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Around three billion people, or half of the world's population, live in cities today, and their numbers are increasing rapidly. Since no population increase is expected in the countryside, it is estimated that within a few years the urban population will exceed the rural population. The growth in the urban population will mainly occur in developing countries. Only fifteen years ago, around one billion people lived in the cities of the South; today that number has doubled. During the coming decades more than 95 percent of the increase of the urban population will occur in cities of the South, an absolute increase of more than two billion. Thus, by the year 2025 four billion people will be living in Southern cities (UNHCS 1996).

Much has been written about the problems accompanying rapid urban growth, such as the spread of squatter settlements and urban poverty, deterioration of the physical infrastructure and the increase in violence. Naturally, it is the poor in particular who are suffering from the worsening conditions in the cities. Yet in spite of the many problems they face, the poor also perceive cities as environments that offer opportunities to pursue their strategies for coping with poverty. Contrary to analyses based on ideas of the 'culture of poverty' (Lewis 1965), the poor are not merely passive recipients of urban problems. During the past decades, it has been demonstrated in many countries that the poor are able to organize themselves, for example by squatting land and building their own shelters. Community-based organizations (CBOs) of the urban poor and supportive non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been actively involved in improving the urban environment, especially in the South. In some countries they form umbrella organizations or networks, thus bringing urban social movements into existence.

I admit the value of Castells' (1983) definition that an urban social movement should change the meaning of the city. However, I will limit the notion to that of a network of urban CBOs and NGOs aiming to obtain access to land and collective goods and services (such as clean water, sanitation and health

care) for the urban poor. The efforts of urban social movements usually contain a dimension of protest and contention, but this may embrace different forms, from negotiation to armed struggle. A network is called a social movement if it is capable of mobilizing people for petitions, mass meetings and demonstrations to support the issue at stake. World-wide, urban struggle mainly revolves around four issues: a. obtaining titles to land; b. improvement of collective services; c. forced upgrading of poor settlements; d. demolition and eviction without compensation. As these issues indicate, an urban social movement is a geographically relevant actor since it is constantly searching for ways to change the urban geographical environment. On the other hand, the urban environment in the broad sense of the word, encompassing physical, economic, demographic, socio-cultural and political dimensions, exerts significant influence on the way the actor proceeds.

A core political question is whether the urban movement will be coopted into the socio-political system or whether it will develop as a countervailing power against the existing power structure. Participants in an urban movement are confronted with the permanent dilemma whether or not, and to what degree, to cooperate with government agencies. The question of the right strategy cannot be answered with the help of abstract theories. There are always changes in the political conditions of cities, regions and countries that require new responses and a rethinking of strategies by urban communities. It is the particular political situation, fixed at a specific point in space and time, that offers constraints and opportunities for collective action. Actors in the urban movement must always be aware of the political opportunity structure (Assies 1997).

In this contribution, I will elaborate on the question of changing strategies. I will look at the connection between urban struggles at the local level and policy trends at the global level, since the specific features of any urban social movement are the result of the interaction between local and global forces. Metro Manila will serve as a case in point. The metropolis is situated on the island of Luzon and consists of four cities and thirteen municipalities. Metro Manila or, as it is often called, the National Capital Region of the Philippines (NCR), is the centre of economic activity in the country, generating one-third of the GNP and receiving 70 percent of the imported goods. Like other large urban agglomerations in Asia, its rate of population growth substantially surpasses the growth of the national population. Around 1960, Metro Manila accounted for 2.5 million inhabitants, while current estimates vary between 10 and 12 million. One in six inhabitants of the Philippines and 40 percent of the country's urban population live in Metro Manila. Each year the natural increase of around 100,000 persons is matched by the arrival of the same number of migrants, who join the urban poor in the metropolis.

Background: globalization and the new urban policy model

Today's globalization is characterized by the mobility of capital. World capital competes for markets and continuously searches for new production locations. Finance capital in particular moves around the globe at great speed and in incredibly large amounts. Rapid change is characteristic of the global, post-modern society, and cities are drawn into an ongoing process of restructuring to adapt to the changing requirements of capital. In this process, some cities lose comparative economic advantages while others gain advantages.

Since the economies of the South are strongly influenced by the world economy, restructuring also occurs in the cities of the South. In the past, the economies of major cities were shaped by their function as regional or national centres for commerce, government, education or manufacturing. The manufacturing industry was aimed at the national market and was intended to substitute for imports; hence, import-substitution industry. Alongside this formal economy, an extensive informal sector came into existence. In this sector, many of the urban poor found employment as contract workers in small-scale industries or construction or were self-employed in street trading, services, and transport. The existence of an extensive informal sector, where jobs are insecure and poorly paid, has since become a characteristic feature of most cities of the South.

Current globalization forces the large cities of the South to offer modern infrastructure and communication facilities, cheap labour and tax incentives in order to attract foreign capital and to develop export industry. East Asian cities such as Singapore, Bangkok, Jakarta, Seoul and Shanghai are outstanding examples of such policies. In these cities, export industry has contributed substantially to high economic growth rates (especially during the years before the region's crisis in 1997-1998), and it is a major source of employment, too. Export-oriented policies have led to changes in the labour market. Due to low wages, a new, female urban working class has come into existence, as well as a middle class of certain affluence.

These cities are global cities as much as their counterparts in the North. Since they are part of a global system, they are drawn into the current global discourse on urban development policy, which focuses on good governance. Good governance stresses interaction and cooperation between the several sectors of society. Limiting the role of the national state in setting economic policy fits into the neo-liberal agenda. Thus there are three major groups of actors in the development process: the state with its governmental agencies, the private business sector, and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs), both representing the 'civil society'. If there are commercially attractive opportunities, the private sector will get a chance, while the civil society will take responsibility for public

services and other non-profit activities. Thus the function of the state ideally is to enable the two sectors to fulfil their theoretical roles and, in doing so, the three will cooperate in the planning and implementation of urban programmes and projects.

The application of this model in the cities of the South creates greater scope for poor communities to participate in urban development processes and to initiate interventions to improve their situation. Therefore, community participation, which comprises both the organization of the poor in urban communities and the facilitation of their access to decision-making institutions, is another key notion in current urban development policy. The more poor communities are organized, the better they can participate in efforts of governmental agencies to improve the urban environment. In this way, benefits for the poorer segments of the population can be improved in matters such as physical infrastructure, public services, urban violence and housing. Moreover, community participation is one of the most effective ways of reducing social exclusion, a major feature of urban poverty.

Proponents of urban governance and community participation in developing countries seem to forget, however, that the application of these principles requires certain preconditions. A major precondition is a government that enables participatory processes to occur at the community level, even if these result in a critical attitude towards government policies or agencies. In other words, the organizational capacity of urban CBOs and community participation depend on the democratic character of local and national governments. It is the government that shapes the political environment in which the development and actions of independent CBOs and supportive NGOs can be encouraged. An enabling government is a precondition for initiating participatory processes at community level. Thus, community participation is closely related to democracy at local and national levels.

Bottom-up processes are difficult to introduce in a political climate where democracy is absent or still in its infancy. By definition, authoritarian regimes do not enable communities to organize themselves. Instead, such regimes aim to control poor urban neighbourhoods. In such societies, participatory processes, if they occur, will mostly be used as instruments to implement goals that are pre-defined by the authorities. The authoritarian character of many governments in developing countries is one of the major factors that prevent poor communities from becoming actively involved in improving their situation.

Another factor is the prevailing social system in developing countries, which for the outsider is often hidden behind formal democratic structures such as political parties, elections and laws protecting the poor (Van Naerssen, Ligthart and Zapanta 1996). Storey (1999) drawing on Grindle (1980), uses the term 'neopatrimonial state' to refer to situations in which bureau-

cracies are weak and the state neglects the needs of the urban poor:

As a mechanism of and for the elite, the state acts both as a means for personal position and gain and ensures, through patronage ties, the subordination and disempowerment of dependent clients (Storey 1999:285).

And he continues:

Although altered by time and circumstance and the ways in which successive presidents have exploited it, the patron-client system has been and remains the fundamental political order in the Philippines (Storey 1999:285).

The core of today's global ideological forces consists of a neo-liberal drive towards liberalization and privatization of the economy, but it is coupled with a socio-political agenda that stresses institutional transparency, governance and participation. Both intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and international NGOs are actively involved in promoting these notions. The latter in particular offer support to locally organized CBOs and NGOs. Charitable NGOs, such as PLAN International and Foster Parents are usually non-political. Other international NGOs, such as Brot für den Welt, Denchurch, NOVIB and Oxfam, come closer to the ideas of participation and *empowerment* of CBOs. They are interconnected and fund projects all over the world. In this way they can exert substantial influence. The globalization of grass-roots politics (Smith 1995) is a phenomenon that should not be underestimated. This globalization also constitutes an important force contributing to changes in urban development policies.

The modernization of Metro Manila

Traditionally, the governmental structure of Metro Manila has consisted of several independent local governments (cities and municipalities) that distributed economic and political interests in the metropolitan area among several competing clans. The system changed under President Marcos (1965-1986). Confronted by strong opposition and a newly established Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which started a guerrilla war in the countryside, Marcos proclaimed martial law in 1972. He was then able to centralize Philippine policy and to create a central Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) with his wife, Imelda Marcos, as governor and general manager.

Some years later, the metropolis came under the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), also with Imelda as its head. The ministry was given extensive powers and the right to interfere in most planning and decision-

making activities concerning public services. President Marcos wanted to achieve industrialization and economic growth by shifting from import substitution to export orientation. The aim was for Metro Manila to attract multinational corporations, so the city had to be modernized and priority given to large infrastructure projects. The World Bank and IMF supported Marcos's efforts.

In 1976, the MMC issued a comprehensive plan for the physical and socio-economic development of the metropolis: 'Manila: Towards the City of Man'. In the public investment programme the centre of gravity shifted to infrastructure. The plan aimed at the construction of an export processing zone, a new port and an improved road system (including an inner urban highway, EDSA, and the Manila North Diversion Road). Building prestigious government centres, international hotels and luxury residences on reclaimed land in the Bay of Manila were also part of the plan. During the period 1973-1981, the World Bank lent US \$ 2.5 billion to the Philippines to support these urban development schemes.

After the People Power Revolution of February 1986, which led to the fall of Marcos, President Aquino (1986-1992) came to power. Democracy was restored, which unfortunately also meant that the old political clans reappeared on the political scene. Nevertheless, with free elections and a free press, more 'democratic space' was created and the idea of governance gained in importance. One example is the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which is widely considered Aquino's most important piece of legislation. Under the LGC, substantial authority is devolved upon local governments. Devolved public services and facilities of national government agencies include those of the Departments of Public Works and Highways, Environment and Natural Resources, Transportation and Communications, Health, and Tourism. The LGC also gives local authorities the power to design their own organizational structures, and it allows CBOs and NGOs to elect representatives to defend their interests in local government bodies.

Since the Aquino administration, the civil society has substantially gained in importance, too. In 1987, the right of independent organizations to participate in decision-making at all levels was included in the new Philippine constitution. Aquino's successor Ramos (1992-1998) accepted this principle of participation as legitimate in the discourse between government officials, the educated middle class and social activists (Carroll 1999). Estrada, who was elected president in 1998, appointed two committed representatives of the NGO world as state secretaries of Agrarian Reform and Finance. However, more recently he has been accused by the same NGO world (and by the influential Catholic Church as well) of 'crony capitalism'. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that NGOs, CBOs and other people's organizations (POs), being the major actors in the civil society, have more scope for influencing

policy and action than elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Clarke 1998). Estimates of the number of NGOs, for example, vary between 15,000 and 18,000.

To a substantial degree, the plans for combatting the central problems of Metro Manila, however, have remained the same. The major objectives are to attract foreign investment and export-oriented industries. The objectives have been strengthened, in the sense that more attention is being paid to liberalization of trade and industry. President Ramos expressed his vision for the country in the plan 'Philippines 2000'. This plan also formed the basis for the economic policy of his successor, President Estrada. The ultimate aim is that the Philippines should become an Asian Newly Industrializing Country (NIC) within a short period.

It is clear that, being the national 'growth pole', Metro Manila fulfils an important role in this vision. The metropolis must be re-created. Once more, priority is being given to large infrastructural works such as the rehabilitation of the Philippine National Railways, the extension of Light Rail Transit (LRT-3), ten radial roads, new land reclamations and a huge industrial area south of the metropolis. In this respect, not much has changed since the Marcos regime, but what can be said about the squatter areas and the urban poor?

The origins of the urban social movement

After the Second World War, thousands of families fled from the devastated countryside to Manila and, settling on available vacant spaces, became urban squatters. The main strategy of the government consisted of eviction and relocation to sites outside the capital. Site provisions, however, were minimal, and urban jobs as well as community facilities were scarce. Thus many settlers abandoned the relocation sites, unable to keep up the payments on whatever lots they were allowed to buy.

During the Marcos period this policy continued, but new legislation was introduced and the forms of interventions were different. The urban poor were considered a pool of cheap labour for export industries as well as a potential source of unrest. Therefore, part of the 'City of Man' plan was to clear the metropolis of its squatter population. To Imelda Marcos, squatters were 'landgrabbers and eyesores' and an obstacle to the realization of her dream of a modern metropolis. In 1975, squatting was declared a criminal offence under Presidential Decree 772, an important tool for clearing the city. A fine or imprisonment ranging from six months to one year was the punishment for squatting.

This is not to say that low-cost housing was not on the agenda. On the contrary, one of the major programmes undertaken by the National Housing

Authority was the Tondo Foreshore Plan, which had a decisive impact on the evolution of the urban movement in Metro Manila. Tondo Foreshore Land, reclaimed before the Second World War, was squatted by migrants immediately after the war. In the 1960s, Tondo was considered to be the largest slum area in Southeast Asia, with an estimated population of 175,000. When Marcos unfolded his vision to modernize Metro Manila, the original intention to create an industrial port area in Tondo was revived. The World Bank supported the plan with loans.

However, it was in Tondo that Philippine urban community organizing got its start. With the support of the Philippine Ecumenical Committee for Community Organizing (PECCO), twenty community organizations established ZOTO (Zone One Temporary Organization), an umbrella organization aiming to improve living conditions through self-help projects and to make demands on city authorities. ZOTO was based on the ideas of community organizer Saul Alinsky. According to these ideas, poor people will experience collective power by confronting outside organizations and agencies on concrete community issues, such as land rights and community services. Community workers were also guided by principles such as 'autonomy' of the neighbourhood and decision-making by residents. I refer to the approach of the CBOs and NGOs concerned as the territorial orientation of the urban movement, since local needs are at the core of their activity (Van Naerssen 1989).

In 1975, ZOTO formed Ugnayan, a federation covering the whole of Tondo Foreshore Land. As an alternative to relocation to distant sites, it proposed 'upgrading' or on-site improvement. A series of mass protests staged by ZOTO/Ugnayan succeeded in changing the original plans of the World Bank. The Bank decided to reserve one part of Tondo for housing, while occupants who had to move were offered a lot in a nearby area. No security of land tenure was offered, however, and the price that had to be paid for legal land titles was high. For this reason, ZOTO/Ugnayan continued to pressure the World Bank and the government. In due course, ZOTO became more and more politicized. Its strategy changed from territorial to political, since it aimed at structural changes in the political environment to improve the situation of the urban poor rather than to focus on their daily needs.

For some years, ZOTO/Ugnayan was the only social organization to challenge the Marcos regime under martial law. It even expanded, with the creation of a larger federation of 50 communities spread all over Metro Manila. Large-scale arrests, however, followed the Habitat Conference in Vancouver in 1976, where Ugnayan presented a 'People's Decree'. On the occasion of the conference, a large demonstration was staged in Manila that resulted in the arrest of no less than 2,000 participants. Savage repression followed, and it seemed as if the urban movement had been destroyed for good.

In 1982, however, a renewed and determined effort at slum clearance and relocation occurred. Imelda Marcos had proclaimed a 'last campaign' and had ordered the immediate removal of squatter families. Organizations of urban poor were subsequently revived. In July 1982 an alliance of squatter federations was created, calling itself the Alliance of the Poor Against Demolition (ALMA). Its primary goal was to resist slum clearance, using a political instead of a territorial approach. For example, it charged the regime with using development loans from IMF and the World Bank to finance demolitions, with the ultimate objective of making way for US investors.

The political climate favoured ALMA. The killing of opposition leader Benigno Aquino (August 1983) led to mass protests, and in all sectors of society people's organizations were activated. Organizations of the urban poor established links with organizations of factory workers, students, religious groups, youth, women, professionals and retailers. The National Democratic Front (NDF), the resistance movement in which the CPP occupied a central position, played a dominant role in the urban social movement. This is all the more remarkable because the CPP followed a Maoist line, which means that class struggle in the countryside and encircling of the cities get priority. As a matter of fact, during these years, intensive guerrilla warfare was being waged in the countryside.

The use of 'democratic space'

The role of the urban social movement in the People Power Revolution of February 1986 is unclear. The CPP had boycotted the people's revolt. According to the party, the popular heroine Cory Aquino also belonged to the elite group of the Philippines and did not deserve support; one could not expect structural changes from her side. Notwithstanding the position of the CPP, however, it is reasonable to assume that parts of the urban social movement participated in the revolt.

Soon after the change in regime, a new umbrella organization of the urban poor came into existence. It did not live long and soon gave way under the dilemma of whether or not to cooperate with the new government. President Aquino had established a special Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), leading to certain expectations by some CBOs and NGOs. They wanted to use the 'democratic space' to put urban land reform on the agenda. Other CBOs and NGOs were coopted by the new government agencies. The fact was that both the territorial and the politically-oriented organizations wanted to preserve the character of protest movement. For the politically-oriented organizations, resistance against urban development policies was still an instrument for political mobilization against capitalist development strategies.

This is not the place to deal with the many activities and initiatives undertaken by the actors of the civil society (see, however, Berner 1997 and Karaos 1993). I will limit myself to some main lines. The PCUP was an advisory committee with minor influence on a weak president. Its major success was the establishment of a large relocation project in Quezon City. The commission had no further mandates. It was largely dependent on local governments, which had the authority to decide in matters of land use, and the PCUP had to stand by helplessly and observe how the ruthless demolitions as under the Marcos regime continued. According to a study by the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights, there were 276 evictions in Metro Manila during the years of Aquino's presidency involving 600,000 urban poor. In 90 per cent of the cases no effort was made to relocate people or give any compensation (Murphy 1993). In two years (1993-1994) during the Ramos administration, 80 demolitions took place, involving around 80,000 people. In that sense, not much had changed.

On the other hand, one cannot deny that the current political situation is different from the one under the Marcos administration. Notwithstanding all the failures, the corruption and the appalling contrasts between rich and poor, many people from the middle and lower classes appreciate the increased democratic space. The NDF, and in particular the CPP, underestimated this support for the institutions of formal democracy. The NDF started with the boycott of the People Power Revolt, a strategic mistake that caused the NDF to lose popular support and sympathy. The party then failed in its efforts to devise an appealing new strategy to cope with the new political situation. Moreover, thousands of guerrillas, tired and wishing to join their families, left the mountains.

After the fall of Marcos, many progressive political parties and groups came into existence, among which were several social-democratic parties. Although it became clear that not much had changed after the Aquino period, some were optimistic about prospects for a radical urban movement. Then the CPP split into two wings. One wing returned to the old Maoist positions and called itself Re-affirm, while the other wing wanted to renew itself and became known as Reject (since it rejected the affirmation of the old strategy). The debate between the two wings paralysed the NDF, and the urban social movement too. The debate centred on the issue of the democratization of the CPP (Rocamora 1994), but the significance of an urban movement was also at stake. While the orthodox Re-affirm wing considered the struggle in the cities as subordinate to the struggle in the countryside, the other wing valued the urban struggle more highly. In this respect, it is significant that the strongly urbanized region of Manila-Rizal belonged to the Reject group.

In the meantime, international NGOs and donor agencies became aware of the political implications of supporting specific groups within the civil

society. They abstained from interfering in the party struggle but generally favoured new CBOs and NGOs not affiliated with the CPP. As Carroll notes:

purely local issues such as demolitions in one or another neighborhood are being transcended [...] in favor of broader sectoral concerns but without the ideological apparatus that in the past proved decisive. [...] Allies such as [...] church leaders, members of academe, sympathetic members of the bureaucracy, congressional staffers, and foreign NGOs have become even more crucial – and in the interaction among these groups one can at times sense the development of a real civil society transcending sectoral and class concerns. (Carroll 1999:131.)

The urban movement in Manila is currently characterized by a wide spectrum of CBOs and NGOs, consisting of both radical-political and reformist groups. The reformists set the tone. One of the successes of the reformists is the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) of 1996. This law was finally passed after six years of advocacy and lobbying by members of Parliament (Karaos, Gatpatan and Hotz 1995). The UDHA sets out the rights of the urban poor regarding evictions and relocations. Also, after intensive lobbying, President Ramos withdrew the notorious Presidential Decree 772 (1998) mentioned above. Further, extensive experiments are being undertaken with the Community Mortgage Programme (CMP), a unique programme of social housing to be carried out through community organizations in poor urban settlements. After President Estrada came to power (1998), he appointed a proponent of the urban movement as director of the Housing and Urban Development Authority (HUDA). Finally, mention should be made of NGOs that look for new ways to improve the living conditions of the urban poor.

All in all, some interesting developments have taken place in urban development policy in Manila. Some actors in the urban movement have definitely succeeded in using the opportunities offered by the political climate since the Marcos period. These opportunities, however, are limited. Like its predecessors (the upgrading policy and sites and services programmes), the CMP generally reaches the better-off among the poor, and unfortunately the rights of the urban poor exist largely on paper. The local governments of Metro Manila often do not implement the UDHA, and in the many poor urban neighbourhoods that lack active CBOs the poor are, in fact, without rights. This is demonstrated by the continuing demolitions and evictions, affecting tens of thousands of families each year. In a number of neighbourhoods, CBOs, NGO's and POs cooperate and succeed in obtaining land titles or in improving the level of collective services. However, while some thousands of families are supported with great effort, the number of urban poor in Manila increases by tens of thousands of families each year. Seen from this perspective much has yet to be done.

Conclusion

In the foregoing sections I described some changing strategies of the urban social movement in Manila. Naturally, the movement consists of groups of various orientations. Whichever orientation ultimately dominates will depend on the political climate. In contrast to the 1970s, when movement and state were strongly opposed to each other, the dominant current tendency is to cooperate with the agencies of the state while maintaining a critical distance ('critical cooperation'). However, it remains to be seen whether the problems of the urban poor can be solved under the existing system. As long as great social inequalities exist in Manila, the potential for a radical urban movement will remain. Thus the struggle for structural changes in society might gain momentum sooner or later. The question is when and under what kind of political climate a radical movement will arise, and who the major actors will be.

Globalization forms the backdrop for the urban struggle in Manila. It is neither the sole nor the major explanation for the existence of an urban movement, but the movement has to be considered as a response to modernization within the confines of the global economy, currently governed by neo-liberal ideas. More directly, globalization is also noticeable in the interaction between international NGOs and actors of the Philippine civil society. This, however, is a topic for further research and discussion.

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