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The crisis of 1740-1 in Java: the Javanese, Chinese, Madurese and Dutch, and the fall of the court of Kartasura


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In 1740 and 1741 events occurred in Java which brought the kingdom of Kartasura to its knees and nearly did the same to the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in Central and East Java. In this period began Java’s last great series of wars of the eighteenth century. The story commenced with a slaughter of Chinese at Batavia which within ten months led to the Dutch coastal headquarters at Semarang being besieged and its garrison at the court being conquered. In 1742, the Javanese court itself fell to two armies in succession. While the events of this period can be described in detail from the archives of the VOC, it is a Javanese court chronicle which makes it possible to analyse the internal crisis which underlay the collapse of the court of Kartasura. The account given in the chronicle can be verified in broad outline as well as some details from contemporaneous Dutch records, and therefore seems to shed a reliable and illuminating light upon the period.

The events of 1740-1 arose from the clash of interests between two powers, the Dutch East India Company and the Javanese dynasty of Mataram, by now located at the court of Kartasura. This conflict began in the early years of the seventeenth century, in the time of two of the greatest empire-builders on each side, Jan Pietersz. Coen (Governor-General 1619-23, 1627-9) and Sultan Agung (1613-46). But by the time the story commences here, neither of these powers was what it had once been. The Company had become directly involved in a series of wars in Central and East Java after 1677 which cost it dearly in men, money, and materiel. The Mataram empire had been sundered by rebellion and resistance in the same period.

In return for the Company’s aid to the beleaguered dynasty, the Mataram kings signed a series of agreements to repay the Company’s costs by delivering cash and agricultural products to the VOC. Caught
between the unwillingness of some kings and the inability of others to meet these obligations, the Company found itself drawn deeper into the defense of a dynasty which it did not trust, in pursuit of stability which it could not achieve, in the hope of profit which failed to materialize. The Company itself became more and more the victim of corrupt, incompetent, sometimes treacherous, and frequently inebriated officials.

The court of Kartasura ruled a progressively smaller part of Java. The Balinese adventurer Surapati and his descendants held effective control over substantial parts of East Java after 1686. The north coastal ports were increasingly influenced by the presence of Dutch trading and military posts, and after 1708 the town of Sëmarang was directly governed by the Company. The coastal lords and their subjects bore much of the burden imposed by the king’s treaties with the Dutch, and by the early eighteenth century some such lords explicitly preferred to be subjects of the Company rather than of the court of Kartasura, as were the princes of Cirebon. Such an arrangement would offer them freedom from royal exactions and political squabbles and a direct tie to their major trading partner, the VOC. But the VOC was not yet willing to contemplate such extensions of its administrative involvement in Java. A series of disputed successions and rebellions within the royal family had done nothing to enhance the court’s tenuous influence over its subordinates.

Meanwhile a new imperial power was taking advantage of the problems of both the Company and the court. The Cakraningrats, Kartasura’s vassal lords of West Madura, were expanding their influence in East Java. The greatest rebel of the seventeenth century, Raden Trunajaya, was from the Madurese princely house, and might well have founded a Madurese dynasty in Central Java had the Company not intervened in support of the house of Mataram. Trunajaya’s uncle (known as Panëmbahan Cakraningrat [III] after 1678; d. 1707), and the latter’s successors Pangeran Cakraningrat III (1707-18) and Pangeran Adipati Cakraningrat IV (1718-46), all became involved in court intrigues while enhancing their influence over the ports of East Java. This tension and competition between the Madura- and East Java-based domain of the Cakraningrats and the Central Java- and west coast-based empire of Kartasura echoed dynastic and regional conflicts which were at least as old as the sixteenth century.

Meanwhile the spear-carriers of this drama were working in Batavia. The Chinese community of traders, artisans, market gardeners, shopkeepers, sugar millers, and labourers had been crucial to Batavia’s development since its foundation in 1619; some were also active in criminal bands around the city. By 1740 there were some 2,500 Chinese houses within the city walls, and the Chinese population of the city and its environs was at least 15,000, or about 17 per cent of
the total population. The Company's Directors, the Heeren XVII in Amsterdam, admired from a distance the industry of the Chinese, but Batavia's population of Europeans and Indonesians, generally a rabble as undistinguished as any to be found in the colonial towns of the eighteenth century, despised, feared, and distrusted the Chinese, who reciprocated those sentiments.

In early October 1740 a massacre of Batavia's Chinese broke out. For several days the Chinese quarter burned, and in the end something like 10,000 Chinese were killed. This massacre precipitated one of the bitterest of the VOC's internal feuds, with Gustaaf Willem Baron van Imhoff (Governor-General, 1743-50) denouncing, imprisoning, and nearly succeeding in executing his predecessor Adriaan Valckenier (Governor-General, 1737-41). The massacre also provided a catalyst for the resolution of several other conflicts: those between the Company and the Chinese, between the Company and the Javanese court, between the court and its subjects, between the court and Cakraningrat IV of West Madura, and between Cakraningrat IV and the Company. These conflicts were ultimately to be resolved by the elimination or exhaustion, at least temporarily, of all the above parties. No one won, as will be seen below, but this chaotic period provided the occasion for a new round of warfare which was to last for seventeen years, and from which the new court of Yogyakarta was to emerge under Sultan Mangkubumi (Hamêngkubuwana I, 1749-92) (see Ricklefs 1974). In the short term, however, the result was destruction and exhaustion on all sides.

The Chinese in Batavia did not accept their fate meekly. There were several attacks on the city by Chinese bands which forced Company units to withdraw with losses. But the city wall stood, and within it the massacre continued. By late October Company troops were gaining the upper hand in the environs of Batavia. On 25 and 27 October a force of 2,000 Chinese was defeated near Angke, with the loss of many men and weapons (including five wooden cannon bound with iron). Now the remaining Chinese began to leave the Batavia region, in search of survival and new fields for revenge against the Europeans.

The Sultan of Bantên, to the west of Batavia, posted 3,000 men at his borders to prevent the entry of fleeing Chinese (Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Oct. 1740, d. J. & v. D. IX:312). It was probably for this reason that the Batavian Chinese mostly went eastwards along the north coast, reporting events in Batavia to their compatriots in other port towns. According to the court chronicle, news of the massacre had already spread, and the Chinese along the coast were gathering for a war of revenge, under the leadership of one Sing Seh, at Tanjung Wêlahan (to the south of Pati, near Tambakrama) (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXII:61-2).

The court of Kartasura was also gathering news of the bloody events
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in Batavia. A lengthy and tolerably accurate account of the Chinese massacre is preserved in the chronicle, although the list of the members of the Council of the Indies there is inaccurate and the details of some of the battles in the countryside seem exaggerated (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXII:36-61).6

According to the chronicle, the court awaited an official account of the events from the Dutch Governor-General, but none came, to the increasing irritation of King Pakubuwana II (1726-49). Tumenggung Tirtawiguna, the chief scribe and a principal adviser in the court,7 told the king, quite accurately, that the Council of the Indies was deeply divided and would surely write when it had resolved its differences (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXII:64-5).8 But Tirtawiguna was opposed by the Patih (chief administrator) Natakusuma (1733-42) and others who sought an opportunity in these events to end the onerous burdens which the Javanese-Company alliance had brought. The court was tense, with renewed rumours of impending princely rebellion and of omens being sighted (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXII:35-6),9 while Pakubuwana II was probably the most incompetent and unfortunate man ever to attempt to rule the empire Sultan Agung had bequeathed to his heirs. Thus, the court was poorly prepared to deal with the events which now followed.

The Company was no better prepared. Both in Batavia and in its coastal headquarters at Sëmarang, there were inadequate numbers of troops and deep animosities divided VOC officials. While Chinese forces gathered in threatening positions around VOC posts on the coast, Batavia sent insignificant reinforcements.10 The number of Chinese at Tanjung Wélahan grew to about 1,000 by April 1741, and they attempted to cut the roads along which rice was supplied to Sëmarang.11 Already the Dutch were beginning to distrust the assurances of support they received from Pakubuwana II,12 with good reason as will be seen below. The new VOC commandant at Sëmarang, Bartholomeus Visscher, who was soon to be replaced on the grounds that his mind was unsound,13 sent out 540 soldiers to attack Tanjung Wélahan, without success. Sëmarang also sent 15 soldiers to reinforce the VOC post at Jëpara and ordered the garrisons at Jëpara and Rëmbang to hire all the local Bugis, Makasarese, and Balinese mercenaries they could find. In the event of a Chinese attack the Dëmak post was to withdraw to Jëpara and the Juwana garrison to Rëmbang.14

In Sëmarang itself the Company called upon the local citizenry, the "Moors" (non-Indonesian Muslims), and all VOC subjects for guard duties (Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, d. J. & v. D. IX:373). At first the Dutch accepted assurances of loyalty from the local Captain of the Chinese community. But in May 1741 this gentleman and most of the local Chinese traders fled the town. The Chinese Captain was caught and a search of his house revealed large amounts of gunpowder and
ball-cartridges, as well as several small cannon. The Dutch now grew very concerned about their plight. The VOC garrison at Sēmarang had only 90 healthy Europeans and 208 Indonesian soldiers, and there was still no sign of any aid from Pakubuwana II.

The Chinese now took the offensive. On 23 May the VOC post of 15 men at Juwana was overrun by 1,000 Chinese who had approached the post without the local Javanese giving any warning to the Dutch. The Resident and five others escaped, but another seven were killed there or after being taken to Tanjung Wēlahan, and two were reportedly obliged to adopt "the religion of the Chinese" (what the VOC understood that to be is not clear) (Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, d. J. & v.D. IX:374-5).

An estimated 3,000 Chinese were now preparing to attack Dēmak. The Resident there retired to a VOC ship in the harbour, but Sēmarang ordered him to return to his post and gave him an additional 80 Bugis and Balinese soldiers. When these fearsome warriors arrived the local Javanese population fled, but the Balinese ensign commanding the reinforcements reported that there was no prospect of resisting the Chinese enemy. By late May Sēmarang decided to withdraw the Dēmak garrison to assist in the defense of Sēmarang itself, leaving the defense of Dēmak in the hands of the Javanese lord Martapura (or Martadipura) (Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, d. J. & v.D. IX:375-6). As will be seen below, this man was in fact deeply involved in the court conspiracy which favoured joining the Chinese against the Dutch.

Sēmarang was now surrounded by Chinese forces, who were able to undertake skirmishes and incendiary attacks up to the walls of the fortress itself. Early in June 1741 the VOC sent out a force of 46 Europeans and 146 Indonesians, aided by local Javanese soldiers, to attack the Chinese. But the Javanese deserted, their commander, the Surabayan lord Surengrana, led the VOC on a tiring series of marches and counter-marches, the Sēmarang governor Dipati Sastrawijaya (who was perhaps of Chinese descent) secretly spoiled the artillery provisions and shortly thereafter disappeared, and the VOC Balinese and Bugis fled when they finally met the Chinese. Having lost two pieces of artillery and killed a few Chinese, the VOC soldiers retired to the fortress.

Rēmbang was now threatened. Sēmarang proposed to send reinforcements but the post was cut off by the Chinese. The Rēmbang garrison was ordered to withdraw, but was unable to do so. When the Chinese attacked the post in July all but 3 Europeans and 3 "Moorish" sailors were massacred and the enemy acquired a goodly collection of heavy cannon. In Tēgal the local Javanese inhabitants burned and plundered all European houses outside the garrison walls. On 27 July they joined the Chinese in an assault on the garrison which was, however, repulsed (Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, d. J. & v.D.)
From Jêpara came further reports of Javanese joining the Chinese forces (Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, d.J. & v.D. IX:381), but (as will be seen below) by late July these caused no surprise for there was no longer any doubt that many Javanese (including the king) had joined with the Chinese.

The Sêmaramg Council saw little hope of defending the town against the Chinese, especially since the commandant, Visscher, was apparently losing his mind. At the end of June Abraham Roos was sent from Batavia to replace him with 170 soldiers and a promise of 250 more. But there still seemed little prospect of withstanding the expected Chinese attack on the fortress, and it was clear that no Javanese help could be expected. Provisions were running short, including water, for the Chinese had dammed the river. The VOC decided that a general massacre of Chinese throughout Java was needed, but could see no means to accomplish this sanguinary objective in the Sêmaramg area. Slowly the military balance was shifting, however, and for some unknown reason the Chinese did not launch a final assault while they had superiority. From July onwards Batavia dispatched at least 1400 men to Sêmaramg, followed by a further 1600 Indonesian soldiers.

Throughout the first half of 1741, it seemed possible to the Dutch that they would be overwhelmed on the central north coast of Java. While at first they expected to receive the support of local Javanese forces, it gradually became clear that no such help would appear. In East Java, however, where the Company had a post at Surabaya and where Cakraningrat IV’s influence was felt, matters appeared to stand on a different footing. There alone was the VOC able to report a general massacre of all local Chinese in July (Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, d.J. & v.D. IX:377, 380). But the greatest uncertainty for the Dutch concerned the position of the king. Until late July it was not clear what his intentions were.

The Javanese chronicle account of the period between October 1740 and mid-1741 and the reports of the VOC garrison at Kartasura clarify what was happening in the court at this time. All manner of intrigues, clashes of interest, and arguments of principle came to the surface as the court sought a policy for one of the most complex crises of the 18th century. One must remember that the VOC was simultaneously two things to the court: it was the primary guarantee of the dynasty’s survival, but also a major irritant to the economic and political affairs of the Javanese. To propose to do without the Company was as difficult as proposing to maintain the alliance. And one must remember, too, that in this period it seemed possible to many Javanese (as it did to many Europeans) that the VOC would be driven out of the Mataram empire by the Chinese, towards whom the court was also ambivalent. Only a few courtiers had sufficient understanding of the VOC’s affairs to realize that the Company’s strength could not be calculated solely
in terms of the soldiers it happened to have on the north coast. From the Cape of Good Hope to Japan there were VOC posts, and throughout Indonesia there were VOC and mercenary forces available. The VOC operation in Central and East Java was unprofitable, corrupt, inefficient; it was also capable of greater military power than some courtiers realized, if it was given time to gather reinforcements. In the midst of this crisis stood the king, a vacillating and foolish man who wanted a unanimous opinion from his courtiers to tell him what to do, something they were unable to reach.

There is some confusion in the chronicle concerning the dating of affairs,21 but it is clear that from about December 1740 until July 1741 a lengthy and acrimonious debate took place among the senior figures of the court. Among the most important members of the court was Tumenggung Tirtawiguna, upon whom the king relied for good advice. The king affectionately called him “Ètir” or “Tir” (e.g. Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXI:60; XXII:19), which was not only a nickname but an appropriate pun, for tir is the Javanese name for the castle in chess. The other leading royal confidant, Raden Arya Pringgalaya, the Patih Raden Adipati Natakusuma, and the four principal regional lords, Adipati Citrasoma of Jêpara (lord of the eastern coastal districts), Raden Tumenggung Surabarta of Panaraga, Tumenggung Mataun of Jipang, and Adipati Jayaningrat of Pëkalongan (lord of the western coastal districts), played major roles. In the midst of these appeared an upstart, a nephew of the king named Raden Tumenggung Martapura, who had recently been appointed as lord of Grobogan and assistant (kliwon) to Surabarta, who was the chief official (wêdana) of the south-eastern outer provinces (moncanagara kiwa) (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXII:62-3).

As these lords gathered at court and exchanged news of events in their own areas, two main attitudes emerged. It is important to note that both aimed at an end to the previous Javanese-Dutch relationship. One view envisaged joining the Chinese to drive the Europeans out. The other favoured eventually coming to the aid of the Company, but at the price of a complete reconstruction of the alliance, doing away with the burdens which the treaties had imposed upon the Javanese.

Citasoma of Jêpara confirmed rumours that there was a Chinese-Dutch war underway in which no victor was yet evident. Martapura reported that the Chinese of his region were seeking the means to go to war against the VOC. Natakusuma, much pleased by this, ordered that such Chinese not be hindered. The following day Natakusuma reported to the king, who had already heard of warfare developing on the coast and was angry that the Governor-General had not yet sent him official news. Tirtawiguna then explained that this was because the Council of the Indies was so deeply divided. In the meantime, it was unclear what should be done. Natakusuma advised that
a reconstruction of the siti inggil kidul (the raised terrace to the south of the court) be undertaken. This would occupy the manpower of the kingdom and provide an excuse if the VOC should ask for troops. To this the king agreed (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XII:66-7), and a report from the Dutch commandant at Kartasura, Johannes van Velsen, confirms that this work began in January 1741.

The king was aware that it was not only Chinese who hated the VOC. Javanese also wished to join the anti-Dutch side, and he ordered that they should not fear him if they did so. He, himself, was deeply angered by the behaviour of van Velsen at Kartasura. The chronicle quotes Pakubuwana II as saying that van Velsen (who was of mixed Dutch-Javanese descent) was arrogant and offended Javanese custom (adat) (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XII:65-6). Later the king protested directly to the VOC in Semarang about the Resident's behaviour.

The king also took the view that his subjects were full of courage and ready for war, but Natakusuma cautioned him not to be overly optimistic about his Javanese subjects in this regard. At this the king ordered his Patih to consult the other senior courtiers on the best course to follow (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXII:66-7), and the long and inconclusive debate ensued.

Citasoma and Jayaningrat, the two senior coastal lords, proposed that it would be folly to join the Chinese. Rather, they said, the court should let the war take its course and then come to the aid of the Dutch in their hour of need; the court could then demand the end of the treaties and their obligations, of compulsory deliveries to the Company, and of embassies to Batavia to welcome each new Governor-General, and instead become merely good friends. The Patih, however, pointed out that the Chinese contributed to the prosperity of Java and therefore should not be attacked. To this Jayaningrat replied contemptuously that the Company had much war materiel and the Chinese had little; the Chinese had fangs of tin, he said, while the Company's fangs were of iron. But the Patih's strong preference for the Chinese and dislike of the Dutch were now clear. Tirtawiguna and Pringgalaya, however, took no part in the discussion (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXII:67-9).

Raden Martapura then dared to challenge the views of Jayaningrat, and spoke of his own courage to fight the VOC in alliance with the Chinese. Jayaningrat attempted to instruct this upstart in the ways of war. But at the end of the meeting, at midnight, Martapura had refused to abandon his views (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXII:69-73).

The next day Natakusuma presented the two argument to the king. Pakubuwana II was told that Tirtawiguna and Pringgalaya had sided with neither Martapura nor Jayaningrat, and Natakusuma refused to say finally which argument should be accepted. The king told him to summon the court again, but in the meantime accepted Natakusuma's
proposal to send Martapura back to Grobogan as an *agent provocateur* to urge the Chinese on against the Dutch. On receiving this secret commission, Martapura emotionally accepted the dangerous burdens laid upon him. He was sent off with gifts from the *Patih*, including money and four fine pairs of pistols (*Babad Tanah Jawi* 1939-41 XXII:73-7).

The lords of the coast and of the kingdom's outer provinces soon held a secret meeting at which they discussed Martapura's departure. On realizing that Jayaningrat had not even been informed, these lords suspected that some dire plot had been concocted by the *Patih*. Fears also grew about the king's apparent willingness to act in the absence of a consensus among the chief courtiers, a sure way of precipitating the disintegration of the state. Jayaningrat was so infuriated that he resorted to blunt and even offensive language which evoked comments from his peers. Above all, he was contemptuous of Martapura, who had apparently been entrusted by the king with a mission of importance (the nature of which was not yet known) while the king's senior lords had been ignored. Surabrata and Mataun added that the king trusted only Tirtawiguna, a man who was like a small cannon (*tiktak*), silently casting threatening glances to and fro during court discussions. The four senior lords were growing increasingly angry now. The king had made them lords above all others and expected them to carry out his orders, they said, yet he failed to consult them in this difficult hour. As for Tirtawiguna, said Surabrata, how could his appanage compare with the 12,000 fighting men of Panaraga (*Babad Tanah Jawi* 1939-41 XII:77-9; XXIII:3-7)? Here, indeed, was a central issue. These four senior lords were responsible for, and derived their power and incomes from, the villagers who would be levied for the king's army, and they feared that these forces were about to be committed in a cause which would ruin the kingdom and themselves without their consent.

Then came news which shocked them all. The *Patih*'s two principal assistants (*kliwon*) were Pringgalaya (*kliwon-tëngë*) and one Tumëng-gung Kartanagara (*kliwon-kiwa*). An emissary arrived to tell the senior lords that Kartanagara had been placed behind Tirtawiguna in the earlier court discussion and had not been consulted. Then the *Patih* had failed in his duty to give the king good advice, had failed to divert the king from bad schemes, and had failed to insist that the king call the senior courtiers together again before taking action. Therefore, Kartanagara was so depressed that he had committed suicide (*Babad Tanah Jawi* 1939-41 XXIII:7-8). A letter from the VOC garrison at the court confirms that Kartanagara died in January 1741, and was replaced by a son of the *Patih*. At this the four senior lords felt that the destruction of the kingdom was approaching and that they could only submit to the will of God. The anonymous chronicler
criticizes these four lords for their narrowness of outlook, for not exercising the responsibilities for the welfare of the state which lay upon their shoulders (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXIII:8).

As the court splintered into a series of individuals each of whom sought his own survival amidst approaching catastrophe, as no one fulfilled the responsibilities of high office, the court chronicle criticizes all parties in turn. Who this chronicler was, and when these passages were written, therefore becomes an intriguing question to which this writer has yet found no satisfactory answer. The four regional lords and the Patih are criticized for their narrowness of outlook, Tirtawiguna for being bad-tempered and failing to warn the king, while the king appears throughout (as he appears in Dutch documents) as vacillating and foolish (e.g. Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXIII:8-9). It is noteworthy that at no point was the king himself present while his court discussed affairs, a serious failure on his part.

The Patih then summoned the lords for further consultation, but only as an outward show, for his mind was made up. By now the regional lords were so offended and worried that they refused to make any suggestions. Nor would Pringgalaya or Tirtawiguna speak. When Natakusuma, Pringgalaya, and Tirtawiguna subsequently told the king of Kartanagara's death, they suppressed that fact that this had been by suicide. The king was merely told that, with regard to the primary issue of whether to join the VOC or the Chinese, the courtiers had not changed their minds (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXIII:9-11).

Meanwhile, according to the chronicle, Martapura contacted the Chinese forces and told them the king's wishes. If they were successful in war against the Dutch, Martapura said, the king would endorse their efforts; if they were not earnest in their intentions, the king would turn against them. Sing Seh informed Martapura that he was delighted to go forward in accordance with the king's desires. Martapura then wrote to the Dutch at Sëmarang, claiming that he had royal authority to attack the Chinese but needed the aid of VOC forces. The outcome of this was a sham battle (a familiar ruse in Java) between the Chinese and Martapura's men, in which the VOC forces, according to the chronicle, were allowed to conclude that Martapura was a faithful ally who had driven the Chinese to flight (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXIII:11-20). The VOC report on this affair, however, suggests that the Dutch in fact concluded that "the Javanese were not to be trusted greatly, and rather wondered whether they were not indeed in league with the Chinese".

But now Martapura got into trouble, for the Patih heard news of this battle and believed it to have been a genuine encounter in which Martapura had defeated the Chinese. The Patih's own emissaries soon discovered the truth of the matter, however, and at least this part of the web of suspicion among the Javanese elite was brought to an end.
When Natakusuma reported all of this to the king, the latter was delighted and asked whether his courtiers had at last finished their consultations (*Babad Tanah Jawi* 1939-41 XXIII:21-7). Clearly Pakubuwana II was determined to have a consensus in favour of war before ordering his new Chinese allies into battle.

Natakusuma reported, however, that the courtiers still held their former opinions but that they could be compelled to accept the king's views. Only the views of Pringgalaya and Tirtawiguna were unknown, for they remained silent. At this the king told his *Patih* to compel the lords to come to a decision. The matter was complicated by the arrival of a letter from Semarang asking formally for the king's aid against the Chinese. When the lords met, Jayaningrat of course argued that it would be folly to reject this request. The regional lords asked for more time to think, and the *Patih* lost his patience with them. The king then seems to have decided, under pressure from his *Patih*, to attempt to play the friend to both the Company and the Chinese, while awaiting the outcome of events. Pakubuwana II was exasperated with his courtiers, and especially with Pringgalaya and Tirtawiguna, who still refused to speak their minds. “Do they intend to seek another king than me?” he asked Natakusuma. The latter assured him that this was not the case (*Babad Tanah Jawi* 1939-41 XXIII:31-2), but the court tensions had now clearly reached a peak.

The chronicle account appears now to have reached about May 1741, as the notables of the kingdom gathered for the annual Garèbèg Mulud festival (28 May 1741), and shortly before the Chinese offensives began late in that month. It was at this point that the Dutch garrison in Kartasura received its first clear news of the conflict within the court. Around 15 May one of the king’s brothers, Pangeran Ngabei Loringpasar, reported to van Velsen that the *Patih* and (according to this version) Pringgalaya were encouraging the king to turn against the Company and to attack its garrison at the court. The coastal lords were, he reported, favourably disposed towards the Company, while the king’s mother (who plays no role in the chronicle account) was too weak to oppose Pringgalaya and Natakusuma. Thus this contemporaneous report to the VOC and the chronicle account appear to confirm each other, except with regard to the obscure role played by Pringgalaya in the court discussions. The court was soon aware that the Company’s garrison was hearing rumours of the discussions. In late May and June 1741, Jayaningrat, Natakusuma, and Pakubuwana II all warned van Velsen that he must give no credence to stories of anti-Dutch plots.

But Natakusuma suddenly realized that he had made a terrible mistake. He had failed to consult Cakraningrat IV, the lord of West Madura, whom the chronicle describes as the champion soldier of the kingdom. Although it was clearly too late to remedy this grave offense
and political blunder, the Pathi nonetheless decided that he must send a letter to Cakraningrat IV (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXIII:40).

The Pathi's letter suggested that he and Cakraningrat IV should meet to decide a policy for the kingdom, but (according to the chronicle) Cakraningrat IV's son at court, the lord of Sidayu, had already told his father of all that had transpired there. In a rage, slapping his chest and with eyes blazing, Cakraningrat IV told Natakusuma's emissaries that he would send no letter in reply, but they were to report his every word. He already knew everything, he said, and would not be called to share in the remnants of a discussion, in the left-overs of consultation. Why had he not been trusted to advise in this matter? Whose idea was it to attack the Company and aid the Chinese? If one aided the Company, surely one would succeed in being freed of the treaties, of debts and obligations to the Company, of compulsory crop deliveries. Surely God would open the way for these things. The Chinese were mangy dogs who licked up the waste of Java's table. The Company, on the other hand, had fought and lost much in the interests of the king. For the king to join the Chinese would be dishonourable and would cause the destruction of the knights and lords of Kartasura. The people of Kartasura, he warned, should consider that the people of Madura would be their enemies if they pursued this course. Cakraningrat IV added ominously that Kartasura need not take part in the war, for he would deal with the Chinese with his people alone, and would come to Kartasura to watch over the king (Babad Tanah Jawi, 1939-41 XXIII:40-4).

The transmission of this ultimatum to the court is confirmed in VOC records. Van Velsen wrote that on 18 June 1741 Cakraningrat IV's son at Kartasura, Raden Tumënggung Suradiningrat of Sidayu, received a letter from his father ordering him to inform the king that if the latter loved the Chinese and hated the Dutch, he could expect no help from Cakraningrat IV, who would join with the VOC. Suradiningrat discreetly gave this awesome message to the king's mother for transmission to the king. Whether it reached Pakubuwana II is not known.

Cakraningrat IV had thus aligned himself with the party which favoured supporting the Company at the price of a reconstruction of the Javanese-Dutch relationship. And he had backed this view with an explicit military threat. The Pathi's response was anger. He wrote back to Cakraningrat IV that the latter was behaving like a rebel, and that the people of Madura were not the only true men of Java; there were many tigers and buffaloes at Kartasura who would find no difficulty in cracking the heads of the Madurese between their teeth. To this Cakraningrat IV sent a threatening and insulting reply, of the kind which was conventional in declarations of war (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXIII:44-7). Even before Javanese forces had been
irrevocably committed in the Dutch-Chinese war, the first steps towards a Madurese-Javanese war had thus been taken. The king claimed to the Dutch that when he himself sent a letter to Cakraningrat IV in early July, the Madurese lord refused to receive it in person and sent the king's emissaries back without a written reply.37

The kingdom now rapidly disintegrated. Under pressure from his Patih, Pakubuwana II pursued a pro-Chinese policy which the most important of his regional lords opposed and which ensured that Madura would yet again march to war. To conceal his intentions from the VOC, the king adopted ineffectual friendly poses which succeeded only in leading the anti-Dutch Chinese to have less than complete confidence in him and to construct links with dissident dignitaries and princes. Javanese who hated the VOC more than they distrusted the court or despised the Chinese were the king's only source of military might. In this fragile environment, several princes sought to curry favour with the Dutch in the hope of winning the throne with Company support.38 Many of those directly responsible for the kingdom's military and administrative affairs were meanwhile convinced that the court was drifting towards catastrophe in the hands of a foolish king and an evil Patih. In late June, Pakubuwana II finally sent an army to SEmarang under Pringgalaya's command ostensibly to aid the VOC, but in fact his troops took no action against the Chinese.39

In July the king's hand was forced by the increasing need to act decisively before his kingdom collapsed under his feet, and he found himself opposed by both the Chinese and the Company. The main supporter of the Dutch alliance, Jayaningrat, was removed from his post as lord of the western coastal districts on 11 July and replaced by a son of the Patih.40 On the 20th, Javanese forces attacked the VOC garrison at the court. Some thirty-five Company servants were killed in the initial assault, but the Javanese failed to take the fortress, which was then besieged for three weeks. Finally the garrison surrendered. The Company's officials and soldiers were divided among Javanese lords and most were forcibly converted to Islam. But van Velsen and a few others were subsequently killed.41

The assault on the Kartasura garrison of 20 July of course ended any Dutch doubts about the king's intentions, and thrust the VOC and Cakraningrat IV into each other's arms. Cakraningrat IV offered military support to the Dutch on condition that he be made a subject of the VOC rather than of Kartasura and that he be given a free hand in East Java. The Dutch readily agreed to the detachment of West Madura from the Mataram empire, but postponed any commitment concerning East Java. Cakraningrat IV's armies were soon on the march, sweeping through East Java, killing Chinese as they went.42

While the east of his kingdom fell to the Madurese, Pakubuwana II also saw his Chinese allies and his own forces collapse in SEmarang.
Even if one were to attempt a defense of the king's policy of attacking the VOC, one could only judge his timing to have been catastrophic. By November 1741 there were estimated to be 3,500 Chinese and 20,000 Javanese with thirty cannon around the Sëmarang fortress. But by this time the VOC had over 3,400 troops there and was able to break the siege. Most of Pakubuwana II's Javanese soldiers fled during the fighting.43

After regaining control of the Sëmarang area, the Company went on to defeat the enemy at Jëpara.44 But the VOC was still unable to launch any major campaign into the interior and the only offensive forces in action in Java were those of Cakraningrat IV and the Chinese rebels with their Javanese allies.

Having perceived that the senior courtiers and Cakraningrat IV had been correct in their assessments, and that his Patih Natakusuma had been wrong, Pakubuwana II attempted to reverse his policy. He begged the VOC's forgiveness. The Company was still quite weak militarily and decided that it would be wise to investigate this renewed friendship although of course it placed little trust in the king. In March 1742 a group of seven VOC soldiers commanded by Captain Johan Andries Baron von Hohendorff finally made the hazardous journey to the court.45 In June the king sent Natakusuma to Sëmarang, where the Dutch arrested him and sent him into exile with the king's approval.46

Having first attempted to maintain his tenuous control of the state by allying with the Chinese, Pakubuwana II had now returned to the policy of his predecessors in seeking the support of the VOC in times of crisis. But the VOC of course trusted him even less than before. At the same time, the previous period of alliance with the Dutch and the king's own incompetence had produced troubles and burdens which had led much of the populace and their leaders to regard Pakubuwana II with little enthusiasm. Now his renewed inclination towards the Dutch completed the alienation of much of the kingdom. The Chinese, of course, were now utterly opposed to the king. Those courtiers who had advocated aiding the Dutch had done so on the premise that this would be a means to restructure the terms of the alliance. By having pursued a different course which failed, as these courtiers had predicted it would, the king had ruled out any change in the VOC-Javanese relationship and thus earned the final contempt of his regional lords. He was now the supplicant begging forgiveness, not the Company's true ally and saviour in its hour of need. It soon became clear that Pakubuwana II's only success had been to convert an anti-VOC war into a rebellion against himself.

Early in 1742 the rebels named a new king, a twelve-year old grandson of Amangkurat III, who had been exiled in 1708. This was Raden Mas Garëndi, also known as Sunan Kuning (the Yellow King).47 At the end of June 1742 the rebels conquered the court and put Paku-
buwana II to flight in the company of von Hohendorff. In his utter desperation, the deposed king told the Dutch that if they would restore him to his throne he would give them the coast and allow them to choose the Patih. They of course accepted this bargain, but had insufficient military means to carry it out, although by late 1742 forces under VOC command were gaining the initiative in the districts from Sëmarang southwards to Salatiga.

Cakraningrat IV, however, swept on. In December 1742 his forces ejected the rebels from Kartasura, and he then told the Dutch that they would be wise to execute Pakubuwana II as an example to other faithless kings. The chronicle account described above confirms the depth of Cakraningrat IV's feelings on this issue. But the Company believed that it had what it had always sought: an utterly malleable king of the Mataram dynasty whom it could control. To avoid war with the Dutch, Cakraningrat IV was therefore obliged to allow Pakubuwana II to return to the court.

The sequel was an unhappy one. In 1743 the Chinese and Javanese rebellion collapsed. In 1744 the king and his VOC ally went to war against Cakraningrat IV, who was defeated in 1745. But the fighting did not come to an end. Warfare continued in Central and East Java until 1757, but now it was princes and senior courtiers of Mataram who led the rebel armies. Pakubuwana II died in 1749 in a beleaguered court which existed only because the VOC defended it against the armies of rebel princes. When the major fighting finally ended in 1755-7, there were two courts and two kings in Java, the coast was under VOC jurisdiction, and the VOC was in an advanced state of exhaustion.

The chronicle account described above greatly clarifies the background to these chaotic events. Clearly the chronicler's judgements must be accepted. The king was a fool, but there had been foolish kings before. This king's major error was that he offended essential political traditions by failing to bow to a clear consensus among some of the most powerful lords of his empire. He failed to consult them personally, and depended instead upon his Patih, who pursued his own schemes until they brought about his own destruction and that of the kingdom. The regional lords failed to insist upon the king taking their advice, but instead withdrew into silence. Tirtawiguna and Pringgalaya were even more negligent in refusing to advise the king at all.

The political traditions which obliged a king to consult with his senior lords were of course a means of keeping the kingdom intact. With administrative and military power widely dispersed and communications limited, it was consensus which held the state together. By ignoring these traditions, the king and his Patih ensured the state's collapse.

Real issues of principle were also involved. Those courtiers who
opposed the king took the view that their obligations to the Dutch were matters of honour. By behaving as honourable allies, they expected to win from the Company the abolition of the more burdensome aspects of the alliance. The king’s failure, in their eyes, to act honourably (or wisely) ensured their contempt and disloyalty.

There remains the question of whether those lords who opposed the king were realistic in their assessment of the prospects for a restructuring of the alliance. Cakraningrat IV found that his crucial support of the VOC did not lead to the restructuring of affairs which he had hoped for. Could the court of Kartasura have been more successful if it had pursued the policies of Jayaningrat and his colleagues in 1740-1?

The question of what might have been of course takes one uncomfortably far into the realm of speculation. It is worth noting, however, that when Cakraningrat IV appeared as the VOC’s most loyal and powerful ally, the VOC readily agreed to the separation of his domains from the Kartasura empire, as he requested. It was his pretensions regarding East Java which worried the Company. This was because a Madurese domain in East Java was inconsistent with the overriding principle of the Company in all its interference in Javanese politics, the need to maintain the integrity of the Mataram empire under the control of a cooperative monarch.had Pakubuwana II appeared with his army as the Company’s saviour and argued that a revision of the treaty relationship was the key to restoring long-term stability in Central and East Java, the VOC’s officials might well have found his proposals attractive, or at least impossible to reject in current circumstances. But whether they would have trusted the Javanese court sufficiently to have agreed willingly to an ending of VOC surveillance and interference is unclear, and open to question.

The crisis of 1740-1 seems to have been a golden opportunity in the realm of VOC-Javanese relations which the king turned into a disaster. But one cannot rule out the possibility that the opportunity was no more than brass, that the Company would have sought a means to reverse any concessions it had given in its hour of need. And it must be accepted that the king faced a most difficult set of circumstances, for the policy which Jayaningrat and his supporters proposed would have alienated other important notables and many commoners within the kingdom. Perhaps no consensus was possible in the court, and in this it may have reflected the state of the empire as a whole. If this was true, then perhaps one should offer Pakubuwana II some valedictory consolation: he may have been a fool, but perhaps not even the wisest of kings could have come through the crisis of 1740-1 with his kingdom intact. And in such a case, no revision of the relationship with the Company would have been possible.

In the years after 1741 a revision of the VOC-Javanese relationship

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did, however, come about, for the Dutch abandoned their policy of supporting the authority of a single king of the Mataram dynasty. Instead, they felt obliged to take direct control of the north coast themselves in 1746, and nine years later were forced to accept the division of the state between Pakubuwana III and Hamengkubuwana I. But this change of policy was brought about by the military successes of the Company's enemies, particularly Pangeran Mangkubumi and Mas Said, not by concessions given by the Company to loyal allies. It was their inability to break a military stalemate which in 1755 forced the Dutch to recognize the partition of the kingdom they had sought to defend and the installation of Mangkubumi, their most dangerous enemy of the eighteenth century, as the first Sultan of the new court of Yogyakarta. From then until the early nineteenth century, when developments in Europe brought about a new wave of European aggression in Java, Dutch interference in the affairs of Yogyakarta was minor when compared to the period before 1755.

It is, thus, difficult to judge the realism of Jayaningrat and his supporters. But it is not difficult to conclude that Pakubuwana II pursued a course which ensured the collapse of his kingdom, even if one doubts whether the alternative proposal could have turned the crisis of 1740-1 into a victory for the interests of the Javanese state and dynasty. Nor is it difficult to conclude that the Javanese chronicle account described above enables one to see the depths of the crisis within the court with a clarity impossible in Dutch records, and thereby to account for the extraordinary progress of events which initiated the last great series of Javanese wars before the nineteenth century.

ABBREVIATIONS

AN Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
H. XVII Heeren XVII, the Directors of the Dutch East India Company, Amsterdam.
VOC Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, the Dutch East India Company.

NOTES:

1 The following account of the background to the 1740-1 episode is drawn from the author's research notes from Dutch and Javanese sources. In due course it is hoped that a study of the whole Kartasura period will be published. An overview of the period is included in Ricklefs 1981, ch. 8. The period is discussed briefly in Ricklefs 1978:7-11, with the period 1680-1720 being covered in greater detail on pp. 188-201.
Formal requests to be made dependants of the VOC rather than the Mataram dynasty were made by the lords of Dèmak, Surabaya, Grèsik, and Tégal in 1704, but the VOC refused them. Such ideas were probably shared by other lords at other times. See R. T. Suranata, Dèmak, to Gov.-Gen. van Outhoorn, rec’d 11 July 1704; B. van Rheede, Jépara, to R. T. Suranata [4 Aug. 1704]; B. van Rheede, Jépara, to Batavia, 14 Aug. 1704; C. Bramer, Dèmak, to van Rheede and Raad, Jépara, 10 Aug. 1704; Ng. Jangrana, Surabaya, to M. Ram [Surabaya], 8 Rangingulakir Ehe [1628/10 Aug. 1704]; Ng. Jangrana, Surabaya, to Batavia, rec’d 15 Oct. 1704; Ng. Naladika, Grèsik, to Batavia, rec’d 15 Oct. 1704; T. Rëksanagara, Tégal, to Batavia, 14 Oct. 1704; all in KA 1587 (OB 1705), Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague. See also de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 VIII:1xxi.

On the history of the Chinese in Batavia down to the massacre of 1740, see Vermeulen 1938.

Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 is the published version of the Surakarta court chronicle completed in A.D. 1836 (see Ricklefs 1972:289). Most of my reading on the Kartasura period in Javanese chronicle sources has concentrated on the Yogyakarta MS Babad Kraton of A.D. 1777-8 (British Library Add. MS. 12320; see Ricklefs 1972:289-90). Due to a scribal error, however, on f.631r. Babad Kraton skips from A.D. 1719 to June 1741. For most of the period covered in this article, Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 is therefore the only Javanese chronicle which I have read.

This text, incidentally, three times gives the figure of 9,000 Chinese dead within the city (Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXII:51, 52, 61). It is noteworthy that this corresponds closely with Vermeulen’s estimate from VOC sources of 10,000 dead. The source of the chronicle's information was presumably the Chinese themselves.

Tirtawiguna, also known as Carik Bajra, is also a major figure of Javanese literary history; see Djajadiningrat 1913:222-4; Winter 1911:354-9.

Tirtawiguna’s sources on the internal affairs of the VOC are not known.

The rumours of rebellion were known at the time to VOC personnel in Kartasura; see the report of the VOC surgeon Gerritsz in Leupe 1864:107-8.


He was appointed sometime before 10 May 1741; Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:374, 378; van Velsen et al., Kartasura, to Sëmarang, 12 July 1741, in AN Surakarta 15, ‘Aparte brieven naar Samarang 1740-1741’.

Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:372-3.

Idem, same date, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:374. See also Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXIII:35. In VOC sources the Captain of the Chinese is called Que Jonko, in Javanese Geyong.

Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:374.
Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:376), but Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XX:64 spells it Sastrawijaya, a usage which I have adopted here.

18 Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:376, 378-9, 381.

19 Idem, same date, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:376, 377-8, 379, 380, 381-2. Ca. 19 July the Chinese launched an attack which burned much of the area near the fortress, but they then retired; idem, same date, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:380.

20 Idem, same date, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:379, 380, 381. There is some uncertainty in this letter about what numbers were despatched at what time.

21 Babab Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXII:62 ff. appears to confuse the various garēbēgs of late 1740 and 1741. Much of the discussion is placed at the time of Garēbēg Mulud (which took place late in May 1741), but a comparison with VOC records of events at the court makes it clear that the discussions began much earlier, probably at the time of Garēbēg Puasa (late December 1740).

22 At Kartasura the siti inggil kidul was separated from the court proper by the krapyak (hunting enclosure), and stood between the krapyak and the alun-alun kidul to the south of it. This location was confirmed both by this writer's own investigations of the ruins in 1973 and by Rouffaer's sketch-map of 1889 (in KITLV MS H 692; see de Graaf 1963:77).


24 According to de Jonge and van Deventer, 1862-1909 IX:1xxx, van Velsen was a mestizo; he is said in Hageman 1852 I:192 to have been born of a Javanese mother at Jëpara.

25 Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:385. Further reports blaming van Velsen for the troubles are found in idem, 6 Dec. 1741, and 14 Jan. 1742, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:401, 406-7. The VOC surgeon at Kartasura, Aarnout Gerritsz, poured lavish posthumous condemnation upon van Velsen, but he appears to have had an axe or two to grind; see Leupe 1864: e.g. 106-7, 112-3, 115.

26 This episode provides an interesting illustration of why generalizations about Javanese history (or, in this case, the specific area of Dutch-Javanese relations) without references to chronological context are of little value. Thus, in 1741, the two main supporters of the Dutch alliance are clearly seen to disapprove of sending embassies to Batavia. But only a few decades later, in 1777 and after, Sultan Hamëngkubuwana I insisted upon sending embassies to Batavia as a right of kingship and refused to send them instead to Sëmarang (see Ricklefs 1974:247-52, 255-6, 306). This also offers some support for the suggestion in the same work, p. 379, that the Baron Sakendher text about Dutch-Javanese relations is unlikely to be older than the mid-eighteenth century in its present form.

27 I am unable to find a reliable figure for Tirtawiguna's appanage in 1741. In 1743, after the tumultuous events described in this article had passed, he held an appanage of 1300 households, cf. ‘Lijst der thans in wezen zijnde kinderen, broeders en susters, mitgaders de afkomst van den Soesoehoenang Pakoeboewana, de hooftregenten en mindere bedienden, die zig aan 't hoff zoo aan de stranden als binnen en bovenlanden bevinden’, Kartasura, Nov. 1743, in AN Solo 42, ‘Rapport Verijssel & Theling 1743’. Tirtawiguna's appanage as Wadana Gëdhong Tëngën is given as 1500 karya [= cacah, household] in Sirat Pustaka Raja Puwara, published in Brandes 1900:160. There are, however, several problems surrounding this text. Brandes says (15*) that the MS was received from G. P. Rouffaer, but I have been
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unable to locate it. The original MS must have been completed later than AJ 1758 [AD 1830-1], the last date mentioned in the text (180), but the information for the reign of Pakubuwana II is said to relate to the year AJ 1666 [March 1741-March 1742] (174). When the figures for various regions given in this text are compared with other sources the dates of which are known with certainty, they often differ, but this does not mean that the Pustaka Raja Puwara information is necessarily inaccurate. For instance, Panaraga is given as having had 12,000 cacahs in 1678, 1709, and 1755 (de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 VII:250 [although here the manpower is said to have dropped at the time to 5,000]; VIII:362; X:374), as well as in Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXIII:7 (concerning 1741), but in Pustaka Raja Puwara, 166, the figure is given as 16,000. Until this text has received further study, I find it difficult to assess its reliability.


29 The report of the king’s message to the Chinese as delivered by Martapura accords with a later rumour reported by van Velsen that the king’s army intended to turn upon the Chinese at Sêmarang and massacre them if they did not conquer the VOC fortress there; van Velsen, Kartasura, to Sêmarang, 22 June 1741, in AN Surakarta 15, ‘Aparate brieven naar Samarang 1740-1741’.

30 Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:373.

31 This brief confusion may lie behind the VOC report of 30 April 1741 that Pakubuwana II was dissatisfied with his coastal lords for aiding the VOC against the Chinese without his authority; Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, in de Jonge and van Deventer, 1862-1909 IX:383.

32 The king’s words are given in Babad Tanah Jawi 1939-41 XXIII:32 as “apa arsa golek Ratu liyan ingwang”. In 1742 Pakubuwana II was still deeply distrustful of Tirtawiguna and told von Hohendorff that “previously he had much trusted Tirtawiguna, but now he didn’t know how he [Tirtawiguna] was inclined, and one can look others in the eyes but not in the heart”; von Hohendorff, consideratiën en remarques, Sêmarang, 27 Aug. 1742, in Gijsberti Hodenpijl 1918:613.

The VOC letter referred to in the chronicle is probably that sent from Batavia on 10 May 1741 urging Pakubuwana II to exterminate the Chinese: see Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:383. On the king’s apparent attempt to maintain contact with both the VOC and the Chinese, see also Gijsberti Hodenpijl 1918:564. BK, f. 677v., suggests that Tirtawiguna favoured maintaining the VOC alliance, but kept silent until the VOC victory over the Chinese in November 1741 (see below) made this politically acceptable in the court.

33 Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:384.

34 Later the Dutch also placed much of the blame for the events of 1741 on the “opperpriester Saïd Aalowie” and Rajaniti (see de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:433 n.l.; Gijsberti Hodenpijl 1918:581). Neither of these figures prominently in the VOC documents of 1741 or the babad account, although BK, f. 687r., presents Rajaniti as opposing the king’s subsequent decision to break with the Chinese.

Van Velsen, Kartasura, to Sëmarang, 22 June 1741 (3rd letter of that day) in AN Surakarta 15, 'Aparte brieven naar Samarang 1740-1741'.

Van Velsen et al., Kartasura, to Sëmarang, 12 July 1741, in AN Surakarta 15, 'Aparte brieven naar Samarang, 1740-1741'. Van Velsen had been informed of this by Tirtawiguna and another courtier, but he doubted whether the emissaries had ever actually been to Madura.

Pangeran Tépasana and Pangeran Ngabei Loringpasar were major informants to van Velsen, and both suggested that the VOC should replace Pakubuwana II with "one of the princes… who offered the Honourable Company support" (i.e., one of themselves); van Velsen, Kartasura, to Sëmarang, 22 June 1741 (3rd letter of that day), in AN Surakarta 15, ‘Aparte brieven naar Samarang, 1740-1741’. Tépasana was the son of Amangkurat III, who had been exiled by the VOC in 1708; he had returned to Java in 1737. He was murdered with his younger brother in the court on the night of 9 Juli 1741; Tépasana’s elder brother Wiramënggala and other family members then fled the court; see van Velsen et al., Kartasura, to Sëmarang, 12 July 1741, in AN Surakarta 15, ‘Aparte brieven naar Samarang, 1740-1741’; BK, ff. 634v.-638v. According to BK, ff. 647r.-v., after the attack on the Kartasura garrison the Chinese leader to whom Wiramënggala had fled turned him over on the king’s orders and he was then killed; Tépasana’s young son Raden Mas Garëndi was, however, protected by the Chinese. After the king’s reconciliation with the VOC, Garëndi was proclaimed by the rebels as a new Susuhunan (Sunan Kuning) early in 1742; Batavia to H. XVII, 5 Dec. 1742, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:413. Loringpasar survived the Chinese war and in 1743, when he was reported to be 35 years old, he held an appanage of 1500 households and had authority over four other Pangerans; ‘Lijst der thans in wezen zijnde kinderen’, etc. (see note 27 above). By 1746 he had died, and his son had joined the ranks of the rebellious princes; [van Imhoff] 1853:415.

Van Velsen, Kartasura, to Sëmarang, 22 June 1741 (3rd letter of that day); van Velsen et al., Kartasura, to Sëmarang, 12 July 1740: in AN Surakarta 15, ‘Aparte brieven naar Samarang, 1740-1741’.

Van Velsen et al., Kartasura, to Sëmarang, 12 July 1741, in AN Surakarta 15, ‘Aparte brieven naar Samarang, 1740-1741’; ‘Lijst der thans in wezen zijnde kinderen’, etc. (see note 27 above); BK, f. 656r.

Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:387-8, 392, 400-1; BK, ff. 642r.-656r.; Leupe 1864. About 180 VOC servants survived and were allowed to leave Kartasura in January 1742; see Gijsberti Hodenpijl 1918:569-70.

Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Nov. 1741; 6 Dec. 1741; and 14 Jan. 1742; in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:388, 390-1; 405; and 407, respectively.


Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1741 and 14 Jan. 1742, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:405 and 407 respectively; Sëmarang Krijgsraad, 27 Nov. 1741, in AN Java N.O. Kust 388, ‘Resolutien Krijgsraad 1741-1742’.

Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1741; 14 Jan. 1742; and 5 Dec. 1742; in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:404-5; 406-9; and 410-14, respectively. On the period from late 1741 to 1743, see also Gijsberti Hodenpijl 1918.


Batavia to H. XVII, 5 Dec. 1742, in de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:413. See also note 38 above.
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49 See von Hohendorff's letters to Semarang between 8 Sept. and 24 Nov. 1742, and Steijnmetz's letters from Salatiga of 16 and 18 December 1742, describing several fierce battles, in AN Java N.O. Kust 388, 'Resolutien Krijgsraad 1741-1742'.
50 Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Jan. and 5 April 1743, de Jonge and van Deventer 1862-1909 IX:420-1 and 422-3 respectively.
51 On these events, see Ricklefs 1974:38 et seqq.
52 E.g., see Verijssel en Theiling, 20 Jan. 1742, reply to letter of instruction of 30 Dec. 1741, in Gijsberti Hodenpijl 1918:589. They say that it "could be contrary to the interests of the Honourable Company that a prince as enterprising as the Madurese and his sons should have a firm footing on Java".

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