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Introduction

The significance of sacred heirlooms with respect to the political, social, and religious organization of Makassarese (and Bugis) society has for decades been a major focus of interest for scholars working on South Sulawesi.¹ Although commonly referred to as '*ornamenten*' by early Dutch writers, sacred heirlooms by no means possess the qualities of mere accessories in Makassarese culture (see Bouman 1928:39). Instead, as the Makassarese terms *kalompoang* ('greatness') or *kalabbirang* ('magnificence') already suggest, these objects are in fact material symbols providing a link between the social organization of kin groups, villages, or federations, on the one hand, and the complex of religion and mythology, on the other.

Kalompoang were of paramount importance for political leadership in pre-colonial Makassarese society. Patterns of leadership all over the region have changed drastically during the last decades, in that the traditional hierarchical system of village communities, principalities, and kingdoms has been transformed into a modern, 'pan-Indonesian' structure comprising *dusun*, *desa*, *kecamatan* (district),² and *kabupaten* (regency). Notwithstanding such administrative transformations, most sacred heirlooms, at least within the area under investigation, not only persist, but are to some extent regarded even by the provincial government as constituting a most significant aspect of cultural heritage and identity among the Makassarese. The present paper

¹ This paper was written in 1987, based upon data collected in 1984/85. Since then the former principality of Kasepekan has been further subdivided, and in 1991 consisted of four *desa* (including the two new units *desa* Sapiri and Tompokang), and two *kelurahan*. Two further subdivisions are already provisionally established.

² Here used in the sense of, respectively, 'village administrative unit', and 'sub-district'. The term 'village' is used for larger settlements (*kampung*). Small settlements, which may consist of only a few houses, in this paper will be called 'hamlets'.

focuses upon two interrelated questions: first, how the role of *kalompoang* has changed with respect to political leadership in some villages of highland Goa, and second, what kinds of consequences have arisen for those community-wide rituals, which, involving a symbolic focus on leadership, center around sacred heirlooms.

Since the *kalompoang* are of rather unknown origin in presumably every Makassarese community, no precise information exists about the roots of the whole socio-religious complex connected with sacred heirlooms. V.E. Korn (1952: 26) rejected as mere 'historio-phantasie' P.J. Kooreman's theory (1883, II:137-9, 348-9), according to which the *kalompoang* had originally constituted 'secondary' sacred objects in addition to sacred stones (*gaukang*). In the village we studied,³ we also recorded four different, and even contradictory myths concerning the origins of the first local village ruler, and, in direct consequence, also four different explanations of the origin of the local *kalompoang* (see Rössler 1987:184-5). Before the kingdom of Goa was occupied by the Dutch in 1906, it had been composed of several minor principalities (*kakaraengang*), each of which consisted of distinct village territories (*paqrasangang*). Since each of these village territories may also be defined as a distinct *adaq* (Indonesian *adat*) unit, the Dutch suitably designated the principalities as *adatgemeenschappen*.

Warfare among principalities, as well as among village communities, had been quite common before the arrival of the Dutch, and therefore the boundaries of each principality were by no means fixed. Powerful noble rulers (*karaeng*) usually annexed autonomous villages or clusters of villages to their own principalities, whereas in other instances, as a result of local feuds, village territories were transferred from one principality to another. In the course of these developments, many villages lost their former political power and economic wealth, while others achieved outstanding positions in the region (see Nawawi 1973:29). Sacred heirlooms played an important part during these feuds, because in the view of the local population, the political power of any community depended on the spiritual power of its *kalompoang*.⁴

As a general pattern all over South Sulawesi, sacred heirlooms are believed to have originated from divine rulers who descended from heaven (*tu manurung*). According to our data, there are only minor differences between

³ Fieldwork in Goa was conducted in collaboration with Birgitt Röttger-Rössler between April 1984 and March 1985 under the auspices of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in Jakarta. It was sponsored by Universitas Hasanuddin, Ujungpandang.

⁴ See Niemann 1889:3-7. For the same reason, the Dutch had to bring the *kalompoang* of Goa, which had formerly been taken to Java and Holland, back to the royal court when the king was to be re-installed in 1936. See Nooteboom 1937:107; Friedericy 1931:634, 1933:448. Detailed accounts of the *kalompoang* of Goa are found in Eerdmans (1897:63-5) and Friedericy (1929:365-9, 1933:491-501).

the various myths of *tu manurung* and *kalompoang* in highland Goa, whether they refer to principalities or villages. Everywhere the divine ruler, before ascending back to heaven, is said to have left an object on earth, which has represented political power ever since, and, therefore also the very institution of leadership within the community. The village rulers, as members of a distinct bilateral descent group founded by the *tu manurung*, may thus be conceived as mere executive agents of the spiritual power inherent in the sacred objects.

Although there were many rulers in the course of history who were not considered legitimate holders of a *kalompoang*, no ruler in fact may borrow his political authority from a sacred object, if he is not a true descendant of the *tu manurung*. Without such genealogical relations between their *karaeng* and his divine ancestor, the ruler's subordinates would not accept their leader as legitimate (see Mattulada 1977b:62). In other words, the political system of any kingdom, principality, or village is rationalized by a myth referring to the origin of the ruler's descent group.

Understanding the hierarchy of sacred heirlooms in Goa requires examining the general political structure of the former kingdom. The population of Goa may be conceived as constituting a network of various mutually overlapping bilateral kin groups, which can be subdivided into three levels, namely high nobility, local nobility, and commoners. Although intermarriage between these levels nowadays is more common than it was before, the most striking feature of the system is the overlapping of kin groups within each of the three levels, which makes it impossible to define the boundaries of kin groups. Furthermore, there is also a close correlation between the aspects of kinship and territory. The territory of a former principality (*kakaraengang*) is inhabited, first, by a comparatively small kin group of nobles (*anaq karaeng*), and, second, by many commoner kin groups. The core of each kin group usually constitutes the population of one village, or of a small cluster of villages. Each of these village kin groups, which are referred to as *pammanakang* in the area under investigation, comprises several bilateral descent groups, most of which focus upon an *adaq*-office and/or mythical ancestor.

These latter groups are usually designated as *pattola*, which means the (potential) 'successors' to the respective office. Even though the recognition of membership in these descent groups is mainly based upon genealogical knowledge (and therefore is often subject to deliberate manipulation), they have to be regarded as institutionalized in that an individual's degree of membership in one of the descent groups is of paramount importance for the attribution of roles in ritual performances and, in particular, for marriage policy. In this context it has to be emphasized again that the phenomenon of the *tu manurung* not only refers to the high nobility or the noble rulers of principalities, but also to many village rulers. Paralleling the descent group of the

Goa nobility, the members of descent groups of village rulers also claim to have originated from a divine (usually female) ancestor. The same applies to sacred heirlooms: the close relationship between political power and *kalompoang* is very important not only with respect to the nobility, but also as regards most descent groups of village rulers. In both cases, the sacred objects are believed to constitute the essential source of the rulers' political power, as well as to represent the intrinsic institution of government.

Apart from the ruler's descent group, in most villages there are other similarly structured descent groups, each of which refers to a subordinate *adaq*-office. Commonly, the holder of the office is also in charge of a minor sacred object of inferior rank. In contrast to these subordinate heirlooms, which in the area under investigation are usually designated according to the title of the office (such as *paggallarangang* for the sacred heirloom of the *gallarang*'s descent group), the sacred object of the ruler's descent group is believed to extend its spiritual power to all members of the whole kin group ruled by the *karaeng*. Since intermarriage between the several descent groups within a village community is, of course, very frequent, the *kalompoang* should not be regarded as a symbol that, irrespective of kin relations, is only worshipped because it represents a political power.⁵

Social structure, religion, and sacred heirlooms

On the village level, a sacred heirloom should instead be conceived as the symbolic focus of the whole kin group (*pammanakang*), because it is kept by the ruler whose descent group is part of the whole kinship network within the village community. In other words, since most inhabitants of a village (who consider themselves as belonging to one *pammanakang*) have kin relations to their *karaeng* – however vague and distant these may be –, the *kalompoang* legitimating the ruler's authority is regarded by the whole community as a symbol of their social as well as religious solidarity. Since in the case of a personal crisis any individual will appeal to the *kalompoang* of a village to which he or she considers him-/herself to be more closely related by genealogical reckoning than to other villages, the factor of kinship structure is a major determinant of allegiance to a sacred heirloom. In his well-known book *Adat Law in Indonesia*, Ter Haar (1948:70, see also 49-52) described Makassarese (and Bugis) social organization as being characterized by territorial communities, the 'vital spirit or soul' of which was represented 'in a par-

⁵ This view seems to be held by Chabot (1950:61-77), who describes the *kalompoang* as a means of integration within a kin group consisting of several different worship communities (*vereringsgemeenschappen*).

ticular object of supernatural qualities'. While correctly emphasizing the important function of *kalompoang* for Makassarese social organization, Ter Haar was definitely wrong in saying that 'the kinship factor has no significance' in this respect (1948:50-1). On the contrary, the aspects of territory, sacred heirlooms, and leadership cannot be explained without considering kinship at the same time.

Defining the *adaq* of a community requires considering the factor of territory. The boundaries of village territories are more or less clearly defined, even though they are subject to constant change resulting from the redistribution of rice fields after their owner's death.⁶ As mentioned above, any village is inhabited by the core of a kin group (*pammanakang*), which also includes the spouses of original 'land owners' (*tu pabbutta*).⁷ In addition, the village territory constitutes an *adaq*, that is to say, a socially and religiously integrated whole the uniqueness of which is pointed out by the members of every village community. It therefore becomes evident that a principality (*kakaraengang*) consisted of several village territories, each of which was inhabited by the core of a kin group, and comprised a distinct *adaq* system that in many cases focussed on a sacred heirloom.⁸

Islam only arrived in highland Goa in the second decade of the twentieth century. The Dutch colonial government considerably facilitated its spread by installing *imam* (heads of mosque) in the administrative districts and complexes. Since the first *imam* of Kasepekan, who is said to have been a noble from Goa, married three women of the local nobility, Islam all over the region has always been closely associated with the nobility. Nobles, besides occupying most of the superior administrative offices, still consider themselves the main agents of Islam, thereby consciously establishing a distinction between Islam as the religion (*agama*) of the upper stratum of the society, and traditional belief (*kepercayaan*) or syncretistic patterns of belief and ritual as prevailing among the commoners.

Before the arrival of Islam, which in the area under investigation has never been practiced in an 'orthodox' sense, the inhabitants of highland Goa adhered to a religion known as the religion of the *patuntung*, which in this context means 'people who strive for honesty and modesty'. Although in some respects the influence of Islam has been rather strong ever since its

⁶ For categories of property and some general rules of inheritance see Rössler (1987:45-6, 63, 97-8).

⁷ A detailed explanation of the *pammanakang* is given in Rössler (1987:57-60).

⁸ The territorial factor is most important with regard to the so-called 'ruler's wet-rice field' (*galung karaeng*), which is said to have belonged to the first *karaeng*, who descended from heaven. These fields are cultivated collectively, while the right of usufruct is handed down from each ruler to his successor. See *Adatrechtbundels* 1929:147-9. The Dutch term for these fields is *ornamentsgronden*.

introduction, the traditional religion is still very important in the region.⁹ The central idea underlying the religion of the *patuntung* is that every member of the community is expected to lead a life as laid down by the deities living on the top of Mount Bawakaraeng.¹⁰

Any violation of *adaq*, or any neglecting of the necessary ritual communication between the living and the souls of their ancestors, would be subject to sanctions imposed by the deities during a person's lifetime, be it in the shape of misfortune, severe illness, or the death of a close relative. The most important intermediary between the members of a given community and Karaeng Kaminang Kammaya ('The Almighty Lord'), the Creator and highest-ranking deity, is the spirit of a *kalompoang*, which according to local tradition originated from Mount Bawakaraeng as well. Since this spirit (*alusuqna kalompoanga*) is believed to be identical with the spirit of the first divine village ruler, it is of considerable significance for the social community. While the spirit of the *kalompoang* – representing the institution of leadership – is believed to be of supernatural origin, the ruling *karaeng*, as a descendant of his divine predecessor, is merely an executive agent of the political power embodied in the sacred object.

In villages of highland Goa, the *kalompoang* are kept in one and the same house for generations, until the house is rotten and about to collapse. This house is usually called *ballaq kalompoang* or *ballaq karaeng*, but the latter term does not imply that the house is necessarily inhabited by the ruler himself. On the contrary, there are some local variations as regards the person who is actually in charge of the sacred object. In general, *kalompoang* are kept in small boxes that are placed on or behind miniature beds provided with tiny mattresses, pillows, and mosquito nets. According to local belief, the spirit of the sacred object frequently leaves the box by night in order to wander about or just to relax on its bed. Apart from its important functions as a representation of political power and a unifying symbol of a kin group, the spirit of a sacred heirloom is also of outstanding significance within the context of pre-Islamic religion.

Although being subordinated to the highest-ranking deity Karaeng Kaminang Kammaya, the spirit of a *kalompoang* may exert its influence upon all members of 'its' kin group, irrespective of their actual residence.¹¹ However, the spirit cannot autonomously decide whether to call forth good or evil, but rather occupies an intermediary position between human kind

⁹ See Pénard (1913); Usup (1978); Cense (1931); Rössler (1987:74-94).

¹⁰ In fact it would be more appropriate to speak of a high-level belief system, which besides religious beliefs comprises many aspects of world view, norms, and values which are regarded by the local population as important for the organization of everyday behaviour.

¹¹ It should be remembered that most members of any kin group usually live at a relatively great distance from their village of origin.

and the deity. Beyond that, every living member of the community may to a certain extent manipulate his or her own fate, in that he or she can appeal to the deity by making an offering to the *kalompoang* of one of the kin groups of which he or she is a member.

While the political, as well as much of the symbolic, meanings of the *kalompoang* are of only minor significance today, individual and collective offerings to the spirits of sacred heirlooms still play an important part within the religious life of village people in highland Goa.¹²

*The history and political organization of Kasepekang*¹³

The principality of Kasepekang, the territory of which today is part of kabupaten Goa, had been incorporated into the kingdom of Goa during the sixteenth century. At that time, Kasepekang covered an area of about 270 km², and might have consisted of some 40 villages, most of which had been conquered by the noble ruler of Kasepekang in the course of history. Only some of these villages possessed a *kalompoang*. According to local sources, two sacred heirlooms were lost during minor feuds long after Kasepekang had been integrated into the Goa empire.

Under Dutch colonial rule, the *kakaraengang* of Kasepekang after 1925 was transformed into the administrative unit of a district or an *adatgemeenschap* consisting of six village complexes. This division into specifically six sub-units, each of which was named after the most important village in its territory, was motivated by the greater influence in local politics of six of the village rulers in Kasepekang. All of these six village rulers held the title of *karaeng*,¹⁴ except for the ruler of Sapiri, which had been the residence of the noble Karaeng Kasepekang for centuries. This village head was called *anrongguru*. In addition to the noble *karaeng* of Kasepekang, and the *anrongguru* as the *adaq* head of the noble ruler's native village Sapiri, there were seven village rulers holding the title of *karaeng*, eight called *gallarang*, and one ruler called *toddoq*. The other villages were of such minor importance and/or size that they were not headed by distinct *adaq* leaders. In spite of some negligible changes, these offices have persisted up to this day, even though their political significance has meanwhile vanished. Corresponding to their colo-

¹² For a detailed description of such rituals, see Rössler (1987:85-7, 186-205, 221-6) and Röttger-Rössler (this volume).

¹³ All names of locations and persons in the area under investigation are substituted by pseudonyms.

¹⁴ The members of the nobility of Kasepekang commonly argue that no village ruler should be called *karaeng*, because in their view this title is confined to nobles. Nevertheless, '*karaeng*' is a common title for traditional village rulers all over the region.

Former principality of Kasepekang

nial interests, the Dutch administrators manipulated the succession to the office of the noble *karaeng* of Kasepekang, who (until 1960) acted as district head within the system of indirect rule. Around 1950, when the Darul Islam rebels began to enter this part of the country, a descendant of the noble family of Kasepekang was again installed as district head. He was and still is accepted as the present 'Karaeng Kasepekang' by the local population.

When in 1960-1961 Kasepekang was united with a neighbouring principality to form the *kecamatan* Tabbingkassi, the district head of Kasepekang became the first *camat*. Within the *kecamatan*, the territory of the former prin-

cipality (later district) Kasepekan was divided into several *desa*, which roughly correspond to the administrative units the Dutch colonial government had earlier established (see map). The former complex Sapiri and part of complex Likopancing were now combined into *desa* Kasepekan. The other part of Likopancing, together with the former complexes of Maciniq and Tompokang became *desa* Beloparang, while the complexes of Batulangga and Banyorang became *desa* Lapparaq, named after the residential village of the *camat* (which had been founded as an administrative centre by the Dutch). In 1977, Batulangga was separated again from Lapparaq to form a *desa* itself. After 1981, both Batulangga and Lapparaq were given the status of *kelurahan*, the head of which (*lurah*) is an employee of the national government (*pegawai negeri*) in contrast to the *kepala desa*, who are not paid by the national government. The two *desa* of Beloparang and Kasepekan are further divided into several *dusun*, while the respective administrative units within the *kelurahan* are called *lingkungan*. The population of the four *desa/kelurahan* within the territory of the former principality of Kasepekan today amounts to some 25,000 individuals, who live in villages rarely exceeding 1,000 inhabitants (except for Lapparaq). On the other hand, there are also many small hamlets comprising only a few dozen people.

Name of complex	Title of ruler
1. Sapiri. Including 5 other villages	Anrongguru Gallarang (2) Toddoq (1) (no distinct <i>adaq</i> head (2))
2. Likopancing Including 2 other villages	Karaeng Karaeng (1) Gallarang (1)
3. Maciniq Including 4 other villages	Karaeng Gallarang (2) (no distinct <i>adaq</i> head (2))
4. Tompokang Including 4 other villages	Karaeng Gallarang (1) (no distinct <i>adaq</i> head (3))
5. Batulangga Including 8 other villages	Karaeng (no distinct <i>adaq</i> head (8))
6. Banyorang Including 8 other villages	Karaeng Karaeng (1) Gallarang (2) (no distinct <i>adaq</i> head (5))

Sacred heirlooms and political change

Answering the question of what happened to the former structure of leadership, which was symbolically represented by the *kalompoang*, requires considering the most significant villages within the former principality. These villages traditionally were members of the 'twelve *adaq*' (*adaq sampulo anrua*), a kind of council composed by the most prominent village leaders in Kasepekang.

First of all, each of the four *désa/kelurahan* is now headed by a member of the noble family of Kasepekang. In contrast, after the retirement of the first *camat* of Tabbingkassi, all of his successors have come from other Makasarese speaking regions. In *kelurahan* Lapparaq, the descendants of the former *karaeng* of Banyorang and Lonrong no longer exert any political influence. The two villages are now headed by members of the Kasepekang nobility. In *désa* Kasepekang, the situation is quite similar: In the five major villages, formal village heads were installed in addition to the *karaeng*, whose functions are today confined to the ritual context.¹⁵ Three of these villages (including, of course, Sapiri as the residence of the noble family) are headed by members of the local nobility. In contrast to these conditions, in *kelurahan* Batulangga the former *karaeng* of Batulangga still holds the office of the village head, and furthermore had until recently been the first *lurah* of *kelurahan* Batulangga. Analogous conditions prevail in Tompokang, Likopancing and Maciniq, as the three major villages in *désa* Beloparang that are still headed by members of their respective *pattola karaeng*.¹⁶ In this connection, the present *karaeng* of Likopancing had also been the head of complex Likopancing between 1950 and 1960.

There are thus only four villages still headed by a *karaeng* who at the same time represents both official administration and *adaq* leadership. Of course, this result is similar to processes of administrative replacement in other regions in Indonesia or South Sulawesi. This transition prompts a closer look not only at leadership per se, but also at the present situation of sacred heirlooms in some villages, since *kalompoang* traditionally legitimated political authority.

With the exception of Lonrong, all other villages that were originally ruled by a *karaeng* or *anrongguru* were once in possession of a sacred heir-

¹⁵ I have elaborately discussed this aspect for the village of Bontoloe, one of the major villages in *désa* Kasepekang, in Rössler (1987:117-9, 351-3).

¹⁶ The *karaeng* of Tompokang claims to be genealogically related to the high nobility of Goa. Although this is affirmed by many people in the neighbouring villages, it is at the same time denied by other local nobles. I am not able to decide which opinion is the right one, since I only met the *karaeng* Tompokang on a few occasions.

loom.¹⁷ As already mentioned, the *kalompoang* of Banyorang and Sapiri were lost in the course of minor local feuds many years ago. The fact that the *kalompoang* of Sapiri had been the sacred object of the local nobility, however, does not seem to have affected the position of the noble *karaeng* of Kasepekang.¹⁸ Accordingly, today there are still five *kalompoang* within the territory of the former principality, namely in Bontoloe, Batulangga, Tompokang, Likopancing, and Maciniq (see map). In Bontoloe and Likopancing, they have the shape of flags (*bate*), whereas in Likopancing and Maciniq the *kalompoang* are swords. In Batulangga the sacred heirloom is said to consist of either some dozen living centipedes, one single giant centipede, or some living scorpions, any of which constitutes a notable exception to other sacred objects of the region.¹⁹

As mentioned above, there are some local variations as regards the persons who are in charge of the sacred heirlooms. In Bontoloe the sacred flag is kept by the *karaeng* and his 'female *adaq*' (*adaq baine*), an old woman who is a member of the *karaeng*'s descent group, but is not necessarily his wife. The same applies to Likopancing, where the *karaeng* is still in charge of the sacred sword. Nevertheless, there is a remarkable difference between both villages: the *karaeng* of Bontoloe no longer holds any official political function, whereas the *karaeng* of Likopancing does. In contrast to these conditions, in the other three villages the charge of sacred heirlooms has been transferred to other families or even other descent groups than that of the *karaeng*. In Tompokang for instance, the present *karaeng* is at the same time chief *imam* of *desa* Beloparang. After he had been elected *imam desa* some 20 years ago, he transferred the local *kalompoang* from his own house to the house of his brother, because, as he told me, it seemed impossible for an *imam* as head of the local mosque to be in charge of a material symbol of superstition and paganism, even though in his own opinion the *kalompoang* should not be depreciated in this way. The situation is similar in Batulangga and Maciniq.

After the *karaeng* of these two villages had been installed as formal village heads after 1960, they were no longer allowed to keep the *kalompoang*, because the provincial government considered their retention of this traditional object incompatible with the new administrative structure. Ever since, in both villages other families have been in charge of the sacred objects. Thus,

¹⁷ I could not find out why, according to local informants, there has never been a *kalompoang* in Lonrong, while I was also told that this village has always been ruled by a *karaeng*.

¹⁸ The present noble head of *desa* Kasepekang told me that some nobles from Bantaeng had once conquered the *kalompoang* of Sapiri/Kasepekang some centuries ago. They would not give it back to its original possessors until the ruler of Kasepekang gave them a water buffalo with horns of pure gold. Since such a buffalo was very hard to find, the *kepala desa* went on, it would be easier to leave the *kalompoang* where it was.

¹⁹ I could not cross-check these contradictory data concerning the *kalompoang* of Batulangga, because I did not have the opportunity to have a look at it.

in only two villages, namely Bontoloe and Likopancing, are the *kalompoang* still kept by the *karaeng* as the head of the local *adaq* council, while only in Likopancing does the *karaeng* at the same time hold the formal office of the village head. The latter fact is to be explained as resulting from the outstanding position of the Karaeng Likopancing, who has been renowned for his loyalty to the national government since the days of the Darul Islam rebellion.

Village	Former ruler	<i>kalompoang</i>	Present village head	Keeper of <i>kalompoang</i>
Bontoloe	Karaeng	x	Kepala	Karaeng
Likopancing	Karaeng	x	Karaeng	Karaeng
Tompokang	Karaeng	x	Karaeng	Karaeng's brother
Batulangga	Karaeng	x	Karaeng	(other family)
Maciniq	Karaeng	x	Karaeng	(other family)
Banyorang	Karaeng	(lost)	Noble Kepala	(-)
Sapiri	Anróngguru	(lost)	Noble Kepala	(-)

The consequences resulting from these constellations not only refer to the organization of rituals concerning the sacred heirlooms, but also to various internal conflicts within the village communities. As I have shown for the village of Bontoloe,²⁰ the fact that the *karaeng*, who is in charge of the *kalompoang*, no longer holds the office of formal village head (*kepala dusun*), calls forth severe social conflicts not only between the adherents of the pre-Islamic religion and the representatives of modern administration and Islam, but also among the group of *adaq* representatives. In this village, the present *karaeng* had been village head between 1961 and 1964, as well as between 1968 and 1970 (see below). In the eyes of many people he is still regarded as the only legitimate *karaeng*, because he is believed to be a true descendant of the first, divine ruler of the community, and therefore could rely upon the sacred heirloom as the very source of his political authority.

After 1961 the genealogical ties between *karaeng* and their mythical predecessors became meaningless for succession to formal governmental offices. Consequently, the significance of sacred heirlooms with regard to the general principles of leadership in the highland villages also declined, since any kind of formal (that is government-sanctioned) leadership is in no way tied to *kalompoang*, while traditional leaders in most instances no longer perform any official functions. Bantang, the *karaeng* of Bontoloe, is still in charge of the *kalompoang* and therefore of the *adaq*, while Nembo, the formal village head,

²⁰ I shall confine the discussion to Bontoloe, because my data about the situation in other villages are not as precise. However, patterns of social conflict are rather similar all over the region.

represents official administration. The members of the *adaq council*, over which the *karaeng* traditionally presided, take sides neither with Bantang nor with Nembo, but instead adjust their political strategies to every situation, as the circumstances may require.

Since the office of the village head is in no way related to *adaq*, and because the *karaeng*'s present function is confined to the ritual domain, there are many occasions for other people to take advantage of the diffuse pattern of leadership, and to strive for political influence on their own. As some of these people affirmed, today political ambitions are no longer hampered by *adaq*, because instead of genealogical ties to the holder of the *kalompoang*, or knowledge of the *adaq*, modern education and devotion to the religion of Islam have become important factors with regard to leadership.²¹ In contrast, the criterion of prior military position, in the region under discussion, is very rarely a factor entitling individuals to formal offices. Apart from these changes within the domain of leadership, further conflicts have arisen during the last 15 years among the *pattola karaeng*, as regards the family who should keep the *kalompoang* in their house. As a result of these developments, the traditionally clearly defined structure of leadership, with the sacred heirloom as a commonly accepted symbol of unity, has been transformed into an ambiguous system of divergent norms. Although the sacred object is still regarded as a source of spiritual power by many, even younger people, the decline of its political significance, among other factors, seems to have fostered the rise of factionalism within the community.

The rise of factionalism

In highland Goa, administrative transformations affecting the traditional political structure were abrupt and brought about rapid changes. The consequences resulting from the modification of the principles of leadership are most clearly visible in such villages as Bontoloe, where the formal office of the village head (*kepala*) after 1961 has been held several times by men who did not possess any genealogical ties to the *karaeng*'s descent group, and hence were not linked to the sacred heirloom. Among the seven village heads installed between 1961 and 1988, only three were members of the *karaeng*'s descent group: Bantang, who was the last to be inaugurated as *karaeng*, and who was village head between 1961 and 1964, as well as from 1968 to 1970;

²¹ In 1983, the candidate who had been proposed for the office of the village head by the inhabitants was rejected by the *kepala desa* because he knew but a few words of the national language. In general, a village head is expected to have at least a certain ability to speak, read and write Indonesian.

his cousin (MZS) Ahad, holding the office between 1970 and 1975; and, finally, Nembo, who was village head from 1983 until 1988. Among the other four *kepala*, one was a noble from Sapiri, while Jumali, who held the office for some months in 1975, is a descendant of former slaves. Most importantly, however, after 1961, succession to formal office has always involved conflict. All seven *kepala* resigned from the office either because they were no longer willing to stand in continuous opposition to a part of the village population, or because they were dismissed from the office by the *desa* government on the grounds that they were unable to meet the requirements of their position.

Accordingly, the local political situation in Bontoloe after 1961 has been dominated by conflict, a decline of the prestige that had formerly been associated with leadership in the village, and a general breakdown of political authority. In a situation of accompanying rapid changes in regard to patterns of religious belief and ritual, improved educational institutions (a village school was established in the 1960s), and the growing influence of urban culture, it has been observed in several parts of the world that local political systems soon become affected by the rise of factionalism (Nicholas 1966:55, 1977:55; Lewellen 1983:109). Factions are basically defined as flexible, non-corporate conflict groups, the members of which are recruited by a leader (Nicholas 1977:57-8). In practice, however, multiple factors account for a high degree of variation in the shape and scale of factions.

For the whole region under discussion, one of the most prominent factors provoking the formation of factions has been the penetration of small-scale traditional political systems by an administrative system based upon nationwide principles (see Schryer 1975:291). Thus, after 1961, dominant external forces have deeply influenced the development of political organization on the village level. In Bontoloe such external pressures, which Siegel and Beals label 'stress' (1960a:109-12), have combined in specific ways with internal 'strain', which is defined in turn as 'sensitive points of potential disruption within the system' (Siegel and Beals 1960a:116). In other words, external forces have swiftly and decisively extended the range of potential conflicts inherent in the traditional political structure of the village community. Although competition in succession to offices and individual struggles to achieve higher social rank and esteem also characterized indigenous politics, in the modern context marked by the penetration of the national administration the normative boundaries which had formerly been established by descent no longer exclude the largest part of the community from competing for (and gaining) political authority.

The type of factionalism resulting from these developments is very diffuse in nature. One group within the village supports the present *karaeng* Bantang, arguing that he is the only man who is entitled to leadership, while others claim that Tibo (*kepala* between 1964 and 1966) is best qualified

because of his wisdom and his knowledge of *adaq*. Close relatives of Ahad (*kepala* between 1970 and 1975), who died some years ago, hold that a man from his family should become village head, because they are members of the *karaeng*'s descent group. Lungga (*kepala* between 1966-1968), as well as Jumali (1975), who are both notorious for their aggressiveness and unscrupulousness, constantly urge those villagers who are not member of the *karaeng*'s descent group to support them in their struggle once more to become village head. Because his father is said to have collaborated with the Dutch colonial government, Nembo has never been accepted as *kepala* since he was installed in 1983, even though he is a member of the *karaeng*'s descent group. I was informed in a letter from Bontoloe that he resigned from his office in 1988. However, leadership in the village is now divided among three men, each of whom is head (*ketua*) of a village sub-unit (*rukun kampung*). Among them is Nembo's nephew (BS) Kammai, as well as Lungga, the former village head. The third *ketua* is again a member of the *karaeng*'s descent group.

Those factions centering around prominent figures, such as Lungga, Jumali, or Bantang, clearly aim at competition for political leadership. There are other similar conflict groups focussing on different interests, for example one comprised of members calling for a stronger position of Islam *vis-à-vis* the adherents of traditional religion. All factions have in common that membership is constantly shifting, and that they as a whole are poorly organized. Therefore, the present political structure in Bontoloe might aptly be designated as being dominated by pervasive factionalism, which differs from schismatic and party factionalism in several respects (Schusky 1975:130; Le-wellen 1983:109; Siegel and Beals 1960b).

The ties between the leaders of factions and their supporters are still largely based upon kinship, except for the case of Jumali, who has no kin relations in the village. In contrast to other common forms of factionalism, economic dependence is insignificant for the establishment of leader-follower ties in Bontoloe. This may partly be explained by the fact that patron-client relationships, which play an important socio-economic role in other parts of South Sulawesi (Pelras, this volume), are virtually non-existent in the area under investigation, because here no traditional system of asymmetrical exchange of goods or services between superiors and inferiors is to be found. Since close kin relations in most instances imply approximately equal social rank, the formation of factions often results in vertical cleavages in the community, without economic factors being involved (see Schryer 1975). In the same way as a member of the *karaeng*'s descent group is considered to be of higher rank than members of other descent groups, factions centering around the representatives of various commoner substrata must be conceived as ranked among themselves.

The motivations for supporting a faction leader in Bontoloe are of a high-

ly variable nature, and cannot be discussed here in detail. Interpersonal conflicts frequently arise over matters of land tenure, social rank and esteem, and honour (*siriq*). Such conflicts may immediately lead to the development of factions with fluid membership and a diffuse pattern of leadership, which are sometimes dissolved again after a few days, as soon as the hostility among the initial opponents has subsided. In some cases, and especially in those with direct relevance to political leadership, conflict groups are much less fragile, and may persist over years or decades, even though many people do not maintain factional solidarity over a longer period of time. In all instances, however, factionalism in Bontoloe seems to be primarily expressed in terms of avoidance of social interaction with opponents, withdrawal from cooperation, and non-participation in ritual activities (see Rössler 1987).

Accordingly, conflicts rarely become manifest, although individual confrontations commonly reveal aggressive behaviour (see Spiro 1968:410-8). This pattern can be explained by the role of external stress. Since manifest conflicts between factions in a village would quickly result in a confrontation with the *desa* or *kecamatan* government, and because it is a distinct feature of factions that their conflicting interests are 'submerged in the context of reacting to outsiders' (Schusky 1975:131), competition among factions is carefully restricted to a cover level.

The present form of factionalism in Bontoloe has resulted from the administrative reforms of 1960-1961. Ever since, the pattern of political leadership, which had probably been characterized by internal strain for decades, if not centuries, has constantly been subject to external stress in the shape of a political structure that is contradictory to the traditional one. The significance of genealogical ties between village rulers and their mythical predecessor, who is believed to have brought the sacred heirloom to the community, has been replaced by such new values as education, modernity, and urban culture, all of which play decisive roles in the formation of factions. As long as transactions between leaders and supporters are still mainly based upon kinship ties, however, factions may function predominantly in positive ways with regard to the solidarity of the community.

Leadership and ritual

A second kind of consequence resulting from political change refers to the rituals concerning sacred heirlooms, which always involve a symbolic focus on leadership. These rituals can generally be divided into the following categories: 1. rituals performed on the occasion of warfare; 2. rituals performed at the inauguration of a new *adaq* head (*karaeng*); 3. periodic rituals performed every year in order to purify the sacred object from evil influences;

and 4. rituals performed in order to make or to redeem a vow (*tinjaq*).

With regard to the first category, I did not meet any person who could still recall the specific characteristics of the ritual that was once performed before the villagers went to war. According to older sources, however, on such occasions the *kalompoang* were taken out of their places before buffaloes were slain as blood sacrifices (see Niemann 1889:4).

In Bontoloe, the ritual on the occasion of the inauguration of a *karaeng* has not been performed since 1960, because since that year the village has been ruled by formal village heads, while the *karaeng* inaugurated in 1960 still acts only as *adaq*-leader. In addition, a blood offering to the *kalompoang* was formerly performed every year after the end of the harvest around the month of July. This purification ritual called *acceraq kalompoang* ('to offer blood to the *kalompoang*') probably ceased to be performed as a communal ceremony in colonial times.²² Nearly all of its sequences and symbolic actions, however, are still performed today, although only on the occasion of an individual vow (see Röttger-Rössler, this volume). On the other hand, the performance of a similar ritual called *ajjaga* ('to guard'; i.e. a child), which has always been linked to the redemption of a vow, is actually confined to the nobility and to high-ranking *adaq* officials on the village level, even though it reveals many parallels with a (present-day) *acceraq kalompoang* in regard to scale and monetary prerequisites. Whenever such a ritual was performed within the territory of Kasepekang, representatives of the so-called 'twelve *adaq*' of Kasepekang were obliged to take part. After several months of fieldwork I came to the conclusion that these *adaq* officials from all over the principality were not representing a definite number of villages.²³ Instead, only the eight most important villages within Kasepekang were always represented among the 'twelve *adaq*', namely the eight villages that were headed by a *karaeng* (7) or an *anrongguru* (1).

In addition to its religious significance, an *ajjaga* also has very important political implications, because it always includes oaths of allegiance (*pangngaru*) that are recited by members of the community in front of their *karaeng* in order to assure him of his subordinates' loyalty. By collectively taking part in the ritual, the representatives of the major villages (or *adaq*) of the principality affirmed their political unity, as well as their common allegiance to the noble ruler of Kasepekang. When in 1984 a (commoner) woman from Parangloe (*kabupaten* Goa) intended to redeem a vow by offering a buffalo to

²² Details of this most extensive ritual in Makassarese culture are discussed in Rössler (1987:186-205). According to several informants, an *acceraq kalompoang* could only be performed in Tompokang and Bontoloe, because only here did the sacred objects have the shape of flags. In other villages, an equivalent ritual is called *attoana rihata* ('to treat the gods').

²³ When finally applying a standardized questionnaire, we found out that in fact more than twenty villages were said to belong to the 'twelve adat'.

the *kalompoang* of Bontoloe, the local *adaq* council first of all decided that an *ajjaga* should be performed, because the woman as the initiator of the ritual was a member of the *karaeng*'s descent group. Very soon, however, several difficulties concerning the organization of the ritual arose, since it became apparent that representatives from the 'twelve *adaq*' could not be invited.²⁴

The reason was simply that, with very few exceptions, the present *adaq* heads of the respective villages no longer performed any official function, while the formal village heads either did not concern themselves with *adaq* or ritual matters, or they even rejected them as constituting 'primitive superstition'. Therefore, the ritual that was finally performed turned out to be an *acceraq kalompoang*, basically a periodic ritual which did not involve the participation of the 'twelve *adaq*', but rather was confined to the framework of the village community. The ritual sequences were extended, so that they not only included the redemption of the woman's vow, but also the traditional oaths of allegiance. However, these *pangngaru* were not performed in front of the *karaeng*, as prescribed by *adaq*, but, instead, in front of the village head, who had never been ritually inaugurated as *karaeng*, and whose function was therefore not linked to the sacred heirloom. Throughout the performance of this particular ritual, the village head occupied the leading position in all sequences referring to the socio-political organization of the village community, whereas the role of the *karaeng* was confined to minor sequences involving only a few participants. Accordingly, latent conflicts between formal and informal leadership were reflected in this performance of the most extensive ritual in Makassarese culture. On this occasion, the opposition between social reality on the one hand and ritual symbolism on the other became extremely obvious, because the socio-religious unity as symbolized in many ritual sequences was counteracted by social conflicts resulting from recent political change.

Some days later, a family of noble descent in Maciniq performed an *ajjaga*. Maciniq is one of the villages still in possession of a *kalompoang*, and also must be represented in the 'twelve *adaq*'. The situation was different here, since the ritual that was performed encompassed virtually all the sequences of an *ajjaga*.²⁵ As prescribed by tradition, there were separated compartments for the representatives of each village which had been invited to take part in the ritual. The division of these compartments on the ritual platform (*lan-*

²⁴ These rituals are performed on very rare occasions, since they require enormous expenses. The ritual under discussion was the first to be performed in Bontoloe after more than twenty years.

²⁵ The whole ritual was filmed by a team from TVRI Ujungpandang (Indonesian Broadcasting Cooperation), which had been invited by the initiator (see below). Accordingly, some sequences were more or less directed, or even repeated a couple of times. It was the first *ajjaga* in Maciniq after more than thirty years.

dang) was as follows:

Anrongguru pajaiq	(Space for dancing performance)		Hamlet C
Hamlet A	Hamlet B	Maciniq	Batulangga
Anrongguru Sapiri	Gallarang Sapiri	Anaq Karaeng Sapiri	Tompokang

As is apparent at first glance, there are only ten compartments instead of twelve. Furthermore, only seven villages are represented. Of these seven villages, only four – namely Maciniq, Batulangga, Sapiri, and Tompokang – are commonly said to be members of the 'twelve *adaq*', whereas hamlets A, B, and C (the names of which are irrelevant in this context) are very small settlements located only some ten minutes away from Maciniq. Since the *anrongguru pajaiq* (specific *adaq* officials responsible for the purification of sacred heirlooms) on this occasion were inhabitants of Maciniq and the *adaq* council of Sapiri (also located near Maciniq) occupied three compartments instead of one, the composition of the 'twelve *adaq*' in this case was mainly determined by geographical and administrative factors. With the exception of Batulangga (the *karaeng* of which is a most influential local politician, as described above) and Sapiri (the traditional residence of the nobility of Kasepekan), all other representatives came from villages located within *desa* Beloparang (see map). The ritual framework did not, as for centuries, comprise the whole *kakaraengang* Kasepekan, but only a *desa* founded in 1960. Due to modified patterns of leadership and political structure in general, the focus of territorial allegiances to this *ajjaga* shifted from the traditional principality to the recently established administrative unit. Even though this is contradictory to *adaq*, it should be considered a logical consequence of political change. In both cases, fixed territorial boundaries account for the places from which participants are invited.

According to *adaq*, the performance of such a ritual requires assembling the sacred heirlooms of every village community to which the initiator is genealogically linked. Since there is considerable overlapping particularly between the various kingroups within one principality, commonly all the *kalompoang* (or at least minor sacred objects) within its territory are taken to the performance of an *ajjaga*. In the case under discussion, however, not only the range of the *adaq* representatives invited, but also the presence of sacred objects was determined neither by tradition nor by the initiator's descent, but

rather by current administrative boundaries imposed by the national government. Accordingly, the only *kalompoang* that were present in the ritual performances came from Maciniq, Likopancing, and Tompokang, all of which are located within *desa* Beloparang.

Apart from other financial and organizational aspects, it was above all the present political situation which accounted for the framework of the ritual. Since it had been announced as a spectacular demonstration of cultural heritage, which furthermore was to be filmed by a team from TVRI Ujungpandang, the ritual was officially sponsored by the *desa* government. The noble *desa* head deliberately confined the framework to participants from his administrative unit, thereby excluding representatives from other *desa*, even though these latter, according to *adaq*, would have been obliged to take part.²⁶ As a result of this sponsorship, the ritual turned out to form a strange mixture of folklore, public demonstration of wealth and prestige, and, as various local officials pointed out on this occasion, a demonstration of 'mutual cooperation' (*gotong royong* (Indonesian)) within the *desa*. Accordingly, in this case a ritual originating from pre-Islamic religion, which should basically symbolize the political unity of a principality, as well as the loyalty of village *karaeng* to their noble ruler, was perfectly adjusted to present political requirements. However, most of its sequences thereby lost their original meanings. Indeed, this consequence is probably what the officials had in mind when they decided to sponsor the ritual:

The *karaeng* of Maciniq on this occasion admonished the inhabitants of *dusun* Maciniq not to conceive this aspect of culture as an obligation, and to reduce the duration of the ritual performances gradually. Accordingly, this *ajjaga* was considered finished after only one night. (Translated from the script of the film 'Ajjaga', which was shot at Maciniq and broadcast by TVRI on 10 and 17 October 1984.)

Therefore, this latter case provides another example of the transformation of an indigenous ritual into art, or, perhaps more aptly, spectacle. Due to the fact that tourism is virtually non-existent in the region, transformations of ritual such as those which have taken place in Tana Toraja (see Crystal 1978; Volkman 1984, 1987) provide no striking parallels to the *ajjaga* at Maciniq, since it would neither be appropriate to characterize the performance of this latter ritual as commercialized, nor has public/touristic interest led to a 'revival' of traditional ritual (Volkman 1987:166; Crystal 1978:119). Furthermore, in contrast to the situation in Tana Toraja, there are but moderate ten-

²⁶ 'Originally, each *DUSUN* formed a small principality that comprised twelve *adat*, viz....' (Translated from the script of the film 'Ajjaga', shot at Maciniq). The script writer, ignorant of the former political organization of the region, was deliberately misinformed by local officials who tried to justify the erroneous composition of participating villages.

dencies for *nouveau riche* families of traditionally low rank to perform rituals which were previously restricted to the nobility (see Volkman 1984:161-2, 1987:165). Instead, performing such extensive rituals (and inviting TV-teams) appears to be a new form of 'prestige battle' among noble families.

The transformation of the *ajjaga* at Maciniq is reminiscent of similar government appropriations of ritual observed elsewhere in Indonesia (for example, Acciaioli 1985 for Central Sulawesi; Siregar 1979 for North Sumatra). In such cases, *adat*, ritual, traditional beliefs, and indigenous culture as a whole are apparently preserved and supported by the local government. Below the surface, however, the implications of the respective (Indonesian!) terms have undergone considerable changes. Culture (*kebudayaan*), ritual (*upacara*), and *adat* are 'aestheticized' (Acciaioli 1985:152-3; see also Siregar 1979:49), and are no longer regarded as appropriate designations for the way of life in a modern community. In regard to religion, the matter becomes even more obscure. In the case of the *ajjaga* at Maciniq, not a single statement (neither in the film script nor in the numerous official addresses) concerned the crucial role of *kalompoang* in the traditional religion, which today is exclusively referred to as *kepercayaan* (beliefs). The reason for this obviously lies in the impossibility of establishing a relationship between *kalompoang* and official religion (*agama*) (see Atkinson 1983).

Conclusion

The imposition of a national administrative system in the local context of highland Goa has called forth several developments, many of which have resulted in new patterns of social conflict within village communities. Since the sacred heirlooms have lost their significance as a traditional means of legitimating political authority, the former interdependency of political leadership and the keeping of sacred heirlooms has been replaced by a comparatively differentiated structure of leadership in most of the villages. If formal political authority is rivalled by leadership that is legitimated by *adaq* (as is the case in most villages), conflicts between the representatives of *adaq* and those of the administration are inevitable.

At the same time, however, such developments frequently provoke internal conflicts among *adaq* leaders, as well as within the wider village communities. Due to external stress resulting from rapid political change, conflicting interests among individuals or groups have given rise to pervasive factionalism. Factions, which mainly center around individuals competing for political authority, commonly lead to withdrawal from community-wide social interaction, cooperation, and participation in ritual activities. Since the ties binding followers to leaders of factions are still based upon kinship,

without economic factors being involved, factionalism has not yet provoked enduring cleavages within the village population.

The official government's struggle against the worship of *kalompoang* further contributes to a rapid decline of the socio-political significance of sacred heirlooms. Nevertheless, rituals in the presence of *kalompoang* are still frequently performed throughout the region, even though only one category of these rituals has persisted up to the present day (Röttger-Rössler, this volume). Modifications of ritual sequences, as well as manipulations of social relations (as regards the initiator's villages of origin) still ensure that the rituals can, at least on the surface, be performed in accordance with *adaq*. However, rituals centering around sacred heirlooms are now often regarded as aestheticized 'cultural' spectacles that disregard their traditional implications for both leadership and religion.

Where recently established administrative boundaries impede an extension of the ritual framework with regard to the participation of *adaq* representatives from all over the region, much of the ritual action is necessarily determined by present political circumstances. In this respect, the *adaq* regulating the organization of rituals proves to be more flexible than the structure of the political system. The indigenous pattern of social organization had to a great extent been based upon overlapping bilateral kin groups allowing for individual choice of allegiance. In contrast to this former system of high flexibility, the rigidity of the modern administrative structure prevents the maintenance of traditional modes of competition and cooperation, as well as the organization of rituals involving participants from villages that formerly were closely associated.