H. Hägerdal
From Batuparang to Ayudhya; Bali and the outside world, 1636-1656


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The problem of how to use Dutch over against indigenous materials in the writing of early modern Indonesian history is a classic one. The history of peoples with a rich literary and cultural heritage but with a lack of first-hand historical documents is apt to be a challenge which a scholar equipped with the traditional tools of historical criticism will find it difficult to meet. Bali is an excellent case in point. In the period between the age of Majapahit and the Dutch presence, in other words, between the sixteenth and the nineteenth century, the island was hardly at a crossroads of political or cultural currents in the Archipelago, being largely left to its own devices. Balinese society was not a passive or an unchanging society, however: it withstood the effects of Islamic incursions, experienced a shift in political system from a strong dynastic centre to powerful local polities, intervened in the affairs of the neighbouring areas, and played a crucial role in the regional slave trade. All this makes serious studies of political, social and economic developments in a wider Indonesian context highly interesting.

Hitherto, relatively few such studies have been undertaken. Though the idea of Bali as a living museum for pre-Islamic Javanese culture hardly misleads serious researchers today, the scarcity of historical studies has helped keep alive a perhaps unintended picture of the island as a kind of hermit kingdom, relatively unaffected by the currents of change affecting maritime Southeast Asia in the early modern era. It is the aim of the present study to challenge this image. I intend to investigate from a number of angles – political, diplomatic, economic – and with the aid of new materials the degree of openness of Bali and the initiative in external affairs taken by the island’s ruling elite over two

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decades in the mid-seventeenth century. Hopefully, this study will constitute a small building block in piecing together a more holistic picture of the often obscure history of Eastern Indonesia during this period, and will enable us to determine whether the broad picture arrived at for the larger region by Reid (1993) and others has any relevance for the Balinese situation. Let us first take a look at the available sources, however.

The sources and their use

Major crises and the quest for legitimation gave rise to the streamlined, but even so quite diverse, mythologizing babad texts. These babad seem to have been written no earlier than the eighteenth century, but mostly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This leaves a considerable gap in the indigenous primary sources between the drying up of the stream of epigraphic data in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the post-1800 period. A great many religious and literary texts were written in this 'pre-modern' period, providing plenty of material for cultural historical studies. With regard to political developments the problems tower sky-high, however. Although a careful deconstruction of more recent historical texts and a comparison with works from other genres may cast some light on historical developments in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it seems obvious that external materials must play a crucial role in any attempt at historical reconstruction for the pre-Dutch period in Balinese history.²

The axiom that chronology is the backbone of history may seem dated in the Balinese context. Nevertheless, when we study the pre-colonial history, it is of the utmost importance to investigate the limited number of accurately dated first-hand sources for the period under investigation carefully. A crucial part is played here by the records of the VOC (Dutch East India Company). The bulky tomes of the Honourable Company, as is well known, often prove stubbornly resistant to the historian's enquiries, while for Bali the materials are not very abundant, moreover. An important problem in this connection is that the Dutch for the most part had a very vague idea of what was actually 'going on'. They apparently interpreted the Balinese situation in terms of their experience of other parts of the Indonesian Archipelago, particularly Java. A few examples of attempts at integrating VOC accounts into historical studies to date are: Bijvanck 1894, on Balinese princes in Lombok in the eighteenth century, De Graaf 1949, on the age of the heroic Raja Panji Sakti in the late seventeenth century, and Schulte Nordholt 1996, on the kingdom of Mengwi in the seventeenth century and later. There are major differences in approach

² The question of how to approach Balinese history, and how to interpret various types of text in each other's light, has been discussed by Adrian Vickers (1990) from rather a different perspective from that adopted in this article.
between these three scholars as regards the use of European materials. Bijvanck based his account solely on this kind of material and does not appear to have been acquainted with the relevant babad texts. De Graaf, with great success, systematically compared the babad traditions concerning Panji Sakti with fragmentary Dutch materials, but did next to nothing to evaluate the cultural implications of the babad accounts. Schulte Nordholt, finally, has worked in the borderland between history and anthropology, placing the various kinds of sources against their cultural backgrounds – a method that has proved most fruitful for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of Balinese history.

For the earlier period, from the first arrival of the Dutch in Bali in 1597 till the mid-seventeenth century, there are a number of reports – the accounts of Lodewycksz and Lintgensz of 1597, the report of the Oosterwijck mission of 1633, and Heurnius' letter of 1638 – which have been published and have been discussed over and over again, by Berg (1927), Hallema (1932), Creese (1991), and Hägerdal (1995). For the period 1636-1656 we additionally have a number of VOC texts, included in the Batavian Letterbook (ARA, The Hague), which so far remain unpublished, however, and have hardly been referred to in the scholarly literature. This material covers the final phase of the rule of a Bali-wide dynastic centre, when signs of internal dissent were becoming visible – a phase that may constitute an appropriate period for further study. The texts are of three kinds. First, there are thirteen letters from Casteel Batavia to various Balinese rulers, generally written in reply to letters from Balinese embassies, which unfortunately have not been found. Then there are three sets of detailed sailing instructions for persons appointed by the VOC as merchants-cum-diplomats. Finally, there are several letters mentioning Bali incidentally, which sometimes contain rather surprising information. These letters are listed in the list of references (A. Unpublished sources) at the end of this article.

What follows will, I am afraid, be reminiscent perhaps of the Bijvanck style of historiography, as my investigation will take its departure from a number of European sources. Even so, the babad accounts, dating in their present form from the eighteenth century and after, will not be left out of consideration. For the purposes of this limited investigation it is necessary to draw a distinction here, however. The Dutch letters are extremely fragmentary sources, as the Casteel Batavia cared little about internal conditions and events in Bali to the extent that they were irrelevant for 3

Handwritten copies of some of the letters are included in the De Graaf collection (KITLV, Collection H.J. de Graaf, 1055, 8), though De Graaf does not seem to have used them (with one exception) in any of his writings. Heeres (1894:179) included a paragraph on Bali in his article on the Lesser Sunda Islands in the 1640's. Although he may have known of some of the letters, he makes little use of them in his brief note on Balinese conditions.
the position and interests of the Dutch. What seemed important to the
Dutch merchant-administrators of the mid-seventeenth century was not
necessarily of note to or even remembered by the babad writers of more
than half a century later. The differences in perspective are so great, in
fact, that it is not always possible to identify events described in these two
kinds of sources with absolute certainty (see Creese 1991; Hagerdal 1995).
The VOC sources as they stand yield some information, when carefully
compared and placed in a wider context, on Bali's relations with the out-
side world – and not only with Batavia – in this period. They provide
clues about political developments on the island. They offer some informa-
tion with regard to its cultural history. And, as texts written by Europeans,
they naturally give some idea of the kind of proto-colonial discourse that
was in vogue at the time where they make Dutch attitudes towards the
Balinese and other Indonesian peoples apparent. All this information can
be used to place Bali in the wider regional context.

With the above-indicated purpose in mind, I shall proceed as follows
in my investigation. First I shall discuss the political situation on the
island as it becomes apparent from these letters. Then I shall deal with
Bali's military relations with its neighbours to the east and west. Third-
ly, I shall describe the diplomatic relations with polities other than
Batavia. Fourthly, I shall analyse the content of the Dutch letters in an
attempt to uncover current conventions and prejudices in Dutch-Balinese
relations. And fifthly, I shall investigate the kinds of trade carried on
here – naturally the main concern of the Dutch in these relations. All this
will be placed against the backdrop of indigenous Balinese views of the
historical past, as well as of political and socio-economic trends in the
Archipelago at the time, which will give rise to some conclusions about
the place of Bali in the Southeast Asian context in this turbulent period of
confrontation and change.

An unstable polity

Until the mid-seventeenth century, Bali was politically dominated by a
dynastic regime centred in Gelgel, which occasionally extended its sphere
of influence to East Java, Lombok and, possibly, Sumbawa. The polity was
important enough to attract some interest from Dutch merchants-turned-
colonizers, the more so as it was non-Muslim. The relations from the first
contacts in 1597 till the demise of the kingdom of Gelgel in the latter half
of the seventeenth century were generally friendly, occasional problems
notwithstanding. Both powers felt threatened by the extensive Muslim
realms of Mataram and Makassar. From time to time, Casteel Batavia
entertained hopes of winning Bali over as an active ally against Mataram,
but all this came to nothing. In 1635 the Balinese single-handedly
expelled Mataram troops which had invaded Balambangan in East Java.
This was the beginning of a long series of clashes between Bali and Mataram, which was to continue beyond the period covered here, and in which the VOC had little part.

After receiving letters from the supreme king of Bali in 1633 and 1636 (Prévost 1763:60; ARA, VOC 858, f.865-6), Casteel Batavia at the end of 1637 or the beginning of 1638 was sent messages by no fewer than three rulers on the island. Of these, the Junior King (*jongen Coninck in lande van Balij*), Radja Tangab⁴, apparently was the highest in rank. The second was Gustij Agongh (also spelt Gustij Agon) *tot Balij*, and the third Key Maes Labba *int lande van Balij*. The letters from the rulers themselves do not seem to have been preserved. In the VOC replies (January 7; ARA, VOC 861), Tangab and Agongh are addressed as Your Highness (*Uwe Hoogh*:t), while Key Maes Labba had to content himself with Your Honour (*U E:e*).

Two of these persons are well known from other sources. From Justus Heurnius' report on Bali of 28 September 1638 (ARA, VOC 1127, f.587) it appears that Tangab was the eldest grandson of the king, born in about 1621/22, that he was disputing the right of succession to the throne with his uncle, Prince Paadjakan (also spelt Pandjakan⁵), and that he was inclined to seek support from the Company. Though not mentioned in the state chronicle, *Babad Dalem*⁶, he appears to be mentioned in a traditional list of dates, called *Pawawatekan*⁷, which states that I Dewa Tangeb was the subject of (royal?) wrath in 1643 A.D.⁸ As for Gustij Agongh, this is our first encounter in a dated document with a representative of the ministerial Agung family. From Balinese *babad*, especially the *Babad Dalem*, we learn that there were two major ministerial

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⁴ I generally use the Dutch spellings of indigenous proper names, particularly as the reconstruction of the original Balinese forms sometimes is problematic. The normal Balinese spelling of this particular name would be Raja Tangeb.

⁵ Consistently spelt Pandjakan in Leupe 1855, although the original text clearly has Paadjakan at the first mention of the name. There are many similar errors in the various text editions by Leupe.

⁶ I have used the Indonesian translation of this important text in Warna et al. 1986.

⁷ I am grateful to Dr. Hedi Hinzler for arranging for a Latin transliteration of this text to be made available for me.

⁸ On the background of this individual, a few pieces of information can be gleaned from various fragments of texts. According to Heurnius, his father, the eldest son of the king, had passed away five years previously. This father was therefore apparently identical with one of the two eldest sons of the king mentioned by Oosterwijck as having passed away in late 1632 or early 1633 – the cremation of the second one to die having taken place on 28 February 1633 (Prévost 1763:52-3). As the eldest (that is, the eldest then living) son, the Dagh-Register version of the Oosterwijck account mentions Pannackan Patiekan, who would in that case be the same person as Radja Paadjakan in the Heurnius letter. It has been argued before (Hägerdal 1995) that these various royal sons can be identified with persons mentioned in the *Babad Dalem* chronicle and the annal-like *Babad Gumi*. The *Babad Dalem* enumerates Dewa Pamayun, Dewa Pacekan and Dewa Ketut as the three eldest sons of Dalem Di Made, one of the last kings of Gelgel (Warna et al. 1986:103). The *Babad Gumi* mentions the death of Dewa Pambayun and Dewa Ketut in Saka 1554 (c. March 1632 - March 1633), and the passing away of Dewa Pacekan in Saka 1572 (c. March 1650 - March 1651). The concurrence between the Dutch and indigenous accounts seems too close for this to be explained as a coincidence.
lineages, allegedly descended from two brothers back in the middle Gelgel period. Of these, the Agungs were the senior lineage and apparently the higher in rank. The junior line of Kaler (also spelt Ler, Lor, Lod) was closer to the royal lineage, however, in that the kings' heirs were regularly born of Kaler mothers. These genealogical details may be correct, or they may be the result of later historiographic streamlining. In any case, members of both families are mentioned from time to time in contemporary sources. In 1633 one of the Kalers, Gusti Panida, appears as principal adviser to the king, while in 1648 what may be a brother of his, Raja Kamasan, is mentioned. According to the babad, the Agungs and Kalers held their position for three generations, until the old Gelgel polity crumbled as a result of internal conflict. One of the Agung lords then made himself ruler; he is known from Dutch and indigenous sources to have died a violent death in 1686.

The third Balinese lord mentioned in the 1638 letters, Key Maes Labba, is otherwise unknown. The name may perhaps be interpreted as Kiyayi (or Ki) Mas Lebah, which title undeniably sounds more Javanese than Balinese, though our knowledge of seventeenth-century indigenous titles is naturally limited. One may thus ask whether a Javanese could have attained a leading political position at the Balinese court at the time.

Judging from the Dutch replies (7 January 1638), Gusti Agung was the most active member of the trio. While the youthful Prince Tangab's main concern was the purchase of two modern guns, for which he sent the (too low) sum of 40 reals, Gusti Agung showed a serious interest in extending commercial relations with the Company. He wanted to send a large prahu to Ambon - a wish that was highly appreciated by Casteel Batavia. The Dutch authorities stated in their reply that not only Gusti

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9 Judging from a comparison between Dutch and Balinese sources, they may be partly correct. According to the Heurnius report (ARA, VOC 1127, f.587), the king's eldest living son, Radja Paadjakan, was born of a sister of one Goustij Painda or Pamda (certainly not 'Goustij Padma', as in Leupe 1855:261), which should perhaps be read as Gusti Panida, which was the name of a Kaler minister known to have existed in 1633. The Babad Dalem actually mentions that the king of Gelgel, Dalem Di Made, married a daughter of the Kaler lord and that his second son was named Dewa Pacekan. The chronicle later seems to imply, however, that the queen was the daughter rather than sister of Gusti Panida (Warna et al. 1986:94-5).

10 The identities of the persons mentioned in the sources during this long period of political erosion are far from clear. A genealogical record entitled Babad Arya Kapakisan (Leiden University Library, LOr 9819) mentions that the third patih of Gelgel, Agung Dimade, had an adoptive brother named Nurah Agung ing Badung, who fathered Agung Jimbaran under the cognomen Badeng, and Agung Anom under the cognomen Geger. Agung Dimade furthermore had a cousin named Lurah Buringkit Bukian. The Babad Gumi states that a Nglurah Agung Bukihan defeated an adversary in 1651 and that an Anglurah Agung Jimbaran came to the fore in 1664-65. The Pawawatekan (Leiden University Library, LOr 3662) also states that the Balinese negara collapsed in 1651, and adds that I Dewa Cawu was made king in that year. One may compare this name with that of a prince called Pannackan 'Jouw, Panouckan t'siauw, and so on, in Dutch sources from 1633-43. According to the Babad Gumi, I Dewa Cawu passed away in Guliang (in Bangli) in April-May 1673, while the Agung usurper was crushed on 31 October 1686. The events of 1651, 1665 and 1686 are all referred to in the VOC sources.
Agung's prahu, but also any other ships with rice, pigs, cattle and other goods from Bali would be welcome and promised that they would issue orders for the Balinese visitors to Amboon and Batavia to be treated well. Key Maes Labba's reply contains little more than noncommittal assurances of friendship, so that his exact motives are not clear.

The next Balinese embassy arrived at Batavia early the following year. In the meantime, quite a few changes appear to have taken place at the Gelgel court. We know something about this from Justus Heurnius (ARA, VOC 1127, f.587; see Leupe 1855:261). By September 1638, Prince Tangab had begun to feel intimidated by his uncle, Prince Paadjakan. The latter was demanding half the realm when the old king should pass away, though his ambitions seem to have gone further than that. Actually, the old king sided with his son and forbade his grandson to keep a 'balega [bale?] of honour' and gold-tipped lances. Heurnius, as a missionary, reported on all this with a particular object in view: if the Company supported Prince Tangab, the Balinese elite might be won over to Christianity.

These hopes were never realized, needless to say. Casteel Batavia accepted the new situation with alacrity, as became apparent when a new embassy with two letters from Bali arrived there in 1639. Of the replies sent by the VOC, one (March 17, ARA, VOC 862) was directed to den Panackan Gede vant Eylandt Balij, the 'brother' of the Company, addressed as Vermogent Coninck and Uwe Maijt. The title Panackan Gede can be translated as 'Grand Prince', the word panackan (also spelt panoeckan, and so on) appearing in several letters as a Balinese title for royal princes. This was most likely the same person as the Prince Paadjakan of Heurnius' letter. As for Prince Tangab, he was not yet completely out of the picture, but now had to do without the title of Junior King. A letter from him was placed before the Company together with that from the Panackan Gede, and the VOC in its reply simply addressed him as its 'brother Panackan Bagus Tangab', whom it sent its best wishes and cordial greetings.

As regards the content of these Dutch replies, they included some unpleasant details about Balinese debts to the Company and a few pieces of information about the political situation in the region, ending in the usual, rather stereotyped, courtesies. It further appears from this that the Panackan Gede had recently been in contact with the Dutch post in Ambon. This will be discussed in detail below, but what should be noted here is the rather complicated picture of the unstable dynast-political situation that emerges from these scraps of information. The senior ruler did not

11 In the documents pertaining to Bali, the Dutch never used the personal name or title of the paramount ruler of the island, but just addressed him as 'King of Bali'. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Panackan Gede was the senior king, the more so as the latter was never referred to as 'brother' in any of the letters. One may compare the title with that of the heir apparent of Jambi, Pangeran Gede (d. 1630), in the same period.
Hans Hägerdal

participate in the diplomatic activities at this stage – actually he is not even referred to in the five letters of 1638-39. As his eldest grandson was born in c. 1621/22, the king must have been relatively old at the time, and may therefore no longer have played an active part in politics. According to Oosterwijk's report he had retired into inactivity and isolation already in 1632-33.\(^\text{12}\)

Possibly he passed away shortly after the 1639 mission, as the paramount king or kings figuring in letters from the 1640's testify to a high degree of external activity. A possible hint of this may be contained in the next exchange of letters, for in November 1643 yet another prince, Pannoeckantchau (also spelt Panacansiauw), lodged a complaint with the VOC on behalf of the paramount ruler, who was now referred to by the seemingly high title of *Sousounangh*, or Susuhunan (ARA, VOC 867). Pannoeckantchau was a familiar figure to the Dutch. In 1633 and 1636 he is mentioned as the king's brother who assisted the king in his dealings with the VOC. In 1643, too, he functioned as a broker, as he negotiated with the Company about a certain sum of money the Susuhunan had claimed from it four years previously for paddy delivered to a Dutch embassy in 1633. If this claim was made in the course of one of the embassies of the late 1630's, the Susuhunan would be the same person as either Prince Tangab or the Grand Prince – perhaps rather the latter, as the person who delivered the paddy in 1633 was Pannackan Patiekan, most probably the same individual as Radja Paadjakan and the Panackan Gede (Colenbrander 1898: 182-4). This is no more than a reasonable guess, but the Batavian Letter-book in any case does not mention any further exchanges in these years.\(^\text{13}\)

The remaining letters from this period that I studied (those of 18 January 1646, 31 December 1647, 9 February 1650, 10 March 1651, and 10 February 1656) were all addressed to (at least two) persons referred to quite simply as 'the King of Bali'. This does not mean that the unstable dynast-political situation had been resolved. As I have indicated before

\(^{12}\) It would seem that the king ruling in 1633 was the same as the one who was sent a letter in 1636; in both cases this king had a brother the Dutch called Pannackan t'Jouw / Panouckan t'siauw. Nevertheless, a few Portuguese reports of 1635 speak of a young king whose father and predecessor is referred to as being deceased (Jacobs 1988:35). Perhaps he is identical with the Junior King Tangab, whose father was in fact dead at the time. In a letter to the king's brother, the aforementioned Raedja Panouckan t'siauw, in 1636, the ruler is referred to as 'the old prince' (*denouden pangoran*), implying perhaps that there was a junior one (ARA, VOC 858, f.867).

\(^{13}\) In the summer of 1639 the Balinese asked the Dutch for help against an assault by Mataram. Naturally, they would then have been in no position to assert a claim of this kind. The Balinese 'annals' *Babad Gumi* and *Babad Bhumi* mention the death of the ruler Dewa (Dalem) Di Made in Saka 1564 (c. March 1642 - March 1643) and his succession by Dewa Pacekan (his son, according to the state chronicle *Babad Dalem*), who passed away in Saka 1572 (c. March 1650 - March 1651). The *Pawawatekan* mentions Dewa Pakrisan (possibly a corruption of Pacekan) as king in Saka 1572. The death of a ruler in the latter year is confirmed by a VOC source, so that the former date may possibly be more or less correct as well. The *Pawawatekan* conveys the impression that Prince Tangab (Tangeb) may have died a violent death shortly after the decease of the old king (see Appendix C).
From Batuparang to Ayudhya

(Hägerdal 1995:118), there are problems in identifying the addressee of the letter of 1647, as one Dutch memorandum asserts that the VOC schenckagie was actually directed to a certain Raja Kamasan (Heeres 1895:428-9). This is a rather enigmatic detail, as the paramount kings were otherwise never referred by their personal names. Could it be that minor rulers masqueraded as 'kings of Bali' in this period? Or was the person occupying the throne at the time completely overshadowed by some relative or minister? As regards the letter of 1656, it was sent only after the (temporary) conclusion of a rather violent civil war (c. 1651-1655) following the death of the senior king. This was the last time, to my knowledge, that the Dutch approached what they believed to be a ruler of the whole of Bali. Already in 1657 there is mention of two minor kings, Radja Longnan and Radja Kalerangh, while for the next decade and beyond there is ample evidence of internecine fighting and the emergence of new local leaders (De Hullu 1904:114-6; De Jonge 1872:94).

A final, and crucial question in this context must be whether the Dutch actually established contact with a Bali-wide dynastic regime at all. They apparently believed they did, but the question is of course how much they understood about local power relations: they may very well have interpreted the local situation in Bali from their experience with Mataram. Some modern scholars (e.g., Schulte Nordholt 1980:42-3; Creese 1993:8) have cast doubt on the supposed hegemony of the court of Gelgel, as this kingdom appears from European sources to be centred on the densely populated rice-growing area of South Bali. I would like to point out here that our material contains three explicit statements, which have not so far attracted any attention, that make it likely that at least the north coast formed part of the realm. A Chinese trader carrying a letter and some gifts for the VOC from the king, whose ship was lost at sea in 1619, later reported to the Company authorities that the island was ruled by 33 petty kings, headed by the paramount ruler, Raja Dalem. In the same context he stated that the place to cast anchor at was Bukti, on the central northern coast (Colenbrander and Coolhaas 1919-53 VII-I:414-5). Even more

16 Bukti, though not very significant today, seems to have enjoyed a certain importance in premodern times. It is the only place on the north coast mentioned on the map of Java and Bali in Mandelslo (1719: facing p. 356), for example.
unambiguous data are provided by the manuscript of the Jan Oosterwijck mission, which was published in French translation in Prévost (1763:52-61) and which contains much information that is not found in the Dagh-Register version: in February 1633 the Dutch embassy arrived in the waters off Buleleng-Penarukan-Sangsit, where it first had a meeting with envoys from the king of Gelgel and his ministers\textsuperscript{17} before receiving permission to proceed to Padang and Kutarawos\textsuperscript{18} on the south coast. It is further clear from this account that the syahbandar of Penarukan was loyal to the said king. The third piece of information is provided by the sailing instructions for Henricq Graman (18 January 1646, ARA, VOC 870). According to these, the Dutch ships, after buying provisions in South Bali on their way to Banda, were to leave some men on the island. These persons were to travel overland to Buleleng, under escort of the king's men, in order to purchase more commodities and then to be picked up by the Dutch ships on their return from Banda to Batavia. Though the Dutch may not have understood much of the political situation on the island, these statements in any case seem to show that the regime was not restricted to South Bali.

The picture of the political situation on the island that we can piece together from these fragments is quite vague and inadequate, of course. But with due reservations, we can say that the various pieces of information seem to point to serious structural problems in the Balinese polity. European reports from 1597 onward emphasize the crucial role of personal loyalty to the paramount ruler on the part of the minor lords, while the same impression is conveyed by the babad tradition. This tradition furthermore assigns the kings a relatively passive role in the conduct of state affairs, in spite of their alleged charisma; it is rather their ministers who are the active element in the polity. This seems to be supported by the available European sources. In fact, the Dutch may even have mistaken powerful ministers for ruling kings. Although in the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century occasional strong personalities on the throne, and particularly strong ministers at the side of such figures, may have succeeded in maintaining a

\textsuperscript{17} The Dutch received two envoys from the king, two from Gusti Panida, and four from Jure Mandewan (also spelt Mandawan). In an earlier article (Hägerdal 1995) I associated the latter minister with the desa of Mandwang in Klungkung. One might alternatively think of Banjar Mandowan, however, which was a place in Buleleng that was later destroyed by the mud flow of 1815 (Van Bloemen Waanders 1868:389). If this is correct, Jure Mandewan, who is mentioned as the most important minister together with Gusti Panida, may have represented the north at the royal court. Gusti Panida himself had a residence at Seban, probably Sibang, which was later the stronghold of a branch of the Mengwi dynasty, which may have descended from him (Schulte Nordholt 1996:24, 47).

\textsuperscript{18} Dutch reports from 1597 onward mention Couteraes, Catros, Cottarawes, Couterawas, and so on, as being located at what today is Labuan Amok. The name is not completely forgotten in the historical traditions. For instance a list of chronograms, Babad Gumi (Leiden University Library, LOr 10.548), mentions a war between two local rulers, Anglurah Agung and Anglurah Sidemen, at Kutarawos in June-July 1669. This is yet another reminder that indigenous sources are likely to contain much valuable factual historical information.
rather fragile balance between king, minister and local lord, the absence of clear regulations governing the royal succession and the precarious position (lack of integration?) of the main ministerial families in the polity made the system increasingly vulnerable to disintegration. The impression we gain from the sources is that it crumbled from the top down rather than from the bottom up, as the various rulers mentioned in the Dutch letters appear to be princes or high ministers rather than petty local potentates and there is no evidence of independently acting local kings before the late 1650's. Of course, deeper social and economic causes should not be underestimated in this connection. The environmental deterioration connected with the 'seventeenth-century crisis' may have played a part in encouraging competition for scarce resources among the ruling elite, though this is hard to prove on the basis of either European sources or the babad tradition.

There is more to the picture, however. As will become apparent from the following discussion, Balinese leaders in the period under scrutiny displayed quite a surprising degree of initiative in establishing diplomatic relations and undertaking political enterprises. After the description of the internal political situation, it is now time to turn to the external scene.

The threat from Mataram

Before the outbreak of full-scale hostilities, the attitude of the Balinese elite towards the realm of Mataram appears to have been one of unqualified contempt. In 1633 the Balinese king venomously referred to the Susuhunan as Key Patee, Kiyai Patih, 'treating him on the same level as the other petty kings of the island who were subject to His Majesty' (Prévost 1763:60). Perhaps this treatment contained allusions to the origins of the upstart Mataram dynasty, which were very recent, in contrast to those of the Balinese kings, who seem to have claimed descent from pre-Muslim Javanese royalty even at this time. Furthermore, Balinese nobles

19 Gerret Vermeulen (1677:61-4), who visited Bali in 1667-68, still mentions a sovereign king who had the hegemony over the various petty rulers. He further tells an undated story of a Christian from Ambon who became the confidant of this king but later plotted with the VOC and was cut in slices on being found out. This is apparently a reference to Jan Troet, killed in 1672/73; the paramount king would then be none other than Gusti Panji Sakti of Buleleng in the north (Vickers 1989:16-8). Local leaders were apparently apt to be identified as paramount kings of Bali at least in the latter part of the seventeenth century, therefore.

20 The legend of Majapahit origins was probably constructed in stages. In the sixteenth century, the Balinese rulers were believed to be descended from the royal family of Bambangan, which in turn was closely related to the late Majapahit patih family. The first dated reference to the myth of Majapahit descent to my knowledge is contained in a letter of 14 February 1714 from the Surabaya administrator Metsue, who says that a Ratou Madja-Payt had given a pregnant wife of his in marriage to the local governor of Bali, 'from which union the following kings of the island successively were allegedly descended, and from which their reported pretensions surely stem' (KITLV, Collection H.J. de Graaf, 1055, 8).
asserted that 'the king ... possessed enough and wanted for nothing save ships for transportation; that he did not consider Madura, Sourabaya, Gressic and Joartan worth the trouble of an attack and could make himself master of them whenever he wished; and that His Majesty was considering some bigger venture against Mataram, but would not start anything until he was able to carry it out effectively' (Prévost 1763:54). Susuhunan Amangkurat I seems to have been very concerned to subdue Bali, as is shown by his repeated measures against the island and his enquiries about Dutch relations with the Balinese (Van der Chijs 1888:123, 125; De Hullu 1903:111-2). It was a matter of Susuhunan against Susuhunan, though the sources contain only vague hints at the prestige issues at stake.

To what extent religion was an issue is debatable. Conversions to Islam by members of the ruling elite were not acceptable to the Balinese king, but commoners had freedom of choice (Leupe 1855:260). There were occasional Javanese and Sundanese religious missions to the island, while in c. 1634 Makassar sent embassies there to impose a conversion, though to no avail (Wessels 1923:438-9). However, the Balinese brand of Hinduism was so intimately connected with the particular Balinese environment that slaves obliged to leave their island for Java and other places were regularly converted to Islam, at least nominally (unlike the present-day Balinese transmigrants). The Balinese monarch as a world ruler in the classical Javanese style probably was more of a nuisance to Mataram than the 'pagan' condition of the people; in any case, the Susuhunan's descendants several decades later approached local Balinese rajas for strategic alliances with no obvious misgivings.

De Graaf (1958:255-63; 1961:25-7) has given a detailed description of five documented Mataram incursions in Balambangan, namely in late 1635, in 1636/37, in 1638, in the summer of 1639, and in February 1647. On the two latter occasions, attempts were even made to attack Bali itself. The result was always the same: after an initial phase of devastation of Balambangan territory by Mataram, the Balinese would eventually return to drive the invaders away and resume their suzerainty over the area. On the last occasion, the Balinese king is said in a Javanese babad to have been the initial aggressor, sending an envoy to threaten the Susuhunan and thus provoking the invasion (Ricklefs 1978:47). The babad represent the 1647 war as a series of initial victories by Mataram over the Balinese and their East Javanese ally Tawangalun, first at Batapura and later in a naval battle off the Balinese coast (if this is true, this is the only known naval battle in Balinese history prior to 1942), after which the Javanese, plagued by sickness, withdrew like beggars, many of them dying on the road (Ricklefs 1978:51). Even less glorious is the picture of the war painted in the Dutch General Missives: after considerable losses on both sides, the army of Mataram simply fell apart and returned home to salvage the harvest (Coolhaas 1964:309-10). There are similar accounts in Balinese
texts; according to the *Pawawatekan*, Balambangan was overrun by Sang Arurah Agung ring Madhya (presumably the Gusti Agung of 1638 and the Gusti Agung Di Made of the *Babad Dalem*) in Saka 1568 (c. March 1646 - March 1647 A.D.), which led to the arrival of Sang Hyang Tawangalun. This would represent the first stage in the conflict, and provide the reason for the Susuhunan's intervention. According to the more recent chronicle *Sejarah (Babad) Arya Tabanan*, lord Gusti Wayahan Pamedekan of Tabanan went to Java in the late Gelgel period to fight the raja of Mataram, suffering a serious defeat. In the annal-like *Babad Bhumi*, there is mention of the death of Putu (= Wayahan) Tabanan in Balambangan in the Saka year 1568. This presumably represented the second stage in the conflict, namely the initial Balinese defeat (though it is possible that later tradition telescoped the fighting of 1635-47 into this single battle). Another annal-like text, the *Babad Gumi*, relates how Dewa Pacekan, of the Gelgel royal family, visited Batur, the mountain temple that is important throughout the whole of Bali, in Saka 1568, and thereafter went to Kuta near the southern sea, attacking the warriors of Mataram (*mangintarang pamating* = repulsing the vagabonds?). This might be the third stage, that of the retreat of the Javanese after the naval battle.

In the letters I have studied, the feelings of the Balinese elite are occasionally reflected in the Dutch replies. So Casteel Batavia was obliged in 1639 to assure the Panackan Gede, as a useful though unpredictable ally, that the fact that the Dutch had initiated diplomatic activities in Mataram did not mean that the VOC had lost its concern with Bali (which actually it soon would). The Dutch wrote to him: 'There are rumours that the Matteram intends to wage war on Bantam and to make peace with us; time will tell, and we will remain vigilant. If he should go to Balij and you need our help, let us know in time, so that we may help and support each other as friends, as Balij and Batavia are one, like man and wife.' (ARA, VOC 862.)

On the same occasion, Prince Tangab made a very unusual request to the Dutch, which again testifies to the rather arrogant Balinese attitude towards Mataram. The Dutch had good reason to decline this request, writing: 'We would certainly be pleased to send Your Highness some Javanese for Your amusement [*vermaeck*], in accordance with [Your] request, but, as the Mattaram is still keeping many Dutch citizens prisoner, this is impossible, as we need to keep them for an exchange [of prisoners] and the release [of the Dutch]. We trust that Your Highness will understand.'

In the sailing instructions drawn up from time to time for voyages to Bali, the issue of a joint Batavia-Bali front is a recurring theme. The merchant Johannes Fochestart received detailed instructions (25 November 1644) on how to behave when visiting the Balinese court. He was to:

'Try and cast anchor near the *negrije* of Gilgil, then go ashore and present yourself to the king and notables, telling them that you have stopped by to procure a number
of cattle and other commodities, then immediately to return to your own quarters. Kindly therefore prepare your request to the one and the other beforehand, as you will have to put it to them quickly. To speed things up, you are to present a modest gift, in addition to conveying our regards and making an offer of any assistance they may need against the Mattaram or any other of their and the Company's enemies, which we will lend them readily, and to emphasize that we want to continue in our genuine friendship with them as long as the sun and the moon continue to shine, with a view to controlling our opponents.'

The question is, how did the Company live up to these lofty promises? Seen from the long perspective, the check placed on Mataram's and Makassar's military potential in the seventeenth century may well have 'saved' Bali (Schulte Nordholt 1986:13). Southeast Asian naval forces in this period had little chance against Dutch ships. Of this the Balinese and their East Javanese allies were given a convincing demonstration in 1635, when Pieter van der Camer badly mauled a considerable fleet from Mataram in the waters off Balambangan with a single ship (De Graaf 1958:258; see Reid 1993:229). Viewed from a shorter perspective, however, the VOC appears to have done very little to help its so-called friends. A few months after the 1639 mission, the storm broke when Mataram forces invaded the hapless Hindu part of East Java and attacked Bali itself. The Balinese king (which one?) asked for three or four ships to drive off the invaders, but the Company had little inclination to send these for the moment, trusting that the island would fend for itself. Active assistance would only endanger the Company's food supply channels in Java (De Jonge 1870:241). In its correspondence with the lords of Mataram, the VOC nevertheless displayed a degree firmness with respect to Bali. So Governor Anthony van Diemen wrote to the magnate Kiai Ngabehi Direndaka (24 April 1640): 'As far as Balij is concerned: the inhabitants of that island are our friends. The king has asked for help, but in this important matter no decision has yet been taken, except that we have ordered our fleet in Amboina to call at that island and take the Dutch there to Batavia' (ARA, VOC 863). In a letter to the Dutch prisoners in Mataram, written on the same day, Van Diemen and Cornelis van der Lijn cautiously added: 'It would be a good thing if the fleet destined for Balij could be delayed a little, as there is cause for fear that there might be trouble in the event of our ships having an encounter. When we shall be at peace with the Sousounnangh, we will have no cause for concern about either this or other wars' (ARA, VOC 863).

These words were confirmed to some extent by subsequent political developments. After the conclusion of a peace between the VOC and Mataram in 1646, the Susuhunan is reported even to have purchased arms from Batavia with which to attack the Balinese territories (Heeres 1894:179)! In their letter to the Balinese king of 1647, the Dutch adopted a remarkably cold tone, complaining about the high prices of Balinese commodities and ill-treatment of Dutch visitors by the king's subjects (ARA,
VOC 872, f.3). Nevertheless, the continued existence of an anti-Mataram force in the eastern region must still have been in the Company's interest, and diplomatic relations between the Dutch and Bali continued as long as there was a Bali-wide dynastic regime. A renewed attempt at persuading Bali to join forces with the VOC against the Susuhunan in 1651 failed, as the old ruler had died and 'everyone ... wanted to be king' (De Jonge 1872: 22-4). Soon enough, in 1655, when to the Company's detriment Amangkurat I closed the ports of his realm, however, the old treaty became vitally important. Bali had been the scene of a violent civil war since the succession crisis of c. 1651, but by a lucky coincidence a victor emerged at the same time as the Company was desperately trying to find new sources of provisions. The Dutch were quick to send a small merchant fleet under Dirck Schouten, provided with detailed instructions, to the island.

As the Susouhounangh [of] Mataram has kept his ports closed for the past few months and has not allowed any rice to be exported from them, we are forced to look for other places supplying rice, so as not to be short of it and to be able to feed the thousands of souls living in the Batavia district. Accordingly it has been deemed proper among other things to send the flutes Campen and Witte Valck along with the aforementioned yacht De Schol eastwards, first to Palembangh [sic, Balambangan] at the eastern end of Java, being a place which comes under the authority of the Balinese and which has proved capable of supplying particularly good quantities of rice; then on to Balij, Lombock and Bima, or until such time as the aforementioned ships have taken aboard a full cargo, so that they may return home. As Palembangh and Lombock come under the authority of Balij, where, we understand, after numerous internal troubles and disturbances finally a young king has come to the throne and pacified the country, we have seen fit to congratulate him in his new function so as to establish relations of friendship and cooperation, in case he may be prepared in the future, or tomorrow, to help us in our opposition to the machinations of the aforementioned Susouhounangh [of] Mataram, since none of the neighbouring princes have such good opportunities of causing him damage as those of Bali.'

We might add that this enterprise ended in disaster: The 'murderous inhabitants' of Balambangan approached the Europeans 'under the guise of friendship' and then slaughtered junior merchant Barent Hunius and fifteen or sixteen other Dutchmen (ARA, VOC 880, f.144-7; Coolhaas 1968:91). The attempt to purchase rice was unsuccessful, too. Food had to be secured in other quarters, such as Ayudhya, until the ports should be opened again the following year.

\[21\] Actually the letter to the king itself does not mention any anti-Mataram front, containing as it does little more than elaborately phrased courtesies. Other subjects were to be put forward personally by the Company's envoy, Jacob Bacharach (ARA, VOC 875, f.121). This gives some idea of the fragmentary nature of the information that may be gleaned from the official letters.

\[22\] The Babad Bhumi, in an enumeration of a number of decisive events in the history of Gelgel, mentions a fight between the Agung and Kaler ministerial families in 1655, the outcome of which is unknown (see Appendix B.).
In conclusion a remark should be made about the title Susuhunan, which as we know had been borne by the monarchs of Mataram since 1624, and which may have been borrowed from earlier Muslim priestly rulers in Java (De Graaf 1958:127-9). The emergence of this title in connection with a Balinese ruler in 1643 raises further questions about the relations between the two regimes. The sovereign kings of Klungkung, the heirs of the Gelgel lineage, used this title in their external contacts until the Dutch conquest of Bali in 1908. In the state chronicle Babad Dalem, on the other hand, the kings are never referred to as Susuhunan. If the title was indeed used only in external contacts, it may have been a direct borrowing from the vocabulary of royalty of Mataram. In spite of all the contempt for the 'Kiyayi Patih' which the Balinese nobles displayed in 1633, the former's power and splendour did not fail to exert its influence on the court culture of his rivals.

The case of Batuparang

It is common encyclopaedia and textbook wisdom that Lombok was subdued by Bali in or before 1740. The original source of this information seems to be a statement in a memorandum written by the VOC authorities in Makassar that 'Salemparang' was taken by the Balinese in 1738-1740 (KITLV, Litg-voet, H 226, f.320). It has long been known that this was merely the final phase of a long-drawn-out contest, De Graaf (1941) having established that the principal Balinese conquests took place from c. 1691-97.24 Balinese dominance over Lombok long before these dates, in the first years of the seventeenth century, is claimed in a Dutch account, while early claims are also made in the Babad Dalem (De Jonge 1865:160; Warna et al. 1986:84, 103). Of the history of relations between Bali and Lombok in the seventeenth century, the thread is rather confused, though a valiant attempt at reconstruction has been made by De Graaf (1941). Noorduyn (1987) established that Makassar first dominated Sumbawa - also an object of Balinese claims - in 1618. In 1620 the Balinese king asked the Company for help against Makassarese aggression as well as against internal rebels, demanding two ships to defend Lombok against possible incursions. The VOC, of course, found an excuse to decline the request (De Jonge 1869:207; Colenbrander and Coolhaas 1919-53, VII-I:625).

23 In a forthcoming article, I will investigate what actually happened in about 1740. According to one tradition, the (half-?)Balinese prince Gusti Wayahan Tegeh went to Lombok to organize its government in that year (Vickers 1986:332).
24 Compare the entry in the Babad Gumi (Leiden University Library, LoR 10.548), according to which the Sasak kingdom of Langko, in South Central Lombok, was defeated by Made Karangasem in 1691.
25 The Balinese list of dates Pangrincik Babad, written before the late nineteenth century, states that Bayan in North Lombok was attacked by unspecified enemies in 1619. Two later lists (KITLV, Collection V.E. Korn, Or. 435, 240; and Leiden University Library, Collection C.C. Berg, Collection C.C. Berg.
some letters from 1633 describing the Balinese ruler as overlord of a considerable stretch of territory, from Blitar and Panarukan in the west to Lombok and Sumbawa in the east (De Jonge 1870:201-3). This information is incorrect in part, however, as Sumbawa had already been subjugated by Makassar - whatever that meant in practice - so that the Balinese claims were perhaps little more than idle pretensions. There is a Makassarese lontar text containing the rather vague statement that 'the people of Selaparang in Bali' sought the protection of Karaeng Matowaya of Tallo' (r. 1593-1636), as did those of Pasir, Berau and Kutai (Rahim and Borahima 1975:17). This ties in with the VOC statement that there was a Makassarese force on its way to chastise the 'rebels' in Lombok in 1640, so that the island (or part of it) may have come within the sphere of influence of Makassar in the period 1620-36. For the next decades until the 1670's, De Graaf found no information at all on the position of the island. Fortunately, a few further pieces of information are provided by the letters under investigation here.

In the first days of the year 1646, three Balinese envoys arrived in Batavia, bringing with them a prisoner and carrying an unpleasant message apparently posing a threat to Batavia's relations with Bali. An explanatory reply was drawn up (January 18), which deserves to be quoted in part.

'This letter is sent to the all-powerful and famous King of Balij by the Council of the Indies, which wishes His Highness a long life on earth and victory over all his enemies.

Sire, we have been handed Your Highness's missive by Your envoys Kinamatta, Kemonjoucka and Kemoucka, along with Nachoda Mostaffa, who after the conquest of Batouparrangh by Your Highness's people was taken prisoner there because he is alleged to have aided that place by supplying munitions. We have questioned him about this, and he solemnly denies it, saying he had come to be in Batouparrangh due to a contrary wind, having had the intention of going to Balij to trade his wares there in accordance with the permit issued by us, after that to return, as he is a resident here and a subject of ours. We therefore request Your Highness to kindly excuse this error and return what may be left of his goods to our captain ...'

B, 41, Tattwa Batur Kalawasan) mention warfare in 'Biasa Gili, Labuhan Lombok' in 1615. Crawfurd (1820) asserts that the Makassarese made an agreement of some sort with the Balinese in 1624, though some of his early dates for the history of Sulawesi are unreliable. Perhaps the event is connected with the Makassarese expedition to Sumbawa of 1626. The curious statement that Bima had been snatched from the king of Bali in c. 1633 (Leupe 1856:30) presumably has some connection with the rebellion against the pro-Makassarese ruler of the kingdom of Bima in 1632-33, which was ruthlessly quashed by Makassarese forces (Noorduyn 1987:330-1). The rebels, who were opposed to the Makassarese overlords' harsh policy of Islamization of the island, may have applied for help to the Balinese ruler. Pangarsa (1992:91) briefly mentions a local text from 1631 describing a Balinese aristocrat who was in power in the village of Karanglangu in North Lombok. This text seems to deserve further study.
The remainder of the letter is devoted to repeated assurances of eternal friendship, plus a request to give the merchant Henricq Graman a friendly reception. Graman, accompanied by two ships, would take the letter to Bali, where he was sailing with the intention of buying cattle, horses, cotton, and women (the last item not being mentioned in the letter), 'to further Bali's and Batavia's prosperity, to the chagrin of our mutual enemies (onse beyder vijanden)'.

Although no more is heard about the battle of Batouparrangh from the Dutch sources, the story does not end there. So we must now enter the world of Balinese historical tradition. This tradition has recently been demonstrated to display a much more varied character on the point of style, function and reliability than has hitherto been assumed (Schulte Nordholt 1996). We have already had cause to mention the Balinese lists of dates of memorable events in which the years are specified by means of chronograms (candrasangkala). While some of these lists present the dates in strict chronological order and are sufficiently detailed to be described as annals, others are no more than compendia in which dates are presented haphazardly. While many of these dates are obviously mythical or fictitious, some of them, it has been argued, can be checked against other, particularly Dutch, sources with positive success (Hagerdal 1995). Furthermore, the dates sometimes include the exact day according to the 210-day pawukon calendar as well as the lunar calendar, and where these dates are internally consistent, the chances are that they are based on actual observations.

One of these lists, the Babad Tusun, is included in a compendium entitled Bungkahing Sundari-Terus (Leiden University Library, LOr 13.192), which otherwise contains texts on divination and so on. It comprises 42 chronograms, not arranged in chronological order. Most of the dates are also found in other compendia. While there are several mythical entries mentioning particulars of certain mountains and rivers, 24 are concerned with dramatic events from the years Saka 1415 (A.D. 1493) to Saka 1567 (A.D. 1645). The last two entries, interestingly enough, refer to the same event as the Dutch letter quoted above. The first of these entries simply states: 'Defeat of Batuparang, Parigi, Samalyan, Bayan, resi gana bhuta tunggal, 1567 (1645)'. The second provides a few more details, saying: 'Eclipse of the moon, at the time when Gusti Agung was still (?) in Padang, the day being Ca., Wa., the week Dukut, in the third month (August-September), at the time when Gusti Agung sent a message to

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28 This is true in particular of the Babad Gumi, which lists events up to the Saka year 1614 (A.D. 1692). In the case of the later dates in this list, namely from the 1660's onward, the month is usually given, and for eight events taking place in the period from 1675 to 1692, the exact day as well. In five or six of these eight cases (depending on how a particular chronogram word is interpreted), the date and month of the pawukon cycle are internally consistent.

29 'Kawon Batuparang, Parigi, Samalyan, Bayan, resi gana bhuta tunggal, 1567.'
Batuparang, resi gana bhuta tunggal, 1567 (1645). The correspondence is exact: the war in question had of course started at least a few months before the VOC letter was written. The relative detail of the final entry and the actual occurrence of a lunar eclipse on the pawukon calendar date mentioned (7 August 1645) also suggest that it is ultimately based on genuine observation. Perhaps the list was even compiled at that particular time.

We now need to establish the identity of Batuparang. The place by this name should presumably be sought in Lombok. As regards the other names mentioned here, parigi (perigi) is the name of a sacred stone in Sasak traditions, while the word forms part of the names of some sacred places in East Lombok (Goris 1936:242-3). What the chronogram is referring to here presumably is a village immediately to the north of the traditional court centre of Selaparang. The Babad Lombok frequently refers to this place, often together with Selaparang (Suparman 1994:359, 400-6). Bayan is a place lying in the north of Lombok, while ‘Samalyan’ may be identifiable with Sembalun or Sembelia in the north-east, or else with Semayan, a place close to Praya. All these places are well-known traditional centres. The Pamancangah Karangasem (Leiden University Library, Collection C.C. Berg, 118, 3), a genealogical record from c. 1900, occasionally refers to Lombok-Selaparang as Watumarang, which may well derive from Batuparang. As the words batu and sela are more or less the same in meaning, Batuparang may quite simply have to be understood as an older or alternative name for the kingdom of Selaparang, which had its centre in East Lombok. In this connection, it is interesting to take note of a chronogram in another list, the Pawawatekan, which mentions ‘the return of Raden Sebit to Langkong, overrun by the people of Sang Anglurah Agung ... May-June ... 1567 (1645)’. Langkong is Langko, a principality in South Central Lombok, so that the statement may imply an even earlier incursion into the Sasak lands.

To sum up, the senior minister of the paramount king of Bali, Gusti Agung, emerges as quite an important political figure in this period, as he does also in other sources. After an earlier raid, he would have set out for the Sasak principalities in about August 1645, successfully capturing a number of important centres, perhaps in an anti-clockwise direction from east to north, and in the process finding a Muslim subject of the Company in

30 Kapangan ulan, duk ing Gusti Agung kantoning Padang, samangkana dina Ca., Wa., wara Dukut, sasih ka 3, duk ing Gusti Agung maputusan ka Batuparang, samangkana resi gana bhuta tunggal, 1567. The pawukon elements would correspond to the 198th day of this cycle, which in 1645 occurred on 7 August, when there was in fact a lunar eclipse. However, 7 August was half a month before the beginning of the third Balinese month.
31 ‘Duk Raden Sebit, mulih ring desane ring Lamngkong [Langkong], kalurug dening wadwane Sanganglurah Agung, ring dina U, Mrakih, Ra, sasih Saddha, rah 7, tenggek 6, Resi annggani bhuta tunggal, 1567.’ The pawukon elements would correspond to 22 May 1645, though once again this would be a few days before the beginning of the given month. This gives rise to the question of whether there may have been some irregularity in the calendar in this year.
suspicious circumstances, to the annoyance of the king. Further details can only be guessed at. If the Balinese soldiers departed from Padangbai, did they first land on the west coast, to proceed to Selaparang by the overland route? Did West Lombok remain under Balinese influence throughout this period? Moreover, what role did Makassar play in these conflicts? It is, in fact, rather remarkable that the fierce Balinese attack took place in a period when Makassarese influence in East Indonesia was at its greatest. Casteel Batavia apparently had no desire to interfere in these events, speaking very vaguely of 'our mutual enemies'. Because of its strained, though temporarily peaceful, relations with Makassar, the Company seems to have been reluctant to discuss the hostility between this realm and Bali, as was also apparent on the occasion of the Oosterwijck mission of 1633 (Leupe 1856:15).

That there were close dynastic relations between Selaparang and Sumbawa in this period has been pointed out by De Graaf (1941:360; see Noorduyn 1987:318, and Ras 1968:513). The king who came to power in (West) Sumbawa in 1648 was the son of Adipati Topati, a ruler of Selaparang who seems to have lived at least until the 1660's. To complicate matters further, the half-brothers of this new king, who later appear to have opposed the Sumbawa branch of the family, were apparently born of a noble Balinese mother (De Graaf 1941:358). Thus the Sasak royal family was connected by blood ties to its neighbours across the Lombok Strait as well as those on the other side of the Alas Strait. The political implications of this are only vaguely visible. What these affinal ties seem to suggest, however, is that the wars in this period were not a clear-cut Balinese-versus-Sasak affair.

How did the Sumbawan princes or their Makassarese overlords react to the renewed Balinese campaigning? About this we hear nothing, while it should be pointed out that Balinese traditions speak of wars with Java and Lombok but not with Makassar. Actually, the Makassarese chronicles repeatedly state that the people of Selaparang were not the 'slaves' of the rulers of Makassar but sought the latter's protection of their own free will, presumably managing their own affairs to quite a large extent (Noorduyn 1987:318, 322-3). In the sailing instructions for Dirck Schouten (10 February 1656), a clear distinction is drawn between 'Sassack Lumbock', as coming under the authority of Bali, and Bima on Sumbawa, which is

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32 One may perhaps compare this with the story in the Babad Dalem and other chronicles of an ultimately successful expedition to Lombok in the late Gelgel period. Sumbawan traditions place the Balinese conquest of Selaparang in 1051 H. (A.D. 1641), which is very close to the battle of Batuparang (Manca 1984:58-60). The later Sasak chronicles telescope the long history of Balinese interference in Lombok into a single event, concentrating on the 'treason' of the Sasak nobleman Arya Banjar Getas (or Wira Candra), who asked the Balinese of Karangasem to invade the Sasak principalities (Suparman 1994:4-5).

33 The Babad Lombok, too, mentions a raja of Selaparang, Prabu Anom, who also ruled Sumbawa, about a generation before the Balinese conquest (Suparman 1994:348).
explicitly said to be under Makassar suzerainty. In contrast to Lombok, Bima was a place where Dutch merchants had to be most careful in their commercial dealings, as VOC-Makassarese relations were fragile and uncertain at the time.

The picture of a long-drawn-out contest over Lombok between Bali and Sumbawa-Makassar is further complicated by the new findings presented in this article. When fuller information becomes available in the 1670's, Lombok, or at least the eastern part of the island, is once again dominated by Sumbawa, so that Balinese influence had clearly dwindled during the period of internal warfare from the 1650's on. The question remains, of course, what the actual consequences of these various overlordships were. That Lombok actually was of some economic significance to Bali, or to its ruling elite, is suggested by the first Dutch report, from the early 1600's. According to this report a lot of rice was grown there and there were shipments of this commodity arriving in Bali across the Lombok Strait every day. Moreover, the Javanese frequently came to the island to buy rice, female slaves and cotton cloth (De Jonge 1865:160-1). A Dutch missive from 1656 also emphasizes the fact that large quantities of rice could be obtained in Balambangan and Lombok, these regions probably being interesting to them because of this product in a period of general dearth of foodstuffs in the mid-seventeenth century (Coolhaas 1968:75).

The Ayudhya connection

From the voluminous Dutch records, we know a lot about Batavia's relations with other Southeast Asian polities. By contrast, the diplomatic exchanges between indigenous states in the region are far from adequately chronicled. So we know little about Bali's non-military relations with the outside world apart from what facts are to be gleaned from the correspondence with Casteel Batavia. There is one piece of information, however, which points to quite far-reaching diplomatic ambitions on the part of the Balinese rulers.

The relations between Batavia and the Thai kingdom of Ayudhya in this period oscillated between friendliness and hostility. The Thai ruler Prasat Thong (r. 1630-1656) is generally painted quite black by contem-

34 The Hikayat Banjar, which is likely to have been written in the 1660's, tells of the marriage of the Banjarese prince Raden Subangsa to the daughters of the king of Selaparang and the birth of his two sons in connection with the regency of Pangeran Mangkubumi in Banjarmasin from 1660 to 1663 (Ras 1968:511-3; Coolhaas 1968:323, 466). The chronicle speaks of a close relation between Selaparang and Sumbawa at the time. In 1676, the youngest of Subangsa's sons is said to have been about ten years old (Coolhaas 1971:58-9). Balinese influence had probably disappeared by the 1660's, therefore. See also Cornelis Speelman's notitie (KITLV, Speelman, 802 1:27), which says: 'During the [Dutch-Makassarese] war they [the Bajaus of Sulawesi] left their homes, some going to Passer, others to Biema, others to Sambouwa, Selaparan and elsewhere, but most of them to the two last-mentioned places'. Hence there was an influx of Muslim (or nominally Muslim) pirates in the 1660's.
porary Dutch observers, which of course is closely connected with this ruler’s policy towards the Company. After some initial difficulties in the relations in the 1630’s, his attitude grew increasingly accommodating. In September 1646, Casteel Batavia sent him a letter and some gifts. Although the tone of the letter was superficially friendly, the Company at the same time emphasized its military strength, stating that it intended to punish the Muslim king Chan of Cambodia for his atrocities towards Dutch citizens. Along with this schenckagie, Casteel Batavia also sent a long letter of instructions for junior merchant Jan van Muyden and for the Council of the Siam Office (September 15). After dealing with a number of particulars, this letter states:

‘Aboard the [ship] Bergen [op Zoom] is an envoy from the king of Balij accredited to the Siamese [king], whom, mission accomplished, Your Honour shall allow to return thither on our ships and shall treat well in every way during the journey. In addition the three elephant keepers are returning there, who came here [to Batavia] with the last elephants as attendants of these beasts ...’ (ARA, VOC 870.)

No more is heard about this mission. The fact that the Balinese embassy is mentioned only far on in the letter, together with elephant keepers, may imply that Batavia did not give much attention to the enterprise. Nevertheless, the information is quite interesting, in that it shows that the geographic horizons of the Balinese rulers were not quite as narrow as one might think. Could it be that the king of Bali, viewing Ayudhya as a strong non-Muslim power, wanted to approach it as a potential ally for political reasons? Or did he hope to establish commercial relations through this act of diplomacy? Considering the geographical distance between the two countries, this idea might seem far-fetched, but then it should be remembered that Ayudhya enjoyed great prestige in the Malay world in this century, with such far-off regions as Jambi seeking support from the Thai kingdom (Van Goor 1986:84). About the relations between Ayudhya and Bali’s enemy Mataram next to nothing is known. In 1653-54, the Siamese (a party of merchants?) are said to have paid homage to the Susuhunan, while a late list of dates gives the improbable information that there was a war with ‘Siyem’ in 1654-55 (De Graaf 1961:67). We might add that in traditional Balinese texts references to mainland kingdoms are rare. In the Babad Bhumi (KITLV, Collection V.E. Korn, Or. 435) ‘Siyem’ is mentioned together with a number of old Javanese kingdoms, with the fictitious year 1145 (1223 A.D.) being given for its ‘collapse’ (rundah).

One might furthermore enquire about the role of the VOC in this mission. The envoy came on a Dutch ship. So did the Company itself suggest the undertaking of this embassy? Would it have materialized at all without the active help of the Dutch? In this connection it should be pointed out that the embassy occurred at a time when Bali was showing remarkable military activity, between the successful raids against the
Sasak principalities in 1645 and the fierce struggle with Mataram in 1647, and at precisely the same time as a peace was being concluded between Batavia and Mataram. The Balinese rulers, of whom Gusti Agung seems to have been the dominant one, may very well have been looking for allies outside Mataram's and Makassar's sphere of influence, but the Dutch, for diplomatic reasons, are unlikely to have been very supportive of any enterprises involving direct aggression against the Susuhunan.

However that may be, there is one other possible indication of long-range foreign relations, this time with a firmly established Muslim realm. The Dutch, in the course of their embassy to the court of Mataram the year after the war between Mataram and Bali, in July 1648, found themselves obliged to answer a few curious questions from king Amangkurat concerning the position of Bali:

'The Sousounan asked if any envoys had come to Bantam from Balij, and the commissioner assured him this was not the case. He further asked what kind of trade we carried on with Balij, whereupon he was told we had no trade of any significance there save only for our empty ships occasionally calling there on their return journey in order to purchase cows, whereat he remained silent for a while.'

(De Hullu 1903:111.)

The Dutch ambassadors' negative reply notwithstanding, Amangkurat was apprehensive of a diplomatic exchange between the two hard-pressed realms of Banten and Bali. Sundanese embassies to Bali are mentioned by the Jesuit Azevedo in 1634-35, while we also know that an exchange of this kind occurred later, in 1696 (Wessels 1923:438; KITLV, Collection H.J. de Graaf, 1055, 8). The fact that there was a real possibility of such relations being entertained also gives rise to questions about the nature of Balinese hostility towards the neighbouring Muslim powers. The distinction Muslim versus non-Muslim may have been less important than issues of power and prestige.35

Etiquette and prejudices

The letters sent by the VOC to Asian princes were often very stereotyped in structure, containing lengthy formal passages full of courtesies and little actual information. The letters to Bali are certainly a case in point. In such a letter, Casteel Batavia would acknowledge receipt of the message from the Balinese ruler in question, express its thanks for the gifts offered, discuss one or two details of trade or current politics, make some statements

35 There is one further piece of evidence of long-distance diplomacy in connection with this region. In 1641 an ambassador from Pattani, Suwararaja, was killed in Lombok with the majority of his followers after being treacherously attacked by people from Sumbawa. There is no hint of the purpose of this embassy, and we know little or nothing about the political situation in Lombok in that year (Van der Chijs 1887:56).
about the long-standing friendship between Batavia and Bali, and conclude by enumerating the return gifts to the ruler. There are a few details strongly suggesting that the Dutch picked up a few points of Balinese etiquette here and there, in spite of their profound ignorance of things Balinese. The most obvious feature is the oft-repeated assertion of the unity between Batavia and Bali, in such terms as 'the two realms may be as a single country', 'like man and wife', 'as long as the sun and the moon continue to shine', and so on. This polite phraseology first occurred in the first letter sent to the Dutch by a Balinese ruler in 1601, and recurs throughout the correspondence between the Company and the Balinese princes in Lombok in the late eighteenth century (De Jonge 1864:475; Bijvanck 1894:328).36

Then again, the VOC could adopt a stance at times which by today's standards seems disturbingly opportunistic, but which of course need not have been perceived as such at the time. This was the case in 1656, when a new incumbent on the throne had to be approached:

'Having heard of the troubles and internal wars which have afflicted the island of Balij, we have not sent any missions to Gilgil for some years, as we did not know who was actually in charge of the government. Having now heard with joy, however, that Your Majesty has finally acceded to the throne and been invested as ruler of the realm, we have hastened to send the present mission to Your Majesty to congratulate You on Your rule and wish You luck, praying to the great God who rules heaven and earth to grant Your rule increasing security and prosperity, for the sake of the greater glory of Your Majesty and the prosperity of Your good subjects, who must necessarily have suffered greatly as a consequence of the internal wars ...' (ARA, VOC 880, f.16.)

Besides testifying to the pragmatic nature of the Dutch approach, this text has a number of interesting features. For instance, the reference to an almighty god may have been formulated so as to satisfy both Dutch and Balinese religious sensibilities. As is apparent from the texts of Oosterwijck (Prévost 1763:59) and Heurnius (Leupe 1855:259), the Dutch knew something about the Balinese belief in a high god, Sanghyang Tunggal or Dewa Ratu. What is further noteworthy is the allusion to the sufferings of the common people, which to a modern reader appears to contain a hint of criticism, but again may be no more than a convention of the period.

Another inevitable component of these exchanges were the mutual gifts that were regularly sent along with the letters. While the Dutch would send a few Indian or East Asian luxury articles, a barrel of gunpowder, or a gun, the Balinese presents were of a more down-to-earth nature, comprising cattle, goats, ducks, cloth, or lances (though the animals often did not survive the journey). Self-belittlement appears to have been part of the

36 A similar formulation was used by Susuhunan Amangkurat when he met some Dutch envoys in 1648: 'the Sousounan replied that Battavia and Mattaram now were one country ...' (De Hullu 1903:110).
conducted prescribed by etiquette, with the Dutch sometimes explicitly describing their gifts as small (enige cleyne presenten, and so on). Sometimes they may have been too modest, as their letter to the Panackan Gede in 1639 makes apparent. This shows that this prince had been in contact with the Dutch trading post in Ambon and received a ruby from it which he did not like. So the merchant Jacob Coper had to take it back and a new one was sent from Batavia, with Casteel Batavia asking the prince to 'kindly accept it, considering our good intentions rather than the worth of the gift'.

Where did the Dutch get the necessary information to enable them to treat the Balinese properly? Detailed reports of the 1597 Dutch visit there were widely read in Holland and were cited almost verbatim in later travel accounts (which highlights the problem with what are purported to be eyewitness accounts). The detailed reports of Oosterwijck and Heurniuss were not published until much later, and it is difficult to know what their influence was. In Oosterwijck's account there is mention of Balinese slaves assisting the Dutch during their 1633 embassy (Prévost 1763:52), and such slaves may of course have helped them regularly in diplomatic exchanges. The relatively frequent contacts in the 1630's and 1640's, moreover, would have enabled VOC scribes and officials to gain some experience in these matters, particularly as some merchants, such as Jacob Coper and Dirck Jansz Knibber, paid repeated visits to the region. Willem Verbeeq, for example, was instructed in 1643 to return to Batavia from Solor via Bali and to 'find out what is happening there, in order to give us a detailed report of everything' (ARA, VOC 867, f.40-1). The existence of such an accumulated fund of knowledge becomes apparent when one analyses the instructions for the 1633 embassy and the sailing instructions of 1644 and 1646, whose wording is partly identical.

Behind the courtesies, one wonders what was the true attitude of the Dutch towards the Balinese they were addressing. Though this attitude is hard to discern in the stylized letters, the sailing instructions do give us at least some hints of it. The expedition of Johannes Fochestart in late 1644 was not exactly intended as a meeting between two cultures. Fochestart was instructed, once in Bali, to be constantly on his guard; to keep the ship and crew ready for any emergency (slachvaerdich); and not to let anyone go ashore except for what was strictly necessary for Company business, '... so that You will not be caught unawares, since the Indian nations are none of them to be trusted, as You well know'. Whenever he went ashore, he was to have himself accompanied by 50 sailors and five soldiers with their muskets at the ready. This attitude of suspicion shines through even in a letter addressed to the king himself; when in 1651 the Company was interested in having a 'habil bequaem person' (capable person) reside on the island, it stated that this could only be done 'under the protection of a ... guard, so as to be safeguarded against any unforeseen calamity' (ARA,}
VOC 875, f.121). This display of distrust notwithstanding, the Dutch still seem to have ranked the Balinese higher than some other Indonesian ethnic groups. The instructions to Henricq Graman of 18 January 1646 contained almost identically the same warnings as in 1644, but with the interesting addition that '... the Balinese are very prone to thieving, but apart from that are of a better disposition than any Indians' – which tells us more about the attitude of the Dutch than about the Balinese character, of course. Bali, with its non-Muslim society, its traditionally friendly contacts with the Dutch, its relative distance from the arena of VOC activities, and its still relatively peaceful internal conditions, would naturally compare favourably with Mataram, Makassar and Aceh in Dutch eyes.

Kinds of trade

As was pointed out by Schrieke (1955:20-1), Bali played a small but not negligible part in the early trade of the Archipelago. On the eve of the advent of the Dutch, merchants from the Javanese Pasisir were exchanging pepper from the western part of the Archipelago for cotton cloth in Bali, subsequently to sell this cloth in eastern Indonesia and the Philippines. The destructive wars of conquest of Sultan Agung of Mataram shattered the greater part of the existing trade network in the region. To the VOC, Bali was not without commercial interest; the Balinese commodities wanted were rice, cattle, horses, women and cotton cloth, while the Balinese purchased household utensils and luxury goods (Heeres 1894:179). This trade was carried on by both the Company itself and private traders furnished with permits. The trade with other peoples is poorly documented, but Chinese merchants are occasionally mentioned from the early decades of the seventeenth century on. In the 1650's, during an attempt by Susuhunan Amangkurat to enforce a blockade, they are even said (by Amangkurat himself) to have been responsible for supplying Bali with provisions (Van der Chijs 1888:109). Moreover, two of the Dutch letters under discussion here, those of March 1639, were sent with the junk of a Malay trader, Intche Nordin. On the relations with Makassar, Cornelis Speelman's notitie (KITLV, Speelman, 802 III:40) provides some information: 'Bali was also visited by them [the Makassarese] in former times, but has not been so for a long time now, since the Balinese have refused them admission; they used to obtain a lot of cotton yarn as well as woven textiles in various colours here'. The Portuguese may have shown some activity in these waters in the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth century, but by 1635 Bali had almost become terra incognita to them. After an abortive attempt at converting the Balinese to Christianity in that year, they apparently entered Balinese waters again in around 1639, as the General Missives seem to hint (Coolhaas 1964:52). Under the terms of the peace
treaty of 1641, they were obliged to keep away from Bali and Lombok, while the sailing instructions to Dutch commanders of 1644 and 1646 ordered the latter to try and seize all Portuguese (and Mataramese) ships they came across in the area.

In general, Bali seems to have been at best moderately lucrative from the VOC point of view. Fochestart's expedition of 1644 was to take a shipment of various commodities from Bali to Banda to sell there at fixed prices: cows at 1¼ to 1½ reals a head, horses at 3, women at 15 to 20, cotton yarn at 20 to 22 reals a *picul*, and paddy at 1 real for 12 large bundles (the same prices are mentioned in the sailing instructions of 1646). Actually, this expedition was prompted by a request from the governor of Banda, which was suffering from a shortage of cattle. Its outcome was disappointing, as few commodities could be obtained in Bali. Nevertheless, it was necessary already the next year to send other ships there to buy cattle, possibly with better success. The next year again, 1646, Henricq Graman appears to have been moderately successful in obtaining goods here, sailing on to Banda with 150 head of cattle and 2000 skeins of white cotton yarn (ARA, VOC 1159, f.129). On this occasion, six men were left in Bali to procure more commodities for Batavia and Taiwan, to be picked up at Buleleng by the returning ships during the easterly monsoon. The Balinese ruling elite apparently, judging from several letters, was extremely interested in entertaining continued commercial relations. The Company, however, in a letter to the king of 9 February 1650 pointed straight to the heart of the problem it was experiencing: cattle and paddy were too expensive. As soon as the king could show that the price of these had dropped, he could expect more Dutch trade expeditions to the island - 'but not before' (ARA, VOC 874).

The purely commercial aspects aside, the Dutch-Balinese relations also offered some mutual practical advantages. Shipwrecked sailors who managed to reach Bali were well looked after by the Balinese rulers (ARA, VOC 867, f.820). Moreover, in 1647 some Batavian *mardijkers* who had been left on the island for some reason were duly sent back by the king (ARA, VOC 872, f.3). In 1650, the VOC in its turn helped the king get satisfaction from a certain Sie Kaija, who may have been a trader who was indebted to the ruler for something (ARA, VOC 874, f.15).

The outbreak of internal hostilities in Bali in the 1650's changed the situation drastically. The chaotic conditions stimulated the supply of and demand for a commodity which had not been unknown before but which was now more abundantly available: slaves. The Company's increasing commitments in Java also stepped up the demand for slave labour. These developments, however, important as they are in themselves, belong to a later phase than the period under discussion here.

In the densely populated, but not particularly outward-looking, agrarian world of Bali, the role of the ruling elite in foreign trade was
prominent, as far as can be inferred from the VOC documents. It is hard to say what relevance the trade had for the Balinese themselves at this time, however, beyond the inflow of luxury articles and modern weapons for those in power. A Portuguese Jesuit report of 1635, admittedly drawing on superficial eyewitness accounts, expressed little appreciation for the Balinese as traders. 'As the land yields an excess of foodstuffs, they do not usually go beyond their country to trade, but restrict themselves to defending it and to tilling the soil'. The report furthermore censured the Balinese for living 'like dumb animals, still displaying traces of natural law' (Wessels 1923:438-9). Such missionary stereotypes aside, the ruling elite was clearly interested in participating in overseas trade. Rulers granted privileges, attracted and repelled Dutch merchants, and personally took part in several commercial enterprises. We have already mentioned Gusti Agung’s trading prahu setting out for Ambon in 1638. The above-mentioned Jesuit text quotes from a letter from the Balinese king (which later turned out to be badly translated) where he states that he possessed a fleet of ships and declares: 'I would like to be a friend from now on, and would like you to come to this port of mine to carry on trade. My country has cloth, slaves, sandalwood, and other things' (Wessels 1923:440). The most obvious example of such commercial involvement is provided by the Panackan Gede’s mission to Batavia in 1639. Prior to this he had sent three thousand bundles of paddy worth 300 reals to the city, in return for which the Company was to send him some unspecified curiosities (rariteyten). He had also been in contact with Ambon. In 1639, however, a dark cloud appeared on the horizon in the form of an allegedly dishonest prince, Panakan Alba.37

'... our traders have informed us that Panakan Alba has purchased 110 pieces of painted cloth worth 330 reals, in return for which he has promised to supply cattle and paddy. However, not having received more than 15 cows, to the value of 22.5 reals, we are asking Your Majesty to be kind enough to demand more paddy from Panakan Alba, [to the value of] 300 reals in fulfilment [of his debt], whereafter he will still owe our traders seven and a half reals.' (ARA, VOC 862, f.167.)

Casteel Batavia’s irritation is obvious in spite of the courteous tone. It is also apparent in the letter to the royal grandson, Prince Tangab. He, too, had sent some rice and cattle to Batavia. Whether this was in payment of the guns sent to the prince the previous year or whether he also wanted to exchange these goods for rariteyten is not clear. In any case, the com-

37 How are we to explain this most un-Balinese name? A glance at the Balinese genealogies would suggest that the person referred to here was Prince Lebah, the brother of one of the last Gelgel kings, Di Made, born of a low-caste mother. The prince might be the same person as the Key Maes Labba of the 1638 mission, though 'Kiyayi Mas' does not sound like a ksatria dalem title (or any other Balinese title).
modities were accepted with alacrity and kept by the Company, which provided a polite but painful lesson for the prince:

'Concerning Your Highness's debt, as our merchants' books testify, it came to eighty reals, which, in addition to twenty-two reals for five painted cloths and a piece of white linen, totals one hundred and two reals, from which should be deducted the aforementioned 400 bundles of paddy and six cows, along with the woman sent as a gift, worth 40 reals, together coming to eighty-nine reals, so that our traders are still owed thirteen reals by Your Highness, which is a debt of little significance among friends' (ARA, VOC 862).

One may wonder if the problems in the commercial dealings with the Balinese elite had anything to do with the Company's reluctance to lend assistance when the island was attacked by Sultan Agung a few months later. However that may be, this was hardly the main reason. Bali, with its 'iron-bound coast' and large population, was likely to be able to fend off the Javanese force, which was far from its bases, anyway, while open support by the Company would only have threatened the status quo (which was not to change to a state of formal peace until 1646).

Nevertheless, if the Dutch found the Balinese lords difficult trading partners, the opposite was true as well. As was mentioned above, prince Pannoeckantchau in 1643 wrote to the Company on behalf of the paramount ruler of Bali to complain about an old unsettled debt. Casteel Batavia replied:

'We have read the letter, and have learnt with astonishment that the Sousounangh four years ago was claiming 42 reals from Captain Deudichum for paddy sold to the latter. We know nothing about this. Moreover, he returned to the Netherlands eight [actually five!] years ago. It is more than twelve [actually ten!] years since this Captain Deudecum was commissioned to sign a treaty with the Sousounangh for assistance against the Mattaram, and we understood that the Sousounangh of Balij then gave him a gift of paddy and cotton yarn. In order to have more definite information about this matter, however, we shall write to the Netherlands and give the Sousounangh satisfaction if the Captain in fact does owe him anything.' (ARA, VOC 867, f.819.)

The person referred to here is Jochem Roeloefsz van Deutecom, who was the leader of the Dutch embassy to Bali in 1633. On 8 April in that year, the Company had been given permission to purchase cattle and paddy, while the next month the embassy twice presented itself to Pannackan Patiekan at the Gelgel court, where it received substantial gifts of foodstuffs and textiles. On the last occasion, Van Deutecom was given an unfriendly reception by the junior king and the ministers, so it is possible that the Dutch had violated some unwritten rule of reciprocity (Colenbrander 1898:182-4). Why the Company had failed to respond to the Balinese claims remains to be explained. Perhaps this was due to a faulty translation of the Balinese missive, or to unclear statements by the envoys,
or perhaps the Dutch were only pretending ignorance – as can be seen from
the above letter, they were not quite truthful about Van Deutecom’s
whereabouts. At any rate, it is remarkable that the Van Deutecom affair
should have been so suddenly revived after so many years. The VOC
apparently found the whole claim unreasonable, since it in its turn
believed that the Balinese rulers had owed it money since 1638-39.38 The
merchant Johannes Fochestart, sailing to Bali in 1644, was warned against
becoming involved in the affair:

'Those [i.e., the rulers] of Bali have been claiming a debt from us for a long time,
although in letters of the year 1639 we have shown the opposite to be true,
proving that they owe us a debt, which is recorded in the account books of
Batavia. Hence if they mention it to you [in the course of your visit to Gelgel], say
you know nothing about it, and parry it [the complaint] with assurances that they
shall receive full satisfaction from us.' (ARA, VOC 868, f.736.)

A further source of irritation for the Balinese must have been the VOC’s
unwillingness to share its commercial advantages with its so-called
friends. Although the Company readily issued trading permits to the
king’s subjects, the latter soon discovered the harsh realities of Dutch
trade policies. In 1646, for example, four Balinese sent by the king to
Ambon on Henricq Graman’s ship who asked for some young clove trees to
plant on their home island, allegedly for medicinal purposes, needless to
say had their request turned down, as this might have ‘unfavourable
consequences’ (quade gevolgen) for the Company. Instead these envoys,
apparently unbeknown to them, were provided with a few sago plants,
which, as the Ambon missive states hopefully, would be hard to cultivate
on foreign soil anyway (ARA, VOC 1159, f.129-30; see Heeres 1894:179). So
much, then, for the unity between Bali and the Company! In any case, this
enterprise is an interesting example of Balinese activity abroad in this
period.

In conclusion it should be pointed out that Bali’s role in the changing
commercial structures of maritime Southeast Asia in this period should not
be underestimated. The island was interesting to the Dutch in the context
of their trading strategy, as it was believed to be capable of producing
commodities for the far-flung VOC strongholds, from Taiwan to Banda. At
the same time, the Balinese ruling elite seem to have been the principal
indigenous entrepreneurs, with Malays, Chinese, and so on, functioning as
brokers.

38 If the conclusions drawn earlier in this article are correct, the ruler Panackan Gede-Paad-
jakan-Patiekan would have reasserted the claim shortly after the death of his father. When
Van Deutecom arrived in Bali in 1633, this prince was the representative of the apathetic
senior king, bearing the title of junior king (jongen coninck) (Prévost 1763:54; Colenbrander
1898:178, 182, 184).
Conclusions

Above, I have tried to cast some light on Bali's external relations in the mid seventeenth century on the basis of information from contemporary European sources. It is evident that the picture thus pieced together is necessarily incomplete. So it is possible that Balinese literary texts written in this period will provide new and interesting sociological information on Balinese views of the non-Balinese world when more research in literary history is undertaken. A good first step in this direction has been taken by Adrian Vickers in his PhD thesis (1986; see Vickers 1990). The babad texts, which in their present form were written several decades or even centuries after the event, constitute an important though extremely difficult source. They inform us about rulers, priests and nobles, rebellions and external wars with Java and Lombok, and rituals and processions, in wordings that are sometimes remarkably similar to those in the Dutch accounts. It is hard to say to what extent events related in these two kinds of sources can be correlated with one another, though a few preliminary attempts at this have been made (Creese 1991; Hägerdal 1995). One important result of my investigations is the finding that the lists of chronograms that are found in some Balinese texts can have a high degree of reliability, as in the case of the Balambangan and Batuparang wars.

The Dutch texts, though not of course sociologically 'superior' to indigenous ones, have the undisputed advantage of being contemporary and, taken together, do tell us something about Balinese actions and Balinese intentions in this period. The main finding of our investigation has been that the behaviour of the Balinese polity was more in agreement with the political and economic developments of maritime Southeast Asia than the previous literature seems to indicate. The ruling elite of the island was not as inward-looking as the later babad tradition or four centuries of Western Orientalism might suggest. Balinese lords sent envoys to distant countries, repeatedly tried to forge links with the regional trading network, showed an interest in growing commercial crops, and occasionally were involved in military expansion. Their military success in the east in 1645 could conceivably have made them over-confident in their confrontation in the west a year and a half later. The diplomatic relations maintained with the Thai world and Sunda imply a certain amount of knowledge of regional affairs, while some European witnesses point to a considerable degree of curiosity about the foreign world view and natural sciences on the part of the Balinese elite (Wessels 1923:437). All this should be viewed against the background of the evolution of indigenous states and regional commerce in this period. From both European and indigenous sources it is apparent that the Balinese polity was based on a markedly agricultural, strongly hierarchical (though not particularly stable) social system. The enormous expansion of commerce in
the region between about 1500 and 1630, however, created new opportuni-
ties for the elite to increase their wealth, as is evident from the accounts
of the first Dutch visit to the area in 1597. In this respect, Bali behaved
much like other kingdoms in maritime Southeast Asia, although certain
factors, such as the absence of good harbours, would have hampered the
development of commercial networks here to some degree. The later
recession in world trade, the severe droughts from the 1630's to the 1670's,
and the disruption of the older trade network by the activities of Mataram
and Batavia may have stimulated the military, commercial, and
diplomatic efforts of the Balinese elite aimed at finding new sources of

To this information on external relations, we must add that on the
internal scene provided by our texts. In the fragmentary picture that
emerges from these we discern unstable and irregular power relations,
which points to the disintegration of the Bali-wide polity from the 1650's
onward. This process in all probability was hastened by the above-
mentioned elements of crisis in maritime Southeast Asia, where several
kingdoms experienced serious difficulties and dismemberment in the mid to
late seventeenth century. Perhaps the hypothesis that the appropriation
of increasing resources by states with 'absolutist' ambitions gave rise to
chronic instability - put forward with respect to the European situation but
to some degree relevant also for Southeast Asian polities - applies here
(Reid 1993:286). Though we have little reason to believe that Bali was
ever anything like 'absolutist', the island's military enterprises of the
1630's and 1640's definitely imply an ability to mobilize considerable
resources, which put the equilibrium between local rulers under enormous
strain.

Finally, we should consider that the texts we have consulted are after
all Dutch, and as such tell us more about the aims and intentions of the
Honourable Company than about Balinese reality. The picture of Dutch-
Balinese relations that we derive from them is not particularly flattering
for the former. The pompous assertions about eternal friendship turned out
to be worth less than nothing when assistance was actually required.
Nevertheless, the Company showed a marked preference for the Balinese
over other 'Indian nations' - an attitude that was to be totally reversed
when the Netherlands began to interfere in Balinese life in earnest a few
centuries later.
APPENDIX

In this article I have demonstrated that Balinese lists of chronograms (candrasangkala), when compared with unpublished Dutch materials, are seen to contain surprisingly reliable information. In this appendix, sections of three of the most important lists, Babad Gumi (Leiden University Library, Lor 10.548), Babad Bhumi (KITLV, Collection V.E. Korn, Or. 435, 232) and Pawawatekan (Leiden University Library, Lor 3662), are reproduced. On the whole, these chronograms appear to accord to a considerable degree with the Dutch texts studied here. So both sources refer to the death of two princes in 1632-33, the possible decease of a ruler in the period 1639-43, the important events in the lives of the princes Tangeb and Cawu, the prominent role of the minister Gusti Agung, the war on Lombok in 1645, the war with Mataram on Balambangan soil in early 1647, the passing away of a ruler in c. 1650, the outbreak of internal warfare in 1651, a decisive battle in 1655, and renewed internal conflict in the following years.

A. Babad Gumi (Leiden University Library, Lor 10.548)

This text was written before the end of the nineteenth century. It contains a pangelingeling describing an eruption of Gunung Agung in the Saka year '33. It begins with the establishment of Mount Tusan in Saka 99 (A.D. 177) and ends with the construction of a watering place in Badu Tegal on 14 April, A.D. 1692. Below are quoted the chronograms for the dates between 1620 and 1660.

Babad duk panwarga I Dewa Sganing, bayu tirtha panca dewa 1545 (Death of I Dewa Seganing, A.D. 1623).

Babad panwarga n I Dewa Pambayun, catur bhuta panca bhumi, 1554 (Death of I Dewa Pambayun, A.D. 1632).

Babad panwarga n I Dewa Ktut, warna panca bhuta tunggal, 1554 (Death of I Dewa Ketut, A.D. 1632).

Babad panwarga n I Dewa Di Made, warna gana panca dewa, 1564 (Death of I Dewa Di Made, A.D. 1642).

Babad I Dewa Pacekan lungha ka Batur, rawuh Ida laris ka Kuta mangintarang pamating, mameseh wong Mataram, brahmana gana [bhuta] tunggal, 1568 (Journey of I Dewa Pacekan to Batur; His later

39 The Pamancangah Karangasem (Leiden University Library, Collection C.C. Berg, 118, 3), which was written in the reign of Gusti Gede Jelantik (1890-1908), includes a list of dates which in essence is borrowed from a list found at the end of a manuscript of Sara Samuscaya Pakence (Leiden University Library, Collection C.C. Berg, 118, 3). The latter list contains dates up to the year 1890, and its first part clearly derives from the Babad Gumi.
arrival at Kuta and His repulse of the vagabonds (?) opposing the people of Mataram, A.D. 1646.

Babad panwarga n I Dewa Pacekan, paksa wiku bhuta tunggal, 1572 (Death of I Dewa Pacekan, A.D. 1650).

Babad pati n de Ambawang, kna parwata angin watu, 1572 (Death of Ambawang, A.D. 1650).

Babad duk Ngurah Bungahya ne mati masiyat ameseh I Dane Nglurah Agung Bukihan, gni gunung bhuta tunggal, 1573 (Death of Ngurah Bungahya in the war against I Dane Nglurah Agung Bukihan, A.D. 1651).

Babad duk Lurah Sidmen seda katebek, gana parwata angin watu, 1576 (Lurah Sidemen is stabbed to death, A.D. 1654).

Babad duk Pangakan Bon Nyuh kalah di Kalianget, kagepok de Nglurah Jlantik, rupa brahmana angin dewa, 1681 (Pangakan Bon Nyuh's defeat at Kalianget on being attacked by Nglurah Jelantik, A.D. 1659).

Babad duk Anglurah Sidmen, sareng ring Lurah Jelantik maprang ring Lebih mamseh wong Badung, paksa gajah bayu ning wong, 1582 (War waged by Anglurah Sidemen, together with Lurah Jelantik, at Lebih against the people of Badung, A.D. 1660).  

B. Babad Bhumi (KITLV, Collection V.E. Korn, Or. 435, 232)

This text was compiled in its present form in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. It is divided into two parts, the first of which constitutes a compendium with dates that are not in chronological order. The second part is chronologically arranged, in the same way as the Babad Gumi, covering events from the mythical establishment of the land of Tulikup in Saka 19 (A.D. 97) to an anti-Dutch rising in 1858 (sic, 1868). One section contains an enumeration of decisive events in the Gelgel period.

Babad panjeneng Dalem Ktut ring Bali, brahmana septa gnia wulan, 1378 (Establishment of Dalem Ketut in Bali, A.D. 1456).

The phrase 'mangintarang pamating' was interpreted by a Balinese informant as 'directing an army against the enemy'. In either case, the approximate meaning of the sentence is clear.

Compare the following statement in R. Friederich's report of 1849-50: 'The war with Sideman (1582, corresponding with A.D. 1660) is found described in the manuscript of the Wriga Garga, which was lent to me. In that year the men of Karang-Assem (Sideman) with their allies, Mengoei, and so on, attacked and entered Badong, without conquering it. This is the only chronologically specified historical fact which came to my attention in Bali.' (Friederich 1850:34.) This correspondence prompts questions about the process by which these lists of dates were compiled. Was the information collected in part from the colophons of manuscripts or pangelingeling? For the function of pangelingeling, see Vickers 1990:170-6.

The last date mentioned is that of the Banjar War, which took place in 1868. Victor Korn apparently used this list when writing his article on Balinese chronograms (1922). The list contains detailed information on the kingdom of Mengwi up to 1836, and a first recension may have been drawn up at about this time.
Babad kawon Batan Jruk, ilang brahma catur bhumi, 1480 (Defeat of Batan Jeruk, A.D. 1558).
Babad lagane Lurah Pande, norag gseng amanca bhumi, 1500 (Battle of Lurah Pande, A.D. 1578).
Babad patine Putu Tabanan ring Blangbangan, brahma pakarenga bhuta wani, 1568 (Death of Putu Tabanan in Balambangan, A.D. 1646).
Babad ‘Gunung Agung mti api, brahma maguna bhuta tunggal, 1538 (Eruption of Gunung Agung, A.D. 1616).
Babad panwarga n I Dewa Di Made, keweke rasa panca bhumi, 1564 (Death of I Dewa Di Made, A.D. 1642).
Babad panwargga n I Dewa Pacekan, anon kuda sanjata wani, 1572 (Death of I Dewa Pacekan, A.D. 1650).
Babad lagane Lurah Bungaya, kaya parwwata sanjataning wong, 1573 (Battle of Lurah Bungaya, A.D. 1651).
Babad lagane Lurah Agung amseh Lurah Kaler, pasang parwwata sanjata wani, 1577 (Battle of Lurah Agung against Lurah Kaler, A.D. 1655).
Babad Gusti Tlabah Batu Lepang anapih maring Gusti Agung ring Gelgel, brahma sunya rasa tunggal, 1608 (Gusti Telabah Batu Lepang disposes of Gusti Agung of Gelgel, A.D. 1686).

C. Pawawatekan (included in Wariga, Leiden University Library, LOr 3662)

This is one of the texts collected by H.N. van der Tuuk, and was therefore written before 1894. It contains 78 chronograms, not in chronological order. Here the dates from the late sixteenth century onward have been arranged chronologically.

Duk kawon Balungbungan, dening wong Pasedahan, bhaga tunggal margganing wong, 1519. (Defeat of Balambangan by the people of Pasuruan, A.D. 1597).
Duking aprang Dane Mangrurah Batulepang, ring pasar ring Hennasada, lawan(g) kawah bhuta rupa, 1549 (War waged by Dane Mangrurah Batu Lepang at the pasar of Hennasada43, A.D. 1627).
Duking Patih ring Balungbungan angabali, ghni saraning bhuta tunggal, 1553 (Return of the patih of Balambangan, A.D. 1631).
Duking lindhu banget, ping 3, sawengi, paksa rasa bayu ning wong, 1562 (Violent earthquake, three times in one night, A.D. 1640).

43 In other entries in the Pawawatekan the name is spelt Heccasada. One may compare this with Iccasada, the name of the place mentioned in the colophon of the Pararaton manuscript of 1613 A.D. The name may be an equivalent of Sukasada, which in the Sejarah Arya Tabanan is an alternative name for Gelgel.
Duk padalemane Kyai Tegeh kagenen, toya rasa bhutaning wong, 1564 (The inner yard of Kyai Tegeh burnt down, A.D. 1642).

Duk I Dewa Tangeb kapongor, ka Anggantiga, bhuta rasa pandhawa bhumi, 1565 (I Dewa Tangeb the subject of wrath at Anggantiga, A.D. 1643).

Anuju, A., Wa., Dungu(la)n, sasih Desta, pratiti awidya, kresna paksa, anuju sasti. Duk geger Anggantiga, panca gana bayuning wong, 1565 ([incomprehensible date] Commotion at Anggantiga, A.D. 1643).

Duk Raden Sebit, mulih ring desane ring Lamngkong, kalurug dening wadwane Sanganglurah Agung, ring dina, U., Mrakih, Ra., sasih Saddha, rah 7, tenggek 6, Resi angganing bhuta tunggal, 1567 (Return of Raden Sebit to the desa of Langko, overrun by the people of Sanganglurah Agung, May 21 (?), A.D. 1645).

Duking Barangbangan, karurug dening Sang Arurah Agung ring Madhya, katekan raweh Sang Hyang Tawangalun, naga gana bhuta tunggal, 1568 (Balambangan overrun by Sang Arurah Agung ring Madhya [= Agung Di Made], leading to the arrival of Sang Hyang Tawangalun, A.D. 1646).

Duk I Dewa Pakrisane jumeneng, amekaring Bangsul, anuwek Idane Mangrurah Ambawang, angapit gunung bhuta sandra, 1572 (Bali's prosperity under I Dewa Pakrisan's reign; Mangrurah Ambawang is stabbed, A.D. 1650).

Duk pejah Idane Mangrurah Bungahya, katekan rundah nagara Bangsul, anjeneng I Dewa Cawu, uti gunung bhuta candra, 1573 (Death of Mangrurah Bungahya, bringing about the collapse of negara Bali; I Dewa Cawu's coronation, A.D. 1651).

Duk kawon Dane Mangrurah Tegalinggah, kalurug antuk I Dewa Kawisasem, ring dina, Ca., Wa., Julungwangi, sasih Sada, kumbang gunung bhuta wong, 1576 (Defeat of Mangrurah Tegalinggah, overrun by I Dewa Kawisasem [Karangasem], 2 June, A.D. 1654).

Duking kawon Banyusukla, kalurug olih De Krurah Singarsa, ring dina, Sa., U., Bala, ring suklapaksa, Dwitya, sasih ka 6, rah 6, tenggek 1, wong rasa rupa bhuta, 1615 (Defeat of Banyusukla, overrun by Krurah Singarsa, [incomprehensible date] A.D. 1693).

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From Batuparang to Ayudhya

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