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“Do We Have a Winner? What the China-India Paradox May Reveal about Regime Type and Human Security”

DEVIN K. JOSHI*

As the concept of human security spreads in the post-Cold War period it is often presumed that non-democracies have worse human security than democracies. But the national human security (NHS) situation in weak or failed democracies can be even worse than in some non-democracies. So how exactly do the NHS records of states with different regime types like non-democratic China and democratic India compare? To address this question the paper assesses and compares NHS in terms of “freedom from want” (anti-poverty security) and “freedom from fear” (anti-violence security). It develops a theory of how different regime types might impact NHS based on how regimes differ along the 1) democratic-authoritarian and 2) predatory-developmental dimensions. It then conducts empirical testing of the theory through a global analysis of 178 countries and case studies of contemporary China and India. The study finds that while democracies and developmental states generally have higher NHS than autocracies and predatory states, developmental authoritarian states like China on average have slightly higher human security than predatory democracies like India.

Keywords: Human Security, China, India, Regime Type, Democracy, Authoritarianism

* Assistant Professor Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver 2201 S. Gaylord St. Denver, CO 80208 (USA); Office: Cherrington Hall 208D; Tel: +1-303-871-4167; E-mail: Devin.Joshi@du.edu; Website: <http://portfolio.du.edu/djoshi6>

I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades the concept of "human security" has evolved into a major goal and objective of many concerned with international security (Paris 2001). Human security differs from traditional security approaches because it gives priority to the survival and well-being of individual people (UNDP 1994) rather than the survival or well-being of states and elites. It redirects preoccupation with the survival of states in the international system towards enhancing the security of all people regardless of their age, gender, class, race, nationality, or ethnicity. It also recognizes that threats to people's security may differ from threats to a state's security (Alkire 2003) and that efforts intended to enhance state security may diminish human security (Enloe 1990).

The rich concept of human security has been promoted by NGOs, international organizations like the United Nations, and national governments including Canada, Norway, and Japan (Axworthy 2001). It has inspired both practitioners and scholars to *reprende* the practice and objective of promoting "security." Advocates of human security have unveiled the fact that some of the traditional military-centered international security practices of the past and present have had little positive impact on improving human security and have at times decreased human security by diverting financial and other resources away from fighting diseases and poverty towards escalation of violence or unnecessary armaments (Dreze and Sen 2002; Alkire 2003).

At the national level states sometimes decrease human security in their pursuit of national security. One example of this occurs when developing countries allocate their scarce resources to purchase large amounts of weapons from industrialized countries. While the weapons may bring some protection to the state or the society, the same money could have been spent on securing food or immunizations that may have kept a much larger number of people alive. Further insult is added to injury when the army is able to use such armaments to extort, torture, and rape people in their local communities.

An even more powerful example of diminished human security in the pursuit of national security can happen at the global level. This can happen when wealthy countries in the Global North spend incredible amounts of resources on measures that do not even increase their national security. Alternatively, instead of wasting such resources on measures that have no or little positive impact on improving national human security, they could be allocated to the fight against disease, corruption, poverty, and violence in the Global South which would dramatically improve global human security (Sachs 2005).

Addressing these critical issues this paper examines whether the dynamics of national human security are related to state regime-types. The paper has four parts. The first part critically reviews the literature on human security.

The second part develops a theory of how developing-state regime-types may impact national human security (NHS). The third part empirically tests the theory across a sample of 178 countries accompanied by case studies of contemporary India and China, the world's most populated countries. The last part concludes with some reflections on the role of state regime-types in improving human security.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on human security, a relatively new sub-field of security studies, has not yet reached a consensus on what exactly constitutes "human security." At this point there are still competing definitions of human security (HS) in the literature. But in spite of some differences it is possible to identify a basic core that most of these definitions hold together in common. Paris (2001) argues that HS differs from other conceptualizations of international security in two ways. Firstly it focuses on threats to individual people rather than threats to states (UNDP 1994; Landman 2006; Glasius and Kaldor 2006; den Boer and de Wilde 2008). Secondly these threats can come from military and non-military sources that are both foreign and domestic (Chari and Gupta 2003). In this way HS differs from the focus on state-security which characterizes the "realist" or *realpolitik* schools of IR. As the *Human Security Report 2005* puts it "secure states do not automatically mean secure peoples" (HSC 2005, viii)

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been one of the international organizations at the forefront of promoting the importance of HS. It defines HS as having two main components; "Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities." (UNDP 1994, 22) This definition was subsequently critiqued by a number of scholars for being too broad and all-encompassing. In response Sabine Alkire from Oxford University's Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) developed a slightly narrower working definition based on safeguarding "the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment." (Alkire 2003) This definition is also somewhat broad but like the UNDP it emphasizes threats to individuals (rather than states) and emphasizes that many if not most human insecurities come from economic, social, community, and other types of threats that are non-military.

Although there are some differences in the HS definitions, the emergence

of the HS paradigm has led scholars and policy makers to broaden and deepen their perceptions of what constitutes a security threat (Paris 2001). This has been critiqued by several scholars of "traditional security" studies who see human security as detracting attention from core military-centered and state-centered security concerns. On the other hand critical theorists like Shani (2007) have argued that increasing "securitization" as a result of the broadening perceptions of security threats may actually result in all-pervasive police states taking advantage of the opportunity to call just about anything a "security threat." This may result in states using their militaries or police powers to control activity in many domains of life and effectively remove those domains from the scope of healthy democratic deliberation and contestation.¹

Acknowledging that there is no perfect or consensus definition of HS at this point, in this paper I follow the widely used and cited UNDP definition of HS as being free from hunger (food security), disease (health security) and repression (political security) as well as protection from unemployment (economic security), violence (personal security), and discrimination (community security). This conceptualization of HS combines both 1) freedom from fear and 2) freedom from want, which also happen to be the two main goals that guide the work of the United Nations (Annan 2000).²

Recent scholarly literature has raised a number of theoretical perspectives to explain why human security may be better or worse within a nation. Leading hypotheses propose that human security improves with state capacity (Rotberg 2004), economic growth (Sachs 2005), democratization (Landman 2006), economic interdependence (Russett and O'Neal 2001), UN peacekeeping operations (HSC 2005), the avoidance of war (Leaning 2008), and the spread of global norms promoting different conceptions of "human security" (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Shani and Pasha 2007). On the other hand, others have emphasized the need for combining multiple measures together to achieve human security such as "the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force." (Barcelona Report 2003, 5)

Unfortunately, the main shortcoming of human security studies is that they tend to focus more on defining and advocating human security rather than empirically comparing how, when, why, and to what extent various factors have or are expected to increase or decrease human security (e.g. UNDP 1994, Alkire 2003, Khosla 2003, Glasius and Kaldor 2006). Another gap is that these studies tend to define human security either in terms of economic development or the absence of war and unfortunately these two dimensions of human security are often treated separately. But is there a factor that can explain protection against both poverty and violence?

III. A THEORY OF HUMAN SECURITY AND STATE REGIME-TYPES

In this paper I explore the role of a factor that is likely important for both dimensions of HS but has not played a central role in the human security literature thus far: state regime-type. While some scholars have already made the basic argument that democracies fare better than autocracies on human security (i.e. Halperin et al 2004), my argument however is that there are *not one but two dimensions* of a state's regime type that are of critical importance for human security within a nation for its "national human security" (NHS).

The first relevant dimension is whether the state is developmental or predatory. A "predatory state" (Evans 1995) is a state that has low government effectiveness in providing public goods and services. Government effectiveness is low because the leader or leaders of the state appropriate a fairly large portion of the state's resources for themselves and the benefit of their close associates rather than strengthening state capacity and providing public goods to all or most of society. A salient sign that a state is predatory is its failure to provide basic services like universal education, one of the most essential public goods for economic and human development in a modern or modernizing state. Predatory states also tend to fail to collect the resources needed to implement public goods and services from the society it governs. For example these states generally fail to adequately develop their capacities for tax collection and military conscription. The "developmental state" (Johnson 1992, Woo-Cummings 2000) on the other hand has relatively higher government effectiveness and actively seeks to increase its national wealth. It is fairly successful in providing public goods like universal education, and it develops adequate state capacity to engage in tasks like sufficient tax revenue collection and universal military conscription.

The second relevant dimension of state regime-type for human security is the difference between democracy and authoritarianism. Democratic states have relatively more representative governments. They tend to represent the interests of a greater portion of the population than authoritarian states because the population has more participation in the selection of leaders and policies (Landman 2006). There is also more contestation between opposing ideas (Dahl 1971). A democratic state generally distinguishes itself from its non-democratic counterparts by regularly holding fair elections and allowing for competition between multiple independent political parties (Sartori 1976). When parties can peacefully alternate in taking control over the government, the state has consolidated a basic level of democracy (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1995). The authoritarian state (O'Donnell 1979) on the other hand is controlled by a single political party or small group of leaders. There are no elections between multiple political parties and few opportunities for most of the population to participate in the selection of leaders and policies (Linz and Stepan 1995).

My theory argues that both of these state-regime dimensions are important

for national human security (NHS). All other things being equal, I expect democratic and developmental states to produce higher NHS than predatory and authoritarian states. However, as will be explained shortly, in the case of mixed states I argue that the developmental authoritarian state will likely have higher NHS than the predatory democracy. Thus the predicted rank hierarchy of regime-types on NHS is led by the developmental democracy (#1), followed by developmental authoritarianism (#2), predatory democracy (#3), and predatory authoritarianism (#4) as shown in Table 1 below. These regime-types vary based on their mix of government representativeness (GR) and government effectiveness (GE). The predatory authoritarian state (#4) is low on both GR and GE while the predatory democracy (#3) is low on GE, but high on GR. The developmental authoritarian state (#2) is high on GE but low on GR, while the developmental democracy (#1) is high on both GR and GE (Leftwich 1996).³

TABLE 1. 4 BASIC STATE-REGIME TYPES VARYING ALONG 2 DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE

	Developmental	Predatory
Democratic	(#1) Developmental Democracy	(#3) Predatory Democracy
Authoritarian	(#2) Developmental Authoritarianism	(#4) Predatory Authoritarianism

Let me now explain why I believe this particular rank order of state regime-types should correspond to a roughly identical rank order of NHS outcomes. The first issue of importance is to understand the main threats to NHS. The two main types of threats are poverty-related threats (PT) and violence-related threats (VT). At the bottom of the human security ladder, the predatory authoritarian state generally can not defend against either of these threats. As a non-developmental state it does not provide a means for the population to escape poverty nor does it have enough resources to prevail in the fight against internal violence or foreign threats. This kind of state will have the worst human security because it can prevent very little if any society-on-society or state-on-society violence. This state closely fits the descriptions of what Peter Evans (1995) has called the "predatory state" in Senegal, Atul Kohli's (2004) depiction of the "neo-patriarchal state" in Nigeria and Joel Migdal's (1988) account of the "weak state" or weak post-colonial state in Sierra Leone. These states fail to achieve both human security and economic development because they are low on both effectiveness and representativeness.

The next best state on the NHS ladder is the shallow or predatory democracy. It often has more representation of society in the government, but the government is usually too weak (insufficient tax revenue collection, high levels of corruption, etc.) and unable to prevent much society-on-society violence. Fortunately, however it usually minimizes state-on-society violence. These states will typically deliver

club goods (Buchanan 1965) to the ethnic, class, gender, religious, or regional group(s) that control the state. Those groups will benefit from some public goods and services that can reduce human insecurity, but other groups will be stuck with high levels of human insecurity. This resembles what Atul Kohli (2004) labels the fragmented multi-class state in his depiction of India where urban, upper caste, upper class, and male groups have disproportionately benefitted from the state while insecurities like poverty, disease, hunger, and violence are still widespread among the rural, lower class, and lower caste groups. This type of state is likely to prevail when dominant caste, class, and ethnic/racial groups use the state machinery to enrich themselves at the expense of other groups.

At the next highest level on the NHS ladder is the developmental authoritarian state. This state is capable of and usually chooses to prevent much society-on-society violence. It often practices universal military conscription and takes the implementation of basic public goods like universal education seriously. Its goal is to generate economic development out of the human and natural resources available. It usually educates the population to have basic skills making them capable of working in factories, as technicians, as soldiers, and as police and security personnel to build the economy and defend the nation. In these states national human security is enhanced through diminished poverty and disease compared to predatory states. On the other hand, civil and political rights are typically worse (more repression by the state) than in the predatory democracy because there are few checks against state-on-society violence. This type of state is typified by South Korea from 1960-1987, which other scholars have labeled as an example of a "developmental state" (Johnson 1982) with "embedded autonomy" (Evans 1995) or as a "cohesive capitalist state" by Kohli (2004).⁴

Compared to all the state types we have discussed so far, the best states for national human security are developmental democracies. These are states with an effective and democratic government. The state has sufficient capacity to implement public goods and collect tax revenue collection. At the same time it is sufficiently transparent and accountable due to the alternation of political parties in power, fair elections, and institutions such as public hearings and press freedom. These states will still have some degree of society-on-society and state-on-society violence but they are expected to have less violence than the other three types of states and a lower incidence of poverty.⁵

IV. EMPIRICAL TESTING

I predict that my classification of regime types will be closely correlated with NHS levels. Firstly I expect that a high portion of the national population in a predatory authoritarian state will suffer from major human insecurities like poverty, disease, repression, and violence. Secondly, I predict that on average

the percent that will suffer from these basic insecurities in a predatory democracy will also be high but not as bad as under predatory authoritarianism. Thirdly, under developmental authoritarianism I expect a slightly smaller portion of the national population to suffer from these maladies compared to predatory democracy. Lastly, I predict that developmental democracies will have the smallest portion of its population suffering from these vital forms of human insecurity.

The first way I test the theory is to look at the global distribution of countries based on regime-type to see if there is any correlation with human security. In order to operationalize my concepts I use several measures as shown in Table 2 below. Firstly, I distinguish "developmental states" from "predatory states" based on the effectiveness of the government in implementing essential public goods. While it is challenging to compare public goods implementation across a large number of countries, a good proxy is to compare the extent to which different states have succeeded in implementing universal basic education. To this end I use the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) education index which measures literacy and school enrollment across nations. I code countries with a score from 0-79 on the education index as predatory and those with a score from 80-100 as developmental. This roughly means that states which have extended basic schooling to over four fifths of the population can be considered as developmental while those that have not are classified as predatory. While this is not a perfect measure of the predatory-developmental dimension it does at least capture the state's effectiveness in implementing a public good that is crucial for development in every modern society.

TABLE 2. INDICATORS OF REGIME TYPE AND HUMAN SECURITY FOR 2005

Concept	Indicator	Source
A1) Developmental State	Education Index Score between 80-100	UNDP 2008
A2) Predatory State	Education Index Score between 0-79	UNDP 2008
A3) Democratic State	Freedom House Score between 7-12	Freedom House 2006
A4) Authoritarian State	Freedom House Score between 0-6	Freedom House 2006
B1) Anti-Poverty Security	Logged and Adjusted PPP Per Capita Income (Scaled 0-100)	UNDP 2008
B2) Anti-Violence Security	Physical Integrity Index Score (Scaled 0-100)	CIRI Database 2009
B3) Human Security Index	Average Score of B1 and B2	Author's Calculations

Secondly, I distinguish democracies from authoritarian states by combining national scores on Freedom House's civil liberties and political rights indices. I code states with scores from 0 to 6 as authoritarian states and states with

scores from 7 to 12 as democratic states. This measure is also not a perfect indicator of government representative-ness but it is available on an annual basis for a large number of countries and does give at least a rough indication of the extent to which a country is democratic or authoritarian.

Thirdly, to measure human security I develop a simple National Human Security Index (NHSI) based on the average of two equally weighted component indicators. The first indicator is logged per capita income measured by purchasing power and scaled from 0 to 100 using the well-known UNDP (2008) scaling methodology which appears in the *Human Development Report*. The second indicator is the physical integrity index (PII) score scaled from 0 to 100 as calculated by the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI 2009) human rights database. The PII is a measure of how well the population is protected from torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and political imprisonment. These two indicators are used to calculate the NHSI because they capture the two main types of human insecurities. The first type ("freedom from want") is mainly poverty-related (disease, poverty, hunger) and the second type ("freedom from fear") is primarily violence-related (repression, discrimination, and violence). Therefore we are able to develop a national human security index (NHSI) by combining an encompassing anti-poverty indicator (purchasing power parity per capita income) with an encompassing anti-violence indicator (physical integrity index score).

Table 3 below provides the 2005 scores for 178 countries on the NHSI, per capita income, physical integrity index, education index, and freedom house index all scaled from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). The five lowest scoring countries on the NHSI are Ethiopia, North Korea, Bangladesh, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo all with scores between 20 and 29 out of 100. By comparison the five highest scoring countries on the NHSI (Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands) had scores between 98 and 100 that were much higher than the average score of 65.

TABLE 3. 2005 HUMAN SECURITY AND REGIME-TYPE INDICATOR SCORES BY COUNTRY

Country	National Human Security Index (NHSI) Score	Physical Integrity Index Score	Scaled Per Capita Income (PPP)	Education Index Score	Freedom House Score
Ethiopia	20	0	39	39	33
North Korea	25	0	49	90	0
Bangladesh	25	0	50	52	50
Iraq	29	13	45	67	25
Dem. Rep. Congo	29	25	33	50	17
Nepal	29	13	46	54	25

Country	National Human Security Index (NHSI) Score	Physical Integrity Index Score	Scaled Per Capita Income (PPP)	Education Index Score	Freedom House Score
India	30	0	59	63	75
Uzbekistan	32	13	51	87	0
Sudan	32	13	51	49	0
Eritrea	33	25	40	48	8
Pakistan	33	13	53	45	25
Nigeria	33	25	40	63	50
Chad	35	25	44	32	25
Uganda	35	25	45	65	42
Burundi	35	38	32	49	50
Togo	35	25	45	54	25
China	35	0	70	80	8
Tanzania	35	38	33	60	58
Colombia	36	0	72	84	67
Cote d'Ivoire	36	25	47	44	17
Haiti	36	25	47	54	8
Indonesia	37	13	61	79	75
Zimbabwe	38	25	50	71	8
Myanmar	38	38	39	70	0
Philippines	39	13	66	87	67
Central African Rep.	40	38	42	39	42
Kenya	40	38	42	67	67
Afghanistan	40	50	30	35	33
Iran	43	13	73	78	17
Thailand	43	13	74	82	67
Madagascar	44	50	37	65	67
Yemen	44	50	37	55	33
Laos	44	38	50	66	8
Zambia	44	50	39	64	50
Mauritania	45	38	52	48	33
Angola	45	38	53	47	25
Azerbaijan	45	25	65	83	25
Rwanda	46	50	42	58	25
Congo	46	50	42	68	33

Country	National Human Security Index (NHSI) Score	Physical Integrity Index Score	Scaled Per Capita Income (PPP)	Education Index Score	Freedom House Score
Malawi	47	63	32	64	50
Venezuela	48	25	70	84	50
Sierra Leone	49	63	35	40	58
Equatorial Guinea	49	25	73	73	8
Syria	49	38	61	73	0
Turkey	49	25	74	78	67
Egypt	50	38	63	74	25
Morocco	51	38	64	55	42
East Timor	51	63	39	61	67
Cameroon	51	50	52	65	17
Burkina	52	63	42	26	50
Mozambique	52	63	42	46	58
Cambodia	53	50	55	67	25
Tajikistan	53	63	44	86	25
Niger	55	75	34	26	67
Guinea-B	55	75	35	41	58
Senegal	55	63	48	51	75
Turkmenistan	55	50	61	86	0
Tunisia	56	38	74	75	25
Ecuador	56	50	63	83	67
Moldova	57	63	51	84	58
Sri Lanka	57	50	64	77	67
Djibouti	57	63	51	48	33
Libya	57	38	77	89	0
Guinea	57	63	52	37	25
Russia	58	38	78	94	25
Mexico	58	38	78	84	83
Papua New Guinea	58	63	54	49	67
Lebanon	59	50	67	86	42
Israel	59	25	93	93	92
Cuba	59	50	68	94	0
Vietnam	60	63	57	77	17
Honduras	61	63	59	76	67

Country	National Human Security Index (NHSI) Score	Physical Integrity Index Score	Scaled Per Capita Income (PPP)	Education Index Score	Freedom House Score
Nicaragua	61	63	60	74	67
Kazakhstan	61	50	73	97	25
Dominican Rep.	62	50	74	81	83
Brazil	62	50	74	88	83
Gambia	62	75	49	46	42
Kyrgyz	62	75	49	89	42
Jamaica	63	63	63	79	75
Mongolia	63	75	51	88	83
Guyana	63	63	64	92	67
Mali	63	88	39	30	83
Swaziland	64	63	65	70	17
Armenia	64	63	65	85	42
Benin	64	88	41	43	83
Ghana	64	75	54	54	92
South Africa	64	50	79	80	92
El Salvador	64	63	66	76	75
Maldives	64	63	66	81	25
Jordan	65	63	67	85	42
Bolivia	65	75	56	86	67
Peru	65	63	68	87	75
St. Vincent	66	63	70	79	92
Ukraine	67	63	71	93	75
Gabon	67	63	71	78	33
Lesotho	67	75	59	74	75
Algeria	67	63	71	72	25
Belize	67	63	71	78	92
Georgia	67	75	59	88	67
Macedonia	67	63	71	83	67
Bhutan	67	75	59	50	25
Belarus	68	63	73	94	8
Guatemala	69	75	64	68	50
Paraguay	70	75	64	81	67
Malaysia	70	63	78	82	50

Country	National Human Security Index (NHSI) Score	Physical Integrity Index Score	Scaled Per Capita Income (PPP)	Education Index Score	Freedom House Score
Dominica	72	75	69	85	100
St. Lucia	73	75	70	85	100
Oman	73	63	84	74	25
Saudi Arabia	73	63	84	79	8
Namibia	74	75	72	75	83
Panama	74	75	72	86	92
Suriname	74	75	73	83	83
Grenada	74	75	73	85	92
Comoros	75	100	50	52	50
USA	75	50	100	96	100
Bulgaria	75	75	75	90	92
Romania	75	75	75	87	83
Solomon Islands	75	100	50	62	67
Sao Tome	76	100	51	75	83
Uruguay	76	75	77	93	100
Bahrain	76	63	90	86	33
South Korea	76	63	90	98	92
Albania	77	88	66	84	67
Cape Verde	78	88	68	74	100
Kuwait	78	63	93	84	42
Fiji	78	88	68	85	58
Argentina	79	75	83	93	83
Vanuatu	79	100	58	69	83
Trinidad	79	75	83	82	75
Bosnia	79	88	71	83	58
UK	80	63	97	96	100
Costa Rica	82	88	77	84	100
Greece	83	75	91	98	92
Chile	84	88	80	89	100
UAE	84	75	92	74	17
Botswana	84	88	80	75	83
Antigua	84	88	81	81	83
Mauritius	84	88	81	80	100

Country	National Human Security Index (NHSI) Score	Physical Integrity Index Score	Scaled Per Capita Income (PPP)	Education Index Score	Freedom House Score
Croatia	84	88	81	86	83
Samoa	84	100	69	86	83
Latvia	85	88	82	95	100
Poland	85	88	82	93	100
Singapore	85	75	95	90	42
Lithuania	85	88	83	96	100
Estonia	86	88	84	96	100
Canada	86	75	97	99	100
Spain	86	75	97	99	100
Tonga	87	100	74	90	50
Barbados	87	88	86	94	100
Hungary	87	88	87	94	100
Bahamas	87	88	87	83	100
Portugal	88	88	89	92	100
Czech	88	88	89	91	100
Taiwan	89	88	90	96	100
Slovenia	89	88	90	97	100
Cyprus	89	88	91	87	100
New Zealand	90	88	92	100	100
Qatar	91	88	94	83	25
St. Kitts	91	100	82	85	100
Italy	91	88	94	95	100
France	91	88	95	98	100
Japan	92	88	96	93	92
Australia	92	88	96	100	100
Finland	92	88	96	100	100
Sweden	92	88	97	97	100
Slovakia	92	100	85	89	100
Austria	92	88	97	95	100
Seychelles	92	100	85	87	67
Swiss	93	88	98	92	100
Ireland	93	88	99	99	100
Malta	94	100	88	84	100

Country	National Human Security Index (NHSI) Score	Physical Integrity Index Score	Scaled Per Capita Income (PPP)	Education Index Score	Freedom House Score
Brunei	97	100	94	85	25
Germany	97	100	95	88	100
Netherlands	98	100	96	99	100
Belgium	98	100	96	97	100
Denmark	99	100	97	100	100
Luxembourg	100	100	100	92	100
Norway	100	100	100	100	100

Our first empirical test is to compare regime-type performance on the 2005 national human security index displayed above.⁶ The results are shown in Figure 1. On the y-axis is the national human security index (NHSI) score and on the x-axis are the 4 regime types. Although there is a large amount of variation in scores for each regime-type a basic pattern emerges which supports the theoretical predictions outlined in the previous section. The average human security scores for each regime-type fit the expected rank hierarchy and the regression line is positive and in the expected direction. On average developmental democracies (type 4) had the highest NHS score followed by developmental authoritarians (type 3), predatory democracies (type 2), and predatory authoritarians (type 1) in that order.

FIGURE 1. REGIME-TYPE AND NATIONAL HUMAN SECURITY INDEX (2005)

A summary of the data displayed in Figure 1 is outlined in more detail in Table 4 below. The average NHSI score was highest for developmental democracies (79). They scored well on both anti-poverty security (82) and anti-violence security (77). Second highest scoring were the developmental authoritarian states (62), followed by predatory democracies (59) and predatory authoritarian states (47). The main divergence among the two mixed-regime types (#2 and #3) is that developmental authoritarian states have more violence (53) but less poverty (71). This means they are probably better for the human security of the poor and working class than for the human security of the rich and the middle class. Predatory democracies on the other hand have less violence (64) but more poverty (54). Presumably this would be better for the human security of the rich and the middle class than for the poor and the working class.⁷

TABLE 4. REGIME TYPE AND AVERAGE HUMAN SECURITY INDEX SCORES (0-100).

Regime Type (n = number of countries)	National Human Security Index	Anti-Poverty Score	Anti-Violence Score
1) Developmental Democracy (n = 75)	79	82	77
2) Developmental Authoritarianism (n = 24)	62	71	53
3) Predatory Democracy (n = 30)	59	54	64
4) Predatory Authoritarianism (n = 49)	47	52	42
Average Score (n = 178)	65	68	62

Although our global comparison of countries has found a correlation in the expected direction it is worthwhile to look now at some case studies to gain a more comprehensive understanding of NHS dynamics. For this purpose we look at two cases of mixed regime countries (India and China) to see more closely how regime type may impact their national human security. India and China are also obvious initial cases to test in developing a global theory of national human security since they have the world's largest populations. Thus, even if we are not able to generalize beyond these cases, the study of these two countries alone can enlighten us about the human security conditions for almost two fifths of the world's population.

Based on our indicators above for 2005 India fell into the category of a predatory democracy while China fits the characteristics of a developmental authoritarian state. If my theory of regime types and human security is accurate then we would expect to find India at a human insecurity level worse than China. As it turns out both countries scored low on the NHSI and India (30) scored lower than China (35). It is noteworthy that India which has remained democratic for much of the period from 1947-2005 (except for 1975-1977) has a very disappointing NHS score, one that is even lower than China. In order to make

sense of this seemingly paradoxical finding it is worth examining the human security situation more closely in these two countries to see why democratic India scores lower than China on the NHSI.

To assess the human security levels of India and China in the 2000s I proceed by disaggregating human security for the three primary population groups: women, men, and children. I begin this analysis with a look at child hunger, poverty, illiteracy, and disease. Children make up a large portion of the population in most developing countries and from a people-centered perspective their security is just as important as the security of adults. Arguably in fact children's security may even be more important because they have potentially long lives ahead of themselves and will determine the security and development prospects of their nation's futures.

- *Children's Security:* When it comes to children China appears to have considerably higher HS than India as of 2005. As an indicator of disease prevalence (health insecurity), India's infant mortality rate of 5.6% is more than double that of China (2.3%) and the percent of children who die before reaching age five in India (7.4%) is close to triple the rate in China (2.7%) (WHO 2008). Hunger (food insecurity) is also a serious problem in both countries but appears much worse in India. According to recent national survey results for 2005-2006 child malnutrition levels in India are very high. Forty-six percent of Indian children are underweight and 38% are stunted (NFHS 2006). It is difficult to know exactly the level of child malnutrition in China because most health surveys in China do not evenly sample the entire population. Urban populations and wealthier areas are over-represented in most surveys while rural and migrant populations and poorer areas are usually under-represented. The highest estimate of child malnutrition in China from a reputable population or health survey is 22%. It is possible that this is an underestimate but there are also estimates that are much lower and some even less than ten percent (WHO 2008). Thus even if we assume the high-end child malnutrition estimate for China to be accurate, it would still be less than half the level of India.

Disease prevention efforts and child health security measures also appear to be more advanced in China. Basic immunization rates are 86% in China compared to 58% in India and the proportion of child births assisted by trained health professionals is estimated to be 97% in China but only 43% in India (WHO 2008). Other forms of child insecurity include low levels of education which prevent skill development and lead to unemployment and underemployment (economic insecurity in adulthood). In India, child labor is estimated at 28% (Jayaraj and Subramanian 2005) and child labor laws are rarely enforced. Underage marriage is also common in India because marriage age laws are not enforced.

The debilitating practice of dowry which is so damaging to girls is also common in India because anti-dowry laws are not enforced. In China, child labor and dowry appear to be less common because there is more enforcement of child labor and anti-dowry laws. Underage marriage is also less common in China because there is more enforcement of underage marriage laws. Both countries are plagued with the problem of child trafficking although the scale appears to be somewhat larger in India (DOS 2008).

- *Women's Security:* The position of women in both Indian and Chinese society is inferior to the position of men. This is based in part on cultural norms favoring men and sons. As a result both countries have skewed sex ratios and a disproportionate ratio of males to females in the youth and adult populations. Sex-selective abortions of females run high in both countries. China has massive forced abortions and forced sterilizations. Women in China cannot choose how many children to have and women are regularly subjected to invasive surgeries and medical treatments as a result of how China implements its one-child policy.

In terms of community violence, it is difficult to measure the exact magnitude of violence against women. Rapes and domestic violence are present in both countries, although women in China appear to have more freedom to move about in public spaces. Recent survey evidence shows that two thirds of married Indian women are not allowed to leave their households to visit relatives or go to the market unless they are given permission by their husbands (NFHS 2006).

Several pieces of evidence suggest that Chinese women are less likely to experience hunger, disease, and poverty than their counterparts in India. One indicator is that 46% of women are married before age 20 in India compared to less than 5% in China. This allows Chinese women to have more time to pursue education and employment opportunities outside the house which can increase their earning capabilities and reduce economic insecurity. One measure that reflects the education divide between the two countries is that as of 2000 female illiteracy was 52% in India compared to 13% in China. The number of girls enrolled in secondary school is also the same as boys' enrollment in China but girls' enrollment is 12 percentage points less than boys' enrollment in India. Because female education is fairly low in India women there are more likely to face economic insecurity and food insecurity.

- *Men's Security:* Since the available national-level data does not usually distinguish men's insecurities from insecurities of the total population, my review of men's security will necessarily overlap with an examination of human security for the total national populations of India and China. As

discussed earlier we can measure food insecurity through health surveys that record malnutrition levels. A related measure of economic insecurity is the population below a nominal poverty line or given income threshold. According to the World Bank's two dollars per day purchasing power parity (PPP) standard the percentage of the population in poverty is 80% in India and 35% in China (World Bank 2009). Based on China's 2000 Census and India's 2001 Census data male illiteracy is 27% in India compared to only 5% in China.⁸

Discrimination on the basis of religion and caste/ethnicity is present in China, but it appears to be higher in India. Based on human rights reports India appears to have more extreme caste/ethnicity-based, religion-based, and gender-based society-on-society violence. Public safety also appears to be a little bit worse in India than China based on crime statistics and the comfort levels of men and women being in public places at night time. However, China is much more repressive when it comes to state-on-society violence. China has over seven times the prison population of India when you include China's "re-education through labor" penal camps although this partially reflects insufficient incarceration and punishment of criminals in India. There is greater likelihood of arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, and torture on trumped up charges in China and a low likelihood of having a fair trial. However, torture in prisons and extra-judicial killings are not uncommon in India either as are long multi-year pre-trial detentions and long delays (often decades) before legal cases are tried and resolved. But the prison capacity of India is much less than China and the scope and scale of state repression and degree of arbitrariness are less in India. Unlike in India, regime dissidents in China face a very high level of insecurity.

A recent Chinese human development report identified four groups of people as being particularly low in security and high in vulnerability. These groups were the urban poor, rural poor, rural migrants in cities, and expropriated farmers. (Li and Bai 2005) India appears to have even more low security groups: scheduled castes ("untouchables"), scheduled tribes (indigenous peoples), backwards castes, the urban poor, the rural poor, rural migrants in cities, and minority religious groups. India's low security groups appear to make up close to three fourths of India's population, whereas they seem to make up less than one half of China's population. It is however possible that some ethnic minority groups in China such as Tibetans also have low security equal to the indigenous peoples of India. The rate of poverty in China may also be much higher than the official average. There is always a certain degree of uncertainty when it comes to such indicators as statistical estimates are often questioned in both countries and the Chinese government is fond of secrecy when it comes to sharing accurate information about the condition of the country.

When we think about personal insecurity (violence) and community insecurity

(repression) against men and other groups in society we can divide this into two basic categories: 1) society-on-society violence and 2) state-on-society violence. India is higher on the former while China is higher on the latter. In India there are many prisoners awaiting trials and much everyday caste-based violence. Many human rights violations in India are committed by society in the way they treat women, lower castes, people of other religions, and indigenous peoples. The Chinese state on the other hand commits terrible human rights violations including frequently punishing dissidents, imprisoning without trial, beating prisoners, and denying religious freedom. On measures of environmental security, both countries face problems of degradation and pollution, but environmental damage, ecological vulnerability, and pollution levels appear to be worse in China than in India. On the other hand there is notably less peace in India. Most of India's border provinces have been in protracted states of war or conflict with indigenous peoples, neighboring countries, or armed insurgents. There are tensions but currently no wars or armed conflicts along any of China's borders.

When you look at employment security, according to World Bank figures unemployment rates were 4.2% in China and 5.0% in India in 2004. But estimates by scholars typically run much higher. Giles, Park and Zhang (2005) estimate Chinese urban unemployment at 7.3 percent and unemployment of permanent urban residents in China at over 11 percent. As is well known Chinese unemployment rates are typically underestimated because the official figures only count registered unemployed workers but do not count the many millions of laid-off (*xiagang*) workers who have been "removed from their post" from state-owned enterprises and are also unemployed. Indian unemployment estimates in the decade of the 2000s also typically fall into the 7 to 10 percent range so there may not be much of a difference between the two countries on unemployment. Perhaps a better proxy of employment security is the percentage of workers working in the formal sector as opposed to the informal sector. As of 2007, an estimated 93% of India's labor force is the informal sector (DOS 2008), a level much higher than in China.

- *Aggregate Human Security:* We have just reviewed some of the basic human security conditions in India and China. This review is merely a rough sketch and is not intended to be complete, exhaustive, or all-encompassing. There are numerous other dimensions of human insecurities in both of these countries that we have not had space to discuss here. But we have hoped to uncover and compare some of the most basic forms of human insecurity (hunger, disease, poverty, violence, repression, etc.) in these countries to see if they match the human security conditions we would expect to see given these nations' state-regime types.

At the risk of over-simplifying a very complex situation we have presented

several NHS indicators in Table 5 below for macro-comparative analysis of national human security in India, China, and elsewhere. Here we compare two indicators of children's security, two indicators of women's security, and six indicators of overall human security based on the six dimensions of human security outlined by the United Nations (1994). China has a better record than India on eight out of the ten indicators including half the poverty rate and half the rate of child malnutrition. However, while China scores better than India on anti-poverty measures it also has higher levels of incarceration and riots than India. The implications for human security are decidedly mixed. China has more economic development than India but it is not democratic. India on the other hand enjoys a democratic government, but one that has thus far been unable or unwilling to eliminate the scourges of caste discrimination, communal riots, and widespread disease, hunger, and poverty.

TABLE 5. HUMAN SECURITY INDICATORS IN CHINA AND INDIA

Human (In)Security Indicator	China	India
1a) Hunger-Population below \$2/day	35%	80%
1b) Hunger-Child Malnutrition	22%	46%
2) Disease-Child Mortality	2.7%	7.4%
3a) Discrimination-Female Illiteracy	13%	52%
3b) Discrimination-Underage Marriage	<5%	46%
4a) Unemployment	7.3%?	7.2%
5a) Violence-Murder (per million)	23.1	29.6
5b) Violence-Rape (per million)	16.9	17.6
6) Mass Incidents (China), Riots (India)	87.0k	56.6k
6b) Repression-Incarcerated Population	2,100k?	325k

NOTES: Poverty from World Bank's World Development Indicators 2008; Malnutrition from 3rd National Family Health Survey (NFHS) 2005-2006 (India) and World Health Organization (China); Illiteracy from Census of India (2001) and 5th Population Census of China (2000); Underage Marriage from 3rd NFHS (India) and Author's Estimate (China); Murder and Rape data for India from National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) (2006) and Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (2005) based on doubling the figures recorded for the first half of the year. Chinese Mass Incident data for 2005 from MPS and Indian riot data for 2006 from NCRB. Per capita statistics based on population estimates of 1.3 billion for China and 1.1 billion for India. India unemployment rate estimate from CIA Factbook (2007). Chinese unemployment rate estimate from Giles, Park and Zhang (2005). Incarceration rates from the US State Department Human Rights Country Reports for China and India (2007).

V. CONCLUSION

In our empirical analysis developmental democracies had by far the best record

of the four regime types on national human security, while predatory authoritarian states had by far the worst record. In the middle positions developmental authoritarians and predatory democracies had similar scores on average although developmental authoritarians scored slightly better. In particular developmental authoritarians had lower poverty scores although predatory democracies had lower violence scores.

In a more detailed analysis of two intermediate cases, China appears to score better than India on five out of six human security dimensions shown in Table 5 above. This suggests the pervasive human insecurity level covering China's population is lower than it is for India. These are of course aggregate measures that do not consider the human security populations of different regions or ethnic groups within these countries. Nevertheless, the NHSI findings for India and China supported my general theoretical expectations of how regime types are likely to impact aggregate national human security. It was predicted that developmental authoritarian states would on average have higher national human security than predatory democracies and in our case studies we found support to suggest that China indeed has higher national human security than India. As we further disaggregated our national human security findings, China came out ahead on women and children, while India and China were about equal on men. A major reason for India's comparatively lower level of human security seems to be poverty-related with much of the insecurity coming from hunger, disease and poverty as well as caste-based and gender-based discrimination. These are problems that can diminish significantly with improvements in economic development and social equality.

In summary, this study reveals that democracies do not necessarily perform better on human security than authoritarian states. However, while developmental authoritarian states may on average have slightly higher national human security than predatory democracies, developmental democracies clearly have much higher human security than developmental authoritarian states. Thus it seems that the ultimate goal of all states seeking to improve their NHS should be to eventually transition to and sustain developmental democracies.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ The human security concept has also been critiqued on other grounds. Richmond and Franks (2005, 34) point out that "most of the resistance to human security stems from the fact that it underlines the negative consequences of all forms of violence, both just or unjust, and also places the 'haves' with responsibilities towards the 'have-nots.'"
- ² Although this definition serves as a useful starting point for my analysis I acknowledge that it is not complete or perfect. Several scholars have argued that psychological factors also play a key role in human security (i.e. Nef 1999; Thomas 2000; Reed and Tehrani 1999). I would largely concur with their assessment that HS is not only made up of external, observable threats to individuals, but also internal perceptions of threats. However, because it is difficult in practice to measure internal threat perceptions at the aggregate level I limit my analysis in this paper to external observables.
- ³ I would like to point out that the basic Weberian ideal-type state regime-types depicted in Table 1 are neither exhaustive nor a complete list of all possible regime-types. Every state is located at a different point on the democracy-authoritarianism continuum and the developmental-predatory continuum. A broader depiction would be to distinguish states into perhaps four places on the developmental-predatory scale such as: heavily predatory, lightly predatory, lightly developmental, and heavily developmental. These distinctions could be separated even further into seven or ten or even hundreds of categories and sub-categories. It is only for the sake of clarity and simplicity that I have laid out the theory and typology in dichotomous terms such as predatory and developmental and democratic and authoritarian. It is hoped that the reader will understand why it is practical to lay out the theory in a simplified form that obviously cannot capture all of the infinite complexity of political reality.
- ⁴ Developmental authoritarian states seem to be most common in Asia with the East Asian states typically having a more advanced form than what exists in Central and West Asia. The primary difference is that East Asian states have tended to opt for a more advanced "human developmental authoritarianism" whereas the West Asian states have generally relied on a less advanced "resource developmental authoritarianism" with Central Asian states falling somewhere in between. The more advanced developmental states realize that they need to limit state-on-society violence in order to sustain economic development so they tend to limit state-on-society violence to harassing and punishing regime opponents. In terms of political economy the advanced authoritarian developmental states also tend to have an export-led economy.
- ⁵ South Korea and Chile since the 1990s are examples of developmental democracies. Neither of these states may be exceptionally high in GR or GE but both are at a sufficiently medium or medium-high level. Many currently developmental democratic states were developmental authoritarian states for much of the twentieth century. This includes states in East Europe, many states in the Caribbean, most states of Northeast Asia, and several states in South Europe. Most of West Europe transitioned from developmental authoritarianism to developmental democracies in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. A few states however were predatory democracies prior to becoming developmental democracies. The states of North America and several states in West Europe fit into this category. It is worth pointing out that within the set of developmental democracies there is a particular subset which has a "deep democracy" or "social democracy" which scores the highest on human security. These states are most concentrated in Northern Europe (Scandinavia).
- ⁶ The cutoff points here between democracy and authoritarianism and between developmental and predatory are admittedly somewhat arbitrary. For example, many would see the UAE as developmental and authoritarian but view North Korea as predatory and authoritarian. Nevertheless, these cutoff points roughly capture the basic differences between the 4 regime-types.
- ⁷ This may in part explain why some developing country intellectuals and middle class members prefer a predatory democracy to developmental authoritarianism.
- ⁸ My personal observations in China suggest that China's male illiteracy rate is somewhat higher than the official figure however it is not clear whether it is actually as high as in India.