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Palembang in 1811 and 1812 (Part II)

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PALEMBANG IN 1811 AND 1812.

(PART II)

Baud's main argument to show Raffles' responsibility for the massacre of the Dutch at Palembang rested upon the use of the words "*boewang habis-kan sakali-kali*" in the letter of March 3⁷⁶). There has been some argument about the exact meaning of these Malay words. Baud's rendering was "throw out and destroy", but Professors W. Ph. Coolhaas and C. Hooykaas have extended the meaning to "make and end to all of them so that none remain"⁷⁷). Sir Richard Winstedt on the otherhand believes that the whole passage should read: "You must *get rid of* all the Dutch and the Resident *making a complete job of it*"⁷⁸). Unfortunately any reconciliation between these interpretations can no longer help us to decide on the general question of Raffles' guilt. The discovery of three of the original Malay letters⁷⁹) sent to Badr'uddin by Raffles (although not the one containing the above passage) show that Baud's versions of the letters were exceedingly bad copies of the originals, and cannot be used as the basis for a fine textual argument. Further, Baud's argument on the interpretation of the Malay phrase must also be overruled on another ground, namely that we possess Raffles' English draft of the letter, and no sinister passage appears in it⁸⁰).

While, however, we dismiss one textual argument based upon the Malay word "*buang*", we must immediately admit another. For in the very first letter Raffles wrote to the Sultan (the original of which exists) there appears the phrase "*pukul buang sekali-kali*". Raffles' draft of the letter in English contains the words: "I would recommend your Majesty to drive them [the Dutch] out from your country at once". His Malay scribe wrote instead: "Therefore I recommend that my friend beat them out definitely", — "*pukul buang sekali-kali*". The

⁷⁶) Baud, J. C., op. cit., p. 16.

⁷⁷) Coolhaas, W. Ph., op. cit., p. 119.

⁷⁸) Sir Richard Winstedt in conversation with the writer.

⁷⁹) Printed in Appendix IV.

⁸⁰) See Part I, p. 311.

meaning suggested by these words, according to Professor A. A. Cense, was that Badr'uddin was to drive the Dutch out *in not too gentle a way*. This idea was conveyed by the use of "*pukul*" meaning "to beat" or "to hit" and "*buang*", "to throw out". However, as Raffles in this first letter was warning the Sultan about the approach of a Dutch naval force, the words "*pukul*" and "*buang*" were probably meant to apply to that force as much as to the garrison. In his later letters, as we have seen from the English drafts, Raffles specifically returned to the question of getting rid of the Dutch garrison, and actually sent arms for the purpose. There is no doubt that he intended force to be used in accomplishing this task, but this is not to admit that Raffles was advocating massacre. He doubtless thought that once the fort had been stormed by the Sultan's forces, the Dutch soldiers with their wives and children would be made prisoners-of-war and treated honourably. There is a good deal to be said for Wurtzburg's argument that Raffles was acting in a war situation, and that he was entitled to stir up opposition against an enemy stronghold⁸¹).

It has been argued against this proposition that Raffles was acting irresponsibly in thinking that the Malay Sultan would behave in a gentlemanly way towards any prisoners-of-war who might have fallen into his hands. While there is something to be said for this argument, based as it is upon the unpredictability of Malay reactions in such a situation, it does not seem to the present writer to offer a satisfactory explanation for the massacre itself. Indeed, there is nothing more remarkable in the whole literature of the Palembang affair than the unsatisfactory explanations offered to account for the actual massacre. It is usually attributed to treachery of the Pangerang Ratoe, the son of the Sultan, who was supposed to have received an insult at the hands of the Dutch⁸²). But the evidence shows that Pangerang Ratoe was a most unpopular member of the court, and it seems likely that he was made the victim by his enemies when they were questioned on the subject of the massacre by Gillespie and others later.

The reason for the massacre was Raffles' irresponsible promise

⁸¹) Wurtzburg, C. E., op. cit., p. 50.

⁸²) The story was first told to Gillespie, who reported it to Raffles. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, pp. 118 et seq. It was such a good story that subsequent historians accepted it uncritically. Baud, however, doubted the Pangerang's guilt (op. cit., p. 19), but he was wrong when he said that Pangerang Ratoe was not mentioned in the eyewitness accounts of the massacre (op. cit. p. 20. See pp. 35-6). The Pangerang undoubtedly played some part in the massacre, but it was a minor one.

of independence to Badr'uddin if he expelled the Dutch before the British invasion of Java⁸³). The Sultan eagerly took advantage of this promise and signed a Treaty with Raffles' Agent Tunku Radin Mahomet. Although the clauses varied considerably from those proposed by Raffles, Badr'uddin appears to have thought that they would prove acceptable to the Governor-General's Agent. He waited for some confirmation from Raffles on the subject, but this never came, due mainly to the fact that Raffles' Agent did not convey the Treaty to Malacca until just prior to the departure of the British fleet. It is true, as pointed out earlier, that Badr'uddin might have been playing for time, but it must be admitted that he could hardly have expelled the Dutch until the Treaty had been ratified by the British. And then the worst happened. Badr'uddin heard of the fall of Java. Remembering Raffles' warning that he could not be considered an independent prince unless he got rid of the Dutch before the invasion, he hastily attempted to put matters right. He realized that his only hope lay in destroying the fort, and murdering all its inhabitants, so that there would be no witnesses to deny his assertion that the fort had been taken prior to the fall of Java. As part of the same plan, Raffles' two agents had to be killed in order to preserve the conspiracy of silence⁸⁴), and later the Commissioners sent there by Raffles had to be prevented from conversing with the natives, lest the secret should be discovered.

If Raffles had never made such a rash promise of independence to Badr'uddin, if he had only officially repudiated the Treaty signed by him, the massacre of the Dutch would probably not have occurred. Badr'uddin would certainly never have put any Dutch prisoners-of-war to death if he had been made to understand that his actions were accountable to the British authorities, by whom he was regarded as a dependent prince. Just how far Badr'uddin justified his actions on the basis of the Treaty he had signed with Raffles' agent Tunku Radin Mahomet, can be seen if we carry our narrative further forward.

No news of the massacre reached Java during the early weeks following the British conquest. Raffles was still in ignorance of it when he despatched three Commissioners to Palembang in November to renew

⁸³) See Part I, p. 312.

⁸⁴) Baud, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

the old agreements between the Dutch and the Sultan for the delivery of tin in favour of the English. Phillips, Wardenaar and Hare were instructed to take charge of the fort, and if necessary render every assistance to the Sultan against pirates. The cession of Banca was also to be obtained⁸⁵).

The Commissioners arrived at the entrance to the Palembang River on November 14, having first touched at Muntok. While there they received two letters of Tunku Radin Mahomet informing them that the Dutch garrison had left Palembang⁸⁶). After waiting a few days they were met by three Palembang Tummungungs who gave them the same story of the removal of the Dutch garrison —

“that in compliance with the wish and upon the suggestion of Mr. Raffles to make a free port of Palembang, they had . . . freed[?] themselves from their ties with the Dutch and expelled their Resident, razing the fort to the ground.”⁸⁷)

They further stated that the Agreement proposed by Raffles had been officially executed, and they had taken especial care to see that tin had been conveyed to no ports other than Malacca and Penang. On being told that the Commissioners wished to purchase tin at the old Dutch prices, the Tummungungs strongly urged that Raffles “had made proposals to the Sultan for throwing open the trade of Palembang on the sole condition of his turning out the Dutch — that the Sultan had complied, and that they could not conceive any object still remaining for adjustment”⁸⁸).

When the Commissioners met Badr’uddin himself on November 23, and informed him that they had come to arrange for the transfer of the Dutch factory to the British, the Sultan answered in much the same way. He said that he had many letters from Raffles, which had conveyed friendly sentiments and advice, and that for his part he had not fallen short in fulfilling his engagements. Phillips replied that on the Commission’s departure from Batavia, there had been no news of the

⁸⁵) Raffles to Captain Richard Phillips, William Wardenaar and Alexander Hare, November 2, 1811, *Bengal Civil Colonial Consultations*, Range 167, Vol. 42, Consultations of September 4, 1813.

⁸⁶) One of these letters was the one forcibly extracted from Tunku Radin Mahomet. See Baud, op. cit., p. 30. A Malay copy of the letter is in the *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 16.

⁸⁷) Report of Phillips, Wardenaar and Hare, December [6], 1811, *Bengal Civil Colonial Consultations*, Range 167, Vol. 42. Consultations of September 4, 1813.

⁸⁸) Loc. cit.

withdrawal of the Dutch garrison from Palembang. Badr'uddin claimed that Raffles had not asked him to inform him of the matter, and that in any case he had been uncertain that the British had conquered Java. He stated that he wished to adhere fully to the engagement he had entered into with Raffles' Agent, Tunku Radin Mahomet. Phillips replied that he knew that the latter had brought a signed Treaty to Malacca, but that Raffles was dissatisfied with it, as it had differed from the one he had proposed. The Sultan made no reply, and the audience broke up. On the following day, the Tummungung who resided with the Commissioners, drew Hare aside, and dwelt on Raffles' assurances, and his insistence that the Sultan send the Dutch away from Palembang. Hare repeated Phillips' argument of the previous day, that the Treaty signed by Badr'uddin was different from that suggested by Raffles. However, when the Commissioners were shown a copy of the Treaty by the Sultan on November 25, they were clearly surprised that Raffles' Agent had affixed his seal to it. Reporting on the matter to Raffles later, the Commissioners wrote:

"It was accordingly brought in with all Mr. Raffles's letters, and while Captain Phillips was perusing parts of them the Sultan said to Mr. Hare 'Is not the purport of these what one ought to rely on?' Then addressing Mr. Wardenaar and pointing to Mr. Hare, he added '[H]e, it is, who is acquainted with this business'. He also selected and read aloud from the letters various passages in which Mr. Raffles discontended[!] on the liberality and munificence of the English character, and more particularly on the total disinterestedness of their views in proposing intercourse with Palembang or any other Native States in opposition to the contracted selfish policy of the Dutch.

Toonko Mahomed's paper was then adduced and *Captain Phillips expressing surprise at seeing the seals with its purport, added that when we left Batavia we were quite unaware of such a Document existing* and requested a Copy, which the Sultan promised, saying that he supposed... had we been apprised, we of course would not have come...."

In reply to a further request to station a British officer at Palembang, the Sultan laughed, and said

"'There is here no place, the former Dutch Residence being completely removed from the ground where it stood. I must therefore beg to be excused upon that, not that I have any apprehension the English would ever become oppressors like the Dutch, but only that it strikes me as unnecessary the placing [of] soldiers here because I assure you as to pirates or any black-skinned Enemies, we have not the smallest occasion for any assistance being perfectly able to defend ourselves....'"⁸⁹).

The Commissioners decided that no further object could be secured

⁸⁹) Loc. cit. Italics mine.

by a longer stay at Palembang, and determined on returning to Batavia. The reasons they gave for this decision are interesting.

"We were principally influenced in this decision", they informed Raffles, "by the consideration that Toonko Mahamat having been apparently vested by you with full powers to come to an agreement with the Sultan assured us that [although] it was not your intention to entrust him with such, we yet doubted with what propriety we could undertake, without a reference, to assert that such agreement should not be attended to and in the event of its ultimately appearing to you only a subterfuge we were unanimously of opinion that it would be preferable to avoid entering into any terms, as such could only fetter and obstruct the views of Government"⁹⁰).

On their way down the Palembang River the Commissioners noticed fresh fortifications being constructed.

They arrived back at Batavia early in December, but Raffles who was in the Eastern Districts, did not receive their report until December 13. He also received a letter of the Sultan's congratulating him upon his elevation to the Lieutenant-Governorship⁹¹). Badr'uddin went on to lament his inability to hand over the Dutch fort to the Commissioners as it had been destroyed as Raffles himself had instructed. He maintained that he had acted on the purest principles in obeying Raffles, "whose express wish it was that the Dutch should be removed...." He had followed the principles of the Agreement, but had not known exactly how to act "for he had not at that time any news of his friend and was in great trouble and distress at not receiving any...." He concluded by appealing to Raffles to honour the Agreement which had been signed by his Agent Tunku Radin Mahomet.

On December 19 Raffles received a brief indication from Malacca of the reports of his Vakeels of the massacre of the Dutch, and on January 1, 1812 the depositions arrived⁹²). At this time Badr'uddin's emissaries, the Tummungung Soera Nandita and the Demangs Soera Derpa and Derya Nata, were at Batavia to assure Raffles of Badr'uddin's continued friendship. Such overtures had come too late, and Raffles in reporting the massacre to Minto, concluded⁹³):

⁹⁰) Phillips, Wardenaar and Hare to Raffles, December 6, 1811, *Bengal Civil Colonial Consultations*, Range 167, Vol. 42. Consultations of September 4, 1813.

⁹¹) *Bengal Civil Colonial Consultations*, Range 167, Vol. 42, Consults of September 4, 1813.

⁹²) Raffles to Minto, March 7, 1812. *Raffles Collection*, IV. No. 23. Baud, op. cit., pp. 28-32.

⁹³) Raffles to Minto, January 15, 1812. "Java Letters to Lord Minto", *ADD. MSS.*, (British Museum) 45, 272.

"I apprehend there can be but one opinion on the Policy we ought to pursue — we evidently I think must break with him — block up his river, which we can do with three or four cruizers, & establish ourselves on Banca".

It is certain that Badr'uddin's refusal to negotiate with the Commissioners would have led to a punitive raid. There was now added the further justification for military action — a ruthless massacre. Immediate measures had to be taken, but even these, as Baud pointed out, were conceived to be necessary not so much because of the massacre itself, but because it took place after the Dutch garrison "*had claimed the protection of the British power, already paramount on Java...*"⁹⁴).

The aim of the expedition under Gillespie was to punish the Sultan by means of a fine and by securing from him by cession the Island of Banca. He was not to be deposed necessarily, only if he was uncoöperative. Indeed, if he proved too powerful Gillespie was told not to risk his troops but simply to take Banca.

"The possession of Banca", he was instructed⁹⁵), "is to be the *sine qua non*, whether the same is to be obtained by cession, or by the mere act of settling there. But an unqualified cession of that Island to the East India Company is to be obtained if necessary".

If the Sultan had to be removed, Raffles thought his brother the Pangerang Adipatti was "a fit person from his general good conduct and abhorrence of the late deeds of the Sultan, to obtain a preference in forming any arrangements for the future Government of Palembang"⁹⁶). The Pangerang Ratoe, however, was not considered suitable because of his having been "a principal actor in the late events, and being obnoxious to the Inhabitants of Palembang, for his crimes and debaucheries". Still even he was not to be entirely eliminated from consideration if Gillespie considered his right of birth outweighed his character. There can be no doubt in the light of these instructions that the object of the expedition was Banca, and that the massacre added only a kind of moral cloak for intervention.

Raffles decided upon the expedition on his own authority, but immediately informed the Supreme Government at Bengal of the measures he had adopted. On March 7, 1812 he reported more fully on the failure of the British Commissioners to take over the Dutch factory, and outlined details of the massacre from the depositions of his Agents.

⁹⁴) See Baud, op. cit., p. 16, footnote 1.

⁹⁵) Memorandum by Raffles for Gillespie, no date, but March, 1812. *Bengal Secret & Colonial Consultations*, Vol. 244. Consults, of May 15, 1812.

⁹⁶) Loc. cit. The Pangerang Adipatti was the future Sultan Najm'uddin. The Pangerang Ratoe was a son of Badr'uddin, whose title was also Ratoe.

He also enclosed copies of the letters he had addressed to Badr'uddin while he was Agent to the Governor-General at Malacca, and the report he had sent to Minto in June of 1811 which summarised the negotiations he had begun with Palembang.

"That report," Raffles wrote⁹⁷⁾, "with its several enclosures exhibits so explicitly the terms on which a negotiation previous to the fall of Java could alone be entered into, that it might be unnecessary to advert to the same, particularly here, if the Sultan had not to serve his own purposes, grossly perverted the meaning and intention of the same, by the fraudulent creation of papers and reports which he extracted by force from my Agents & others. Fortunately the authority given to my Agent was so defined and explicit, and so well understood by the Sultan, that no explanation is necessary. It is sufficient to state that the Sultan further informed the Commission that he had decidedly acted up to the Agreement entered into by him & the Agents of the British Government, in sending off the Dutch Residency previous to the capture of Java, and that he conceived himself entitled in consequence to be considered as a free and independent Prince, and a faithful ally of the British Government".

Having justified himself against the more dubious facts which the Commissioners at Palembang had unearthed, Raffles stated the reasons which he thought justified military action against the Sultan. These were the rights following conquest of entering into all contracts which subsisted between the late Dutch-French Government and the Sultan; the right of punishing him for the "cruel murder committed on *persons who already were become pre-sumptive British subjects...*"; and the necessity of making an example and exhibition of British power to afford a salutary lesson to the native states in the Eastern Seas⁹⁸⁾.

There was also, of course, Banca⁹⁹⁾. Writing three days later to Minto in a private letter Raffles expressed himself more clearly about the motives which determined his measures against Palembang.

"Waiving the natural impulse of resentment against the barbarous conduct of the Sultan", he wrote, "our Interests require that the present opportunity of obtaining Banca should not be passed by — and as the permanent possession of that settlement can never be secured unless the power of the Court of Palembang is reduced, *I am inclined to contemplate the present state of affairs as fortunate for the eventual security of our interests in that quarter*"¹⁰⁰⁾.

⁹⁷⁾ Raffles to Minto, March 7, 1812. *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 23. Lady Raffles printed extracts from this despatch in the *Memoir*, pp. 110-12.

⁹⁸⁾ Loc. cit. Italics mine.

⁹⁹⁾ In his despatch of March 7, Raffles had pointed out the "importance that may arise to the British Nation from the possession of Banca to the West and of Banjer Massing to the East, as permanent and undisputed British Settlements in the event of any discussion at a Peace with regard to the subsequent possession of the Island of Java". Loc. cit.

¹⁰⁰⁾ Raffles to Minto, March 10, 1812. *ADD. MSS.*, 45,272. Italics mine.

He asked for Minto's approval of the expedition, and of its aims. On March 22 he reported Gillespie's departure, enclosing the instructions and proclamations he had issued to the latter ¹⁰¹).

In the meantime, Minto had received copies of the depositions of Tunku Radin Mahomet and Said Abu Bakir direct from Malacca, but he had not committed the Supreme Government to any definite policy regarding Palembang, feeling that any instructions sent to Raffles would arrive too late to cover action which the Java Government would undoubtedly take ¹⁰²). But he thought intervention was justifiable on the grounds that the massacre was "an act of positive hostility towards the British Government, since he [the Sultan] not only destroyed a place which he knew had become the property of that Government, for the avowed purpose of dissolving the pre-established relation between him and the ruling power in Java, but sought the lives of the British Agents dispatched to his Court on a Mission of Amity" ¹⁰³). That Minto was not so much concerned with the actual massacre of the Dutch, as with the way that loss of life was occasioned, can be seen in the following extract from a letter he sent to Raffles on May 15, 1812 ¹⁰⁴).

"If he had attempted", Minto wrote about Badr'uddin, "only to withhold the transfer of his engagements with the Dutch to ourselves, and had denied that a succession to their Treaty was one of the fruits of our Conquest; if he had even in support of that pretension taken violent possession of the Dutch Fort, and either detained the Garrison in his custody, or transported them to a place of safety, he would have afforded a just motive for the employment of our arms; but an offer of satisfaction for the injury as it affected our Interests, and a suitable submission on the points which touch'd our honour, might have fulfilled the object for which the war was undertaken, and have furnished acceptable grounds of adjustment and pacification.

But since the insult and injury offered to ourselves, were united with and indeed consisted in a [ferocious] massacre... we have in this war, not only assert our invaded rights, and interests, but to avenge innocent blood...."

The dethronement of Badr'uddin therefore was for Minto the first

¹⁰¹) *Bengal Secret & Colonial Consultations*, Vol. 244. Consults. of May 15, 1812.

¹⁰²) Minto to Raffles, January 25, 1812. *Bengal Political Consultations*, Range 119, Vol. 42. Consults. of January 25, 1812.

¹⁰³) Loc. cit.

¹⁰⁴) Minto to Raffles, May 15, 1812, *Raffles Collection*, IV, No. 25. Italics mine. Van der Kemp, P. H., "Fendall's en Raffles' opvattingen in het algemeen omtrent het Londensch Tractaat van 13 Augustus 1814", *Bijl. T.L.V.*, (1897), XLVII, p. 367, gives an unfair summary of Minto's views.

object of the punitive expedition. With respect to Banca he advised caution¹⁰⁵).

Gillespie, in the meantime, was settling affairs at Palembang according to Raffles' instructions, and was contemplating whether he would allow Badr'uddin to remain on the throne. But the arrival of Minto's orders for the deposition of the Sultan, turned Gillespie's thoughts first to the Sultan's third son, a boy of twelve, and eventually to Najm'uddin, the Sultan's brother. On May 29, Gillespie reported to Raffles that he had placed the Adipatti on the throne, and had secured a treaty for the cession of Banca and Billiton. He had also left an establishment at Muntok¹⁰⁶). Before his departure, Gillespie made an investigation into the massacre of the Dutch garrison, and from this concluded that the main responsibility for the act lay with Pangerang Ratoe. Gillespie thought that Badr'uddin was "but an Instrument for the protection of his son's wickedness, and he has discovered too late by his own overthrow, the melancholy consequences that ought always to attend so unprincipled [a] departure from every sacred law and moral obligation"¹⁰⁷).

On May 21, Raffles reported to Bengal on the success of the Palembang venture, and of the dethronement of Badr'uddin¹⁰⁸). Minto replied that this action was "entirely consistent" with the policy already outlined by the Supreme Government¹⁰⁹).

After Gillespie's departure, affairs at Palembang became very unsettled. Badr'uddin with his forces retired to Moeara Rawas, and successfully overcame the attempts to dislodge him. Into his situation, early in 1813, came one William Robison, who with extraordinary disregard for orders, replaced the fugitive Sultan on the throne. The reasons for his action have never been fully investigated. Among others was his belief that Badr'uddin was not responsible for the massacre of the Dutch.

The material which relates to the Robison period at Palembang has all to be interpreted in the light of Robison's personal character — of his trustworthiness, or otherwise, as a witness. Because of his bitter dislike of Raffles, Van der Kemp, on extremely slender evidence,

¹⁰⁵) Minto Raffles, May 15, 1812, Ibid.

¹⁰⁶) Gillespie to Raffles, May 29, 1812, *Java Factory Records*, 60, Part I. See also Van der Kemp, P. H., op. cit. pp. 367-9.

¹⁰⁷) Loc. cit. Part of Gillespie's report is in Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, pp. 118-122.

¹⁰⁸) Raffles to Minto, May 21, 1812, *Bengal Secret & Colonial Consultations*, Vol. 244. Consults. of July 10, 1812.

¹⁰⁹) Minto to Raffles, July 10, 1812, Ibid.

questioned Van Kampen's assertion that Robison was guilty of corruption at Palembang¹¹⁰). De Haan, on the otherhand, realised that Robison was by no means a straightforward character¹¹¹). On his return from Palembang, Robison was charged by the Java Government with having doctored accounts, especially in the matter of the money paid by Badr'uddin for his restoration to the throne. These charges were eventually dismissed by the Supreme Government, but this should not be accepted as a clear vindication of Robison's character. The evidence presented by the Java Government against him was so contradictory and confused, that an acquittal was the only possible course for the Supreme Government. But some of the evidence was highly compromising indeed. While admitting this, however, bribery as a motive does not sufficiently explain Robison's action in restoring Badr'uddin to the throne. Robison was convinced that the Sultan was innocent of, and Raffles responsible for, the massacre at Palembang, and it is on this question that we must now concentrate.

Robison had come into conflict with Raffles soon after he had been appointed to the post of Secretary to the Government. Robison was caught in some irregularity, and was dismissed from office. Raffles informed Minto of the dismissal in January, 1812¹¹²), on the grounds of "the rapaciousness of Captain Robison [which] has in my opinion passed all bounds". Raffles said he did not know how to employ him on Java — "he certainly has lost my confidence, but still there are many situations in which I hope I shall be able to employ him with advantage to himself and with benefit to the Government". Soon afterwards Robison was appointed Resident of Palembang and Banca.

His task at Palembang was to overcome Badr'uddin's forces at Moeara Rawas. He soon found, however, what Gillespie had discovered earlier, that the immense power exercised by Badr'uddin's treasure made effective opposition to the ex-Sultan impossible. On June 18, Robison was approached by the Pangerang Depatty, and his brother the Pangerang Ario, who pointed out the inutility of maintaining Najm'uddin on the throne in the face of the opposition of the Palembang people. With regard to the ex-Sultan's responsibility for the massacre of the Dutch, which was, of course, the main obstacle prevent-

¹¹⁰) Van der Kemp, P. H., "Palembang en Banca in 1816-1820", *Bijdr. T.L.V.*, (1900), LI, pp. 334-5. Footnote (a) p. 335 for citation from Van Kampen, N. G., *Geschiedenis der Nederlanders buiten Europa*, (Haarlem, 1832), III, p. 543.

¹¹¹) De Haan, F., "Personalialia", op. cit., pp. 630-2.

¹¹²) Raffles to Minto, January 15, 1812. *ADD. MSS.*, 45, 272.

ing his restoration to the throne, the two Pangerangs declared that "both the reigning Sultan, and they themselves were as much guilty of it as the old Sultan. *They all understood, it was what the English desired that they should get rid of them from Palembang*"¹¹³).

Subjected to the first pressure, Robinson, accompanied by a military force, pushed up river towards Moeara Rawas. On June 26 he was met by Badr'uddin himself some miles below his stronghold. On the following morning, with tears streaming down his face, he solemnly vowed that he had never given orders for the massacre of the Dutch, nor heard of the act until a long time afterwards. He stated his willingness for Robison to investigate the matter, and promised that he would hand over any person found guilty for punishment. He admitted that he had ordered the Dutch away "*because it was what the English had often desired him to do, as he could shew by several letters in his possession, and that ammunition and [muskets] had been sent up to him, to get rid of them by force of arms, if he could not do so by remonstrance.*"¹¹⁴) In his most impressive manner, he asked Robison:

"[W]hat have I done to deserve so severe a punishment as you seem to have awarded me? From bad advice and misrepresentation of your intentions, I did not pay the submission expected of me to the persons who were first sent here from Java. I did no affront or offence to them in any way, on the contrary, I received them hospitably and with as much respect as I had been used to pay to the Dutch Gentlemen in former times. I thought I had a right to do as I pleased, and I discouraged as much as I could another European Nation from settling in Palembang as the Dutch had done, but I never supposed this would cause the English to make War upon me — and drive me away...."¹¹⁵).

Badr'uddin had earlier explained to Robison that the reason why he had fled from Gillespie was not due to guilt, but because the vakeels he had sent down river to meet Gillespie had been made prisoners, and he had been told that the English, if they captured him, would give him no quarter.

After subsequent involved negotiations with both Badr'uddin and Najm'uddin, whom Robison prevailed upon to abdicate, the ex-Sultan was restored to the throne. Among other conditions agreed upon was the payment of 200,000 Spanish Dollars to the British Government at Batavia. The second article of the Treaty signed by Badr'uddin on June 29 stated:

¹¹³) Robinson to Raffles, July 20, 1813. *Java Factory Records*, 37. Italics mine.

¹¹⁴) Loc. cit. Italics mine.

¹¹⁵) Loc. cit.

"The Sultan solemnly denies having ordered or been in any way privy to the Murder of the late Dutch Factory, and agrees on condition of his life being spared to give up his Eldest Son the Pangerang [Ratoe], who was suspected of being instrumental in that unpardonable transaction, to the discretion of the Java Government. He further agrees to deliver up to Government [un]conditionally any other persons who may hereafter be found to have been guilty of that Murder".

After the restoration Robison reported to Raffles that "there was nothing atrocious, nothing of the assassin in the character" of Badr'uddin. He was more timid than turbulent, kind and indulgent to his children and brothers, and in the highest degree liberal to his chiefs ¹¹⁶).

On his way back to Batavia at the end of July, Robison took occasion again to mention to Raffles the circumstances surrounding the massacre of the Dutch. He admitted that he had had a most difficult time getting a coherent story from any of the natives ¹¹⁷), but he questioned the deposition of Raffles' Agents that Pangerang Ratoe had presented the forged letter relating to the departure of the Dutch for their signature ¹¹⁸), because the Sultan had never employed him in public business. In any case, at that time the Pangerang was under the guardianship of Najm'uddin, thereby implying that if the Pangerang were guilty, Najm'uddin would have to accept some of the responsibility. Robison hinted gently to Raffles that Tunku Radin Mahomet had not been an honest Agent, and had fabricated many of his stories ¹¹⁹).

Soon after Robison's arrival at Batavia, rumours began circulating that he had accepted bribes from Badr'uddin when he had restored him to the throne. A Commission was appointed to investigate these charges, and to restore Najm'uddin to the Palembang throne. The Commission uncovered much interesting material concerning the massacre of the Dutch, and although it all relates to Robison's period at Palembang, it shows clearly why Robison concluded that Badr'uddin was innocent of the massacre. Almost all of it depends upon Badr'uddin's assertions, and these, of course, were of a very dubious nature. Perhaps the best statement of his defence was that presented by Robison to the Supreme Government early in 1814.

"I am brought, says he, [Badr'uddin] into all the misery and disgrace in which you now see me for doing what I was led to suppose would be acceptable to the British Government. Many, many were the letters and

¹¹⁶) Loc. cit.

¹¹⁷) Robison to Raffles, July 28, 1813, *Java Factory Records*, 37.

¹¹⁸) See Baud, op. cit., p. 30.

¹¹⁹) Robinson to Raffles, July 28, 1813, op. cit.

proclamations I received from Mr. Raffles at Malacca urging me to send away the Dutch Factory and give it over to his Malay Agent Radeen Mahomed. I never betrayed the wishes of the British Government to the Dutch Resident, and I felt every desire to do what they requested me when the proposal first was made, but we all were lead to form a great idea of the power and forces of Marshall Daendels who then commanded on Java, and I did not think it would be prudent in me to provoke the resentment of so great a man before I had some adequate assurance that the English expedition going to Java [was] strong enough to succeed in taking it. When that assurance came to me I then sent them away, having provided two vessels by request of the Resident, before we heard of the fall of Java, to carry him and his Factory to Malacca.

The murder of these people I solemnly declare, what may be proved if you enquire, was never an act done by my order. I never knew of it for some time after it happened and *I can attribute it to nothing else but the proclamations of Mr. Raffles which were circulated among the people of Soesong at the mouth of the Palembang River... [advising] them that the ships cruising off there were only come to capture all Dutch people and property they could find. Either those Soesong people may have murdered them for the plunder not to let it fall into the hands of your cruisers, or the prow people must have risen upon them for the same purpose*¹²⁰). But if my intention had been either to kill or to plunder them I need not have sent them away from Palembang to do so. I was then Master of their lives and of everything belonging to them. But they left Palembang with all their property and followers. To have demolished the Dutch Factory after they went away, it was an act I did by the desire and advice of all my people — and my Brother who[m] you have made Sulthan being then Radeen De Patty. My first minister is the person who was chiefly instrumental both in sending away the Dutch people, and afterwards in demolishing their Fort and houses. If blame is due for these transactions certainly he cannot be free from it, [he] who led the party of his own zeal to the Dutch Factory and destroyed it.

Radeen Mahomet, said the Sulthan, was the Agent sent to me by the English, and both he and the letters he brought me, informed me I was regarded as an Independent Chief and might dispose of my Country and people as I pleased, and especially that the English never meant to establish any Factory at Palembang. They only wanted to make a contract with me to get the tin from Banca, and that I made no objection to give them. The Sulthan concluded this Statement with producing the correspondence he had with Mr. Raffles and his Agent Radeen Mahomed. The reasons why... Radeen Mahomet has been so much my Enemy with the English, said the Sulthan, I suppose are these. He wanted money of me to pay his expences, which I declined to give him. He also took away one of my Women from my palace, availing himself of his situation as

¹²⁰) Italics mine. Badr'uddin was referring to Raffles' proclamation addressed to Campong Soengsang. The original is printed in Appendix IV. A secondhand account of the massacre reported to D'Aquilar in May 1813, also ascribed the massacre to the inhabitants of Campong Soengsang. See "Deposition of [Komis] Mahomed [Hanapiah]..." *Bengal Civil Colonial Consultations*, Range 167, Vol. 43. Consults. of October 2, 1813. It is a very different story from that of Willem van de Weteringe Buis, and Louisa Haarvlegter, Baud., op. cit., pp. 32-7.

English Agent. If any other Malay had done such an insult he could not have escaped punishment for so doing" ¹²¹).

In his defence against Raffles' charges, Robison said that he had made a diligent enquiry into the circumstances surrounding the massacre of the Dutch, and had found that everyone at Palembang had agreed that it was not an act of the Sultan's. Robison further contended that Raffles' letters to Badr'uddin (a summary of which he submitted) "might shew plain enough that the act of sending away the Dutch Factory was in some degree an act of our own". In any case, he said, it was most unfair to condemn Badr'uddin for the massacre on the evidence of Raffles' agents, Tunku Radin Mahomet and Said Abu Bakir, because they were unscrupulous adventurers ¹²²). Lord Minto, Robison continued, had given his support to Raffles' policy at Palembang only because he believed that Badr'uddin had been guilty of the massacre. But, Robison asserted, Minto had probably never been fully informed of Raffles' negotiations with the Sultan of Palembang prior to the Java invasion. These negotiations, he said, "considering the people with whom [they were] opened, the Agent who had to conduct it on our part, and the whole circumstances of the transaction[s], *might in some Men's judgment have been considered an extenuation at least of the barbarous offence, if it was even clearly proved that he [Badr'uddin] had committed it*" ¹²³).

That seems the most satisfactory point to leave Robison's justification of his own actions and those of Badr'uddin. For although there may be some doubt that he himself accepted bribes from the Sultan, there can be none that Badr'uddin himself was the one who ordered the massacre. It is not hard to understand why no native at Palembang came forward to give evidence against his Sultan, and it is not difficult to understand how by his forceful personality (all observers commented upon it) persuaded Robison that he knew nothing of the massacre. But Robison's point about the extenuation of the guilt must be admitted. For it was Raffles' irresponsibility in making a dubious promise of independence that caused the massacre of the Dutch. Raffles himself considered Robison's charges on these questions as "a mass of ab-

¹²¹) "Case of Major Robinson — late Resident of Palembang and the Island of Banca", Calcutta, 25 January, 1814. *Bengal Civil Colonial Consultations*, Range 167, Vol. 53. Consults. April 28, 1814, Part III. The following quotations also come from this source.

¹²²) See especially Mears' letter about them, recorded loc. cit.

¹²³) Loc. cit. Italics mine.

surdity and trash", and with regard to his negotiations with Badr'uddin wrote ¹²⁴⁾:

"[A]ll my Proceedings as Agent to the Governor General with the Malay States were duly reported to the Governor General, and... it was with a full knowledge of all the communications I had had with Palembang, that the Supreme Government directed without advices from me on the subject, measures of exactly the same tendency, as those which this Government had adopted...."

The Supreme Government never carried out any thorough investigation into the Robison charges on these particular points, and Robison himself was finally acquitted of the charges of bribery ¹²⁵⁾.

In the meantime, Raffles had restored Najm'uddin to the throne ¹²⁶⁾, and of the money paid by Badr'uddin for his restoration, transferred 100,000 Spanish Dollars to the former's account. In addition, Badr'uddin's regalia was taken from him and given to Raffles' protégé. When the Supreme Government heard of this, although they concurred in the restoration of Najm'uddin, they bitterly condemned Raffles' action in retaining some of the money which Badr'uddin had paid for his restoration. They ordered that this, together with his regalia, should be returned to him. If, however, the regalia had already been surrendered, the Supreme Government stated that it would not reverse the situation, but did so only on the grounds of achieving a constancy of policy ¹²⁷⁾.

The Court of Directors, when they heard of the affair, were more critical still.

"The proceedings which have taken place at Palembang", they wrote to Moira in May 1815, "have naturally excited our strongest disapprobation. We greatly fear that it will not be easy to remove the disgrace which has been incurred in that quarter: and altho' the re-establishment of the Ex-Sultan was wholly chargeable upon Major Robinson, [!] who appears to have acted in direct contradiction to the letter & spirit of his instructions, the conduct of the Lieut. Governor of Java is without any extenuation, in having assumed the right to dispose of property that had come into his power by an unauthorized act which he himself had disavowed and condemned in the most unqualified manner. We regret to find that the resolution you adopted of restoring the treasure to the Ex-Sultan was not effectual for preventing a portion of it from being diverted into a channel from which it cannot be recovered, and that, in fulfilling the

¹²⁴⁾ *Bengal Civil Colonial Consultations*, Range 167, Vol. 61. Consults. of October 17, 1815.

¹²⁵⁾ At the end of April 1814, the Supreme Government brought in a verdict declaring that in "the absence of proof of any corrupt motive", Robinson's deviation from orders were to be ascribed to "an error in judgment". *Bengal Civil Colonial Consultations*, Range 167, Vol. 54. Consults. of April 28, 1814.

¹²⁶⁾ Minto had concurred in this action before he left Bengal.

¹²⁷⁾ Supreme Government to Raffles, April 30, 1814. *Java Factory Records*, 41.

obligations of honour, you will, probably, be involved in a serious pecuniary loss" ¹²⁸⁾).

The Court concluded its condemnation of Raffles' general policy by stating that his "continuance in the Government of Java would be highly inexpedient", and ordered that he be replaced by another civil servant on the Bengal establishment.

The following conclusions regarding the Palembang massacre can now be drawn.

1. Baud's argument based upon the words "*boewang habis-kan sakali-kali*" can no longer be admitted. The Malay letter upon which his arguments rests, was only a poor copy of the original, and so there is some doubt that the above phrase actually appeared in Raffles' letter.

2. The argument, therefore, that Raffles deliberately *advocated* the massacre of the Dutch garrison, must be dismissed. In this connection it is important to point out that later Dutch historians have carried Baud's argument further than he himself was prepared to go ¹²⁹⁾).

3. But Raffles did encourage the Sultan to storm the Dutch factory, and despatched arms for the purpose. That is a different thing from advocating the *massacre* of the garrison, although it may still be held that in the long run it would amount to the same thing.

4. The massacre did not stem directly from Raffles' action in sending arms to the Sultan, but rather from his irresponsible promise of independence to Badr'uddin.

5. It must always be remembered, however, that Raffles was acting in a situation of war, where moral judgments if they are to be made at all, are certainly most difficult to apply.

6. Badr'uddin himself was responsible for the actual massacre, so that the part played by his son the Pangerang Ratoe, must be regarded as minor. There is, however, much to be said in extenuation of Badr'uddin's action.

7. There seems little doubt that Najm'uddin had a hand in the massacre, and because of this, should never have been raised to the Palembang throne by the British.

The final words can be left to the wisest of Raffles' contemporaries, Muntinghe, who wrote to Van der Capellen in 1820 that "the barbarous murder of 1811... must be attributed to the at least very imprudent instigations and promises of the British Government" ¹³⁰⁾).

¹²⁸⁾ Court to Gov.-Gen.-in-Council, May 5, 1815. *Despatches to Bengal*, Foreign Department, Vol. 69.

¹²⁹⁾ Baud, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹³⁰⁾ Cited by Coolhaas, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-5.

APPENDIX I. *Chronology.*

The dating of the Raffles-Badr'uddin letters presents many difficulties. Baud's dates are mostly incorrect, especially of the early letters. His letter No. 1 (my letter B, Part I, p. 306) he dated December 11, 1809¹³¹). The original Malay letter now printed in Appendix IV has had the date torn off, and the English draft did not carry a date. But the letter can be dated exactly as December 15, 1810 from a reference in a letter which Raffles addressed to Lord Minto on that day. (See Part I, p. 307). Because Raffles stated in his second letter to Badr'uddin that he had sent the first letter five days earlier, letter A (Part I, pp. 305—6) must have been despatched on December 10, 1810. However, the original Malay letter in Appendix IV bears a Malay date of December 5, 1810 (not 1811, as stated in footnote 30, Part I). It seems, therefore, that Raffles delayed despatching the letter for five days.

The English versions of Badr'uddin's replies to Raffles (letters C and D) now printed in Appendix II, can both be dated January 10, 1811 as they carry Malay and Western dates. This chronology is confirmed by a reference in letter E (Part I, p. 309) which states that Tunku Radin Mahomet arrived at Palembang on January 5 or 6, 1811. Letter E itself carries both the Malay and Western date of February 8, 1811.

Baud's letter No. 3, which contained the sinister Malay passage, was dated by him as March 2, 1810. Professor Coolhaas made this date March 16, 1810¹³²). But again both are impossible. Baud was exactly one year out, for the English version of the letter (letter G, Part I, p. 313) carries the Western date of March 3, 1811¹³³). The accompanying letter of Raffles to his Agent, and the Memorandum and proposed Treaty must all, therefore, have been written on March 3, 1811.

Badr'uddin's reply to Tunku Radin Mahomet, which was written after he had received Raffles' letter of March 3, 1811, carries no date,

¹³¹) See Coolhaas, op. cit., p. 118 on Baud's dating.

¹³²) Loc. cit.

¹³³) Robison's version of the letter (*Bengal Civil Colonial Consultations*, Range 167, Vol. 53. Consults. of April 28, 1814, Part III) has a Malay date of March 4, 1811.

but must have been written at the end of March. (Letter H, Part I, p. 314).

The Treaty which was negotiated about this time carries the internal Malay date of January 5, 1811, which is, of course, impossible. (See Part I, p. 315). Letter I (Part I, p. 316) has no date but was written some time after the Treaty had been concluded.

Letter J (Part I, p. 317) has a Malay date of April 19, 1811, which I have accepted. Baud's letter No. 4 was dated by him as April 22, 1811, but Professor Coolhaas has written privately that it should be May 5, 1811, and that Baud's letter No. 5 should be dated April 19, 1811, and therefore precede letter No. 4. I have preferred, however, to follow Baud's sequence because I think it is the correct one, but his dates are certainly wrong, especially his letter No. 5. Badr'uddin's reply to Raffles via Macdonald (letter K, Part I, pp. 317—8) has a Malay date of May 23, so that Professor Coolhaas' dating of Baud's letter No. 4 is probably correct. If that is so, then Baud's letter No. 5 must also have been written in May.

Letter L (Appendix III) has the Malay date of May 15, 1811, but from internal evidence I should be inclined to place it a little earlier.

The original Malay proclamation to the chiefs of Campong Soeng-sang printed in Appendix IV, carries the Malay date of January 13, [1811].

APPENDIX II. (*Letters C and D*).

Letters C and D were written by Badr'uddin on the same day — January 10, 1811. Letter C was dated at one o'clock on that day and addressed to Raffles. Letter D was dated three hours later, but not addressed. It stated in clearer terms what were Badr'uddin's objections to coming to a definite agreement with Tunku Radin Mahomet. The Letters are in the *Raffles Collection*, IV, Nos. 7 and 6.

LETTER C:

"I have to inform my friend Thomas Raffles Esquire that his Letter with the presents sent by the hands of my Brother Radin Mahomed, as well as his former letter, have reached me in safety....

With respect to the tenor of my friend's letter. I have not yet fully answered it in consequence of my Brother Radin Mahomed, who brought the letter not being furnished with credential Letters from my friend for the purpose. If my friend looks forward to good measures and Tranquility, and is desirous of avoiding measures that would be against the Interest of the Rajahs of different black People, let my friend forthwith deliver the

same to my Brother Radin Mahomed and dispatch him back again to Palembang with every expedition, when I will comply with my friend's letter.

The people (ambassadors) whom my friend requests cannot now be sent... as my Brother Radin Mahomed will fully inform my friend, who I hope will be satisfied and induced immediately to dispatch back my Brother Radin Mahomed with a letter on that subject, and a written Power".

LETTER D:

"Whereas my Brother having brought a letter from a great man of the English Nation, informs me that he is further directed to lay before me the following good advice with which he is commissioned, viz:

That the said great man desired the two Brothers, my subjects, to acquaint me respecting the Commission which is not mentioned in the letter, that is to say, that if it is difficult for me to drive the Dutch from Palembang, that the English will then do it, and that if I was apprehensive of trouble in consequence, they would wait at the mouth of the river of Palembang, with ships or otherwise as I should request — And further that if I was in distress to dispose of the Tin, on account of hostilities with the Dutch, that the English would either purchase the same with cash — even at a dearer rate than for that now delivered to the Dutch, because they don't think of taking advantage of Palembang, or otherwise they would allow a Trade to be carried on with Palembang on the same footing as it is at present with [Lingga], Rhio, Siac, and [Tringgano] agreeable to the chance[!] of Trade with other Nations.

These two subjects further stated that they were charged with a Commission from the Great man, should I desire it to make an Agreement conformable thereto.

To the above I replied that what they stated was certainly the desire of a great man in every point, and that it comprehended good advice, without inclination to any improper measure, but there was not a token with them from this Great Man, duly accrediting them. On this account I dispatched my Brother back with every speed in order to obtain what is wanted.

I further informed them that as the Dutch were still at Palembang they could not act against them, and as their Power did not appear yet from that Great Man we could not enter into any agreement on the subject.

I have not yet dispatched my Ambassador to the great man, but on the return to Palembang of my said Brothers with proper Powers for that purpose, I will not fail to dispatch my Ambassador, if nothing [prevents] me from doing it".

APPENDIX III. (*Raffles Collection, IV, No. 12*).

LETTER L:

"... the Paduca Sri Sultan Ratu wishes to make known to his friend the Sri Paduca Raffles Esq'... that his respected letter, with what accompanied it, brought by Seyyad Abu Beker Rumi, has fortunately arrived & been received with great satisfaction....

We have also been informed with regard to the wishes of our friend respecting your enemies the Hollanders which are in Palembang. Let not our friend have either doubt or fear any longer regarding them, for in truth we will conduct ourselves regarding them with the utmost of our ability, so that everything shall proceed agreeably to the wishes of our friend. Besides with respect to this conduct nothing whether right or wrong shall be concealed, nor shall there be either failure or fault on my part to interfere with our friendship for the future. *I have accordingly sent to Batavia that they may take away these Hollanders with all speed who are in Palembang, & if they are not speedy in taking them off, some misfortune will befall them & the blame will not be mine*¹³⁴). Such is the state of the matter, but the message has not yet arrived. In this matter however we are not in truth devoid of resources in order to accomplish our purpose with all speed according to the desire of my friend. Let not therefore my friend have any further doubts about these Hollanders; for I have no intercourse nor connection with them.

It is however proper that we should inform our friend concerning the first introduction of the Hollanders into Palembang for in former times they were of great utility to our ancestors, and our ancestors did not wish us to forget their good offices, & thus the Hollanders have continued in Palembang to the present time, but at present we have no connection with them, & no desire to be concerned in the operations of the Hollanders, for they are only aliens in effect and it is to us that the country belongs. Therefore let not our friend have any doubts regarding them for we will do our best to expel the enemies of our friend.

With respect, however, to the paper to which I have affixed my seal, I have received no notice of its having reached you. We therefore request the earnest attention of our friend to it who is sagacious & wise, for everything with regard to this paper has been concluded with my friend's authorized Wakil Radin Muhammed, & everything required by my friend being acceded to, I have affixed my seal to it as a token....".

APPENDIX IV. *The original Malay letters.*

Here follow the texts of the original Malay letters which Raffles sent to Palembang. They have been transcribed by Professor Dr. A. A. Cense, who has also rendered the English translation of the most important parts of the letters¹³⁵).

Letter No. 1 which corresponds with Raffles' English draft Letter A, (Part I, pp. 305-6):

Above the letter: the Arabic formula *Kauluhu 'lhaqq*; to the right: seal in Arabic characters: *Mahārādj Governor General Banggala*, beside which is the signature: Tho^a Raffles.

¹³⁴) Italics mine.

¹³⁵) In this transcription *j*, *tj*, *dj*, *sj* represent Eng. *y*, *ch*, *j*, *sh* respectively.

Surat tulus i[khlās] serta kasih dan sajang jang tiada berkesudahan daripada beta Seri Paduka Thomas Raffles Esquire¹³⁶⁾ jang ada ganti dari Paduka Gilbert Lord Minto¹³⁷⁾ Guvernur Djeneral radja diatas segala radja² jang ada ta'lu' dibawah bandera radja mahabesar negeri dari atas angin sampai kebawah angin jang dipertuan-besar negeri Benggala. Telah sampailah warakat al-ikhlas ini kehadapan sahabat beta Sultan Mahmud Badr ad-Din jang ada semajam diatas tahta keradjaan negeri Palembang serta dengan bidjaksana telah terma[sj]hur nama kepudjian sampai kemana².

Waba'dahu kemundian dari itu beta ma'lumkan ahwal maka adalah beta baharu sudah datang [da]ri negeri Benggala sampai kenegeri Malaka mau buat bitjara sama dengan segala radja² negeri dairah timur pasal segala kapal² [pe]rang ini djangan lagi ia tangkap segala perahu² orang pergi datang berniaga dari negeri Palembang dan negeri lain² sampai kenegeri Kompeni Inggeris djika ada masing² dengan tjap beta. Dan lagi apakala beta sudah sampai ke Malaka maka ada beta dengar khabar daripada radja Malaka mengatakan ada banjak kapal perang orang Belanda sudah sampai kekuala Palembang maka betapun menjadi banjak susah hati menengarkan khabar itu karena dari dahulunya Sultan Palembang ada bersahabat betul sama dengan orang Belanda ka[rena] djikalau Sultan Palembang tiada bersababhat jang betul sama dengan orang Belanda mengapa maka sampai sekarang ini dibe[ri] orang Belanda tinggal didalam negeri Palembang itu. Maka apabila beta sudah dengar khabar itu maka betapun sigera berkirim surat ini kepada sahabat beta boléh sahabat beta djagakan baik² diatas orang Belanda karena ia orang djahat ia hendak mendjadi orang kaya dengan harta dan réal daripada sahabat beta. *Maka hendaklah sahabat beta pukul buang sekali² djika orang Belanda tiada mau bitjara baik² seperti kehendak sahabat beta dan lagi djika sekarang ini sahabat beta tiada boléh buang sekali² orang Belanda dan djika sahabat beta ada mau djadi sahabat betul sama dengan orang Inggeris boléh sahabat beta kirimkan satu surat dengan sigeranja mengatakan segala pasal²[nja] itu serta dengan satu orang wakil jang baik akal bitjara daripada sahabat beta sampai kepada beta boléh beta bitjarakan djika dengan suka sahabat beta dan suka beta berkehendakkan boléh beta habiskan segala bitjara karena dibawah hukum beta ada banjak kapal perang boléh buang orang Belanda djika selaksa adanja sekalipun.*

Dan lagi ada ... segala jang tersebut didalam surat ini djangan sahabat beta beri lain² orang tahu karena segala bitjara jang ... Maka apabila sahabat beta hendak beri surat serta dengan orang wakil itu mari kepada beta pu ... djangan lain orang ketahui, biarlah datang seperti satu orang berniaga sahadj kenegeri Malaka ini. Maka a[pab]ila sampai ia ke Malaka ini beta sendiri boléh bitjarakan sama dengan dia. Maka inilah tanda ikhlās daripada beta ada k[ai]n khās¹³⁸⁾ bunga emas sekaju dan kain emas bebunga satu gulung dan kain sāl sehelai, boléh sahabat beta terima dengan putih hati tanda sahabat jang betul. Ahwal inilah beta ma'lumkan. Diperbuat surat pada delapan hari bulan Dhu 'l-Ka'ida pada hari Kamis sanat 1225 tahun² djim. Tammat.

¹³⁶⁾ In these letters written Tamas R.fl.s Eskuir.

¹³⁷⁾ The name Gilbert is written in these letters with the consonants Gbltlt; Lord is spelled Lard or Lart (in letter No. 3 erroneously Ladr).

¹³⁸⁾ Usually written khāša.

Translation from "maka apabila béta" to "mengatakan segala pasal²[nja]":

"When I heard these tidings [the approach of the Dutch naval force to Palembang] then I sent quickly this letter to my friend that my friend may be on his guard towards the Dutch because they are bad people. They wish to become rich people with the goods and the money of my friend. Therefore I recommend that my friend *beat them out definitely* [pukul buang sekali²], if the Dutch are not willing to consider things well according to the will of my friend. If now my friend cannot throw out the Dutch entirely, and if my friend is willing to become a good friend of the English, then can my friend send a letter quickly, mentioning the affair ..."

Letter No. 2, which corresponds with Raffles' English draft letter B, Part I, p. 306, and Baud's Malay letter No. 1, Baud, op. cit. pp. 21-2:

Above the letter: to the left: three cartouches with Arabic words and formulas:

1. *al-mustahakka*(?)
2. *Kauluhu 'l-hakik*
3. *yā Kādiya 'l-hādījāt*

to the right: seal (the same as in the first letter) beside which is the signature: Tho^a Raffles.

Surat tulis ikhlās serta kasih dan sajang jang tiada berkesudahan selagi ada perkitaran tjakrawala matahari dan bulan daripada béta Seri Paduka Thomas Raffles Esquire jang ada ganti daripada Seri Paduka Gilbert Lord Minto Guvernur Djeneral di Benggala radja diatas segala radja² jang ada ta'lu' dibawah bandéra radja mahabesar negeri Inggeris dari atas angin sampai kebawah angin jang ada terhenti didalam negeri Malaka. Telah terletaklah warakat al-ikhlās ini dihadapan sahabat béta Sultan Maḥmūd Badr ad-Dīn jang ada mempunjai tahta keradjaan negeri Palémbang serta dengan dairahnja dār as-salām serta limpah ma'mūr daripada Tuhan seru 'alam serta dengan bidjaksana telah termasukhūr nama kepudjian sampai kemana² daripada tulung menulung sahabat dan handai jang amat sempurna budi bitjara.

Waba'dahu kemundian dari itu béta ma'lūmkan aḥwāl maka adalah dahulu daripada surat ini lima hari béta ada beri suatu surat pinta bawa'kan kepada sahabat béta maka dari belakang surat itu inilah pulak suatu surat lagi béta beri kepada Tenku Radén Muḥammad mendjadi utusan serta wakil daripada béta pergi membawa' surat ini sampai dihadapan sahabat béta. Maka inilah béta sudah ada ganti Guvernur Djeneral di Benggala mari mau buat bitjara jang besar sama dengan segala radja² Melaju negeri dairah timur ini sampai kenegeri Palémbang karena Guvernur Djeneral di Benggala ada banjak suka mau mendjadi sahabat jang betul sama dengan segala radja² Melaju negeri dairah timur ini dan sahabat béta. Maka inilah béta ada banjak kasih kepada sahabat béta mau mendjadi sahabat jang baik serta dengan putih hati djangan lain lagi pada kemundian harinja. Maka adalah pasal orang Belanda itu apa guna sahabat béta benarkan beri ia tinggal didalam negeri Palémbang itu karena orang Belanda ada banjak djahat ia mau buat sesuatu djalan [the letter is broken through here by the fold in the paper. It is possible to read: kedjahatan ... djadi susah hati] sebab sahabat béta tiada djadi sahabat betul sama dengan Kompeni Inggeris dan djika sahabat béta ada suka mau mendjadi sahabat

jang betul sama dengan Kompëni Inggeris hendaklah sahabat bëta tentukan sekali² serta beri balas surat ini dan surat dahulu itu dengan sigeranja serta dengan segala pasal²nja orang Belanda dengan sahabat bëta serta dengan satu orang wakil daripada sahabat bëta jang baik akal bitjara datang kepada bëta. Dan lagi lepas tudjuh hari Tenku Radën Muḥammad didalam negeri Palëmbang bolëh sahabat bëta hantarkan ia balik dengan sigeranja bolëh sampai kepada bëta. Maka djika sudah baik segala bitjara dan djandji sahabat bëta antara bëta bolëh bëta habiskan sekali² dan lagi maka adalah didalam surat ini bëta ada beri suatu salinan seperti jang tersebut didalam surat jang sudah bëta hantarkan dahulu daripada surat ini dan inilah tanda ikhlās daripada bëta ada kain tjita Éropa dua kaju dan permadani dua helai bolëh sahabat bëta terima dengan putih hati... (Because the remainder of the letter is torn away the last lines are lacking; after the word "hati" only the following words can be read: tiada.dengan... inilah bëta ma'lûmkan. Diperbuat surat...)

Translation from "maka adalah pasal orang Belanda itu" to "satu orang wakil . . . datang kepada bëta":

"As to the affair of the Dutch, what is the use of it that you comply with letting them stay in Palembang because the Dutch are very bad. They will make a bad way . . . I feel troubled because my friend is not a true friend of the English Company, and when my friend wishes to become a true friend of the English Company, I ask my friend to show this in a clear way and to send quickly an answer to this letter and that former letter concerning all the affairs between the Dutch and my friend, and to dispatch to me a clever wakil of my friend".

Letter No. 3. Raffles' letter to Campong Sungsang¹³⁹), which Baud prints as his letter No. 2, pp. 22-3:

Above the letter: to the right: seal (the same as in the first letter) beside which is the signature: Tho Raffles.

Warakat al-ikhlās hormat mulia kasih serta sajang jang tiada berkesudahan fi'l-laili wan-nahāri iaitu daripada bëta Seri Paduka Thomas Raffles Esquire jang ada ganti Seri Paduka Gilbert Lord Minto Guvernur Djeneral di Benggala radja diatas segala radja² jang ada ta'luk dibawah bandëra radja mahabesar negeri Inggeris dari atas angin sampai dibawah angin. Ini sekarang bëta ada terhenti didalam negeri Malaka ini. Maka adalah bëta memberi surat al-ikhlās kepada sahabat bëta orang besar² atau datu² dan penghulu sekalipun jang duduk dikuala Palëmbang kampong Sungsang perihal bëta menjatakan didalamnja ini daripada hal kapal perang ini tiga buah datang kemari. Bëta ada mendengar khabar kapal Wilandis ada dikuala Palëmbang ini bëta mau halau, djanganlah sahabat bëta mendjadi susah hati karena bëta tiada mengapa-mengapakan kepada sahabat bëta orang Melaju segala-galanja atau paru²nja (sic) Melaju ketjil dan besar sekali². Djanganlah sahabat bëta takut dan lagi djangan sahabat

¹³⁹) This letter is rather slovenly composed and contains several mistakes: three times behind the end -*wau* of "Melaju" and "seteru" a superfluous *alif* is written; the word *hāl* is written *hal*; in the date the digit-figure is missing, etc.

béta masuki pada Wilandis itu. Dari itu béta suruhkan kapal perang mengalaukan padanja dan sahabat béta boléh tinggal diam baik² djangan mengambil susah hati, bagaimana dahulu begitu sekarang djuga sahabat baik djuga pada béta pada segala-gala Melajunja datanglah sekarang i[ni]. Demikianlah adanja dalam itu djikalau sahabat béta masuki pada Wilandis itu nistjaja sahabat béta mendjadi seterulah pada béta sekalian orang Inggeris itu adaja.

Maka termaktüb surat ini kepada tudjuh belas hari bulan Dhu 'lHidjdja pada tahun sanat 122[?].

Translation from "sekarang béta ada terhenti. . . ." to "sekalian orang Inggeris itu adanja":

"I am staying now here in Malacca, and am now sending a letter of good faith to my friends, nobles or Datus and Penghulus, who live at the mouth of the Palembang River at Campong Sungsang in which I write about these three men-of-war that came here (Malacca?). I heard that Dutch ships are in the mouth of the Palembang River. I will chase them, do not be afraid because I do not wish to do anything to my friends the Malays, or to Malay praus small or great. Do not be afraid, and do not mix with the Dutch. Therefore I give orders to men-of-war to chase them so that you may stay quietly, and that you do not feel troubled; now as formerly there is good friendship between me and the Malays. So be it, if however my friends mix with the Dutch they become enemies of us, the English."

JOHN BASTIN.