Received March 7, 2018

Revised June 4, 2018

Accepted June 18, 2018

What's So Peaceful about Asian Peace?

BLAKE HOFFMAN* • PAUL F DIEHL** • ANDREW OWSIAK*** •

GARY GOERTZ**** • YAHVE GALLEGOS*****

Previous work on an Asian peace has been imprecise on where, when, and why it occurs. This study examines different levels of state-based peace starting with the absence of war; unlike other treatments, however, we examine the incidence of civil war as well as the traditional interstate war. We then consider a more stringent threshold for peace, focusing on the absence or diminution of violent conflicts short of war, specifically incidents of militarized disputes and lesser conflicts. Finally, we look a broader conception of peace ("positive peace") and examine all state relationships in Asia along a peace scale, which ranges from serious rivalries to negative peace to integrated security communities. Our findings indicate the strongest evidence for Asian peace with respect to avoiding interstate war. Nevertheless, there are significant conflicts involving violence and the threat of military force that persist in the region. A number of rivalries, many of them long-standing, continue to raise the specter of war. In addition, positive peace in Asia is rare for interstate relations and isolated to a few states for internal peace.

Keywords: peace, war, Asia, ASEAN, conflict, negative peace, positive peace, rivalry

* Ph.D. candidate, University of Texas at Dallas, USA;

E-mail: bmh160030@utdallas.edu

** Corresponding Author, Ashbel Smith Professor, University of Texas at Dallas, USA; E-mail: pdiehl@utdallas.edu

*** Associate professor, University of Georgia, USA; E-mail: aowskiak@uga.edu

**** Professor, University of Notre Dame, USA; E-mail: ggoertz@nd.edu

***** Ph.D. candidate, University of Texas at Dallas, USA;

E-mail: Yahve.Gallegos@utdallas.edu

DOI: 10.16934/isr.19.1.201806.49

I. INTRODUCTION

There have been numerous claims about a so-called “Asian Peace.” Some confine this to the eastern section of that region (e.g., Kivimaki 2014a), whereas other authors conceive of it as including Northeast Asia (e.g., Sung-Han 2008) and extend the notion to Southeast Asia as well (e.g., Tang 2012). Besides the uncertainty about the geographic reach of any peace, there is divergence on the characteristics of the purported peace. For some scholars, it is little more than “negative peace,” or the absence of war (e.g., Kivimaki 2010). Other analyses conceive of a peace that involves broader economic cooperation and integration, especially with respect to Association of South East Asian Nations or ASEAN (e.g., Weismann 2010; Acharya 2001). Further complicating the vision of Asian peace is the literature on Asian rivalries (e.g., Chan 2013; Ganguly and Thompson 2011), which identifies a number of serious and militarized rivalries among states in the region, which suggests an undertone of significant hostility in what is thought to be a zone of peace.

Before one can properly account for any peace in Asia, its existence must be documented and its scope and form(s) determined. This study offers a multidimensional look at peace in the Asian region over a broad historical time frame (1900-2017). The analysis specifically concentrates on state peace rather than transnational or community-based peace. In addition, the bulk of this study examines various forms of negative peace, although we also touch on some elements positive peace, although again confined to the state-level.

To understand if and when Asian peace exists, we examine different levels of peace starting with the most basic dealing with the absence of war; unlike other treatments, however, we examine the incidence of civil war as well as the traditional interstate war. We then consider a more stringent threshold for peace, focusing on the absence or diminution of violent conflicts short of war, specifically incidents of militarized disputes and lesser conflicts. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that we do not cover all types of conflict, but we cast a wide net to capture confrontations between and within states that range from severe to more tempered disagreements. Finally, we take a broader conception of peace (“positive peace”) and examine all state relationships in Asia along a peace scale, which ranges from serious rivalries to negative peace to integrated security communities. We also examine different elements of the Global Peace Index to ascertain the extent of peace internal to states in the region. The use of data starting with the advent of the 20th century allows us to document patterns over time and pinpoint the timing of any Asian peace that is identified.

II. PREVIOUS VISIONS OF THE ASIAN PEACE

The extensive research on the “democratic peace” (e.g., Russett and Oneal 2001) – that is, the finding that democracies don’t fight each other – spawned a series of extensions in which scholars explored so-called “zones of peace” (Kacowicz 1998), which collectively imply geographic patterns to the absence of war between states, besides those based solely on regime type. It is in this context that works on the Asian peace emerged.

1. What Constitutes Peace?

There is some variability in the conceptual and operational definitions of peace used by scholars claiming that an Asian peace exists. This is consistent with the various descriptions could be used to define peace in specific geographical locations around the world (e.g., Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). Conventionally, and as is true of Asian analyses, many have focused on the frequency and effects of war. This could be the so-called “ASEAN Peace” (Kivimaki 2010), which has been described as the absence of intra- and interstate conflict in the geographical areas of the states that belong to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; conflict tends to be conceptualized as full-scale war. Other analyses focus on the number of battle deaths as an indicator to determine whether peace exists, rather than using frequency of conflict onsets (Goldsmith 2014; Kivimaki 2010). Introducing a temporal element, “Relative Peace” (Kivimaki 2010) in Asia can be defined not as state of being, but rather as a trend in which the average yearly deaths from warfare decline, but violence still occurs. Moving beyond overt violence, researchers have looked at “dangerous grounds” (Katchen 1977), regions that lack violent conflict, but remain at risk for future military disputes. There, peace is more than the simple war or fatalities, but includes the lack of a significant threat of war as well.

These studies place an emphasis on negative forms of peace. That is, they are concerned with violent conflict. Its absence or diminution is equated to peace. Nevertheless, this classifies relationships in North Asia, which has been free of full-scale war since the Korean War but contains serious rivalries, into the same category as that between New Zealand and Australia, who have a close partnership in many areas. There are also potential pitfalls of using battle death indicators as an argument for peace in Asia, as it may obscure for the less hostile, but still conflictual, relationships between states (Beeson 2015).

The previous conceptions focused primarily on interstate conflict. Analyses of internal conflict as representative of peace are less common in studies of the Asian peace, but indicators, such as intentional homicide data from the United Nations Drugs and Crime records, have been used as evidence to

support the perception of relative peace in Asia (Kivimaki 2010).

Most prior work has ignored positive conceptions of peace even as there are many cooperative and integrative behaviors between and within states in the region. Some researchers have been trying to determine how peace can “deepen” within the region (e.g. Kivimaki 2014b), suggesting a more nuanced conception of peace that includes cooperation in addition to the absence of armed conflict. Still, the ideas that peace can exist in varying degrees and involves more than limiting or avoiding violent conflict are underdeveloped in past work.

2. Spatial and Temporal Dimensions

If peace is defined largely in negative terms, where in Asia is it present and during what time frame(s)? Again, there is some imprecision in how these questions are answered in extant studies. Perhaps most commonly, peace in the region is described as occurring in “East Asia.” The countries considered within East Asia and the zone of fewer conflict-related deaths include China, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Mongolia, and the states that constitute ASEAN (Kivimaki 2001; Tang 2012).¹ Burma/Myanmar and the Philippines are regarded as exceptions because they have experienced significant battle-related deaths from internal conflict (Kivimaki 2010).

Researchers have extended the notion to other areas, such as Northeast Asia (Sung-Han 2008), Southeast Asia (Tang 2012), or both (Kivimaki 2014a; Goldsmith 2014). With respect to Northeast Asia, the spatial parameters encompass China, Japan, Mongolia, and the two Koreas. Nevertheless, scholars have pointed out that Japan and Mongolia’s peace started earlier than the rest of the East Asian region (Kivimaki 2010). Some have included Russia and the United States as well, as least as far as their Asian activities have been involved (e.g. Sung-Han 2008). Generally, treatments of the Asian peace do not extend to all states in the Pacific. Notable exclusions are Australia and New Zealand, countries that have had long-standing peaceful relationships with one another and largely with proximate neighbors as well.

Scholars who argue that an Asian peace exists have not necessarily agreed on its timing beyond that it exists at the time that the research was published. In terms of peace onset, 1967 and 1979 are cited as watershed years for peace in ASEAN and East Asia respectively (Kivimaki 2010). The Bangkok Declaration in 1967 by the initial 5 member states of ASEAN was the foundation for peace development in Southeast Asia by establishing norms for non-interference, cooperation, and amity. The timing of the declaration and purported trend towards more peaceful relations among countries who joined ASEAN occurs against the backdrop of a major militarized conflict in the region, the Vietnam War. Thus, the selection of the onset year is based more on the alleged

“explanatory variable” rather than primarily or exclusively on the decline in conflict; the timing of peace here is also confined to the ASEAN area.

Adopting a more deductive standard, battle deaths and conflict declined at least in East Asia beginning in 1979 (Goldsmith 2014; Kivimaki 2010). The key timing for the inception of East Asian peace after 1979 ironically occurs during a period of upward global trends in average yearly battle deaths. The average number of yearly battle deaths in the rest of Asia continued to rise after 1979 as well, suggesting that the East Asian peace is not the result of global or larger regional trends towards peace (Kivimaki 2001; Kivimaki 2010). The estimated number of battle deaths in East Asia in the period of 1950 to 1979 is approximately 4.2 million, while the period of 1980 to 2005 produces approximately 100,000 deaths (Tonnesson 2009).

Moreover, transition points in the 1980s and 1990s have been pointed to as further entrenching peace within these regions (Xiao 2016; Weissmann 2010). That is, these transition points are defined by events that lead East Asian states into even more peaceful and friendlier relationships, once again paying as much attention to purported cause as the effect in defining any Asian peace. More specifically, the transition point event that helped root a concept of peace in the region were changes in China’s foreign policy in the early 1980s that reflected the country as a “quasi-status quo” state, promoting peace and economic development, rather than a revolutionary state characterized by being prepared for war (Xiao 2016).

3. *Rivalries in Asia*

In parallel are studies of Asian interstate rivalries. These are long-standing, militarized competitions between states, in which the threat, display, and use of force are common, even as they might not always escalate to war. Dreyer and Thompson (2014) identify 32 rivalries in Asia since 1816, with nine of them ongoing as of 2010. Moreover, Ganguly and Thompson (2011) identify five modern ongoing rivalries taking place in East Asia and Southeast Asia as China-Japan, China-Taiwan, China-United States, North Korea-South Korea, and Malaysia-Singapore respectively. The authors also distinguish between two types of rivalries. One type is characterized as a common rivalry of two adjacent states; the other reflects contention over regional superiority (Ganguly and Thompson 2011).

At first glance, the prevalence of rivalries in Asia calls into question the existence of any Asian peace. Repeated militarized confrontations and threats between states, some involving nuclear weapons, are not what most observers would regard as commensurate with peace. Ideally, true peace (no militarized conflict or threat thereof) would involve the absence of rivalries between states in

the region. Recall, however, that Asian peace is often defined in terms of war, and rivalries only rarely escalate to that most severe level of conflict. In addition, there is a decline in the number of rivalries in the region following World War II, even as the pattern is uneven when one takes a subregional perspective. Dreyer and Thompson (2014) conclude: "Southeast Asian rivalries have died off while those of South Asia remain constant in recent decades. East Asian rivalries, usually involving China, initially focused on European actors (and Japan) operating in Chinese territory. After World War II, they have been more likely to involve asymmetrical rivalries between either states once much stronger than China (the United States and the Soviet Union) or much weaker (Taiwan and Vietnam). Central Asia, thanks in large degree to Russian occupation, has long remained an arena not characterized by much rivalry activity, but that may be in the process of changing, albeit slowly."

Other scholars possess more optimistic outlooks for enduring rivalries and for the prospect of peace in East Asia. Chan (2013) suggests that there is a diminution rather than exacerbation of hostility associated with rivalries in the region. By looking at various indicators of rivalries, one can detect a shift towards economic openness, interdependence, and multilateral relations that has helped countries transition towards more peaceful relations. A combination of less contentious third party involvement (such as by the US) and the proclivity towards economic openness and interdependence are believed to have positively influenced the rivalrous relationships within the region. Chan (2013, 79) concludes: "East Asia does not appear on the whole to be a more contentious or more belligerent region than others, nor does it appear to be poised to enter a more turbulent period. Although the number of militarized interstate disputes has remained steady or even increased for some dyads, the general trend points to declining regional tension." In fact, the author predicts that economic growth downturns could be the primary obstacle to or why rivalry relationships might intensify in the future. More specifically, the author states that when the economy falters, political elites are more likely to turn to nationalism in order to ensure their political survival. That is, political leaders use nationalistic policies to promote their popularity when economic downturns occur, which leads to more regional contestation.

Overall, there appears to be some consensus that an Asian peace exists. Nevertheless, there is less agreement or clarity on the geographic scope of the peace and the timing of its onset. More seriously, it is unclear what kind of peace is posited for the region, with at best some understanding that negative peace (the absence of war) is present, but little more to tell us about more positive types of peace. In the analyses below, we seek to examine different patterns of Asian conflict behavior to determine if, when, where, and what kind of any Asian peace exists.

III. EMPIRICAL PATTERNS

Before presenting our own empirical analyses, we need to clarify some of the parameters of our study. First, we need to define more clearly the scope of the Asian region. A broad definition, one that encompasses the entire Asia-Pacific region, allows us to detect not only general patterns of peace but also permits any identification of subregional patterns. We begin with reference to the regional divisions devised by the Correlates of War (COW) Project and its set of state members of the international system.² COW lists 47 states, ranging from China to Nauru, as being in the Asian region. This constitutes the core population, and we investigate conflict between members of this group. In addition, there are other states whose territory includes part of the Asian continent, specifically Turkey and Russia. In these cases, we also consider conflict involving these states, but only vis-à-vis other Asian states, thereby ignoring the involvement of such multicontinental states in conflicts that occur in the Middle East and Europe. Finally, we make occasional reference to conflict between the United States, the most significant extra-regional power, and any Asian states as a separate category; this permits an analysis to discern whether any exceptions to an Asian peace are driven by external powers.

Second, we conceptualize peace in non-binary and multifaceted terms. Peace is conceptualized not as a condition that exists or not, but one that can vary in degree. In addition, we do not look exclusively at the absence of war (“negative peace”) to define rather peace. Rather, we also consider lesser violent conflict and the threat of violent conflict to identify degrees of peace. Finally, we look to “positive peace” indicators as a way to move beyond conflict to consider different conceptions of peace including cooperation. Note that in considering different kinds of peace, we look at peace between as well as within states.

As the data collections we use permit,³ the scope of the analysis covers the extended time period of 1900–2017. Although scholars view the Asian peace as a relatively recent phenomenon, this longitudinal analysis allows us to compare conflict frequency over time as well as potentially pinpoint any transition points to peace. We most frequently compare ten-year blocks of time for the frequency of conflict or contentious behavior. The temporal scope usually covers more than a century, and as a result, the number of Asian states in the region varies considerably over time. Accordingly, we “normalize” or standardize the frequency of conflict events by the median number of Asia states in the international system during the ten-year blocks; this ensures that the time periods are comparable and conflict frequency is not distorted by increased or decreased “opportunity” for conflict occasioned by the number of countries in the region.

1. War and Severe Conflict

The first test of any Asian peace concerns the avoidance of war or what has been called “negative peace.” To identify wars, we begin with a high threshold definition. The COW Project codes wars as militarized confrontations that result in 1,000 or more battle-related fatalities. This widely-used standard is applicable to both interstate (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) and intrastate wars (Dixon and Sarkees 2015). Recognizing that this baseline might mask significant violence below that threshold, however, we also examine armed conflict between and within states that reaches 25 or more deaths; these latter data come from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.⁴

*1,000 or more battle-related fatalities

FIGURE 1. ONSET OF INTERSTATE WARS IN ASIA, 1900-2007*

Figure 1 summarizes the frequency of interstate war onset from 1900 to 2007, coded by the year of onset and normalized by the median number of states in the Asia-Pacific region during the designated time period.⁵ Perhaps not surprising, World Wars I and II and the contentious 1900-1945 period involve a heightened risk of war during the first part of the 20th century, especially given the small number of independent Asian states. Although there is decline in the first 35 years of the post-war period in terms of the standardized measure, there are still a dozen or more interstate wars, most notably those in Korea and Vietnam. Thereafter, interstate warfare declines significantly; the rate of war onset is reduced by 75% from the previous four periods. This is not merely a function of the increase in Asian states, most commonly small states in the

Pacific subregion. After 1980, there are only 3 distinct wars between states: the Sino-Vietnamese Border War (1987), the Kargil War between India and Pakistan (1999), and the Invasion of Afghanistan (2001; involving Australia). United States war involvement in Asia parallels the broader interstate warfare pattern within the Asian region; the invasion of Afghanistan is the only outbreak of a US war with an Asian state since the 1970s.⁶ Thus, from an interstate war perspective, there is an emerging Asian peace, with the onset occurring in the roughly around 1980. Areas of the Pacific and many other parts of the region have been immune from these most serious conflicts in the last several decades.

*1,000 or more battle-related fatalities

FIGURE 2. ONSET OF INTRASTATE WARS IN ASIA, 1900-2007*

Patterns of intrastate or civil wars within the Asian region, presented in Figure 2, provide less evidence for regional peace than interstate ones. The period 1910-1930 has the highest civil war per state ratio, but serious interstate conflict persists in significant numbers from 1950 onward, with 5-13 civil wars per ten year block. The last two periods show a relative decline, but this is more a function of the increase in state numbers than a diminution of internal conflict. Some states, such as the Philippines, Pakistan, and Indonesia, have faced multiple insurgencies, simultaneously and at different times. Geographically, intrastate wars are found across the region in the most recent periods, with perhaps only Northeast Asia (e.g., Japan, Koreas, China)⁷ avoiding severe civil conflict.

Full-scale war is rare, especially at the interstate level. Thus, we next lower the threshold for conflict to 25 or more deaths to assess whether any Asian peace exists at lower levels of violence, designated in the Uppsala data as “armed conflicts.” Figure 3 summarizes the data for this analysis; these data start later

than the COW data (1946), but end closer to the present time (2015).

*25 or more battle-related fatalities

FIGURE 3. ONSET OF INTERSTATE “ARMED CONFLICT” IN ASIA, 1946-2015*

The patterns of armed conflict between states in the Asian region mirror those of full-scale war noted above. Armed conflicts between states notably drop after the early 1970s, and the last encounter that produces 25 or more deaths is a border confrontation between Laos and Thailand in 1986 – see Figure 3.

*25 or more battle-related fatalities

FIGURE 4. ONSET OF INTRASTATE “ARMED CONFLICT” IN ASIA, 1946-2015*

Similarly, there is a decline in lower level civil conflict starting in 1960, but this levels off and includes two slight spikes upward in the 1970s and 1990s respectively – see Figure 4. Despite these trends, there is still a substantial number of armed conflicts within states. After 2000, these are fewer, however, and tend to be concentrated in certain subregions, especially South Asia. There is, of course, the ongoing war in Afghanistan, and its associated spillover into Pakistan. In addition, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India also fight various insurgent and rebel groups in this time period. Beyond South Asia, however, there are only isolated armed conflicts (e.g., China against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)).

Previous studies of the Asian peace have focused on the avoidance of high threshold interstate wars. Looking at related phenomena, and even lowering the benchmark for violent conflict, we find some similar results, albeit with several qualifications. Interstate conflict that results in significant fatalities has been reduced substantially, and all but eliminated in the 21st century. Nevertheless, any Asian peace seems to occur much later than the late 1960s or 1970s as claimed. Furthermore, the decline of interstate war is not unique to the Asian region. Globally, state-state wars have become rare, with perhaps only the Sudan-South Sudan interstate war in the last decade or more.

Previous works sometimes make passing reference to limited civil conflict as a component of the Asian peace, but do not necessarily offer solid empirical evidence. The data we examine provide more ambiguous conclusions about internal peace in Asia. On the one hand, there have been a significant number of Asian conflicts with substantial casualties, and some continue today. Thus, it would be a mistake to characterize Asia as peaceful both inside and outside national borders. On the other hand, violent internal conflict has declined in recent decades, with the biggest decline after 1990 and into the next century. Furthermore, contemporary civil conflict seems to be concentrated in only one part of the region: South Asia.

2. Militarized Disputes, Territorial Claims, and Other Negative Peace Concerns

Although simple “negative peace,” or the absence of war and violent conflict, would be an important achievement, a more difficult standard is not only for Asian states to avoid war and lesser violent conflict, but also to sidestep other forms of conflict that raise tensions between states and increase the risk of war. Such disputes not only lead states to increase military expenditures, but also lessen cooperation that can lead to deeper forms of peace. These disagreements also carry with them the possibility of future armed conflict and war.

We begin by considering the frequency of “militarized interstate disputes” (MIDs) in the period 1900-2010. These are “a set of interactions between or

among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force... these acts must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned” (Gochman and Maoz 1984, 587). An example is the Hainan Island incident in 2001 when a US Navy plane was intercepted by Chinese fighter jets. Although MIDs include wars and some armed conflicts, most do not involve either fatalities or reciprocal uses of military force. Nevertheless, all are militarized and therefore considered serious and hostile acts.

Lowering the threshold even more, we also consider “territorial claims” made by one Asian state against another. A territorial claim is defined as an “explicit contention between two or more nation-states claiming sovereignty over a specific piece of territory. Official government representatives (i.e., individuals who are authorized to make or state foreign policy positions for their governments) must make explicit statements claiming sovereignty over the same territory” (Hensel 2014). The data for Asia extend from 1900 to 2000, which include a total of 49 territorial claim onsets between countries in the region. These might or might not include any militarization (indeed, most do not), but either way, territorial claims are generally considered provocative acts. Territorial claims are also those most subject to ongoing rivalries and escalation to war (Senese and Vasquez 2008). Thus, the existence of ongoing territorial claims between states raises questions about the depth and stability of peace between states. Notable, but not limited to, examples in Asia include overlapping claims on the Spratly Islands between various states and Russia-Japanese disputes over the Kuril Islands.

FIGURE 5. ONSET OF MILITARIZED DISPUTES (MIDs) IN ASIA, 1900-2010

As indicated in Figure 5, disputes between China and Japan constitute a significant portion of the 79 disputes during the first part of the 20th century. After World War II, the rate of MID occurrence increases significantly for the next two decades. There is a decline starting in 1970, but it would be misleading to conclude that this is an inflection point ushering in an era of Asian peace; the rate of militarized dispute onset in the post-1970 era merely returns to the levels found in the first half of the 20th century. There are approximately two MID per Asian state for each of the last 40 years in the data and almost 300 total disputes (about 7.5 per year on average) over the same period. This is hardly supportive of a notion of a peaceful region. The most common pairing of disputants is India-Pakistan, but a large number of confrontations occur between various combinations of the United States, North Korea, and South Korea, as well as Japan. Southeast Asia is a region of conflict for much of the post-war era. The Vietnam War, starting in the 1950s, and involving France, the United States and others, lasts more than two decades and encompasses several states in the region (e.g., Laos). Beyond the end of that war, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and other disputes keep this a conflict-ridden region, even as the disputes that occur do not end in war and even though a number of the states are members of ASEAN. The Pacific subregion is relatively peaceful in that many of the states (e.g., New Zealand, Indonesia) are not involved in MID for the most part. Nevertheless, the China-Taiwan rivalry remains intact, with periodic crises, and there are continuing, albeit low-level, MID concerning the Spratly Islands.

FIGURE 6. ONSET OF NEW TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN ASIA, 1900-2000

In contrast to the MID patterns above, Figure 6 on territorial claims provides some support for the notion of more harmonious relationships developing the Asian region. That is, after a spike in claims after World War II

with new states entering the system, there is a gradual reduction in the rate of territorial claim dispute onsets until a slight upswing in the last decade of the 20th century (the last period for which data are available). This is consistent with global patterns, which exhibit a decline in new claims and a resolution of existing ones. As one could imagine, many of the territorial claim dispute onsets occur between countries that are contiguous or share a border, such as China and India. Nevertheless, the South China Sea territorial dispute has involved multiple state actors such as China, Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. This can be described as “dangerous ground,” in which the territorial dispute can escalate in militarized interstate dispute, armed conflict, or war, more quickly than two countries having a contiguous border dispute.

Although there are fewer territorial claims in the last period, many old claims persist and thus raise the specter of continued conflict, and possibly war into the future. The Spratley Islands are an obvious concern as are the competing island claims between Russia and Japan. Historically, unsettled land borders have been the most dangerous for war (Owsiak 2012). Asia has more multilateral and maritime claims than other regions, but there are nevertheless ten unsettled land borders in the region: Russia-China; Afghanistan-Pakistan, Tajikistan-China, China-India; China-Bhutan; North Korea-South Korea; India-Bhutan; India-Pakistan; India-Bangladesh; Malaysia-Singapore (Owsiak, Cuttner, and Buck 2016).

Turning from interstate peace to domestic or internal peace, we examine where Asian states rank on the Global Peace Index (GPI) in 2017.⁸ The composite score combines 23 different indicators. Most look at domestic or internal political elements of peace. Virtually every one deals with some form of negative peace; examples include the homicide rate, access to small arms, and military expenditures, to name a few. Asian countries that are in the top 20 in the world, and therefore with the highest levels of peace, include New Zealand, Japan, Australia, and Bhutan; New Zealand is the highest ranked, second in the world (exceeded only by Iceland). Almost symmetrically, five Asian countries are in the bottom 20, signifying the lowest levels of largely internal peace: Turkey, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, with Afghanistan ranking the lowest among Asian states, nearly last in world rankings (followed only by Syria). Other Asian states are scattered through the range between these two extremes. In general then, there is no evidence that Asian states are any more peaceful (or less so for that matter) with respect to internal peace short of war.

3. Broader Conceptions of Peace – Positive Peace

The previous analyses occurred with the backdrop of negative peace. That is, the reference point was always war, violent conflict, or the risk of war.

Nevertheless, there are broader and more “positive” notions of peace that involve cooperation and integration between states (for a review, see Diehl 2017). Thus, a fuller test of the Asian peace suggests that we consider the positive forms of peace as well as the more negative types.

Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016) argue that interstate relationships can be organized along a continuum from very hostile (i.e., rivalries) to very friendly and integrated (i.e., security communities). Placement along this continuum or “peace scale” depends broadly on the number and salience of disputed issues, as well as how states handle the issues over which they disagree. We use their data for the period 1900-2015⁹ to look at the frequency of five different kinds of relationships.¹⁰

The hostile, or rivalry, side of the continuum has received a tremendous amount of scholarly and policy attention (e.g., India-Pakistan), and the associated research on Asian rivalries was noted above. Rivals see one another as enemies and competitors. Rivalries with the most hostility and the greatest number of militarized encounters are labeled “severe rivalries” (e.g., India-Pakistan). “Lesser rivalries” are not as intense or hostile as the rivalries described above (e.g., China-Philippines). Within these latter relationships, both the frequency and severity of violent interactions are lower.

Violent, hostile episodes almost disappear entirely when we move into the middle of the continuum: what the authors call “negative peace.” Dyads at negative peace possess a number of characteristics. They rarely or never fight or threaten one another militarily; have resolved or mitigated their major issues; only possess unresolved issues of low salience; recognize one another diplomatically; communicate officially with one another; and engage in peace negotiations and/or sign peace agreements with one another. At negative peace, states are therefore neither close friends nor bitter enemies (e.g., the states in the Pacific Islands Forum, such as New Zealand and the Marshall Islands).

Beyond negative peace lie two additional, more peaceful relationship types (“positive peace”): “warm peace” (e.g., Australia-New Zealand) – defined by increasing integration and the removal of military options for managing disagreements – and “security communities” (e.g., European Union states) – which involve compatible values, expectations of mutual reward, institutionalized conflict management processes, and mutual responsiveness (Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). The two types of positive peace relationships differ from each other largely in terms of the degree of coordination and cooperation in policy and the level of institutionalization to facilitate these.¹¹

TABLE 1. ASIAN STATE RELATIONSHIPS ALONG THE PEACE SCALE, 1900-2015

Period	Severe Rivalry (%)	Lesser Rivalry (%)	Negative Peace (%)	Warm Peace (%)	Security Community (%)
1900-1909	3 (37.5%)	0	5 (62.5%)	0	0
1910-1919	3 (33.3%)	1 (11.1%)	5 (55.6%)	0	0
1920-1929	3 (18.8%)	0	13 (81.3%)	0	0
1930-1939	3 (17.6%)	1 (5.9%)	13 (76.5%)	0	0
1940-1949	8 (15.1%)	7 (13.2%)	38 (71.7%)	0	0
1950-1959	15 (16.3%)	15 (16.3%)	62 (67.3%)	0	0
1960-1969	19 (18.4%)	17 (16.5%)	66 (64.1%)	1 (1%)	0
1970-1979	21 (16.9%)	15 (12.1%)	86 (69.4%)	2 (1.6%)	0
1980-1989	16 (11%)	12 (8.3%)	114 (78.6%)	3 (2.1%)	0
1990-1999	15 (5.8%)	11 (4.2%)	230 (88.8%)	3 (1.2%)	0
2000-2009	11 (4.5%)	7 (2.9%)	223 (91.8%)	2 (0.8%)	0
2010-2015	8 (3.4%)	6 (2.5%)	220 (93.2%)	2 (0.8%)	0

Table 1 traces the frequency that Asian state relationships fall into each of the five categories on the peace scale; this analysis parallels that of Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016), but here we restrict analysis specifically to the Asian region. Consistently throughout the periods of study, the relationships among pairs of Asian states fall most commonly in the middle of the scale, designated as negative peace. States that fall into the Negative Peace category are not at war with one another, and have fewer proclivities towards conflict in the future, but still have disagreements over which intense fighting would not arise.

Most important for our purposes are changes or trends on either side of the middle category of negative peace. Rivalries, both severe and lesser, decline as a percentage of all Asian relationships, first starting in the 1920s and more significantly for our purposes in the 1980s; this is consistent with the empirical breakpoints we noted with respect to war and militarized disputes above. The latter drop does not necessarily mean that the number of rivalries declines, but rather that their percentage of overall relationships is lower. There is an expansion in the number of Asian states and relationships, and these are almost all of the negative peace variety, such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. More optimistically, the number of rivalries declines in the mid-1990s and thereafter, as some hostile relations, such as that between China and South Korea, dissipate. Thus, Asia does move in a more peaceful direction in recent decades in the sense that the region as a whole is less hostile and there are fewer intense rivalries. This is consistent with global patterns of increasing peace (Goertz, Diehl, and Balas, 2016).

Although there are fewer rivalries, there has not been a coterminous increase in positive peace relationships. There are no instances of security communities in Asia as there are in North America (e.g., US-Canada) or Europe (e.g., European Union). Pairs of states in “warm peace” are also rare in Asia, with many fewer (in number and percentage) than in other parts of the world. The four relationships that have warm peace at one point in time are New Zealand and Australia (1983-present), Russia and Kazakhstan (2000-present), Russia and Mongolia (1962-1991), and Cambodia and Vietnam (1979-1991); the latter was largely achieved through invasion and hegemony, however, rather than by voluntary cooperation. ASEAN states are not coded as warm peace because they lack highly developed transnational ties and even nascent institutions that promote integration. Similarly, the Pacific Islands Forum has done little more than solidify negative peace among its members. These regional institutions have improved relations and perhaps helped avoid militarized confrontations and war, but they have not yet transformed the interactions into integration and positive peace, at least according to the scheme adopted in the peace scale.

The Global Peace Index also has a “Positive Peace Index” (PPI) that is constructed according to eight dimensions or “pillars” (e.g., corruption, flow of information, human capital) that encompass 24 indicators (e.g. economic inequality, judicial independence, scientific publications). Although these scores are positively correlated with the GPI scores that are negative peace based (discussed above), PPI better taps broader conceptions of peace that deal with issues of economic development, justice, and human rights.

The placement of Asian states on the PPI resembles the patterns found in the GPI. The Asian states that are in the global top 20 include New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, and Japan, with New Zealand ranking the highest out of all the countries in the world at eighth. In contrast, the Asian countries that are in the bottom 20 of the world are Pakistan, Afghanistan, and North Korea. North Korea is the lowest ranked Asian state within the Positive Peace Index at 159 in the world. Again, other Asian states are found at various points along the continuum between the top and bottom groups.

In general, interstate relationships have become more peaceful over time in Asia, but the changes have moved states to negative peace rather than to more positive peace cooperation. Within states, Asia has states at all levels of positive peace; longitudinal data are not available to make judgments about changes over time, but in the present situation Asia is neither a beacon of peace nor a hotbed of hostility.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

1. Overview of Findings

The notion of an Asian peace has been widely discussed, and our contribution to this debate is threefold. First, we consider more than just the incidence of war (or simple negative peace) as a standard by which to judge whether a region is peaceful or not. We consider a range of different phenomena that include violence or conflict short of war as well as some elements of positive peace. Second, rather than focus primarily on interstate relations, we also evaluate the peacefulness of the Asian region based on civil or internal components of states as well. Third, and finally, we have conducted systematic and empirical analysis across the whole Asia-Pacific region throughout a broad time frame, rather than only considering a subset of states in a static fashion.

There are a number of conclusions from our research that provide a more nuanced view of the Asian peace. We agree with past research that interstate peace is primarily of a negative variety. The strongest patterns seem to be with respect to avoiding interstate war. Nevertheless, there are significant conflicts involving violence and the threat of military force that persist in the region. A number of rivalries, many of them long-standing, continue to raise the specter of war. Although it is correct that violent and lesser conflict has declined, there are two qualifications to labeling this as the Asian peace in the literature. First, Asia has become more peaceful, but it is a mistake to call the situation “peaceful;” military interactions and rivalries persist with enough frequency that there is much progress left to be made. In addition, positive peace in Asia is infrequent based on the number of relationships that have transitioned into either of the two positive peace categories. Second, empirical patterns suggest that transition points to a more peaceful region occur at various points, most commonly in the 1980s and to the greatest extent in some cases in the 21st century. Geographically, Southeast Asia remains a hotspot of interstate conflict, and Northeast Asia has several rivalries as well, even if war has been avoided in recent decades. The Pacific region perhaps makes the best case for interstate peace, but there, most of the states are small and weak (and thereby largely incapable of substantial interstate violence), and clashes over the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea portend that relative tranquility there is ending.

Intrastate patterns of conflict give another potential dimension to Asian peace. The evidence on this is less supportive of peace in the region. Again, there is some evidence for the decline of civil conflict in the 21st century, but internal violence involving the governments is still at a significant level. Furthermore, indices of internal peace of both the positive and negative varieties show few Asian states near the top or bottom of the rankings. Claiming that Asia is

peaceful, at best, must include the caveat that this is not reflective of internal conflict. That said, much internal conflict is concentrated again in South Asia, and it would be a mistake to characterize the region as awash with conflict. Internal peace is neither wholly present nor wholly absent in the region. In general, Asia lags behind Europe on a relative basis, but less conflictual than Africa.

2. Accounting for Patterns of Asian Peace

Any explanation for the Asian peace needs to reflect the varying degrees of the Asian peace as well as the timing of the transition points uncovered. Starting from the results above, we turn to a consideration of the various reasons offered for the Asian peace.

Neorealist arguments involving the balance of power among states have provided scholars a fundamental framework through which to account for peace in East Asia (Tonnesson, 2009). Military capabilities and strategies of deterrence might cause peace within the region (Solomon, 2013). In general terms, states within the region have established powerful enough military capabilities or alliances to deter rivals and other hostile nations. The South Korean-United States alliance, for example, offers sufficient power and military plans to deter an attack from North Korea. This realist narrative comports with any achievement of negative peace at least with respect to avoiding war. Nevertheless, it falls short in a number of ways. First, at best, it applies to the absence of war on the Korean peninsula, but cannot account for similar outcomes in the rest of the region. Second, it is also not clear that it corresponds to the specific timing of the onset of negative peace; deterrence and alliances predate the empirical patterns in the decline of conflict described above.

Other scholars have pointed to mechanisms such as conflict prevention and peacebuilding, such as elite interaction and communication, economic interdependence and integration, functional cooperation, and conflict management mechanisms (e.g., mediation) within the East Asian context (Weissmann, 2010; 2012). For example, ASEAN member states have relied on regional economic cooperation and interdependence to solidify peaceful relations (Weissmann, 2010; Chan, 1993). Relatedly, states in the region are purported to have common interests, trust on norms and culture, and a sense of common identity, which has led to peace and cooperation (Kivimaki, 2001). Furthermore, analyses point to changes by political actors that subsequently created liberalized economic policy diffusion across East Asia (Goldsmith, 2014; Xiao, 2016; Tang, 2012); states in East Asia helped promote peace by shifting policy goals to emphasize economic growth and trade within and between countries in the region. This explanation has promise in that it comports with the shift from rivalry to negative peace found

among ASEAN and other states. Nevertheless, the impact of such forces occurs much latter (1980s and early 21st century) than might be predicted from the formation of ASEAN decades earlier. The account is also limited to East Asia or merely ASEAN members, and does not explain peaceful relations elsewhere, specifically in the Pacific subregion.

Track II, unofficial or private research and policy networks, has been also noted by scholars to have an impact on peace in the region by working with government officials from a region to address issues ranging from economic to security-related (Endicott and Gorowitz, 1999; Simon, 2002; Morrison, 2004). For example, Councils for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific have supplied governments of ASEAN countries with information in order to help promote peace within the region (Simon, 2002). To the extent that these have had an impact, they have, at best, solidified negative peace among states and likely have more far-reaching consequences over transnational relations that are not the focus of our analysis. More ambitious, a Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for Northeast Asia has been advocated for peace and security within that region. Specifically, Endicott and Gorowitz (1999) point out that Track II efforts were used in the 1990s to help bring about talks between countries in the region and world powers, such as Russia and the United States, to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles in the region. That is, multilateral efforts by unofficial government representatives within the region have led to support among Track I officials from various governments for the prospects of a non-proliferation agreement in Northeast Asia. Again though, such efforts are confined geographically and prospects remain unfulfilled at this writing, especially with the development of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Track II diplomacy might yet enhance Asian peace, but it cannot account for all or most of the major shifts in conflict behavior at the state-level.

As the empirical patterns noted above indicate, the case for an Asian internal peace is considerably weaker even as there has been some decline in civil conflict. Most explanations are speculative and lack empirical testing. Neorealist explanations of intrastate peace suggest that the development of law and order, and capacities of states to repress armed internal opposition, has helped peace develop. Neoliberal arguments of intrastate peace suggest a correlation between poverty and conflict, with poorer countries having a proclivity towards conflict (Tonnesson, 2009).

In general, explanations for the Asian peace tend to be post hoc accounts of why conflict is less likely and remain focused on the avoidance of war. It is not clear from these treatments whether the factors noted were causal or catalytic forces in precipitating peace or whether they were merely consequences of more peaceful relationships. It is conceivable that they are both. Furthermore, explanations need to match the proper temporal ordering of cause and effect

(peace) in order to be valid; yet past analyses often don't match the onset of peace with the occurrence of the factors thought to precipitate peace. Tonnesson's (2009) call for a research agenda into explanations for an Asian peace is still largely unheeded.

3. Future Concerns

As one looks to the future, there are several elements that deserve attention from scholarly and policymaking audiences. There is not the space for an attempt to theorize about conflict and peace patterns found in Asia and test explanations. Our contribution was to provide a more systematic, empirical rendering of the existence and depth of any Asian peace. That said, there are some directions for such an effort. First, we note that patterns of conflict in Asia – declining incidence of interstate war, continuation of lesser conflict and civil conflict, and the like – are consistent with world-wide patterns of the same phenomena (see Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016; Pinker 2011). Heretofore, previous work has been perhaps too myopic, constructing explanations narrowly on factors unique to Asia when broader global forces are at work. Thus, attention should be given to those factors (e.g., conflict management mechanisms, changing international norms, and the like – see Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016) as well as elements unique to Asia. In addition, scholars need to address different patterns, such as (1) why ASEAN states have not moved beyond negative peace to greater integration as in Europe, and (2) why the timing for the decline of conflict in Asia may come later than in other regions. When the empirical patterns map with the global and regional factors driving them, we will have a better understanding of any Asian peace as well as a projection of what future trends might bring.

Consistent with the scholarly literature, this article has focused on state-level peace, but there are other planes for analysis as well. Transnational aspects of peace between citizens, groups, and other private entities deserve examination as well. It might also be the case that such peaceful interactions will have a spillover effect to the state level through Track II diplomacy and other processes. Subnational peace within communities is another dimension for examination, especially in the many states in Asia that have large and diverse populations of different ethnicities; current scholarship does not pay sufficient attention to community interactions and tends to privilege only the most violent ones for study.

Similarly, the high threshold for conflict examined here and in conventional studies might miss so-called “gray zone” conflicts (see Mazarr, 2015), those between states as well as non-state actors that might involve cyberwarfare, propaganda, and other non-military challenges. Examining these

would provide another dimension to the existence (or lack thereof) of an Asian peace.

In addition, we have focused primarily on the Asian writ large in order to provide a holistic view of the Asian peace. Nevertheless, Asia as we have conceived it encompasses several subregions (e.g., South Asia, Pacific subregion, Northeast Asia). We have noted how some of the subregions differ from one another, but future research might not only address additional patterns, but explore alternative explanations for them in that the subregions have different structures, processes, and challenges. For example, whereas Northeast Asia is complicated by North Korean nuclear status, Southeast Asia might be driven more by economic concerns and therefore more amenable to regional integration.

From a policy perspective, it is always speculative and therefore prone to error to project what the future of any Asian peace might be. A resolution (or not) to North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons would have dramatic consequences for the Northeast Asia region and perhaps more broadly for Asia as a whole; a number of rivalries intersect with this concern and state relations could easily turn better or worse depending on the outcome. As noted above, Chan (2013) warned about an economic downturn leading to a diminution of any Asian peace that presently exists. Economic growth has slowed in the region in recent years, but is still generally robust. Nevertheless, the associated rise of more nationalist leaders in China and India in particular has occurred. One consequence has been a more aggressive Chinese foreign policy concerning the South China Sea. A stronger China could raise tensions in the region, but it could also promote positive peace integration, especially in the economic realm, by smaller states in the region as a counterweight to Chinese growth and influence. Nevertheless, a nationalistic wave in the region, stemming from a global economic recession, would suggest not only more conflict, but fewer positive peace initiatives in terms of free trade, policy coordination, and regional integration at the state level. Trends do not suggest any significant increase in the likelihood of civil war beyond the areas of South Asia already experiencing upheaval.

REFERENCES

- Acharya, Amitav. 2001. *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. London: Routledge.
- Beeson, Mark. 2015. "Is the 'Long Peace' of East Asia Exceptional?." *International Studies Review* 17(3):476-478.
- Chan, Steve. 2013. *Enduring Rivalries in the Asia Pacific*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chan, Steve. 1993. *East Asian Dynamism: Managing Growth, Order, and Security*

- in the Pacific Region*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Diehl, Paul F. 2017. "Peace: A Conceptual Survey" Third Global Transitions Conference, Hamburg, Germany, 7-8 December.
- Dreyer, David and William Thompson. 2014 *Handbook of International Rivalries*. Washington: CQ Press.
- Dixon, Jeffrey S., and Meredith Reid Sarkees. 2015. *A Guide to Intra-state Wars: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014*. Washington: CQ Press.
- Endicott, John E., and Alan G. Gorowitz. 1999. "Track-II Cooperative Regional Security Efforts: Lessons From the Limited Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone for Northeast Asia." *Global Change, Peace & Security* 11(3): 293-323
- Ganguly, Sumit and William Thompson, eds. 2011. *Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level Games*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Gochman, Charles S. and Maoz, Zeev. 1984. " Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28(4): 585-616.
- Goertz, Gary, Diehl, Paul F., and Balas, Alexandru. 2016. *The Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace in the International System*. Oxford, United Kingdom. Oxford University Press.
- Goldsmith, Benjamin E. 2014. "The East Asian Peace as a Second-Order Diffusion Effect." *International Studies Review* 16(2): 275-289.
- Hensel, Paul. 2014. *The ICOW Territorial Claims Data Set*, Last updated: 12 October 2016, last accessed 1 January 2018, Accessed at: <http://www.paulhensel.org/icowterr.html>.
- Kacowicz, Arie. 1998. *Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective*. Albany, NY. SUNY Press.
- Katchen, Martin H. 1977. "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: 'Dangerous Ground' for Asian Peace." *Asian Survey* 17(12): 1167-1181.
- Kivimäki, Timo. 2001. "The Long Peace of ASEAN." *Journal of Peace Research* 38(1): 5-25.
- Kivimäki, Timo. 2010. "East Asian Relative Peace and the ASEAN Way." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11(1): 57-85.
- Kivimäki, Timo. 2010. "East Asian Relative Peace—Does It Exist? What Is It?." *The Pacific Review* 23(4): 503-526.
- Kivimäki, Timo. 2014a. *The Long Peace of East Asia*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Kivimäki, Timo. 2014b. "Can the Pragmatic East Asian Approach to Human Security Offer a Way for the Deepening of the Long Peace of East Asia?." *Journal of Human Security* 10(1) 76.
- Leung, Kwok. 2003. "Asian Peace Psychology: What Can It Offer?." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 9(3): 297.

- Mazarr, Michael. 2015. *Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict*. Carlisle Barracks, PA. USA: United States Army War College Press.
- Morrison, Charles E. 2004. "Track 1/Track 2 Symbiosis in Asia-Pacific Regionalism." *The Pacific Review* 17 (4): 547-565.
- Owsiak, Andrew P. 2012. "Signing Up for Peace: International Boundary Agreements, Democracy, and Militarized Interstate Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 51-66.
- Owsiak, Andrew P., Cuttner, Allison, and Buck, Brent. 2016. "The International Border Agreements Dataset." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894216646978>
- Pinker, Steven. 2011. *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Russett, Bruce and Oneal, John. 2001. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York, NY. W. W. Norton & Company.
- Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Wayman, Frank. 2010. *Resort to War : A Data Guide to Inter-state, Extra-state, Intra-state, and Non-state Wars, 1816-2007*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Senese, Paul D. and Vasquez, John A.. 2008. *The Steps To War: An Empirical Study*. Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press.
- Simon, Sheldon W. 2002. "Evaluating Track II Approaches To Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: The CSCAP Experience." *The Pacific Review* 15(2): 167-200.
- Solomon, Jonathan F. 2013. "Demystifying Conventional Deterrence: Great-Power Conflict and East Asian Peace." *Strategic Studies* 7(4): 108-148.
- Sung-Han, Kim. 2008. "Searching for a Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism." *Asian Perspective* 127-156.
- Tang, Chih-Mao. 2012. "Southeast Asian Peace Revisited: A Capitalist Trajectory." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12(3): 389-417.
- Tehrani, Majid. 1999. *Asian Peace: Security and Governance in the Asia-Pacific Region*. IB Tauris 1999.
- Tønnesson, Stein. 2009. "What is it that Best Explains the East Asian Peace since 1979? A Call for a Research Agenda." *Asian Perspective* 111-136.
- Weissmann, Mikael. 2012. *The East Asian Peace: Conflict Prevention and Informal Peacebuilding*. Berlin: Springer.
- Weissmann, Mikael. 2010. "The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A Study in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building." *Asian Perspective* 35-69.
- Xiao, Ren. 2016. "Idea Change Matters: China's Practices and the East Asian Peace." *Asian Perspective* 40(2): 329-355.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Notably, these analyses do not include ASEAN affiliated or observer states such as China and Timor Leste.
- ² <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership> (last accessed 15 February 2018)
- ³ The data sets used in this study vary in their temporal scope with some beginning as late as 1945 and others ending as early as 2000.
- ⁴ <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/ucdp-data/> (last accessed 15 February 2018)
- ⁵ The COW list extends only through 2007. Nevertheless, no military encounter in the next decade meets the 1,000 battlefield death threshold required for it to qualify as an interstate war.
- ⁶ Note that the Vietnam War involving the US ends in 1975, having begun more than a decade earlier.
- ⁷ Note that the China-Taiwan and North Korea-South Korea conflicts are coded as interstate, not internal, conflicts. In any case, they fail to meet the 1000 battle death threshold in recent decades to be called wars.
- ⁸ <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/06/GPI-2017-Report-1.pdf> (last accessed 15 February 2018)
- ⁹ The original source included data through 2006, but these have been updated through 2015.
- ¹⁰ States are considered to be in a relationship only if there is meaningful government-government interaction, and this is determined by a variety of indicators including geography, alliances, economic integration, and the like – see Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016 Chapter 2) for a full explanation as well as the coding rules for all five categories on the peace scale.
- ¹¹ Note that merely being in a regional economic institution such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) does not automatically place its states in a positive peace relationship. Rather it is the totality of the state interactions and economic interactions must involve deep cooperation and some integration before meeting even the criteria for warm peace.