a brigade made up exclusively of former guerillas.

With respect to the number of guerillas the Government was prepared to accept into the Army, Maknum Sumadipradja’s mandate contained the vague formula that in principle all guerillas were acceptable. They were to form part of the National Reserve Corps. But, as it would turn out, the Government had not the least intention of letting them all stay in the Army. The majority was to be demobilized. The Government’s scheme provided for the permanent admission of only a small proportion — originally a figure of between three and four thousand being quoted. The remainder — according to a contemporary estimate about ten thousand — would have “to return to society”, as the phrase ran (IM 13-10-1951).28

The rebels accepted the proposals formulated by the interdepartmental committee. In anticipation of a solution Kahar Muzakkar on October 22nd, while still in fugitive, had converted the KGSS into the Persiapan B(rigad)e Hasanuddin, or provisional Hasanuddin Brigade, headed by himself and Saleh Sjahban, the former staff officer of his who had founded the KGSS. After the rebels’ acceptance of the Government’s proposal, fighting between the Republican Army and the Persiapan Be Hasanuddin accordingly stopped. The two forces thereupon began to take joint action against groups which continued committing acts of robbery and intimidation. So Kahar Muzakkar launched an operation against bands on the Island of Selayar which had forced several local government officials to flee to Ujungpandang (I 24-11-1950).

It took some time for the procedure of the guerillas’ enlistment in the Army to get underway. To begin with, the Army, out of dissatisfaction with a solution formulated by civilian politicians, made no move to negotiate with the guerillas about the mode of implementation of the agreement. Its hesitancy in turn strengthened the distrust of the guerillas, who refused to come out of the bush until negotiations started.

Special committees to work out the details of the agreement were set up at the end of December. Lieutenant-Colonel Kokasih announced the formation of two such committees in the radio broadcast in which at the same time he accused the guerilla force
of being infiltrated with bandits, trouble-makers and opportunists. The one, chaired by T.I.A. Daeng Tompo, head of the Civil Administration of South Sulawesi, was designed to supervise the guerillas’ reception in prescribed territorial zones and their selection. The other, headed by J. Latumahina and with Captain Idrus as vice-chairman, was charged with the supervision of the return to society of guerillas who were to be demobilized. The members of the latter included Jusuf Bauti and Mrs. Salawati Daud of the former Committee of Good Services, and the heads of the Offices of Agriculture, Industry and Fishery of South Sulawesi. Not all the members of these committees had the interests of the guerillas for whose fate they were responsible equally at heart. In February 1951, for instance, Jusuf Bauti was arrested by the authorities on charges of misappropriation of money and food entrusted to him for handing over to the guerillas (N 14-2-1951, 15-2-1951, 19-2-1951).

In January 1951 the guerillas began their march to the various territorial zones where they were to await their definitive incorporation. Kahar Muzakkar had given them orders accordingly after the settlement of differences with the Army about the size of the zones. In mid-January 2,000 guerillas were reported as already having registered in each of the zones of Malino, Enrekang and Pinrang already (N 10-1-1951).

Kahar Muzakkar, moreover, in his capacity as commander of the Persiapan Be Hasanuddin, to show his good faith declared all identification papers, instructions, orders and insignia issued by the KGSS or the Persiapan Be Hasanuddin between July 5th and January 15th null and void, and ordered these to be handed in (I 7-2-1951). At his headquarters in the Latumojang mountains he furthermore instituted the GUKRINDO, short for Gabungan Usaha Kemajuan Rakyat Indonesia (Association for Furthering the Progress of the Indonesian People), with the aim of assisting the Government with the development of South Sulawesi and aiding the population in its economic activities (N 14-4-1951).

Kahar Muzakkar’s cooperative attitude nevertheless did not spell the end of all trouble, and South Sulawesi remained far from safe. In spite of Kahar Muzakkar’s and the Army’s joint efforts to put an end to the unrest, bands varying in strength from a few individuals to five hundred men continued operating. Robbery remained a common phenomenon. In Bonthain, for instance, eleven robberies in one evening were reported (N 30-1-1951).

Kahar Muzakkar and his men most probably had no part in all
this. His troops marched from their positions in the bush to the regional units as agreed. On March 25th, 1951, the long-awaited day of the Persiapan Brigade Hasanuddin’s official constitution as part of the Republican Army National Reserve Corps finally came. On this same day Kahar Muzakkar left his hiding-place. A special ceremony to welcome him was held at Maros, where a crowd of between five and six thousand had gathered to witness his and his soldiers’ entry into the town at seven in the evening. The troops were addressed by Salawati Daud and Kahar Muzakkar himself. The latter, in a speech lasting about half an hour, went at considerable length into the accusations that he was over-ambitious, that he had retreated into the bush solely to further his own ends, and that he had unnecessarily drawn out the negotiations in order to ensure his confirmation in the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Although many people believed him and Saleh Sjahban to be “rank- or position-hungry” he denied these charges by pointing out that in spite of the fact that he had possessed “big chairs, big tables, and had confronted important people” in the past, all that was not his sole aim in life. “I am suspected of hungering after [the position of] lieutenant-colonel, but I had the lieutenant-colonelcy thrust on me”, he asserted, adding that if there was anyone who wanted to take over the command of the Hasanuddin Brigade, let them come forward and do so; only he would not commit it to the charge of men who had burnt down the houses of innocent people (N 28-3-1951).

From Maros Kahar Muzakkar then went to Ujungpandang accompanied by his fully armed troops. Here he was officially installed as commander of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi. At his inauguration, which was again attended by thousands of people, he swore his allegiance to the Government and the State of the Indonesian Republic.

4. The Fate of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi

The National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi was made up of five battalions. These were the Batu Putih Battalion, commanded by Kaso Gani; the Wolter Mongisidi Battalion, commanded by Andi Sose; the 40,000 Battalion, commanded by Sjamsul Bachri (Syamsul Bakhri); the Arief Rate Battalion, commanded by Azis Taba; and the Bau Massepe Battalion, commanded by Andi Selle.

The members of the corps continued styling themselves the Persiapan Brigade Hasanuddin. The Republican Army and
Government, on the other hand, preferred to speak of the *Korps Cadangan National* of South Sulawesi.\(^{33}\)

These were not just two different names for one and the same organization. The former guerillas, by referring to themselves as the *Persiapan Brigade Hasanuddin*, implied that they were expecting to be incorporated into the Republican Army *en bloc*. The Indonesian Government and Army, by using the term National Reserve Corps, deliberately established a connection with the reserve corps in other parts of Indonesia, which had been formed with the sole aim of facilitating the demobilization of former irregular guerilla fighters. The different status of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi was, however, recognized. It was admitted that in this area a "selection had still to be made between those who would return to society and those who would stay in the Army . . ." (ANP-Aneta 1951:310).

The constitution of the National Reserve Corps in March in no way meant that Kahar Muzakkar's guerillas had become regular soldiers of the Republican Army yet. Their formal incorporation was planned for August. Between March and August 1951, however, a series of incidents took place which resulted in renewed friction between the Army and Kahar Muzakkar. These new conflicts in the end led to an open and irreconcilable rift.

There were three specific factors which fanned the enmity between the two. First, there was the difference on the number of guerillas to be accepted into the Republican Army, second, the Army Command's refusal to constitute a brigade made up exclusively of soldiers who were former "wild" guerilla fighters, and third, the encroachment — intended or unintended — on Kahar Muzakkar's authority.\(^{34}\)

Kahar Muzakkar and the authorities had opposed views on the former guerillas' *en bloc* incorporation into the Republican Army. The former, although sometimes expressing himself to the contrary, favoured the integration of all guerillas who evinced a desire accordingly. The latter — already burdened with an excess of regular soldiers as it was — was inclined to admit as few guerillas as possible. The official viewpoint had been reiterated on March 14th, a few days before the formal constitution of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi. On this date Prime Minister Natsir, in a letter on the procedure of the reserve corps' incorporation, had stated that "it would be investigated immediately [after admission to the National Reserve Corps] whether the applicants met the requirements for entering the Army" (ANP-Aneta 1951:310).
These requirements were far from easy to satisfy. Of the guerrillas who had already tried in the early months of 1950 to gain admission to the Army many had failed the relevant tests. Thus quite likely the guerrillas looked upon these tests as a Government device to get rid of them. To be admitted to the Army one had to pass a medical as well as a psychological examination. Physically the candidates were tested on “body weight and height, chest width, eyesight, hearing, presence of venereal diseases, etc.”, and psychologically on “intellectual ability, fluency of speech and general knowledge” (Bardosono 1956:92). By May 1950, 3,248 guerrillas had undergone the tests, and only one third had passed (Bardosono 1956:92).

The composition of the Hasanuddin Brigade, if it was to be constituted at all, caused uneasiness, too. Was it to be made up entirely or only partially of former guerrillas? And who was to become its commander, Kahar Muzakkar or someone else — for instance Warouw, who was less acceptable to the guerrillas but more so to the Army?

Kawilarang, commenting on the rumours about renewed tension between the guerrillas and the Army in July 1951, underscored once again that the members of the Reserve Corps would only form part of the new brigade. As a cause of the current tension he mentioned the demand that Kahar Muzakkar should become commander of the Hasanuddin Brigade — a demand he personally could not agree to. Another point at issue, he said, was the definition of the brigade’s task as a strictly regional one, in other words, the question of whether the Hasanuddin Brigade was to be stationed exclusively in Sulawesi or in other parts of Indonesia as well.

Kahar Muzakkar, in his response to Kawilarang’s statement, put forward other reasons for the renewed tension between his troops and the Army. So he mentioned the desertion of Army soldiers to the National Reserve Corps in consequence of their refusal to submit to examination, warning the Republican Army leaders to be mindful of the real reasons for these desertions. In the second place he protested against the Army’s intention of incorporating the National Reserve Corps battalion by battalion, which, according to him, testified to gross ignorance of the reality of that Corps’ unity. Furthermore, he lashed out at what he called the reactionary Army officers in South Sulawesi, and against the Army’s refusal to let his men participate in the peacekeeping operations in the area. He claimed that the National Reserve Corps’ incorporation was being retarded by a number of
reactionary officers on the staff of the Military Command of East Indonesia whose highest officer he wanted to see removed. This officer, whom he also described as reactionary, was Kawilarang, the territorial commander. There were, in fact, rumours at the time that Kawilarang’s transfer was being contemplated because of Kahar Muzakkar’s charges (IM 21-9-1951). Three other of the allegedly reactionary officers are identified by Barbara Harvey, who writes (1974:237): “There is unanimous agreement that Saleh Lahade headed the list. Major Mochtar, who was a member of the committee to determine who among the CTN members wished to enter the TNI, was probably included; and the third was possibly Captain Idrus, who was on the committee charged with supervising demobilization.” Mohammed Saleh Lahade and Mochtar (Mokhtar) had both fought alongside Kahar Muzakkar in Java.

Kahar Muzakkar’s disappointment at the Army’s refusal of his request to take part in the peace-keeping operations in South Sulawesi constitutes one of the basic reasons for his growing antagonism towards the Army. He felt personally responsible for the behaviour of the guerillas of South Sulawesi. Throughout 1950 and 1951 there were repeated skirmishes between Republican Army and irregular units. Sometimes these latter units behaved like mere bandits, at other times they were motivated by federal or even APRA sympathies. Kahar Muzakkar felt that the ultimate responsibility for troublesome units which did not have such sympathies lay with him. He claimed a share in the operations against these bands on the basis of this belief. The Republican Army not only denied him the right to participate in these operations with his guerillas, but in most instances did not even inform him of its plans beforehand (Sulawesi 1953:342).

The infringement upon Kahar Muzakkar’s authority over the irregular bands reached a climax on August 7th, 1951, when one of the National Reserve Corps battalions was officially incorporated into the Republican Army. The battalion in question was the Bau Masseppe Battalion commanded by Andi Selle, one of the most influential guerilla leaders operating around Parepare.

In the newly arisen conflict between Kahar Muzakkar and the Army, Andi Selle had sided with the latter. And when he submitted the request for the integration of his Bau Masseppe Battalion, this request was granted without Kahar Muzakkar being consulted.

For several days it nevertheless seemed as though a definitive breach between Kahar Muzakkar and the Army might still be
avoided. New negotiations were set afoot at Enrekang, where the respective leaders of the guerrillas and of the Army met. The former included Kahar Muzakkar himself, his Chief of Staff B. Sutrisno, the battalion commanders Andi Tenriadjeng (Tenriadjeng) (who had taken over the command of the *Batu Putih* Battalion), Andi Sose, Azis Taba and Sjamsul Bachri, and Reserve Corps staff members Usman Balo and Hamid Gali. The Army was represented by Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Warouw, the commander of the so-called “A-troops”, and two members of his staff, Major Ibnu Subroto and Lieutenant Asmanu. (“A-troops” was the new name for the 18th Brigade of the *Brawijaya* Division, which had joined the expeditionary force sent to South Sulawesi after the Andi Abdul Azis rising. It had received this name after the other units of this force had returned to Java.35

Within a day a new agreement was reached with Kahar Muzakkar. Under the terms of this the integration of the other four battalions of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi would follow that of the Andi Selle Battalion soon. The official ceremony was to take place on August 17th, the day of commemoration of the declaration of independence of the Indonesian Republic. Kahar Muzakkar was promised the position of acting deputy commander of the “A-troops”, in which capacity he would for the second time in his life serve under Warouw and would receive as special duty the command of the guerrilla battalions entering the Army. The four existing commanders of these battalions would then continue in their function in the rank of acting captain. The other members of his staff would be either appointed to the staff of the “A troops” or incorporated into the battalions. Who was to be appointed in which function was left to Kahar Muzakkar and Warouw to decide. Furthermore, it was resolved to institute a special committee for supervising the guerrillas who were to be demobilized, to which Kahar Muzakkar was to be advisor.

On August 17th, however, Kahar Muzakkar and his troops did not turn up for the grand incorporation ceremony, which as a result fell through. The officials who had been invited and the brass band which had been especially sent for from Manado came to a place that was totally deserted. The National Reserve Corps guerrillas had retreated into the jungle and, to make the débâcle complete, had taken with them about Rp. 1.5 million in cash and 5,000 uniforms provided them by the Army as a kind of present in celebration of their incorporation.

In justification of this breach of agreement Kahar Muzakkar
had one day previously issued a statement accusing the Republican Army of violation of the agreement of August 7th. The military command had, he alleged, failed to transfer its reactionary staff officers, and to release members of the National Reserve Corps arrested in the preceding months. On the Army side Kawilarang responded by claiming that these two points had never formed part of the agreement (Sulawesi 1953:346). There was, indeed, no mention of them in the agreement of Enrekang. There were persistent rumours, however, that the officers representing the Army at the negotiations had, without actually putting this in writing, promised the fulfilment of these two conditions by word of mouth.

Among the various reasons put forward in explanation of Kahar Muzakkar's behaviour on this occasion have been mentioned his alleged personal ambition, his dislike of Warouw and short-sightedness which induced him to renounce his allegiance. Although personal ambition may have played some sort of a role, these interpretations fail to take into consideration the support which Kahar Muzakkar was able to command and the general feeling of distrust of the Republican Army. The negotiations of 1950 and 1951 and the Army's behaviour in those years seem to warrant the conclusion that Kahar Muzakkar and his followers had at least some reason for distrusting the Republican Army and Government with regard to the latter's treatment of former "wild" guerillas. The rumour that after their integration into the Army the guerillas would be sent to Kalimantan probably further strengthened this distrust (Djarwadi 1959:124).

According to other explanations Kahar Muzakkar was not responsible at all for the decision to retreat into the jungle again. Allegedly it had been forced upon him by Usman Balo, Andi Sose, Azis Taba and Hamid Gali at a meeting of guerilla leaders on August 16th. It was these same leaders who, according to this explanation, at the end of August stopped Kahar Muzakkar and Sjamsul Bachri from reporting to the authorities (Mussaffa 1951 n. 6).

On August 29th Indonesia's new Prime Minister, Sukiman, issued an ultimatum giving the rebels five days in which to report. Sukiman stated at the same time that in the Government's view the problem of the former guerillas was no longer a problem of the National Reserve Corps, as this had ceased to exist in South Sulawesi on August 17th (ANP-Aneta 1951:372–373). Mrs. Salawati Daud and other civilians who tried to get in touch with Kahar Muzakkar failed. After a journey
of 500 km by car and 16 hours on horseback they only met some minor leaders (IM 6-9-51).

On expiry of the ultimatum a military operation — the Operasi Merdeka, or Freedom Operation, as the general name ran for the campaign that was undertaken against bands of former irregular guerilla units all over Indonesia at the time — was launched. At the start of this the Army was over-confident that the rebellion could be quickly suppressed. It regarded most of the guerillas who had retreated into the woods as “wobblers” (kaum pembimbang) and believed that Kahar Muzakkar was only really supported by a small group of die-hards. Besides, its members, as regular soldiers, had a very low opinion of the fighting capacity of their opponent. It estimated that there were only about 800 armed guerillas and felt that, had there been no interference from civilians who by sending a parliamentary mission to the area had hardened Kahar Muzakkar in his attitude, the matter would have been satisfactorily settled long before (IM 19-9-1951). Even later, when it turned out that the rebellion was not as easy to suppress as was originally believed, the Army maintained an outward appearance of confidence. At the end of 1952, when in an internal power struggle in the Army Warouw supplanted his superior, Colonel Gatot Subroto (who for his part had replaced Kawilarang in January of the same year), and took over the military command of East Indonesia, the supposition was even expressed that the rebellion would now probably soon end because there were strong ties of friendship between Warouw and the guerilla leaders (IM 12-12-1952). This supposition, which was far beside the truth, was prompted more by a desire to justify Warouw’s insubordination than by any aspiration to give an assessment of the real situation, however.

At first all did, in fact, go well for the Army. On the first day of the campaign Kahar Muzakkar’s headquarters at Barakka, north of Enrekang, were occupied and burnt down, with Kahar Muzakkar himself being forced to retreat to the Latumojang mountains. And at the end of October the Army claimed that its campaign was already half completed, Kahar Muzakkar’s troops having been put to flight and dispersed. Kahar Muzakkar had, in point of fact, been forced to move further inland and march in the direction of Siwa, with as ultimate destination the Batu Putih area. This latter was described by the Army as a good choice, as the region was most suitable for guerilla warfare and difficult for an outside enemy to attack (IM 15-9-1951, 31-10-1951). The Army in those first months engaged mainly in minor skirmishes
with the rebels, and in only a few larger-scale battles in which guerilla bands of between two and three hundred men were attacked. Contrary to its claim, the Army did not succeed in defeating the guerillas, however. Avoiding battle, the latter even extended their range of operations and guerilla groups were active in Wajo, in particular around Siwa and Sengkang, in Soppeng, notably around Parepare, and in Bone, Gowa, Jeneponto and Bonthain. In fact, people had to be prepared for guerilla actions throughout the whole of South Sulawesi, including the city of Ujungpandang. The guerillas were moreover active in Southeast Sulawesi, especially around Kolaka and to the north.

That the guerillas were anything but defeated became painfully clear at the end of 1951. On New Year's Eve to celebrate the coming of the new year, and by way of reaction to the statement of Deputy Prime Minister Suwirjo (Suwiryo) that the rebellion in South Sulawesi no longer constituted a problem, they attacked the towns of Parepare, Malino, Malakaji and Jeneponto, even entering the latter. In Ujungpandang, too, shots were fired.

The skirmishes and attacks in the last months of 1951 and the first months of the next year notwithstanding, neither Kahar Muzakkar nor the Republican Government altogether excluded the possibility of a peaceful solution. Kahar Muzakkar may even initially have intended his retreat into the forests as a tactical move aimed at strengthening his bargaining position in future negotiations. In any case, he ordered his men never to attack first, and to offer resistance only if there was no alternative (Tiardjono 1959:60).

The Republican Government for its part also made a number of gestures indicating that it did not yet consider a peaceful settlement out of the question, notably on discovering that Operation Freedom was not as successful as it had hoped. For it was obliged to admit as early as the end of 1952 that the so-called fortress or benteng strategy by means of which the Army had expected to be able to deal with the rebel problem had been a failure. This strategy, which before the Second World War the Dutch had used with some measure of success, involved the establishment of small outposts all over South Sulawesi, from which detachments were frequently sent on patrol into the interior. It was unsuccessful now as it required many more soldiers than the Army was able to provide, while communications between the outposts were poor because of the impassable terrain, making the isolated posts an easy prey for Kahar Muzakkar’s bands. Even the build-up of Republican forces in the area from twelve battalions in
January 1952 to nineteen at the end of that year had little effect on the situation (Djarwadi 1965:32–33).

Forced by circumstances, after Kawilarang's replacement by Colonel Gatot Subroto, the Indonesian Government aimed at a peaceful settlement. Thus at a conference organized to discuss the security situation in Sulawesi in February 1952 it decided that a “politico-psychological” solution should have priority over a military one (Sulawesi 1953:348). In this connection it promised a pardon for all former members of the National Reserve Corps who had returned to society to build up a lawful existence of their own accord as well as the release of all prisoners who had formerly belonged to the National Reserve Corps. In its view, the prisoners who still remained to be released all belonged to the criminal category. The remainder, who did not, had already been released in May of the previous year. The Government further tried to persuade Kahar Muzakkar to resume negotiations, in spite of the failure of an earlier attempt in this direction at the end of 1951. These new attempts likewise proved in vain. Even so, part of Kahar Muzakkar's troops surrendered to the Indonesian Army between March and July.

5. Kahar Muzakkar and the Darul Islam Movement

At the same time as the Republican Government was advocating a “politico-psychological” solution, Kahar Muzakkar was hardening his position. This was the period in which renewed relations were established between him and Kartosuwirjo. The first contact between them had been made in August of the previous year, when Kahar Muzakkar had taken to the bush. The latter had at that time been pressed through the agency of Buchari (Bukhari), then vice-chairman of the Islamic youth organization GPII, and Abdullah Riau Soshby, one of the top leaders of the Islamic Army of Indonesia in West Java, to establish a “Kommandemen TII” for Sulawesi. Kartosuwirjo had personally sent Kahar Muzakkar a letter offering him the Sulawesi command of the Islamic Army of Indonesia a few months later.

Kahar Muzakkar officially accepted this offer on January 20th, 1952. Thus he became commander of the Fourth Division of the Islamic Army of Indonesia, also called Hasanuddin Division. Sjamsul Bachri was appointed Military Governor of South Sulawesi. In a letter of the said date written by Kahar Muzakkar in acceptance of his appointment, he stated himself to feel grateful and to hold in high esteem the confidence shown him by Karto-
suwirjo through the decision to appoint him commander of the Islamic Army of Indonesia for Sulawesi. At the same time he was reluctant to fully commit himself, pointing out various circumstances which might impede any actions undertaken by him as commander of the Islamic Army. He further observed that of the five battalions commanded by him some included groups of non-Muslims who had been influenced by Communist ideas. He continued by stating that he had wanted to start an Islamic revolution as early as August 16th, 1951, and had had everything planned with his sub-commanders Saleh Sjahban and Abdul Fatah, but that the latter had proved inconsistent so that the plan had fallen through. He had been thwarted, he said, by a more powerful force with greater influence in society, namely “the feudalists and the common people”. About the Islamic population of South Sulawesi he observed that “it would take time to implant and cultivate the true Islamic spirit in them”. Kartosuwirjo replied in a letter of February 27th urging Kahar Muzakkar to do his utmost to make the population “Islam-minded” and “Islamic State-minded” and further to do anything else recommended by Islamic law in times of war (IM 13-5-1952, 14-5-1952).

The contacts between the Darul Islam movement in South Sulawesi and in West Java do not seem to have been very close. There are no indications of any intensive sort of ideological guidance being provided by Kartosuwirjo. Nor does one get the impression that Kahar Muzakkar attached much value to the political concept of an Islamic State of Indonesia. Only for a relatively short time — in the years between August 1953 and 1960 — did he act in the name of the Islamic State of Indonesia.

Notwithstanding his appointment as regional commander of the Islamic Army of Indonesia, Kahar Muzakkar refrained for the moment from the use of this name for his troops. In March 1952, in fact, he renamed them Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat (TKR), or People’s Liberation Army. As an alternative to the Pancasila he put forward the concept of Trisila, or Three Pillars, viz.: Belief in the one and only God, social justice, and humanitarianism (IB 1-9-1954). Only on August 7th, 1953, exactly four years after Kartosuwirjo’s proclamation of his Islamic State, did Kahar Muzakkar represent Sulawesi and surrounding areas i.e., the rest of East Indonesia, including West Irian, as forming part of the Islamic State of Indonesia. At this same time he actually referred to his troops as the Islamic Army of Indonesia. The decision to finally merge with the Islamic State had been taken at the end of
July, at a conference of guerilla leaders near Palopo. It is typical for the low frequency of contacts between Java and South Sulawesi that Kahar Muzakkar in fact proclaimed Sulawesi part of the Islamic Republican State of Indonesia, or *Negara Republik Islam Indonesia*, instead of simply the Islamic State of Indonesia.40

In the copy of the proclamation that was smuggled into Ujungpandang, Kahar Muzakkar furthermore announced that as from the date of issue of the proclamation his previous "total people's defence plan" was cancelled, to be replaced by a general mobilization scheme. He ordered the local newspapers to publish the proclamation at the risk of being treated otherwise as enemies, with all the consequences that this might have. That this was not altogether an empty threat and that his troops were indeed very close at hand had been discovered the preceding days, when the heaviest fighting for two years had occurred around Ujungpandang as these troops had tried to disrupt communications between Ujungpandang and the surrounding area and to isolate the city. The sound of automatic weapons and mortars being fired had been audible even in the city. This was followed by more heavy fighting to the east and north of the city in the night of August 16th, when Republican troops attacked the rebels' hide-outs (PR 8-8-1953, 21-8-1953; IB 4-11-1953).

In August 1953, moreover, Kahar Muzakkar started collecting taxes — e.g., a development tax, a 'struggle' tax, a livestock tax, and an income tax — in the name of the Islamic State (PR 14-8-1953). He founded a youth organization, called *Pemuda Islam Jihad*, while his wife Corry instituted a women-fighters' corps, or *Lasykar Wanita* (PR 10-8-1953). In support of the proclamation Kahar Muzakkar urged the population to carry on with what he called "the Islamic revolution", trying to persuade them to take his side and to repair and improve their mosques.

Kahar Muzakkar became even more involved in the Islamic State of Indonesia at his appointment on January 1st, 1955, as First Deputy Minister of Defence of a government of the Islamic State of Indonesia that covered the whole of the territory of the Indonesian Republic.

Kahar Muzakkar's more aggressive policy in the early months of 1952 is attributed by some observers, in fact, to his contacts with the *Darul Islam* movement of West Java.41 He himself justified his attacks on positions of the Indonesian Army and Government by describing them as a retaliation for the Army's military actions against him. He did so explicitly in an order issued on April 5th,
1952, in which he referred to his *moment operasi*, whereby he instructed his troops to apply hit-and-run tactics, that is to say, to surprise the Republican troops with lightning attacks and to retreat before the army could strike back, as a return action for the Army's *sweeps operasi*. These purely military tactics were to be combined with psychological warfare, in which the most was to be made of the crimes of the Indonesian Government (Sulawesi 1953:350).

Besides the Indonesian Army's actions and the possible influence of Kartosuwirjo, there is yet another factor that should be considered in explaining Kahar Muzakkar's change in attitude, namely the Indonesian Government's current attempts to induce his subcommanders to defect and let themselves be integrated into the Indonesian Army. Kahar Muzakkar announced his *moment operasi* on April 5th. The official incorporation into the Republican Army of one of his subcommanders, Andi Sose, and his detachment had become a fact one day earlier.

At the conference of guerilla commanders preceding the proclamation of Sulawesi as part of the Islamic State of Indonesia, a constitution of the *Negara Republik Islam Indonesia*, or, as it was also called, *Republik Islam Indonesia*, was drafted. This constitution is known as the Makalua Charter, after the place where the conference was held.

The Makalua Charter is one of the surviving documents that can give us at least some insight into the nature of Kahar Muzakkar's movement. Another is a pamphlet written by Kahar Muzakkar entitled *Tjatatan Bathin Pedjoang Islam Revolusioner* (Notes on the Morality of the Revolutionary Islamic Fighter). Both documents are quoted in part by Bahar Mattaliu (1965:50–57) and Radik Djarwadi (1963:12–17). It would be an understatement to say that these two were no friends of Kahar Muzakkar's. Bahar Mattaliu had long been a comrade in arms of his, joining him already in the fighting in Java during the Indonesian struggle for independence, and following Kahar Muzakkar when the latter had finally taken to the bush in 1951, where for a time he had been one of his most trusted commanders. The relation between the two men had gradually deteriorated, however, until finally in 1959 Bahar Mattaliu defected. After his return to Indonesian society he wrote a book on Kahar Muzakkar to whitewash himself and to blacken Kahar Muzakkar. The passages of the two documents quoted by him are clearly intended to represent Kahar Muzakkar as an immoral blackguard hungry for power and money.
The documents testify in the first place that, compared with the *Darul Islam* movement in West Java, Kahar Muzakkar placed greater emphasis on the social and economic organization of the state. The Sulawesi *Darul Islam* documents contain more, and more precise, articles regulating the social and economic life.

The second point that emerges from them is that Kahar Muzakkar aimed at the creation of an egalitarian, and in some respects puritan, kind of society. He was keen to eliminate all vestiges of traditional social forms, envisaged a modest land reform, and aimed at erasing differences in personal wealth in general. Lack of experience and proper guidance brought most of these well-intentioned regulations to naught in practice, however, which obviously was all grist to Bahar Mattaliu’s mill.

Neither of the said two main tendencies was very new. Kahar Muzakkar was a long-standing enemy of the traditional rulers and had come into conflict with the *adat* leaders as early as 1943. A proportion of his followers, too, moreover wanted social reform. The traditional rulers’ initial backing of the proclamation of Indonesian independance and the subsequent strong Dutch military presence in the area may well have prevented the outbreak here of a “social revolution” of the kind that took place in Pekalongan and Aceh. There were some indications of the rudimentary start of such a social revolution in 1950, after the Dutch had left and before the Republican Government had established its control over the region. So Jusuf Bauti observed at the end of 1950 that there were signs in the direction of a “social revolution” in Makale. The groups that favoured the abolition of traditional institutions and practices were very strong according to him (N 11-12-1950). A similar situation was reported for Mandar, where Republican guerillas tried to eliminate the traditional rulers by force even during the revolution. A number of them had been killed, in fact. Nevertheless, the relevant trend never gained momentum, as the ruler of the region, the Maraddia of Balanipa, espoused the Republican cause. It was he, too, who was elected head of the Civil Administration of his district by the people in 1950 (Masri 1959:10). These same tendencies are discernible in the objectives of GUKRINDO, which was founded by Kahar Muzakkar in 1951. As is apparent from its statutes, its aims included the protection of the people against monopoly capitalism, the establishment of institutions for the education of the people and of policlinics in the villages, and the eradication of illiteracy and unemployment (N 14-4-1951).

Kahar Muzakkar tried to stamp out traditional practices in
South Sulawesi by tackling their outward trappings. So the Makalua Charter provides for the suppression of the use, deliberate or unintentional, of traditional titles or honorifics. Accordingly the use of such titles as andi, daeng, gede-bagus, teuku and raden was prohibited. In his zeal to establish equality he also prohibited the use of such a purely Islamic title as haji, as well as any generally used terms of respect, as bapak or ibu, branding these terms feudal, too. The Makalua Charter furthermore declared war on all persons of noble or aristocratic descent who refused to give up their titles, as well as on fanatic mystical groups (art. 15–16).

Part of the Makalua Charter is devoted to the regulation of marriage. Some of the relevant stipulations are quite plain and easy to understand. So the Charter prescribes that everyone who breaks the rules of Islamic law on social intercourse and on relations between the sexes shall be prosecuted. Then there are rules designed to restrict the costs of marriage (art. 44, 47). Other regulations create rather an odd impression on first reading, on the other hand. So it is stipulated that people who oppose polygamy shall be prosecuted and that no proposal of marriage may be rejected except where the suitor is a juvenile, is impotent, is suffering from a contagious disease, or is of abject character (art. 45, 46). Much has been made of these latter two articles by Bahar Mattaliu and Radik Djarwadi, as they allegedly tacitly legitimatize promiscuity, as of the abuses for which they give scope. Boland (1971:66) points out, however, that the article on polygamy was “intended as a solution to the social problem of widows of the war dead, and may therefore be considered an authentic Islamic solution”.42

The section of the Makalua Charter regulating “the way of life and the proprietary rights of the Mujahidin [Fighters in the way of Allah] and their families in the revolutionary process” testifies most clearly to the rebels’ egalitarian ideals. The purchase and ownership of cattle and land, as well as of shops, factories, hire-cars, sailing proas, etc., was prohibited, except with the permission of the revolutionary organization (art. 49). This article later provided the starting-point for the implementation of modest land reforms. The manner of implementation was later defined in more detail by Kahar Muzakkar. On this subject Bahar Mattaliu writes that “in the ‘Notes on the Morality of the Revolutionary Islamic Fighter’ the prohibition on the ownership of land, sawahs and ladangs, cattle and luxury houses by members of the Darul Islam is also stressed”. All such property was to be handed over to the revolutionary organization, to be thereupon sold according
to regulations laid down by Kahar Muzakkar in the "interests of the revolution" (Mattaliu 1965:45). By "revolutionary organization" is probably meant the monopolistic government trading organization founded by Kahar Muzakkar under the curious name *Usaha Rahasia Khusus Organisasi*, which may be translated as "The Organization's Special Secret Venture".

Another part of the same section deals with the ownership of personal effects by "revolutionary Islamic Fighters" and their families. So they were forbidden to own or wear gold and jewellery, to wear clothes made of expensive materials such as wool or silk, to use pomade, lipstick or face-powder, and to consume foods and beverages bought in towns under enemy control, such as milk, chocolate, butter, cheese, canned meat or fish, biscuits, wheat, cane sugar and tea (art. 50). If such goods had come rightfully into the possession of the current owner, then the revolutionary organization was to buy or borrow them; if, on the other hand, the goods had been acquired through "moral deception", they were to be confiscated (art. 52).

Stricter rules still in this connection were laid down in the 'Notes on the Morality of the Revolutionary Islamic Fighter'. Here Kahar Muzakkar pursues the point of a moral and spiritual revolution. According to Bahar Mattaliu he became convinced of the necessity of such a revolution on perceiving the behaviour of his men and on realizing that no revolution could succeed the people's support. He moreover believed that no material improvement was possible without a revolutionary change in thinking (Simatupang and Lapian 1978:10).

On hearing the people's complaints and witnessing the "moral crisis" and "the inclination of his men towards pleasure and a life of luxury", Kahar Muzakkar embarked upon a campaign of primitive socialism. This campaign was to start on March 1st, 1955, and was planned to last six months, during which period Kahar Muzakkar's soldiers and their families would have to hand in all possessions which Kahar Muzakkar considered to be of a luxury or superfluous nature. Gold and polished diamonds would have to be "lent" to the Military Government, which would convert these objects into cash through trusted dealers in the towns. With the money collected in this way weapons and other necessities of war would be purchased. All persons who so surrendered their gold and diamonds would be compensated as soon as the situation became stable. The regulation also applied to wrist watches, which were allowed only for military purposes, gas-
lamps and radios, which were only allowed on military or government premises. It was furthermore stipulated that no family might save more than Rp. 30.– a month, while the wardrobes of soldiers and their families were also made subject to stringent restrictions (cf. Mattaliu 1965:50–57), with Kahar Muzakkar urging them to hand over all clothing in excess of the prescribed maximum to people who were in greater need of it, or otherwise to sell it to the Government.

As in the Makalua Charter, rules on the consumption of food and drinks were also laid down here. Soldiers and their families were forbidden to smoke foreign cigarettes, and to eat or drink chocolate-milk, butter, cheese, canned fish and “other delicacies originating from the cities”, except if seized in battle or produced by the owner himself.

The strict observance of these rules seems to have given rise to certain excesses. So Bahar Mattaliu complains how he “was filled with compassion at the sight of wives of members of the DI/TII who were pregnant or who had just given birth with pale faces and thin bodies because the Notes on Morality forbade them to eat tasty foods and drink wholesome drinks” (Mattaliu 1965:45). He also hints that no-one knew whether weapons and other necessities of war actually were purchased with the proceeds from the goods handed in by the people.

In the same year that the moral revolution was scheduled to take place, a conference organized by Bahar Mattaliu was held at Wanua Waru which resulted in the drafting of a Revolutionary Islamic Program, or Program Islam Revolusioner. One of the points agreed upon here was that polygamy should be propagated. This conference was also attended by a representative of the Darul Islam movement in Aceh.

Kahar Muzakkar, in an attempt to give substance to his ideas, proceeded to establish policlinics, schools and hospitals and an academy of literary science. To help the latter to the necessary materials his troops ransacked the library of Majene, where 2,500 titles were reported to have disappeared (IB 11-1-1955). He also kidnapped doctors to work at his policlinics.

Kahar Muzakkar was a pious Muslim. Although occasionally Christians were victims of the raids conducted by his troops, of which cases much was usually made, it appears that the people concerned were only killed if they resisted the rebels and refused to give them food and information. As a rule civilians — Muslims and Christians alike — were well treated by him. Thus it was reported that “the bands under Kahar Muzakkar still respected
human rights"... and... “what was a fact was that the bands exerted pressure upon Muslims to comply faithfully with the demands of God and pray five times daily” (IB 26-9-1954).

6. Rifts Within the Rebel Force

The Republican Army tried to deal with the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion by means of a series of military operations and, especially in the early years of the rising by attempts at disaffecting segments of the rebel force. Where this latter point was concerned, the Republican Army was able to take advantage of quarrels among the guerillas themselves. These disputes were occasioned partly by personal ambitions and animosities, partly by ideological differences as regards the course the rebellion should take.

After the constitution of the Kesatuan Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan it was joined by some twelve guerilla groups. Opinions on the total strength of these forces, sometimes referred to as battalions, and the quality of their soldiers varied. Officers of the official Republican Army, as we have seen, tended to entertain a rather low opinion of the strength, morale and fighting capacity of the guerillas, considering the majority of them as mere bandits. They were prepared to admit at most three to four thousand guerillas to the Army. This was about one third of the total number of guerillas, whose strength must have lain at somewhere between ten and twelve thousand. Even this latter figure may represent a moderate guess. The Department of Information (Sulawesi 1953:336) quotes a figure of 15,000, Feith (1962:213) mentions one of 20,000, and Natsir (Sulawesi 1953:351) speaks of “not 10,000... but a multiple of this number”.45 Putting the number of those demobilized at between five and six thousand, and those integrated into the army at another four thousand, the number of guerillas must still have exceeded ten thousand.

As we saw above, in the second half of 1950 there seemed to be certain prospects of a compromise between the guerillas and the Republican Army. Pending a definitive settlement, and in the belief that a Hasanuddin Brigade would take shape in the near future, the guerillas began to prepare themselves for the formation of such a brigade. An internal reorganization was undertaken. As was mentioned earlier, five battalions — the Bau Masseppe Battalion in Parepare, the Batu Putih Battalion in Palopo, the Arief Rate Battalion in Bonthain, the Wolter Mongisidi Battalion in Enrekang, and the 40,000 Battalion in Rappang —
were formed, together constituting the *Persiapan Brigade Hasanuddin*.

In the weeks preceding the day fixed for the official integration of the National Reserve Corps, the first internal conflicts among Kahar Muzakkar’s followers broke out when Andi Selle chose the Government’s side in the question of whether or not the integration of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi should take place battalion by battalion.

The incorporation of Andi Selle’s *Bau Masseppe* Battalion into the Army as the Battalion 719 on August 7th, 1951, only aggravated the conflict between Kahar Muzakkar and the Army still further. Nevertheless, not the entire *Bau Masseppe* Battalion followed its commander, but part of it with Hamid Gali and Usman Balo as principal leaders, remained loyal to Kahar Muzakkar. After some fighting with Andi Selle’s followers they retreated to another part of Parepare and formed a new battalion, commanded by Hamid Gali (Sulawesi 1953:344). Nor were the ties between Kahar Muzakkar and Andi Selle completely severed, and in time the relation between the two improved again. Bahar Mattaliu mentions Andi Selle as one of Kahar Muzakkar’s principal sources of weapons, in fact, saying, “This meant that raw materials continued to be sent by Kahar to Andi Selle, who paid for these with bullets, with heavy and light arms, and with army uniforms” (Mattaliu 1965:40).

Yet more followers of Kahar Muzakkar became disaffected when the Republican Army, in consequence of its “politicopshychological” approach, in March 1952 re-opened the opportunity for them to be incorporated into the Army or return to society without further ado. The Eastern Indonesia Territorial Command announced that it was prepared to recognize the former guerillas as soldiers and expressed the hope that a number of guerilla units might be integrated soon. The term set for the operation of the amnesty offer was from March 11th till June 10th. The Army repeated its appeal and reiterated its preparedness to admit all “true” guerillas in a communique of May 10th.

In early April, during another of Mrs. Salawati Daud’s peace missions it became apparent that some of Kahar Muzakkar’s subcommanders were prepared to accept the amnesty offer. Although Mrs. Salawati Daud’s mission was only partly successful, as she did meet Kahar Muzakkar but failed to persuade him to surrender, she did bring back letters from Hamid Gali and Usman Balo, both from the *Bau Masseppe* Battalion, and from Sjamsul Bachri of the 40,000 Battalion, and Azis Taba, of the
Arief Rate Battalion, stating that they and their men were willing to enter the Army as soon as possible (IM 11-4-1952).

Hamid Gali and Usman Balo soon changed their minds again, but the incorporation of the other battalions eventuated. On May 25th the Arief Rate Battalion became Battalion 722, and the 40,000 Battalion the Battalion 723. The latter, however, was not commanded by Sjamsul Bachri but by M. Arief, as Sjamsul Bachri had stayed in the bush and remained loyal to Kahar Muzakkar. Nor did the whole of the Arief Rate Battalion join the Republican Army. Besides guerillas of the 40,000 and Arief Rate Battalions, members of the Wolter Mongisidi Battalion also reported to the Army authorities. For the commander of the latter, Andi Sose, this opportunity provided by the Army came at just the right moment, as he had come into serious conflict with Kahar Muzakkar and had even contemplated forming his own independent guerilla force. He and his men were integrated into the Republican Army as the Battalion 720. In the same period smaller guerilla groups and bands which had not entered the KGSS or the National Reserve Corps, such as the Lipang Bajeng and the Mobile Brigade Jeneponto, surrendered as well.

On expiry of the term of the amnesty the Army cleared parts of Palopo, Wajo, Enrekang and Southeast Sulawesi of civilians who had not been living and working there for some time already. In this way it hoped to isolate the guerillas and to facilitate the operations of its own troops. Guerillas surrendering after the deadline were not treated as well as the larger groups that had reported earlier. When a small group of guerillas surrendered in July and expressed the wish to enter the Army, it was refused, as this did not fit in with the Army Command’s and Central Government’s plans to keep the size of the Army down as much as possible. Instead, these men were to be sent to other parts of Indonesia in conjunction with the transmigration scheme the Government had evolved for former guerillas.

Worried by the mass defection of his troops, Kahar Muzakkar set about reorganizing what remained of them. Again he formed five battalions, sometimes also referred to as brigades: the Latumojang Battalion, commanded by Hamid Gali and with Usman Balo as second in command, which operated around Enrekang and Parepare; the Batu Putih Battalion, commanded by Andi Tenriadjeng, which operated between Palopo and Siwa; the Lereng Cinta Battalion, commanded by Bahar Mattaliu, which operated in Soppeng; the Rante Mario Battalion, commanded by Sanusi Daris, which operated in Enrekang; and the 40,000 Battal-
To bring his troops up to strength again he conceived the idea of giving the population in the regions under his control some rudimentary military training. Not much came of these plans, however, although he did succeed in recruiting a number of new soldiers, even from among the youth, while the *Lereng Cinta* Battalion even trained a number of secondary school pupils (IB 11-1-1955).

The most serious setback suffered by Kahar Muzakkar in those initial years of his rising came at the end of 1952. In December of that year a rebellion within a rebellion, brought about by internal factors, took place. Starting as a conflict between sub-commanders about the territories under the control of their respective units and the rights of other units to enter these, it soon assumed an ideological dimension. Kahar Muzakkar had assigned each of his battalions a fixed area at the time of the reorganization of his Army. The realities of guerilla warfare and the pursuit of the guerillas by the Republican Army had made the crossing of the boundaries between these inevitable, however. So in December 1952 Usman Balo of the *Latumojang* Battalion entered the territory of the *Rante Mario* Battalion. There was subsequently some fighting, in which units of the latter battalion were put to flight. Kahar Muzakkar thereupon took Usman Balo to task for the conduct of his men, levelling the accusation against them of betrayal of the ideals of the struggle of the rebelling guerillas by stooping to rape and plunder. Usman Balo did not bother to reply and proceeded to sever all ties with Kahar Muzakkar.

To start off with, he and Hamid Gali again sent a written request to the authorities to be admitted to the Army as regular soldiers. This request was refused by the Army, however, which pointed out that the incorporation of Usman Balo’s and Hamid Gali’s units would be in contradiction with the plans for its future development. It was having trouble enough with lack of discipline among its own soldiers and the admission of members of guerilla bands who for the greater part had lost their morale and discipline would only aggravate the problem (IB 12-10-1953).

This possibility thus for the time being precluded, Usman Balo and Hamid Gali now had to defend themselves against the Republican Army as well as against Kahar Muzakkar’s troops. Kahar Muzakkar, who had sworn to annihilate them, had given his troops orders to attack the defectors at every opportunity.
Usman Balo was subsequently attacked, defeated and put to flight. He then turned for protection to the Republican detachment of his former commander, Andi Selle. The latter handled the situation very skilfully, defending Usman Balo's troops not only against Kahar Muzakkar's attacks and thus giving them a reprieve, but also against the Republican troops who were after Usman Balo. As a result fighting occurred among Republican soldiers themselves.

For a while it looked as though Usman Balo and Hamid Gali would lay down their arms, both issuing statements to the effect that they supported the government of Soekarno and were willing to enter the Republican Army, Usman Balo adding that it was better to betray Kahar Muzakkar, who had deviated from the principles of the struggle for independence, than the revolution itself. Subsequently, on November 30th, 1953, 1,200 of Hamid Gali's guerillas reported themselves, after the Army, more or less under pressure from Soekarno, had re-opened the opportunity accordingly. However, they pulled the same trick Kahar Muzakkar had played in August 1951 and returned to the bush after receiving food, money and clothing from the Republican Army (Alers 1956:265). Thereat they once more began disturbing the peace in the northern and eastern parts of Parepare, a region that was extremely difficult of access to the Republican Army. By the end of 1953 they had regained control of the roads in this area and were obstructing the traffic passing along them again. As in the case of certain other guerilla leaders, also outside Sulawesi, there were many tales circulating about the supposed wealth amassed by Usman Balo in robbing and stealing. He allegedly possessed as many as ten bags of gold and a pistol case of pure gold (IB 9-2-1954, 3-3-1954).

By that time the latter's conflict with Kahar Muzakkar had assumed an ideological character. Usman Balo rejected the Darul Islam course that Kahar Muzakkar was now publicly pursuing and advocated communism instead. To what extent their ideological differences constituted a cause or were only a consequence of the conflict between them is difficult to say. Owing to lack of data it is impossible to assess how consistent and well-defined Usman Balo's communist philosophy was, as well as in what way it differed from Kahar Muzakkar's ideas on social change. In any case, upon Kahar Muzakkar's changing the name of his force from Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat to Tentara Islam Indonesia in August 1953, Usman Balo and Hamid Gali continued operating under the former name.
The Republican Army left nothing undone to exploit the rift. It sent officers to the rivals’ respective headquarters to make sure there was no reconciliation between Kahar Muzakkar and Usman Balo, and even to aggravate the conflict (Djarwadi 1959:145). This conflict reached its peak in December 1954, when a three-day battle was fought between the rivals’ respective forces to the north-east of Pinrang starting on December 14th. Here Kahar Muzakkar put into the field about 900 soldiers commanded by Sjamsul Bachri. Hamid Gali, who was his major target, had to deploy his entire force and was even obliged to mobilize the male population of the area under his control. Later, after Kahar Muzakkar’s troops succeeded in occupying the TKR headquarters, Usman Balo and 300 of his guerillas came to Hamid Gali’s aid.

Kahar Muzakkar’s troops would have been able to deal the TKR its death-blow at this time had not the Republican Army decided that it could well use the TKR in the suppression of the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion. Of all the existing rebel forces it considered the TKR the weakest as well as ideologically the least far removed from the Republican State. Moreover, if it won over the TKR, it could have the assistance in its operations of soldiers who knew the area well and could provide information on the whereabouts of Kahar Muzakkar’s troops.

Accordingly the Republican units engaged in the campaign against Kahar Muzakkar decided to give the TKR some breathing space. In return the TKR assisted the Republican Army in its pursuit of Kahar Muzakkar’s troops, who now in their turn were forced to retreat under the Army’s attacks. When in January a second battle was fought between the TKR and TII, the Republican Army went to the aid of the former. The following month, when the TKR and TII engaged in their third battle, it looked for a short time as though the Republican Army would attack the TKR as well, despite the fact that a tacit understanding appeared to have been reached between the latter two. But headquarters had issued orders to the effect that the troops in the field should attack both guerilla forces — the TKR and as well the TII — so that these now faced the problem of which of the two guerilla forces to attack first. It took a while for them to reach the decision to pursue their previous course and to attack the positions of the TII while trying to secure the cooperation of the TKR.

There was no more fighting between the Republican Army and the TKR from the end of February 1955 onwards, when the
cooperation between the two was consolidated. In August they held a joint celebration of Indonesia's independence at the TKR's headquarters. On this occasion the "sacred" red and white flag which had been the first Republican flag to be hoisted in Rappang, and which had been kept by Hamid Gali and Usman Balo for almost ten years, was flown (PR 23-8-1955). In consequence of the truce between the Republican Army and the TKR the military posts in the area were gradually dismantled and replaced by Police ones. But it was to be another two years before the TKR was finally integrated into the Republican Army, in October 1957 (cf. Djarwadi 1959).

7. Consolidation

The Republican Army's operations against TKR and TII concentrations briefly described above formed part of the Operasi Hilalintar, or Thunderbolt Operation, launched in October 1952. In the first years the results of this operation were meagre. Later, at the end of the 1950's, the tide turned, however.

In the beginning the initiative remained with Kahar Muzakkar. His troops controlled large parts of the rural districts, isolating the Army in the towns and cities. Even these were not safe, however, and the towns people, too, had to be constantly on the alert against attacks by Darul Islam troops. Army efforts to keep the roads open were futile. Road travel was possible, but only under armed escort. Wherever they could people travelled by sea. By mid-1954 the situation had grown so grave that there were fears of the rebelling guerillas' sealing off Ujungpandang from its hinterland unless there was a change for the better. Provisions could only reach the city by sea, and it was apprehended that the people of Ujungpandang would in the very near future suffer directly from the rebellion. Also indicative of the serious situation is the fact that a Government party on an inspection tour to Bone was forced to travel by sea because the roads in the interior were impassable.

Compared with the rest of South Sulawesi Ujungpandang and environs were still relatively well off. The areas which suffered most, and had the highest number of refugees, were Bone, Luwu, and Parepare. In mid-1955 there were reported to be about 290,000 refugees in the whole of Sulawesi, over 88,000 of them in Bone, over 96,000 in Luwu, and over 45,000 in Parepare. These figures admittedly are slightly distorted, being released immediately after a military operation in Bone during which...
many houses were burnt down. Other official figures usually show Luwu and Parepare to have the highest number of fugitives. In Luwu it was particularly the region around Palopo from which people fled, though there were also many refugees in the extreme north, near the border with Southeast Sulawesi. The situation of these refugees was deplorable. The government tried to relieve their suffering to some extent by sending food and clothing. But there were still people dying of hunger, and many others suffering from extreme malnutrition and beriberi (PR 31-5-1955, IB 5-4-1955).

The towns of Palopo and Parepare, having large concentrations of rebelling guerillas in their vicinity, became the latter’s target a number of times. At the end of 1952 about 3,000 people fled the town of Parepare for fear of an imminent attack by Kahar Muzakkar’s troops. In 1955 again over 2,000 of Kahar Muzakkar’s soldiers were concentrated in the area in an effort to gain control of the rice fields around Parepare. A year previously Kahar Muzakkar had mobilized his troops for an attack on Palopo, but had seen his plans thwarted by Republican troops.

The situation in the kabupaten of Mandar was also extremely difficult. The roads here were still virtually impassable as late as 1959, as many bridges had been destroyed either by floods or by the Darul Islam forces. Communications with the rest of Sulawesi had almost come to a stop. The only means of reaching the outside world — and hence of importing rice and exporting copra — was by proa. No motor-vessels called at any of the ports of the area except to supply the Armed Forces (Masri 1959:3).

As in 1950 and 1951, there were many people who, mindful of the guerillas’ merits during the struggle for independence, continued urging for a solution through negotiations. The Eastern Indonesia Army Command at first adopted a moderate attitude, and as a result succeeded in the first half of 1952 in luring away some of Kahar Muzakkar’s subcommanders. When after the October Affair J.W. Warouw took over the command of the Republican Army it became much more uncompromising, however.

One of Warouw’s first acts in his new function was the rejection of a peace offer by Kahar Muzakkar in December 1952. The latter, inspired by the October Affair, had sent a letter to Soekarno in which he stated himself to be prepared to support the President in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Republican Armed Forces, and one to Warouw suggesting that his and Warouw’s forces should cooperate in keeping the peace in South
Sulawesi. The Army immediately replied that it wanted to hear nothing of such a suggestion, however, with the spokesman for the command, Captain Rahasia, flatly stating at a press conference that it could not cooperate with rebels. It further announced that Operation Thunderbolt would be continued. All rebels wishing to return to society would have an opportunity to do so, on condition that all those who had been involved in criminal acts should be handed over to the appropriate authorities for punishment. Under no circumstances would those surrendering be accepted into the Army, however (IM 12-2-1952, 18-12-1952).

Warouw and his command displayed the same uncompromising attitude in February of the next year, when President Soekarno visited South Sulawesi and asked Kahar Muzakkar to give himself up — one of Soekarno’s many personal attempts to persuade rebellious groups in Indonesia to cease fighting. This particular visit of Soekarno’s was part of a kind of tour of special trouble-spots. Before coming to South Sulawesi he had been to Kalimantan, in fact, where there had also been a rising of former guerillas, who some time later were to join the Darul Islam movement. The tour was an indication of the tension and nervousness prevailing in the first years after 1949, when the Republican Government was confronted with all kinds of major and minor uprisings and internal disturbances and conflicts.

Kahar Muzakkar had written his above-mentioned letters to Soekarno and J.F. Warouw just two months prior to Soekarno’s visit to South Sulawesi. There was some hope of a settlement being reached. There were even rumours circulating of a meeting between Kahar Muzakkar and Soekarno at the latter’s visit to Parepare. Soekarno himself did not exclude a peaceful solution, either. In his speech at Parepare, in fact, he indirectly appealed to Kahar Muzakkar to come out of the bush, saying that “The independence of Indonesia is not the property of Bung Karno or of the people in the cities alone, but of the guerillas, of Kahar Muzakkar, of Hamid Gali, and of others as well” (PR 6-2-1953). The emphasis on unity and the desire to bury past differences are also evident from a written message left behind by Soekarno in Pangkajene. In it he said, “People of Pangkajene, Indonesia's independence is the fruit of our common struggle. Let us be watchful that there does not come a point where it is disgraced by our own acts” (PR 6-2-1953).

The Republican Army thought otherwise, however. Captain Rahasia immediately reacted by warning people not to get
wrong idea about Soekarno’s words. He hastened to point out that the Eastern Indonesia Army Command considered Soekarno’s speech logical and understandable, and agreed that independence was the property of one and all — of people in the towns and cities as well as in the countryside. On the other hand, however, it regarded everyone who upset that independence, whether they lived in the bush or anywhere else, as a rebel. He stressed that Kahar Muzakkar’s troops constituted an illegal organization against which the Army was obliged to take action. He further pointed out that if Kahar Muzakkar was indeed fighting for justice and prosperity, he must admit that every citizen had the legal duty to hand over criminals to the authorities and agree that equal treatment should be given to all, whether they be his own followers, many of whom had joined him only recently, or Army soldiers who had fought and suffered in the performance of their duty for years. He wondered whether it was wise to try and solve the problems in South Sulawesi simply by admitting all of Kahar Muzakkar’s men as soldiers of the Army, pointing out that the guerillas were asking recognition as such exactly at a time when the Republican Government was forced to retrench and to send hundreds of thousands of its soldiers back into society. The only gesture the Army was prepared to make was to admit Kahar Muzakkar’s guerillas to the so-called development units, in which former guerillas who wanted to return to civilian life were collected. If Kahar Muzakkar agreed to this, then the Army for its part would show its good faith by releasing all prisoners who had merely been followers of Kahar Muzakkar’s (IM 13-2-1953; PR 6-2-1953). A few days later Warouw intimated that it was not altogether out of the question that the demand of Kahar Muzakkar and his guerillas for admission to the Army would be partially met, in view of the Army’s need for specialists, under observance of the normal procedures. If agreement on this point could be reached with Kahar Muzakkar, his Command would press for its acceptance by the authorities, Warouw asserted (IM 7-2-1953). Considering the low esteem in which the Army held the rebels’ technical capacity, Warouw’s kind words in reality implied nothing other than a flat refusal to integrate a significant number of guerillas into the Army.

In October, while on a second short visit to Sulawesi, Soekarno repeated his appeal to the guerillas and pleaded with Kahar Muzakkar once more to return to the right path and call a halt to the disturbances in the island. Army opposition notwithstanding,
Soekarno’s renewed appeal signified a new opportunity for the guerillas to surrender. Leaflets explaining that they would have a chance to report to the authorities between October 20th and November 1st were dropped by plane. The Army nevertheless made it clear that Soekarno’s appeals would in no way affect its military operations, which would continue as usual. It regarded Soekarno’s speech only as a guide to the tactics to be adopted in the case of rebels reporting themselves, and stressed that bargaining about the conditions of surrender was ruled out. The rebels were an undisciplined lot and would never be admitted to the Army en bloc (PR 21-10-1953; IB 12-10-1953).

At first the appeal seemed to be having some success, with Warouw even announcing that as many as 12,500 rebels were prepared to surrender. It was moreover rumoured that Kahar Muzakkar had panicked because of the large number of his followers in favour of responding to Soekarno’s appeal. He was reportedly on the run in fear of capture by his own men. All these reports turned out to be ungrounded and inspired by mere wishful thinking, however. The rebels mentioned by Warouw were the soldiers of Usman Balo and Hamid Gali, who did, in fact, report but returned to the jungle again shortly afterwards, upon its becoming clear that the Army had no intention at all of honouring Hamid Gali’s persistent claim that all of his men should be incorporated into the Army first and about two-thirds demobilized later (IB 19-11-1953, 8-12-1953, 13-12-1953; PR 7-12-1953, 27-12-1953).

Soekarno made his third appeal in May of the next year. This time he warned that he could not go on forever asking the guerillas to lay down their arms, and that his patience might run out, in which event he would give all branches of the Armed Services orders to crush the rebels (PR 7-5-1954). Again the appeal was in vain. Although the then Vice-Premier, Wongsonegoro, reported the surrender of two-thirds of the rebels, his statement was far beside the truth and it is not clear where he obtained his information. The Central Government, in the belief that at least thousands were involved, sent a team to South Sulawesi to arrange their reception. On arrival there was a big surprise awaiting this team, for only a few individuals turned out to have surrendered. There was even a figure of only nine quoted (IB 11-9-1954).

One of the reasons for the Republican Army’s early lack of success in the area was that the partially East Javanese units had to fight on unfamiliar terrain and in unfriendly surrounding. This
put them at a serious disadvantage, the more so because the
topography of the region made it difficult for them to benefit
from their superior arms. It was sometimes impossible to give
soldiers on field patrol artillery support. Because of lack of com­
munication artillery or air support usually came either too late of
not at all.

Kahar Muzakkar’s guerillas, moreover, adhering to the prin­
ciples of their leader’s moment operasi, avoided battle where
possible wherever circumstances were not in their favour. It took
the Republican troops years to evolve a method of dealing with
these guerilla tactics. To make things worse for the Army, co­
ordination between the separate guerilla units improved with
time, while Kahar Muzakkar also succeeded in stepping up the
fighting capacity of his troops. This latter he accomplished by
forming four crack units, partly for the purpose of crushing the
revolt of Balo’s Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat. These were named
Momok, an abbreviation for Moment Mobile Kommando, which
is perhaps best translated as Instantaneous Mobile Commando.
The four Momok units each had its own standard in the colour
expressed by its name — red, black, green and white — with the
Muslim bulan bintang, or crescent and star, painted on it
(PR 3-3-1955). According to a Battalion 711 intelligence report
from early 1955, Kahar Muzakkar personally commanded the
white one, while the green, the black and the red Momok were
under the command of Pattawari, Sjamsul Bachri and Andi Masse
respectively (Djarwadi 1959:146).

Radik Djarwadi (1965), analysing the various military struggles
in the first decade after independence, distinguishes two separate
phases in South Sulawesi. The first was the period between 1950
and 1954, when Kahar Muzakkar’s troops operated in small
numbers in small and isolated pockets — fifty-five in South and
Southeast Sulawesi in 1952, according to him. The year 1954
marked a change in the situation. Then, in the second phase,
between 1955 and 1958, the guerilla force displayed a vast im­
provement in its manoeuvring ability, as was evident, according
to him, from the fact that “the enemy never fell into the traps
set by us in advance” (Djarwadi 1965, III:62–63).

In general this evaluation of Radik Djarwadi’s is correct. Never­
theless, Kahar Muzakkar was occasionally able to put larger con­
centrations of troops into the field before 1954, while the Repu­
blican Army was not totally without significant successes after
that year. The latter gained a few victories where it was able to
engage larger concentrations of the enemy in battle and bring
into action its heavy artillery as well as the combat planes of the Air Force, with which it dealt the Darul Islam troops some serious blows. In some of these operations the Navy also participated, not only for the purpose of shelling the coast, but also in order to stop Kahar Muzakkar’s pirate ships from attacking trading-vessels, as they occasionally did.

The Army’s only successful operations as a rule were those carried out along the coast. In the interior it experienced much more difficulty in mounting effective offensives. In 1953 and 1954 large-scale attacks on guerilla concentrations involving units of the Army, Navy and Air Force were launched, for instance, against concentrations of Darul Islam units which had their base in the swamps to the north and east of Ujungpandang, from where they occasionally infiltrated into the city. In September 1955 another combined operation was launched on the coast of Bone Bay, where hundreds of rebels were killed. During the latter attack rebels fleeing from the Republican Army became an easy prey for the combat planes of the Air Force as they tried to cross Bone Bay by canoe to retreat into the Darul Islam areas in Southeast Sulawesi. Two months later Government troops landed at Wawo, in Southeast Sulawesi, to occupy one of the rebels’ civil and military administrative centres (PR 26-9-1955, 9-11-1955).

Not only the ineffectualness but also the bloody nature of the Army’s offensives attracted criticism. So the prominent politician from South Sulawesi Bebasa Daeng Lalo, in a last appeal for a peaceful solution to the conflict in early 1955, asserted that what was needed was an operation that claimed few victims and had a great deal of effect, instead of one which, as was currently the case, claimed many victims and had little effect. At the same time he once again took out of mothballs the proposal to indirectly recognize Kahar Muzakkar’s troops by transforming them into a special division for the liberation of West Irian. Any embarrassment the Government might feel at even considering the proposal must be irrelevant, he said. Alleviation of the suffering of the people was much more important than any Government loss of face (IB 5-3-1955).

The situation improved for the Republican Army, and its operations became more successful, after the mid-1950’s. This was a result partly of the assistance it received from the Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat, partly of a change in tactics. Instead of spreading its troops over a large number of small field posts, it now began concentrating them in large units (cf. Djarwadi 1959:161–165). Army headquarters in Jakarta, moreover, dis-
appointed at the meagre results of the previous military operations, in July 1956 instituted a special military command, the Komando Pengamanan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara (KoDPSST), or South and Southeast Sulawesi Pacification Command, with as special assignment the suppression of the Darul Islam revolt (cf. Harvey 1974:313–320; 1977:38–40). Its commander was Colonel R. Sudirman, as whose Chief of Staff Mohammad Saleh Lahade was appointed a few months later.

The change implied that the Republican Army was for the first time in many years taking the ideological aspect of the conflict into consideration in dealing with the rebellion. For it tried to enlist the support of the social and religious leaders of the region for what it described as its “methaphysical” operation aimed at ending the rebellion (Djarwadi 1965, II:30). As R. Sudirman argued: “Peace for the region could only be achieved if there were peace in the villages; peace in the villages could only be attained if each household were at peace; peace in the family required that each individual felt at peace — and this could only be obtained through faith” (Harvey 1974:318).

This change in approach nevertheless also failed to have the desired results. For the attention gradually shifted to internal Army conflicts, notably the antagonism between Javanese and soldiers from the other islands. The culmination of these tensions in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion deflected the Army’s attention from the military campaign hitherto waged against Kahar Muzakkar and his Darul Islam activities.

Kahar Muzakkar himself meanwhile declined every offer of peace. He had firmly committed himself to the Darul Islam cause and did not want to know of any settlement short of a recognition of the Islamic State of Indonesia. Things were still going quite well for him, and in addition to exercising the control of parts of South and Southeast Sulawesi, he was trying to extend his influence to areas outside Sulawesi. Thus he sent troops to South Kalimantan to assist the rebels of Ibnu Hadjar, and to Halmahera and the Moluccas to get a Darul Islam rebellion under way in these parts. Although there were reports of some Darul Islam activity in the latter two regions, this did not amount to much. In the Moluccas Kahar Muzakkar sought to secure the cooperation of what was left of the RMS. There were, in fact, plans for proclaiming the Moluccas part of the territory of the Islamic State of Indonesia on February 1st, 1955. Before these plans could materialize, however, the commander-to-be of the Islamic Army of the Moluccas, Latang, was arrested (Bung
In South Sulawesi Kahar Muzakkar, in token of his hostility towards the Republic, tried to disrupt the polling for the general elections in September 1955. People who intended participating in these elections he branded as infidels. Officials in charge of the registration of votes were threatened and in some cases kidnapped. And all voters who had had themselves registered risked being fined. He was even said to foster the ambitious plan of occupying the more isolated subdistricts before the end of August to make voting there altogether impossible. To put this plan into execution 200 proas with reinforcements were to have been sent from Java, according to one captured Darul Islam leader, Mazdjono Iakandutju (Mazjono Iakanducu), who styled himself Commander in Chief of the Special all-Indonesian Student Division (PR 25-6-1955). Notwithstanding this opposition of the Darul Islam, as well as of the Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat – which demanded recognition as a regular Army unit before allowing people to cast their vote – the election was a success. The percentage of the electorate of South and Southeast Sulawesi taking part in the voting, though lower than for the rest of Indonesia, still came to over seventy (Feith 1971:54).

8. The United Republic of Indonesia

The PRRI/Permesta rebellion brought about a drastic change in the situation. In the first place, the Government saw itself obliged to deal with yet another rebellious movement in Sulawesi. Secondly, the rising once more impressed on the Government the urgency of the regions’ claims for wider autonomy and a greater share in the State revenues. It was now forced to give in at least partly to these demands and to remove some of the causes of regional discontent which had also inspired Kahar Muzakkar and his followers. In 1957 Parliament subsequently passed a new Law on Regional Administration, in which the regions’ authority to conduct their own affairs was extended. Steps were also taken to gradually abolish the existing civil service corps, or pamong praja, through the instrumentality of which the Central Government, through its Ministry of Internal Affairs, administered the regions. Understandably enough, however, the Central Government did not want to lose its control over the regional export earnings, but on the contrary, even tried to consolidate this control. It was prepared to discuss at most the
distribution of the export earnings and other State revenues over the different provinces. More or less the same held true for the Central Army Command, which had no desire to relinquish its control of the regional commands, but on the contrary, wanted to take back from the regional commanders the right of independent action which the latter had arrogated to themselves with time.

The half-heartedness with which the Central Government reacted to the demands for greater regional autonomy — giving in a little where matters of civil administration were concerned, and trying to extend its authority in matters concerning the Army or vital exports — greatly upset the regions outside Java. This reaction of the Government's anything but diminished the fear of Javanese dominance; nor did it remove the feeling prevailing in the outer regions that they were being neglected and exploited by the Javanese. Two islands in which this feeling was particularly strong were Sumatra and Sulawesi, both of which were to become the centres of a second rebellion (the PRRI/Permesta one), which, claiming the whole of Indonesia as its territory, presented itself as an alternative to the Indonesian Republic alongside the Islamic State of Indonesia. What opposed it to the Republic was not religion, as in the case of the Islamic State of Indonesia, but a second constitutional problem which had troubled Indonesian political life from 1945, namely the question of the relation between the Central Government and the individual regions, each with their own ethnic, economic and religious characteristics. This actually amounted to the problem of whether Indonesia should form a unitary state or should have a federal structure.

The Sulawesi variant of the rebellion went by the name of Permesta, short for Perjuangan Semesta or Total Struggle. In it two of Kahar Muzakkar's long-standing adversaries played a decisive role, viz. Mohammad Saleh Lahade and J.F. Warouw. A Charter stating the Permesta's demands was made public by the former on March 2nd, 1957. This urged for greater autonomy, financial as well as otherwise, for the four provinces of East Indonesia and for more intensive efforts to step up regional development. It also asked for a full mandate to solve the security problems of the region and put an end to the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion. One of the other major points of the Charter was its rejection of a Central Army headquarters plan for dissolving the Eastern Indonesia Military Command, which, although applauded at the lower levels, posed a threat to the higher echelons of the command.
The supporters of the Charter did not initially repudiate the Republic, its signatories asserting that they wanted to achieve their aims "by assuring leaders of all strata of society that we are not separating ourselves from the Republic of Indonesia" (Harvey 1977:166). They did take up arms against the Republic one year later, however, when on February 15th, 1958, the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI), or Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic, was proclaimed. Besides Mohammad Saleh Lahade, who became Minister of Information, the rebel Cabinet included Kahar Muzakkar's second long-standing foe who played an important role in the Permesta, Colonel J.F. Warouw, who was appointed Minister of Construction and Industry (Harvey 1977: 87).

Two months after the development of the Permesta reaction into an open rebellion, Kahar Muzakkar joined forces with the movement, a formal agreement being concluded between the "Government of the Eastern Section of the Islamic Republic of Indonesia" and the "Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic" on April 17th, 1958. Hereby the two rebel Governments agreed to cooperate in opposing Indonesian as well as international Communists, who were influencing and manipulating the Soekarno group in both a direct and an indirect way, so it was alleged. Both rejected the sovereignty of the Republic, again by reference to the alleged communist influence. They agreed on a mutual armistice and promised to help each other in the struggle against the common enemy (PR 17-5-1958).

Up to a point this gave Kahar Muzakkar what he had always wanted. The agreement was drawn up as one between two independent states. Where he had after he had joined the Islamic State of Indonesia always countered every call for negotiations on the cessation of hostilities with the demand that such negotiations be preceded by recognition of the Islamic State, now, with the agreement with the PRRI/Permesta (represented in the negotiations by Mohammad Saleh Lahade and the PRRI Minister of Religion, Mochtar Lintang (Mokhtar Lintang)), that State was for the first time recognized by outsiders. All reference to the ideological foundations of the two different rebel States was, however, carefully avoided. The agreement explicitly stated, in fact, that such subjects as the form of government, the state ideology and the international status would for the time being be left out of consideration. These matters would be discussed by the Central Governments of the two States at some future point of time when the situation permitted it.
The military cooperation between the *Permesta* and Kahar Muzakkar’s *Darul Islam* never came to anything much, however. For one thing the *Permesta* was mainly a North Sulawesi (Minahasa) affair, while Kahar Muzakkar’s forces operated in South and Southeast Sulawesi. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the *Darul Islam* rebellion, the PRRI/Permesta one was short-lived. Government troops had occupied the major centres of rebellion and driven the *Permesta* into the jungle within half a year. Although the latter continued operating from here till 1961, it no longer posed a serious threat to the Indonesian Republic (Dahm 1971:186).

Kahar Muzakkar was given some arms by the *Permesta* rebels. In return he promised to send food up north (DM 26-2-1959). He moreover received a reinforcement of some 200 *Permesta* guerrillas, commanded by one Gerungan, who had been driven away by Republican troops (Harvey 1974:405). But that was all. Nevertheless, he did formally join the Republik Persatuan Indonesia (RPI), or United Republic of Indonesia, which was originally the outcome of negotiations in February 1960 between the PRRI and *Darul Islam* leaders in Sumatra who continued their resistance after the majority of the *Darul Islam* leaders there had come to an agreement with the Indonesian Republic.

So Kahar Muzakkar’s Army in later years comprised three different forces: the *Momoks*, the Tentara Islam Indonesia (now made up of only two “divisions”, namely Bahar Mattaliu’s 40,000 and Sjamsul Bachri’s Hasanuddin Division) and a *Permesta* Unit. At the time of the PRRI/Permesta rebellion he instituted another re-organization, whereby he established a new *Momok*, the *Momok Ansharullah* (Allah’s helpers), into which he appears to have intended integrating not only the old *Momoks*, but also the greater part of the remaining two TII divisions. This plan brought him into conflict with some of his subcommanders, however, notably his two principal lieutenants at the time — Bahar Mattaliu and Sjamsul Bachri. The former of these accused him of aiming at the destruction of the Islamic Army of Indonesia in Sulawesi, and later wrote, speaking of the *Momok Ansharullah*: “Only after the formation of the *Momok Ansharullah* did it transpire that Kahar Muzakkar’s idea in forming this *Momok* was nothing other than the introduction of a wholesale rationalization of the TII, or even its total abolition, for the reason that the TII was infected with the disease of moral crisis, which had led to a total decline of its fighting power” (Mattaliu 1965:62). As a result of the opposition of these commanders the
TII was kept in existence, be it in an inferior status. The *Momok* units functioned as crack troops, and were much better armed than the rest. In confrontations with Republican troops the TII generally had to attack first, along with units armed only with small daggers and choppers. After they had taken the first blows, the *Momok* units were then brought into action, advancing "on a large scale, wave after wave" (Harahap 1956:6).

There was almost an armed clash between the two parties, in fact, with Kahar Muzakkar leading his troops against Bahar Mattaliu and the other commanders of the 40,000 divisions who refused to be incorporated into the *Momok Ansharullah*. In the end Kahar Muzakkar gave Bahar Mattaliu the choice of either becoming vice-Minister of Defence of the Islamic State of Indonesia — instead of himself —, or going abroad for a study-tour. Bahar Mattaliu claims that he opted for the second alternative for fear of being accused of entering into rivalry with Kahar Muzakkar (Mattaliu 1965:92–93).

In actual fact he prepared himself to surrender. On September 5th, 1959, an envoy of his visited the Military Command of South and Southeast Sulawesi, saying that Bahar Mattaliu had taken over the command of the *Darul Islam* troops in protest against Kahar Muzakkar’s instructions to burn down the houses of civilians. On hearing of Bahar Mattaliu’s intention to surrender, the Military Command then proclaimed an amnesty.

On September 12th Bahar Mattaliu, styling himself Commander of the DI/TII of South and Southeast Sulawesi, formally gave himself up and appealed to the rest of the Islamic Army to do the same (DM 10-9-1959, 11-9-1959, 19-9-1959). Pamphlets were dropped by Republican Army planes, moreover, in which Bahar Mattaliu, in his capacity as Commander of the Fourth, or *Hasanuddin*, Division of the DI/TII, ordered all military and civil officers of the Islamic State in South Sulawesi to surrender to the Republic. He further forbade members of the DI/TII to join the *Momok Ansharullah* or *Permesta*, because, he asserted, the activities of these two rebel groups were responsible for the destruction of South Sulawesi (DM 21-9-1959).

In his appeal to the other members of the Islamic Army to surrender he explained that his own decision to return to the Republic had been inspired by Soekarno’s decree ordering a return to the 1945 Constitution which marked the beginning of Guided Democracy (Pemulihan 1959:518). Kahar Muzakkar had, in fact, gathered his commanders together shortly before the Indonesian Republic’s return to the Constitution of 1945 to
discuss the future course of his rebellion, on which occasion apparently some of the commanders declared themselves in favour of surrender. Later Bahar Mattaliu adduced his conflict with Kahar Muzakkar and the moral decadence of the latter’s troops as reason, which seems more to the point. He was particularly critical of the behaviour of the Momok Ansharullah, as well as the order Kahar Muzakkar had allegedly given its members to marry women-prisoners (Mattaliu 1965:93–98).

The Momok Ansharullah is also the target of an attack in a pamphlet written by Bahar Mattaliu entitled Manifesto Tahun 1379 H, in which he argues that “all of Kahar Muzakkar’s steps were in defiance of Islam” (Mattaliu 1965:97). This pamphlet, although dated in its introduction September 25th, 1950 [1959], i.e. two weeks subsequent to the author’s surrender, creates the impression of being written while the latter was still in the bush. In it he mentions a number of factors which were detrimental to the Islamic revolution, among them the development of the Momok Ansharullah into something quite different from what had originally been intended or what he had agreed to, namely a special unit operating alongside the Islamic Army and functioning at the same time as Kahar Muzakkar’s bodyguard. He deplores the latter’s policy of providing this Momok with only the best of arms and his attempt to incorporate the other military units into it. A second such detrimental factor mentioned by him is the failure to transform Gerungan’s Permesta troops into an auxiliary force to support the TII in its struggle for an Islamic state (Mattaliu 1965:98–103).

On November 28th President Soekarno issued a decree granting an amnesty to all those in South Sulawesi who had surrendered between September 12th and November 28th. Bahar Mattaliu was thus treated with considerable leniency by the Republican Government. His surrender was attributed to the success of the Republican Army’s military operations (Harahap 1965:7) and accordingly used for propaganda purposes. The rebels, on the other hand, accused him of treason and venality and tried to belittle the effects of his defection. In their view, as the magazine PRRI Information states (December 1959, no. 9:25), “... Bahar Mattaliu and a small fraction of his unit, but together with some tens of thousands of villagers from the neighbourhood who could not stand the present economic pressure any longer, ‘went over’ to the Djakarta government and were received with open arms and a promise of a Rp. 250,000 subsidy”.

Bahar Mattaliu (1965:119) himself boasts that in the period
immediately following his surrender Kahar Muzakkar lost about seventy percent of his followers. His defection indeed meant a setback for Kahar Muzakkar, who for the second time in the period of his *Darul Islam* rebellion lost part of his followers on account of internal dissensions. On the other hand, it freed him of one of his rivals, against whom, as we have seen above, he had contemplated steps to relieve him of his command. With Bahar Mattaliu and Sjamsul Bachri — whom he had sent abroad — out of the way, he had rid himself of two major potential opponents. Before he could be again firmly in control, however, he also had to solve his problems with Gerungan’s troops. These, mostly Christian, troops were likewise contemplating defection and had to be forcibly brought to heel. Fighting occurred between the two opposing forces in early 1960, with Kahar Muzakkar emerging victorious. He thereupon arrested Gerungan and 150 of his followers (DM 1-4-1960, 16-5-1960), who were subsequently converted to Islam. After this Gerungan became one of Kahar Muzakkar’s “most trusted followers” (Harvey 1974:412) and eventually even his Minister of Defence (Siliwangi 1968:574).

The end of the 1950’s even so marked Kahar Muzakkar’s downfall. In these years the Republican Army’s military operations, better organized and coordinated as they now were, finally began to bear fruit. In the extreme south the roads were gradually cleared, and the road connecting Ujungpandang with Bone through Maros and Camba could again be used normally for the first time in many years. Kahar Muzakkar was pushed further and further into the interior and had to fall back to two strongholds of the early years of his rebellion, the one located in Southeast Sulawesi, in the mountains north of Kolaka, the other in the Latumojang region, near Palopo, which had of old been a refuge for people escaping from prosecution for violation of the *adat* laws. The first indications that he was prepared to negotiate were given by him in mid-1960, after launching a futile attack on Cimpu, near Mount Latumojang. He subsequently proposed to the regional Republican commander, Andi Sose, that they should establish a cease-fire and enter into negotiations in “an Islamic way” (DM 25-6-1960). In 1961 he in fact started negotiations with the Republican Army, even meeting the then head of the Military Command of South and Southeast Sulawesi, M. Jusuf (M. Yusuf) (Harvey 1974:416–420). He had first sent his wife Corry to Jusuf as his private envoy. She had arrived in Ujungpandang on September 24th, and left for Jakarta to meet Nasution the next day (DM 28-9-1961). Following this Jusuf and Kahar
Muzakkar themselves met in a small village north of Watangpone (DM 23-10-1961). On November 12th Kahar Muzakkar declared his loyalty to Soekarno, Nasution and Jusuf at the military headquarters of Bone in the presence of Jusuf. The next year hostilities were resumed, however. The Republican Army, as a result of its successful suppression of rebellious movements in other parts of Indonesia, was now able to concentrate all of its efforts on South Sulawesi.

The definitive end of the Darul Islam movement followed in the course of 1964 and 1965. In the successive military operations preceding this Kahar Muzakkar lost gradually more ground. The Republican Army owed its present success partly to the fact that it was able to bring more troops into action, but partly also to the circumstance that soldiers originating from South Sulawesi itself were playing an increasingly important role in the planning and execution of these operations. These latter included the above-mentioned military commander of South and Southeast Sulawesi, Jusuf, who was a native of Bone, and Kahar Muzakkar’s old comrades in arms Andi Sose and Azis Taba. M. Jusuf, as military commander of the region, personally headed the final operations against Kahar Muzakkar’s Darul Islam, the Tumpas (Extermination) and Kilat (Lightening) Operations, with as Chief of Staff Solihin, who as commander of the Siliwangi Division had gained considerable experience in counter-insurgency actions. Although Andi Sose initially also took an active part in the campaign against Kahar Muzakkar, for a time even commanding the principal operations against him, the Army Command remained distrustful of him as a former KGSS battalion commander who still commanded much support among his soldiers and among the local population, and who tended to act as he pleased. Eventually he was transferred from his unit, finally in 1964, to be arrested (cf. Harvey 1974:424, 478–479).

Another former KGSS battalion commander who fell victim to the South and Southeast Sulawesi Army Command’s policy of tightening its control over its military commanders and, like Andi Sose, lost his command, was Andi Selle. The show-down in his case came in 1964. He had taken the jungle and, to talk out the differences between them, had invited Jusuf to come and see him near Pinrang. At this meeting at first all seemingly went well, and an agreement was actually reached. Following this, however, as Andi Selle accompanied Jusuf in his car for a ride to Parepare in order to show the population “that he really was prepared to cooperate” (AB 25-4-1978), some of his men who were driving
along in separate cars cut in on the one in which he and Yusuf were sitting. Hereupon Yusuf and Andi Selle both got out, and the latter ordered his men to fire at Yusuf. He was not hit, but in the ensuing skirmish Andi Selle himself, who succeeded in escaping, was shot in the shoulder. He was subsequently formally branded a rebel (BBM 13-2-1977). From then on Republican military actions had to be directed not only against Kahar Muzakkar, but also against Andi Selle, who operated in the Sawitto mountain range near Pinrang. The latter's rebellion was not granted a long life, however. Betrayed by one of his own followers, his camp was raided by Republican troops at the end of August. He himself managed to escape but in his flight fell into a ravine, and died from his injuries the next day, September 1st, 1964. Now the Army was able to concentrate its undivided attention on Kahar Muzakkar. First it purged the Latumojang region, forcing Kahar Muzakkar to retreat to Southeast Sulawesi. Here he was followed in hot pursuit by the Republican troops, which — as in the case of the units brought into action against Andi Selle — had orders not to return until they had captured the rebel leader dead or alive. On February 1st, 1965, they finally discovered Kahar Muzakkar's hiding-place at the Lasolo River, which on February 3rd they proceeded to attack. The hut in which Kahar Muzakkar was believed to be sheltering was riddled with shots, which sent him running out of it. He was shot and killed before he had come five metres (BBM 5-12-1976; cf. Tamatlah 1965).

With Kahar Muzakkar's death the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi virtually ended. His Minister of Defence, Gerungan, was captured in July, and subsequently tried and executed (cf. Siliwangi 1968:580—583; Harvey 1974:428). After that the Government remained on the alert against rebel remnants until as late as the end of the 1960's. During a visit of Soeharto’s to Southeast Sulawesi in 1969 the possibility of Darul Islam activities around Kolaka and Kendari was still a security consideration, although it was announced at the same time that they no longer posed a real threat to the general security of the area (cf. Rentjana 1969).