Book Reviews

- P. van de Velde, Chester G. Starr, Early man - Prehistory and the civilizations of the ancient near east. New York, London, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1973. 7 + 205 pp., num. ill. black and white colour.
- H. Hoetink, Ashley Montagu, Mans most dangerous myth: the fallacy of race. New York, Oxford University Press, 1974, 5th edition, 542 pp.
- J. Tennekes, Margaret T. Hodgen, Anthropology, history and cultural change. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, number 52. The University of Arizona Press, pp. 108, 1974.
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BOEKBESPREKINGEN

CHESTER G. STARR, *Early Man — Prehistory and the Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*. New York, London, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1973. 7 + 205 pp., num. ill. black and white and colour, 16 x 23½ cm.

P. VAN DE VELDE

This book is thoroughly anchored in our Great Western Tradition, which equates civilization with the urban phase of peasant society, and claims that the roots of our own civilization are to be sought in that of the Near East, namely in Egypt, Sumeria and Assyria. Nonetheless the relatively large part of the book devoted to Early Man (i.e., from Australopithecinae to Proto-Urban Mesopotamians), viz. 73 out of a total of 192 pages, seems somehow to reflect a slight de-Westernization of that tradition, and perhaps also of the humanities in general.

However, from a statement like "... the population of the area North of the Alps remained in a backwater from after 10,000 B.C. until the time of Christ..." (p. 52), together with the virtually exclusive references to American excavations and publications and the disparagement of non-US theories (e.g., "ingenious but not very convincing", with reference to Leroi-Gourhan's work on cave art; p. 63) it is clear that there still remains a lot of acculturative work to be done by both anthropologists and archaeologists.

If the above remarks seem negative, we should hasten to add some positive comments, which the book definitely also merits, the more so since it seems to be aimed not at a strictly scientific, but rather at a broader reading public (possibly junior highschool students). By restricting its scope to 3 topics (Early Man, Hammurabi Babylon, and the Persian Empire), the book strikes a good balance between size and content. It contains many good illustrations, which are well integrated into the text, the latter being well-written and devoid of jargon. In addition, the book includes several special, non-technical essays on archaeologically important subjects (such as pottery, radio-carbon dating, and so on), and a selection of extensive quotations from various historical sources. Finally, there is a useful list of suggested further reading for those readers wishing to pursue the subject at greater depth. All in all this book will serve as reading for anyone looking for a quick, easy introduction to non-anthropologized Ancient History.

ASHLEY MONTAGU, *Man's Most Dangerous Myth: the Fallacy of Race*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1974, 5th edition, 542 pp.

H. HOETINK

In the 1940's and early 1950's a large number of studies on the racial problem were published, especially in the United States. They were, to a large extent, the result of, on the one hand, indignation at the racist theories and atrocities of the Nazi regime and, on the other, embarrassment about the racism displayed in earlier works of social scientists both in the United States and elsewhere. Professor Montagu's book, first published in 1942, stands out as one of the most successful of this group of works. This fifth edition has new chapters added on the plight of the American Indian, the meaning of equal opportunity, and sociogenic brain damage; in addition its bibliography has been updated. The remaining chapters deal with such topics as the origin and different meanings of 'race', and its supposed relation with society, culture, war, natural selection and psychology.

Professor Montagu, in a generally readable, erudite and convincing way, succeeds in unmasking many of the folk-beliefs and quasi-scientific theories that have ascribed hereditary differences in mental make-up and intelligence to the different races of mankind (which the author prefers to call 'major groups'). It is his conviction that these beliefs and such theories are the root cause of racism and that they should be eradicated through constant and intensive educational effort.

One might observe, without undue sarcasm, that since the mass sales of a book (such as this) can surely be conceived as part of such an educational effort, any reviewer who (even if he shares many of the author's views) criticizes some of Professor Montagu's assumptions at all strongly, thereby — who knows? — diminishing the book's sales potential, might stand accused of committing an act close to immorality. It is hard indeed to believe, as Oscar Wilde has observed, that there is no necessary congruence between morality and reason.

It is, accordingly, with some trepidation and, indeed, regret, that this reviewer will now proceed to point to what he considers to be two shortcomings of this impressive study.

The first of these is confined to one particular chapter, but is of crucial importance. This chapter is called 'The creative power of "race" mixture'. Here the author does not restrict himself to dispelling the notion that racial mixture results in biologically or mentally inferior individuals, but enthusiastically endorses the opposite view. Among many statements in this vein is one according to which 'Negro-white crosses (in Cuba) are generally recognized to be of particularly fine physical type and socially among the most progressive'. On a more general level, he seems to sympathize with Kretschmer's statement that 'most geniuses were of mixed ethnic ancestry' and that 'the rise of lofty civilizations, blossoming with genius, was caused by a similar biological process of cross-breeding', himself adding that 'the future will see race

blends (...) greatly superior to those referred to'.

You cannot have your cake and eat it too. In the remainder of this book, as in his forty-odd others, Professor Montagu maintains rather convincingly, I would think, that hereditary mental differences between the major races are either non-existent or so small that collective human achievements, or lack thereof, must be understood in terms of economic, cultural and social factors. If this is so, then of course the rise of lofty civilizations or of socially progressive strata cannot be explained by a theory which ascribes primary importance to the factor of biological mixing. As Ortega once wrote in a similar discussion with Toynbee, such a reasoning would be tantamount to denying the importance of alcohol in a wine, yet stressing it in a cocktail. It is not only an example of rather muddled thinking; it is, by Professor Montagu's own definition, an expression of racist prejudice.

The second shortcoming of this work is of a more general methodological nature and typical of the ameliorative school of thought during the period the book was written. I refer to the author's inclination to view racist theories and beliefs as 'causes' and his consequently profound hope that education will provide the cure. Such optimism has faded in recent decades, however, and it now seems more appropriate to regard such theories and beliefs as symptoms rather than causes, as rationalizing justifications of existing structures, in the change of which the schoolroom can play only a rather subordinate role. Hence also the increasing interest, in the last few decades, in the *comparative* study of socio-racial structures, in the different ways in which different societies socially categorize similar 'racial' groups, and in detailed research into the factors that may account for such different social perceptions and their consequences for mechanisms of selection and mobility. In spite of a certain amount of, mostly bibliographical lip-service to these new schools of thought, Professor Montagu does not deal with them seriously. In fact, he prefers to use the concept of prejudice on a high level of abstraction, and to subsume a wide variety of linguistic, religious and 'racial' groups under the general heading of 'ethnic groups' which are subject to 'prejudice' caused by false beliefs. Like many of his school of thought, he is not eager to try to devise more refined conceptual tools in order to analyze more carefully the differential treatment meted out to different 'ethnic groups' in the same society, or to similar ones in different societies, to study changes in treatment, position and prejudice in time-depth, or to explain differences in absorption and assimilation or their countervailing processes. Blunt instruments cause less pain, so it would seem.

The major strength and appeal of this book lie in the elegant competence and unfailing professionalism with which Professor Montagu, himself a physical anthropologist, criticizes and effectively unmasks the many fads and fancies concerning the human race and its subdivisions which in the course of time even his fellow physical anthropologists have subscribed to. He is, as he himself admits, hard on them and on the popular misconceptions that were, in part, generated by their theories.

The weakness of the book shows up in those passages where Professor Montagu leaves the field of his professional competence in order to tackle problems of cultural history and sociology, in which he has a keen interest.

The historical importance of this work can hardly be denied, and the author has rightly been commended for the monumental work he produced so many years ago.

The somewhat ambivalent feelings which this work arouses in the present-day reader may be due to the circumstance that Professor Montagu has proved in more than one way that the study of ethnic or racial relations today falls outside the scope of physical anthropology.

MARGARET T. HODGEN, *Anthropology, History and Cultural Change*. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, number 52. The University of Arizona Press, pp. 108, 1974. Price \$ 4.50.

J. TENNEKES

Zoals de titel van de studie reeds aangeeft gaat het Margaret Hodgen er om de verhouding van de culturele antropologie en de geschiedwetenschap te verduidelijken en aannemelijk te maken, dat de cultureel antropoloog in het bestuderen van culturele verandering niet moet aarzelen het traditionele object van de geschiedwetenschap — zij noemt dat 'Dated Cultural Events' — tot het zijne te maken. Tenslotte beginnen de schriftloze volken, waar de antropologie zich tot nu toe met name mee bezighield, te verdwijnen en de 'meer vooruitziende antropoloog' vraagt zich volgens haar op dit moment af wat hij moet doen met wat zij noemt 'his expertise in cultural morphology, description, analysis and comparison, and especially with his persistent interest in the solution of the problem of cultural change' (p. 94). Volgens haar is het meest hoopvolle antwoord op deze vraag de erkenning van de zijde van de antropoloog dat 'since what the anthropologists call 'culture' is a common possession of all human groups, historical and non-historical, the study of change may best be conducted by the collection of dated changes, and [the anthropologist should] turn his attention to the historical peoples' (p. 95).

Deze conclusie wordt voorafgegaan door een vijftal korte hoofdstukken. In het eerste behandelt de schrijfster de tegengestelde houding van antropologen en historici ten opzichte van het gebruik van wat — onvertaalbaar — heet: 'the scientific method'. De antropologen claimen traditioneel het gebruik van deze methode, de historici doen juist het tegengestelde. In het tweede hoofdstuk wordt de houding die antropologen als Sapir, Kroeber, Evans-Pritchard en de leden van de Duits-oostenrijkse cultuurhistorische school hebben aangenomen ten aanzien van de geschiedenis, behandeld. Bij allen constateert Hodgen een gebrek aan belangstelling voor de studie van culturele verandering met behulp van 'the dated record of changes' (p. 33). In het derde hoofdstuk gaat ze na waarom antropologen zich zo weinig met dit soort data hebben

bezig gehouden. Eén van de redenen daarvoor is volgens de schrijfster dat de antropologen historische gebeurtenissen als uniek kwalificeren en dientengevolge de geschiedwetenschap zagen als een literaire discipline gericht op het schrijven van geschiedverhalen. Deze visie op de geschiedwetenschap is haars inziens echter onjuist. Ze meent dat het wel degelijk mogelijk is om historische feiten 'wetenschappelijk' ('scientific') aan te pakken. In het volgende hoofdstuk 'The Classification of Dated Cultural Events: An Alternative Use of History Illustrated', laat ze dan zien hoe er in schijnbaar unieke ontwikkelingen zoals de verspreiding van het christendom over de oude wereld en de opkomst van de drukpers in Europa wel degelijk regelmatigheden zijn te ontdekken. In het vijfde hoofdstuk — 'Historical Process versus Natural Law as Forms of Explanation' — weidt ze dan nog aan de hand van een nadere analyse van het in het vorige hoofdstuk gepresenteerde materiaal uit over de methodologische problemen van de door haar voorgestelde benadering.

Door haar studie te centreren rond de vraag of historische gegevens ('dated events') ook wetenschappelijk ('scientific') kunnen worden behandeld, continueert Hodgen een naar mijn smaak grotendeels zinloze discussie die helaas door het angelsaksisch woordgebruik nu eenmaal wordt aangemoedigd. Aan het eigenlijke probleem van de verhouding tussen geschiedwetenschappen en culturele antropologie komt ze daardoor nauwelijks toe. Voor zover ik het echter begrijp, doen volgens haar 'vooruitziende' antropologen en 'wetenschappelijke' historici in feite hetzelfde. En misschien is dat ook wel zo.

REGNA DARNELL, *Readings in the History of Anthropology*.
New York etc., Harper & Row, 1974. 479 pp.

H. J. M. CLAESSEN

In this book Regna Darnell (University of Alberta) has brought together a number of selected articles and chapters on the history of anthropology. She is one of the few anthropologists specializing in this branch of the subject. Usually the history of anthropology is concentrated in more or less extended chapters in introductory textbooks, or in such books as Marvin Harris' detailed discussion of the rise of anthropological theory. The volume under review includes several more or less unknown chapters. By virtue of this fact alone the collection is well worthy of praise. Regna Darnell has not only brought together a fine collection of essays, however, but has also knit them together into a well-integrated book. She has succeeded in this task by dividing the contents into four parts: a. The nature of anthropology; b. Voyagers and philosophers; c. Professionalization of anthropology; and d. History from within the discipline, by providing a long and lucid general Introduction, and by adding shorter special introductions to each of the four parts. She seems thereby to have hit on a fortunate compromise which is somewhere between a book on the history of anthropology and a mere collection of selected readings.

It is to be regretted that Regna Darnell has restricted her attention in the second half of the book to the history of American anthropology. The first half of the book, however, contains among others a chapter from Herodotus, a passage from the work of Ibn Khaldûn, and the famous essay *Des Cannibales* by Michel de Montaigne. Also J. H. Rowe's article on the Renaissance foundations of anthropology is included in this section.

The higher the stage of development reached by anthropology, the more difficult the task of selecting representative texts becomes. As far as a foreign reader is able to judge, Regna Darnell has at least succeeded in making an interesting choice from among the variety of articles on the history of American anthropology. Of the various essays in this part of the book, I found especially interesting the two articles by Gerald Stocking, mostly because of the width of their scope and the deep insight into people and ideas they display.

In view of the concentration on the development of anthropology in America in this particular part, the article by Fortes on the situation at Cambridge seems rather misplaced here.

A few slight omissions should be pointed out as well. The list of ethnological societies in Europe on page 170 omits to mention the Dutch 'Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde' (Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology), which was founded in 1851 and has since held a prominent place in the anthropological world, especially in the field of Indonesian studies. Also the reference to 'Stockings 1968' on page 170 (as on page 292) is rather vague, since the list of literature cited mentions no less than four works by Stockings published in 1968. The title of the book by Bastian (1881) is reproduced in incomprehensible German. All in all, however, *Readings in the History of Anthropology* is a fine book in which the interested general reader as well as the specialist will find a wealth of lucidly arranged data.

F. ALLAN HANSON, *Meaning in Culture*. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul (International Library of Anthropology), 1975. xi, 127 pp., bibl. Price £ 3.95.

JOHN BEATTIE

In this short book Dr. Hanson offers what the blurb describes as 'a philosophically sound treatment of those conceptual and theoretical problems which actually plague the practising social scientist'. Dr. Hanson writes with commendable clarity — and with a good deal of self-assurance — about the quite complex issues involved. But a good deal of what he says has been said before, and the sceptical reader may suspect that not all the problems raised are to be solved quite as easily as the author thinks.

He starts by telling us that the various social sciences differ not because they are concerned with different kinds of subject-matter, or even with different levels of analysis, but because of the particular 'perspectives' they adopt, and the different kinds of questions they ask. Thus 'institutional' questions (asked by social anthropologists and sociologists) are to be distinguished from 'individual' ones (asked by psychologists), and the former are not to be reduced to the latter. I suppose this distinction is at least as old as Durkheim (to whose *Rules of Sociological Method* Hanson makes no reference), and it has been reiterated often enough since, though perhaps it still needs saying.

It follows that the 'intrinsic' meanings studied by social anthropologists are not to be found in people's purposes or intentions, but by reference to 'the consequences of the things in question' (p. 10). So the meanings sought are 'implicational' or contextual, and the context includes not only 'logical' connexions between ideas and beliefs but also, apparently, their causal implications — though the differences between these two kinds of contexts are not spelled out. All this is unexceptionable, if familiar, enough (though psychologists might demur at being so neatly characterised). The meanings that modern anthropologists seek are indeed contextual ones, whether the contexts are 'functional' or 'structural'. It is difficult to see what else they could be.

These considerations lead Dr. Hanson straight to a thoroughgoing cultural relativism: the 'meaning and truth [of 'all propositions, beliefs and other cultural institutions'] is [sic] to be found in their logical relations with other propositions, beliefs, institutions' in the same culture (p. 21). Accordingly the concepts of 'truth and meaning ... apply only within systems of ideas and institutions', and a crucial implication of this is, of course, that 'all cultures ... must be understood from within, in their own terms' (p. 22).

The difficulties involved in this position have been widely discussed in recent years, and Dr. Hanson devotes the two central chapters of his book to them. But although he makes some shrewd points and adduces some interesting arguments, I do not think that he can be said to have resolved them satisfactorily.

He begins by distinguishing 'evaluative relativism', concerned with the relativity of moral judgement (and so with the possibility of a universalistic ethics), from 'epistemological relativism', concerned with 'the nature of our knowledge [my emphasis] of other cultures'. He has no difficulty in showing that as far as moral judgement is concerned, it is an illusion to suppose that we can evaluate in terms of another culture, for 'no evaluation can sensibly be called mine if I do not accept it as valid, that is, if I do not affirm the standards involved and their application in this case' (p. 35). Whether there are such things as 'universally valid [moral] standards' is, he argues, another matter; he accepts as 'a working hypothesis' that there are not. But he does not explain how, if standards are affirmed at all, they can be conceived to be of less than universal application. It is of interest that in another careful recent study of this topic (S. Moser, *Absolutism and Relativism in Ethics*, 1968)

the conclusion is reached that 'sociocultural ethical relativism' cannot be regarded as 'a well-founded ethical doctrine'.

But, Hanson continues, even if we can't *judge* in other cultures' terms, we can at least *understand* in them: cultural phenomena can, and should, 'be understood from within, in their own terms' (p. 46). No anthropologist would deny that to see the institutions he studies as far as possible as the 'native' sees them is an important part of his task. But it is certainly not the whole of his task. Further, any verbal communication between people (whether of the same or different 'cultures') must involve a 'bridgehead' of at least some shared concepts or ways of thinking about things. Hanson grants that certain 'purely formal criteria' such as 'the laws of identity and non-contradiction' may be granted universality, though he is less clear than he might be about the implications of this for his uncompromisingly relativist stance. However he draws the line at admitting to this status the concept of 'truth' as verifiability (or falsifiability) against experience, posited as a universal criterion of rationality by Steven Lukes and others (p. 51). But there is a confusion in Hanson's argument here. The fact that the verification principle is context-dependent does not make it culture-dependent too; on the contrary, it must be, in appropriate contexts, common to all cultures. With members of a culture which lacked any concept of things being the case and of it being possible to check whether they are or not against experience, rational discourse would be impossible.

Hanson goes on to argue that the crucial problem of how we can achieve 'internal' understanding of 'alien beliefs and behaviour' fades away when we recognise firstly that what we are looking for are 'implicational' (or contextual) meanings, and secondly — a much more interesting point — when, following Ryle, we abandon the Cartesian body-mind dualism, and realise that understanding other people's thoughts is not a matter of somehow getting inside their minds, but simply of 'knowing how to use beliefs, ideas, manners, customs like [sic] the natives use them' (p. 67). This is all very well — and there is more to Hanson's argument than can be presented here — but some readers will remain puzzled by the suggestion that we can somehow learn how to 'use' beliefs and ideas without any precedent notion of what those beliefs and ideas are.

In the end, Hanson's relativist prescription is affected by the same fatal flaw that affects all such uncompromisingly relativist approaches. If the injunction that we should understand (other) cultural phenomena 'from within, in their own terms' is *itself* to be understood in the same manner, on what ground can the wider validity seemingly claimed for it be based? In a fundamental sense, what is sauce for Hanson's evaluative goose is also sauce for his epistemological gander. Just as any moral judgement that I make must be *my* judgement, based on standards that I accept, so also any assertion that I make about the categories of another culture must be *my* assertion, based on criteria of rationality that I accept and to which I attach a more than merely relative validity.

But whatever one's views on these complex issues, Hanson's concise

and well-argued book, the argument of which gallops along at a spanking pace, contains much to stimulate and interest, even if it does not wholly convince. It can be commended to all social scientists, and especially to social anthropologists.

Oxford

DAN SPERBER, *Le Symbolisme en Général*. Collection Savoir, Hermann, Paris, 1974. 163 pp. Prix NF. 28

J. VAN BAAL

The author is an anthropologist who studied at Paris and Oxford, did fieldwork among the Dorzé of Ethiopia, and is now associated with C. N. R. S. and the University of Nanterre. In the present book he tries to come to grips with "symbolism in general", an ill-defined term covering a wide variety of phenomena including myth and figurative speech, ritual and the gestures of polite behaviour, as well as the recurrent symbols of the dream. The author excludes language, however, and makes no mention of the systems of symbols used in science and artistic expression. The author's primary concern is the difference between symbolism in general and the symbolism of language. He rejects the hypothesis of the semiologists that these general symbols constitute a kind of meta-language and can be interpreted as "des signifiants associés à des significées tacites sur le modèle des rapports entre son et sens dans la langue" (p. 10). Over against the semiologists' view that these symbols are signs which must be decoded on the basis of a body of rules, he advances the hypothesis that these general symbols must be conceived as basically cognitive, and that their effectiveness derives from their intrinsic power to make implicit knowledge explicit in a process guided by the unconscious rules which give structure to the individual's 'improvisation'.

It is open to question whether much profit can be derived from the author's attempt to oppose the semiologic forms of cognition and the cognitive ones by associating the former with analytic and clearly defined forms, and the latter (the cognatic!) with those which are synthetic and not necessarily clearly defined. If there is any sense in subdividing cognition in such a manner, it is necessarily that of creating an opportunity for tacitly classifying the affective contents of the mind with the cognitive, an artifice which leads to confusion rather than to the lucidity of the argument. Nevertheless, the author's comment on the semiologists is of interest. He distinguishes between two schools of thought. The first of these holds the view that a myth refers to some hidden truth in nature or society. Malinowski is a good representative. The weakness of this interpretation of myth as a cryptic reference to a number of quite general and well-known conditions in or features of nature or society, lies in its redundancy. Why do people bother to express elaborately in figurative language that which everyone knows anyway,

and could better be expressed in plain words? The argument is all the more cogent since the narrators of a myth often show a remarkable ability to formulate its meaning in plain and simple words. This adds a new dimension to the general problem of myth which the author, after a digression on Freud's observations on the recurrent symbols of the dream, tries to solve as follows: the native's explanation of a myth is not a real explanation but must itself be understood as a statement of symbolic nature. The solution is hardly convincing but it has the merit of drawing attention to the fact that the so-called meaning of a myth is at best the smaller half of the truth.

The second school of semiotic interpretation is that of Lévi-Strauss. He calls mythology a meta-language, though a meta-language of a peculiar kind. Whereas linguistic practice makes use of categories to formulate propositions concerning the world, symbolic thought makes use of propositions to express relations between categories. The study of myth discloses the operation of identical systems of oppositions in various distinct realms (codes) by means of which one realm refers to the other. Here it is not the meaning of a myth which is of interest, but its structure, and the author deals with this approach to mythology under the caption "*La signification absente*". In fact, Lévi-Strauss' interpretation of myth is not semiotic at all, a conclusion which induces Sperber to express his sympathy with the master's quest for the unconscious rules defining the structure of mythical expression. Yet, here again he finds himself face to face with an astonishing measure of redundancy. Why does the application of only a small number of implicit rules require such a complicated apparatus as that of mythical expression?

In chapters 4 and 5 the author presents his personal views. In 4, "*Symbolisme et Savoir*", he opposes symbolism and language. A language is a closed system, learned at an early age and always neatly distinguished from other languages learned later on in life. In contrast, symbolism is not a closed system. New symbols are added to it throughout the individual's lifetime. They are absorbed into the individual's ordered reservoir of symbols, in which there is room for symbols of the most diverse origins.

He then opposes symbolic and encyclopedic knowledge, or real knowledge, advancing the view that symbolic knowledge is that which is believed, and therefore should be placed between quotation marks, since it is accepted without prior investigation. Symbolic knowledge does not constitute a meta-language, but a meta-encyclopedia.

The fifth and last chapter is devoted to an exploration of the question of how this meta-encyclopedia is activated into representations which are never quite accurate and always slightly different individually. The "*dispositif symbolique apparaît donc comme un mécanisme très général qui sous-tend des activités intellectuelles extrêmement diverses*" (p. 152).

This brings us to the end of our rather incomplete and hardly satisfying summary of the contents of this book which, in spite of its virtues, raises various objections. One of these concerns the author's leaning

towards provocative statements, such as: "les phénomènes symboliques ne sont pas des signes" (p. 97). This, of course, is not true. If symbolism constitutes a meta-encyclopedia, then the symbols must necessarily refer to something. Actually, the author himself makes mention of symbolic acts which are pure signals, e.g. putting one's knife and fork next to each other on one's plate after a meal (p. 33). It is as senseless to deny that a myth has a meaning as it is to accept what people say or think that this meaning is. If they could really say what the meaning is, they would not need the myth. It is necessary to enter more deeply into the problems posed by myth. The author has made a valuable contribution by pointing to the apparent redundancy, to the possibility that the alleged meaning of a myth should itself be understood symbolically, and to the fact that symbols are stimulators, provoking the listeners to improvise their own, individual interpretations. Unfortunately, the author has blocked his way to a more comprehensive understanding of myth by concentrating on its cognitive aspects. Cognition always implies a knowledge of something definite and myth does not. A myth refers to what something outside of the believer means to him, reflects the believer's way of what Merleau-Ponty called his being-to-the-world and the way the world is to him. This is not a matter of cognition (though cognition is implied) but of emotional experience, of how the world appears to the believer and even addresses him, arousing vague notions of fear and apprehension mixed with a longing for reassurance and confidence. Such feelings can find their expression only in myth. It is tempting but not feasible to pursue this theme here. Instead, I wish to raise one final question. Why do students of myth pay so little attention to its most challenging characteristic, the fact that every myth confronts us with at least one event or situation which is physically or humanly impossible?

CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, *La Voie des Masques*. Les Sentiers de la Création, Editions d'art Albert Skira, Genève, 1975. Vol. I, 142 pp. and Vol. II, 147 pp. Figs., maps, colour plates.

DAVID S. MOYER

The titles and cover illustrations of Lévi-Strauss' original works have long provided us with examples of bricoleurean wit and codes to be deciphered. His latest book is no exception. The title appears to be a transformation based on the name of the series in which it appears: *Les Sentiers de la Création* by the Swiss publisher Albert Skira. In contrast to this link based on semantic similarity, we are confronted with an opposition based on the plastic features of the two masks that appear on the front covers of each volume. At first glance this opposition subtly recalls the opposition between the Thespian masks of the Hellenic dramatic tradition; the most distinctive features of the opposition in both the cases involve transformations on the shape of the eyes and

mouth. One of the Kwakiutl masks has cylindrical protruding eyes and a narrow slit mouth with a protrudent tongue, the other has deepset eyes and a rounded mouth. Upon further reflection one notices more contrasts: one is painted and the other is not; one is decorated with bird feathers and the other with animal fur; and one has deeply recessed cheeks and the other does not.

The work itself is divided into two portions which, incidentally, do not parallel the division into volumes. The first portion presents a detailed structural analysis of the semantic and plastic relations among three masks: the *swaihwé* mask from the Costal Salish, and the *xwéxwé* and the *Dzonokwa* masks from the Kwakiutl just to the north. The argument begins with an analysis of the mythological significance of the *swaihwé* mask. The *swaihwé* guarantees the acquisition of wealth and is a means of establishing marital alliances (it is given by the father to his daughter's husband). The next step of the argument demonstrates that the Costal Salish *swaihwé* mask is the same mask, i.e., the same in plastic form, as the Kwakiutl *xwéxwé* mask. This is necessary because although both masks share cylindrical protruding eyes, brightly coloured paint, and decorative bird motifs, the slit mouth and protrudent tongue of the *xwéxwé* mask is absent from the *swaihwé* mask. There one finds a stylized lower jaw and tongue which has been folded down into a vertical plane. Supporting his argument that these, at first glance, apparently different masks, are in fact two variants of a single structural entity, Lévi-Strauss cites a Kwakiutl legend (not a myth) indicating that the *xwéxwé* mask was acquired from the Comox, a Costal Salish people from Vancouver Island. However, the mythological evidence indicates that the *xwéxwé* is not generous but avaricious and greedy. One must note that the argument is now at its weakest point. However, this is due more to the paucity of data than to the quality of the argument.

The argument continues with an examination of the portrayal of the *Dzonokwa* in Kwakiutl culture. In plastic terms the *Dzonokwa* mask is the inverse of the *xwéxwé*: recessed instead of protruding eyes, a rounded instead of a slit mouth with protrudent tongue, unpainted instead of painted (or dark instead of light), and decorated with animal fur rather than bird motifs or feathers. Mythologically the *Dzonokwa* is a blind or at best very shortsighted, rather stupid kidnapper of children and stealer of salmon. However, various heroes are able to acquire wealth by stealth or trickery from the *Dzonokwa*. These riches include the supreme form of wealth for the Kwakiutl: the famed coppers. Thus the *Dzonokwa* is the inverse of the *xwéxwé* at both semantic and plastic levels. But with respect to the *swaihwé* the inversion only occurs at the plastic level. Lévi-Strauss concludes: "*Quand, d'un groupe à l'autre, la forme plastique se maintient, la fonction sémantique s'inverse. En revanche, quand la fonction sémantique se maintient, c'est la forme plastique qui s'inverse.*" [italics in the original] (Vol. II, p. 29).

If the first portion of the study is most appropriately entitled *La voie des masques*, then the second is undoubtedly a *chemin de cuivre*. Here the argument is directed towards demonstrating, at a variety of levels,

that the *swaihwé* mask of the Costal Salish and the "coppers" of the Kwakiutl have identical mytho-logical, sociological and socio-logical functions. Sociologically, both the coppers and the masks are a means of establishing successful marital alliances. Socio-logically and mytho-logically both are a means of uniting opposites. For example, at the plastic level, the *swaihwé* mask serves to represent a unification of the two variants of the *swaihwé* origin myth. Among the Costal Salish of Vancouver Island the *swaihwé* have a celestial origin and on the mainland they have an aquatic origin. Though nearly all *swaihwé* masks are decorated with feathers or bird motifs, in some the stylized tongue is assimilated with a fish, thus representing a synthesis of celestial and aquatic elements. But perhaps the most interesting part of the argument involves a demonstration that both the *swaihwé* and the coppers are in an identical transformational relationship with the logical structure of a copper origin myth of the Athabaskan speaking Déné peoples of the interior. The evidence is amassed carefully and elaborately. And the reader notices that the author insists on developing the argument on a variety of levels which are kept distinct but parallel. The reason for this care emerges in the final chapter where Lévi-Strauss argues that the mytho-logical and socio-logical evidence serves to explain the curious similarity between the form of the Salish *swaihwé* mask and the Kwakiutl coppers even though they come from different cultural groups. However, he is not content to leave the matter there and goes on to argue that the form of the copper is derived from that of the *swaihwé* masks. "La forme des cuivres serait inexplicable si elle ne dérivait pas de celle des masques swaihwé" (Vol. II, p. 112 f).

Although this study is Lévi-Strauss' first full-scale analysis of plastic forms, the book is at least as important as a contribution to anthropology in the broadest sense of the term because it triumphantly resolves certain opposed trends in anthropological publication. On the one hand anthropology has become fashionable with popular books on primitive art, with journalistic simplifications by otherwise reputable scholars and with a plethora of introductory texts, readers, and microstudies. On the other hand, "serious" publication has all too often withdrawn into an aesthetically sterile "scientific" prose. In such a setting a book that is accessible to a wide audience and at the same time exhibiting the highest scholarly standards is especially welcome. In the first instance, the book is profusely illustrated with beautiful colour plates that are placed in such a way that the illustrations parallel the argument. On the other hand, the text itself is stylistically informal and at the same time intellectually rigorous, thus making it readable for a general audience as well as making it an important contribution to scholarship. The first portion of the book, involving the analysis of three masks, is valuable as a concise but elegant introduction to Lévi-Strauss' methods of analysis. Hopefully it will replace *La Geste d'Asdiwal* as the most often used example of Lévi-Straussian technique. For while *La Geste d'Asdiwal* is an excellent example of the analysis of a single myth it does not adequately reveal Lévi-Strauss' use of the notion of transformation nor his use of com-

parative material from differing cultures. On the other hand, the second portion of the book, dealing with the origin, functions and use of copper represents a fascinatingly elegant argument that is both provocative and stimulating for anthropologists interested in and familiar with structural analysis as a means of resolving complex and illusive problems.

SUZANNE PETRA SCHAD, *Empirical Social Research in Weimar-Germany*. Mouton, Paris-The Hague, 1972. 155 pp. Prijs 44.— F.

W. C. ULTEE

In de jaren zestig is door de Amerikaanse socioloog Lazarsfeld en enkele van z'n leerlingen een bijdrage geleverd tot de herschrijving van de geschiedenis van de sociologie. In de gangbare historische inleidingen wordt het beeld opgeroepen van het ontstaan van de sociologie uit de sociale filosofie. Lazarsfeld c.s. zijn er in geslaagd haar tweede wortel in het empirisch sociaal onderzoek aan te wijzen. Voor uitgekozen landen en perioden werd het verrichte empirisch sociaal onderzoek uit de vergetelheid opgediept. Het boek van Schad is een Ph.D. dissertatie die onder Lazarsfeld tot stand is gekomen en handelt over Duitsland in de periode 1918—1933. De studie kan beschouwd worden als de opvolger van Oberschall's *Empirical social research in Germany 1848—1914*. Net als de studie van Oberschall lijdt de studie van Schad aan de kwalen die de auteurs in het door hen opgediepte onderzoek menen te kunnen aanwijzen: een onduidelijke probleemstelling en probleembehandeling.

In afwijking van wat de andere leerlingen van Lazarsfeld gedaan hebben, beperkt Schad, zonder argumentatie, haar studie tot het werk van personen die zichzelf "socioloog" noemden of zo genoemd werden. Waarom naamgevingskwesties zo serieus opgevat dienen te worden, valt niet goed in te zien. De sociologie in Duitsland in deze periode zou bijna geheel theoretisch geweest zijn, en als toch nog empirisch onderzoek uitgevoerd werd, was het ontwikkelingsnivo uiterst laag. Schad stelt dan de vraag naar de verklaring van deze twee aspecten. De stelling over de twee aspecten moet plausibel worden gemaakt door onsystematische inhoudsanalyses van vier periodieke publikaties en van het werk van drie sociologen. De lezer heeft zelf te raden dat de vier periodieken volgens Schad alle periodieken waren en dat de drie sociologen de meest empirisch gerichte waren (wat geen van tweeën waar lijkt te zijn). De periodieken en sociologen lijken van "slechtst" naar "best" geordend te worden, waarbij de "beste" nog "slecht" is. Er wordt hoog opgegeven over de verwachtingen die het werk van Horkheimer opwekken. Op de onheilzame rol die Horkheimer en z'n Frankfurter Schule in de jaren zestig bij de neergang van het empirisch sociaal onderzoek in Duitsland gespeeld hebben, wordt niet ingegaan. Een inhoudsanalyse van Horkheimer's *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, die naar mijn mening niet al te "best" in de zin van Schad uit zou zijn gevallen, blijft achterwege. Een

schaal voor het ontwikkelingsnivo van empirisch sociaal onderzoek wordt niet ontwikkeld. Tussendoor worden op onsystematische wijze verklaringen geopperd die niet beproefd blijken te worden. In een omvangrijk laatste hoofdstuk wordt betoogd dat veel en beter onderzoek, dat nu empirisch sociaal onderzoek genoemd zou worden, in andere disciplines (psychologie, psychiatrie, medicijnen, pedagogiek) uitgevoerd werd; een aantal redenen voor de empirische traditie in deze vakken wordt opgesomd. Welke de preciese functie van dit betoog voor de oorspronkelijke probleemstelling is, wordt niet erg duidelijk.

Het boek lijkt een aantal kleinere onjuistheden te bevatten. Dat Tönnies' empirisch onderzoek los zou staan van z'n theorie is gewoon niet waar en de probleemstelling van Geiger's empirisch onderzoek naar de sociale gelaagdheid van het Duitse volk was wel degelijk theoretisch, en nog wel identiek met de bejubelde probleemstelling van Horkheimer. Over Michels wordt gezegd, dat hij het waardevrijheidsbeginsel van Weber niet goed begrepen heeft, wat gezien z'n samenwerking met Weber uiterst twijfelachtig is. Schad vertaalt "Erkenntnistheoretiker" als "phenomenologists", wat waarschijnlijk "epistemologists" moet zijn. Een verder gebrek is dat niet het idee geopperd wordt, dat de theoretische oriëntering in de Duitse sociologie opgang maakte uit onvrede met het geringe informatiegehalte van de hypothesen uit het empirisch sociaal onderzoek. Weber's "verstehende" sociologie was in ieder geval ontworpen ter verklaring van statistische regelmatigheden binnen een meer omvattende theoretisch stelsel, maar deze onderkenning wordt door Schad niet gemaakt.

PAUL-HENRY STAHL, *Ethnologie de l'Europe du Sud-est. Une anthologie*. Mouton Éditeur, Paris/La Haye 1974.
312 p. Prix f 38,—.

C. J. J. VERMEULEN

In de inleiding van zijn boek wijst Stahl op het belang van een meer historische benadering voor etnologisch onderzoek in Europa (pp. 6-8). Met dit boek wil hij de aandacht vestigen op oude bronnen betreffende de Balkan. Hiertoe heeft hij een selectie gemaakt uit oude reisbeschrijvingen en studiën die verschenen in de periode van de 17e tot de 19e eeuw. Hij organiseert zijn materiaal rond vier onderwerpen: de Aromcunen, Montenegro, de sociale organisatie van de Zuidslaven en de vrouw en het huwelijk.

Het meest interessante deel van het boek vormen de selecties over de sociale organisatie van de Zuidslaven, een oud en nog steeds belangrijk thema uit de Balkan etnografie. Vooral de studie van B. Bogišić (pp. 193-228) is erg boeiend. Bogišić betoogt in zijn artikel van 1884 dat westerse studiën van de familie-organisatie op het platteland alleen aandacht schonken aan de samenwonende patrilineale familie, de zgn. *zadruga*. Onder andere hierdoor werd in de wetgeving het alleenwonende gezin op het platteland gewoonlijk gelijkgesteld aan het stede-

lijke gezin en scherp onderscheiden van de *zadruga*. Bogišić toont aan dat deze gelijkstelling onjuist is, omdat het gezin op het platteland vaak een fase is in de cyclische ontwikkeling van de *zadruga* waardoor de leden andere rechten en plichten hebben dan die van het stedelijke gezin. Hij bekritiseert op deze gronden de wetgeving, niet alleen omdat deze de *zadruga* onderdrukt, maar ook omdat het leidt tot onrechtvaardige rechtspraak en tot verlies aan vertrouwen in de overheid.

Het gedeelte over de Aromcunen en dat over de vrouw en het huwelijk zijn het minst bevredigend. De Aromcunen, zoals ze zichzelf noemen, vormen een etnische groep die verspreid leeft over Boelgarije, Joegoslavië, Albanië en Griekenland. Ze spreken een taal die verwant is aan het Roemeens. De Aromcunen zijn voor het merendeel herders die hun zomerweiden in de bergen hebben en hun winterweiden in de vlakten van o.a. Thessalië en Macedonië. Het gedeelte over de Aromcunen wordt grotendeels in beslag genomen door reisbeschrijvingen van F. C. H. L. Pouqueville en W. M. Leake. Deze reisbeschrijvingen zijn nogal breedvoerig en bevatten relatief weinig informatie over de Aromcunen. Het gedeelte over de vrouw en het huwelijk heeft als bezwaar dat het bestaat uit een groot aantal kleine teksten van slechts enkele bladzijden, waarvan het belang niet altijd duidelijk is. Deze korte schilderijen betreffen onder andere huwelijksplechtigheden, de harem van de sultan en een beschrijving van de manieren en kleding van een dame van adel. Het gedeelte over Montenegro bevat drie interessante beschrijvingen over de zeden en gewoonten van de Montenegrijnen en de tekst van een wet uit 1885.

Het is te hopen dat Stahl's boek zal bijdragen tot een grotere aandacht voor oude publikaties, maar het is de vraag of er niet een grotere behoefte is aan een uitvoerige bibliografie met index.

JULIET DU BOULAY, *Portrait of a Greek Mountain Village*. Oxford Monographs on Social Anthropology. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1974. viii, 296 pp., photogr. Price £ 6.00.

G. J. J. VERMEULEN

When selecting a village for fieldwork, Juliet du Boulay looked for a small, remote and isolated village in Greece. She found what she had been looking for in Ambéli, a mountain village with a population of 144. This village seemed to be an ideal setting for somebody interested in the more traditional aspects of village society (p. 4).

In her preface Juliet du Boulay expresses her deepest thanks to Dr. John Campbell for his continual support and his invaluable advice (viii). After reading Du Boulay's book I concluded that Campbell's well-known monograph on the Sarakatsani — *Honour, Family and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community* — served her as a model or example to follow closely.

Both writers concentrate on the moral values of the communities studied and tend to view these as constitutive of the social order. The most striking differences between the two monographs are largely a result of the difference in sex between the two authors. Du Boulay pays more exclusive attention to the house and the family (viii) than Campbell and less to aspects related to the male world, such as patronage.

Ambéli is a nucleated and relatively prosperous village in the wooded mountains of Euboea. At the time the fieldwork was carried out (1966) the villagers still depended largely on subsistence agriculture for their livelihood. The main crop was wheat, and cash was earned through the sale of resin, cheese, wool and meat. Sheep-herding, once of much importance, had declined since 1958.

The book is divided into three parts. The first has a primarily introductory character. In it the reader is introduced to the village and its basic institutions and values. The house is described as the basis of the social order. At the centre of the household, which includes livestock and other property, is the family. It is only within the house that complete trust exists and only here that one can be confident that secrets are kept. The trust and affection characterizing the relations between the members of the household stand in contrast to the distrust and friction prevailing outside.

The main weaknesses of the book are perhaps most apparent in the first part. They are, in my opinion: 1) the often too speculative analyses, which cannot be sufficiently checked against the information presented, and 2) the heavy emphasis on the explanatory power of values. These points may best be illustrated by discussing one particular example in some detail (pp. 33-58). Because of heavy emigration from 1960 onwards there is more than enough land to cultivate and there are plenty of pines to tap in Ambéli. Though the peasants could make more money by abandoning their fields and making pine-tapping their first priority, they are not doing so. Why? In trying to answer this question Du Boulay remarks: 'the truth is of course that the traditional villager has never sat down and worked out why he does one thing rather than another' (p. 35). She concludes: 'It seems plain, then, that what causes the villager ... to continue to place cultivation of the fields before that of the forest, is some powerful value which is quite independent of rational and materialist argument' (p. 35). This powerful value is embodied in the villagers' attitude to cash, which is related to the symbolic significance of the house. To the villager — the writer argues — subsistence farming and the related storage of farm produce in the house appear to be conservation, while the earning of cash and its subsequent expenditure is considered tantamount to dissipation. The villagers' distrust of cash is conditioned by a basic reluctance to buy and sell at all. This speculative explanation seems to be belied by the fact that many villagers are abandoning subsistence farming in order to work for wages in the cities or abroad. The economic behaviour of most villagers is perhaps better explained by reference to the insecurities of agriculture and, more specifically, the attempt to spread one's risks over different crops and

avoid the risks of monoculture. The information on the instability of resin prices (given on p. 30) and the perceived security offered by the stabilization of resin prices in 1965 (footnote p. 33, p. 247) is insufficient for us to be able to evaluate this alternative explanation. It may well be, however, that the typical comment 'A little from here, a little from there, that's how we manage to keep things going' (p. 35) is an indication of a rational strategy rather than an expression of a powerful value or failure to see the rational advantages of exploiting the forests for cash crops.

The second part of the book is the most important, both in volume and argumentation. It presents a very stimulating and perceptive analysis of values and interpersonal relations in Ambéli. The social world of the villagers is described as embracing two antithetical types: the inner circle of affection, mutual trust and confidence represented by the household and the family, and the outer sphere of hostility and suspicion which surrounds it. These two worlds are, however, mutually connected by a number of links. The relations between kin, friends and neighbours as well as patronage alliances and marriage — all discussed in detail — provide a variety of contacts with the hostile outside world. In the pursuit of one's personal interests lies have to be used to conceal one's own failures as well as to defame one's opponents. One of the most fascinating themes of this particular part is that of the relation between the self and others. It is argued that the structure of social relations acts counter to an introspective awareness of the self and others. The individual acts as the representative of his family, his personal integrity being identified with that of his family group. Morally right behaviour is behaviour that is in conformity with one of a limited number of clearly defined roles rather than that based on individual conscience. In a sense conscience resides in public opinion rather than in the individual (p. 109). Du Boulay stresses especially the 'lack of insight' (pp. 83, 85) into self and others. Despite the writer's declared intention that it is not her purpose to morally evaluate different types of experience, this formulation — like certain others — itself suggests a negative evaluation. I do not object to the fact of evaluation in itself, but I do to the naïveté of the belief that it can be avoided, as well as to the one-sidedness of the analysis and related evaluation. One may well wonder, for example, if the structure of social relations which restricts knowledge of the self and others does not at the same time create a sense of belonging which prevents alienation from the self and others (cf., e.g., Henry 1963). It is also to be regretted that Du Boulay, in discussing the relations between the self and others, in addition to other aspects of interpersonal relations in Ambéli, does not relate this to any other literature on the subject. The reason perhaps is that the book is meant to be descriptive rather than theoretical in character.

In the last part of the book the transformation of the rural society is discussed. In this process changes of values are considered crucial (e.g. pp. 49, 79). War and emigration are seen as the two main factors responsible for increased communication with the outside world and

contact with its values. Emigration, especially post-1960 emigration, has resulted in a rapid depopulation and was itself largely the product of a collapse of confidence in the validity of the inherited way of life which followed World War II and the Civil War. In an interesting, though rather short section it is pointed out that, whereas formerly the pursuit of self-interest did not destroy the community, because the interests of the family and the community largely coincided, nowadays the two are mutually opposing forces, while further traditional curbs on hostility and quarrelling are breaking down. This section raises the important question of to what extent the ethos — in many ways similar to that of Banfield's Montegrano (1958) — as described in the second part of the book can be considered 'traditional', and to what degree and in what respects it is the result of a process of transformation. To this question the book provides no clear answer.

Notwithstanding its shortcomings, Du Boulay's monograph is a well-written and important contribution to Mediterranean anthropology. No one interested in interpersonal relations and the moral order in Mediterranean villages can leave it unread.

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JACOB BLACK-MICHAUD, *Cohesive Force. Feud in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1975. With a Foreword by E. L. Peters. 270 pp. Price £ 5.50.

LODEWIJK BRUNT

Op het eind van de vorige eeuw kreeg een groepje dorpelingen in Albanië ruzie omdat men het niet eens kon worden over de onderlinge verschillen in grootte van de eerste sterren die 's avonds aan de hemel verschenen. De ruzie nam snel in hevigheid toe en in zeer korte tijd waren er zeventien doden en elf gewonden in het dorp te betreuren. Een ander incident, ook in Albanië, veroorzaakte op één avond achttien doden: het ging hier uiteindelijk om twee schaareshonden, toebehorend aan verschillende lineages, die met elkaar hadden gevochten... (Black-Michaud, pp. 34, 132, 133).

Dit soort verhalen, zo stelt Black-Michaud, worden in de ogen van leden van de Westeuropese middenklasse afgedaan als 'rare' gewoonten van een rechteloze samenleving. Men doet geen poging om de

episodes van die verhalen met elkaar in verband te brengen. Ieder geval wordt los van tijd en ruimte beschouwd en men tracht niet te verklaren waarom de ogenschijnlijke oorzaak in geen enkele verhouding staat tot het ogenschijnlijke gevolg.

Waar het hier om gaat zijn verschijnselen die wel worden aangeduid als *Blutrache*, *vendetta*, *vete*, *feud* en *bloedwraak*. Black-Michaud probeert in zijn studie heel uitdrukkelijk wèl te doen wat anderen volgens hem hebben nagelaten: verbanden leggen, verklaren en vooral theoretiseren. Toch zou ik, na lezing van zijn boek, nog niet precies kunnen uitleggen waarom bovengenoemde incidenten nu eigenlijk die vorm hadden, hoewel ik van de achtergronden wel iets meen te begrijpen.

Het boek is een 'compacte' studie, die niet eenvoudig en zeker niet beknopt in alle details is samen te vatten en weer te geven. Ik zal in deze bespreking dan ook (helaas) veel interessante dingen onbesproken moeten laten. Ik wil hiermee niet suggereren dat het om een moeilijk leesbaar boek zou gaan. De schrijver deelt een gave van veel Engelse antropologen, namelijk een verbluffend gemak om helder te schrijven.

In zijn eerste hoofdstuk ontwikkelt de auteur een typologie van geweld, waarbij hij verschijnselen als vete, overval, oorlog en wraak begripmatig van elkaar onderscheidt. Hij zet zich af tegen gangbare antropologische opvattingen, zoals die van Evans-Pritchard, Gluckman, Malinowski en vooral Middleton en Tait. De laatsten, die zich overigens gedeeltelijk baseren op de etnografie van de Nuer, onderscheiden vete van oorlog op grond van de veronderstelling dat er bij de vete een mechanisme zou bestaan (arbitrage) om de vijandelijkheden te stoppen en dat er ook een morele verplichting zou drukken op de vijandige groepen om zich op die mechanisme te beroepen (zie pp. 3 e.v.).

In de loop van het boek wordt echter steeds duidelijker, dat de vete, in de maatschappijen waar het voorkomt, de *polsslag van de samenleving* is. Black-Michaud spreekt dan ook over 'feuding societies', een in het Nederlands eigenlijk niet te vertalen begrip. In maatschappijen waarin vetes voorkomen, zo stelt de auteur (o.a. p. 120), is de vete vrijwel alles wat er überhaupt gebeurt. "In other words, as a social phenomenon feud is very nearly synonymous with the social system within which it is found" (p. 121). De auteur is vooral tot deze opvatting gekomen op grond van zijn interpretatie van het werk van Emrys Peters in Cyrenaica, die in zijn voorwoord tot dit boek deze zienswijze ondersteunt in zijn uitspraak, dat de vete zich niet noodzakelijk manifesteert als een reeks moorden. "Feud is also advanced without a gun being fired or the loss of a single life" (p. xxvii; overigens is Peters het niet op alle punten eens met Black-Michaud). Black-Michaud verklaart dit karakter van de vete door erop te wijzen dat deze allesomvattende gegeneraliseerde strijd alleen kan optreden onder de condities van wat hij een *totale schaarste* noemt. Hieronder verstaat hij een permanent ervaren "... inadequacy of all existing resources and political structure to meet the minimal conscious requirements of the whole population" (p. 122). Het belangrijkste maatschappelijke bijverschijnsel van deze totale schaarste is een alles doordringende *angst*: angst

voor de hongerdood omdat een individu, door afwezigheid van een beschermende juridische context, niet in staat is om zijn hulpbronnen tegen agressie te beschermen.

Op naar mijn smaak ingenieuze manier construeert de auteur (in het laatste hoofdstuk) een soort parallel tussen ritueel en vete. Hij stelt de essentiële ambivalentie vast van ritueel: enerzijds het verhelderen van bedoelingen, anderzijds het afbakenen van (machts-)posities van groepen en individuen ten opzichte van elkaar. Ook een vete functioneert zo en bepaalde soorten vetes zijn dan ook te zien als een rituele 'performance' (p. 217). Bij vetes gaat het bij uitstek om kwesties van *eer*. In een situatie van totale schaarste bestaan geen mogelijkheden voor de ontwikkeling van een interne machtshiërarchie, die als coördinerende kracht kan dienen bij de samenwerking op politiek of economisch gebied. Maar juist door vetes ontstaat een ritueel kader waarin de onderlinge status van groepen en individuen wordt verduidelijkt: vetes scheppen immers de mogelijkheid om, door middel van moorden, eer en prestige te verwerven. De vete is dus geen vorm van 'self help', die door arbitrage tot staan kan worden gebracht, maar is per definitie 'eeuwig' (p. 16).

Toen Professor Mair in september 1975 enkele voordrachten hield in Nederland, noemde ze Black-Michaud een van de meest veelbelovende jonge Engelse antropologen. Ik vermoed inderdaad dat zijn werk een nieuwe periode zal inluiden in het denken over het verschijnsel van de vete. Toch heb ik wel enkele bezwaren tegen het boek.

Als hij — op zichzelf zeer terecht — de rol van vrouwen bespreekt in het 'eer-en-schande' complex, dat zo nauw vervlochten is met het verschijnsel vete, lijkt hij mij al te gretig om alles met alles in verband te brengen. Bovendien gaat hij daarbij wel erg schematisch te werk. Met een Lévi-Straussiaanse onnavolgbaarheid vloeien paren van verschillende verschijnselen als man/vrouw, eer/schande, vete/huwelijk, ritueel/vete samen tot één sterke 'samenbindende kracht' (*cohesive force*), die moet voorkomen dat de betreffende samenlevingen verworden tot een betekenisloze *anomie*. Voor de historische context van de maatschappijen die hij (in de literatuur) bestudeerd heeft — Albanië, Kabylie, Turkije, Corsica, Cyrenaica, etc. — lijkt hij weinig oog te hebben. Eén van de condities die hij noemt voor het bestaan van een 'feuding society' is de afwezigheid van een centraal gezag, dat het monopolie heeft op het gebruik van geweld in de maatschappij (pp. 146 e.v.). Daarin heeft hij natuurlijk gelijk. De historicus Fernand Braudel merkt bijvoorbeeld op (in *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'Époque de Philippe II*) dat samenlevingen als de hierboven genoemde werden gekenmerkt door *vendetta's* omdat zij niet waren gevormd door de middeleeuwse begrippen van feodaal recht. Het betreft hier volgens hem allemaal *bergsamenlevingen*: een onoverkomelijke hindernis voor de 'brede bewegingen van de geschiedenis' en daarom een vrijplaats, waar mensen buiten bereik van de tirannie der beschaving kunnen blijven.

Naar aanleiding daarvan vraag ik me af, of dit nog steeds zo is. En, uiteraard, of dit altijd zo geweest is. De ontwikkeling van moderne

naties is een betrekkelijk recent historisch verschijnsel. Waren *alle* geïsoleerde samenlevingen vóór deze ontwikkeling 'feuding societies'? Of is het ontstaan van 'feuding societies' juist een *gevolg* van deze ontwikkeling? Waardoor onderscheiden zich 'feuding societies' nu precies van 'non-feuding societies'? Welke veranderingen hebben plaatsgevonden in de aard van de 'feuding societies' als consequentie van het proces van steeds toenemende civilisatie?

Dat dit soort vragen op basis van Black-Michaud's boek onbeantwoord moet blijven, komt doordat hij uiteindelijk toch meer belangstelling schijnt te hebben voor abstracte constructies dan voor de empirie. Zijn visie op de vete — en daarmee op de 'feuding society' — als een 'eeuwig', dus 'tijdloos' verschijnsel, komt mij voor als een *esthetisch* bevredigende vondst, maar een wetenschappelijk monstrem. Naar mijn smaak manifesteert zich in deze visie het inherente gebrek van de 'armchair anthropology'. Mocht de auteur echter besluiten om zelf veldwerk te gaan doen in een 'feuding society', dan is in ieder geval duidelijk dat hij, als géén ander, zijn huiswerk grondig heeft gedaan!

D'ARCY MCNICKLE, *Native American Tribalism - Indian Survivals and Renewals*. Oxford University Press, New York, London, 1973. 190 pp., geïll. Prijs \$ 6.95.

J. H. VAN DEN BRINK

Dit boek is een herziene uitgave van het in 1962 verschenen "The Indian Tribes of the United States". Het werd uitgebreid met vier hoofdstukken, enkele kaarten en een dertigtal illustraties.

De schrijver, Program Director bij het "Center for American Indian History", Newberry Library, Chicago, beschouwt het verloop van de aanraking van de Noordamerikaanse Indianen met het Westen. Hij verklaart waardoor de Indiaanse gemeenschappen binnen de Amerikaanse en Canadese samenleving een etnische en culturele enclave bleven en schetst de wijze waarop de Indianen werden bejegend, zowel door de Spanjaarden en Engelsen in hun koloniaal systeem als, in latere en recente jaren, door de Amerikaanse en Canadese overheid. Daarbij valt de nadruk sterk op de kwestie van het grondbezit en op het recht van de Indianen op tribale zelfbeschikking.

Een inleidende beschouwing vestigt de aandacht op deze aspecten en op het "survival-element": "more than tentatively, one can say that American Indian communities, as a whole, are distinct growing communities that still preserve the core of their native style of life". Daarop volgt een uiteenzetting van de in de koloniale situatie zeer verschillende benadering van de Indianen door de Engelsen en Fransen. Aan de hand van o.m. de ervaring van de Cherokee in Georgia toont de schrijver aan dat in de beginjaren van het koloniaal bestuur de erkenning van de rechten van de Indianen op hun grond door prominente overheidsdienaren in werkelijkheid niet voldoende bescherming gaf.

In het hoofdstuk "Years of Attrition" volgt een beschrijving van een aantal in de vorige eeuw uitgevaardigde wetten, zoals o.m. de Indian Removal Act, de Appropriation Act en de General Allotment Act, wetten die onbegrip tonen voor het systeem van gemeenschappelijk grondbezit van de Indianen dat men ook niet wilde erkennen. Met de Allotment Act van 1887 trachtte men de Indianen het recht te onthouden als zelfstandige samenlevingen voort te bestaan. Dit slaagde niet, ondanks de scheiding van de stammen van hun grond, het leidde wél tot verpaupering, zoals McNickle beschrijft voor de Sisseton van Z. Dakota.

De opzet de Indianen tot landbouwers te maken, waartoe de overheid grond uitgif in persoonlijk eigendom, mislukte eveneens. De auteur schrijft dit toe aan de geringe interesse voor de beoefening van de landbouw in het algemeen en voor het marktgerichte bedrijf in het bijzonder. Ik zou hieraan willen toevoegen dat in die jaren de monocultuur en het grote veebedrijf steeds meer terreinwinst boekten waardoor de vooruitzichten voor de kleine landbouwer in het algemeen ongunstig waren.

McNickle beschouwt de Indianen tot de dertiger jaren van deze eeuw als "prisoners of war when no state of war existed": vrijheid van godsdienst ontbrak en in de scholen werd het gebruik van de eigen taal bestraft.

Keerpunt werd de Indian Reorganization Act (1934) die onder federale jurisdictie de zelfbeschikking van de Indiaanse samenleving bevorderde en een eind maakte aan de opdeling van de gronden. Deze wet leidde tot de formatie van intertribale organisaties die een regio of een staat omvatten — een "renewal-element". De schrijver beschouwt deze ontwikkeling als één van de belangrijkste gevolgen van de wet: het bevorderde, in 1944, het tot stand komen van het National Congress of American Indians.

McNickle gaat uitvoerig in op de na de Tweede Wereldoorlog in de V.S. gevolgde "policy of termination" die tot doel had de relatie te verbreken waarin de Indianen stonden tot de federale overheid: tribale autonomie werd tegengegaan en de Indianen zagen opnieuw hun grondbezit bedreigd. De auteur beschrijft treffend hoe zwaar de Klamath van Oregon en de Menominee van Wisconsin in hun economisch bestaan getroffen werden. Hij hecht veel betekenis aan de tijdens de regering van President Kennedy aangenomen "Declaration of Indian Purpose" en aan de opkomst, daarna, van de militante National Youth Council: uit de bereidheid van de leden van dit verbond tot politieke actievoering ontstond het begrip "Red Power".

In de beschrijving van de succesrijke ontwikkeling op het Rough Rock reservaat van de Navajo in Arizona toont de auteur waardering voor het door President Johnson en President Kennedy bepleitte democratisch pluralisme met als beleidsinstrument o.m. de Indian Community Action Programs. In deze tijd beschouwt men het behoud van de Indiaanse cultuur als een nationaal belang.

Het Canadese beleid ten aanzien van de Indianen krijgt in dit boek te weinig aandacht. McNickle spreekt van een duidelijke tegenzin in het aanvaarden van verantwoordelijkheid voor aangelegenheden die de

Indianen betreffen en voegt daaraan toe: "As a department within the national household, Indian affairs was cast in the role of the unloved orphan".

Ik kan mij moeilijk verenigen met zijn uitspraak dat de Canadese Indianen zich eerst recentelijk van hun precaire positie inzake het grondbezit bewust werden. Immers, de in deze zeer belangrijke Nishga Petition dateert van 1887 en sedertdien zijn de Indianen terzake bijzonder op hun hoede gebleven, zoals ook enkele jaren geleden bleek uit de reactie op de regeringsverklaring van Premier Trudeau waarin de eertijds gesloten verdragen dreigden te worden opgezegd.

McNickle beschouwt een in 1971 in het kader van de Settlement Act getroffen regeling als een precedent voor toekomstige overeenkomsten. Daarbij werd het grondbezit van in Alaska wonende Indianen erkend en bood men hun ter compensatie voor de exploitatie van de minerale hulpbronnen o.m. een aandeel in de baten.

In het geheel bezien geeft dit vlot geschreven boek onmisbare informatie voor een goed begrip van recente gebeurtenissen en ontwikkelingen. De in de appendix opgenomen demografische gegevens zijn ontleend aan de census van 1970.

CHRISTINE OPPONG, *Marriage among a Matrilineal Elite. A family study of Ghanaian senior civil servants*. Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology 8. Cambridge University Press, London 1974. 187 pp., map, tables. Price £ 4.50 in U.K., \$ 13.95 in USA.

SJAAK VAN DER GEEST

Mary Douglas' question some years ago of whether matrilineality is doomed to disappear in Africa is still being answered by anthropologists today, this time by Dr. Christine Oppong, Senior Research Fellow of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana. Her Ph.D. thesis, *Aspects of Conjugal Relationship among Akan Senior Civil Servants in Accra*, has been published in an abridged and slightly revised form under the more graceful title *Marriage among a Matrilineal Elite*. If participant observation is the key to successful anthropological research then Dr. Oppong, who has spent many years in Ghana and is herself "conjugal related to an Akan senior civil servant in Accra", is a good case in point.

The author states in her introduction that, during her preliminary investigations among elite couples, she was struck by two types of emphatic statement which were made repeatedly in connection with urban elite marriage. The first was that matrilineal type unions are fraught with serious problems of incompatibility, and the second that these problems tend to reduce greatly between spouses who are second — or third — generation educated.

The latter statement marks out a well-defined area of research with an independent variable (number of generations educated) that lends itself to exact measurement. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most

lucid conclusions of the study are those pertaining to the influence of formal education on marriage and kinship relations. So Dr. Oppong has discovered *inter alia*, that the number of generations educated correlates positively with "closure" of the conjugal union, jointness of financial management between spouses, and participation of the husband in domestic chores.

The former statement, on the other hand, points the way to an extremely intricate complex of social dynamics on which numerous anthropologists have tested their talents and there is no denying that Dr. Oppong has added an important contribution to the bulk of matrilineality studies produced by anthropologists such as M. Fortes, Audrey Richards, Kathleen Gough and D. Schneider.

The author had three aims in view when starting her investigation, viz.: 1) to contribute to the "growing body of data on marriage and family life among urban, educated West Africans"; 2) to conduct an experiment in methodology by "documenting and comparing two major aspects of conjugal family relationships: the division of labour, resources and power between husbands and wives, and the extent to which the conjugal family is a functionally discrete unit . . ."; and 3) "The examination of marital continuity and change among educated, urban migrants from a region characterized by *matrilineal* descent and inheritance" (p. 1; *my italics*).

In the first chapter an account is given of the research methods and the theoretical framework. The author places herself in the tradition of Farber and, more particularly, Bott by utilizing the concepts of 'openness' and 'closure' with respect to conjugal unions, and 'jointness' and 'segregation' in relation to conjugal roles.

The second chapter is devoted to the social traditions of the matrilineal Akan with respect to kinship and marriage, and to the main factors of change that have given rise to the present urban elites.

In the next chapter members of these elites are shown to be torn between rural and urban obligations or, in other words, between the modern economic system from which they derive their occupational status and their particular kind of conjugal ties on the one hand, and the demands of kinsmen on the other. The problems of this dichotomy are presented through the medium of a number of cases that illustrate how the respondents in question achieved their high status, got married and set up their household, and what role their matrilineages played in these processes. These cases provide a wealth of information, in fact, more than could be dealt with in the analysis.

The fourth and fifth chapters deal with the main subject of the study. Here the allocation of resources (financial provision, financial management, and participation of the husband in the household tasks) and the processes of conjugal power and decision-making (joint or segregate) are analyzed and assessed and related to the degree to which kinship ties continue to cut across conjugal bonds (i.e., whether the marriage is open or closed). The hypothesis that joint conjugal roles are connected with closed marital unions, and segregate roles with open unions

is confirmed by the situation in this West African — elite — setting.

In the final chapter the author gives special attention to a thread running through the entire study, namely the theme of tension and change. She attempts to shed more light on these concepts by fitting them into the sociological models of Stouffer and Merton. The study ends with the thought-provoking statement, "... we do not see such changes to be simply the result of 'Christian influence', 'culture contact' or the 'copying of European models', as a number of previous commentators appear to have believed, but as explicable in terms of adaptations within the system of domestic relationships, serving to adjust it to the economic and demographic changes, which have been taking place and are still continuing" (p. 159).

Another intriguing contention is that, in spite of supposed female emancipation among the urban elite, the married elite woman has lost three crucial resources providing the basis of the relative autonomy of Akan wives in a traditional setting. These resources are: financial independence, the possibility of recourse to the matrilineage and — *in cauda venenum* — freedom to divorce and enter into a new marriage (pp. 116-9). The last point is particularly intriguing. The argument here is that an elite woman who has lost her youthful glamour lacks the traditional facilities to withdraw from marriage, since the conditions for remarriage are not as favourable.

A few critical remarks about the book do not seem out of place. Compression of the original text has not always been conducive to bringing out clearly the main threads of the argumentation, particularly in the last three chapters. It would, moreover, have been better if the various cases had each been printed under a special heading and in a different letter type rather than interweaving them with the main body of the text. Further, the author seems rather over-optimistic about the accuracy and adequacy with which the traditional matrilineal kinship system has been described and analyzed (pp. 21 and 30). There is reason to believe, as has also been noted by Van Velsen, that conjugal and kinship ties in semi-literate societies are less stereotyped than has been suggested by some pioneer anthropologists. Personal investigations among the rural Akan, for example, support the view that there is a wide variety of sexual unions in rural communities and that there is considerable freedom of choice in the election of heirs.

The book has an elaborate index and is published in hard cover only. It is to be hoped that a paperback edition will follow soon, so that this elite study will also be available to non-elite students.

CHRISTINE OPPONG, *Growing up in Dagbon*. Accra-Tema, Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1973. 79 pp., map. Price \$ 5.00 (£ 2.00).

SJAAK VAN DER GEEST

Most sizeable ethnic groups in Northern Ghana have their "own" ethnographer. The Tallensi have Meier Fortes, the Lowiili and Lodagaa

Jack Goody, the Gonja Esther Goody, and the Konkomba David Tait. The Dagomba, however, cannot make such a claim. This is all the more remarkable since they have played a major role in the history of Northern Ghana and have to a large extent dominated the other groups. In the middle of the 18th century the Dagomba and Asante concluded a treaty whereby the Dagomba gained free access to Asante markets and were supplied with guns. In return the Dagomba provided the Asante with slaves, among other things. These slaves were captured from among neighbouring tribes.

The Dagomba, whose traditional capital is Yendi, have a centralized kingdom and are under strong Moslem influence. The fact that their rich political and social traditions have not up till now been studied in depth may be due partly to the premature death of Tait, who at one time focused his attention on the Dagomba kingdom. *Growing up in Dagbon*, a recent study of Dagomba life by Christine Oppong, a research fellow of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, does not make up for this lack entirely. It is not her aim, however, to present a full picture of Dagbon society; she is concerned rather with describing one particular aspect of the social life, namely education, both in the traditional and the modern sense. Her study, therefore, is a contribution to the scant existing literature on the Dagomba, as well as representing an attempt to further our present knowledge of socialization in the African context.

She gives a concise account of the history and political structure of Dagbon (chapter 1) and of the various aspects of children's lives (chapter 2). In this context she deals with the types of housing, rules of descent, ideas and practices with respect to pregnancy and childbirth, the composition of the average household, stereotyped emotional relationships between relatives, and the customs in connection with child adoption.

In chapter 3 the author examines the way in which boys (little is said about girls) are recruited for traditional professions such as that of butcher, drummer and diviner, and are gradually introduced to these adult occupations. Most traditional professions are of the ascriptive type, but the degree of compulsion varies from one to the next. Training of children by non-parents is common and is made possible though fostering and adoption.

Whereas the above type of training aims at the preservation of traditional values, modern education (chapter 4) rather encourages a departure from tradition. The author describes the Dagomba as "a people with pride in its own ancestry and mode of living", who have therefore reluctantly adapted to the Western school system which was forced on them. The recruitment of pupils for these schools at first met with serious opposition. Chiefs used to send slaves, orphans and subjects' sons in place of their own children. It is only recently that people in Dagbon have become more interested in Western education, though the number of girls attending school is still very low.

Dagomba culture is a blend of indigenous traditions and Moslem

influences. To this the arrival of Western colonialism had added a third dimension, thus making Dagbon society an interesting subject for students of social change. The author has shown the resultant ambivalences in the light of education. One of the merits of the book is the method of description of the social functions of fostering, which is a much more typical phenomenon in Northern than Southern Ghana.

The book is a condensed, and evidently popularized version of the author's M.A. thesis. This probably explains its limited size (79 pages) and the absence of tables, an index and an account of the research methods.

JAN VANSINA, *The Tio Kingdom of the Middle Congo, 1880-1892*. Published for the International African Institute by the Oxford University Press, London etc. 1973. 586 pp. Appendices, bibliography, index, glossary, maps, diagrams, plates and figures. Price £ 8.00.

H. J. M. CLAESSEN

In this voluminous, heavily documented book the well-known Africanist/historian Jan Vansina describes and analyses the culture and history of the Tio (Eastern Bateke), who in former times economically and politically dominated the Middle Congo.

The book is based on a combination of fieldwork and literature research. Vansina demonstrates most convincingly that, by making use of both kinds of sources, the reconstruction of a pre-colonial period — in this case the period 1880-1892 — can be achieved. However, he does not confine himself to a description or analysis of the Tio only at that specific time. By making use of the literature from 1600 on, and adding the information from traditional accounts and evidence from the field, he succeeds in giving a coherent picture of the political and economic history of the Tio from the very beginning down to the present.

The book contains an immense wealth of data, conveniently arranged through a division into three parts. The first part, *The Little Society* (pp. 29-243), is mainly ethnographic. In it kinship, marriage, types of group, subsistence agriculture, the life-cycle, beliefs and rituals are described in great detail. It is Vansina's contention that these aspects of Tio life underwent the least change in the course of time. Though the small neighbourhood groups create the impression of closed, tightly integrated kinship groupings, they have nevertheless had a number of connections — political as well as economic — with the outside world. These aspects form a kind of bridge to the second part of the book, *The Wider Society* (pp. 244-435). Here Vansina analyses and describes in detail Tio society in its relations with the rest of the Congo. He distinguishes two centres of importance: *Mbe*, the political capital, and the *Pool*, the commercial one. Geographical factors account for the dominance of the people around the *Pool* in the system of trade and commerce, ivory and slaves being the main commodities. The political

influence of the ruler in *Mbe* is more difficult to explain. For he ruled over 'a Kingdom without a central army or a unified set of courts, central councils, central administration, delegation of authority from the top down, and where at least two ideologies competed...' (p. 431). Still, the ruler succeeded in governing his kingdom by maintaining a certain balance of power between the lords of the realm. Moreover, the ritual relations between the ruler and his lords played a binding role.

In the course of time the economy of the *Pool* area, a market economy in the fullest sense of the word, considerably changed the social organization of the Tio living there. A division of the population into two classes gradually occurred (pp. 309 ff.). The final part gives a *Perspective through Time* (pp. 439-493). This forms a kind of complement to the more descriptive parts, concentrating on the period 1880-1892, with an outline of the history from 1600 on. In this way Vansina places the period under consideration in its proper historical context and shows (as far as the sources permit) how it was possible for this specific type of society to develop and how this society fared during the colonial period and after.

It will be clear from the foregoing that with this well-written book Vansina has produced yet another masterpiece. The wealth of data in it illustrate not only the growth and decline of Tio society, but also provide a basis for extensive comparative study. Although we feel tempted to illustrate this with examples, this would go too far beyond the scope of a review. The book is a must for economic as well as political anthropologists, and likewise for historians.

SINNAPAH ARASARATNAM (ed.), *Memoir of Julius Stein van Gollennesse, Governor of Ceylon 1743-1751*. Selections from the Dutch Records of the Government of Sri Lanka. Colombo, 1974. 153 pp.

J. VAN GOOR

Up to now the eighteenth century in the history of Ceylon has not received the attention from historians which it deserves. This is a pity not only because it is an interesting period in itself, but also because it sheds so much light on certain important developments that took place in the English period. The Dutch language, however, for many people constitutes an insurmountable barrier to original research. That is why we have every reason to rejoice at Dr. Arasaratnam's work on Ceylon in general, and his edition and translation of the memoir of Stein in particular.

Julius Stein van Gollennesse, a native of Sweden, entered the Dutch East India Company's service as a sergeant in 1723. Later on he was transferred to the civil ranks, and became *inter alia* *gezaghebber* of Bantam, Commander of Malabar, Governor of Ceylon, and, finally, Director-General. He had a vast experience of Indian Affairs. Traditionally every retiring governor, commander or head of a Dutch factory

was required to draw up a report on the current state of affairs for the benefit of his successor. These "memories" provide a most important source of information not only for the activities of the Dutch but also for the history of the Asian territories in which they lived. Stein's memoir follows the pattern set by Governor Van Imhoff, which is virtually the same as that used in the annual letters to the Lords XVII.

Formerly Ceylon constituted an important part of the VOC territories, the Company officials governing a considerable portion of the coastal area of the island. Consequently the office of governor here involved much more than just the headship of a factory. For as well as being a good merchant, this officer also needed a certain measure of political sense for his dealings with the king of Kandy and other rulers in Southern India. Moreover, he had to govern several hundreds of thousands of native subjects. Essentially, the main problems with which the Dutch were confronted on first coming to Ceylon remained the same throughout their stay here. First of all they had to make sure to be on good terms with the king of Kandy, without giving in too much to the court's wishes with regard to the opening up of the ports which the Dutch kept closed. Although the kings were not able to expel the Company from its forts, they could do much harm by inciting the lowland Sinhalese against the Dutch. During Stein's tenure of office matters were further complicated by the extinction of the autochthonous Sinhalese dynasty and its succession by members of a related royal family from Southern India. Stein tried to ingratiate himself at court by giving material support to a Kandyan mission to Thailand with the aim of securing a renewal of ordination of the Buddhist clergy. Though the king was duly grateful, this was not sufficient to stem the tide of anti-Dutch feeling in Kandy.

Another important problem was provided by the relations with the native population. Owing to a perennial shortage of staff and lack of knowledge of the internal indigenous administration, the Company was unable to rule its subjects directly. Native chiefs hence played an important role as intermediaries between the Company and its subjects. Many of them used their subsequent power to further their own ends. We therefore see the Dutch constantly struggling to gain more knowledge of the internal administration through the institution of lists of landholdings and people and the services for which they were liable. These were the so-called *tombos*. Under Stein the enormous task of compiling a new *tombo* for the Dutch territories was commenced. As may be expected, Stein's memoir also gives much information on trade and trade policies. In fact, it touches on all aspects of Dutch rule. Dr. Arasaratnam's introduction provides an excellent summary of Dutch activities in Ceylon in the first half of the eighteenth century. His translation merits the same qualification.

It is to be regretted, however, that the Dutch and English texts are not printed face to face, but rather the one following the other. "Heer van Toll" (p. 19) should be "Mr. Gerrit van Toll". There are furthermore a number of printing errors in the Dutch text.

All in all, Dr. Arasaratnam has done some very valuable work in editing this memoir, as it sheds so much light on the rather quiet period intervening between the years of turmoil resulting from the maladministration of Governors Vuyst and Van Domburgh and the war with Kandy in 1760, in which the court tried to take advantage of the discontent prevailing in the lowlands to break the Dutch chain around the island.

BENJAMIN A. BATSON, *Siam's Political Future: Documents from the End of the Absolute Monarchy*. Ithaca: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No. 96, 1974, ix + 102 pp. Price \$ 4,—.

NIELS MULDER

The term of King Prajadhipok's reign (1925-35) forms a bridge between the period of absolute monarchy and that of experiments with constitutional government in Thailand. Since the *coup* of 1932 the country has been dominated most of the time by military dictatorships, interspersed with various attempts to establish civilian rule. The 43 years that have elapsed since the overthrow of absolute monarchy illustrate clearly the difficulties foreseen by Prajadhipok in the event of his delegating some of his authority and establishing a more popularly based form of government. The Thai system of government has always been top-heavy with executive power and administrative responsibility vested in a handful of men. Prajadhipok himself complained about this phenomenon and was aware of the necessity of delegating power and sharing responsibility with wider circles of politicians and administrators if Thailand were to become a modern country capable of facing up to the challenge of the 20th century.

Most commentaries on the Seventh Reign, at least those on the years immediately prior to the end of absolute monarchy, are by members of the factions that were involved in the 1932 *coup*. Naturally these all took a critical view of the last years of absolute monarchy and defended their own views and roles. Consequently there have been relatively few studies describing the events and problems of the period as they appeared to a variety of groups in Thai society at the time. Even the basic historical documentation has been little explored. As a result the conventional view of the final years of absolute monarchy has been a largely negative and partly misleading one.

The documents and introductions presented in this data paper represent a first attempt at correcting this "conventional view of the last years of the absolute monarchy". They give an idea of the less than auspicious circumstances under which Prajadhipok ascended the throne.

In the words of Prince Damrong, he was heir to a "deplorable inheritance", the administration being in disorder, the monarchy in disrepute, and the state finances deeply in the red. By acting wisely and relying on good counsellors, he showed that these difficulties might

have been overcome had not the king's reforms been overtaken by the world economic crisis of the 1930's. In spite of his efforts to delegate authority, the king was held personally accountable for all the adverse developments affecting the national welfare. Ironically, the main obstacle to Prajadhipok's plans for modernising the polity was provided by the fact that he was an absolute monarch.

Prajadhipok emerges from the documents as a sympathetic person and a conscientious and diligent king, who was devoted to the welfare of his kingdom and people, and prepared to learn and to listen to others and to improve his own and his administration's performance. He showed an unusual willingness to admit his own mistakes and to be critical of himself, a personal quality that undermined his position of infallible absolute monarch and encouraged those who considered themselves better qualified to govern, however. Overtaken by the 1932 *coup*, he was never in a position to implement his ideas on gradual political change. When he abdicated in 1935 he was disappointed that neither he nor the then ruling autocracy had been able to give the Thai people a real voice in the country's affairs. Today also it still remains to be seen whether the October revolution of 1973 will initiate a period of substantial political innovation in Thailand.

The book consists of a general introduction followed by nine key documents, each preceded by a separate introduction. Both the documents and the introductions are well annotated, combining to present a well-integrated picture of the intellectual climate and the personalities that determined the pre-coup situation. Although Prajadhipok's abdication statement no longer belongs to the period of absolute monarchy (chronologically), it is in its substance illustrative of the end of an era, and forms a fitting conclusion to the volume. The compiler-translator-editor and Cornell University should both be complimented for making these documents available to a wider public.

LOUIS DUMONT, *Dravidien et Kariera, l'alliance de mariage dans l'Inde du sud, et en Australie*. Textes de sciences sociales 14, Mouton éditeur. La Haye-Paris 1975, 148 pp. Prix NF 38,—.

H. J. RUITER

Aanleiding tot het schrijven van 'Dravidien et Kariera' is, zoals Louis Dumont in het voorwoord van zijn boek te kennen geeft, geweest, de wens van zekere docenten in de sociale anthropologie te kunnen beschikken over in het Frans geschreven studiemateriaal ten dienste van het onderwijs op hun vakgebied.

Tegemoetkomend aan deze wens heeft de sociaal-anthropoloog Dumont een viertal studies gecomponeerd, alle betrekking hebbend op de systematiek van de verwantschap en bijeengebracht onder boven vermelde titel. Een methodologische opmerking is hier al op haar plaats. Dumont verstaat onder wat ik met verwantschap heb vertaald (hij

schrijft: 'parenté') twee onderscheiden, hoewel zeer op elkaar te betrekken zaken, te weten: bloedverwantschap en aanverwantschap. Het is één van zijn fundamentele punten van critiek dat veel anthropologen deze twee zaken (geen woorden) door elkaar halen en daardoor een verkeerd inzicht in de realiteit van 'la parenté' hebben. Voor wat mijzelf betreft: wanneer ik over verwantschap schrijf bedoel ik Dumont's 'parenté'.

Wie nu van een schoolse aanleiding een schools werkje verwacht, komt in dit geval bedrogen uit. In een betrekkelijk gering aantal pagina's van bescheiden formaat wordt op uiterst deskundige en erudiete wijze zoveel fundamenteels met betrekking tot de realiteit en de logica van de verwantschapsproblematiek en -systematiek aan de orde gesteld, dat het niet doenlijk is binnen deze beperkte ruimte het werk te bespreken op de wijze die het verdient, namelijk bijna bladzijde voor bladzijde. Een dergelijke manier van recenseren dringt zich des te meer op waar Dumont ten aanzien van vele oude, klassieke thema's een eigen gezichtspunt ontwikkelt dat altijd de moeite van een discussie waard is. Wat het gegeven kader slechts toestaat, is het heel globaal aangeven van de voornaamste thema's welke Dumont aanroert, dit in de hoop de lezer zo nieuwsgierig te maken dat hij ertoe komt het boek zelf ter hand te nemen en het grondig te bestuderen. 'Dravidien et Kariera' verdient het.

Het eerste hoofdstuk, opgedragen aan Claude Lévi-Strauss, is gebaseerd op een tweejarig veldonderzoek (1949-1950) in Zuid-India. Vanuit comparatief gezichtspunt heeft de auteur daar een aantal Tamoul-sprekende groepen bestudeerd, die enerzijds de indruk maken sociaal gezien zeer homogeen te zijn, maar anderzijds een zekere verscheidenheid vertonen met betrekking tot een aantal aspecten die men gewoonlijk als fundamentele trekken van het verwantschapssysteem beschouwt (afstammingsregels, plaats waar gehuwden zich vestigen, etc.).

Een aantal van zijn Zuid-Indische bevindingen toetst Dumont aan de door Lévi-Strauss ontwikkelde begrippen 'systèmes harmoniques' en 'systèmes dysharmoniques', wier realiteit hij goeddeels in zijn onderzoek bevestigd ziet.

In één van zijn eindconclusies stelt Dumont vast dat het afstammings-principe ('principe de filiation') bij de Dravidiërs tegengestelde vormen aanneemt, maar 'le principe d'alliance' een constanter karakter heeft en in die zin het fundamentele principe van de verwantschap is (p. 81). Het gehele boek is doortrokken van dit gezichtspunt, ook wanneer andere dan Dravidische samenlevingen in het geding zijn.

Veel van de ervaringen en conclusies uit hoofdstuk I worden kritisch verwerkt in de volgende twee studies.

Het tweede hoofdstuk gaat na, in hoeverre de Dravidische verwantschapsterminologie uitdrukking is van een 'emic' theorie waarin het huwelijk wordt gezien als bevestiging van de totaliteit van de samenleving.

In het derde, meest hypothetische hoofdstuk vergelijkt Dumont de verwantschapsterminologie van de Australische Kariera met die van het Dravidische type. Deze twee vocabularia worden, zo schrijft Dumont,

nog al eens met elkaar verward of zelfs met elkaar op één lijn gesteld, maar dat ten onrechte. In zijn strijd tegen het atomistisch denken wil hij de elementen van de onderscheiden verwantschapsterminologieën eerst systematiseren om ze daarna als subsystemen te confronteren met andere subsystemen, i.c. het Kariera sectiesysteem.

Met veel slagen om de arm probeert Dumont dan aannemelijk te maken dat het verschil tussen de verwantschapsvocabularia van Kariera en het Dravidische type niet te verwaarlozen is. Het correspondeert met de afwezigheid (in Zuid-India) of aanwezigheid (Australische sectiesystemen) van een nauwe band tussen verwantschapsvocabularium en een globale vorm van de samenleving.

Het laatste hoofdstuk, gewijd aan de Australische sectiesystemen, bevat naar mijn mening het 'principe d'unité' van 'Dravidien et Kariera'. Het is om die reden dat ik op deze studie relatief dieper wil ingaan.

Dumont stelt vast dat als het om de aard en de betekenis van de Australische sectiesystemen gaat, anthropologen van een verrassende eensgezindheid blijken te geven. Ook t.a.v. de zgn. ontdekking van *latente* matrilinies heerst er een algemene, welwillende instemming 'parmi des gens qui sont si souvent en désaccord entre eux par ailleurs' (p. 119). Zoals men reeds uit deze zinsnede kan opmaken, vertrouwt Dumont die consensus niet. Waar hij zich niet kan voorstellen dat de feiten haar hebben afgedwongen, neemt hij aan dat 'leurs (= anthropologen) pré-suppositions initiales' ervoor verantwoordelijk zijn. Met die 'présuppositions' doelt Dumont op de overtuiging, aanwezig bij veel anthropologen, dat het principe van 'filiation' ('descent') de verwantschapsgroepen constitueert en hun huwelijksbetrekkingen reguleert. Verstaan wij, met A. R. Brown, onder 'filiation' de regel dat een individu lid is van een gesloten groep op grond van het feit dat *één van zijn ouders* (genitores) tot die groep behoort, dan betekent 'filiation' altijd 'unifiliation', onderstreept het bloedverwantschap en maakt het 'intermarriage' tot een randverschijnsel.

Zien wij nu, aan de hand van Dumont, naar de Australische Kariera.

Bij de Kariera nemen de anthropologen twee locale, exogame groepen waar, die zij meestal secties noemen (A en B). Verder stellen zij vast dat die secties in subsecties zijn verdeeld (A1 en A2, B1 en B2). Een andere belangrijke observatie is dat de kinderen van een A1-vader tot diens sectie (A) behoren, maar niet tot zijn subsectie, ergo zullen zij resorteren onder subsectie A2. De kinderen van vaders zoon zullen weer 'terugkeren' in A1.

Nu rijst er een probleem. Hoe is het, vanuit de optiek van 'unifiliation', gegeven slechts het empirische, bewuste 'emic' feit van 2 locale, exogame groepen (A en B), die zich (aangenomen) op patrilineaire basis vormen, mogelijk dat er 4 groepen (A1, A2, B1, B2) zijn? Binnen het gegeven kader is een oplossing gevonden, die men slechts kan begrijpen als men weet dat de patrilineaire 'horde' — *horrible lectu* — als primaire eenheid en als universeel Australisch verschijnsel wordt opgevat. Welnu, de meeste anthropologen zien in de secties A en B manifeste patrilineaties, doorsneden door de *latente* matrilinies 1 en 2. Twee afstammings-

lijnen, 'double descent', kunnen nu een verklaring bieden voor het bestaan der vier secties.

Dumont wijst dit 'observer's model' van de hand. Hij is van mening dat onder andere die matrimoieties niet meer zijn dan een hypothese, die logisch voortvloeit uit de 'présuppositions', maar niet strookt met de realiteit. De werkelijkheid van het Kariera verwantschapssysteem ziet hij fundamenteel als volgt.

In tegenstelling tot de secties hebben de subsecties namen, te weten: A. KARIMERA, BURUNG; B. PALYERI, BANAKA. Op grond van de betreffende empirisch vastgestelde regel valt zoons zoon (IA1) in dezelfde subsectie als vaders vader (IIA1) en dat vormt een oppositie met de sectie waartoe zijn vader (IIIA2) en de zoon van vaders vader (IVA2) behoren. In plaats van een 'individualité collective' is er een geheel gebaseerd op de oppositie van zijn samenstellende, complementaire delen, bijvoorbeeld KARIMERA + BURUNG. Deze subgroepen bestaan beide tegelijk of geen van beide. Er zijn opposities, er is dus structuur. Het zijn binnen die structuur de secties, inclusief de zgn. subsecties (in feite alternerende generatiegroepen) die 'les agents de l'intermariage de groupes' zijn (p. 140). De (sub)secties zijn dus instrumenteel en bestaan op grond van de (huwelijks)relaties. Dumont pleit er dan ook voor het verwantschapssysteem der Kariera vanuit een bijzonder geheel van relaties, d.w.z. structureel te bestuderen. In het onderhavige geval is dat 'intermariage', niet 'filiation'. Hierbij geeft Dumont ter overweging dat structuur of complementariteit noodzakelijkerwijs aan substantie en individualiteit voorafgaan (p. 126).

HAROLD M. ROSS, *Baegu. Social and Ecological Organization in Malaita, Solomon Islands*. Illinois Studies in Anthropology No. 8. University of Illinois Press, Urbana. 1973. Price £ 4.50.

J. RUTHERFORD

This book, as the author himself says, is a largely descriptive, partial ethnography of various aspects of Baegu culture and social organisation, which, as the chapter headings indicate, include the world view, kinship ideology and social relations, land tenure and property concepts, residential groups and residential behaviour — such as settlement patterns, residence rules and spacing mechanisms. The cover description says that "He focuses on social organisation and ecological relationships; the complex of tropical ecology, demography, settlement patterns, land tenure, folk geography and cosmology, residential behaviour and spatial aspects of social behaviour the book is one of the first to make a successful synthesis of cultural ecology and social structural thought that also takes into account ethno-semantic details. Ross has dealt with both abstract (or normative) social structural principles and the practical, statistical and historical details of demography within the same theoretical framework."

Certainly Ross attempts to do this, although he is probably more modest in his claims than the cover notes might indicate. But whether a synthesis of such wide-ranging materials could be successful in a volume of about three hundred and forty pages is, I think, open to doubt. The issue is basically whether one should consider a few fields of enquiry in depth, or many fields of enquiry in less depth and detail, assuming that one cannot do both in a volume of this size. From the cover description and the chapter headings it is clear that Ross has chosen the latter approach.

A discussion of the Baegu world view (Chapter Six) in twenty-five pages must necessarily omit much detailed ethnographic analysis of cases and situation, such as the particular contexts in which myths are told, or detailed ethnographic accounts of ritual situations. The same can be said for Chapter Five, "Human Ecology in Malaita", which contains sections on ecological zones, ecological adaptations, ritual and fertility, other bush economic activities, natural disasters, trade and money, bush markets, human population size and distribution, and, finally, time, all within the space of thirty pages.

Similarly Chapter Four, "The Baegu People", compresses an account of physical anthropology, culture and personality and acculturation into twenty-six pages, which seems to me to be more like a quest for the Grail of Holism than a serious attempt at analysis.

I find the resulting 'synthesis' rather bitty and also a little frustrating, since the data are so rich and suggestive in many places that I want more information, which is simply not there.

But perhaps we should not pay too much attention to the success or otherwise of the synthesis, but should concentrate on the main theoretical framework of the book, which, says Ross, is an attempt to test the ideas of his adviser, Professor D. L. Oliver, about the formulation of descriptions of social structure around a single dimension, man's spatial relationships to the land. This orientation follows from a concern with residence and behaviour which is closely related to the empiricism of Malinowski and the behaviourism of Murdock.

There are real dangers arising from a uni-dimensional approach to the analysis of social phenomena. Fortes (1953) noted that Malinowski tried to understand all the dimensions of social organisation, kinship and politics in terms of a unifying concept of culture, with the result that 'he had no sense for social organisation' and 'no real understanding of kinship or political organisation'. I would argue that this is also true for attempts to analyse myths or kinship systems by assuming that there are a few universal rules of logic or kinship, and that all human thought or kinship must therefore be based on these. The result is, I think, 'no real understanding of mythology or kinship'. The dangers of the approach are clear, I think, for any analysis, including this analysis of the Baegu.

Ross, like Murdock and Oliver, is concerned largely with the behavioural implications of residence, but in a rather one-sided way. The chapter on property and land tenure deals almost entirely with concepts

and not with the associated behaviour, much of which would surely relate to case studies of legal and political disputes and their settlement. There are no case studies in the book about the social conflicts produced by residence, which is surprising in a book concerned with the utilisation of space.

In the section on kinship and decision-making there is the same avoidance of hard data on social action that there was in the section on property and land tenure, which makes the description rather abstract and idealised in nature. Ross shows how the Baegu have an agnatic ideology, but operate kinship bilaterally in most practical situations, in which the ego-centred kindred is of great importance. He argues that kinship should not be considered as an isolated phenomenon, but as a set of elements which can be manipulated in their inter-relations with economic and residential decisions; but again we lack case studies of how this happens. Once again we lack a real account of social conflicts. Surely there are disputes about land or other issues which cause people to move. This must change the balance of man to land in particular localities, and this balance, of course, can also be changed by fluctuations in resources and demographic patterns. Thus social spaces become vacant and may be refilled by migration. There are some fascinating glimpses of how this might happen. Ross says that some groups are culturally coastal, but are hill people socially and by descent, and he also says that there are Baegu migrants from hills to the coast, which he excludes from his analysis. Evidently there is a dynamic relationship between population and resources, as there must be in any ecosystem, but such considerations are excluded from Ross's static account of ecology and spacing.

For all that this book makes a useful contribution to anthropological literature. If I largely disagree with his methods of analysing the data, that is not to dispute the value of the data that are there. There are few enough data on the Solomon Islands that have been gathered and analysed with modern anthropological techniques, and there are likewise few data on decision-making and choice within the kinship systems of the area. This neglected field is worthy of much closer attention than it has received in the past, and Ross's book is a welcome addition to the literature of the area. Let us hope that Dr. Ross has far more detailed ethnographic data than are published here, and let us also hope that he will publish them as soon as he can.

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G. K. ROTH, *Fijian Way of Life*. Melbourne 1973 (second edition), Oxford University Press, 176 pp. Price £ 4.90.

SIMON KOOIJMAN

This second edition of Roth's *Fijian Way of Life* is an unrevised version of the book as it came out in 1953. The situation in Fiji has changed a great deal in the 20 years separating the two editions. Mention is

made of these changes by G. B. Milner, Professor of Austronesian studies at the University of London, a knowledgeable scholar of the Fijian language, who has written an introduction to this edition. After dealing with colonial policy and administration, and the criticisms made of these in particular by overseas consultants, he states that during the phase of indirect rule of the colonial period the basis was laid for the modern development of the Fijian people. Unlike other Pacific groups who had been in close contact with Western civilization, the Fijians have managed to come to terms with the modern world. "This is shown by their contribution to the economic life of Fiji and by their role as public servants, policemen, soldiers, sailors, teachers, politicians, in trade and industry as well as in agriculture" (p. xxvii).

This involvement in Western activities has not led to the abandonment of the 'Fijian way of life' for essential elements of the traditional culture, be it often in a more or less 'acculturated' form, still function in modern Fijian society. This holds for what is generally called the material culture as well as for the social and ceremonial aspects of life. In all these fields the information the author provides is still valuable, since it is based on a thorough knowledge acquired over a period of a quarter of a century.

The author was an interested and keen observer and his descriptions of, for instance, houses and house building (pp. 9-36), the origin and ceremonial function of the *tabua* — sperm-whale teeth — (pp. 96-106), and the part played by *yaquona* (kava) and the *yaqona*-ceremony (pp. 106-128), are still a 'must' for any anthropologist working in Fiji. It should be borne in mind, however, that in most cases Roth's observations and descriptions apply only to Bauan institutions, as has already been remarked by A. Capel in his review of the first edition of the book (Oceania XXIV, 1, p. 318).

As a reader who is more familiar with one of the other cultures of Fiji, one is all the more struck by the width of their applicability, however. So when writing about the main house types occurring in the Archipelago, for instance, the author elaborates on the description of the square type with the statement that the houses of the Lau Islands are only designated as 'Tongan' and are very concisely described as being 'in plan much like a European athletic running track' (p. 9).

The concluding chapter on the Fijian administration (pp. 134-163), which includes among other things a diagram illustrating the rather complicated structure of the Fijian administration in 1953 (p. 142), will be useful not only to students of colonial history but also for those interested in the political structure of the independent state of Fiji.