J. Bastin

Palembang in 1811 and 1812

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PALEMBANG IN 1811 AND 1812.

(PART I)

It is now one hundred years since Baud published in the first volume of this journal his article under the above title charging Raffles with the responsibility of the massacre of the Dutch garrison at Palembang in 1811¹). For a century Baud's argument has been accepted by Dutch colonial historians, and has coloured considerably their interpretations of Raffles and his administration of Java²). Baud's charges have not only been a stick in the hands of the conservatives to beat Raffles, but have also proved to be a source of embarrassment to the liberals who were prepared to admire his principles of colonial administration. With few exceptions the outline of Raffles' character drawn by Baud a century ago has remained intact in Dutch historiography³).

Recently the controversy surrounding the Palembang massacre was reopened with the publication of an English translation of a letter which Raffles sent to the Sultan Badr'uddin, and which was not published by Baud⁴). The late C. E. Wurtzburg argued on the basis of this new letter that the sending of arms to Badr'uddin⁵) was not directed for use against the Dutch garrison there, but against a Dutch naval force reported off Palembang.

Professor Dr W. Ph. Coolhaas of the Koninklijk Instituut voor de

¹) Baud, J. C., "Palembang in 1811 en 1812", *Bijdr. T.L.V.*, (1853), I, pp. 7-40.

²) Even the most recent account of his administration by van Klaveren, J. J., *The Dutch Colonial System in the East Indies*, (Rotterdam, 1953), p. 87 is prefaced by a rather inaccurate account of the Palembang massacre. See De Klerck, E. S., *History of the Netherlands East Indies*, (Rotterdam, 1938), II, pp. 42; 48-9; Levyssohn Norman, H. D., *De Britsche Heerschappij over Java en Onderhoorigheden, (1811-1816)*, ('s-Gravenhage, 1857), pp. 84-97; Vlekke, B. H. M., *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), p. 243; and other works cited hereafter for accounts of the massacre.

³) Baud's other article "De Bandjermasinsche afschuwlijkheid", *Bijdr. T.L.V.*, (1860), III, pp. 1-25, was also, of course, responsible for lessening Raffles' character in the eyes of the Dutch.

⁴) Wurtzburg, C. E., "Raffles and the Massacre at Palembang", *Journal Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society*, (cited hereafter as *J.M.B.R.A.S.*), (March, 1949), XXII, Part I, pp. 38-52.

⁵) See letters Nos. 4 and 5 published by Baud, op. cit., pp. 26-7.

Tropen, Amsterdam⁶⁾, attempted to destroy Wurtzburg's argument by maintaining that the new letter was incorrectly dated⁷⁾. His conclusion about Raffles' responsibility for the massacre was, nevertheless, a modification of that of Baud and his followers⁸⁾.

Baud had based his argument upon Malay letters which Raffles had addressed to the Sultan of Palembang in 1810—11. He had seen copies of these letters in 1816 when Badr'uddin sent the originals to "an old friend at Batavia" to present to the Commissioners-General "in order to make use of them for averting the calamities which he expected might come down on him"⁹⁾ for the part he played in the massacre of the Dutch in 1811. He sent the letters in the hope of throwing the blame for the massacre onto Raffles.

Baud himself never saw the original letters, but printed the copies which Badr'uddin's friend had made for him. On the basis of these copies Baud had no difficulty in showing Raffles' guilt. However, the discovery of three of the original letters from Raffles to the Sultan¹⁰⁾ now show clearly that Baud's copies were inaccurate, not only substituting a crude Malay for the polished high-court Malay of Raffles' scribe, but in some cases altering the meaning by compression of phrases.

The three original letters will be dealt with in Part II of this article, when Baud's textual arguments will also be examined. For the moment it is important to point out that Raffles did not actually pen any of the Malay letters to Palembang himself. He gave English drafts to his scribe who put them into Malay. It is therefore necessary, if we are to examine Raffles' motives in his negotiations, to consider these English drafts rather than their Malay translations. Fortunately most of these draft have been preserved in the India Office Library, London¹¹⁾. With these and other English translations of Malay letters

⁶⁾ I should like to acknowledge here the considerable help given to me by Professor Coolhaas during the writing of this article. Professor A. A. Cense of the Kon. Inst. T.L.V., The Hague; Sir Richard Winstedt; and Dr. P. Voorhoeve of the Leiden University Library all helped me with the Malay texts.

⁷⁾ Coolhaas, W. Ph., "Baud on Raffles", *J.M.B.R.A.S.*, (February, 1951), XXIV, Part I, pp. 109-120. See Wurtzburg's brief reply *Ibid.*, (August, 1952), XXV, Part I, pp. 178-80. On the dating problems connected with the letters, see my Appendix I.

⁸⁾ Coolhaas, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁹⁾ Baud, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁾ The letters are now in the possession of the Kon. Inst. T.L.V., The Hague.

¹¹⁾ They are all in the *Raffles Collection*, IV. Other copies are in the *Java Factory Records*.

sent by Badr'uddin to Raffles in reply, we can now build up a satisfactory account of Raffles' negotiations with Palembang prior to the Java invasion.

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In June 1810 Raffles left Penang for Calcutta in high hopes of being appointed to the government of the newly conquered Molucca Islands¹²). On his arrival, however, he found his hopes dashed, and so turned his attention to Java. That island had interested the Supreme Government for some time, and Minto expressed his willingness to receive any information which Raffles could supply regarding it¹³). Immediately Raffles began penning those interesting reports on the Eastern Islands which ended only with the sailing of the British fleet from Malacca a year later¹⁴).

Early in July, Raffles had made a determined bid for fresh employment offering his services to Minto "in the fullest extent for carrying into effect any arrangements which your Lordship may have in contemplation with regard to the Malay Countries"¹⁵). He referred to the general reports which he had already submitted, regretting at the same time his inability to supply more accurate information, which could only be obtained at Penang and Malacca.

"[I]f," he continued, "... your Lordship should be pleased to authorize my proceeding thither with powers to communicate with the Malay States *I think I could venture to promise the most [complete] success in detaching at once the Sultan of Palembang from the Dutch & in obtaining possession of the person of the King of Bantam.*"

About this time he submitted to Minto a long Paper in which he outlined in detail his ideas regarding Palembang.

"It has been the surprize of the Native powers to the Eastward," Raffles informed his superior, "that the Dutch should have been permitted so long, and at so little trouble to retain an influence at Palembang in the immediate neighbourhood of our Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, and that the English should obtain by *underhand means* so principal a part of their cargoes to China, while *it lies so much within their power to detach the Sultan from the Dutch Interests* and to establish the Trade on a fair and respectable footing more suited to the British character & reputation"¹⁷).

¹²) Boulger, D.C., *The Life of Sir Stamford Raffles*, (London, 1899), p. 81.

¹³) Loc. cit.

¹⁴) These reports are in the *Raffles Collection*, I. O. Library.

¹⁵) Raffles to Minto, July 11, 1810. *Raffles Collection*, I, No. 4.

¹⁶) Loc. cit. The italics in the passage are mine.

¹⁷) Raffles to Minto, no date, *Java Factory Records*, (I.O. Library, London), 68. Raffles sent a copy of this paper to the Chairman of the E. I. Company on March 19, 1812. Italics mine, except for phrase "underhand means".

He dwelt on the profits which the Company would derive by a contract with the Sultan for the whole of his tin production, but if these profits were not great enough to warrant the detachment of the Sultan from the Dutch, then such a course was necessary for the security of the British interests at Bencoolen¹⁸).

"[A] satisfactory arrangement with Palembang and the expulsion of the Dutch influence from that rich and valuable province", he argued, "would... tend effectually to reduce the remaining power of that Nation on the Island of Sumatra, and consequently decrease the expenses incurred in the protection of the English Settlements on the West Coast"¹⁹).

On these grounds he urged the following course of action.

"A negociation... may be immediately opened with the Sultan of Palembang, either directly or intermediately thro' the Syeds and principal natives who are in the habit of trading in Malacca and Prince of Wales Island. ...

In the event of the former, the present opportunity affords a pretext for an Agent proceeding directly to Palembang for the purpose of enquiring into and demanding a satisfactory explanation of the circumstances attending the loss of an English vessel lately cut off near [Muntok] in the Straits of Banca. Such [an] Agent might avail himself of personal communication with the Sultan to make him acquainted with the views of the English, and adopt such measures with regard to the Dutch as existing circumstances might require.

Should it however appear from local information to be obtained at Malacca and Rhio, that it will be more expedient to proceed to the point more circuitously — there are natives in view of established character and influence who may be entrusted in any undertaking of the kind, under the immediate direction of an Agent residing at Malacca and Rhio, which last mentioned place is distant only two days sail from Banca. Among these is a Malay Prince born at Palembang and connected by blood with the leading men if not the reigning family, and who married a sister of the present King of Keddah"²⁰).

The thing that puzzled Raffles about opening such a negociation with Palembang was the basis upon which it should be conducted. He argued at length upon the value of Banca tin to the Company in the China market, but wondered if the Company showed no interest in the matter whether some arrangements could be made with the Sultan for

¹⁸) The danger from a supposed Dutch-French attack against the British settlements in Sumatra was pointed to about this time by the Resident at Fort Marlborough. Raffles to Minto, August 9, 1810. *Raffles Collection*, I, No. 5.

¹⁹) *Java Factory Records*, *Ibid*. The following quotations come from the same source.

²⁰) The reference is presumably to Tunku Radin Mahomet who was employed as Raffles' Agent to Palembang. He was not, however, a prince of Palembang. The reference may, on the other hand, be to Radin Wahib, a fugitive prince of Palembang, who was given asylum by the Sultan of Rhio at this time.

"a fair and safe speculation for private traders". If on the latter basis, Raffles thought

"it would be sufficient to assure the Sultan that on the removal of the Dutch Resident, he would not be subjected to any exactions whatever on the part of the English — that his contract with the Dutch would be entirely annulled — and that he would be considered in strict alliance with the English who would protect him from any interference on the part of the Dutch Government at Batavia. ...

*It may also be necessary that the Dutch Resident and Guard should be removed without any interference on his part, in which case the services of one of His Majesty's Brigs of war would be very useful and might of course be obtained"*²¹⁾.

The Sultan knew the power of the English, Raffles continued, and realized that they could with facility take Banca from him in the event of any misunderstanding arising. The Sultan would therefore take seriously any negotiation opened with him by the English.

By the beginning of August, Raffles' leave of absence from Penang had expired²²⁾, and he was still at Calcutta without any new official appointment. He continued nevertheless supplying the Governor-General with his ideas. With regard to Palembang he wrote:²³⁾

"The advantages to be derived from an early communication with... [Palembang] as suggested in the Paper I had the honour to submit, become more particularly evident from the establishment which appears to have been formed by the people of Lampoon on the western part of Java and the political importance which Marshal Daendels seems to have attached to their operations. Your Lordship is already aware of the ancient and intimate friendship subsisting between Bantam and Lampoon — the vicinity of the latter to Palembang, while it affords the most favorable opportunity, under present circumstances, for negotiation, may enable us successfully to annoy the Enemy in this quarter by throwing in supplies of stores to a formidable opponent, and at the same time by taking advantage of the existing hostilities, effectually to cut off all communication between the Dutch Government and the Island of Sumatra".

The intention of supplying arms to Palembang and the Lampoons for a flank attack on Java could be a point of considerable importance in explaining future happenings at Palembang. Raffles regarded Palembang at this time, not only as a supply base for such an attack, but thought of establishing himself there²⁴⁾ from whence he could direct his communications with the native states in the Eastern Seas.

Raffles' appointment as Agent to the Governor-General with the

²¹⁾ Italics mine.

²²⁾ Raffles had two months leave from June 7, 1810. Boulger, op. cit., p. 81.

²³⁾ Raffles to Minto, August 9, 1810: *Raffles Collection*, I, No. 5.

²⁴⁾ Loc. cit.

Malay States was made early in October, 1810. In his Instructions ²⁵⁾ he was directed to establish good relations with the native powers on Java in order to secure their assistance in the projected invasion, and also open friendly negotiations with Bali, Palembang and the Lampoons.

"Should these people have still been able to keep their ground against the Dutch," the Instructions continued, "or even continue in a condition at all capable of recommencing their attack, they may be encouraged in their exertions, and so far as prudence may warrant, assisted with stores" ²⁶⁾.

Raffles' task, in other words, was to encourage and cause as much dissension among the native powers as possible, in order to assist the British invasion of Java.

Raffles arrived at Malacca on December 4, 1810 and decided that that was the best place to make his headquarters ²⁷⁾. On his arrival he received information that a number of Dutch vessels had been seen off the Palembang River, apparently with warlike intentions either towards Palembang or Lingga ²⁸⁾. He was also told of a message which had been received from one of the Tumungungs of Palembang by a merchant at Malacca "intimating in ambiguous terms the desire of the Sultan that the English should interfere in expelling the Dutch. . . ." ²⁹⁾. Raffles immediately opened a communication with the Sultan by despatching the following letter on December 10, 1810 ³⁰⁾.

(LETTER A.)

"I have to inform your Majesty of my arrival at Malacca [in the capacity of Agent to the Governor General with the Malay States] ³¹⁾ for the

²⁵⁾ A draft copy of his Instructions is in *Raffles Collection*, III, No. 5, and is dated October 13, 1810. They were undoubtedly drafted by himself. For the official copy see *Java Factory Records*, 12.

²⁶⁾ Italics mine.

²⁷⁾ Raffles to Edmonstone, February 10, 1811. *Raffles Collection*, III, No. 8. Raffles' arrival at Malacca in December 1810 makes nonsense of Baud's dating of the early letters to Badr'uddin. See Appendix I.

²⁸⁾ Raffles to the Sultan of Lingga, no date, *Raffles Collection*, I, No. 8. Professor Coolhaas, op. cit., p. 118 identified this Dutch force as that in command of Lieutenant-Colonel Voorman. It was despatched by Daendels in September 1810. Van der Kemp, P. H., "Palembang en Banka in 1816-1820", *Bijdr. T.L.V.*, (1900), LI, 660.

²⁹⁾ Raffles to Edmonstone, January 31, 1811. *Java Factory Records*, 13. The Tumungung was probably Kerto Negoro.

³⁰⁾ *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 4. Another English copy, with some slight differences, is in *Java Factory Records*, 13. The original Malay copy of this letter, dated December 5, 1811, is printed in Part II.

³¹⁾ The passage in brackets is deleted in the manuscript. The letter, which is in Raffles' own handwriting, is labelled "Translation". In other words it is Raffles' translation of the Malay letter in Part II. The letter B of December 15,

purpose of explaining and communicating with the Princes of the Eastern Courts on the subject of many Malay Prows and Vessels having been lately captured by the English ships of war. ... Since my arrival at Malacca I have heard with much concern of the approach of a Dutch force to the mouth of the Palembang River, and I lose no time in dispatching this letter to put your Majesty on your guard against the evil machinations of the Dutch, a Nation that is desirous of enriching itself from the property of your Majesty as it has done with that of every Prince of the East with which it has had connection. Their sending a fleet of armed vessels within your Majesty's dominions is a sufficient proof of this, as your Majesty has always been on friendly terms with them. ...

I would recommend your Majesty to drive them out from your country at once, but if your Majesty has reasons for not doing so, and is desirous of the friendship and assistance of the English, let your Majesty inform me thereof in a letter stating every particular, and send a confidential Agent of ability and discretion to negotiate with me at Malacca — for I have power over many ships of war and if I think proper to do it, I can drive the Dutch out even were they 10,000 in number."

On receiving subsequent accounts that the Dutch vessels had been permitted into the Palembang River, Raffles despatched a second letter to the Sultan, this time by Tunku Radin Mahomet who had been engaged by Raffles in Penang. The letter was sent on December 15, 1810³²). It reads:

(LETTER B.)

"I wrote to your Majesty five days ago, & now without waiting for an answer address you again by Tunku Radin Mahomet whom I have appointed my Agent to proceed to your Majesty's Court with this letter. ...

With respect to the Dutch what does it signify that your Majesty should longer remain attached to them & permit them to reside in Palembang — for they are a bad Nation and intend to follow a bad course towards your Majesty and your Majesty's Country. It is therefore on this account important to your Majesty's interests to become the friend of the English.

If your Majesty is desirous of meeting my wishes I recommend that you should forthwith send me an answer to this letter containing every particular in writing of your Majesty's difficulties with the Dutch, and let a confidential and intelligent Agent from your Majesty convey the letter, in order that I may be able to consult and arrange with him on all matters — and if we can make an Agreement that will be satisfactory to your Majesty, the affair shall be immediately settled."

On the same day that Raffles despatched this letter to the Sultan, he informed Minto of his negotiations in that quarter.

1810 is labelled as a "draft". It is again in Raffles' handwriting, and is the draft of the second original letter in Part II.

³²) *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 5. The date on the original Malay copy is torn off, but it can be dated exactly by a reference in a letter of Raffles to Minto of December 15 below. Baud prints his version as letter No. 1, op. cit., pp. 21-2.

"As the Sultan of Palembang is one of the richest of the Malay Chieftains and is literally said to have Godowns stored with Dollars and Gold hoarded by his Ancestors, I considered it a point of some importance to prevent Daendels from availing himself of this extensive source of supply, and in consequence wrote to the Sultan immediately on my arrival here urging him to be on his guard against the Dutch operations, and assuring him of the friendship of the English should he be desirous of getting rid of them. Having since heard that part of the Dutch vessels have been permitted to go up the River, & that they are likely to succeed in whatever object they have in view — I have this day dispatched a second letter entrusted to [Tunku] Mahomed, a relation of the Sultan's, and a confidential Agent whom I have employed as my Vakeel on the occasion. ...

*Altho' Palembang is a small point in my general plan of operations, yet as my giving my ostensible attention to it in preference to others, may cover more political measures, I consider it of material importance"*³³).

Still not hearing directly of the movements of the Dutch naval force, which he thought consisted of 28 vessels, and not being certain whether it was to be directed against Palembang, Rhio or Lingga, Raffles decided to exploit the doubt by sending a mission to the latter place³⁴). Scott³⁵) and Tunku Pangeran of Siac³⁶) left Malacca for Lingga on December 23, 1810 aboard the cutter "Arethusa" carrying Raffles' letter to the Sultan. This read:

"Having immediately on arrival at Malacca received intimation from the Commandant that many Dutch vessels had arrived off the mouth of the Palembang River, intending to attack your Majesty's dominions in conjunction with the forces of the Sultan of Palembang, I lose no time in sending to [Lingga] one of the Company's vessels with a gentleman... named John Scott, Esq., accompanied by Tunku Pangeran of Siac... in order that they may ascertain whether it is true or not that the Dutch have such a plan in contemplation. ...

I have directed Tunku Punjuan of Siac to go and examine the Palembang country as well as the shores of Banca and of the Lampun country in order to ascertain where the Dutch vessels may have taken shelter — and I request your Majesty's assistance in furnishing him with a Prow... to effect the service. ..."

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³³) Raffles to Minto, December 15, 1810. *Raffles Collection*, XIII, No. 3. Italics are mine. Compare Baud, op. cit., p. 9.

³⁴) Raffles wrote to Minto, Ibid., "... at the same time that I send a vakeel to Palembang I have deemed it advisable to send Mr. Scott to [Lingga] to put the Sultan there on his guard against Palembang".

³⁵) On Scott see De Haan, F., "Personalialia der Periode van het Engelsch Bestuur over Java 1811-1816", *Bijdr. T.L.V.*, (1935), 92, p. 643.

³⁶) Tunku Pangeran of Siac was brother-in-law of the Sultan of Siac, and a pretender to the throne.

³⁷) Raffles to the Sultan of Lingga, no date. *Raffles Collection*, I, No. 8. Tunku Pangeran was not to investigate the Palembang country at all. His instructions directed his attention to Java. Raffles' idea was simply to secure help from Lingga in smuggling the Cheribon princes back into Java, and at the same time ingratiate himself with the Sultan of Lingga.

Scott and the Pangeran arrived at Lingga on December 28, and after some difficulty prevailed upon the Sultan to place a prow at the disposal of the Pangeran of Siac as requested. The latter left Lingga for his mission eastwards on January 9, 1811³⁸). Raffles, of course, did not receive any information from him regarding the Dutch naval force, and not having heard from Tunku Radin Mahomet at Palembang, decided to send Captain James Bowen of H.M.S. "Phoenix" with another letter to Badr'uddin, and also to find out about the Dutch ships³⁹). Of this letter we know nothing except that it was safely delivered to the Sultan. It was probably Bowen who took Raffles' letter of January 13, 1811 to the chiefs of Campong Soengsang at the mouth of the Palembang River warning them not to consort with the Dutch⁴⁰).

On January 23 Bowen addressed a report to Raffles from the Straits of Banca. He told him that the Dutch naval force at Palembang had left thirteen days previously, and had consisted of three cruisers, four gun boats and ten merchantmen.

"They did not", Bowen wrote⁴¹), "succeed in obtaining their object with the Sultan who would not supply them with tin unless they paid for it in hard cash which they were not prepared to do. *It does not appear that the garrison of Palembang has received any reinforcement*, and the people who have visited the "Phoenix" have manifested every mark of friendship for the English."

Raffles must have received Bowen's letter together with a fuller report sometime towards the end of January, for on the 31st of that month he reported on the measures he had taken towards Lingga and Palembang⁴²). He informed Minto of the apparent withdrawal of the Dutch establishment in the Lampoons, and outlined Daendels' scheme for marching an army overland to Palembang. This plan, however, had been abandoned, but he had equipped a naval expedition for use against Palembang.

³⁸) Scott to Raffles, no date. *Java Factory Records*, 13.

³⁹) It is possible that Bowen left Malacca for Palembang in December, 1810. From other evidence, however, it seemed best to place his departure early in the New Year.

⁴⁰) The original Malay letter, dated January 13, [1811] exists, and is printed in Part II. Baud's version is his letter No. 2, op. cit., pp. 22-3.

⁴¹) Bowen to Raffles, January 23, 1811 *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 3. Italics mine. The passage is significant in the light of Raffles' subsequent despatch of arms to the Sultan.

⁴²) Raffles to Edmonstone, January 31, 1811. *Java Factory Records*, 13.

Fortunately the Sultan had

"been early aware of the hostile designs of the Dutch from the discovery of a quantity of arms &c concealed in several Prows or Boats sent up the River laden apparently with Rice and in consequence declined giving his permission to the Dutch Commandant to go higher up the River than the Straits of Jarang."

Although Raffles' mind was set at rest to some extent by the reports of the departure of the Dutch ships, and the apparent inactivity of enemy forces in the Lampoons, he was still concerned about matters at Palembang itself, and especially of his Agent Tunku Radin Mahomet. Early in February, therefore, he issued secret instructions to Captain Macdonald of the Company's brig "Ariel" to proceed to Palembang and find him, and also endeavour "to ascertain the exact nature and strength of the Dutch force stated to be in the Lampoon country and in the vicinity of Palembang...." Macdonald's instructions read:⁴³⁾

"In the neighbourhood of the Palembang river you will most probably find a small brig, (the *Friend's Adventure*) engaged by me, and under the orders of Toonkoo Radin Mahomed, ... for whom I also entrust you with a letter; from *this Person* you will be able to obtain the latest information respecting the state of the country, and the disposition of the Native Chieftains.

It would be advisable that you should, if practicable, deliver the letters to the Sultan in person. ...

You will be pleased to direct the Commander of the *Friend's Adventure* immediately to return to Malacca, and if convenient, afford a passage to Radin Mahomed on board the *Ariel*, in order to accelerate his return here.

You will be *most minute* in your enquiries respecting the state of the enemy's force in the Lampoon and Bantam countries, *and if the Sultan should require your advice and assistance in finally arranging with Dutch persons now residing at Palembang, you are authorized to attend thereto.*"

Macdonald apparently found Tunku Radin Mahomet at Muntok and from him learnt of his sorry negotiations with the Sultan, who had refused to recognise him as Raffles' Agent because he did not have official credentials⁴⁴⁾. Tunku Radin sent with Said Abu Bakir the following account of his reception by Bad'ruddin.

(LETTER E.)

"I have to inform my friend that I arrived safe at Palembang on the 9th of the month Dulhadjé⁴⁵⁾ and on appearing before the Sultan delivered the letter. ... My friend made mention therein respecting friendship with

⁴³⁾ *A Narrative of the Early Life and Services of Capt. D. Macdonald, I. N.*, (Weymouth, no date), 3rd. edit., Appendix C, pp. 245-8.

⁴⁴⁾ *Raffles Collection*, IV, Nos. 6 & 7. See letters C & D, Appendix II, Part II.

⁴⁵⁾ 5 or 6 January, 1811 for the Mohammedan year 1225. If the date is accurate it took him 21 days to reach Palembang from Malacca.

the Sultan, on which the Sultan observed that he was very glad thereof as it presaged good measures, particularly as his Brother had been dispatched to wait on him personally. . . .

I acquainted His Majesty of my Commission, when the Sultan enquired if it was a fact that I was an Agent to Mr. Raffles, to which I replied yes, I am an Agent to him. Afterwards the Sultan asked me if I had any written power besides the said letter, to which I said no, but only the said letter which I had delivered, on which the Sultan said that it was only a letter which was forwarded by the said Great man to him, without mentioning to His Majesty that I had any authority.

The Sultan then said that if I was in possession of such a written Power, he would fully enter into an agreement and decide on every point but as it was, it would be better for me to return to Malacca and request such a written Power from my friend which the Sultan seemed to think I had forgot previously to request.

After this the Sultan wrote the reply to my friend's letter, and after I received the same, I left Palembang. On my way I touched at [Muntok], where I found a Brig belonging to Achmat Sahib from Malacca, in which I wished to obtain a passage, but could not . . . and as my own vessel could not proceed so quick, . . . I have dispatched my Brother Said Abu Bakir on board the aforesaid Brig with the above mentioned letter. . . .

I request my Friend to dispatch the said Said Abu Bakir as soon as possible to me with the required written Power as Agent to my friend. . . ." ⁴⁶⁾

When Raffles received this letter, those of the Sultan of January 1811 ⁴⁷⁾, the verbal report of Said Abu Bakir, and news of Macdonald's failure to come to some arrangement about the Dutch garrison, he decided on a more determined policy with regard to Palembang. The tin mines of Banca which had attracted his attention earlier before the worries of a Dutch invasion of Palembang, now became the essential objects of negociation. If Badr'uddin could be persuaded to assert his independence, any cession of Banca would be binding, irrespective of any future negotiations for the return of Java to the Dutch ⁴⁸⁾.

It was on this basis that Raffles issued fresh instructions to Tunku Radin Mahomet early in March 1811. He sent him by Said Abu the following letter, dated March 3 ⁴⁹⁾.

(LETTER F.)

"I have received your letter, as also that accompanying from the Sultan of Palembang, and as far as I can judge therefrom, and the representations of Said Abubaker, approve your conduct.

In return, I now send by him a further letter for your immediate delivery to the Sultan, and in which I have referred to a deed of treaty to be presented by you for his attestation.

⁴⁶⁾ *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 8. The letter is dated February 8, 1811.

⁴⁷⁾ See Appendix II.

⁴⁸⁾ Raffles to Minto, June 1811, Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, pp. 42-3).

⁴⁹⁾ *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 11. Italics mine.

I also transmit to you a proper authority constituting you to act as my Agent in receiving and acknowledging the same from His Majesty, as also to confer on all points relating thereto. Whatever observations or proposals may occur to His Majesty you will be the medium of communicating to me, but must observe, by an attentive perusal and consideration of the accompanying memoranda which I enclose for your guidance, how important it is that the Deed be as early as possible signed and returned *without objection, or the introduction of any new matter rendering further reference necessary.*"

The deed of Treaty proposed by Raffles was:

"Whereas we Paduka Sultan Sri Ratu of Palembang, &c. &c. having long had reason to suspect the sincerity of the Dutch Government towards us and our Dominions, and late circumstances having convinced us of their sinister disposition, want of faith, and rapacious spirit of aggrandizement, evincing itself as well by their proceedings towards other neighbouring states, as in the late intrusion of a hostile force with [an] attempt at the clandestine introduction of warlike stores, and the unpermitted establishment of a military post within our Territory; apprehensive of our danger from continuing the connexion with a Power of late equally regardless of individual rights as general alliances; and viewing the [striking] difference of principle which apparently actuates the British Government in their intercourse with all native states, ... do by these Presents cancel all engagements that we have hitherto entered into with that nation, embracing, under the following stipulations, the protection of the British Government on whom we rely for the future prosperity and welfare of our Dominion.

Article 1. That from and after the date and signing of these Presents, there shall be established between His Majesty the Sultan of Palembang and the English East India Company, mutual peace, friendship and alliance, as long as the sun and moon shall shine.

[Article] 2. His Majesty the Sultan hereby engages to dismiss from his Territories the present Dutch Resident, and all Persons acting under the authority of the Dutch Government⁵⁰), binding himself hereafter never to re-admit such [a] Residency, or that of a similar agency from any foreign power whatever with the exception of the English, who shall be at liberty to establish such [a] Factory or Factories as may be hereafter agreed upon.

[Article] 3. His Majesty the Sultan agrees to transfer to the English exclusively his contracts with the Dutch for [the] sale of Tin, Pepper, &c. should they require it, the terms thereof to be finally arranged within twelve months from this date; and, in the meantime, none but vessels having a British pass expressly for the purpose, be permitted to export Tin from the Sultan's dominions; the English Company agreeing to grant such licenses freely, till then, to all British and Eastern native vessels sailing from British Ports; the unexceptionable exclusion of foreign Flags being admitted as a basis of this and all future agreements between the contracting Parties.

[Article] 4. In order that such further arrangements and stipulations as may be necessary should be duly entered into, the Sultan further agrees

⁵⁰) The italicised passage is Raffles' English version of the sinister Malay phrase "boewang habis-kan sakali-kali" used to such advantage by Baud, op. cit., p. 16. See Part II for a discussion of the point.

that an accredited Ambassador from Palembang shall forthwith proceed to the Seat of the British Eastern Government, and, as soon as the terms of a full and detailed treaty shall be drawn out, to receive at Palembang an Agent from the English East India Company, when the Deed may be regularly signed and attested by the contracting Parties"⁵¹).

In a covering Memorandum, Raffles informed his Agent of the following points to stress upon Badr'uddin⁵²).

"As the British Government meditate the immediate assumption, by conquest, of the authority heretofore maintained by the Dutch over the Island of Java, and its dependencies, the advantages that must accrue to the Sultan, by the expediting of this measure, must be evident, being as follows:-

1. By a treaty previous to the fall of Batavia, all existing claims of the Dutch for arrears of contract may be annulled, which otherwise might not be the case, as on so becoming possessed of the original Deeds, the nature of our Government might make it requisite to exact whatever those Deeds might as Conquerors entitle them to.

2. The Sultan has now the opening of evincing his attachment to the English interests, which hereafter may be no longer voluntary; consequently such [a] disposition will entitle him to the more favourable and liberal consideration of the English in arrangements that must necessarily follow the conquest of Java.

3. *The Sultan cannot but be aware that there is always a difference in the political relation of a State which falls after conquest from a European Power, and one which commences alliance by negotiation with a Native Prince; the former being subject hereafter to such arrangements as on a peace may take place between the two European Powers, whilst the latter, entirely independent of such events, is not liable to be brought into the discussion, and consequently not subjected to the fate of war in Europe*⁵³).

4. The English holding such immense Territories and Power on the Continent of India, ... cannot in their proceedings Eastward be actuated by the rapacious and greedy conduct that has distinguished the Dutch, ... the views of the British being principally directed, first, to the expulsion of their European enemies; secondly, to the relief and support of the legally established Native Authorities, ... and thirdly, to the full establishment of one general system of commercial policy throughout Eastern and Western India, the principle of which must tend no less to the prosperity of the regular Native Ports, than to the utter annihilation of all future misunderstandings, and subjection of such Ports to the European law of blockade, which as connected with such [an] Enemy, they must otherwise be occasionally liable to.

5. It is of importance, in order to secure the advantages above stated, that the Sultan's part of the Treaty be dated at Palembang, as early as possible after receipt of this, as there is no saying how soon the hostile force alluded to may make its appearance in these seas, and it be too late for negotiation on the liberal principles now contemplated".

⁵¹) *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 11a.

⁵²) *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 11b.

⁵³) Italics mine. It was this attractive proposal, as we shall see, which explains Badr'uddin's subsequent massacre of the Dutch.

In a letter to the Sultan explaining his wishes, Raffles regretted that he had not sent an accredited Agent to confer with him at Malacca. Because the shortness of time he has had to entrust the negotiation to Radin Mahomet, (LETTER G.)

"to propose that your Majesty, in consideration of the late intrusion of the Dutch force, with [the] attempt at [a] clandestine introduction of warlike stores, and the establishment, without your permission of a military post at Tulang Bawang, should in cancelling all engagements with them, throw yourself on the protection of the British Government by a spontaneous tender of the following terms: [Here follow the various articles set out in the proposed Treaty.]

In order the more fully to explain the motives that urge the necessity of immediate arrangements I have communicated to my Agent Tunco Radin Mahomed such further considerations as I flatter myself must weigh with your Majesty. Considering the form and solemnity due to the regular execution of so important a Deed as that which may regulate the future connexion of your Majesty's rich and important dominions with those of the English, and that the attestation thereof should not in the first instance be delegated to any secondary Power whatever, I have entrusted Tunco Radin Mahomed with the form of a Treaty drawn out on the foregoing principles, which, if agreeable to your Majesty, I request may be dated at Palembang, and transmitted to me attested under your Royal Seal... and as soon as the same shall be received, and the ambassadors therein proposed shall have arrived, which it is of the utmost importance they should do within a month from the date thereof, a similar Deed on the part of the English East India Company shall be immediately returned with due form and solemnity"⁵⁴).

Four days after despatching these documents by Said Abu Bakir, Raffles reported to the Governor-General on "the favorable commencement" of his negotiations with the Sultan of Palembang, enclosing his correspondence with Badr'uddin. "I trust", he continued⁵⁵), "your Lordship will generally approve of the motives which have dictated the proposal made to the Sultan with the view of effecting by negotiation alone a *final arrangement* in favor of the English...."

Raffles' letter of March 3 must have reached Badr'uddin towards the end of the same month, although there was some delay in conveying the proposed Treaty to him. The Sultan's first reaction to Raffles' proposals was one of extreme caution⁵⁶).

⁵⁴) *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 11c.

⁵⁵) Raffles to Minto, March 7, 1811. *Raffles Collection*, XIII, No. 19.

⁵⁶) *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 9. The letter is undated.

(LETTER H.)

"We have to make known to our brother Radin Muhammed with regard to the Hollanders in Palembang that we wish to conduct the whole matter respecting them as far as in us lies to the satisfaction of the great man in Malac[c]a, for we are by no means desirous of being brought into any trouble from the proceedings of the Hollanders, and therefore we have sent an urgent message to Batavia in order that the [Governor] general of Batavia may recall them with the utmost speed. We are also entirely unwilling to be involved in the hostilities between the Hollanders and the English. Let not our brother then have any doubt or suspicion further for we have no inclination to be conjoined or connected with the Hollanders, no inclination in the least. ... Again be it known to our brother that in all former time[s] from the first introduction of the Hollanders into Palembang, no war has occurred between the Hollanders & the English & that they have been of the greatest advantage to our ancestors, & therefore our ancestors were desirous of not forgetting their good offices, & thus till the present time they have continued in Palembang. ...

[W]ith respect to the expulsion of the Hollanders we shall act to the best of our ability & in such a manner that our name shall occur no obloquy among great men and those who are our particular friends. However we have to request of our friend the great person in Malacca a little patience. ... If however any fault should occur on the part of the Hollanders we shall immediately accomplish our object by force, but if we were to act so without any reason, we should undoubtedly be blamed by our friend for our conduct. ...

*Again with regard to the letter, expressive of the wishes of the great man at Malacca, which was brought by the Seyyad Aln Bekir Rumi, we wish our brother to be particularly well apprized that we can by no means assent to it & we desire him to be informed that as far as regards its excuses & reasons it cannot be stable but on the contrary an introduction to destruction, for there is no mutual regard or affection indicated between the parties. ...*⁵⁷⁾

With respect to the proposed method of trade we wish our brother to reflect that we must be most gratified by the most numerous concourse of traders according to the customary method of traders going and coming from the West, according to the long established usages through every season.

With regard to the information which our brother formerly communicated to us concerning his being appointed authorized Vakif of the great man at Malacca, & having with him a paper containing all the propositions of the great man, if we approve of and are pleased with the said letter we will affix our seal to it, but the truth is that the paper has not yet been received. ..."

After some negotiation on the part of Tunku Radin Mahomet, the Sultan committed himself to a Treaty⁵⁸⁾. This Treaty, of which an English version exists, differed in many points from that proposed by Raffles⁵⁹⁾.

⁵⁷⁾ Italics mine.

⁵⁸⁾ Baud, op. cit., p. 12 was incorrect when he asserted that no Agreement was ratified by Badr'uddin.

⁵⁹⁾ Raffles Collection, IV, No. 10. Italics mine.

"On the 9th day of the month Zu'lhajjeh, and seventh day of the week in the year 1225⁶⁰), Radin Muhammed ben Hussein ben Shehal ed Din brought to the [Paduca] Sri Sultan Ratu Beder ed din seated on the throne of authority in the land of Palembang, the land of Islam, a Letter which he has now delivered to his Majesty for the purpose of concluding all the proposals of the Sri [Paduca] Thomas Raffles in order that his Majesty of his own good pleasure may ratify them. Now the following are the propositions referred to, and presented by him in the capacity of Wakil fully authorized to conclude concerning them.

If there should be any difficulty in expelling the Hollanders from Palembang, he [Raffles presumably] will expel them.

If his Majesty should be pleased that he (the said Thomas Raffles Esq^{re}) should take possession of the Place occupied by the Hollanders, *yet while Batavia is not yet taken, as this might occasion some distress to his Majesty, the Hollanders shall continue to occupy that place.*

If his Majesty however, should not be pleased that he should occupy the place of the Hollanders, he shall order him to guard the entrance of the River Palembang with ships and he shall guard it.

If his Majesty should not be pleased to permit him to guard the entrance of the said River, he shall direct him to return to Pulau Penang or Malacca, and he shall return, and when any trouble occurs to his Majesty, he shall send and inform him and he shall come and assist his Majesty.

Again if his Majesty should be displeased with the price of Tin on account of the avarice of the Hollanders, he will cause Dollars to be offered up to his Majesty.

And if his Majesty should require a little higher price for his Tin than from the Hollanders he will take it nevertheless, and will pursue no measures of any kind tending to injure the revenues of Palembang.

And if his Majesty should [choose,] he may establish such regulations concerning the English trade as are in use in [Lingga,] Rhio, Siak, Tringano with regard to buying and selling sometimes cheap and sometimes dear, as in the practice of commerce among all Nations.

With regard to the whole proposition of the Sri [Paduca] Thomas Raffles Esq^{re}... there is now between the English and Palembang who are connected in friendship, the terms as with all the Rajas of the black [complexion] who constantly [have] been on uninterrupted terms of friendship with them, and they are to use no means whatever to possess themselves of the Revenues of Palembang. ...

In this manner are finally concluded the whole of the matters contained in this paper and terminated through means of the authorized Wakil with the [Paduca] Sri Sultan Ratu Mahmud Beder ed din, who has accepted the proposed agreement by virtue of this Letter of truth. ..."

The Sultan's seal was affixed to the Treaty, which was to become the justification for his subsequent actions at Palembang. The Treaty, of course, left the initiative with Badr'uddin, for he could adopt a waiting policy so far as the Dutch garrison was concerned. Indeed, the Treaty clearly stipulated that it could remain at Palembang until after the fall of Java.

⁶⁰) The Malay dating is incorrect here, being the equivalent of January 5, 1811. This is obviously impossible.

Why Raffles' Agents allowed such vague clauses to be inserted in the Treaty can only be guessed. In any case it is clear that Raffles heard nothing of it until later because of the further letters he sent to the Sultan, while the latter appears to have done nothing but wait for confirmation of the Deed by Raffles. While it is true that Badr'uddin undoubtedly wished to postpone any decision about the side he would support in the coming struggle, it is also true that he could not have taken positive action in support of the British, except at considerable peril, without first having the Treaty confirmed. This explains his delay in not ridding himself of the Dutch, as much as any other ⁶¹⁾.

During all this time, however, he was being urged to take positive action by Raffles' Agents. To these requests Badr'uddin replied:

(LETTER I).

[W]ith respect to the enemies of the English chiefs, the Hollanders who are in Palembang, we will do our utmost to expel them acting in such a manner as may give no occasion for bringing reproach or disgrace on our name among our friends in future time. But further with regard to the letter to which we formerly affixed our seal at the representation of our brother that he was the authorized and absolute vakil of the great man at Malacca & which letter contained so many propositions of the great man at Malacca, & being approved by us had our seal affixed to it. Unto the present time there is nothing more of the matter, which excites in our mind the greatest doubt and anxiety ⁶²⁾. Our brother is best advised with regard to everything that relates to this letter but where then is the answer & recognition of it?...

[O]ur brother wanted it to receive the seal & sign manual of the great man at Malacca, and yet after going away, Seyyad Abu Beker Rumi has returned back privately without bringing back that letter. This is what fills me with the utmost anxiety concerning this matter. ... ⁶³⁾.

While these events were being played out at Palembang, Raffles sent a certain Captain Teak there both to buy tin, and convey to the Sultan Raffles' exact wishes ⁶⁴⁾. It was apparently in reply to a letter

⁶¹⁾ Compare Court, M. H., *An Exposition of the Relations of the British Government with the Sultan and State of Palembang and the Designs of the Netherlands' Government upon that Country*, (London, 1821), p. 3, on Badr'uddin's motives in not dispelling the Dutch until after the fall of Java.

⁶²⁾ Italics mine.

⁶³⁾ *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 13. The letter is undated.

⁶⁴⁾ We learn this fact from one of the letters seen by Robinson at Palembang later. The letter is dated April, 1811 and from the Malay dating, Sir Richard Winstedt has fixed upon April 1. It is possible that Captain "Teak" was in fact Captain Tait who commanded the ship "Thainstone" which brought Raffles supplies of muskets and ammunition to Malacca. Raffles to Edmonstone, January 24, 1811. *Java Factory Records*, 13.

sent about this time that Badr'uddin addressed the following to Raffles on April 19, referring to the concluded Treaty ⁶⁵).

(LETTER J.)

"The Paduca Sri Sulan Ratu has to inform his friend the Sri Paduca Thomas Raffles Esq' that the last letter of our friend has reached us. ... With respect to the import of our friend [s] representation — it is all settled and we have desired the bearer forthwith to set sail on his return with prosperous auspices."

Such vagueness still left Raffles in the dark. As the invasion force was assembling at Malacca, Raffles adopted more positive action. Captain Macdonald was again despatched to Palembang conveying letters both from Raffles and the Governor-General, together with copies of letters already sent, a sure sign that Raffles had received none of Badr'uddin's replies through his Agents. In the letter conveyed by Macdonald, Raffles deplored no answer from the Sultan, and informed him that he would have to act swiftly as the fleet was about to leave Malacca for Java. "As the Dutch are at Palembang", he concluded ⁶⁶), "I send four cases of 80 muskets in all as well as 10 baskets of cartridges filled with powder and shot. I can send you whatever you want, ships, men or arms".

When Macdonald arrived at Palembang he sent Raffles' and Minto's letters to Badr'uddin by Said Abu Bakir. By the same agency he despatched the muskets and cartridges. Macdonald wrote to the Sultan informing him of this, concluding:

"As for the Dutch, I am instructed by the Big Man to evict them but it will be as you wish" ⁶⁷).

On May 23 Badr'uddin replied to Raffles: ⁶⁸)

(LETTER K.)

"... the Paduca Sri Sultan Ratu has to explain & make known to his friend the Sri Paduca Thomas Raffles Esq' ... that his highly honoured and respected letter with the accompanying presents brought by Capt. Macdulon

⁶⁵) *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 14.

⁶⁶) Baud's letter No. 4, op. cit., p. 26. The translation is by Sir Richard Winstedt. See Wurtzburg, op. cit., p. 52.

⁶⁷) Baud's letter No. 5, op. cit., p. 27. Translation by Sir Richard Winstedt. See Wurtzburg, op. cit., p. 52. I have used these two letters of Baud because neither the Malay originals, nor English drafts exist. The fact that arms were received by Badr'uddin is confirmed by the English translation of his reply to Raffles, Letter K below.

⁶⁸) *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 15.

(Macdonald) has prosperously arrived... & has been received with the utmost satisfaction. ...

The Paduca Sri Sultan Ratu has to make known to his friend the Sri Paduca Thomas Raffles Esq^r that the whole of the matter alluded to is finished with everything regarding it by the intervention of the authorized Vakils appointed to act between us. ... *They have however been exceedingly delayed in returning to Malacca through a variety of obstacles which it was not in their power to avoid.* ...⁶⁹).

We have also to signify to our friend regarding his tokens of friendship & affection, the guns with all their apparatus, that we consider ourselves as highly indebted to his kindness. Let not our friend however be displeased at what has occurred [for our friend may be assured that we shall infallibly conduct ourselves in the way which is best and which it is impossible should lead to any bad consequences]⁷⁰). ...

With regard to the Hollanders in the kingdom of Palembang, we request our friend to entertain no doubts or displeasure. The Paduca Sri Sultan Ratu will not enlarge upon this topic, in every particular, nor about its conclusion, for there is a letter with our friend's authorized vakils, ... which will suffice. ..."

The arms despatched to Badr'uddin at this late period can only have been intended for use against the Dutch garrison at Palembang. That was what the Sultan believed⁷¹), and no other explanation seems possible. As pointed out earlier, Raffles did have ideas of using Palembang in a flank attack against Java, and the despatch of arms to the Sultan might be explained on those grounds. Wurtzburg had something of this argument when he maintained that the arms were sent for use against the Dutch naval force⁷²). But in Wurtzburg's case the chronology is impossible, and the first likelihood must surely be ruled out by the small amount of arms sent. Eighty muskets would have been of very little use, *except for an attack against the Dutch garrison at Palembang*, which Raffles knew had not been reinforced.

Macdonald must have brought the Sultan's reply back to Raffles about the end of May⁷³). Also he apparently conveyed Raffles' Agents Tunku Radin Mahomet and Said Abu Bakir to Malacca. With their arrival Raffles heard of the signing of the Treaty for the first time. The unsatisfactory nature of the clauses, together no doubt with biased

⁶⁹) Italics mine.

⁷⁰) This passage in brackets is deleted in Ms.

⁷¹) Robinson to Raffles, July 20, 1813. *Java Factory Records*, 37.

⁷²) Wurtzburg, op. cit., pp. 47-50.

⁷³) Presumably with another letter written some days earlier on May 15. This letter L. (*Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 12) is printed in Appendix III. From the similarity of its contents to the letter addressed by Badr'uddin to Tunku Radin Mahomet above, it may have to be dated a little earlier. It is important in showing clearly Badr'uddin's reluctance to commit himself to the English side before the Treaty he signed had been approved by Raffles.

reports from his vakeels, persuaded him that any future negotiation with Palembang before the invasion was impossible. He instructed his two Agents to proceed to Banca and await further orders⁷⁴). At the same time he submitted a full report to Lord Minto on his negotiations with Palembang.

"I shall begin", he wrote, "with stating the result of the negotiation... commenced with its Sultan. Of the importance of Palembang to the Dutch government of Batavia, succeeding inquiries had only tended to convince me the more. Large balances had long been avowedly due to the Dutch regency; the Sultan of Palembang was known to be extremely rich in long-hoarded heaps of precious metals, and it was greatly to be feared that the energy and vigour of Marshal Daendels might so intimidate him as to induce him to pay up these balances, which would have been of the utmost importance to the finances of the Marshal at the present crisis. I knew that the Marshal had not only severely threatened the Sultan, but was taking active measures to compel him to accede to his terms. Upon this circumstance I founded the project of opening a negotiation, considering it as certain that, whether the Sultan accepted or refused the terms proposed, the proposal alone would be sufficient to prevent him coming to any accomodation with Marshal Daendels: a circumstance which was sure of inspiring fresh spirit into the Bantamese and Lampungs, disheartened by recent defeat. If the Sultan acceded to the propositions offered, we would not only acquire a powerful ally, by whose assistance a formidable demonstration might be made on the side of Bantam without weakening our main attack, *and whose voluntary alliance would prevent his being subjected to the fate of war in Europe*, but we would also be put in possession without further trouble of the grand monopoly of the tin trade. This, however, I was scarcely sanguine enough to expect, as I knew that not only several of the Sultan's ministers were decidedly in the Dutch interest, but that the whole state of Palembang had been too long accustomed to a contraband traffic to consent readily to resign its advantages. As I expected, the Sultan demurred and adopted a temporizing policy, endeavouring by every means in his power to spin out the negotiation till he should perceive what was likely to be the course of events, *although I had taken care to explain to him in the most particular manner the important difference that would occur in the political situation of a dependent state that should submit after the conquest of Java, and one that should voluntarily enter into an alliance with us previous to that event*. Though I believe the fact to be incontrovertible, that the Sultan of Palembang is bound to the Dutch by various agreements and treaties, and though it is certain that various acts of hostility have been committed by the Dutch, in concert with his subjects, on the English shipping within his boundaries, yet he has assumed the character of an independent and neutral power; and because some of the English ships have at times managed to procure cargoes of tin at Banca, in spite of the Dutch prohibition, he wishes to avail himself of this circumstance, to represent that he has always been on terms of amity with the English. The true reason, however, I was soon informed of by means of my agent, Tunku Radin Mahammed, who states that some of the Sul-

⁷⁴) This chronology seems sound enough. They arrived at Muntok on July 22. See Baud, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

tan's counsellors, especially the Tamungung Lanan, had persuaded him that the English interests were in the utmost jeopardy, not only in Europe, but in Bengal and the rest of India, and that therefore we were anxious to acquire new settlements to the eastward" ⁷⁵).

The invasion force began leaving Malacca in June, and arrived off Batavia early in August. After the defeat at Meester Cornelis, Minto on September 11 proclaimed Java and its dependencies to be under the authority of the English East India Company. A few days afterwards news of the defeat of the Dutch and French forces reached Palembang, and on September 14 the Dutch garrison was massacred near the mouth of the Palembang River. There can be little doubt that Badr'uddin had a hand in the massacre, although some evidence to the contrary will be discussed in Part II.

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JOHN BASTIN

⁷⁵) The despatch is dated June, 1811 in *Bengal Civil Colonial Consultations*, Range 167, Vol. 42, and is printed in Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, pp. 42-3.