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**Beyond Aid Effectiveness?:
Private and Public Partnerships in South Korea's Official
Development Assistance (ODA) Strategy as Soft Power
Strength and Weakness**

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In 2009 Hubbard and Duggan published their book 'The Aid Trap' which argued that a thriving private business sector in the recipient country must be encouraged. Otherwise foreign aid simply reinforces debt, poverty and dependency. This debate between neoliberal and neo-Keynesian approaches influenced the formation of effective foreign aid 'strategies from new ODA donors such as South Korea. South Korea's role in the ODA debate represents a more general geopolitical shift by emerging nations. The paper provides a critical assessment of South Korea's state-led and soft power ODA policies by focusing on initiatives on aid effectiveness and fostering private/public partnerships (PPP's). The paper goes on to critically consider and judge these elite-led ODA initiatives by addressing a grassroots NGO perspective.

Keywords: Foreign Aid, Aid Effectiveness, Civil Society,
Private and Public Partnerships

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I. INTRODUCTION

The traditional understanding of foreign aid in the modern post-World War II era had two main assumptions. Firstly, that foreign aid is a moral obligation. Secondly, that foreign aid could help kick start economic development. This would not only eradicate poverty (a moral issue) but also the associated economic and social conditions of inequality which could sow the seeds for leftism and communism. This, after all, was the beginning of the Cold War. As a result, foreign aid institutions which aimed to provide donor state resources to recipient countries evolved from the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 (World Bank and International Monetary Fund-IMF) and in the context of United States hegemony and the post-War Keynesian consensus. In the more contemporary context, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN) have expressed specific interest in constructing and evaluating foreign aid policies. In a geopolitical sense, the construction of institutions, norms and the values of foreign aid were the dominion of Western nations as a philosophy of ‘embedded liberalism’. According to Riddell (2007):

ODA consists of flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction which meets the following two criteria: 1. It is administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and, 2. it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%) (Riddell 2007, 19).

According to the OECD-DAC,¹ ODA is also defined as those aid flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients and to multilateral development institutions (Lancaster 2007). ODA is not directly linked to military security or to peacekeeping operations but can be linked to the provision of military protection for humanitarian assistance staff. ODA can also be linked to civilian nuclear energy developments and to cultivating

cultural interactions, but not financing one-off ‘celebrity’ cultural events. ODA is assumed to be both a moral action and one that yields economic development and escape from poverty in the developing world.

The economic orthodoxy, agenda, rules, norms and expectations within these above mentioned international institutions (regimes) have, of course, changed and evolved over the years, most notably away from Keynesianism and toward free market neoliberalism. This shift began in the early 1980s with subsequent strategic debates concerning the role of the state and the market (public spending or private enterprise). Such debates have also occurred in the context of the critiques of market based neoliberal globalisation (the Washington consensus) and the emergence of new development aid norms such as aid effectiveness and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s). This has more recently generated calls, in light of the recent financial crisis, for a return of Keynes (Skidelsky 2011). Added to these economic debates, are the changing geopolitics of the aid debate, the relative decline of the Western donor states and the rise of emerging nations and former recipients now turning into ODA donors. With this, there is also a growing view that economic development does not necessarily lead to poverty eradication.

Many writers have therefore begun focusing on the potential role of emerging country donors such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRICs) and the new programs of aid effectiveness and south-south partnerships (Gray and Murphy 2013). The issue seems to be whether emerging nations can (or should) strategically push for a new aid paradigm given that the Western aid donors are mired in their own economic crisis of debt and austerity; or whether they can consolidate their role as emerging nations to reform (yet reinforce) the existing aid regimes; or whether they can cooperate to form a counter-hegemonic movement and create an alternative aid agenda from ‘the global South.’ This would be based on equal partnerships between donor and recipient. These strategic decisions, and often paradoxical options, would take an entire article in itself. Therefore my aim in this paper is to focus on a specific manifestation of this new agenda from an emerging nation donor, Korea. The focus here is the current state-led promotion of aid effectiveness and of private and public partnerships (PPP’s).

In the current literature, the term partnership is often related to the

apparent equality of south-south partnerships by emerging donors rather than the rather hierarchical and condition based donor-recipient partnership of Western donors. New donor aid is based on promoting shared colonial experiences. This is the soft power approach by middle powers and non-Western states explored here (Tharoor 2012). Therefore, let me frame my argument in this way to embed this piece in the literature on development and international relations (IR). I argue that Korea's new middle power positioning (first promoted by President Roh, 2003-2008, as a bridge between China and Japan) is allowing Korea a unique voice in the ODA debate. From a state centric level this voice is promoting the consensus agenda of aid effectiveness, and, within this has emerged the policy of private and public partnerships. These are regarded as not only a more pragmatic and results based approach to aid effectiveness but also as a way to transcend the neoliberal/Keynesian impasse. This was made clear at the 2011 Busan Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. The argument in this paper is to critically assess the stated approaches to aid effectiveness and partnerships through an alternative NGO perspective.

Issues that have been raised include assessing the real intentions of emerging nations and whether the donor-recipient relationship promoted as 'fair' and equal (or as a unconditional 'gift' between 'partners') stands up to critical scrutiny (Mawdsley 2012, 2012a). More broadly, there is an issue as to whether emerging country donors unintentionally reinforce the existing system, or are able (or want to) construct alternative (aid-2) programs, or are just satisfied with becoming 'members of the elite' and therefore in changing the system 'from within.' Terms used to describe such states now include, new middle powers, postcolonial donors, cusp states, or so-called frontier or BRIC and next-11 states (O'Neill 2011; Sharma 2012). Moreover, the geopolitical assumption is that this 'southern solidarity' has its own progressive history evolving from calls for non-aligned third world solidarity (Bandung 1955), through to calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s, and through to the more recent Beijing consensus and the 'rise of the South.' Brazil is for instance giving its increase in ODA to Lusophone Portuguese ex-colonies in Africa (Angola and Mozambique) to aid with cooperation rather than natural resources access, whilst Portugal itself and old colonial European

powers continue to have their own economic problems. This argument posits that aid recipients can benefit from new aid and trade relations which are repositioning and responding to the changing nature of power in the global political economy brought about by the financial crisis. In Korea this is leading to new debates over the role of the Chaebols and the state in providing ODA resources. There is emerging more emphasis by the major political parties on so-called economic democratization (Stolte 2012).

The paper argues that private-public partnership initiatives (PPP's) can be placed within the evolution of the state-led ODA effectiveness debate. This now reflects a strategic shift beyond the 'aid trap' debate. Aware that it cannot match the immense aid quantity levels of the larger and older donors, PPP's, from a civil society rather than state-led perspective can potentially about an alternative strategic opportunity for South Korea as a middle power, to rethink the model of ODA and the concept of foreign aid itself. My argument proceeds through the following sections. Firstly, it will embed development and IR perspectives within the evolution of the foreign aid debate. Secondly, it will discuss the current debates on soft power and middle powers. I then turn to outlining Korea's ODA model and its current reevaluations by placing this within the context of IR and development perspectives. This, then, allows me to consider the emerging critiques of state-led and corporate PPP's and to consider an alternative approach which is more inclusive of alternative development stakeholders such as non-government organizations (NGOs) and small to medium sized business (SME's).

II. EMBEDDING IR, DEVELOPMENT AND MIDDLE POWERS

Development issues and IR can be linked through three main perspectives. Firstly, the view from realism is that foreign aid can be instrument to gain allies and threaten allies. Lancaster (2007) makes the point that foreign aid would not have occurred but for the Cold War. Thus, foreign aid is another instrumental arm of state in the anarchical state system and is used for national self interests. Secondly, the more liberal position is that foreign aid represents ongoing cooperation between states with the links made between development values and security clearly breaking the realist hierarchies of low and high

politics. In the age of complex interdependence then states are increasingly vulnerable and sensitive to the new transborder security issues of which poverty and development deficiencies can both produce conditions for societal instability and terrorism (Keohane and Nye 1977). Thirdly, there is the Marxist view that foreign aid is directly connected to the need for capitalist classes to gain access to overseas natural resources, cheap labour and to export surplus capital (Bieler and Morton 2004; Carroll 2012). For both realists and liberals attention is drawn to distinctions between the positioning and concomitant behavior of big and small powers as well as between superpowers and middle powers. And for Marxists, the distinctions are between core, semiperiphery and peripheral states.

My discussion of new emerging powers is placed within the IR debate as to whether these states are to be understood as rising superpowers, as regional superpowers, or as so-called middle power bridge nations. Korea is often placed within this latter category. Middle powers generate discussions as to what these states represent, discussions to explain behaviour in relation to larger states and toward international organizations and norms. The traditional and most common way to measure middle powers is to aggregate critical physical and material criteria to rank states according to their relative capabilities. Keohane (1969) distinguishes between middle power as system determinant, system influence, system affecter, or ineffectual state. Current issues call for new concepts and a qualitative break to explain the rise of non-Western emerging nations based on a states' function, status, (self) perception, and place in the UN within the international system. However this system is now more horizontally organised than vertically, with not only a diffusion of traditional power (military and economic) but through new networks of power which disrupt the notion that power in IR is necessarily zero-sum and that the rise of emerging nations necessarily means the decline of more established states. Moreover, a conceptual apparatus that continues the either/or a more horizontal system does not necessarily mean that the old powers are not powerful or that emerging nations *necessarily* are. Middle powers are determined by their regional and global position, their geography, but often have similar material capabilities with older and greater powers. Jordaan (2003, 165) notes that:

All middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives. However, emerging and traditional middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioural differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviourally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association.

South-south partnerships and the ODA agenda emerging amongst the BRICs are now often regarded as a continuum of these anti-Western histories, but now are being given the immense opportunities and resources that emerging countries have. At the recent 2013 BRICSS summit, it was noted by the leaders:

We are open to increasing our engagement and cooperation with non-BRICS countries, in particular Emerging Market and Developing Countries (EMDCs), and relevant international and regional organisations, as envisioned in the Sanya Declaration. We will hold a Retreat together with African leaders after this Summit, under the theme, “Unlocking Africa’s potential: BRICS and Africa Cooperation on Infrastructure”. The Retreat is an opportunity for BRICS and African leaders to discuss how to strengthen cooperation between the BRICS countries and the African Continent. Within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), we support African countries in their industrialisation process through stimulating foreign direct investment, knowledge exchange, capacity-building and diversification of imports from Africa. We will seek to stimulate infrastructure investment on the basis of mutual benefit to support industrial development, job-creation, skills development, food

and nutrition security and poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa. We therefore, reaffirm our support for sustainable infrastructure development in Africa.²

For realists, there is always the need to understand the implications of the reconfiguration of power provoked by the rise of China. Foreign aid agendas, therefore, represent an aspect of this recalibration of power in the international system. As a response, middle and smaller powers often have strategies of aligning, bandwagoning, the forming of counter-hegemonic alliances, the reinforcing of multilateral institutions, ‘buffering’ and spoiling existing institutions. This geopolitical shift has policy implications for emerging market states as to where to put their aid resources and as to what their governments decides is the ‘global agenda.’ Thus, there is an issue as to whether this geopolitical repositioning is a short term result of the relative decline of the West, and, that whilst emerging nations and new middle powers are fundamentally transforming their own societies and policies, this is in fact reflecting more of a short term downturn in the West which itself, is now taking the opportunity to restructure and increase its robustness or ‘anti-fragility.’ As such, so-called break out nations may also want to become a part of old structure to show that ‘they have made it’ rather than representing a challenge to the economic and geopolitical structure (Sharma 2012). Thus:

The current international landscape requires such an initiative and an increasing role of middle powers. The world now works not hierarchically, but in a networked fashion. In this world, no one can dictate what others have to do. In a networked world, a group of like-minded countries can lead a meaningful change in the world. They do so not by power, but through creative ideas, a smart and flexible strategy, and moral leadership. Middle-power countries are well positioned to lead this inter-connected world.³

The old middle powers typically emerged during the Cold War whilst new middle powers have recently emerged onto the world stage and in the era of globalization. Thus:

In a networked world, the state has to deal with an increasing number of motivated actors with a vast array of tools to spread their message. The solution is to become part of the conversations-to engage with foreign publics and to validate the country's messages and modify them as needed. In doing so, the government will need to formulate customized packages of public policy messages that cater to local needs and tastes. Public diplomacy's efficacy depends on whether the government arduously and effectively communicates with foreign publics to shape and reshape its own messages.⁴

Middle powers display a foreign policy behaviour that often stabilises and legitimises the existing global order. This is the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide diplomacy. Middle powers are states that may also commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace and help to maintain the international order by serving as mediators and go-betweens.

III. SOFT POWER IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

ODA has often been placed in the context of middle power soft power. In this respect ODA is a way of generating alliances, gaining respect and credibility and promoting present and future leverage as 'international hero.' Soft power for Marxists however is obscuring underlying economic interests for capitalist classes rather than the 'nation' such as access to markets and natural resources under the guise of 'fairness' and 'solidarity.' It is no coincidence therefore that one of the leading proponents of soft power is Joseph Nye. This is logically following the complex interdependence thesis. For Nye, new middle powers are particularly potent actors of soft power. Joseph Nye (2010, 2010a) argued that as a middle power South Korea's technological, digital and post-industrial economy can help enhance its emerging state-led soft power. Nye (2004, x) famously defined soft power as the 'ability to get what you want

through attraction rather than coercion or payment' and has made the point that states use soft power 'to tell a story.'

There are several debates on this hard power and soft power relationship. Firstly, there is a debate as to whether soft power is an alternative to the use of hard power in sensitive regional politics and is therefore regarded as 'weakness' rather than strength. Secondly, there is a debate as to whether state-led soft power is a mere extension of a states coercive hard power and the issue of where one draws the distinction. Thirdly, there is a debate whether soft power can, ironically, help create a cushion for the more effective exercise of hard power. Fourth, there is also the issue as to whether soft power is a part of, or interrelated to, hard power and if so, in what ways. This is, the question as to whether soft power is the cause or consequence of the existence and the actual use of hard power.

Nye (2011) takes a conventional state-centric approach to soft power as an instrumental extension of hard power and marginalizes the underlying contestations as to the use and concept of power and how power is recognized (and why) by other states (Barett and Duvall 2005). In this sense, different forms of soft power might tend to produce different results when in combination with themselves or with hard power at specific times and spaces. There are therefore more substantive issues regarding soft power and state/national identity construction beyond mere instrumental extension. Moreover, there are distinctions made between state-led soft power and civil society soft power. State-led soft power is understood as an extension of state power whilst civil society or non-official soft power involves the interactions of individuals and non-governmental organization often mobilizing in civil society and using new information technologies such as cultural exchanges, popular culture, social media, social movements, music and literature exchanges, and so forth.

The actual instrumental use of soft power is how to get others to behave consciously (or more importantly unconsciously) to 'want what you want' through attraction. Nye (2011) argues that the exercise of power also alters an actors' behavior than what the conscious actor or actors wanted or had even intended. For Nye (2004) power can be understood as both the reality and the perception of a states' strength in terms of population, territory, economy and military power, all combined with an actors' willingness or ability to use

power and, crucially, an actors' ability to 'control' outcomes and events from intentions. Moreover, a state can have power but might not have to use hard power which can be interpreted as weakness or as strength. Power must also be recognized as power by other states (Lam 2007; Lampton 2008). This means that contextual intelligence is also needed in understanding the causal relationship between hard and soft power and changing temporal and spatial context upon which smart power is effectively used. The conceptual puzzle is whether soft power is either intended and/or perceived to be an alternative to hard power, whether it requires the back up of hard power, whether it represents a weakness or compensation for lack of hard power, or whether the system has changed so much that soft power is in effect 'the new hard power.' Nye (2004, 105) argues that 'Promoting positive images of one's country is not new, but the conditions for projecting soft power have been dramatically transformed in recent years.' But does a badly aligned smart power inevitably lead to bad consequences, and might hard power undermine soft power and even vice versa? Does an intended good aligned combination of hard and soft power *necessarily* lead to a good result or outcome? Nye (2009, 1) also argued that:

Quietly, South Korea has moved away from being defined by its problematic North Korean neighbor, and is becoming an important middle-ranking power in global affairs ... South Korea has impressive soft-power potential ... Even more important, South Korea also developed a democratic political system, with free elections and peaceful transfer of power between different political parties ... The traditions of Korean art, crafts, and cuisine have already spread around the world ... South Korea has the resources to produce soft power, and its soft power is not prisoner to the geographical limitations that have constrained its hard power throughout its history ... South Korea is beginning to design a foreign policy that will allow it to play a larger role in the international institutions and networks that will be essential to global governance.

Sook (2009, 2011) argues that state-led soft power can be used for the

setting of the environment for the exercise of hard power. Sook argues that soft power helps foster an external environment conducive to national interests and hard power resources which consequently guarantees embedded soft power. The South Korean government in its 2010 White Paper (2010, 228) stressed, in a section entitled *Enhancing National Prestige through Advanced Cultural Diplomacy*, that as:

Soft power is becoming increasingly important, culture has surfaced as an indispensable element of a nation's competitiveness and economic resources that produce added value. To keep in pace with this changing global environment, Korea has adopted cultural diplomacy as a new pillar of the country's diplomatic make up.

IV. THE GLOBAL AID EFFECTIVENESS DEBATE

Aid effectiveness is becoming a key aspect of Korea's ODA soft power as a new middle power. The first aid effectiveness conference, convened at Paris in 2005, covered not only issues of aid amount but introduced issues such as aid ownership, the need for an alignment of aid policies, and the need to harmonise institutional policies to address actual results based outcomes rather than on simply intentions and pledges. However there was a view that this conference was primarily driven by Western and OECD-DAC donors. The 2005 Paris document stated:

We resolve to take far reaching and monitorable actions to reform the way we deliver and manage aid, we recognise that while the volumes of aid and other development resources must increase to achieve these goals, aid effectiveness must increase significantly as well as its support partner country efforts to strengthen governance and improve development performance.

Focus was to be placed on best practice transparency, in reducing overhead costs, and in reducing replication and fragmentation. Effectiveness was also debated as to whether this should be measured absolute or relative, or to

based on snapshots or on trends. The main themes were renegotiating aid amount and better channelling, to decide criteria on the actual content of aid (tied or grant based) and to consider the prioritising of specific sectors as country based packages. Indeed, it would appear that traditional donors have followed new donors on this issue, no coincidence breakthrough on this came at the Busan conference in 2011 held in Korea. One result of this was to be the possible creation of National Aid Implementation Agencies based in each recipient country and based on national sovereign control. The assumption here was that a better targeting and quality of aid would solve not only the poverty trap (that was solvable) but also the institutional trap. This was the view that a negative association between aid and growth correlation could be identified but in fact there was no inconsistency between their being too little growth and too low aid. The 2013 Human Development Report publicity also notes that the 'rise of the south' has meant the need to identify and understand the changing causal relationships between emerging nations influence and the changing agenda of poverty, development and foreign aid.⁵

V. KOREAN ODA

With its recipient experience, Korea is promoting its state-led soft power through this lens. In 2010, Korea's total quantity of ODA was \$802 million (KOICA 2010). Korean ODA is defined as:

Grants and concessional loans that government organizations offer developing countries for their economic development and welfare improvement. Grants are funds that do not entail duty to repay. Concessional loans come with a duty to repay, but on relaxed terms with a grant element of over 25% (MOFAT 2010, 188).

The global aid regime does not mesh with Korea's emphasis on aid loans (rather than aid grants). Peer reviews suggest that Korea also has a high percentage of tied aid (see Table one) and a particular regional emphasis (see Table two).

TABLES: LEVELS OF UNTIED AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BILATERAL AID FROM 2001-2007⁶

TABLE 1.

	Japan (%)	South Korea (%)	DAC Average (%)
2001	81.8	1.5	79.9
2007	95.1	24.7	84.6

The table⁷ shows the 2009 regional recipient emphasis and allocation of gross bi-lateral ODA (\$ million):

TABLE 2.

	Japan (\$ million)	South Korea (\$ million)
Asia	5,068	212
Europe	512	32
Middle East/North Africa	1,647	42
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)	1,410	82
Latin America	752	64
Central Asia	2,777	92

Korea also finds itself in paradoxical N-11 strategic territory however in that by using its middle power status to increase its national power it simultaneously alienates those developing countries that have looked to Korea as a bridge to the global North and that have given Korea this role through their support. There is also a concern that Korea is simply using its ODA to 'reward' those recipient countries who helped (South) Korea during and after the Korean War (1950-1953)⁸ and a view that ODA 'payback' is used as justification for providing tied aid meaning that ODA is too thinly spread.

However, the Korean government suggests that a *qualitative* shift in ODA strategy is being developed in Seoul⁹ and Foreign Minister Kim recently said that Korean ODA policy 'will also seek partnership with foreign countries including the United States, Japan and those in Europe, and also international bodies including the UN, to contribute to ending poverty and achieving sustainable development.'¹⁰ Korean ODA can also be viewed as hierarchical paternalism in aiding states which, it is assumed, would like to emulate Korea's unique (but paradoxically exportable) developmentalist model of the

1970s in the 21st century.¹¹ The focus on loans rather than grants is justified that loans promote fiscal responsibility and inspired by Confucian ‘self help’ philosophy of personal obligation. This is also a justification for lack of investment in domestic social safety nets. There is still the cultural position that Korea’s *ODA Watch*¹² states that ‘Korea shares a unique experience of overcoming national poverty and achieving economic growth in just a few decades.’

VI. THE APPROACH OF KOICA

KOICA’s (2010)¹³ mission remains to make a better world by helping to achieve the (MDG’s) and promote equitable and sustained development in our partner countries. Before Korea joined the OECD DAC, its loans increased from \$118.6 million to \$132.2 million. Korea is also aiming to reduce its bi-lateral and loan emphasis by 2015 in accordance with the norms of the global aid regime. There are concerns in Seoul that as the global aid regime encourages further multilateralism and grant based provisions, then Korea might lose its comparative advantage in the ODA debate with its emphasis on business and loans, through which to promote its new agenda. However the new interest in business partnerships might in the long term put Korea in a prescient position. There have been concerns with the large number of recipient countries involved with Korean ODA and that Seoul is spreading its donor aid too thinly to gain maximum soft power diplomacy. Seoul says that tied aid¹⁴ will be reduced to 25% of bi-lateral ODA by 2015 but critics have suggested that this is a bureaucratic exercise in the reclassification of aid and that tied aid is continuing recipient country dependency on large scale projects. State-led and large scale projects and the emphasis on construction are based on the Korean development model. During times of economic difficulties Korea often encourages mass construction projects which is a strategy now being rethought in the context of economic democratisation.¹⁵

Firstly, KOICA clearly recognizes the need for a single legal framework and a reappraisal of the loans/grant ratios. Secondly, KOICA has accepted that Korea’s focus will now be on 56 countries to maximize the impact of ODA. Thirdly, KOICA has now emphasized the importance of providing specialist

knowledge in health, education, governance, ICT, rural development, industry, energy and the environment through encouraging more tailor-made national development plans and comprehensive national distribution of resources. Sectors such as rural development programs, education, health and Information Computer Technology (ICT) witnessed an increase in ODA along with Korea's 'green growth Korea' strategy.¹⁶ The 3rd High Level talks on foreign aid effectiveness (*Accra Accords on Aid Effectiveness*) stated that since 2005 the number of people around the world living in extreme poverty (less than \$1 a day) has fallen to one out of four people. However the lack of success in fulfilling key MDG's is being put down by reformists to capacity issues and to managerial and institutional inefficiencies.¹⁷

On 26 May 2011 Korea hosted a convention entitled 'Styles of Foreign Assistance' in preparation for the 2011 High Level Talks.¹⁸ A leading UNDP representative there emphasized the need for more effective local and national ownership of aid particularly in post-conflict and so-called 'fragile states' (Degryse-Blateau 2011). The concern was that ODA in states torn by civil war and without centralized government could actually fuel division and conflict on the one hand, or merely replicate projects on the other. The aim of foreign aid, it was suggested, was to now make 'solutions owned by the recipients through people-based development. The concern from NGOs is that once the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)¹⁹ deadline has passed then high level government attention may prioritise other areas of spending. Both NGOS and government effectiveness campaigns are pushing for better integration and better institutional capacity building to absorb aid.

VII. FROM STATE-LED AID EFFECTIVENESS TO STATE-LED PPP'S

One of the key issues following the global financial crisis is the difficulty states, in the age of austerity, have for financing development projects and for providing foreign aid. Some authors have talked about an aid 2 paradigm forming, moving from quantity issues and looking at more proactive recipients (Sumner and Mallett 2012). Such a move would also link into Korea's emphasis on PPP's. This is the view that governments at times of fiscal difficulties,

debt and austerity, are being encouraged to use the private sector. However, this approach is also affected by the fact that many businesses also seem to be reluctant to invest (as do credit banks), and the money that governments provided the private sector with to try and get Keynes's 'animal spirits' back (leading to more public debt) seems to have ended in stagnation but with further austerity packages to reduce this debt and to inspire investor confidence. At the same time austerity is hitting consumption and demand in those economies experiencing these policies. The debate of course continues between the neoliberals and Keynesians on this (Krugman 2012). Given this context, one argument is that public projects should now be aided by the private sector and the two sectors can work together. This model is now being translated into the ODA debate with the view that foreign aid can and should now be placed more at the door of responsible private businesses rather than to the maze of aid bureaucracies and 'planners' (Easterly 2006). Likewise, donor state austerity and fiscal tightening can be regarded as either a determining factor behind the new interest in private and public partnerships, or, as being a fetter on a public and private partnership ODA model. However, in this new climate of emerging nations and new donors, as well as stalemate between neoliberals and Keynesianists, then a pro-business strategy from the private sector does not necessarily mean dogmatic neoliberal policies. On the contrary, many small and medium size businesses, as well as larger businesses, are reflecting on the neoliberal model as perhaps counter-productive to business and missing the larger social consequences (and therefore profit consequences) of unfettered neoliberal globalization. Moreover, the business sector is diverse and can clearly benefit from state subsidies and protection. Many policymakers are arguing, however, that the choice between the public and the private is a false choice and both sectors can and always have been able to work together, if the political will is there. UN General Secretary Ban ki-Moon recently stated this:

I thank the Global Compact Korea Network for working so hard to further align business in Korea with the goals and priorities of the United Nations ... to raise awareness about corporate sustainability and the role that business can and must play in building a better world for all. A vibrant corporate movement is underway. The UN now

counts business as a key partner. More than 6000 companies in 140 countries are participating in the Global Compact. More and more companies are coming to see that ignoring environmental, social, and governance issues can have a negative impact on the bottom line.²⁰

Initial questions with these top down initiatives include: What is the actual nature of this partnership in terms of resources and power in the short to long term? And whose interests are being best served by this partnership? Similarly, the issue of fair and equal partnership is being promoted by new donors such as south-south relations.

Korean Government Ministries, private sector organisations and UN bodies launched 'Development Alliance Korea' to help boost South Korea's implementation of the "Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation." This initiative now takes a new look at the role of the private sector as a shift away from the state and from NGOs, the traditional actors of foreign aid. At the same time it is realized that this is more than businesses simply 'filling the gap' of a now limited and indebted state as a result of the financial crisis. East Asia does not seem to have such concerns and can therefore act more as 'heroic' soft power leaders as opposed to the parochial and apparently malign West. The argument here is that results based approach to ODA (whatever the intentions) could deliver much needed economic development and virtuous cycle. Korean businesses such as Asiana and Samsung are engaged in community based (not necessarily led) development projects in South East Asia. KOICA's current vision of public and private partnerships continues to be elite led and as a response, a number of smaller NGOs are now beginning to have a creatively pragmatic impact on the Korean ODA debate and concern for instance is with local community dependency on big business technology and labour. However, these private/public partnership initiatives can also go beyond the current elite-led aid effectiveness and aid trap debates in order to actually rethink the site and nature of the private and public through cultivating new networks of NGO-small/medium business relationships at the start-up and community level. This links to recent interest in so-called economic democratization in South Korea.

The Chaebol business is generally regarded by the government as a

potential area for ODA resources and an insurance of a ‘too big to fail.’ For small businesses in the donor and recipient countries, Chaebols still tend to monopolise the technology sector and crowd out non-state backed businesses. Critics of the Chaebols argue that small businesses do well *in spite* of Chaebol growth and South Korean narratives on ODA are predicated on the following assumptions. Firstly, economic development is the priority and democracy will catch up when the time is right. Secondly, economic development is based on a cultural narrative of a ‘We Koreans’ ethnic nationalism, reflected by economic and political elites. Thirdly, the developmentalist Korean model from the 1970s is a stages-of-growth model which is assumed to be a strategy that aid recipient countries can and should replicate. The developmentalist model is framed as a national development model which is then ostensibly separated from the global and regional context of Korea’s development during the Cold War and post-cold War eras. There is also the historical and methodological issues as to the abstracting of history and debates concerning the reality of the Korean developmentalist model in the first place and its survival in the context of the 21st century global political economy (Cherry 2005; Kalinowsky 2008, 2009; Park 2011; Pirie 2005, 2005a, 2012; Strange 2011; Stubbs 2009). Not only is this historically problematic but paradoxically can often hint at a universalisation of a unique model which is in effect an unintentional neocolonialism under the guise of ‘soft power.’ If we take a step back then, paradoxically, the argument relies on both an ahistorical economic trade theory *and* the concrete historical uniqueness of South Korea’s own development experience. Secondly, many recipient countries actually suffer from conditions not experienced by Korea such as natural resource curse and ethnic tensions.

The implication here is that the private sector has the resources and technical expertise whilst the state is unable to provide funds as a result of austerity, it can protect and provide a better risk environment for companies and recipient governments. Such a relationship between the state and business can often be reinterpreted as Korean state-business patronage. Another twist here would be Moyo’s (2009) point that less government funding means less tax burden on citizens and with less tax burden comes less involvement and representation in state affairs, or a ‘Boston tea party in reverse.’ According to Yoo (2010) in Korea, PPP’s were first introduced in the First Enactment of 1994 which was entitled ‘The Private Capital Inducement Promotion Act’ with

an amendment in 2005 as the 'Act on Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure Diversification.' Distinctions are made between Build Transfer Operate (BTO) projects or construction by a private consortium, with ownership transferred to the government and then operated by the private sector; or BTL (Build Transfer Lease) with construction by the private sector, ownership by the government and then future lease by government. In Korea, BTO in December 2009 counted at \$44.8 billion and BTL recorded at \$16.8 billion. The benefits for the public are assumed to be smooth supply and product quality and efficiency, the creation of new jobs in the private sector as a 'trickle down' innovations in new technologies and sharing of risk. For the private sector, there is the added inducement of a long term relationship with government (but dangers of patronage) and that the government can save time and focus on other issues that the public are concerned with, and therefore increasing democratic accountability. For Hawkesworth (2011), PPP's are the Provision by private sector of a public service through a contract that backloads the cash flow payment for the government arising from the provision of the service, and sharing of risk between public and private sector that is innovative with respect to traditional forms of risk sharing' provides value for money. As Hawkesworth (2011) notes, the percentage of public sector infrastructure projects which now count as PPP's in the OECD, range from 0-5% (Austria, Germany, Canada, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Holland, Hungary, Norway, Spain), from 5-10% (UK, Czech, Slovakia, Greece, Italy, South Africa, Ireland), from 10-15% (Korea) and from 20% (Mexico, Chile). In this sense it seems to be the emerging nations that seem to be picking up the PPP approach. According to Araujo and Sutherland (2010, 8) a PPP is recently defined as:

An agreement is defined as a long term contractual relationships between a public body and a private partner (or a consortium of private firms) for the construction and operation of infrastructure. The private partner will be in charge of building, managing and asset maintenance, service provision and for financing the investment, in exchange of regular payment by the government and /or user charges.

Critics suggest Korean PPP's are merely a continuity of state-Chaebol

dominance from the South Korean developmentalist model. Moreover, many contracts are based on 'bundling' and on previous experience of good relations which can lead to greater accountability and trust with no need for the lengthy tendering or contracts but can also lead to a partnership which can become exclusive and based on a form of patronage (which is always an issue in Confucian based societies) and which can cause monopolies, intellectual property rights and innovation/patent issues. Other concerns are as follows. Firstly, that business by definition has narrow corporate interests and is using these partnerships merely to promote a superficial corporate social responsibility. Secondly, the size of the business means that in the South Korean case, specifically, it is not the 'free market' but Chaebol business which may counter-productively crowd-out local business within South Korea and in the recipient country. However, there is an argument to suggest that if businesses are to be involved, then recipient countries have more trust in the resources of the established corporations. The question is whether the partnerships are packaged and 'exported' as a model and then have 'add ons' as part of the model evolution, or, whether the partnership model can be cultivated at the local level as an ongoing process with a built in flexibility from the very start. Thirdly, businesses are responsible to their shareholders rather than the local population. However this argument ignores the fact that shareholders can also be stakeholders and voluntary donors to NGOs. This is not an either/or case and indeed, many larger NGOs are often shareholders in big companies to enforce and to make sure companies adhere to the Global Compact and other such responsible initiatives.

Thus it is suggested that 'Korea should make efforts to strengthen and broaden the global development partnership, and also to create common guidelines that all stakeholders-including emerging donors and private aid players-can support. Korea has experience both as an emerging donor and now a DAC member; this experience could help build a bridge the two communities.'²¹ Representatives from the Korea NGO Council for Overseas Cooperation, the Federation of Korean Industries, the Korean Council for University Education, the Korea Association of International Development and Cooperation, the Global Compact Network Korea, the UN Academic Impact Korea, the Foreign Ministry and KOICA formed the umbrella Development

Alliance.²² Many of the corporate participants include the major South Korean Chaebols such as POSCO, Hyundai Motor and LG.²³ The Development Alliance comes as a part of the government's efforts to streamline and enhance the efficacy of its aid projects but there are concerns that this is merely big business marketing and not a fundamental change in state-business partnerships that exclude NGOs or at best tolerate civil society. Indeed, Chaebols are criticized for stifling creativity and efficiency through unproductive rent seeking activities.

Seoul's ODA totaled \$1.32 billion in 2011 and is now consisting of grants and low-interest loans. This reflects a remarkable 12.5 percent jump from 2010 and a six-fold growth since 2000. To continue this level, therefore, the Korean government is wanting more of an input from the private sector as fears of debt and domestic poverty in Korea are also emerging (housepoor) as a result of the real estate crisis. Participants of the UN Global Compact 2011 CSR Conference agreed to enhance human rights in business in respect to the UN "Protect, Respect, and Remedy" Framework, to promote 'harmonious' industrial relations and welfare, and to welcome Union Social Responsibility (USR) as an innovative initiative introduced by leading Korean firms. The group also aims to find innovative methods to contribute to the UN MDGs and encourage the implementation of the 5W (World, Weather, Water, Wisdom, and Welfare) by enhancing the "1 company to 1 tribe" partnership between large firms and SMEs in order to improve supply chain sustainability and achieve corporate sustainability.

On Feb 16, 2009, SK Telecom held a meeting called Corporate Citizen Committee consisting of 3 outside-the-company executive directors along with 2 internal executive directors. It was established in May 2008 under the control of the board of trustees and aims to inspect SK Telecom's management transparency and social contributions such as Global compact. In May 2007, SKT joined UN Global Compact and was the 1st among Korea's Big 4 (Samsung, Hyundai, LG, SK) to join UN Global Compact. SKT's progress is evaluated by the Corporate Citizen Committee. In 2009, SKT plans on establishing a supporting committee as well as organizing 4 committee meetings instead of semiannual meetings of previous years, thereby raising the level of sustainable management. Samsung-Tesco-Homeplus also joined the Global

Compact in 2009.²⁴ Chang points out that KOICA have teamed up with Asiana Airlines to help provide funds for buying textbooks to Cambodia. However if the local community is involved there are a number of problems here such as the quality of textbooks and the age level of textbooks to fit in with the country educational culture.

For instance, on the question of the Korean airlines, there have been numerous examples cited of how aid can take the form of passenger cash donations given during the flight (a moral captive trade for aid) and financial donations from the company or passengers of 'free air miles' to voluntary organizations so as to help their workers actually travel to the recipient country. Whether the corporations have acquired their wealth through the free market and such freedom of choice however is a matter of opinion, particularly with respect to South Korean corporations. In this sense, the view would be that the corporations provide the money and the NGOs and state institutions 'get on with using it.' For the state this makes foreign aid easier to sell to a taxpaying public back home at a time of economic austerity.

VIII. PPP's, NGO'S AND CIVIL SOCIETY

So an alternative PPP model can be constructed from NGO-local business partnerships, along with donor and recipient states. As mentioned, the concern from NGOS is that the big companies use this as 'soft power' and companies create confusion as to their intentions. For the South Korean government, by linking its foreign aid with South Korean corporations, the activities reflect on the soft power of the government as 'national brand.' This partnership might indirectly affect diplomatic relations between governments as their image and relations is reliant on other actors' behavior. On the public/private partnership issue, the view from KOICA in recipient countries such as Laos is that:

Aid should be planned and implemented upon the needs of the local community, not under the discretion of the donor state. We have to blend with the local community as we cannot procure all necessary material and human resources from Korea ... Aid organizations are often blamed for spending money, time and human resources on other

states instead of on the local low-income bracket. International aid, however, is not just a moral deed but a crucial role for a country to play in the global society. We see ourselves as salespersons for Korea, promoting its brand image and delivering its culture to overseas countries.²⁵

There is also interest in developing local cooperative movements as stakeholding. This is an important point but can be countered; what if there had been no initial donor aid to government, would things have been worse? Second, questions are also being asked about project replications and so-called white elephants. Competition between donors and the universalizing of each country's ODA model is unproductive and more productive energy should be directed toward exploiting each donor's different expertise and different responsibilities. This would assuage the temptation to superimpose a perhaps counter-productive 1970s developmentalist industrial model on countries which are simply bypassing this stage of development anyway.²⁶

One recent proposal from the top down partnership advocates has been for the channelling of public ODA grants into the social safety sector which means local and national government is also relieved from imposing higher taxation on the private business sector to provide welfare. This means a business sector can be encouraged and a business cycle can be started. In fact Korea's social sector ODA amount therefore comprised of 46% of its total ODA which was 15% higher than the DAC between 1990-2008. For NGOs, the strategic issue is whether a partnership with business undermines NGO credibility in the local community even if funding is available. This is the strategic balance for NGOs and the importance of maintaining trust, particularly important as I will show, for smaller NGOs. The Development Alliance has argued that grant provision can encourage local businesses through NGO deployment can encourage grassroots business initiative. In other words the model aims to both promote a 'combination' of smart power in the form of loans and grants to use South Korean big business and enhance business in the recipient country. Seoul argues that this is a progressive and more responsible approach to ODA for jump-starting a country's development.²⁷

Seoul has committed to a long term objective to make its ODA 90%

grant-based by 2015 but this view of grants is different from established Western donors.²⁸ Critics from established donors argue that Seoul has deliberately set the bar on grant provision at a low level so as to gain political capital for any small increase in grant provision. However the site and nature of 'grant' is now being contested by the new partnership model as a package of grants and loans to encourage local businesses which can be self sustaining and link to NGO strategies.

KOICA is increasingly aware of the need to create an integrated strategy of providing ODA in the context of local cultures and societies in donor and recipient countries. Korean government officials have argued that the Korean public still wants to see immediate results and to know exactly what they are getting for their money. Therefore this space ironically provides an opportunity for collaboration between business and NGOs. Indeed NGOs clearly want to be more included with larger policies but recognize the dangers of inclusion with this as they do not have the big resources. The problem is that smaller NGOs are constantly submitting proposals, hoping to catch KOICA's attention for funding. So teaming up with South Korean businesses and bypassing KOICA would seem an interesting strategy. Moreover, there are concerns that after 2015 as the deadline of the MDG's then smaller NGOs such as *Global Civic Sharing* will struggle to attract this funding and that donations will be transferred to the larger 'corporate' brand NGOs. Funding for Korean NGOs comes from KOICA, individual philanthropists and the Korean corporate sector. Whether or not an NGO receives funding often depends on personal connections and on a particular NGOs track-record through a results-based assessment. With calls for the Korean government to focus more on multilateralism and civil society movements from the OECD-DAC, smaller, multifaith or secularised NGOs are beginning to get funding from elsewhere such as the private sector. In this sense the idea of partnership is purely based on previous funding strategies but this relationship is now entering new territory at the local community level. This is because NGOs are concerned with KOICA's reaction to this and smaller NGOS might even become financially stranded with KOICA's emphasis on 'corporate NGOs' and results based effectiveness. Thus, a partnership with local businesses would counter the fear of NGOs that they will run out of funds. NGOs and business

working together at the local level backed by a new global regime on corporate responsibility would ease the pressure for the smaller NGOs. However the danger would be that the larger NGOs become backed by Chaebols and smaller South Korean businesses would be backing smaller NGOs. This would create a strategic and uncoordinated competition with the civil society community which would fuel further project replication and lack of self-sustaining community development. Moreover, a big business focus on elite NGOs would simply crowd out more creative businesses and NGOs. For instance, bigger NGOs may take smaller NGO workers with better job prospects and undo years of trust building in the community. This trust is cultivated by educational programs and cross cultural programs often in the most basic but vital ways. For instance, Director Kim²⁹ also said that a shift to permanent library access in a school setting rather than through a 'mobile library,' as well as the distribution of library cards to children, also creates a 'feeling' of having a regular educational environment. *Global Civic Sharing* (GCS) has developed specific rural projects such as the creation of a clean water supply, a sustainable use of local resources and the ownership of resources, and the improving of school age education through mobile libraries and 'happy trucks.' Emphasis is placed both on using the talents of South Korean human capital in technology and engineering but at the same time recognising the need for alternative and cross-cultural training. The main concern is how to attract the most effective talents of Korean students. Recruiting from Korean universities and setting up 'open days' for foreign exchange students is now beginning to occur. KOICA has recently inaugurated a 'World Friends Korea' program by sending 4000 trained Korean volunteers overseas to aid with this training. There are still problem of maintaining incentives for Koreans to work overseas if their employment is not with the prestige of established government ministries.

Stakeholding and ownership have become key issues in the partnership between the private and public. Emphasis has been placed on local initiative and creativity and projects to supply electricity to schools which increase education and studying in Kenya.³⁰ Smaller NGOs recognize that the developmentalist model of industrialization is a stage now being leapt over by many recipient countries. This means alternative approaches to local initiatives and ownership. At the same time an argument could be made that either this turns

into a local cooperative movement with ownership by the community or it evolves into larger business organizations with more shareholder funders. But the direction of initiative challenges the old ODA models. For instance, the use of mobile phones means no longer a reliance on traditional infrastructure such as rail and road projects. Relatively cheap mobile phones are being assembled from imported materials into countries such as Rwanda which has become the first country in the East African region to set up a mobile phone handset-assembling plant. Focus on south-south partnerships, as well as PPP's is linked to economic democratization in Korea.³¹

This has also been an issue for the Presidential Committee on Shared Growth for Large and Small Companies which is still a paternalism and contradiction in the Korean approach. However, South Korean electronic goods manufacturer LG is planning to establish a Ksh100 million (\$1.4 million) mobile phone handset assembly plant in Kenya by next year. LG said the Nairobi-based company would lead to a reduction in the prices of mobile handsets in Kenya by 15 per cent. KOICA also recognize the need for more emphasis on the connections involved in development strategy. For instance, small investment in street lighting bulbs in Laos, allows markets and businesses to stay open longer and make more profit. This strategy would seem to correspond to the 'aid' effectiveness debates and William Easterly's (2006) 'searchers.' However, searchers experimentation strategies might take a while to find the 'magic bullet,' and time is money. In this sense, big business can focus funding more effectively but then loses local creativity and risk taking.

Whether KOICA can sustain state-led funding for this strategy remains to be seen, particularly if aid effectiveness is linked to a justification for reductions in donor and recipient government spending. In this case, a promotion of business partnerships might not only fill the gap to reductions in state funding as a result of 'greater effectiveness' but also offer alternative proposals and 'packages' of aid project design. For Global Civic Sharing, local community development agencies, NGOs and local smaller businesses, encourage local communities to have a direct financial stake in the development programs by putting a small amount of money (25 cents) into a pool. The goal is for the local community to be able to say after project completion 'we did that.'³²

Crucially, there is no separation made between the agencies and ‘the people,’ with the realization that local community recipients are also business people and NGO workers with a multitude of interests and stakeholding positions. This complexity tends to be lost at the top down level where recipients are all paternalistically framed as ‘victims.’

Smaller NGOs are sometimes criticised for their local ‘parochial’ approach and in not ‘seeing the big picture’ due to lack of resources. *Global Civic Sharing* argues that seeing the big picture and ‘connecting the dots’ is only strategically possible from a grassroots approach in today’s globalizing world where local and global are so intertwined. Indeed, it is the centralized approach that often becomes ‘tunnel visioned’ and fails to see connections between cause and effect.

IX. CONCLUSION

The paper has argued that local and non-elite NGOs can effectively build alternative private and public partnerships between emergent donor countries and recipient countries through civic citizenship and educational projects. The aid effectiveness debate has now generated interest in the private and public partnerships, but there is concern that as a middle power state Korea is promoting this through state-led soft power to reinforce state-chaebol relationships. An alternative narrative on PPP’s is emerging from Korean NGOS. This is very early days but Seoul’s positioning on this issue addresses key ways, both strategic and normative, of going beyond the stagnant aid trap debate and opens up more strategic and normative opportunities for recipient countries and their relationships with donor country actors.

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ENDNOTES

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- ² <http://www.cfr.org/emerging-markets/joint-statement-fifth-brics-summit-durban-march-2013/p30341>.
- ³ <http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/global-governance-middle-powers-south-koreas-role-g20/p30062>.
- ⁴ http://www.globalasia.org/V7N3_Fall_2012/Yul_Sohn.html.
- ⁵ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/humandevlopmentreportpresskits/2013report/>.
- ⁶ http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0.3349.en_2649_34447_1783495_1_1_1_1.00.html.
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- ⁸ 'Lending a Helping Hand: Interview with Park, Dae-won, President of KOICA,' The Joong Ang Daily, 26 January 2011.
- ⁹ 'Korea's Foreign Aid Jumps 14%' Available at <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/news/biz/2011/02/123-42330.html>.
- ¹⁰ The JoongAng Daily at <http://mengnews.joinmsn.com/view.aspx?gCat=030&aId=2957861>.
- ¹¹ 'Lending a Helping Hand: Interview with Park, Dae-won, President of KOICA' The Joong Ang Daily, 26 January 2011.
- ¹² <http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng/include/glance.php>.
- ¹³ KOICA at <http://www.mofat.go.kr/koica>.
- ¹⁴ Aid given on the presumption that South Korean companies will have future access to resources and markets in the recipient country.
- ¹⁵ On Jan. 27, the conservative Grand National Party, now the Saenuri Party, announced it would include "economic democratization" in its party platform. It pledged "to promote economic democratization in order to realize a fair-competition economy that protects the market, small and mid-sized businesses and consumers from mammoth economic forces." The legal basis for the concept was stipulated in the Constitution upon its revision in 1987 in item 2 of Article 119 of the Constitution that the constitutional term of economic democratization 'refers to efforts to promote balanced growth, economic stability and equitable income distribution and to prevent market domination by a select few and their abuse of economic power.'
- ¹⁶ 'Korea to Boost Renewable Energy Sector' The Chosun Ilbo, 14 October 2011.
- ¹⁷ There is concern that MDG's deadline of 2015 creates an artificial timeframe and post-2015 attention might mean that government funds will be placed elsewhere. Moreover, not achieving the goals might also lead to disillusionment in donor and recipient states. On the other hand a deadline does raise awareness and processes set in place prior to 2015 might continue as 'virtuous circle' momentum jump-started by ODA.
- ¹⁸ Styles of Foreign Assistance Convention, Lotte Jamsil Hotel, 26 May 2011.
- ¹⁹ These are, eradicate extreme poverty and hunger/Achieve universal primary school enrollment/Promote gender equality and empower women/Reduce child mortality/Improve maternal health/Combat HIV/Ensure environmental sustainability/Increase global partnerships.
- ²⁰ <http://unglobalcompact.kr/eng/21.htm?ptype=view&idx=1537>.
- ²¹ 'Korea's Role in Global Development' The Brookings Institute at. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/02/09-korea-global-development>.
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- ²³ <http://view.koreaherald.com/kh/view.php?ud=20120813001118&cpv=0>.
- ²⁴ http://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/commitment_letters/4908/original/Global_Compact_Join_Letter_8334.pdf?1262613537.
- ²⁵ Korea Herald interview with KOICA Chief in Laos, Director Kwon, <http://www.koreaherald.com/kh/view.php?ud=20120513000104>.
- ²⁶ http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/04/116_55998.html.

- ²⁷ The South Korean Constitution states: The state must regulate and coordinate economic affairs in order to maintain the balanced growth and stability of the national economy, to ensure proper distribution of income, to prevent the domination of the market and the abuse of economic power and to democratize the economy through harmony among the economic agents.
- ²⁸ <http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng/include/glance.php>.
- ²⁹ 'Group discussion, Global Civic Sharing, 1701, Garden Tower, Anguk, Seoul, 27 May 2011.
- ³⁰ 'Bright Ideas for a Brighter Future' Time at [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0.9171.2123704.00.html](http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171.2123704.00.html).
- ³¹ 'Who helps Ahn's undeclared bid' The Korea Times 14 September, 2.
- ³² Interview with Minyoung Kim, Director Global Civic Sharing, Seoul, 27 May 2011.