

## Metaphorical Appeals to Civic Ethos in Lycurgus’ *Against Leocrates*\*

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Democratic citizenship and political identity of classical Athenians have been studied from numerous perspectives,<sup>1</sup> as notions entangled in a set of social and moral preconceptions.<sup>2</sup> Despite the well-recognized fact that citizenship constituted a crucial socio-political category in Athens, it also—and to a large extent—created the very perspective through which citizens perceived their socio-political reality.<sup>3</sup> As a concept, it developed unevenly in Athens and other *poleis*, making one wary of substituting ‘Greek’ for ‘Athenian’,<sup>4</sup> but

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\* This research has been supported by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education, under the ‘Mobility Plus’ scholarship, and by the Foundation for Polish Science (FNP). I would like to thank audiences at UCL, Royal Holloway, and Leeds for their insightful comments and clever questions on my reading of Lycurgus, and Lene Rubinstein for her guidance during my stay at the Centre for Oratory and Rhetoric at Royal Holloway. I would also like to express my gratitude to all those who have shared their comments on this paper and idea, in particular Margarita Alexandrou, Clifford Ando, Ilias Arnaoutoglou, Michał Bizoń, Josine Blok, Roger Brock, Douglas L. Cairns, Chris Carey, Lucia Cecchet, Matthew R. Christ, Mike Edwards, Michael Gagarin, Benjamin Gray, Brenda Griffith-Williams, Edward M. Harris, James Kierstead, Janek Kucharski, Stephen D. Lambert, Donald Lateiner, Irene Salvo, Alessandro Vatri, Vladimir Zuckerman, all equally unaccountable for any deficiencies that remain. The classical abbreviations throughout the text follow LSJ (Liddell et al. (1996)), but shorter ‘Lyc.’ is used for Lycurgus and ‘Aes.’ for Aeschines. RO stands for Rhodes and Osborne (2003).

- 1 For recent reassessments, see in particular Scafuro (1994), Rhodes (2009); cf. Balot (2006) 53–57.
- 2 See Blok (2013) on the roots of civic identity in Athens, and Sinclair (1988) 49–76 on what was commonly expected of a citizen; see also a brief but good overview of these issues in Carey (2001) 36–42. Cf. Liddel (2007) on the rhetoric of civic obligations in fourth-century Athens, with Christ (2008) and Blok (2010); see also Manville (1994), who criticises modern influences on treating Athens as a ‘state’, but seems to rest his disapproval on an exclusively modern, post-Bodin idea of the ‘state’; cf. n. 83 below on the polis as a ‘state’ proper.
- 3 As adroitly observed by Blok (2013) 162. See Herman (2010) and Epstein (2011) 96 on Athenian political bodies as the so-called ‘traditioned groups’, with shared symbolic sphere and identity.
- 4 See Blok (2005), Davies (2004).

laying a fertile ground before students of Athenian literature interested in political discourse.

Metaphor, in turn, has most often been discussed as a figure of speech identified by Aristotle (*Rhet.* III 3–4, 1406b.1–11, 20–26), a way of equating through language two things commonly seen as distinct from each other ('man is a lion'), and thus primarily a matter of words, or poetic expression specifically. Yet since George Lakoff's and Mark Johnson's *Metaphors we live by* (1980), the so-called 'conceptual metaphor' has been widely studied in cognitive linguistics as a reflection of patterns of thought in which humans indulge in their everyday lives, which may—but need not—find its expression in literary language. Metaphor understood in such terms has been defined as a 'mapping between conceptual domains', leading to the understanding of one such domain in terms of another (e.g., 'politics is war' or 'love is heat').<sup>5</sup>

The present paper will attempt to trace this kind of metaphorical thinking in the civic discourse conveyed in Lysurgus' speech *Against Leocrates*.<sup>6</sup> It will analyse the expressions that refer to citizenship in a way similar to how the statement 'I'm afraid we need to go our separate ways, darling, this relationship isn't *going anywhere*' rests upon the understanding of 'relationship as a *journey*',<sup>7</sup> even though it does not express this concept through an explicit literary metaphor (cf. 'intellectual activity as farming' in the first paragraph of this essay). As scholars have noted, such metaphors need to be based on conceptual connections that make sense to their addressees. To accomplish this, they should provide coherent structure, by highlighting certain specific aspects of the conceptual framework they implement, while downplaying others, so that they may endow established ideas with a new meaning.<sup>8</sup> In this essay, by discussing their use in Lysurgus' *Against Leocrates*, I argue that Attic orators consciously employed such metaphorical concepts in appeals to their civic audiences in Athenian political institutions.<sup>9</sup> This paper will

5 See, e.g., Lakoff and Turner (1989) 1–4, 62–64, *passim*, Gentener and Bowdle (2008).

6 For a recent cognitive re-evaluation of the Roman concept of citizenship, see Ando (2015), and for a study of Greek political imagery more broadly, see Brock (2013); see also Sansò (2014) on cognitive linguistics in the studies of ancient Greek, and a recent discussion on its application in Cairns (2014). On civic metaphors in Athenian oratory and political rhetoric, see also Wohl (2009) and Cook (2012).

7 For this often-quoted conceptual metaphor, see Lakoff (1980) 44–45 (expressed there as 'love is a journey', which I consider less precise in the context of 'splitting up').

8 See Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 139, 149–152.

9 This paper is a first step in a larger project, aiming at a comprehensive discussion of such metaphors in Athenian political discourse.

thus also aim to answer broader questions about the ideas underlying Greek political discourse and Athenian civic ideology specifically, along with the ways in which these could become relevant in what we may call political rhetoric.

The speech in question was written for an unusual court case, which rendered it particularly bountiful in its use of political language, especially in the ways it played upon Athenian citizens' understanding of civic ethos and their own role as citizens in troubled times. At some time between mid 331 and mid 330 BC,<sup>10</sup> several years after the Athenian defeat at Chaeronea, Lycurgus—a prominent politician at that time—brought to trial for treason, under the high-profile procedure of *εἰσαγγελία*, an Athenian citizen named Leocrates.<sup>11</sup> He had then already prosecuted Lysicles, the general in the lost battle brought to court and sentenced to death using similar legal means ([Plu.] *x orat.* 843d; cf. Lyc. 1.53 on Autolycus below). Leocrates, in turn, was a private citizen who had left Athens with his female companion<sup>12</sup> and slaves shortly after the battle—amid universal fear of Philip's imminent arrival at Athens—and came back to his native city after some six years abroad. It was not the only trial linked to these events to take place several years later. Within a year, another famous dispute was brought to people's attention—one concerning the crowning of Demosthenes by the people six years earlier, leaving a record in the famous pair of speeches by Aeschines and him (Aes. 3 and D. 18). As a result, both cases once again turned the defeat of 338 and its immediate aftermath into a burning issue,<sup>13</sup> as did Diondas' prosecution of Hypereides and the latter's defence speech some three years earlier.<sup>14</sup>

10 On the date of 331, as opposed to the traditionally assumed 330, see Harris (2001) 159, n. 1 and Whitehead (2006) 132 n. 2, cf. Harris (2013) 233, n. 54; see also an overview of dating issues in Engels (2014) 22, cf. (2008) 113. Lycurgus speaks of the trial as being held 'in the eighth year' after the battle (§ 45), that is at least seven years after early August 338, if we can at all count on the speaker's accuracy; all dates from this point will be BC, unless stated otherwise or obviously modern (as in dates of publication).

11 On *εἰσαγγελία* in late fourth-century Athens, see Hansen (1975) 16–20, 29–36, cf. Rhodes (1979) and Hansen (1980); cf. Hansen (1975) cat. 121 on Leocrates' case. It was around that time when the procedure started to be used more widely against private citizens rather than various 'public figures', cf. Azoulay (2011), but see Hyp. *Eux.* 28–29 with MacDowell (1978) 183–186.

12 Described by the speaker, perhaps slanderously, as a *hetaira* named Eirenis (§§ 17, 55) but otherwise unknown.

13 See Burke (1977) on the possible links between two cases, and Harris (1995) 174 to the contrary.

14 See Carey et al. (2008) for the *editio princeps* of Hypereides' speech, and a commentary by

## 1 DEPARTURE IS TREASON ... AND SACRILEGE

Simply leaving the city, rather than escaping conscription, fleeing the battlefield, or abandoning one's post in a besieged city, was not punishable as treason in Athens at the time of Leocrates' departure, and thus Lycurgus needed to go to extra lengths to prove that what the defendant had done ought to be judged as 'treason' (προδοσία).<sup>15</sup> The prosecutor himself concedes that the Athenian laws prescribed no penalty for Leocrates' actions, although they listed other specific offences, and thus his case—he urges—needs careful scrutiny by the dikasts acting as posited 'lawgivers' entrusted with the task of 'giving an example' (§§ 8–9; παράδειγμα: cf. §§ 27, 83, 100, 127–129, 150; see also § 10).<sup>16</sup> Leocrates apparently took up this line of defence in his now lost defence speech in reply to Lycurgus' accusations and argued that he had not been in charge of the shipyards, the city gates, or the camps (§ 59), while the supporting speakers<sup>17</sup> who accompanied him claimed openly that it was not 'treason' to leave the city (§ 68).<sup>18</sup> To forestall this (or respond to it in the version published later),<sup>19</sup>

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Horváth (2014); cf. Rubinstein (2000) 224, n. 89 on Hypereides' and Demosthenes' likely collaboration in this period.

- 15 A law making such actions liable to prosecution as treason might have been introduced after his departure (as Petrie (1922) xxviii suggests), but it would not have been retroactive. According to the prosecutor, shortly before Leocrates' departure, the people prepared an ad-hoc decree and voted to 'have the generals assign for guard duty ... [any citizen or metic] in whatever way they saw fit' (§ 16); cf. Hyp. *Ath.* 29, 33 for a law prohibiting Athenian metics from leaving the city during war. See Hyp. *Eux.* 7–8, 29 for the offences explicitly listed in the εἰσαγγελία law (quoted by the speaker not long after Leocrates' trial), cf. MacDowell (1978) 183–186 and n.11 above. See also Christ (2006) on various forms of 'cowardice' and 'un-civic behaviour' in Athens.
- 16 See Harris (2001) 160 and the rest of the introduction to the speech on this, cf. (2013) 175–176, 233–241, *passim* for a detailed analysis of the law's open texture; see Petrie (1922) 70 and Harris (2013) 261–266 on Lycurgus' use of the argument from precedent and Allen (2000) 20 on deterrent; see Harris (2013) 173–174, 250–266, 322, 325–326, 331 and Rubinstein (2007) on precedent and deterrent in Athenian oratory and legal system in general; see Harris (2000) 67–75 and Liddel (2007) 102–108 for analyses of the rhetorical argumentation employed in the speech. Asking the dikasts to become 'lawgivers' appears in four prosecution speeches in the oratorical corpus, see Harris (2013) 272–273.
- 17 *Synēgoroi*, on which see Rubinstein (2000); cf. Harris (2000) 67–75 on their line of argumentation in this trial.
- 18 The *nomos eisangelitikos*, referring to such obligations, could have been quoted by another prosecutor at Leocrates' trial before Lycurgus' speech.
- 19 The speech may have been edited before publication, and perhaps enhanced with addi-

Lycurgus aimed to persuade his audience by various appeals to the ‘true’ nature of treason—opposed to being a good citizen—in Athens,<sup>20</sup> and in doing so he employed a rich set of rhetorical tools in an attempt to shift the boundaries, trying both to win his questionable case and to prepare the ground for his future policies.<sup>21</sup> From the very beginning (§1), he claims that Leocrates betrayed the temples, shrines, precincts of the gods (cf. §§17, 143), honours granted by the laws, and ancestral sacrificial rites (cf. §35). At one point in his speech, he cleverly summarises what he wished to advocate, when referring to those usually accused of treason:

Ἡξει δ' ἴσως ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν λόγον φερόμενος, ὃν αὐτῷ συμβεβουλεύκασί τινες τῶν συνηγόρων, ὡς οὐκ ἔνοχος ἐστὶ τῇ προδοσίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ νεωρίων κύριος οὔτε πυλῶν οὔτε στρατοπέδων οὔθ' ὅλως τῶν τῆς πόλεως οὐδενός. ἐγὼ δ' ἠγοῦμαι τοὺς μὲν τούτων κυρίους μέρος ἄν τι προδοῦναι τῆς ὑμετέρας δυνάμεως, τουτοῖ δ' ὅλην ἔκδοτον ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν. ἔτι δ' οἱ μὲν τοὺς ζῶντας μόνον ἀδικοῦσι προδιδόντες, οὗτος δὲ καὶ τοὺς τετελευτηκότας {καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἱερά}, τῶν πατρῶν νομίμων ἀποστειρωμένων ...

Perhaps he will come forward and rely on the argument that some of his supporters have advised him to use, namely, that he is not guilty of treason since he was not in charge of the shipyards, or the city gates, or the army camps, or any part of the city at all. My opinion is that men in those positions can betray part of our forces, but this man handed over the entire city to the enemy. The treason of the former harms only the living, but this man's treason **robbed even the dead** [and the temples in the countryside] **of their ancestral rites.**<sup>22</sup>

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tional detail and more sophisticated arguments, as well as with replies to the original line of the defence; on revising delivered speeches of other orators in Athens, see Dover (1968) 170–172 on Lysias; cf. MacDowell (2009) 7–9 on Demosthenes.

20 Cf. Harris (2000) 74 = (2013) 240: ‘Lycurgus’ own view of treason is closely linked to his view of citizenship; see also Azoulay (2011).

21 Faraguna (2011) 74, although not the first to observe this, summarises the issue well: ‘Lykourgos’ controversial abuse of *eisangelia* ... and extensive interpretation of *asebeia* ... had political implications that went far beyond the limited scope of Leocrates’ trial; cf. Azoulay (2011).

22 The Greek is based on N.C. Conomis’s Teubner edition of 1970, and the translations of Lycurgus follow Harris (2001) (with modified spelling), unless stated otherwise.

In response to the defendant's claims, Lycurgus not only insists on calling his departure *treason* (προδοσία, προδοῦναι), but also appears to suggest that Leocrates is guilty of another crime, that of theft or, more specifically, temple<sup>23</sup> or grave robbery, since he *despoiled* (ἀποστερῶν) the dead and the temples of their metaphorical *belongings*, that is ancestral rites, as if they were living people owning actual possessions of which they may be deprived (cf. §§ 38, 97, 129, 147).<sup>24</sup> One man's act of leaving the city is thus equated with the actions of those who open the city gates and wilfully betray the besieged city to the enemy on the one hand,<sup>25</sup> and of those who steal sacred objects from the temples on the other. In using this metaphor, the speaker downplays the fact that the defendant had no official duty in the city at the time of his departure, and instead underscores the act of departing from the city with its temples and graves—crucial tokens of Athenian identity<sup>26</sup>—by likening it to abandoning the living people (yet he emphasizes the defendant's deeds as even worse than that). Such arguments rested upon the importance given in Greek thought to the *oikos* as continuing in time over generations, including the past and future ones, but stretched this idea much further in linking it to betraying one's country by 'abandoning' its sacred places and the cult objects of its particular households and families.

Another notable feature of this conceptualization is that the polis itself is treated here as an object and a commodity (rather than collective or an agent, cf. § 133), since it can be passed on to someone (ἔκδοτον ποιῆσαι, cf. § 78: παρέδωκε), as if it could be picked up and carried by hand: a metaphor and ambiguity embedded in the use of ἐκ- and παρα-διδόναι in classical Greek (cf. Eng. 'give' vs 'give up', or Lat. 'tra(ns)-do'), and presumably one consciously employed in Lycurgus' rhetorical endeavours to represent the act of *treason* (προδοσία). And since the country can be shared, passed on, or given away (see below), the speaker implies that it needs to be protected from any such harmful actions (cf. § 78). The passage in question thus rests upon a set of conceptual metaphors, which—if we take some conceptual schemas to be narrower than others<sup>27</sup>—may be described as follows: 'departure is treason', 'polis is an object',

23 If we accept the reading of the manuscripts.

24 See below with nn.29 and 77 on 'ancestral' gods, rites, and places.

25 Cf. Harris (2000) 72–73 on the usual meaning of προδοσία. Cf. Aen. Tact. 10.5–11.15 on the duties of—and restrictions imposed on—individuals in the *besieged* city.

26 See Blok (2013) 165: 'Tending the graves of deceased kin not only showed piety towards one's own dead, but also demonstrated one's identity as the heir of one's ancestors'.

27 Cf. Lakoff and Turner (1989) 64.

‘dead people are living people’,<sup>28</sup> ‘temples are people’ (cf. §§ 8, 17, 150), ‘rites are (their) possessions’, and ‘departure is theft (or: sacrilege, cf. § 129)’. All of this, as we will have seen shortly, is in tune with the general argument the speaker was trying to make in accusing his opponent of treason, as he has done throughout the speech; in doing so, he even went so far as to imply that the defendant’s departure and unwillingness to defend the interstate role of his polis—the effective outcome of losing the war with Macedon at the time of the trial—had been equal to planning an anti-democratic coup d’ état (§ 126).

## 2 OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE

Earlier in his argumentation, the prosecutor claims that Leocrates, after his departure, had sent for sacred ‘patrimonial’ cult objects (τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ πατρῶα),<sup>29</sup> ‘asking’ them to abandon their fatherland and the temples as he himself had done, and thus forcing them to settle in a foreign country, strange to their nature in its customs (§ 25). And although the speaker mentions only nearby Megara, he presents to his audience the terrible fate of these sacred symbols dear to Athenian citizens by likening it to a non-citizen’s life in an alien country, without the kindness and respect they would receive at home. In doing so, not only does he clearly employ the ‘symbols are people’ metaphor, but he also suggests that ‘symbols *are* citizens (of a particular country)’, which could be facilitated by the anthropomorphic nature of such figures.<sup>30</sup> Since those symbols were instituted by the ancestors of the contemporary Athenians, they themselves became and remained *Athenian*, and they could equally become *aliens* when ‘dwelling’ outside of their native city, having been forcefully resettled. This seems to imply not only that these sacred objects are defined by how they are being taken care of by citizens to whom they belong, but that people, too, are defined by their patrimonial symbols and can fully be deemed ‘citizens’ only when they remain in the city together with them.

This argument tallied well not only with Leocrates’ roaming life after his departure, when he chose to reside as an alien deprived of civic privileges in other Greek cities, but also with the general fear shared by the Athenians and abundantly represented in classical literature that they might lose their status

28 On this conceptual blend, see Fauconnier and Turner (2002) 204–206.

29 See Parker (2005) 9–36 on the so-called ‘household religion’ and the ambiguous ‘ancestral gods’; cf. Harris (2015) 77–79 on τὰ πάτρια in the laws of Greek *poleis*. See further below on πατρῶος.

30 See Sullivan (2002a) 99.

of Athenian citizens with all the advantages it entailed. The orator was able to exploit this fear by linking it to the belief that victory in battle depends upon divine favour (cf. § 82)—obtained through orderly worship—which Leocrates chose to turn into ‘exportable goods’ (§ 26), thus risking the gods’ wrath against his native polis.<sup>31</sup> In doing so, the prosecutor obviously neglected to mention that Lycurgus’ actions might as well be interpreted as his great care for these sacred ancestral images, since he took much effort in keeping them with him when staying abroad;<sup>32</sup> however, this period of Athenian history indeed shows a growing concern with the treatment of various cult objects and places of worship (sometimes regulated by law).<sup>33</sup>

Later in the speech, Lycurgus asks the dikasts if they are going to acquit someone who ‘abandoned the *dēmos*’ (§ 116: τὸν δῆμον ἐγκαταλιπόντα), as if the Athenian people *en masse* or its political system was a person or an object which could be left behind (the ambiguity and inherent metonymy in the term δῆμος, along with its contemporary deification, must have played a role in such conceptions).<sup>34</sup> Although Dinarchus (3.21) and Aeschines (3.170, 232) occasionally use the verb ἐγκαταλείπειν ‘to leave behind’ in a metaphorical sense, over one third of its occurrences in the entire oratorical corpus (over 150 individual works)<sup>35</sup> come from Lycurgus. He speaks of ‘abandoning’ the polis (§§ 26, 43, 134, 145, 147, cf. §§ 38, 112–114, 148) and its sacred matters (§ 2), the citizens (§ 5), ancestors (§§ 70, 97) and their tombs (§ 8), the land (to the enemies, § 89, cf. § 147) or the fatherland (§§ 52, 101, 144),<sup>36</sup> the commanders (§ 81, ‘citing’ the Oath of Plataea)<sup>37</sup>, and finally, the laws (§ 143), much of which

31 See Parker (2005) 395–397 on the gods-protectors of the city, and pp. 397–403 on their role in warfare, cf. Mikalson (2010) 156–159; see also Mikalson (1983) 18–26 on the spheres of divine intervention and ways of securing the goodwill of the gods, cf. pp. 94–95, 99–100. On exporting the gods’ favour by Leocrates, cf. Parker (1996) 251.

32 Cf. Sullivan (2002a) 98–99.

33 See, in particular, *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1, 445 with Lambert (2010) 230–231.

34 Although Lycurgus throughout the speech prefers the explicit term *dēmokratia* for the Athenian constitution, the *dēmos* at the time could denote ‘the people’, ‘democracy’ (explicit here in the petrified phrase δῆμου κατάλυσις, §§ 124–126, 147), or ‘the Assembly’ (e.g., § 16, 19, 41); see Hansen (2010) on these—and other—meanings of the term. After Chaeronea, deified representations of *Dēmos* and *Dēmokratia* began to emerge in Athens, a practice apparently supported by Lycurgus, see Gilliland (2007).

35 See Edwards (1994) appendix 2.

36 The word ‘fatherland’ (πατρίς) also appears in this speech much more frequently than in any other preserved Athenian oration, see Allen (2000) 6, n. 2, cf. Engels (2008) 159. See below on the language of state-household in §§ 48, 53, with nn. 75, 76, and 82.

37 Incidentally, in Lycurgus, the beginning is attested as Οὐ ποιήσομαι περὶ πλείονος τὸ ζῆν τῆς



he directly links to the defendant's act of leaving the city. This metaphorical concept—as opposed to abandoning a physical entity—is used throughout the speech alternately with another term from the same stem, ἐκλείπειν ‘to forsake, abandon’. The way it is employed by the orator with all its military connotations, it frequently brings to mind fleeing the battlefield (λιπο-τάξιον), a serious crime punishable under Athenian law with disenfranchisement (see below).<sup>38</sup> Lycurgus plays upon this concept throughout his speech, linking departure to abandoning the country in need, desertion, and treason, in a litany of accusations: [ἐγ]καταλιπών—φυγών—προδοῦς ‘(that who) abandoned, fled, and betrayed’ (e.g., in §§ 2, 5, 43, 114, 147–148).

### 3 CITIZENSHIP IS WARFARE

The allusion to desertion made way for another metaphor crucial to the speaker's argument: ‘citizenship is war’, or—more specifically—‘democratic citizenship is a hoplite battle’. When studying Athenian oratory through a conceptual lens, one cannot fail to notice that military metaphors were a common way of expressing civic duties or ideals.<sup>39</sup> Such metaphors recur throughout *Against Leocrates* in various references to the defendant's act of leaving the city, represented as abandoning the battle line (in the phalanx), by definition threatening to hoplite warfare.<sup>40</sup> Lycurgus thus asks rhetorically:

καίτοι κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους ὦ ἄνδρες τίς οὐκ ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἠλέησεν, οὐ μόνον πολίτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξένος ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις ἐπιδημηκῶς; τίς δ'

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ἐλευθερίας ('I will not consider living to be worth more than freedom', tr. JF), while in a mid fourth-century inscription as μαχοῦμαι ἕως ἂν ζῶ, καὶ οὐ περὶ πλέονος ποῆσομαι τὸ ζῆν ἢ τὸ ἐλεύθερος εἶναι ('I shall fight while I live, and I shall not put life before being free', tr. RO); for the text and further discussion of its authenticity (including another quotation in Diodorus), see RO 88 § ii. Cf. Steinbock (2011) 294 ff.

38 On the law concerning λιποτάξιον, see Harris (2013) 217–220. See §§ 110, 130, 132 on Lycurgus' accusing Leocrates of 'cowardice' (δελία), cf. Hansen (1976) 72–74. Ascribing avoidance of military duties to one's opponents was quite common in Athenian rhetorical practice, on which see Christ (2006) 46 with n. 4, *passim*.

39 On military metaphors in oratory, see, for example, Balot (2004) 251–253 and (2014) 66–70, Brock (2013) 161 ff., Yunis (1996) 269–277, Roisman (2004) 262, and Christ (2006) 138–140.

40 See Wees, van (2004) 108–113, 184–197 on the classical phalanx, Ridley (1979) on the socio-political aspects of hoplite training, and Crowley (2012) (esp. chs. 5 and 6) on the interdependence of citizens' identity and military discipline in Athens; cf. Harris (2013) 217.

ἦν οὐτως ἢ μισόδημος τότ' ἢ μισαθήναιος, ὅστις ἐδυνήθη ἀν ἄτακτον {τὸν} αὐτὸν ὑπομεῖναι ἰδεῖν;

And yet at that time who would not have taken pity on the city, not just a citizen but even a foreigner who had merely visited here in the past? Who could have despised the *dēmos*<sup>41</sup> and Athens so much that he could have borne to see himself **not at his post**?

§ 39, tr. modified

Since Leocrates was not assigned a *post* while remaining in the city, as hoplites in the battlefield were, the speaker's words need to be read metaphorically, as a reference to the defendant's role as a citizen in the polis, whose proper 'battle-line order' was to remain in his native city and defend it if the need ever arose in those unsteady times. By employing the phalanx metaphor, the prosecutor suggests that one man's actions in the polis at a particular moment could be crucial to its survival, contrary to what the defendant's supporters seem to have claimed in court (cf. § 63, quoted below). Since Leocrates—in the prosecutor's view—did not fulfil his duty, he became a *deserter*, having fled from the metaphorical civic battlefield by dereliction, as many of his fellow citizens had less virtually done either at Chaeronea or by not showing up for service before the battle.<sup>42</sup> While 'taking pity' on the polis (cf. § 17) might be read as either a commonly used metaphor ('states are people') or metonymy ('polis for its inhabitants'), which are not always easily distinguishable in conceptual terms (cf. §§ 93, 128; but see §§ 41–43, 60–62),<sup>43</sup> the rest of this revealing passage rests upon the 'citizenship is warfare' metaphor, in which citizens are soldiers bound to remain in a certain *order* (τάξις) in defence of their polis, with their public activities imagined on a civic battleground. It is by reversal of this duty that not living up to the prosecutor's political ideals makes the defendant a 'people-hater' (μισόδημος) and an 'anti-Athenian' (μισαθήναιος) (§ 39), that is an exemplary 'bad citizen', the anti-hero of Athenian polis, contrary to the city-loving prosecutor (§ 3: φιλόπολις).<sup>44</sup>

41 See n.34 above on *dēmos* as either 'the people' or 'democracy'.

42 See Christ (2006) 49, 94–95, 135–136 and Sullivan (2002a) 111.

43 See discussions on the problematic distinction between metonymy and metaphor in Lakoff (1980) 35–40, Panther and Thornburg (2007), and essays in Barcelona (2000). Nonetheless, the classical Greeks would almost always speak of, e.g., 'the Athenians' or 'the Lacedemonians', rather than 'Athens' or 'Sparta'.

44 Cf. Whitehead (2006) 146. On various types of citizens who did not fulfil their civic duties in Athens and their representation in Athenian political discourse, see Christ (2006).

Tellingly, the first surviving reference to the citizen's duty presented as standing in the battle-line order in civil war is Lysias' *dokimasia* speech *Against Philon* (Lys. 31.14, 28) written at the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries,<sup>45</sup> a fervent denunciation of the mode of life of a former supporter of the oligarchic regime of the Thirty.<sup>46</sup> Numerous similarities between the two speeches and court cases have long been observed, and there is little doubt now that Lysurgus had the Lysianic speech before his eyes when preparing his own, drawing from his 'prototype' extensively.<sup>47</sup> And although citizens soon after the rule of the Thirty were often informally accused of 'staying in the city' and thus showing support for the oligarchic regime, rather than departing from it (which is what the democrats had done), Philon's case was less typical. He was accused of leaving the city and not choosing either side in the conflict by preferring to 'live dishonourably' as a metic elsewhere (Lys. 31.8–19, 26, 27), an idea commonly presented as abominable in classical Athenian sources, even though in this case the stay abroad was limited to the brief time of the conflict.<sup>48</sup> In the context of the Thirty this amounted to the accusation of 'betraying' the democratic polis (expressed as not protecting its 'freedom').<sup>49</sup> Second, he was blamed by the speaker for not providing a proper burial to his mother (31.20–23), a significant accusation in a *dokimasia* (cf. n.46 above). Third, and even more crucial, Philon was accused of 'betraying the entire polis' through his actions (31.26, cf. § 9), while making profit abroad at the expense of his fellow citizens (31.17–19,

45 As rightly observed by Brock (2013) 162 with nn. 157 and 158. See Carey (1989) 179 and Todd (2000) 310 on the date, and Carey (1989) 179–204 for a commentary on the speech. The first reference is literal (the on-going fights between two sides of the conflict), but the second is metaphorical (there is a certain *order* in the polis that needs to be kept by citizen-soldiers, and failing to do so equals desertion and treason, cf. 31.26); see Carey (1989) 192 on the language of 'taking up a position' with further references.

46 On *dokimasia*, a public examination common in various Athenian institutions (in this case, of the to-be Council member), see [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 55.3, Feyel (2009) 160–171, *passim*, cf. MacDowell (1978) 167–169, Todd (2010), Gagliardi (2010); see a brief overview in Todd (1993) 285–289 on its role after the regime of the Thirty.

47 See Whitehead (2006), cf. Petrie (1922) 79, 87, Carey (1989) 183.

48 See Carey (1989) 186–187, Whitehead (2006) 139–140; cf. E. *Ion* 670–675 on exile as the lack of civic *parrhēsia*.

49 'Staying in the city', that is under the ruling oligarchic regime, was a popular informal accusation—that is one limited by the amnesty—against those who did not go to exile; see the wording of Lys. 18.19, 25.1, 2, 3, 5, 26.16 and Isoc. 18.42, 50, 7.68; note also the title of the fragmentary speech 50 (fr. 106–107 Carey), given by the manuscripts as ὑπὲρ Ἐρυξιμάχου μείναντος ἐν ἄστει (*For Eryximachus, who had remained in the city*). On the argument of Philon's 'betrayal', see an overview in Todd (2000) 308–309.

cf. *Leocr.* 21–27, 55–56, 88).<sup>50</sup> Fourth, he was said to have abandoned ancestral gods and thus to have no respect for oaths, sworn before them (31.31), and fifth, he also claimed that there had not existed a specific law which he could break by such actions (31.27–28). The Lysianic speech thus presented a model of criticism of ‘anti-civic’ behaviour, with its own set of conceptual metaphors used to illustrate political activities in a democracy.<sup>51</sup>

The use of the ‘citizenship is warfare’ metaphor, on which both speakers’ arguments rested, most probably points not only to the particularity of both cases but also a more general trait in the Athenians’ perception of their own citizenship and its relation to the state, which the professional speakers and speechwriters skilfully exploited. Within such conceptualizations, the *citizen* appears to be envisaged as one party to the common model of state organization, which we might be tempted to call an early form of social contract<sup>52</sup> but which the Greeks would usually describe in terms of reciprocity (cf. below with n.80), with the (personified) state acting as the other. According to this model, adult male citizens need to defend the state with their life, while the state likewise takes responsibility for protecting its citizens. To follow Lycurgus’ argument based on such presumptions, leaving one’s proper place (*taxis*) in the polis ought to be understood as endangering the entire civic body, just as leaving the *taxis* in a hoplite battle would endanger the rest of the soldiers, each covered by the shield of the man next in line and thus dependent upon a single person and group solidarity, including encouraging others to carry on fighting (note the speaker’s own explanations in § 77).

Such metaphors highlighted each person’s responsibility for the community, but downplayed the fact that one person’s act of leaving the city hardly amounted to endangering one’s neighbour or fellow citizen as it would in an actual battle. The phalanx imagery and group solidarity in the descriptions of the city’s wellbeing in fact dated back to Tyrtaeus’ poetry from the 7th century (e.g., 11.31–34W, 10W), which Lycurgus quotes extensively in the speech (§§ 106–107 = 10 W) and which promulgated the patriotic ethos of honour won in dying for the political community apparently very close to the prosecutor’s heart, praising the brave and condemning the deserters. And indeed, it was through extensive quotations from poetry as an already-coined reflection of the normative image of patriotism that Lycurgus’ claims about model civic

50 Cf. Whitehead (2006) 140.

51 Including being a good citizen and Council member presented as ‘*sharing* in the good and the bad that happens to one’s polis’ (31.5–7); cf. Filonik (2015) chapter 3.4.1.a on the rhetoric of freedom in this speech.

52 See Harris (2016) on the inapplicability of the social contract theory to classical Greece.

demeanour could reach their full end (cf. § 100), coupled with a set of skilful conceptual metaphors.<sup>53</sup> Such remarks, common in Greek literature and political discourse, were of course aimed to encourage future participation in warfare, but here the prosecutor takes it one step further by applying this model to a situation not related to an actual battle or fighting.

One could, of course, argue that in the near future Leocrates might have been required to take a military post, for example, during the expected siege of the city, yet this is not a point that the speaker puts forward. Instead, he focuses on the citizen's duty to *share everyone else's fate* as the citizen's proper civic 'post', or 'place in the battle line', and in doing so he employs a military metaphor quite common in oratory. And even though the '*dēmos* is an army' metaphor had its basis in the explicit ideology of 'citizen army',<sup>54</sup> in turning to such conceptions public speakers extended the idea of 'warfare' to the various aspects of city life important to Athenian citizens and useful to their own rhetorical argumentation. Perhaps in this particular case it was also meant to serve as a reference to the recent 'patriotic' reform of the ephobic training by Epicrates, which was at the very least supported by Lycurgus.<sup>55</sup> The latter was also involved in a number of similar enterprises, including both the proposed and finalized changes in Athenian religion, architecture, statues, finances, laws, inscriptions, and archives.<sup>56</sup> In fact, Lycurgus' conception of civic duties and treason seems to be tightly linked to the recently rephrased ephobic oath in the coining of which he probably participated and which he quoted later in the speech (see below). Young Athenian trainees swore in it, among other things, to defend the sacred rites and the boundaries of their polis, and hand it down to posterity greater—all of which the defendant failed to fulfil according to the charge, by allegedly 'giving the land to the enemy' (and thus 'lessening' it) and leaving the sacred precincts 'abandoned'.<sup>57</sup>

53 See Hanink (2014) 25–59, Allen (2000) 25–26.

54 Quite far indeed from the actual military practice which shows the involvement of many non-citizens in warfare; see Wees, van (2004) 45–46, 71–76, 211–212, 241–243.

55 See Faraguna (2011) 69 briefly on the likely role of both, cf. Sullivan (2002) 152–153. On the ephobic training, ideology, and oath in more detail, see RO 88 § ii, Friend (2009), and Steinbock (2011). On the variety of 'civic oaths' in ancient Greece, see Hansen (2015) 32–53.

56 On the reforms of the so-called 'Lycurgan period', see, in particular, Mitchel (1970), Humphreys (1985), Engels (2008) 13–28, Faraguna (2011), Lambert (2010) and (2011), Taddei (2012) 35–62, and Hanink (2014). See also the decree honouring Lycurgus, *IG* 11<sup>2</sup> 457 + 3207, cf. [Plu.] *x orat.* 851f–852e.

57 The oath itself is not preserved in our manuscripts, but its content is known from else-

Military metaphors in oratory could sometimes extend to subjects other than just the defendant and be used either to describe the struggle of the speaker trying to persuade his audience (thus fulfilling his civic duty, cf. n.39 above), or to present other citizens' role in the polis as a battle against various adversities. This includes presenting before the dikasts their proper role as *guardians* of civic ethos and political order, based on the 'litigation is war' metaphor. Lycurgus, for his part, solemnly instructs the judges:

... ἀξιοῦτε οὖν τοὺς μάρτυρας ἀναβαίνειν καὶ μὴ ὀκνεῖν, μηδὲ περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι τὰς χάριτας ὑμῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλ' ἀποδιδόναι τῇ πατρίδι τὰ ληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, καὶ μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, μηδὲ μιμείσθαι Λεωκράτην, ἢ λαβόντας τὰ ἱερά κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἐξομόσασθαι.

Insist therefore that these witnesses come forward and that they do not hold back; demand that they do not place personal favours ahead of their respect for you and the city but **that they either repay their country with truth and justice and that they do not desert their post** in imitation of Leocrates or perform the rites and refuse on oath to testify in accordance with the law.

§ 20, tr. slightly modified

In this call to fulfil everyone's obligation, the speaker introduces the dikasts' task as being *guardians* of the civic order (cf. below with n.98) and the witnesses' role as *battle*, by urging the former to make sure that the latter stay in the battle-line formation, rather than desert it (μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν ταύτην), as Leocrates had done, thus turning traitor. In keeping with this military-civic order, the citizen-witnesses ought to pay back their country (ἀποδιδόναι τῇ πατρίδι) for their citizenship with truthful and just witnessing. The speaker's point rests upon the 'citizenship is a debt' metaphor (see below) with respect to the witnesses (in which 'moral standards are possessions', or 'a currency'), while Leocrates' case is brought again to attention to emphasize that 'citizenship is (hoplite) warfare', which leads to the conclusion that 'witnessing is warfare', too. Athenian citizenship is presented here as a beneficial gift and part of a loan (that is a contractual agreement) that needs to be eventually repaid, not

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where, including a fourth-century stele from the deme Acharnae (cf. n.37 above). On the idea of 'giving' the land to the enemy, its relation to the oath, and hoplite ethos, see Steinbock (2011) 296–297, 306–307, cf. Hesk (2000) 100–101. See above on Lys. 31.31 and the religious dimension of citizenship stemming from the breach of the oath.

least by activities in the various political institutions of the city. This conceptualization of citizenship within the bonds of institutionalized reciprocity is reiterated on various occasions in Athenian oratory, as will soon become clear on the basis of other examples.

#### 4 CITIZENSHIP IS SHARING

Citizenship in Athenian sources is commonly referred to metaphorically as ‘having a share in the polis’ or in the polis’s affairs (μετ-έχειν [τῶν] τῆς πόλεως, cf. n.64 below),<sup>58</sup> a conception and phrasing not specific to Athens,<sup>59</sup> but one quite distinct from the modern idea of ‘citizen rights’,<sup>60</sup> and perhaps closer—yet not equal—to ‘participation’ but instead phrased through the idea of ownership (cf. n.64 below). This metaphorical expression rests upon the concept that ‘polis is a possession’, while ‘citizenship is owning a share’, which—in turn—implies that ‘citizens are shareholders’, or ‘part-owners’. This conceptualization of Athenian citizenship usually involves participating in certain social (religious) and political activities and privileges. It thus rests on the ‘actions are objects (or: possessions)’ metaphor, since all of them are part of the conceived ‘share’. It is well demonstrated by a passage from one of the final sections of the speech:

καὶ γὰρ δεινὸν καὶ σθένιον, ὅταν νομίζῃ δεῖν Λεωκράτης ἴσον ἔχειν ὁ φυγῶν ἐν τῇ τῶν μεινάντων πόλει, καὶ ὁ μὴ κινδυνεύσας ἐν τῇ τῶν παραταξαμένων, καὶ ὁ μὴ διαφυλάξας ἐν τῇ τῶν σωσάντων, ἀλλ’ ἦκη ἱερῶν θυσῶν ἀγορὰς νόμων πολιτείας μεθέξω, ὑπὲρ ὧν τοῦ μὴ καταλυθῆναι χίλιοι τῶν ὑμετέρων πολιτῶν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ ἐτελεύτησαν καὶ δημοσίᾳ αὐτοῦς ἢ πόλις ἔθαψαν ...

It would be a terrible shock if Leocrates, who fled, did not face danger, and failed to protect the city, **thinks he should have an equal share in the city of those who remained, stayed at their posts, and saved the city. But he comes to share the temples, sacrifices, market, laws, and privileges**

58 See, for example, [D.] 59.28, III, D. 24.202, [26].2, 57.51, Aes. 1.160, [Lys.] 4.48; cf. [D.] 25.26, [59].104; X. *Eq.* 2.1, Arist. *Pol.* III 9, 1280a.26–27, V 12, 1316b.2, VII 9, 1329a.20, [*Ath. Pol.*] 8.5, 26.3, 42.1 (τῆς πολιτείας); see also Lyc. 1.5, 127, 134; cf. Antiph. 6.4. On ‘sharing in the *hiera* and *hosia*’, see Blok (2013) 163–164.

59 See Gawantka (1975) 22–29 on the non-Athenian use of this concept; cf. Brock (2015).

60 On the idea of citizenship as ‘sharing in the city’, as opposed to modern ‘possession of rights’, see Ostwald (1996) = (2009) 7–21.

**of citizenship**, for which 1,000 of your citizens died at Chaeronea so that they may not be destroyed, men whom the city buried at public expense.

§142, tr. modified

Here, the metaphorical ‘share’ (ἴσον ἔχειν, μεθέξων) in the ‘city of those who stayed and saved it’—apparently, by the simple act of not leaving, since there was no further fighting—includes both the spheres of activity not exclusive to citizens, such as religion and law,<sup>61</sup> and the actual privilege of participating in citizenship (πολιτεία).<sup>62</sup> The latter commonly included being able to take part in certain political activities, such as meeting at the Assembly, holding magistracies, and serving as a dikast, as well as the prerogative to own land in Athens (by purchase or inheritance) and to enter into formal marriage (by ἐγγύη) with an Athenian. And in fact, metics and foreigners were excluded from this very tangible ‘share’ in the polis, since they were not registered in the demes and thus could not own land in Attica without special permission.<sup>63</sup> Nonetheless, Lysurgus and other classical authors use the phrasing of ‘sharing’ metaphorically, especially with reference to participating in the ‘affairs of the polis’.<sup>64</sup> Perhaps the best summary of various forms of ‘having a share’ in the city can be seen by looking at what was taken away from a citizen who became

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- 61 The role of the *agora* on this list is less straightforward, since citizens were somewhat more entitled than metics and foreigners to the ‘market as a trading place’ (cf. D. 57.31), but the latter also ‘had their share’ in it. Cf. Vlassopoulos (2007) on the spaces in Athens where people of different political statuses could meet (however, the outcome and regulation of such meetings is a separate question).
- 62 The abstract notion of *politeia* in this sense refers in the classical sources primarily to citizenship as a status either granted or claimed (‘the privilege of citizenship’), cf. LSJ s.v. (1.1), but in general the term was used since the late fifth century primarily in reference to the character of the polity, cf. Blok (2013) 163.
- 63 Cf. Patterson (2000) 98 on metics’ political exclusion; but see Wijma (2014) on their inclusion in Athenian cults. See MacDowell (1978) 76–79, Harrison (1968) 189–199, and Todd (1993) 194–199 on their economic privileges and duties, and legal status more generally.
- 64 The fine but important distinction seems to be one between the original content of both phrases. While ‘sharing in the polis’ can either have the literal, more tangible—and perhaps primary—meaning of having a share in the state conceptualized as the *land*, which can be ‘owned’ and ‘divided’ as an object (a separate conceptual metaphor, but on a different level), it can also mean ‘sharing in the state’ as an abstraction, with all the privileges of being its citizen just mentioned. The phrase ‘sharing in the polis’s matters’, on the other hand, seems to be unambiguously metaphorical, and refers to the activities of the citizen in the polis as if such activities were objects that could be divided and shared between those participating in them, and was perhaps coined on the basis of the former concept (cf. D. 15.32: μηδενὸς τῶν κοινῶν μετέχειν).



disenfranchised (ἄτιμος), that is the ability to appear not only in courts and in the Assembly, but also in the market *and* the temples,<sup>65</sup> both of which even metics could normally participate in to a certain degree.

What seems particularly curious about the quoted passage is that in stressing that ‘citizenship is guardianship’, which includes looking after (διαφυλάττειν) the polis and taking risks for it (κινδυνεύειν), the speaker employs the language of *stasis*, or civil war.<sup>66</sup> When he calls Leocrates ‘the exile’ (ὁ φυγών), while the citizens in the city ‘those who stayed’ (μείναντες), he seems to be pointing to two separate groups of citizens and two different modes of civic demeanour. Although the roles of those who stayed and those who left had been different then, such oppositions were a mark of the political language after the democratic restoration of 403, and are found, for example, in the surviving speeches by Lysias written not long after these events (see, e.g., Lys. 18.19 of ca. 396; cf. above on Lys. 31). Their sudden reappearance in the 330s manifests itself as Lycurgus’ conscious summoning back of the dividing lines from that era, suggesting that the defendant sided in the metaphorical ‘civil war’ with those who chose not to protect the city, as opposed to those who died at Chaeronea, worthy of having a share in the city.

The metaphors of ‘sharing’ or ‘having a share’ in the polis could be formulated in either technical or more general terms. For example, when commemorating the legendary kings of Athens, the prosecutor reminds everyone that because they gave their lives for the benefit of their polis,

... μονώτατοι ἐπώνυμοι τῆς χώρας εἰσίν, ἰσοθέων τιμῶν τετυχηκότες, εἰκότως ὑπὲρ ἧς γὰρ οὕτω σφόδρα ἐσπούδαζον, δικαίως ταύτης καὶ τεθνεώτες ἐκληρονόμου. ἀλλὰ Λεωκράτης οὔτε ζῶν οὔτε τεθνεῶς δικαίως ἂν αὐτῆς μετᾶσχοι, μονώτατος (δ’) ἂν προσηκόντως ἐξορισθεῖη τῆς χώρας, ἦν ἐγκαταλιπὼν τοῖς πολεμίοις ᾤχετο· οὐδὲ γὰρ καλὸν τὴν αὐτὴν καλύπτειν τοὺς τῇ ἀρετῇ διαφέροντας καὶ τὸν κάκιστον πάντων ἀνθρώπων.

... they alone have given their names to our country and have received divine honours—and rightly so. **Even in death they justly inherited a share of the country** to which they were so firmly devoted. But Leocrates **should have no share of our country either in life or in death** according to justice. He alone would rightly be cast out of the country that he

65 Cf. Todd (1993) 142–143, 182–184. On *atimia* in Athens, see Hansen (1976) 55–90 and Kamen (2013) chapter 7.

66 I would like to thank Lene Rubinstein for bringing this to my attention.

betrayed to the enemy. For it is not right that the same land should cover men who excelled in bravery and the greatest coward of all mankind.

§§ 88–89, tr. modified

Since these mythical heroes were the ones after whom the Athenian tribes, that is the primary division units of the polis, received their names, they now, even after death, still have their share in the *land*. In fact, Lycurgus uses here a term (*κληρονομεῖν*) which points to the technical language of inheritance,<sup>67</sup> as if the dead kings not only continued to possess a share of the land to which they had left their names, but had actually *inherited* it as their possession because of their display of care for the city. He also reemphasizes the importance of the land to the Athenian civic body in the same breath when he states that the same soil should not cover its best and worse men. An apparently conscious paradox on the part of the prosecutor derives from the fact that normally the dead would be the ones leaving the inheritance, rather than inheriting anything themselves. Thus, within the boundaries of this metaphor, the dead ancestors are given—by reversal—the role of living citizens, and they do so by contributing to the polis's prosperity.<sup>68</sup>

All these metaphors link back to the conceptualization of citizenship as 'sharing' or 'owning a share',<sup>69</sup> since Leocrates—by failing to be a good citizen and take care of his polis—does not merit *having a share* in the city either in life or in death, equally deservedly being deprived of it as the kings were exceptional (*μονώτατος—μονώτατοι*) in proving to be worthy of theirs. Apparently it was the prevalence of the metaphorical conceptualization of citizenship as 'having a share in the polis' in Athenian political parlance that cleared the way for the professional speakers to construct new meaning by playing on the concepts of 'sharing' and 'partaking' in the way Lycurgus does.

67 There are actually three levels of conceptualization behind the term itself: (1) the act of allotting (*κληροδοῦν*), (2) the 'allotted' part, or piece of land in general (*κληῖρος*), and (3) inheritance as an abstraction of the process of receiving this *κληῖρος*. On eponymous heroes, see Steinbock (2011) 289–294, *passim*.

68 On Lycurgus' use of myth and poetry in appeals to Athenian civic identity, see Engels (2014) and Hanink (2014) 25–59; cf. Parker (1996) 242–255. On Athenian inheritance law, see Griffith-Williams (2013) 3–23. Incidentally, it was the heir that would normally undertake the duty to perform religious rituals for the dead relative in Athens, cf. Parker (2005) 22–31 and n.26 above.

69 Cf. Petrie (1922) 159 ad loc.

## 5 CITIZENSHIP IS PROTECTING

When reiterating that the polis is something which should be given special care, the orator moreover points to those who are or should be responsible for ensuring that such an obligation is being carried out. At the beginning of his speech, he explains:

τρία γάρ ἐστι τὰ μέγιστα, ἃ διαφυλάττει καὶ διασώζει τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἢ τῶν νόμων τάξις, δεύτερον δ' ἢ τῶν δικαστῶν ψῆφος, τρίτον δ' ἢ τούτοις ἀδικήματα παραδιδούσα κρίσις.

Three things are most **responsible for guarding and protecting the democracy and the city's prosperity**: first, the system of laws; second, the vote of the judges; and third, the trial, which brings crimes under their control.

§§3–4

The order of the laws, the dikasts' ballot (that is each dikast's ability to vote), and the court proceedings themselves thus safeguard the Athenian democracy and the city's overall wellbeing. Within the common set of metaphors: 'political system is a person', 'polis is a person', 'laws are agents', and 'actions are people' (adorned by a topical 'stone for vote' metonymy), there remains an underlying concept that the city with its political institutions deserves protection equal to that received by human beings, for which someone ought to be held responsible. Lysurgus soon suggests that by failing to save the Acropolis with its gods Zeus and Athena the Saviours, the defendant—who had 'abandoned' them—himself should not be saved by his polis, equated with its patron gods through their statues (§17).<sup>70</sup> Later in the prosecution, he once more instructs the judges:

... καὶ τοῦθ' ὑμᾶς δεῖ μαθεῖν, ὅτι τὸ συνέχον τὴν δημοκρατίαν ὄρκος ἐστί. τρία γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκεν, ὁ ἄρχων, ὁ δικαστής, ὁ ἰδιώτης. τούτων τοῖσιν ἕκαστος ταύτην πίστιν δίδωσιν, εἰκότως ...

... you must realize that **what preserves our democracy is the oath**. There are three elements of the constitution: the magistrate, the judge, and the private citizen. Each of these gives this oath as a pledge and rightly so.

§79, tr. slightly modified

70 See Lambert (2010) 229.

To render the speaker's words literally, 'what *holds* the democracy *together*' (τὸ συνέχον τὴν δημοκρατίαν) is the oath. This curious expression reveals an assumption that the 'oath is a binding material' (or force) that keeps the polity from dissolving (cf. §§ 77–78). The speaker thus conceptualizes the constitution as a set of dispersed elements, held together by an external power. He does not miss the opportunity to name these elements, which—somewhat curiously in the military context—all derive from the judicial (that is political) institutions of the city (cf. And. 1.9, D. 24.2), with the private citizen acting as a volunteer prosecutor *in spe*.<sup>71</sup> In his typology of civic roles, Lycurgus enumerates only three possibilities for his audience to endorse (as he does with naming just three safeguards of the constitution), in a mode favoured by the orators, as if these three were indeed the only options available to Athenian citizens, rather than simply fitted the speaker's rhetorical ends at the time.

This statement also helped to underline the importance of another oath with religious significance, that which all young citizens undergoing a military training were expected to swear as ephebes, to which the speaker repeatedly alludes throughout his prosecution (see below). The use of such metaphorical concepts in addressing Athenian audiences was meant to draw attention only to specific aspects of civic activities and present them as every good citizen's duty and indeed the only choice available to him. The theme of such duties comes back in various forms in the prosecution's line of argument, including the speaker's explicit remarks on the nature of such relations in reference to other cities destroyed in the past (cf. §§ 41–43, 60–62, 149):<sup>72</sup>

Ἴσως οὖν τῶν συνηγῶρων αὐτῷ τολμήσει τις εἰπεῖν, μικρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα ποιῶν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἂν παρ' ἑνα ἀνθρωπων ἐγένετο τούτων ... ἡγοῦμαι δ' ἔγωγε ὦ ἄνδρες τοῦναντίον τούτοις, παρὰ τοῦτον εἶναι τῇ πόλει τὴν σωτηρίαν. ἢ γὰρ πόλις οἰκεῖται κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐκάστου μοῖραν φυλαττομένη· ὅταν οὖν ταύτην ἐφ' ἑνός τις παρίδῃ, λήληθεν ἑαυτὸν ἐφ' ἀπάντων τοῦτο πεποιηκώς.

Perhaps one of his supporters will dare to minimize his crime and say that one man could not be responsible for these disasters ... My opinion, gentlemen, is very different from theirs: the city's safety was this man's responsibility. **Every individual has his own personal share in managing**

71 On the role of volunteers in the Athenian legal system, see Rubinstein (1998) and (2000) 186–198; cf. Rubinstein (2003) on other *poleis*. See also Christ (2012) 84–87 on Leocrates' justification of volunteer prosecution.

72 See also Hyp. *Ath.* 29, *Phil.* 7 on the metaphor of 'condemning the city to death'.

**and protecting the city**, and when someone neglects his duty in one way, he may not realize it, but he neglected it in all ways.

§§ 63–64

Since the affairs of the polis were Leocrates'—as much as every other citizen's—business ('depending on him', lit. 'with him', or 'at his side': *παρὰ τοῦτον*), and since he disregarded it (cf. *ἔταν τις παρίδη*), he would have been personally culpable had anything bad happened to his native polis. The reasoning here is again based on the concept that 'citizenship is responsibility'; and because the 'preservation' (*σωτηρία*) of the city was at stake, it is expressed through the '*poleis* are people' metaphor (cf. §§ 6, 41–43, 60–62, 149). The speaker's argument also expounds the idea that 'citizenship is sharing' by more literal means, since according to the orator, everyone has their own *portion* of the state (*μοῖρα*) to care for at all times (cf. *ταύτην ἐφ' ἑνός* 'that which is in each person's authority'), once more pointing to each and every individual's role in the communal caring for the state.

## 6 CITIZENSHIP IS A PRIZE (FOR MERIT)

Just before his inventive description of the role of the oath in the Athenian state, the prosecutor pays tribute to the lost glory of Athens of yesterday (§§ 68–74, 82), followed by ardent poetic praise of its old ways:

... ἐγκώμιον γὰρ νῆ τὴν Ἀθηναίων εἰσι τῆς πόλεως οἱ παλαιοὶ νόμοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ταῦτα κατασκευασάντων. οἷς ἂν προσέχητε, τὰ δίκαια ποιήσετε, καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις σεμνοὶ καὶ ἄξιοι τῆς πόλεως δόξετ' εἶναι.

By Athena, **the ancient laws and values** of the men who originally established them **are a eulogy of the city**. If you pay attention to them, you will act justly and gain a common reputation for being righteous and worthy of the city.

§ 75, tr. slightly modified

The laws and customs of old, Lycurgus urges, are the city's ornament, or—more specifically—an *enkōmion*, a laudatory ode customarily written for victors in sport and war, or a panegyric for a commended person in general. This, again, rests upon the concept that '*poleis* are people' (competing for a eulogy; cf. § 83), but also introduces the 'litigation is a sporting competition' metaphor; and in competing for the prize, citizen–dikasts may gain a good reputation by showing

obedience towards the laws. There are thus two levels of sporting competition happening simultaneously: one already won by Athens *in toto* (cf. § 83), and another in which each and every citizen can win his civic reward, proving to be worthy of the city by giving a just verdict in accordance with the customary rules of conduct (cf. § 50).<sup>73</sup> Athenian citizenship, that is being deserving of playing a vital role in such a splendid city, thus becomes a *reward* for proper behaviour in an everlasting *agōn* (cf. on § 88–89 above), and cannot be simply taken for granted.

## 7 CITIZENS ARE CHILDREN

Furthermore, at one point in the speech, Lycurgus refers to another of his public prosecutions and compares it to the present case by claiming:

... Αὐτολύκου γε ὑμεῖς κατεψηφίσασθε, μείναντος μὲν αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, ἔχοντος δ' αἰτίαν τοὺς υἱεῖς καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα ὑπεκθέσθαι, καὶ ἐτιμωρήσασθε. καίτοι εἰ τὸν τοὺς ἀχρήστους εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὑπεκθέσθαι αἰτίαν ἔχοντα ἐτιμωρήσασθε, τί δεῖ πάσχειν ὅστις ἀνὴρ ὦν οὐκ ἀπέδωκε τὰ τροφεῖα τῇ πατρίδι;

... you yourselves condemned Autolykus for sending his sons and wife abroad, even though he himself remained here to face danger.<sup>74</sup> If you condemned a man who was guilty only of sending abroad people who were unfit for military service, what punishment must be suffered by someone who, despite being a man, **did not repay his fatherland for raising him?**

§ 53, tr. slightly modified

The speaker presents here an *a fortiori* argument, common in Athenian forensic oratory, when he points to a smaller offence which resulted in sentencing the wrongdoer and concludes that a more serious crime—incidentally, also prosecuted by him—deserves nothing less (cf., e.g., [Lys.] 6.17, [D.] 59.116–117, Aes. 3.252). What is more peculiar here, however, is that—by saying that the defendant failed to *pay back* his fatherland *for nurture*—he suggests that ‘fatherland is a nurturing parent’ (cf. Pl. *Cri.* 51c–e, 50d), providing maintenance

73 Cf. § 100 with Hanink (2014) 40–53 on the language of praise in Lycurgus’ remarks on Euripides.

74 On Autolykus, see Wissowa (1896) 2602, s.v. Autolykos (5), and Sullivan (2002a) 130–132 on his trial.

(τὰ τροφεία) to his children, that is all Athenian citizens (cf. [Lys.] 6.49).<sup>75</sup> And what is particularly curious in this phrasing is that the τροφή ('sustenance') was also the term describing the ephebes' pay in Athens ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.3), while according to a later account Athenian ephebes swore to fight to death for their 'nurturer', as Leocrates too calls the 'fatherland' (§§ 21, 47, 85).<sup>76</sup>

In fact, the entire speech plays upon the idea of father-country, in attempt to merge the 'fatherland' (πατρίς), 'father' (πατήρ), and 'ancestral' (or 'patrimonial', πάτριος, πατρῶος) customs, objects, and rites into one blended conceptual space with all these elements dependent one upon another (e.g., §§ 2, 25–27, 48, 95–97, 101–103, 127).<sup>77</sup> Lycurgus thus likens leaving such a personified polis to abandoning one's parents in old age, as if Leocrates actually neglected his responsibility to take care of his elderly parents (cf. § 144), and *ill-treatment of one's parents* (κάκωσις τῶν γονέων) could be prosecuted in Athenian law by *εἰσαγγελία*, a variant of the procedure under which the current trial was being held.<sup>78</sup> By doing so, the prosecutor aimed to imply that Leocrates' departure constituted yet another crime in Athens (cf. §§ 56, 120–121 et al.), and should thus be punished equally severely, following a straightforward tit-for-tat penal paradigm and a corresponding reinterpretation of the Athenian legal system (cf. §§ 8–9, 65–66, 71, 78, 91, 110, 122–123, 134, 150). His posited code of conduct rested upon a harsher model of social interaction than the one usually advocated by the speakers in Athenian courts,<sup>79</sup> and one more suitable to the Spartan constitution, which he openly praises (§§ 128–129, cf. § 106).

75 For this notion, along with the Mother Earth metaphor, see A. *Sept.* 14–20 with Parker (1996) 252–253; cf. Christ (2012) 71.

76 Σ 537a Dils ad D. 19.303: ... ὤμνον ὑπερμαχεῖν ἄχρι θανάτου τῆς θρεψαμένης (used intermitently in active and passive voice in Lycurgus); cf. Steinbock (2011) 297. For the metaphor, see also Lys. 2.70, [Lys.] 6.49, cf. Petrie 1922 (119).

77 On 'conceptual blending', a concurrent and insightful theory in cognitive linguistics that I deliberately leave out of this paper in order to focus on metaphors, see Fauconnier and Turner (2002) and Kövecses (2010) 267–283.

78 Or, in fact, two different procedures of the same name. Cf. n.11 above and Petrie (1922) 119. On *eisangelia* (or *graphē*) *kakōseōs goneōn*, see Rhodes (1981) 629, cf. MacDowell (1978) 92, Hansen (1976) 72 with n. 7; see also Rubinstein (1993) 64–68 on *gērotrophia*; cf. Millett (1991) 129–135 on 'family solidarity'. See also Loomis (2003) 293, 296 on 'mother-beater' and 'father-beater' as insults as grave as 'murderer' or 'shield-thrower' (deserter) in Athens.

79 Cf. Azoulay (2011) 206. I believe arguments such as this are more crucial for understanding Lycurgus' view of the goals of punishing (here: treason punished with an ignoble death) than a linguistic approach to his use of terms such as *καλάζειν*, advocated by Allen (2000). See also Rubinstein (2000) 212–215 on such rhetoric and the dikasts' actual options in Athenian courts, and Herman (1998) on the 'tit for tat' strategy in game theory and the popular discourse of forgiveness in Athens.

## 8 CITIZENSHIP IS A DEBT, CITIZENSHIP IS A DUTY

Drawing further on the rule of reciprocity,<sup>80</sup> Lycurgus emphasizes that Leocrates *did not pay his due* (οὐκ ἀπέδωκε) to his polis as its citizen (§ 53, cited above). This expression hinges on the idea that ‘citizenship is a debt’ which needs to be *repaid* by means of military service or, more generally, standing in defence of the city (cf., e.g., §§ 132–133, 140: as if it was a person calling for help).<sup>81</sup> And since the fatherland is a nurturing *parent* (a *father*, if one follows πατρὶς literally),<sup>82</sup> such an argument implies that the ‘polis (as a city–state) is a household and (as a society) a family’.<sup>83</sup> This is quite a common metaphor in the extant literary sources, which often draw direct parallels between the larger, communal world of the polis and that of the individual *oikos* (‘household’).<sup>84</sup>

The ‘citizenship is a debt’ metaphor is further reiterated throughout the speech; by the end of it, the prosecutor makes an attempt to discourage his fellow citizens from feeling mercy for Leocrates and—in advocating capital punishment—approaches them with a series of rhetorical questions:

καὶ δεήσεται καὶ ἱκετεύσει ἐλεῆσαι αὐτόν· τίνων; οὐχ οἷς τὸν αὐτὸν ἔρανον εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν εἰσενεργεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησε;

He will plead and beg for pity. Whom is he asking? Surely not those with whom **he did not have the courage to contribute to this very loan for our defence?**

§ 143, tr. modified

The speaker’s statement—again—rests upon the well-grounded metaphor of civic obligation to contribute to the polis, but this time its wording is more

80 On reciprocity in Greek culture, see essays in Gill et al. (1998), and Christ (2012) 90–93 on Athenian ideology of reciprocity; cf. Christ (2006) 26 with n. 31 and Liddel (2007) 139–143, *passim* on Athens. Cf. Ober (2008) 183–186 on the concept of reciprocity in Lyc. 1.

81 Cf. Christ (2012) 26, 70–72 on civic and military obligations phrased as ‘helping the polis’ within the bonds of reciprocity; see also an apt observation on p. 98 on βοηθεῖν as a term evoking, etymologically, a cry for help meant to attract the attention of the bystanders.

82 See Strauss (1993) 21–60, Nielsen (2004), Cuchet (2006) 10–21, 166–173, 294–297, Christ (2006) 26, and Liddel (2007) 139–143 on the πατρὶς terminology as a reflection of the father–son relationship; cf. n.36 above on Lycurgus’ extensive use of the term.

83 See Hansen (1998) 17–34 on different shades of meaning of the term polis in classical Greek; cf. Harris (2013) 21–59 on Athens as a ‘state’ proper.

84 See Brock (2013) 25–42, cf. Harris (2006) 76 with n. 89.



technical.<sup>85</sup> Lycurgus follows the topical phrasing by contrasting Leocrates' actions with the stance of those who 'gave their due' in battle. He expounds on the idea of shared participation by saying that being an Athenian citizen is a particular kind of contribution towards a *loan* within a small group of friends (ἔρανος), which was taken by each member for the sake of the city's 'salvation' (εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν) as its immediate goal, with each contribution brought to the common pot. As he will soon argue more forcefully (§ 147), failure to act should thus be treated equally severely as a negative act, for which the defendant ought to be punished and sentenced to death.

By invoking the concept of a *duty to contribute* (by either 'repaying one's due', § 53, cf. §§ 20, 46, or 'contributing to the common good', § 143, cf. §§ 43, 132–133, 139–140), the orator suggests to the dikasts that Leocrates did not repay his civic debts arising from the bonds of reciprocity, a misdeed that turns him into a peculiar kind of *civic debtor*: even stronger an allegation in the face of the earlier accusation against him regarding the city's finances (§ 19), and particularly forceful when coming from a politician personally responsible for the latter. Yet what seems crucial in this metaphor of *owing* the state is that being an actual *state debtor* was not only another crime punishable by Athenian law, but also one which would disenfranchise a citizen from the political community and the privileges it entailed,<sup>86</sup> thus making him not a *citizen* proper (as Lycurgus himself probably argued in a case brought together with Demosthenes against a state debtor Aristogeiton, which they won).<sup>87</sup> The same holds true for other offences alluded to by the speaker, such as mistreating one's parents and desertion.<sup>88</sup> This aspect of his rhetorical appeals makes such claims a much more powerful statement than simply saying that Leocrates failed to become an exemplary citizen. As an *atimos*, he would also be excluded from entering the sacred precincts of all Athenians (see above, with n.65)—a religious dimension of 'having a share in the city' on which Lycurgus himself expounds when recalling divine supervision over civic duties:

85 See Millett (1991) 154–155 on the topical nature of the *eranos* metaphor, and Liddel (2007) 141–143 on its connotations; see, for example, [D.] 25.21–22 and n.97 below; cf. Christ (2006) 29–30 and (2012) 71–72 on its use for describing the citizens' 'loan', in turn, *given* to the city (by the fulfilment of public or military service). On *eranos* as (1) a friendly lending group in Athens and (2) a type of loan in such a group, see Arnaoutoglou (2003) 70–87 and Harris (2006) 333–354.

86 On *atimia* imposed on state debtors in Athens, see Harrison (1971) 82–83, 172–176, Hansen (1976) 55–90, and MacDowell (1978) 74–75, 164–167.

87 See [D.] 25.21–22. See also n.85 above on the *eranos* metaphor.

88 Cf. Hansen (1976) 72–74.

ὑμῖν γὰρ ἔστιν ὄρκος, ὃν ὁμνύουσι πάντες οἱ πολῖται, ἐπειδὴν εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον ἐγγραφῶσιν καὶ ἔφηβοι γένωνται, μήτε τὰ ἱερά ὄπλα καταισχυνεῖν μήτε τὴν τάξιν λείψειν, ἀμυνεῖν δὲ τῇ πατρίδι καὶ ἀμείνω παραδώσειν. ὃν εἰ μὲν ὁμώμοκε Λεωκράτης, φανερώς ἐπιώρκηκεν, καὶ οὐ μόνον ὑμᾶς ἠδίκηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἠσέβηκεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμώμοκεν, εὐθύς δηλὸς ἐστὶ παρασκευασάμενος (ὥς) οὐδὲν ποιήσων τῶν δεόντων, ἀνθ' ὧν δικαίως ἂν αὐτὸν καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν θεῶν τιμωρήσαισθε.

You have an oath that all the citizens swear when they are enrolled on the list of citizens and become ephebes: not to dishonour their sacred arms, not to abandon their post, to defend their fatherland and hand it down greater. If Leocrates swore this oath, he has clearly perjured himself and has not only wronged you but also has committed impiety against the divinity. If he did not swear it, he was clearly not prepared to perform any of his duties. For this you would be justified in taking revenge both for your own sake and for the gods.

§ 76, tr. slightly modified

This is a revealing passage, for Lycurgus draws attention to the religious aspect of citizenship by saying that *all citizens* during their military training swear the ephebic oath that Leocrates allegedly broke by leaving the city (since his departure was equal to ‘abandoning the battle line’, a concept introduced earlier that now starts to build up).<sup>89</sup> And because the oath is sworn before the gods (cf. § 79, quoted above, and § 82), the defendant—by not staying in Athens—in Lycurgus’ view committed impiety (ἀσέβεια, cf. §§ 94, 129, 147; § 77: ἀνοσιώτερος), that is another serious crime prosecuted under Athenian law.<sup>90</sup>

In such instances, the prosecutor plays upon the concept of ‘citizenship as a religious duty’, as indeed he exploits religious rhetoric throughout his speech (see, e.g., §§ 26, 59, 79, 97, 129). He does so equally vigorously by invoking the gods in a prayer at the very beginning (§ 1) and by threatening the dikasts with the gods’ wrath if they give an ‘impious’ verdict at the end of his speech (§§ 146–148, cf. § 91–94).<sup>91</sup> In resorting to such arguments, not only did he exploit Athenian religious identity as a prosecutor, but also made use of his

89 Cf. n.55 above on oaths.

90 On the charge of—and trials for—impiety in Athens and possible penalties, see Filonik (2013); cf. Martin (2009) 158. Lycurgus also refers to an unknown law ‘concerning piety’, (recently?) introduced by the people (§ 146).

91 Cf. Martin (2009) 152–165 on Lycurgus’ use of religious argumentation.

religious authority as a member of a renowned priestly clan and a magistrate responsible for recent changes in the financing of ceremonies and cults that were meant to emphasise both the role of religion in the polis and individual citizens' contribution to it.<sup>92</sup> Furthermore, the to-be ephebes, in addition to the gods, called also the frontiers of the fatherland and the fruit of the land as witnesses to their oath (RO 88.16–20), all seen as living beings that could watch their behaviour and give testimony if necessary. Referring to the oath was thus particularly useful for the prosecutor in presenting Leocrates' leaving the very borders of the land as betraying his country, through rhetorical 'tailoring' of the meaning of the commonly recognized concepts or indeed changing their sense.

## 9 The Rhetoric of Civic Identity

In employing such rhetorical measures, Lycurgus attempted to redefine the boundaries of treason on various planes, and with reference to different posited civic duties, based on conceptual metaphors of citizenship in Athens which highlighted some of its aspects while downplaying others. The pinnacle of this 'civic' rhetoric can be found in the summary part of the speech, where the litany of accusations is further extended; the line of argument there unveils the speaker's attempt to present Leocrates as a model anti-hero of Athenian democracy and link his case to the breach of every single rule which a citizen in Athens should care about; at the same time, the speaker promotes himself as a guardian of all such principles and represents the dikasts as arbiters of the civic demeanour of the litigants, themselves put on trial along with the accused:

In my opinion, gentlemen, you are casting one vote today to punish all the greatest and most terrible crimes, for you can see Leocrates is guilty of every one of them: treason because he left the city and put it

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92 See Parker (1996) 242–255 (p. 251: 'He made use, it seems, of his unique prestige with the jurors in order to turn the courtroom speech into a textbook in civic virtue'); cf. Azoulay (2011) 210: 'L'orateur donnait manifestement une lecture biaisée de l'ordre légal athénien dans le but de redéfinir les obligations du citoyen'. On the priestly family to which Lycurgus belonged, see Taddei (2012) 22–35, Engels (2008) 15–16, cf. pp. 22–25 on his financial activities in Athens as a magistrate. He himself, however, might not have been a priest at all, on which see Blok and Lambert (2009) 112–113. Cf. n.56 above on other reforms of this period.

in the hands of the enemy [τὴν πόλιν ἐγκαταλιπὼν τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑποχείριον ἐποίησε]; subverting the democracy because he did not face danger in defence of freedom [οὐχ ὑπέμεινε τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας κίνδυνον]; impiety because he is guilty of doing all he could to ravage the sacred precincts and destroy the temples [τοῦ τὰ τεμένη τέμνεσθαι καὶ τοὺς νεῶς κατασκάπτεσθαι]; mistreatment of parents by destroying their tombs and robbing them of their ancestral rites [τὰ μνημεῖα αὐτῶν ἀφανίζων καὶ τῶν νομίμων ἀποστερῶν]; and desertion and avoiding conscription for refusing to report to the generals for duty [οὐ παρασχὼν τὸ σῶμα τάξει τοῖς στρατηγοῖς]. Who then will vote to acquit him or show sympathy for his deliberate crimes? Is anyone so senseless as to save this man and thereby give away his own safety to men who wish to betray us? Or to pity him and thereby choose to die unpitied at the hands of the enemy? Or be answerable to the vengeance of the gods by doing the traitor of the fatherland a favour? By defending our country, our temples, and our laws, I have conducted this case in a fashion both just and correct, without attacking the rest of this man's life or making irrelevant charges. Each of you must now realize that a vote to acquit Leocrates is a vote to condemn our country to death and slavery. There are two urns placed before you, one for treason, the other for survival, and you are casting your votes either to destroy our country or to keep it safe and prosperous. If you acquit Leocrates, you will vote to betray the city, the temples, and the fleet [προδιδόναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰς ναῦς]; if you put him to death, you will encourage the defence and protection of the country [διαφυλάττειν καὶ σφῆξιν τὴν πατρίδα], its revenues, and its prosperity. Imagine then, men of Athens, that the land and the trees are imploring you; the harbours, the ship sheds, and the city walls are asking you;<sup>93</sup> and the temples and the shrines are pleading with you to defend them. Make an example out of Leocrates; remember the charges against him, for pity and tears do not have a stronger claim than the preservation of the laws and the people.

§§ 147–150, tr. modified and complemented (the sentence 'Or—favour' is missing from the translation used)



93 Cf. Engels (2014) 28: 'The public space of the city of Athens itself with its religious and profane buildings in Lykurgos' view strengthens and preserves Athenian civic identity ... Hence in his epilogue Lykurgos names the walls and fortifications of Athens and Attica as visible symbols of Athenian civic pride.'

I have argued in this essay, on the basis of Lycurgus' prosecution speech *Against Leocrates*, that the representation of citizenship and civic duties could be skilfully reframed by Athenian orators for their rhetorical ends, by the deliberate and sophisticated use of conceptual metaphors. In doing so, the speakers played on the normative aspects of Athenian citizenship, but employed their own set of rhetorical tools to focus on whatever they considered important to their own argumentation. Lycurgus almost succeeded in his systematic attempt to redefine the boundaries of the concepts of both treason and citizenship, considering that Leocrates escaped the death penalty only because a tied vote worked in the defendant's favour (Aes. 3.252).<sup>94</sup> This shows the power of such rhetoric, since he was able to persuade several hundred Athenian citizens judging the case to regard Leocrates' departure as a betrayal of what it meant to be a *good citizen* in Athens, even though he had apparently broken no law at that particular time (cf. above, with nn.15–16).

Within this rhetorical strategy, Lycurgus promoted particular public policies, including—yet going beyond—the recent changes in Athenian military training, the *ephebeia* (this 'training in citizenship', as Reinmuth once called it), in the last words of his speech positing the dikasts in the role of hoplites marching to defend the sacred precincts of Athens with their vote.<sup>95</sup> He thus to the very end made efforts to reframe established conceptual metaphors of Athenian political discourse and build on them with new conceptualizations of civic duties that seemed relevant to the present case and the charges he brought. What also emerges out of this analysis is the extent to which such deep-level reframing of accepted notions could influence not only civic identity but in the case of Athens also the boundaries of the law and people's lives, to which the Athenians apparently expressed their objection by introducing further procedural limitations.<sup>96</sup> To put it differently, a good number of Athenian citizens serving as dikasts in this trial were significantly influenced by Lycurgus' rea-

94 See Whitehead (2006) 133 with n. 4 on this surprising tied vote, uncommon at the time when there was normally an odd number of dikasts (cf. Boegehold et al. (1995) 34). For two different interpretations of this passage, see Sullivan (2002b) and Bianchi (2002). The rule about a tie working in favour of the defendant was an old one, surrounded by Athenian foundation myths; see A. *Eum.* 741, 752–753, 795–796 with Loraux (1991) 41–42. Another solution is to assume Aeschines was not being precise and there was simply one more vote for acquittal.

95 As rightly observed by Steinbock (2011) 295, 311 (citing Reinmuth on the 'training').

96 According to Hansen (1975) 29–31, around the year 330 a penalty for not gaining one fifth of the votes in an *eisangelia* was introduced as a measure aimed at preventing frivolous prosecution; cf. MacDowell (1978) 183–186.

soning or otherwise ill-disposed towards the defendant when they decided to condemn him to death, while an equal number felt that this interpretation of the law and their civic identity was not a valid one and should be taken for little more than an abuse of the normative dimension of citizenship and civic duties in Athens.

Since conceptual metaphors exist at a deep level of people's cognitive image of the world, they echo conceptual frames that constitute their basic sense of identity, and may thus be particularly efficient in appeals to the latter. The appeals to the civic ethos constituted a significant factor in Athenian rhetorical practice, and were entangled in a complex framework of metaphorical language and thinking, lying open to discursive exploitation. Admittedly, many issues raised by the speaker would be things associated with citizenship by the average Athenian. What is important in rhetorical analyses of these texts, however, is the way in which such metaphorical conceptualizations operate when creating so-called mappings, that is by highlighting some aspects of conceptual domains that they refer to, while downplaying others. This could mean both exploiting the existing conceptual associations *and* creating new ones, although based on the extant sample of publicly delivered speeches it might be often difficult—and sometimes impossible—to tell which orator first employed a particular metaphor or reframed an otherwise recognized concept.<sup>97</sup>

Not least due to its unique speaker-audience interaction, oratory remains a particularly fruitful source in studying the application—and potential impact—of metaphorical conceptualizations in Greek political discourse. Conceptual metaphors of civic duties could serve as a potent tool in the hands of orators and politicians such as Lycurgus, helping them to influence their audiences and promote desired policies by exploiting the civic ethos presumably shared by Athenians. They appear as a common trait of Athenian political discourse, but at the same time the audiences of these speeches might not have been aware of their impact to the extent to which professional speakers were familiar with it. Demosthenes, in his deliberative speech *On Organization* from the mid-fourth century encompassed this cleverly by saying:

καὶ νῆ Δί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἕτεροί γε λόγοι παρερρῆκασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ψευδεῖς, καὶ πολλὰ τὴν πολιτείαν βλάπτοντες, οἷον 'ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ὑμῖν ἔστιν ἡ σωτηρία,' καὶ 'δεῖ τῆ ψήφῳ τὴν πολιτείαν ὑμᾶς φυλάττειν.'

97 For example, we first find the *ἔρανος* metaphor ('citizenship is contributing to a loan among friends') in Demosthenes' *Fourth Philippic* (10.40–41) of 341; cf. Liddel (2007) 141–143, see also Harris (2006) 136. Cf. n.85 above on *eranos*.

And by Zeus, men of Athens, there are other mendacious claims that have slipped by you and that do much harm to the constitution, such as that ‘your salvation lies in the courts’ and that ‘you must guard the constitution with your vote.’

D. 13.16, tr. TREVETT (2011)

Just as the ‘dikasts are guardians of democracy’ metaphor constituted a *topos* from Lysias to Dinarchus,<sup>98</sup> similar conceptualizations of civic roles were part of everyday Athenian political discourse, more or less skilfully employed by the orators, and to an unknown degree acknowledged by their audiences. Noticeably, we now have only scattered reflections of such rhetoric, but the glimpses that do survive reveal the crucial role of metaphorical thinking in appeals to shared identity of Athenian citizens, calling for far greater attention in our analyses of Greek political discourse than it has thus far received.

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98 See Lys. 26.10 (a sound claim in a *dokimasia* case in the context of the Thirty), D. 22.57, Aes. 3.4–7; cf. Aes. 1.5, Din. 1.9, [And.] 4.16, Lyc. 1.66. See also §§9–10 for the ‘judging is teaching (or: giving an example)’ metaphor, cf. §§4, 15, 27, 46, 67, 102; cf. n.16 above on the argument of precedent and deterrent.

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