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Continuity and Discontinuity in the Multiple Realities of Riau

Introduction

Processes of globalization impacting on Riau are not a new phenomenon. External agendas have been imposed on Riau since the arrival of European colonizers in the sixteenth century. Thus, current forces of globalization in Riau are part of a continuous historical process that began centuries ago. However, the difference lies in the rate and scale of the changes that Riau inhabitants and their habitats have experienced.

Presently, Riau is increasingly perceived to be within a collective Singaporean, Malaysian, and Indonesian developmental agenda known as the 'Growth Triangle'. This scheme aims at pooling resources from the three countries for complementary development. Thus, Riau is at yet another important intersection of these political and cultural formations that interact with each other in asymmetrical power relations. Interlocked between these interactions, the internal and external agendas of the local Riau inhabitants and the Growth Triangle respectively often converge. In most cases, such convergence exacerbates a power asymmetry generating unequal benefits and costs for different sectors of the society. The focus of the new and competing external agenda to remap Riau focuses on widespread industrialization for the area to generate monetary benefits. Neglect of issues pertaining to social viability and environmental concerns has led to direct and indirect costs borne by the local communities and individuals.

This developmental program of repositioning Riau also reallocates the region's resources. Inevitably, a simultaneous transaction of both material and symbolic capital is occurring whereby new patterns of political domination and realities are resulting in the region. There is now the use of ethnic resources for both political domination and political resistance in varying political realities within the region. Riau within the Growth Triangle has first disempowered the Malays as the marginalized majority in Riau; second, further marginalized the minority Malays in Singapore; but third, empowered the Malays as the dominant majority in Malaysia. This paper examines how the social and ecological consequences of these processes are symptomatic of a global situation characterized by contradictions between growth and unsustainability and by new patterns of wealth and poverty.

The Multiple Realities of Riau

Power is the authority to define and thereby shape realities. Riau is not just a placename for an unchanging geographical reality, but a referent for different political realities shaped by different powers. The theme of this volume, 'Riau in transition' is apt, and stresses the importance of analyzing the interplay between economic development, political structures, historical processes and geographical space.

It is thus instructive to compare the different usages of 'Riau' as expressed by our Malay informants in Riau. They possess a sense of Malay historicity which manifests itself in different forms. These include both the oral and the textual as recorded in the *Penurunan*, published in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur under the title, *Sejarah Melayu* (Wee 1988:60-61). While these usages of Riau did emerge chronologically, they did not necessarily supersede one another. At least four of these usages exist concurrently at the present time, clearly indicating the overlapping realities that currently exist in Riau. Thus the question, 'Whose Riau do we speak of?' can be also be understood as, 'Whose political perspective are we referring to?' To view this, let us examine the following chronology:

- 1677-1683. 'Riau', a referent to Sultan Ibrahim's ruling Melaka-derived dynasty.
- 1708-1716. 'Riau', a referent to Sultan Abd al-Jalil's promotion from *bendahara* (treasurer; grand vizier) to Sultan.
- 1719-1722. 'Riau', a referent to Raja Kecil's pretensions to the throne as the alleged descendant of Sultan Abd al-Jalil's Melaka dynasty.
- 1722-1787. 'Riau', the coalition between the Bugis conquerors and the descendants of the *bendahara* dynasty.¹
- 1787-1795. 'Riau', a Dutch colony.²
- 1795-1804. 'Riau', a territory defined by the rivalry between the Bugis

¹ Riau river was discovered and became Raja Kecil's new capital (Ali Haji 1982).

² In 1784, the Dutch took possession of Tanjung Pinang. Sultan Mahmud was forced to submit his territory as 'fief of the VOC' to the Dutch (Ali Haji 1982:370; *Surat-Surat* 1970:3-31), and to promise that no Bugis would ever be appointed as *yang dipertuan muda* (viceroys) again. This marked the first occasion when 'Riau' came to be defined by an external power. Although this usage of 'Riau' as a fief of the VOC is defunct now, the process of external definition is still in operation particularly in the current context of the Growth Triangle. Subsequently, Sultan Mahmud invited Ilanun pirates from Sabah to attack the Dutch. The raid was successful, but fearing Dutch retaliation, Sultan Mahmud and his followers moved to Lingga. The name Lingga thus became a distinct Malay territory south of 'Riau' which was then under Dutch rule. This historical distinction is the basis of the subsequent usages 'Riau-Lingga' (from the perspective of 'Riau') and 'Lingga-Riau' (from the perspective of Lingga). Both these usages are still found among the people of Penyengat in 'Riau' and the people of Daik in Lingga. This usage of 'Riau' refers specifically to the islands north of the Lingga archipelago and does not include any part of Sumatra.

and the *bendahara* dynasty.³

- 1804-1819. The reinstatement of the Bugis in 'Riau' resulting in a geographical division of the kingdom into Bugis 'Riau', Malay Lingga and the *temenggung*'s (territorial minister) Bulang.⁴
- 1819-1824. The convergence of internal fission and external ambitions, resulting in the legal fragmentation of the sultanate and the rise of Singapore, first as a British colony, then as a nation state.
- 1824-1911. The break-up of the sultanate, a process that had begun with the territorial division of 'Riau' and Lingga in 1804.
- 1911-1942. 'Riau', a Dutch colony.
- 1942-1945. 'Riau', a Japanese colony.
- 1945-1958. 'Riau', a part of the province Sumatra Tengah (Central Sumatra).
- 1958-present. 'Riau', a province in the Republic of Indonesia.

One similarity shared by the different political realities from 1677-1804 is that they were all located along the Riau river. Until 1804, 'Riau' referred to settlements built on the river's banks. In 1804, when Sultan Mahmud III made the gift of Penyengat island to the Bugis, the name 'Riau' applied to a wider area from which the Bugis rulers could derive their revenue.⁵ Penyengat became their capital, and Bugis-governed 'Riau' included Pulau Tujuh to the east, Pulau Abang to the south, and Pangkil to the west. This was a clearly demarcated territory, differentiated from Bulang to the west, and Lingga to the south. Bulang was the fief of the *temenggung*'s faction led by Engku Muda, the contender of the Bugis (Trocki 1979:4), while Lingga remained under the Sultan (Ali Haji 1982:212). Thus, from 1804 to 1911, the name 'Riau' came to refer to an internal division of the kingdom in a political reality that was divided into three zones of domination – 'Riau' under the Bugis *yamtuan muda* (viceroys), Lingga under the Sultan, and Bulang under the *temenggung*.

³ Before Napoleon Bonaparte's conquest of the Netherlands in 1795, the Dutch entrusted their colonial possessions in the East, including 'Riau', to the British for safekeeping (Ali Haji 1982:377). Finding no use for 'Riau', 'the English company ... restored Riau to Sultan Mahmud' (Ali Haji 1982:196). Although the consequences were on this occasion positive for the sultanate, they were the outcome of larger world events happening elsewhere. In ways similar to many other parts of the world, 'Riau' was vulnerable to external agendas of powerful Others, as it still is today. Hence, the topic of this volume.

⁴ After the restoration of the territory, Sultan Mahmud left his second cousin, Engku Muda to 'guard Riau' (Ali Haji 1982:197). A civil war ensued between him and his cousins (Ali Haji 1982:380), which led to the return of the Bugis to 'Riau' and the breakaway of Singapore as a separate territory from the rest of the Riau archipelago in 1819.

⁵ Penyengat island was the Sultan's *mas kawin* (wedding gold) to his bride Raja Hamidah, daughter of Raja Ali Haji. This gift, made in 1804, reinstated the position of the Bugis in 'Riau'.

The *temenggung*'s dominion spanned from Karimun, Buru, Galang, Moro, Batam, Terong, Sugi, Bulang, Pekaka, Temiang, and Singapore to Johor (Trocki 1979:44). There are several noteworthy points about this list of places that formed the *temenggung*'s dominion. First, to this day, the Galang people say that they are going to 'Riau' when they go to Tanjung Pinang, thereby indicating that they do not perceive Galang as a part of Riau. Given the historical pattern of political allegiance, it is easy to comprehend why they say this.⁶ Second, Batam, which is directly opposite Singapore, is now an important part of the Growth Triangle that will be discussed later. Third, most significantly, Singapore, an island about the size of Batam, was just one of the many islands under the *temenggung*. This island is now a nation state that is legally equal in status to the nation state of Indonesia despite the huge disparity in geographical and demographic size. The historical irony that is often forgotten is that Singapore is geographically part of an archipelago comprising more than 3,000 islands. The current dominance of Singapore over the other islands is thus the result of particular processes of economic and political structuration. At present, Singapore is the linchpin of the Growth Triangle. Fourth, the 'Johor' mentioned in the list above refers to the Johor river where the capitals of the sultanate had been located. In 1823, Johor was not a separate state and Johor Baru was not yet built. The creation of 'Johor' as a separate state with demarcated boundaries was a subsequent event that occurred through a division of power between the English and the *temenggung*. At present, the name 'Johor' refers to a state within the nation state of Malaysia, that forms the northern part of the Growth Triangle.

The next significant event occurred in 1824 when the British and Dutch governments signed a treaty dividing Southeast Asia into their respective spheres of influence. The dividing line was the Main Strait flowing between Singapore and Batam. This was a cut right through the *temenggung*'s dominion. The Dutch bestowed that part of the *temenggung*'s dominion to the Bugis *yamtuan muda* (viceroy) instead. After a short civil war between the Bugis and the *temenggung*'s faction, which ended in October 1827, the *yamtuan muda* consolidated his control over the post-1824 'Riau sphere' that had been expanded by the Dutch (Ali Haji 1982:252-55, 394). The western and southern extent of this 'Riau sphere' included Karimun, Buru, and Kundur in the west, and Pintu and Duyung in the south. The northern extent of the 'Riau sphere' was marked by the Main Strait. An eastern boundary was also instituted during Viceroy Raja Ali's reign (1845-1857). The result is a post-1824 'Riau sphere' bounded

⁶ Interestingly, the local Chinese also refer to Tanjung Pinang as 'Liaolai' (in Hokkien and Teochiu), meaning 'Inside Riau'. This usage includes Senggarang, on the opposite bank across from Tanjung Pinang, which has an old Chinese settlement that possibly dates from before 1722.

on four sides as a consequence to political action, rather than as the result of geographical circumstances.

Our informants are still conscious of the *temenggung*'s dominion as a distinctive territory, which they refer to as *daerah* Bulang (Bulang area). They say that this is because his base was located on the two small islands of Bulang Lintang and Bulang Gebang. From this base, he ruled a large dominion that included Galang, Batam, Singapore and Johor. These sites are now politically separated into three nation states, namely, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. From a historical perspective, the Growth Triangle can be seen as the re-combination of fragmented parts of the *temenggung*'s dominion.

Yet is this really so? To what extent can the formation of the Growth Triangle be considered as part of Malay history? The question, 'Whose Riau are we referring to?' is also the question, 'Whose history are we discussing?' The point is that the power to define and shape realities is also the power to make history and create discourse.

In 1911, the Dutch forced the last Sultan into abdication and established Residentie Riouw en Onderhoorigheden (the Residency of Riau and its Dependencies), with its capital at Tanjung Pinang. This comprised Afdeeling Riouw Archipel (the subdistrict of the Riau archipelago) and Afdeeling Inderagiri (the subdistrict of Inderagiri), with the island territory of the former Riau-Lingga sultanate included in the former. In 1938, Afdeeling Bengkalis was added to the residency. In 1942, all the former territories of the kingdoms such as Siak, Pelalawan and Rokan in the east coast of Sumatra were included (Lutfi 1977:380-6). During this period, through Dutch colonization, the name 'Riau' encompassed an area much wider than what the Riau-Lingga kingdom ever controlled.

From 1942 to 1945, Residentie Riouw was replaced by the Riau-syu of Japanese colonization, which included only the Sumatran part of Residentie Riouw together with its immediate off-shore islands. The island territory of Afdeeling Riouw, which had formerly belonged to the Riau-Lingga kingdom, now came under the military administration centered on Syonanto (Singapore) (Lutfi 1977:407). During this period, the name 'Riau' became totally detached from the Riau-Lingga islands, and became attached instead to a part of Sumatra.

After World War II, from 1945 to 1950, there arose a period of conflicting interests. The Dutch wanted to reclaim their former colonies, some aristocrats wanted to re-institute the former Riau-Lingga kingdom, and the nationalists were eager to form a new nation state – Indonesia – comprising all the former Dutch colonies in the area. Hence, it was unclear what the name 'Riau' referred to during this period. Eventually, the conflict was resolved in favor of the nationalists, who formed provinces larger than the Dutch residencies.

Thus, Residentie Riouw was incorporated into the province of Central Sumatra (Sumatra Tengah), with the name 'Riau' used only for Kabupaten

Kepulauan Riau (District of the Riau Archipelago). This district was based on the island territory of the former Riau-Lingga kingdom. In 1958, the name 'Riau' was once again applied to a wider area, when a Propinsi Riau (Riau Province) was formed with the same territorial shape as the former Residentie Riouw (Lutfi 1977:672). This is still the situation at present.

This chronology illustrates a few key points. First, the geographical area referred to as 'Riau' has been part of larger world events since the eighteenth century and indeed before that. Current globalization processes have their roots in earlier historical events. Second, the relative visibility and invisibility of different 'Riaus' indicates the power differentiation of particular perspectives. Power gives visibility. Third, 'Riau' is not an objective place but formations conjectured by historical clashes between political structures arising from socio-ecological choices made millennia ago. The resulting societal differentiation has produced the categories that we now know as Suku Hutan, Suku Laut, Malay, Javanese, Chinese, and European.

At this point in time, 'Riau' is an intersection of these political and cultural formations that interact with each other in asymmetrical power relations. In these interactions, internal tendencies and external agendas often converge. In most cases, such convergence further exacerbates the power asymmetry, rendering the weaker party even weaker. As a result of this power asymmetry, current development processes are generating unequal benefits and costs for different sectors of society. The social and ecological consequences of these processes are symptomatic of a global situation characterized by contradictions between growth and unsustainability and by new patterns of wealth and poverty.

Riau in the Growth Triangle

The 3,200 islands of the Riau archipelago are now considered as part of a Growth Triangle. The concept of the 'Growth Triangle' was first mooted in December 1989 by Mr. Goh Chok Tong, who has since become Singapore's Prime Minister.⁷ The Growth Triangle was an idea proposed by the Singapore government and accepted by the Indonesian and Malaysian governments. The three sides of this Triangle are Singapore, Johor in Malaysia, and the Riau Islands in Indonesia. Hence the acronym 'Sijori', popularly used in Indonesia to refer to this Growth Triangle. As noted by the Singapore-based *Business Times*,

'At present, the Growth Triangle is one only in concept, albeit endorsed at the highest levels by the three countries. In practice, there are three still separate sides, all a part of the Triangle only in that they have incorporated the concept into their respective development plans. Thus, Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad recently said the Triangle fitted nicely into Johor state's

⁷ *Business Times*, 09-10-1990.

development, while Indonesia saw the concept in the context of its own development master-plan for the Riau region, now being prepared [...] But the Triangle only becomes a reality, especially in the eyes of outside investors looking in, when it is jointly presented, marketed and operated as a distinct entity'.⁸

Even in this brief newspaper report, it is clear that there are multiple realities at work in the area known as Riau:

- the reality of the Singapore government's development planning, out of which came the concept of the Growth Triangle;
- the reality of the Malaysian government's development planning, of which Johor state's development forms but a piece of the national whole;
- the reality of the Indonesian government's development master plan for the Riau region, which too forms but a piece of the national whole;
- the reality of the Growth Triangle as an economic area to be 'presented, marketed and operated as a distinct entity'.

These are governmental realities, existing at the level of national development plans that are decided upon in capital cities. In these realities, Riau serves as a means to other ends, rather than as an end in itself. Hence, from the perspective of the three national governments, Riau is significant only in so far as it fits into their national development plans. What does not fit is thus irrelevant.

However, this sharply contrasts with the perspective of the local communities living in Riau where there is another local and historically evolved reality as discussed above, which is generally not considered relevant to these national development plans, particularly when they are the plans of foreign governments. As a result, the development plans and processes visited upon local communities in Riau have come as top-down external agendas with very mixed effects on local communities. While some individuals have benefited from new economic opportunities, in most cases, the externally driven development agendas have disrupted the lives of many communities and provided them with few economic alternatives. In the last five years since the Growth Triangle was initiated, there have been massive changes occurring at a very rapid rate. Many people in Riau feel that they have been overtaken by events beyond their control, often without even their knowledge.

Why has this happened? Why indeed has the Growth Triangle emerged? To answer this question, we need to understand the process of growth itself. Essentially, the idea of the Growth Triangle is that of linking three areas with different endowments and different comparative economic advantages to form a larger region with greater potential for economic growth. According to this model of growth, the differences in comparative advantage would serve to complement one another rather than compete

⁸ *Business Times*, 08-08-1990.

with each other. Industries located within the Growth Triangle could take advantage of the efficient infrastructure and higher-skilled workers of one location and the lower costs and ample supply of cheaper labor, land, and other resources in other locations. A transnational symbiotic relationship is thus established between the countries based on the fact that they have different rates of economic development. They are: Singapore as a NIC (Newly Industrialized Country), with a relatively higher rate of growth; Malaysia as a near NIC with a fluctuating rate of growth; and Indonesia as an aspiring NIC with a relatively lower rate of growth.

This Growth Triangle has been hailed as a major step in subregional co-operation that can be used as a model for further strengthening economic co-operation in ASEAN (Kumar and Lee 1991:3). In this context, it is significant that the concept of the Growth Triangle originated from Singapore. As the term 'Newly Industrialized Country' indicates, Singapore has a highly industrialized economy located in a densely built-up city-state, where the rural sector has dwindled to insignificance. Like all other cities, it is dependent on water, energy, food, and even human labor drawn from rural hinterlands.

Implicational Development

Apart from its own reservoirs, Singapore currently buys unprocessed water from Johor in Malaysia. This is filtered and chlorinated for consumption in Singapore, with any remaining excess resold to Johor as processed water. In recent years, this water trade has become a political controversy in Malaysia because of its existing commitment to sell water to Singapore. The controversy was especially pronounced when Melaka was suffering from a drought and Johor was not able to help. The issue of Johor re-buying as processed water at least some of the water it sells to Singapore has intensified this controversy. Singapore is already unable to provide for its own water needs in its current state of development. In view of increasing water needs as a result of projected population growth and further industrialization, alternative supplies of water are definitely needed, especially if Johor's supply cannot be guaranteed. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, said:

'Singapore's intention to buy water from Indonesia would not cause "unhealthy competition" with Malaysia, which has for a long time been Singapore's main source of water. [This] was first made public by Mr Lee [Kuan Yew] when he visited Jakarta in October [1989]. The Republic's water needs were expected to escalate and Johor, now a main supplier, had not agreed to build more dams for the time being [...] A feasibility study would have to be conducted before a decision could be made on the supply on Indonesian water to Singapore. If adopted, the proposal would involve bringing water from Jambi or Riau in Sumatra to Batam before going to Singapore.'

⁹ *Straits Times*, 24-11-1989.

It is thus significant that in an agreement-in-principle signed on 28 August 1990, the Singapore and Indonesian governments agreed on the joint development of tourism, water supply, and industries in the Riau islands. This agreement explicitly states, *inter alia*, that: 'Singapore and Indonesia will co-operate in the sourcing, supply and distribution of water to Singapore. The terms of co-operation will be set out in a separate agreement.'¹⁰

At present, as far as is currently known, on Bintan island alone, three fresh-water reservoirs are to be built. One specifically for the beach resorts on the north coast of Bintan, another in the middle of Bintan island, and the third as a dam in Teluk Bintan (the Bay of Bintan) from which the sea water is to be pumped and into which several rivers are to pour their fresh water.

This amount of fresh water to be collected exceeds the needs of the 90,000-strong population of Bintan. Much of it will therefore be channeled to meet the needs of other populations. As mentioned by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, it will probably be pumped via Batam to Singapore.¹¹

The allocation of land and resources in Bintan is thus being determined not by local needs but by external agendas. The thousands of people living in the affected areas are all to be resettled. Some have already been resettled, while others are still waiting to be informed of their fate. The livelihoods and lives of local communities are thus being disrupted by the development needs of another economy in another country.

Even so, according to the Singapore Minister of Foreign Affairs and Finance, the one million gallons of water a day available from Bintan would not be sufficient for both domestic needs and Singapore's needs. Therefore, another site in mainland Riau, located opposite Pulau Burung, has been identified as a more abundant source of water:

'Mr. [Tunky] Ariwibowo [the Indonesian Junior Industry Minister] said the Indonesian government wanted its private sector to be actively involved in the proposed project to pipe water to Singapore, and the leading conglomerate, the Salim Group has come forward [...] A spokesman for the Salim Group said its 500,000 ha of land on the Riau mainland could harness about five million tonnes (about one billion gallons) of water daily.'¹²

There is thus a collusion of interests between the Singapore government, the Indonesian government and private-sector conglomerates, particularly the Salim group which is playing a leading role in both mainland and island Riau. Where do the interests of local communities fit into this transnational scenario for development? Do the people living in the affected areas even

¹⁰ *Straits Times*, 29-08-1990.

¹¹ *Straits Times*, 10-04-1990.

¹² *Straits Times*, 10-04-1990.

know what is being planned for their land, their homes and their resources? Is the Salim Group's 500,000 hectares of land on the Riau mainland totally uninhabited? What will be the environmental impact of these huge dams built in Riau? And who will be most affected by this impact, which will include the loss of biodiversity and the loss of land?

Obviously, drastic changes to the habitat will most affect the people living in that habitat, rather than those who will be enjoying the benefits of such changes in faraway Singapore, Jakarta and beyond. Yet, the people most affected are those with the least say in the matter. A big gap has thus arisen between those who decide on the use and allocation of land and other resources and the local inhabitants, who depend on the land and natural resources for their everyday livelihood.

It is interesting to note that for its energy needs, Singapore serves as a major base for oil refining and petrochemical processing, thereby attracting a regular supply of oil. Thus far, Singapore's energy needs are being adequately met. Although mainland Riau is rich in oil, this aspect of Riau's resources has not been much mentioned in the development discourse of the Growth Triangle.

In contrast, Singapore's food needs compete with its land needs. Although Singapore previously had an agricultural sector of some significance which actually enabled the country to be self-sufficient in eggs, poultry and pork, it has been government policy to reduce this sector systematically to take over farmland for industrial and residential use. The previously viable farms of Singapore have thus been phased out by having them move to Riau – for example, pig farms to Bulang. What particularly annoys some Riau Malays is that these pig farms have been moved near the site of the *temenggung*'s family graves. The *temenggung* was the Malay Minister who leased Singapore to the British in 1819 when they were looking for a trading post.

The desire of Singaporeans to own landed property is also supplied by Riau, especially on the island of Batam, just across the straits from Singapore. Although there are difficulties in Indonesian law for foreigners to own land, there are nevertheless many proxy purchases going on. The consequences are a dramatic increase in property prices in Batam and the rise of squatters as increasing numbers of migrants from other Indonesian islands come in search of jobs, but can find no affordable housing.

Ironically, therefore, rather than improving local community livelihoods, such a program for development has had adverse effects on the local population in Riau. Largescale land acquisition by the local governments for public or private development has also led to the massive dislocation of families and communities, leading to a crisis in resettlement and livelihoods. Problems for the local communities have been compounded by the fact that there has been no recognition of their land rights. Although these local communities have been living on the islands for centuries, they do not possess the necessary title deeds. Consequently, only minimal compensa-

tion has been given to such people who are treated as squatters and compensated only for their house structures and fruit trees. The compensation has been approximately Rp. 50 (approximately US\$ 0.025) for each square meter of the footprint of a village house. In many cases, the monetary compensations (usually given to the men only) have subsequently been spent on relocation. Of these recipients, a significant number have become landless due to insufficient compensation or knowledge relating to capital investment. Destitution has led to the break-up of families and communities, with both or either spouse, and the young and able, heading for towns and cities in search of permanent employment.

Just as the local communities have been misrecognized as squatters, resettlement is also misconceptualized simply as a rehousing issue. No attention is given to the resource base and traditional livelihoods of the communities involved. There are thus cases of fishing communities being moved far inland without any regard for the loss of their access to the sea and the loss of their livelihood. No compensation is given for the loss of their boats as means of livelihood. Indeed, local authorities hope to transform all fishing and farming communities into an industrial workforce.

However, will taking away the livelihood resource base of a fishing or farming community automatically transform them into industrial workers? An example we can learn from is the resettlement of the people who lived on the north coast of Bintan island to make way for the development of golf courses and hotel resorts spanning the entire coastline. Since resettlement, this community has lost its traditional means of livelihood based on fishing and plantation cultivation. They now live in dire poverty and are struggling to survive. While a few members of the community have been able to move to nearby towns to find odd jobs, the rest of the community are unable to do so, as they would be even less able to afford the high costs of living in town.

It should be realized that employment opportunities generated by industrialization are most suited for able-bodied young men. Indeed, many factories want to hire only workers in their twenties. Those in their thirties are regarded as overaged. Village communities, however, are intergenerational collectivities of people who have evolved a livelihood system based on mutual support. Each village has women and men, young and old, the able-bodied and the not-so-able, who together forge a community livelihood derived from a shared resource base. An employment policy that caters only to able-bodied young men neglects the livelihoods of whole communities. As a result of the age and gender skewering of industrial labor demand, a paradoxical situation has arisen whereby there is a labor shortage of able-bodied young men, coupled with the unemployment and underemployment of everyone else. In the case of the Riau islands, this selective labor shortage is filled by young, male and able-bodied migrants from other Indonesian islands, especially Java, Bali, and Sumatra. This makes the existing local communities economically dependent on the

financial contributions of their younger members. Should these contributions not be forthcoming for any reason, such as low wages, personal expenditure, illness, loss of job or loss of money, the other members of the community could face serious livelihood difficulties.

In a situation where hundreds of thousands of people are going to be displaced by development projects, it is important to understand that the village is not an urban residential block of strangers who happen to live together. The village community shares a mode of production, consumption and distribution. Therefore, resettlement is more than just rehousing. Usually, where housing is provided for resettled communities, the cheapest, most functional form of housing (such as zinc-roofed wooden huts) is provided. There is neither consideration for the indigenous vernacular forms of architecture that had previously existed, nor for the reconstitution of sustainable livelihoods for resettled communities.¹³

The varying degrees of impact on community livelihoods can be located along the following continuum.

Indirect impact	<-->	direct impact
rural-urban migration	<-->	displacement & resettlement
degraded resource base	<-->	loss of land and resource base
community in change	<-->	community at risk

Five types of communities can now be differentiated in the Riau islands:

- Communities not being threatened with resettlement, but whose population is affected by rural-urban migration and by the consequences of industrial development.
- Communities on the verge of being resettled whose original habitat and indigenous modes of livelihood need to be documented as a template for making the resettlement site ecologically more sustainable, culturally more appropriate, and socially more equitable.
- Communities who have been forced to resettle, often to arid areas inhospitable to their indigenous modes of livelihood (such as fishing

¹³ Indigenous architecture is usually autonomously produced. It is also often well adapted environmentally, and embodies, supports and maintains the integrity of the cultural and livelihood systems of the indigenous population by providing the spaces in which culture and social relationships are lived out. By providing meaning and security, suitable indigenous architecture may significantly reduce the stresses of change in other areas of life. Indigenous architecture is a resource that should be treasured for rural development schemes, such that resettled communities should be able to reconstruct their indigenous vernacular forms of architecture as an expression of their world views and life spaces. Resettlement must thus involve the establishment of an alternative livelihood base for the community as a whole, and not just able-bodied young men.

communities forced to move inland), and who desperately need to find alternative ways of surviving.

- Indigenous nomadic communities whose livelihoods are endangered by their loss of access to the natural resources on which they depend – for example, boat-dwelling sea nomads, whose access to fresh water and littoral resources is increasingly reduced as entire coastlines become either state property or private property.¹⁴
- Indigenous communities on the verge of extinction whose population have dropped below reproductive capacity and who are dying communally – for example, the forest-dwelling indigenous community of Rempang in Riau, whose numbers are now reduced to 20 in an area that is being rapidly deforested (Wee 1985; 1988).

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the story of the high-growth economies is also the story of the lower-growth economies. The high-growth economies did not develop in isolation, but in complement with the lower-growth economies. This pattern of implicational development – that is, development within one economy that implicates other economies – has now spread to almost every country in the region.¹⁵

Conclusion

Riau has changed dramatically in the 1990s. On the one hand, the remapping of Riau into developmental programs such as the Growth Triangle has opened new possibilities for it to make the transition into higher levels of co-operation with the global community, and vice versa. On the other hand, new political formations and economic processes for Riau have led to dramatic shifts in geopolitical and sociopolitical relationships.

As transnational shifts of capital, technology, natural and human resources flow from higher-growth to lower-growth countries, natural and human resources leave in the opposite direction too, to feed into the higher-growth countries. This has had massive consequences for the local Riau rural communities who belong to the lower-growth country and whose livelihoods depend on the very resources that are flowing out. By remapping Riau within such a context for generating wealth, we are simultaneously confronted with the emergence of other realities of and in Riau. Namely, 'What is being exchanged for what?', 'For whose gain is it?', and 'At whose expense is this wealth generated?'

Yet, ambitions to remap Riau in this wider regional developmental program to increase its competitive edge in the global market economy cannot and should not be averted. It must be recognized that monetization and

¹⁴ See the contribution by Cynthia Chou to this volume.

¹⁵ Other new Growth Triangles have been declared, including a triangle encompassing North Sumatra (Indonesia), Penang (Malaysia), and South Thailand; and a triangle encompassing Mindanao (Philippines), Sabah (Malaysia), and Brunei.

industrialization are increasingly pervasive processes, with which rural subsistence economies must coexist if the latter are to survive at all. It is thus important that sustainable livelihoods can thus be viable only if the communities concerned are themselves viable, in terms of their physical, social and cultural well-being. Indigenous knowledge must also find new relevance. This is a necessary precondition to their utilization of vital existing and new resources and to gaining access to the global market.

However, what cannot be ignored is that a number of negative consequences have emerged as a result of the implementation of this regional growth model. Large-scale deforestation caused by logging, infrastructural development, resort and golf-course development, housing and manufacturing have directly and indirectly led to the dislocation of local families and communities. Many have had their land acquired by local governments for public or private development. In many cases, the monetary compensations, usually given to the men only, have subsequently been spent on relocation. A significant number have become landless due to insufficient compensation or knowledge relating to capital investment. Destitution has led to the break-up of families and communities, with both or either spouse and the young and able, heading for towns and cities in search for permanent employment.

Changes brought about by developmental programs become particularly dangerous when they take place rapidly and the social as well as environmental impacts are hidden. This is because these costs are borne privately by local individuals, families and communities, but do not emerge as cost items in the foreign investors' development projects.

In a situation where remapping Riau means that power and money go together, there is an urgent need to find alternative resource bases for the powerless whose livelihood and lives are endangered by the loss of their traditional resources. Indigenous peoples cannot continue successfully as custodians of their environments nor enter the global market economy without adequate capital if their legal rights to land, resources, and sustainable livelihoods are not given due recognition. Development projects that usurp such rights, or fail to safeguard them, will generally and quite rightly be fiercely resisted. Such rights need legal recognition if adequate compensation is to be awarded in the event of resettlement. Indigenous relationships to land and resources must thus be translated into customary laws that are legally valid. This is of relevance in terms of the compensation for land and resource rights for communities undergoing resettlement.

The multiple realities borne by remapping Riau for rapid development and growth can thus either form scenarios of marginalization and disempowerment for its own people or, if the development program is adequately and sensitively implemented, empower its people and place them in the global community.

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