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At the time Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed Indonesia's independence on 17 August 1945, considerable numbers of arms were actually in Indonesian hands (Wagner 1988:119). In 1943 the Japanese had established the Indonesian PETA, in Java comprising 66 battalions.¹ Besides, there were the *heiho* (in my previous articles incorrectly spelled *heihō*), the Indonesian auxiliary forces, amounting to 25,000 troops.² In addition there were 24,000 lightly armed Indonesian police with their better equipped Tokubetsu Keisatsutai (special police units), with a total of 15,000 revolvers, 10,000 rifles and 80 machine guns at their disposal (Miyamoto 1973:60, 1986:340; Rummelink 1978:53). This advantageous starting-position of the fledgling republic was not to last long, however.

At noon on 17 August, very shortly after Sukarno had made the proclamation, the Gunshireikan (Japanese army commander), Lieutenant General Nagano, issued Army Operation Order No. 1113, ordering the East,

¹ Allen 1976:70; Lebra 1977:109; Notosusanto 1979:99. Miyamoto (1973:17), followed by *War History Series* (1976:3), Rummelink (1978:50), Groen (1985:94), and L. de Jong (1986:520, abandoning the correct figure in L. de Jong 1985:972), mentions a figure of 67 battalions, including 3 (according to the editors of Miyamoto 1986:223 this should be 'plus 3') in Bali; however, according to Miyamoto's notes on a copy of this publication which I was fortunate enough to be personally presented with by him, the number was 69 (including the 3 in Bali). Salim Said (1991:13), referring to Simatupang, says there were 60 battalions in Java. As Miyamoto (1973:25, 27, 1986:231-3) points out, the PETA was under-equipped, however. Initially only 20,490 weapons were made available to around 33,000 PETA members, and this was later even reduced by 6,500.

² Miyamoto 1973:29, 1986:235. Wagner (1988:119) overlooks the *heiho*. Lebra (1977:97) points out that thousands of *heiho* were sent to Burma and Thailand and Raben (1999:85) says that the Japanese also deployed *heiho* troops in the Philippines. According to Army Operation Order No. 1125 of 26 August 1945, 1,286 *heiho* were to arrive at Tanjung Priok harbour in that month (NIOD IC 065459:12, which mentions Jogjakarta as the place where the relevant army orders were issued, although the army headquarters were in Jakarta; the *katakana* mentioning the place name was incorrectly transliterated by the British intelligence).

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Central and West Java military commanders to disband the PETA on or around 19 August.³ A similar order with respect to the *heiho* was issued on 20 August, to take effect on 23 August, and with respect to the 48th Division on 25 August (Army Operation Order 1119, NIOD IC 065459:6).

The decision to dissolve the PETA and *heiho* was taken on 16 August (when Sukarno and Hatta were being held captive by some *pemuda*, or militant youths), at a meeting of the brain trust of the Gunshireibu (army headquarters) together with the Gunseikanbu (military administration) top. This meeting had been convened on 15 August, after the Japanese had heard the radio broadcast of the Emperor's shattering announcement of Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and a broadcast by the Japanese press agency Domei.⁴ Then Major General Yamamoto, the chief of staff (Sambōchō) and superintendent of the military administration (Gunseikan), had decided, on the advice of the civilian top official Saitō, that the Japanese should maintain the *status quo*.⁵ The formal decision on this and other important policy matters was taken the next day. As the Allies at that time had not yet established contact with the Japanese army, Allied pressure in this respect, as Alers (1956:107) for instance suggests, was absolutely out of the question. Mean-

³ NIOD IC 065459:3. *Peranan TNI* (1965:28) and B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:100) seem to assume that, in view of the date of the army order, the Japanese took the decision accordingly on 17 August. Nugroho Notosusanto (1979:134) mentions 18 August as the day when the order was issued, whereas Rinzema (1989:31) claims that the PETA was disarmed on the 29th. It is certainly wrong to say, as Dahm does (1971:115), that the Japanese took the decision because of PETA attacks after the proclamation of independence. According to Kahin (1952:137), PETA units throughout wide areas of Java, if they were not too far outnumbered, resisted disarmament and clashed with the Japanese. R. Kadim Prawirodirdjo (1972:8) mentions only two places where the PETA was not disarmed: Sokowidi (Banyuwangi) and Pelabuhan Ratu (Sukabumi). Larson (1970:260) only mentions Salatiga in this connection. Notosusanto (1979:135), on the other hand, says that all PETA units without exception were disarmed by the Japanese. Van Mook (1949:85) erroneously claims that the disbanded PETA were allowed to retain their arms.

⁴ Sukarno and Hatta, when seeking confirmation of Japan's surrender, did not meet anyone at the Gunseikanbu office (Hatta 1970:30) in the BPM building (Djojoadisuryo 1972:71), on the north-eastern corner of Gambir Square (formerly Koningsplein, and currently Medan Merdeka), at noon on 15 August, as all had been summoned to listen to the Emperor's radio broadcast at the Gunshireibu in the NKPM building, on the opposite south-western corner of the square. See the photo of Army Commander Imamura in front of this building in *Ran-In* (1967) and Imamura (1986:67), who incorrectly locates this building on the eastern and the palace on the western side of the square. Curiously Meelhuijsen (2000:30, 35), possibly influenced by Shibata (NIOD 006958), mentions 14 August as the date of the Imperial Proclamation.

⁵ Notosusanto 1979:129. When Sukarno and Hatta approached Major General Nishimura on the evening of 16 August to ask permission to proclaim independence, the latter, mindful of his superior's decision, very cautiously withheld his consent (ARA AS 5205-23:2). To Rear Admiral Maeda, naval liaison officer of the army general staff, Sukarno and Hatta had expressed hopes of Japanese non-interference. As Maeda was not in a position to give them the desired assurance, he requested Major General Nishimura to see the two Indonesians (Han 2000a:240). Maeda's role as described by Van den Doel (2000:77) is therefore not in agreement with the facts.

while, Army Operation Order 1110 to prepare for the change in the situation by tightening security measures was issued at 10 p.m. on 15 August. The army was hereby ordered to be prepared to suppress any possible outbreaks of violence (NIOD IC 065459:1-2).

In the absence of orders from higher levels of command⁶, the army brain trust on the 16th stipulated in the first place that the interests of the Japanese army and Japanese citizens, as well as their protection, were the army's main concern. In the second place the greatest sincerity should be observed vis-à-vis the Allied forces. Thirdly, further guidance for the Indonesians on their road towards independence was impossible. All those attending the meeting endorsed the proposal by the *sakusen sambō* (staff officer in charge of operations), Lieutenant Colonel Miyamoto, to dissolve and disarm the PETA and *heiho*.⁷ On the other hand, it was decided to widen the scope for Indonesian participation in the existing government administration.⁸ Moreover, it was felt that the industry supplying the army's needs should be converted into one supplying the needs of the people and that Indonesian industries should be extended and supported.⁹

As A.H. Nasution (1977:286) points out, dissolution of the PETA and *heiho*

⁶ ARA AS 5205-23:2 (ARA AS 5208:5, suggesting the reverse, is probably ambiguous); Nishijima and Kishi 1963:478-9; Miyamoto 1973:50; *War History Series* 1976:8; Notosusanto 1979:129. B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:79), followed by, for example, L. de Jong (1985:1037, 1986:516) and Van Poelgeest (1999:24), assumes that the orders to maintain the status quo were received from Singapore.

⁷ Miyamoto 1973:50; *War History Series* 1976:8; Rummelink 1978:52. Van Delden (as cited by Van Bruggen and Wassing, 1998:72) incorrectly suggests that Miyamoto was the fourth-highest in rank in Java. See, however, the photo in Blussé, Rummelink and Smits (2000:240), showing Colonel Obana on the extreme left sitting next to Major General Nishimura, and Miyamoto with Lieutenant Colonel Nomura and Major Count Yamaguchi, who all three belonged to the fifth echelon, standing behind Obana, Nishimura and Yamamoto (see also Miyamoto 1973:4). Also on the 16th, anticipating the disbandment of the *heiho*, Army Operation Order 1111 (NIOD IC 065459:2) was issued. Providing for a composite infantry battalion to be made available to the commanders of internment camps, it stipulated an increase in the number of camp guards, who up till then had been mainly *heiho* (see Overdijkink, 1946:28, who describes their misconduct towards internees). In addition, the Ōtsuka battalion of the 48th Division in Jogjakarta was ordered to detach 400 troops to the internment camps. The apparent reasons for this were that there was no Japanese garrison in the immediate vicinity of the camps in Ambarawa and Banyubiru, while the Japanese garrison in Semarang comprised chiefly *heiho*. Three hundred of these Japanese troops were allocated for guarding the camps in Ambarawa and Banyubiru and 100 the camps in Semarang (Han 1996:395, 411).

⁸ The Japanese had no alternative, as they had replaced Dutch employees mainly with Indonesians, rather than Japanese, keeping only the top positions for themselves. So the public services were manned by, and thus dependent on, Indonesians to a far greater extent than under Dutch rule (ARA AS 5205-25:9, 5205-39:4; Van Mook 1949:74; Woodman 1955:182; De Kadt 1989:66). Van den Doel (2000:64, contrary to what is said on p. 67) implies that this was not the case.

⁹ These were the only decisions favouring the Indonesians. Nishijima and Kishi (1963:478), apparently considering them as being of no consequence, omit to mention them. Gotō (1984:5)

was actually in contradiction with the Japanese aim of maintaining the *status quo*. However, as Japanese safety and Allied interests were the army's two most important concerns, the decision to disband them was quite logical. Miyamoto's reflections (1973:49) on the preparation of his proposal are interesting in this connection. He still had vivid memories at the time of the PETA uprising against the Japanese in Blitar, East Java, earlier that year and expected the Allies to order the Japanese to disband the PETA and *heiho* in the context of a general disarmament of the Japanese forces anyway. That he was quite right in this is proven by Rear Admiral Patterson's order of 15 September 1945 (ARA Van der Plas 122). A clash in that event would have been disastrous. To avoid such a clash, an immediate, swift surprise action was wanted. In addition Miyamoto believed – remarkably similar to Sukarno and Hatta in their pursuit of a policy of diplomacy – that the international community would lose sympathy for the Indonesians if they resorted to armed combat and that a peaceful solution was far preferable for that reason alone. Although the latter may have been a side effect of disbandment of the PETA and *heiho*, in view of the Japanese army's above-mentioned main objectives it certainly was not, in my view, the aim of the measure.

Eighteen years later, however, Miyamoto (as cited by Gotō, 1976:68), omitting to mention the army's main objectives and his other considerations, alleged that the purpose of dissolving the PETA and *heiho* had been to help the Indonesians! Assuming that the Allies would most probably recognize Indonesian independence, the Japanese, according to Miyamoto, considered it advisable that the Indonesians should not have any arms, as this might damage their image as a peace-loving nation. This is a typical example of presenting Japanese measures in a favourable and altruistic light in retrospect.¹⁰ As we will see, Miyamoto offers such favourable interpretations of several

points out that the Japanese military top were not so much concerned about the issue of independence for the Indonesians or the fear of losing face as with the protection of their own interests. See also B.R.O'G. Anderson (1961:94). Van Poelgeest (1999:25), probably influenced by Rummelink (see footnote 26, however), asserts that the Japanese army policy of 16 August was inspired by concern for the interests of Indonesia as much as those of the Allies, Japan, and the Japanese in Java, as though the Japanese attached as much importance to Indonesian interests as to their own and those of the Allies. This anti-Japanese bias, as it seems to me, is also displayed by other Dutch historians, who appear to assume a greater degree of Japanese complicity in the Indonesian struggle against the Dutch than there was in reality. For example, Van Poelgeest (1999:36) still repeats the view (Groen 1985:116; Rinzema 1989:32) that the Japanese in Semarang in October 1945 were indecisive and hesitated to fight the Indonesians, even though this view has meanwhile been refuted with extensive arguments (Han 1996:417–20), which, however, he does not enter into. This is regrettable from an academic point of view.

¹⁰ Interestingly, Giebels (1999:371), probably due to a misunderstanding of B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:102), puts forward the view that the Japanese disbanded the PETA and *heiho* to prevent the Allies from treating them as *francs-tireurs*.

other issues.¹¹ A number of Japanese who served in Indonesia showed a tendency after the war to emphasize their good intentions with and contribution to the Indonesian cause. This in itself is very understandable, as Indonesia has since emerged as an independent power of increasing economic and political importance. But in doing so, these Japanese individuals furnish grist to the mill of those Dutch authors who accuse the Japanese of supporting the Indonesians in their struggle against the Dutch to a greater extent than was actually the case (see footnote 9). Focusing on Japanese-Indonesian relations, these Japanese apparently fail to remember the relationship between their nation and the Netherlands, which at the outbreak of the war had existed 342 years. Where in the year 2000 the 400th anniversary of Dutch-Japanese relations was celebrated in grand style in both the Netherlands and Japan, in point of fact it was the Japanese soldiers gallantly fighting the Indonesians in protection of the Dutch after Japan's surrender who began the work of restoring these relations after the three-and-a-half-year break during the war (Han 2000b:34).

Miyamoto's consideration, it is true, was in line with the explanation given by the army commander in his farewell address to the PETA on 17 August 1945 (copies of which presumably were handed out to each unit on being disbanded, for as far as I was able to find out, it was not published in the newspapers). This explanation was that the Indonesians supposedly were not yet able to take on world powers which had an atomic bomb at their disposal, so that open enmity shown against these powers by armed organizations would be disastrous (ARA AS 5204-11a; Wehl 1948:1-2; Notosusanto 1979:166-7). Obviously, the army commander's words were meant just to soothe the Indonesians in order to make the operation proceed as smoothly as possible, the real purpose of dissolving the PETA being quite different. Indeed, Miyamoto contradicts himself elsewhere (Miyamoto 1986:327) where he explains that the Japanese disarmed the PETA for fear of a clash with them (see also Tsuchiya in Bosdriesz and Soeteman, 1985:43) and that they were prepared to use force against the Indonesians if necessary (Miyamoto 1973:

¹¹ For example, Miyamoto (1986:325-7) blames Maeda for informing the Indonesians of Japan's surrender on the 16th without consulting the army. Had Maeda not done so, the Japanese army, in Miyamoto's view, would have been able to offer the Indonesians the best conditions for seizing independence till the evening of 18 August, when the official confirmation of the surrender was received. Miyamoto (overlooking Yamamoto's decision) believes that the army was under no obligation until that time to maintain the *status quo*. Independence could in that case have been proclaimed on the 19th. He totally forgets, however, that the Indonesians were in a great hurry, as there were rumours that the Allies would land on the 20th (ARA AS 5204-18:9). To me it seems quite improbable that the army could have done much for the Indonesians within the three days in which Miyamoto claims it would have been legally free to do so. On the contrary, it had already decided on 16 August – note well, at the suggestion of Miyamoto (1973:50) himself! – to disband the PETA and *heiho*, by force if necessary!

51; *War History Series* 1976:9). He concedes (Miyamoto 1973:59) that for him the dread of another Blitar was decisive. Oemar Bahsan's assertion (1955:63-4) that the Japanese army, when disarming the PETA unit in Rengasdengklok, took up its positions near the PETA garrison camouflaged and obviously ready for battle, thus showing an intention to use force, clearly gives the lie to Miyamoto's biased explanation. Djatikusumo (as cited in Bouman, 1995:211) furthermore reports that the Japanese troops which surrounded his PETA unit in Surakarta had their machine guns trained on his men. According to Bouwer (1988:378), moreover, the Japanese disarmed the PETA in Bandung in a heavy-handed way, appearing with full battle equipment. So it is obvious that what the Japanese were looking after was not at all Indonesian interests.

Most curiously – Nasution (1977:221) and Nugroho Notosusanto (1979: 135, 141-2) both conspicuously omit to mention this – the newspapers announced the disbandment of the PETA and *heiho* not as a Japanese measure, but as the result of a decision by the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee!¹² This Committee at its morning meeting of 19 August unanimously voted in favour of a proposal to request the Japanese to dissolve the PETA and *heiho* officially and quickly. It further decided that the President should form a national army as soon as possible (Cribb, 1984:66, 1986:77, claims that it rejected the idea of forming an army, however). The argument for the request to the Japanese was that, as the PETA was a Japanese creation, it had a status which in the international context was '*tidak karuan*' (Yamin 1959:463), meaning 'irregular, ambiguous, uncertain' (Poerwadarminta 1982:496; Smail, 1964:30, translates this term as 'makes no sense'). According to Sidik Kertapati (1964:126-7) the real reason was that PETA *daidanchō* (battalion commanders) in general, who had just sworn at a conference on 14 August to fight with the Japanese till the end, feared being treated like *francs-tireurs* by the Allies (see also Bahsan 1955:56, 60). B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:102) assumes that the Japanese had led them to believe this in order to facilitate their disarmament. J.R.W. Smail (1964:30-1), supposing that the Indonesian government was aware of the Japanese plan, posits that this was in order to avoid revolutionary violence in case the PETA and *heiho* resisted disarmament. According to C.L.M. Penders (1974:99) the Indonesian government was not at

¹² See *Asia Raya* 4-200, 19 August 2605. It is not clear, therefore, what Van den Doel (2000:78) is alluding to where he says that the PETA and *heiho* disbandment presented a big problem. Meelhuijsen (2000:40), unaware of the Indonesian request, assumes that the Indonesians failed to protest against the Japanese measure in order to avoid antagonizing the Japanese. For some fallacies about this committee, see Han (2000a:259, footnote 49). Said (1991:11), Bouman (1995:213), and Van den Doel (2000:78) also incorrectly claim that, when the committee decided on 22 August to institute the Komite Nasional Indonesia, it converted itself into that Komite. Sastrosatomo (1987:32) says this was on the 19th.

all sure it could control the PETA. In addition, as Smail suggests, the Indonesians may have feared deployment of the PETA by the Japanese against their own people (see below), as in the case of the suppression of the Blitar revolt. As the Japanese implemented their PETA disbandment plan on that very same day, the *pemuda* not surprisingly, according to B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:103), suspected Indonesian collusion with the Japanese. Kertapati (1964:144) points out, however, that in Jakarta it was the Indonesians, though making use of the Japanese army, who disbanded the PETA. Had not the Japanese decided on PETA and *heiho* disbandment three days earlier, it would indeed look as though they acted in compliance with Indonesian wishes, in agreement with Miyamoto's representation of the situation.

That afternoon (Salim Said 1991:11, followed by Bouman 1995:212, claims it was the previous day) a group of militant *pemuda* led by Adam Malik (1975: 82) had talks with Sukarno and Hatta, whom they urged to decree the formation of an Indonesian national army, to be made up of former PETA and *heiho* units. Kertapati (1964:144) ruefully remarks that, if the PETA and *heiho* had actually been converted into such an army, the course of Indonesian history would have been quite different! Since the Japanese were still militarily in full control of the situation, however, such a course of action would have required the Indonesians to seize the power from them, while, as Malik (1975:87) admits, in Jakarta they were still powerful enough to crush such a coup.¹³ When Sukarno raised objections to the idea, one of the *pemuda* point-

¹³ Nasution (1977:290), on the other hand, believes that, had Sukarno and Hatta ordered the PETA and *heiho* to rise against the Japanese on 15 August, they would have been able to disarm the Japanese in the following four days. With due respect, I doubt whether a plan for such a general rising against the Japanese army could have had a chance of success. In the first place, the PETA comprised only local units which were highly independent of one another, rather than forming an integrated army under a single central command (Notosusanto 1979:115-6, 148), while the *heiho*, as part of the Japanese army, were fully controlled by the Japanese. Secondly, the PETA was seriously under-equipped (see footnote 1). Thirdly, it was uncertain whether the PETA would obey an order to rise against the Japanese. Seeing that there had been suggestions that the Japanese might deploy it against the Republic, it looked as if it, too, was still fully under Japanese control. In fact, its commanders had just sworn their allegiance to the Japanese on 14 August. And in the fourth place the Japanese, judging from the way they disarmed the PETA and *heiho*, at that time were far from being demoralized. Although the surrender had shocked them terribly, the Japanese army maintained its discipline (ARA AS 5205-24:3) and in Bandung and Semarang proved to be in good fighting condition still as late as October 1945 and the following months. Besides, Japan's sudden surrender had surprised everybody, so that Sukarno and Hatta could not possibly have had any plan ready for a general rising against the Japanese (see also ARA AS 5205-24:3). Hatta, also referring to the disbandment of the PETA, parried Nasution's criticism by pointing out that it was based on information obtained much later, whilst at the time there was no information available whatever about the PETA (Noer 1990:435). Indeed, Nasution himself even in 1955 (1955:18), interestingly enough, did not know the exact number of PETA battalions and could only say there were 50 to 60 in Java. Penders and Sundhaussen (1985:19) accordingly still speak of 55 PETA battalions.

ed out that indecisiveness would be extremely dangerous, as the Japanese might deploy the PETA and *heiho* against the Republic (Kertapati 1964:125). Sukarno and Hatta during these discussions kept silent about the Independence Preparatory Committee's decisions earlier that day. This committee subsequently decided on 22 August¹⁴ that an organization for the people's security (Badan Keamanan Rakjat, abbreviated as BKR) should be formed, rather than an army. According to Malik (1975:83), the creation of an army, as he had insisted, would have looked to the Japanese like a form of open opposition, so Sukarno and Hatta hastened to style the organization Badan Keamanan Rakjat in order to avoid antagonizing them. Prominent western scholars like Smail (1964:31), B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:104-5), and A. Reid (1974:31) share this view. Malik, apparently unaware that the Japanese had already formulated their policy on the 16th, believes that they realized very well what the BKR's actual purpose was and therefore proceeded to dissolve the PETA (Malik in 1980:193 reverses the sequence of events).

Sukarno gave his first major speech as President of the Republic of Indonesia on 23 August. L. de Jong (1985:1043) and recently in his wake, Van Poelgeest (1999:25) criticize the Japanese for allowing the radio broadcast of this speech (see footnote 9), though actually an improvised Indonesian transmitter was used (Giebels 1999:371; see Kertapati, 1964:134, on the Indonesian underground radio transmitter). In this speech, Sukarno urged members of the former PETA and *heiho* and all other *pemuda* to join the BKR provisionally (Groen, 1985:95, and Van Delden, 1989:72, allege that this was on 20 August), assuring them that they would be called up for service in Indonesia's national army in due course (*Asia Raya* 4-206, 25 August 2605; Raliby 1953:20; Koesnodiprodjo 1951:245-50). So, although he did not at all restrict his appeal to the former PETA and *heiho*, as B.R.O'G. Anderson suggests (1972:105), the government had not rejected the formation of a national army, but only postponed it. Sukarno moreover pointed out in his speech that Indonesia at that stage still needed to gain international recognition (see also Legge 1972:208). The Indonesians had started building their independent nation at a time of war, but after Japan's surrender had to continue in a time of peace and in an international context. While relations with Japan had been broken off, no relations had been established as yet with the international community. In other words, a national army would be formed as soon as international

¹⁴ Giebels (1999:371) claims, like B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:103), Miyamoto (1973:56), *War History Series* (1976:11), Cribb (1984:65-6, 1986:77, 1991:59), and Sastrosatomo (1987:33), that the committee's decision was taken on 20 August. L. de Jong (1985:1042) mentions 21 August as date, and Kahin (1952:140) says that the BKR was formed on 29 August. Meelhuijsen (2000:40) points out that, in addition to the BKR, a Badan Penolong Keloearga Korban Perang (Organization for Aid to the Families of War Victims) was established. In fact, the BKR formed part of the last-mentioned organization, see *Asia Raya* 4-204, 23 August 2605.

recognition was gained. And this is what in fact happened shortly after the newly appointed British commander-in-chief of the AFNEI, Lieutenant General Christison, implied in a statement to the press on 29 September that the British *de facto* recognized the Republic of Indonesia.¹⁵ The motive behind the formation of the BKR instead of a national army thus was concern about relations with the Allies rather than with the Japanese, as Notosusanto (1979: 141-2), R.B. Cribb (1984:66, 1986:77), and L. de Jong (1986:598) agree. Again, the consonance between the explanations of the Japanese and the policy of the Indonesian leaders is striking indeed. Most probably the Indonesians' aim was to avoid negative reactions from both the Japanese and the Allies (Nasution 1977:221; Cribb 1991:59, departing from his previous view).

Many ex-members of the PETA, *heiho*, and *seinendan* (youth corps; *Asia Raya* 4-214, 4 September 2605) and other *pemuda* complied with their leader's wishes, but many others joined (Alers 1956:107) or set up (B.R.O'G. Anderson 1972:106) other groups or organizations. This, as the PETA and *heiho* had been disarmed and the *seinendan* were only equipped with wooden rifles (the police being the only force that remained armed¹⁶), created no problems as yet. So for several weeks after the proclamation of independence the Repub-

¹⁵ See *Merdeka* I-1, 1 October 1945, and Yong Mun Cheong 1982:36. Pursuant to his announcement of 23 August, President Sukarno established the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (Army for the People's Security) by decree No. 2 on 5 October (Koesnodiprodjo 1951:51). According to Said (1991:12, 25), who totally overlooks Sukarno's announcement, Sukarno and his associates only agreed to raise an army after they inferred from Christison's statement that they no longer needed to fear prosecution for collaboration with the Japanese, as the Dutch authorities had repeatedly threatened in their broadcasts from Australia. As a Japanese officer reported (ARA AS 5204-13:8, 5205-36:17), Sukarno had indeed asked by telephone almost daily whether there was any order from the Allies to arrest him. I disagree with Said that personal considerations were decisive in the conversion of the BKR into TKR.

¹⁶ Groen (1985:107), followed by Van Delden (1989:93), claims, in contradiction with the facts, that the Japanese disarmed the police for the greater part as well. Indonesian police historians, on the other hand, generally suggest that the police soon broke away from Japanese control. Pending further research, however, there is reason to believe, in my view, that the Japanese remained in control of the police in several places for a number of weeks after Japan's surrender. In Semarang, for example – differently from what Hadiman and Suparmin (1985:25) and Abrar Yusra and K.H. Ramadhan (1993:123-4) assert – Police Inspector Hoengeng (who in the 1960s became head of the national Indonesian police force) asked his Japanese superintendent, Kinoshita, only on 18 September 1945 why it was forbidden to fly the Indonesian flag. Only after the latter said that he had not forbidden this at all was the Indonesian flag flown from all police buildings and were police officers instructed to wear the national symbol (ARA PG 745). Mohammad Yasin claims that the special police of Surabaya was proclaimed a Republican police force on 21 August (Hadiman and Suparmin 1985:27; Setiadijaya 1992:83-5), but in Surabaya the police issued a statement to this effect only on 28 September (Setiadijaya 1992:145). In Jakarta the police declared themselves Republican police, and stated they would resign in case of disarmament, on 20 September (Koesnodiprodjo 1951:291). Nevertheless, the police replaced the Japanese police badges on their uniforms only on 6 October (Koesnodiprodjo 1951:193). Kertapati, 1964:146, mentions a date of 30 September.

lic was practically defenceless. Miyamoto (1973:50) concedes, his biased explanations notwithstanding, that by disbanding the PETA and *heiho* the Japanese actually deprived Indonesia of its advantageous starting position. J. de Kadt (1989:91), one of the very few Dutch authors, if not the only one (see footnote 9), to deny Japanese collaboration with the Indonesians in the matter of the newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia, finds corroboration of his view in the disbandment of the PETA and *heiho*.

The Indonesians did not immediately feel the disadvantages of their handicap, however. After the proclamation of independence the *pemuda* started various activities for which no arms were required, like impressing on the people the importance of freedom and independence. They exhorted people to raise the red and white flag, to wear red and white badges, and to use the exclamation 'Merdeka!' (Freedom!) as a greeting. Although there was some intimidation as well, most of these activities proceeded very well without arms. They were extremely important activities, as the greater part of the population had no idea of the meaning of independence.¹⁷ After the hardships suffered during the Japanese occupation, many people, especially ordinary people, expected or hoped to see the return of the good old life under Dutch rule of before the war (see also Overdijkink 1946:5; Wehl 1948:16; Bouwer 1988:391-2) and kept talking about the *djaman normal* (normal era, meaning the old Dutch days) for many years after. The *pemuda* after a while resorted to painting slogans on walls and organizing protest demonstrations and mass rallies. Pressing Indonesian employees to show their patriotism and to support the Republic (Cribb 1984:65, 1986:76), the *pemuda* had no great

¹⁷ See also Overdijkink (1946:108-9), who talks of Indonesian Commander-in-Chief Sudirman complaining about the attitude of the people. I personally remember often seeing Indonesians evince this indifference, which was quite clear in addition from the nature of the various *pemuda* activities and from the wide scale on which these activities took place. I therefore do not agree with criticism like that expressed by Schulte Nordholt (2000:227), which requires backing by extensive statistical research. The team parachuted into Jakarta on 8 September made the same observation as Overdijkink (Wehl 1948:37), but wrongly concluded that, once transport and security problems were solved, other tasks would be comparatively simple to carry out – incredibly ignoring what was going on in Indonesia (Dennis 1987:83). This was a remarkable conclusion, even in modern history, for its optimism, which was belied by events (Wehl 1948:38). It seems unlikely that, as Yong Mun Cheong (1982:34) suggests, an assessment of the political situation was not one of the team's tasks. For these tasks, see J.J.P. de Jong (1988:72). Quite different were the reports of the British ex-prisoners of war Lieutenant Colonel Van der Post and Lieutenant Lambert (Squire 1979:72; *Enquête Commissie* 1956, Vol. 8 CII:1387; L. de Jong 1986:612, 638) – whom Drooglever (1998:10), interestingly, believes to be one and the same person, assuming that Lambert's report did not reach the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, Admiral Mountbatten. According to Squire, however, the latter, referring to a more pessimistic report he had seen, had asked Rear Admiral Patterson for an up-to-date assessment. As Dennis (1987:83) puts it, Yamamoto's observations (see footnote 27) in essence underlined these reports.

difficulty in taking over office buildings, power stations, waterworks, telephone exchanges, the railways, and other facilities. As the personnel of these were almost entirely Indonesian, the Japanese authorities were powerless (ARA AS 5205-39:4; Kahin 1952:139; Reid 1974:32).

Illustrative of the significance of *pemuda* activities is the case of the Resident of Bodjonegoro, R.M.T.A. Suryo (one of the first Indonesian *shūchōkan*, or Residents, appointed by the Japanese, see *Djawa Baroe* 23:9, 1 December 2603). Suryo, who was a determined leader during the heroic fighting against the British in Surabaya in October and November 1945, when still Resident of Bodjonegoro initially only allowed the Indonesian flag to be flown side by side or alternately with the Japanese flag. In mid-September he even forbade flying of the Indonesian flag altogether, in compliance with an order from the Gunseikanbu. Only on 24 September, after *pemuda* pressure, did he declare Bodjonegoro a Residency of the Republic of Indonesia and hoist the Indonesian flag.¹⁸ And the Assistant Resident of Pekalongan, M. Besar, the later highly respected secretary-general of the Justice Department, reportedly said in the same period that only the Japanese flag was allowed to be flown because the Japanese were still responsible for maintaining law and order (Lucas 1984:132).

These cases additionally illustrate how people continued to stand in awe of the Japanese military power after Japan's surrender. This is not surprising in view of the myth of violence, physical prowess and extraordinary powers which according to B.R.O'G. Anderson's (1966:20) in-depth analysis surrounded the Japanese after the defeat of the Dutch. J. Fabricius (1947:22-3), arriving in Jakarta together with the Dutch naval captain P.J.G. Huyer shortly after Rear Admiral Patterson's *Cumberland* had anchored at Tandjung Priok on 15 September¹⁹, reported that the city still had the appearance of being fully controlled by the Japanese army. High-ranking Japanese officers in full dress uniform were still rushing about in Buicks and Packards (A.J.F. Doulton, 1951:232, reports that the situation was still the same at the end of the month), with Japanese sentries everywhere jumping to attention and presenting arms. He also saw the Japanese sentry at the Harmonie building ordering an Indonesian boy to come back and bow to him in the prescribed way.²⁰ And Nippon time, which was one and a half hours behind Java time,

¹⁸ *Djawa Timur* 1953:40-1; D.Ch. Anderson 1976:110; Sukadri, Soewarno, and Umiati 1991:81-2; Sudarno 1993:237.

¹⁹ Some sources, such as Wehl (1948:39) and Indonesian sources like Osman Raliby (1953:34), Kertapati (1964:139), *Peranan TNI* (1965:32), *Sam Karya* (1968:34), *Zeni T.N.I.* (1971:16), Hardjosoediro (1987:48), Sukadri, Soewarno, and Umiati (1991:106), mention the 16th as date. Poesponegoro and Notosusanto (1984:121) even say that the *Cumberland* arrived on the 29th. According to Meelhuysen (2000:51), on the other hand, this was on the 14th.

²⁰ It is interesting to note that the *pemuda*, as Lucas reports (1984:345), also insisted on show-

according to my diary was only abandoned on 24 September (see also Smail 1964:37-9). The situation was further typified by the fact that the Japanese army commander remained in the Governor General's palace on Gambir Square (formerly Koningsplein and currently Medan Merdeka) until 28 September (see ARA AS 5205-33b:7; Miyamoto 1973:457). Also because of the continuing spell of the Japanese army's omnipotence, Sukarno and Hatta were extremely careful not to antagonize the Japanese in the process leading to the proclamation of independence (see footnote 5). As we have seen, this also influenced the Independence Preparatory Committee's decision to decree the establishment of a BKR rather than an army.

Sukarno, in his above-mentioned speech of 23 August, had repeatedly urged the nation to '*tetap tenang, tinggal tenteram, memegang teguh disiplin*' (remain cool and calm and maintain discipline; this speech certainly did not contain harsh words against the Japanese like those appearing in the Dutch text quoted by L. de Jong, 1985:1043-4). A few incidents aside²¹, the situation in general after the proclamation of independence indeed remained calm and unmarked by any disorder or violence. Penders (1974:100) points out that the generally quiet and peaceful mood prevailing in August and most of September cannot be attributed solely to the power and prestige of Sukarno and his government. In his view – apparently based on an analysis that is not as discerning as B.R.O'G. Anderson's – the lack of violence and absence of other outward signs of a physical revolution were in part a result of the fear and terror the Japanese had inspired in people in the preceding period. The conduct of Sukarno and his government, however, in turn was a consequence of the belief that the Japanese military power was still in firm control.

In this context the 'gentlemen's agreement' which Sukarno and Hatta concluded with the Japanese authorities on a strictly personal basis should be mentioned. Sukarno stated in his speech on the occasion of the installation of the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat on 29 August 1945 (*Asia Raya* 4-210, 30 August 2605) that the Japanese authorities had insisted that they remained responsible for the maintenance of law and order, whilst at the same time promising to transfer the management of the various departments and services as much as possible to Indonesians (as we have seen, this last point was decided at the staff meeting of 16 August). He did not divulge, however, that

ing deference to their own sentries, slapping anyone who failed to do so in exactly the same way as the Japanese had done.

²¹ Listed in ARA AS 5205-33a. The first such incident was an attack on 18 August on the *kem-peitai* (military police) in Serang, with one Japanese killed and another one injured. B.R.O'G. Anderson (1961:114), still believing at the time that this incident provided the Japanese with the motive for disarming and dissolving the PETA, claims that there were 1,100 casualties, including 700 killed. The source he refers to, however, mentions these figures as the total number of casualties for the entire period (ARA AS 5205-24:2).

the Japanese had requested Indonesian cooperation in the maintenance of public order – whereas according to the memoirs of the Gunseikan the latter had a positive impression of Sukarno's reply to such a request (Gotō 1984:16-7). Authors like Malik (1975:76-7) have no doubt that the Japanese urged Sukarno to refrain from doing anything that might discredit them in the eyes of the Allied Forces and that Sukarno promised not to seize power by force (see also Reid 1974:33).

Soetan Sjahrir (1949:260) observed during a two-week tour of Java shortly after the proclamation of independence that the general quiet was not disturbed by the Dutch leaving the Japanese internment camps. The people's attitude towards the Dutch was definitely neutral, if not friendly. This is confirmed by a Dutch observer (Bouwer 1988:392), while another reports that this situation lasted five weeks (Posthumus in Van der Wal 1971:137). One Dutchman travelling from Bandung to Surabaya by train experienced how demobilized *heiho* fellow travellers offered him food which they had bought at an intermediate station (NIOD IC 032388:1). Fabricius (1947:51) informs us that in early September a Dutch former government official toured his region by car totally undisturbed.²² And in the third week of September the Dutch were still able to move around freely in Jakarta and even travel to Puncak, on the road to Bandung, unhampered (see also L. de Jong 1986:550). So it is definitely not correct to say, as does Touwen-Bouwsma (see footnote 33), that racial tension developed into open hostility immediately after the war.

Although there were no outbreaks of violence and no disturbances in the earliest days, the atmosphere gradually began to change in about the second or third week of September.²³ It is difficult to say exactly how the antagonism between the Indonesians and the Dutch developed. As far as I personally

²² According to J.J.P. de Jong (1988:67) this official was B.J.G. Hogewind, whom he describes as the former Resident of Malang, whereas in fact he had been governor of West Java (*Enquête Commissie* 1956, Vol. 8 CII:1384; L. de Jong 1986:553).

²³ According to Van Mook (1949:86) this was after the arrival of the RAPWI teams. Bouwer (1988:396-7) indeed indicates that the situation in Jakarta changed after the arrival of the first of these teams on 8 September. Reid (1974:33), Cribb (1984:73-4), and Van Delden (1989:93) also say it was in the second week of September. Posthumus (in Van der Wal 1971:137), B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:128), L. de Jong (1986:598), and J.J.P. de Jong (1988:67, 1991:90) mention the second half of September; see also Squire (1979:71). Loebis (1995:122) confirms that things were still quiet in mid-September. In Semarang the Indonesian movement turned more hostile from 24 September on (NIOD IC 055795:7). According to my diary, the Dutch destroyer *Tromp* was at that time expected to arrive within two days. The day after, the *pemuda* seized several important offices and arrested doctor Soetarto for failing to fly the Indonesian flag (compare *Sejarah Pertempuran* 1977:91; Boissevain and Van Empel 1991:285-8), and raided an arms transport (see Han 1996:398). According to Smail (1964:39), writing about Bandung, and Penders (1974:100) the situation remained quiet for most of September. Van der Plas testified that on 28 September Jakarta was perfectly safe and quiet (*Enquête Commissie* 1956, Vol. 8 CII:1388).

observed, the Dutch at first were merely surprised and puzzled at the sight of the various *pemuda* activities and the flag which before the war had been banned by their government. But these activities, and particularly the appearance of the red and white flag, soon began to irritate them. They naturally had an impulse to show their own red, white and blue flag, but initially were prevented by the Japanese from doing so. Eventually this gave rise to incidents. The Dutch soon became painfully aware that the Indonesians, though not yet showing open hostility, opposed the restoration of their pre-war colonial order. Many of them, particularly the Indos (Eurasians), had been born and bred in the Indies and had never been to the Netherlands. These people instinctively felt that their continued stay in their homeland was at stake!²⁴ Quite naturally this stirred them to action, especially after the arrival of small Allied teams, arousing hopes that the Republic would soon be crushed. As soon as they felt sufficiently strong, the Dutch started behaving accordingly. This in turn provoked the Indonesians tremendously and made them hostile to the Dutch. Besides, Dutch army officers began to appear on the scene, being permitted by the Japanese to leave the prisoner of war camps to help with the relief for the women and children in the internment camps (NIOD IC 055795:4). Thus the militant *pemuda* saw their new-found freedom and independence threatened, in particular when the Allies or the Japanese started providing the Dutch with arms. Hence the urgency of arming themselves became clear to the Indonesians.

From the outset there were militant *pemuda* in Jakarta who wanted to wrest the power, and weapons, from the Japanese. Sukarno and Hatta were against this and were subsequently kidnapped by the *pemuda*, who, however, failed to launch their planned coup on 16 August, and again on 18 and 20 August (see Han 2000a:235-6, 244). That was why, when Fabricius and Doulton arrived in Jakarta, the city, in conformity with Sukarno and Hatta's

²⁴ Van Poelgeest (*Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, 26 May 2000) hits the nail right on the head where he says that the enormous resentment felt by these people against the Japanese up until the present moment is the result of their having had to leave the only country they had known all their life, their paradise on earth. Regrettably there is no such a clear and apt explanation in Van Poelgeest 1999:441. The question is why the persons in question project their resentment exclusively onto the Japanese, and not at all onto those who are directly responsible for their loss of their beloved homeland: the Indonesians. Is this perhaps a vestige of the pre-war colonial view of the Indonesians as a docile people without a will and ideas of their own? Or is the cause the same as that of Indo women's preparedness, as Janssen (1995:136) reports, to talk about the acts of violence committed against them by the Japanese, while they keep silent about those committed by Indonesians? Is the reason that the Dutch could not get over what the Indonesians did to them, as is suggested by P. Gomes (1995:45)? Or are the colonial relations responsible (Captain 1995:112)? Probably people avoid talking about this subject for fear of being confronted with the question whether perhaps Indonesian violence could be regarded as being a consequence of the bad treatment the Indonesians received from the Dutch.

above-mentioned gentlemen's agreement with the Japanese, still had the appearance of being fully controlled by the Japanese army. Aboe Bakar Loebis (1995:122) complains that the Indonesian nation still after one month noticed little of its independence and its own government. All public buildings were still in Japanese hands, the Japanese flag was still flying everywhere, and the *kempeitai* (Japanese military police) was still patrolling the streets. Out of dissatisfaction, and also in view of the arrival of the Allies and their contacts with the Japanese, the *pemuda* decided to make a fourth attempt to topple the Japanese government and seize the power and their arms from the Japanese. This they hoped to achieve through a mass rally on the Ikada sports field at Gambir Square on 19 September.²⁵ The effect of this, however, was that the British hurried to assign the 23rd Indian Division for duty in Java, after the local Allied authorities, who were fully informed of the developments, had sent a signal of what was happening to Singapore (Woodburn Kirby 1969:391). As the Allies had impressed upon the Japanese High Command its responsibility for maintaining peace and order, the Japanese on 18 September put a ban on gatherings, the carrying of arms, and the hoisting of the Indonesian flag (Miyamoto 1973:69, 1986:328). The West Java Commander was ordered by Army Operation Order No. 1138 (NIOD IC 065459:22) to send three infantry companies and one light-armoured car company to Jakarta as reinforcements, while another armoured car unit was to be set up. The police, which had up till then been responsible together with the *kempeitai* for the maintenance of law and order, was relieved of this duty and replaced by army units. Nasution's alleged statement (Meelhuijsen 2000:63) that just one company of Indonesian soldiers would have reversed the outcome of the rally showed him to be clearly out of touch as regards the forces deployed by the Japanese. Nasution himself writes (1977:214), however, that there were three Japanese battalions in Jakarta. Judging from Army Operation Orders Nos. 1117 and 1130 (NIOD IC 065459:6, 15), there were even about four in the Jakarta area: the 151st Infantry Battalion and three composite Hikari Battalions – which were, I presume, 5th-Division units in transit from East Indonesia.

In addition, orders were given for the preparations for what in the western literature is called Japanese 'self-internment' to be restricted to a minimum. The restrictions on Japanese arms were moreover put on hold and the Japanese troops instructed to rearm themselves (although the order for this

²⁵ Kertapati 1964:139; Malik 1975:93; Malaka 1998:167; Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1984:101; Roem 1972:68; Loebis 1995:123. As H. Burgers pointed out to me in a personal communication, the former Koningsplein was renamed Gambir Square during the Japanese occupation. Differently from my earlier statement (Han 2000a:244) and what many other authors say, the Ikada sports field actually formed part of the square.

was not taken seriously by Remmelink, 1978:61, and was subsequently neglected in the historiography). The orders for self-internment and arms restrictions had been issued on 21 and 29 August 1945 respectively (Army Operation Orders Nos. 1120 and 1127, NIOD IC 065459:7, 12) with a view to avoiding possible clashes or incidents with the Allied forces, whom the Japanese expected to arrive any day. In the then still peaceful, quiet atmosphere, as described above, with the PETA and *heiho* already disarmed, these measures to my mind were quite justified and not at all in conflict with the obligation to maintain peace and order; when in mid-September the situation changed accordingly, they were revoked. According to another of Miyamoto's remarkable explanations, however, the self-internment and arms restriction orders were intended to pave the way for the Indonesians, and the stated aim of avoiding clashes or incidents with the Allies was just an excuse to the Allies!²⁶ Very conspicuously, Miyamoto says nothing about the revocation of these measures on 18 September.

Army Operation Order No. 1138 clearly indicates that the Japanese were determined to obstruct the rally planned by the *pemuda*. Mohamad Roem (1972:67), who was a witness to these events, confirms this. Margono Djohadikusumo (1970:146), who attended the emergency Cabinet meeting on 19 September, testifies that the Indonesians feared that the rally would result in a sea of blood. Loebis (1995:126) asserts, like Roem, that the Japanese prevented everyone from approaching the square and confiscated all weapons, such as *klewang*, *golok*, and *bambu runcing*. Apparently the army high command had not expected such huge masses to attend the rally. Staff officer

²⁶ Miyamoto 1973:59-60. This explanation is accepted in *War History Series* 1976:10, Remmelink 1978:53, 55, Rinzema 1989:39, Zwitser 1995:263-4, Van Delden as cited by Van Bruggen and Wassing, 1998:72, and Drooglever 1998:5. Miyamoto asserts that the Japanese army decided to do its utmost to serve Indonesian interests out of gratitude for the cooperation the Japanese had received from them during the war. As Japan wanted neither to become Indonesia's enemy nor to obstruct its peaceful development, it felt it should withdraw from the political scene. In view of the adamantness of the Japanese authorities in their refusal to support the Indonesians in the preceding days (see Han 2000a:234-45) and of the resolute way in which they disarmed the PETA, I personally feel, like Squire (1979:59), that this sudden complete about-turn is highly implausible. Gotō (1984:17-8) points out that the arms restriction was meant to prevent arms from falling into Indonesian hands. See also Nishijima and Kishi (1963:477-8), who, although they also mention the Japanese contribution to the Indonesian cause, very conspicuously omit to mention the idea of a policy of friendship put forward by Miyamoto. We should not forget that the Japanese government in 1944, as Kanahele (1967:161-218) and Gotō (1984:5-9) relate, introduced its policy of gradually granting independence to Indonesia because it was increasingly facing defeat, hence purely for the sake of winning Indonesian support and not out of altruistic sympathy with the Indonesians. Accordingly, all relevant Japanese documents open explicitly with the phrase 'in order to contribute to the prosecution of the war' or 'in order to aid the successful completion of the Greater East Asia War' (Benda et al. 1965:267-74). There were few if any signs throughout the Japanese occupation indicating that the Japanese in general (individual exceptions aside) were genuinely sympathetic towards the Indonesians.

Miyamoto, seeing the crowds pushing forward like an avalanche and fearing a terrible bloodbath (which, as he alleged in 1973, would have driven a wedge between the Indonesian and Japanese nations – as though the thousands of Indonesians who perished as *romusha*, or forced labourers, and the extreme poverty to which the Indonesians were reduced during the occupation were not sufficiently incriminating factors!), rushed to the scene. Acting on his own initiative (this is confirmed by Nishimura, as quoted by Bosdriesz and Soeteman, 1985:49) and flying in the face of the furious protests of the commanding officer concerned, he ordered the troops to let all demonstrators in (Miyamoto 1973:69-71, 1986:329-30; according to L. de Jong 1986:626, however, the army commander had given the relevant order out of sympathy with the Indonesians, see footnote 9). Tan Malaka (1998:170) and Malik (1975:95-7), unaware of Miyamoto's intervention, claim that the Japanese were unable to withstand the pressing crowds, although these were only armed with *bambu runcing*, *golok*, and *pisau*. Soebadio Sastrosatomo (1988:111) alleges that the crowds broke through the cordon. Roem (1972:72), on the other hand, believes that he was eventually successful in persuading the *kempeitai* to allow the meeting.

Dutch Major General Van Straten, typically, failed to realize the significance of this mass demonstration (Van der Wal 1971:147). I personally believe that it actually shocked the Japanese into a realization of the terrible predicament they would be in if confronted with Indonesian mass actions. Had the feared bloodshed materialized, this would not only have been harmful to Indonesian-Japanese relations, but would have been condemned in utter disgust by the whole world. Most importantly, the British, although having themselves ordered the Japanese to take measures against possible mass meetings, would certainly have joined in the condemnations and denied any responsibility. Thus the position of Japan and the Emperor was at stake. As a consequence, the Japanese general staff conferred two days later. These discussions in Gotō's (1984:19-20) opinion were of particular interest for their reconfirmation of Japan's basic policy of absolute avoidance of any action that might jeopardize the national polity. The conclusion drawn here was that in principle the use of arms against Indonesians should be avoided²⁷,

²⁷ Miyamoto 1973:75 (followed by Rummelink 1978:56), typically, alleges that this was for the sake of maintaining mutual goodwill! According to him, the matter of independence was to be left to the Indonesians and the Dutch to settle, with the Japanese and British withdrawing as quickly as possible (which in Gotō's view, 1984:20, represented another breach of faith on the part of the Japanese). An independent Indonesia was in the interests of Japan (again, we should not forget that Miyamoto was writing this in 1973). The reality of the situation was to be explained to the British. This Yamamoto did on the same day (according to Drooglever, 1998:4, the day before) at a meeting with Rear Admiral Patterson on board the *Cumberland* (ARA AS 5204-10), followed on 23 September by a letter of advice (ARA AS 5204-9). Patterson (Squire

although no Army Operation Order to this effect was issued (in mid-October, in fact, this policy was abandoned – about which, most surprisingly, Miyamoto says nothing; see Han 1996:403). Loebis (1995:124) on the day of the rally did not expect the Japanese to use force if there were thousands of people attending the meeting. The British probably well understood the extreme difficulty of the situation the Japanese had to face, seeing that on 20 September they advised the Japanese to use tear gas (Miyamoto 1973:72, 1986:321; Rummelink 1978:56). Even Van der Plas, the Dutch SEAC delegate (Van der Wal 1971:128), was against the Japanese maintaining order in their usual violent way. According to L. de Jong (1986:627) and Van Poelgeest (1999:31) it was Van der Plas who persuaded the British to advise the Japanese to use tear gas, but I was not able to find anything about this in any of the records cited by them.

The important point to note is that all the above-mentioned Indonesian authors saw only cutting or stabbing weapons at the rally²⁸ (an exception being Ahmad Subardjo Djojoadisuryo, 1978:375, who mentions a few pistols). Indeed, in the few existing photographs of the mass rally no weapons can be seen at all (except those of the police). Hence, contrary to what Mountbatten (1969:290), D. Wehl (1948:39), Miyamoto (1973:69, 1986:329), Allen (1976:88), and Dennis (1987:84) assert, up till 19 September the Indonesians in general had no firearms.

This rally did not result in a Japanese transfer of authority and arms to the Indonesians either (Malaka 1998:170). Sukarno, at the insistence of staff officer Miyamoto, asked the obedient crowd to return to their homes quietly.²⁹ Although they did not inform Miyamoto (1973:72, 1986:331) of this, the

1979:71) and Van der Plas (Van der Wal 1971:150), followed by Drooglever (1998:4), assume that Yamamoto had persuaded the Indonesians to refrain from making trouble by promising them that he would plead their cause with the British. In view of the actual course of events, I do not think this is correct. Authors like Kahin (1952:137), Legge (1972:210), and Reid (1974:33) confine themselves to stating that the Japanese could not but be impressed by Sukarno's show of authority, whilst Dahm (1969:323) adds that the Japanese subsequently warned the Allies not to underestimate the Indonesian movement. Personally I believe that Yamamoto was primarily worried about the impossibility of suppressing mass actions without bloodshed. L. de Jong (1986:627), overlooking the fact that the Japanese military never worried about losses, alleges that the motive was fear of Japanese casualties.

²⁸ See in addition, for example, B.R.O'G. Anderson 1961:123, Nasution 1977:296, Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1984:102, Van der Wal 1971:143, L. de Jong 1986:620, and Bouwer 1988:403.

²⁹ Sukarno, when about to enter the sports field, was stopped by Miyamoto, warning him against inciting rioting against the Allies (Miyamoto 1973:71, 1986:329; *War History Series* 1976:11). In the film footage of the rally which I saw I indeed noticed a Japanese staff officer talking to Sukarno from behind. As Sukarno subsequently dismissed the rally, I assume with Bouwer (1988:403) that he was ordered to send the crowd away. Roem (1972:70) also says that the Japanese insisted on this, and Malik (1975:96) asserts that Sukarno acted on the Japanese warning. Djojoadisuryo (1978:373-4) alleges, however, that on his advice Sukarno himself had

Allies, who had expected the rally to be the test of the Japanese resolve to use force, were satisfied with the outcome and took no further steps. The Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia reacted with the words 'Delighted patient is showing signs of recovery!' The situation in Jakarta continued calm (Squire 1979:71, see also Mountbatten 1969:283). Accordingly Jakarta is not mentioned in Hadiman and Suparmin's overview (1985:57-93) of the disarming of the Japanese in various places. Sutomo, one of the *pemuda* leaders in Surabaya, who was well known as Bung Tomo, when in Jakarta in October was flabbergasted to see how different the situation there was compared with Surabaya. He was subsequently asked to indicate how a smooth Japanese arms transfer could be achieved (Parera 1982:39-41; Parrott 1977:118). This brings us to Surabaya, where the situation developed quite differently.

On the day of the Ikada mass rally in Jakarta an incident took place in Surabaya (Sastrosatomo, 1987:37, mentions different dates) in which *pemuda* pulled down the Dutch tricolour from the flagpole on top of the Yamato Hotel (formerly Oranje Hotel and today Hotel Majapahit), tearing off the blue band. According to J. Boer (1997:203), one of the persons who hoisted the Dutch flag, this was not done with the intention of provoking the Indonesians, but solely to indicate that there was a parachute team staying in the hotel. As this team was subordinate to the Allied command, the question is whether it was correct to fly a Dutch flag. Whatever the case, under the circumstances the presence of the flag did enrage the Indonesians.

The essential point here again is that existing photographs show no Indonesians carrying arms (see also Frederick 1989:225). Of the different accounts of the incident reviewed by Meelhuijsen (2000:72-7), conspicuously all but one explicitly mention that no arms were carried.³⁰ Only in one case

already decided before proceeding to the Ikada field to quickly dismiss the rally and that he was allowed to enter the field after explaining this to Miyamoto. Loebis (1995:129) also believes that this was why Miyamoto let Sukarno through. Djojo Hadikusumo (1970:147), who was present at the Cabinet meeting, does not confirm Djojoadisuryo's story. Whatever the case, it is perfectly clear why the Japanese did not prevent Sukarno from holding his speech. Van Poelgeest (1999:31), who is not fully informed of the circumstances, seems to censure the Japanese for not doing so (see footnote 9). Allen (1976:88) incorrectly assumes that Miyamoto ordered the troops to withdraw because they feared anti-Japanese reprisals (as though the Japanese had ever cared about their losses). Claims that General Nakamura, the Central Java military commander, was put on trial for this are not correct either.

³⁰ See also, for instance, *Dokumentasi Pemuda* 1948:50; 'Insiden Bendera' 1970:54; Abdulgani 1975:13; Sumantri 1966:72; Muhkardi 1983:17; Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1984:103; Hadiman and Suparmin 1985:33; Sukadri, Soewarno, and Umiati 1991:71; and Notosusanto 1995:17. Parera, 1982:21, asserts that only the police were armed. According to Kertapati, 1964:156, the Indonesians began seizing Japanese arms after the flag incident, and to Raliby, 1952:28, after the arrival of Captain Huyer on 23 September.

was a single *bambu runcing* reported being used in self-defence against an attack by an Indo. To the extent that some Indonesian sources³¹ do indicate the presence of weapons, perhaps for the sake of embellishing their stories (see Frederick 1989:201), the weapons concerned were only *bambu runcing*, cutting and stabbing weapons, and clubs.

Poesponegoro and Notosusanto (1984:109) assert in the introduction to their discussion of the flag incident, however, that the Indonesians raided the Don Bosco arms depot. This raid and those on several other Japanese barracks according to Notosusanto (1995:14), Soejitno Hardjosoediro (1987:61), *Sejarah Panglima* (1989:174), and Tjokropranolo (1992:46) began on 16 September. Had the Japanese arsenals and depots in Surabaya indeed been raided prior to the flag incident, then in my opinion the *pemuda* would undoubtedly have attacked the Yamato Hotel using some of the weapons they had just captured and the flag incident would have been much bloodier. As this was not the case, the conclusion must be that there were no raids on Japanese arsenals and barracks prior to 19 September. Meelhuijsen (2000:67) arrives at the same conclusion, albeit on the basis of different arguments.

The flag incident clearly indicates that tensions between the Indonesians and the Dutch were growing. It is most noteworthy that several Indonesian sources³² explicitly mention the Indos as a group that manifested itself together with the Dutch as enemies of the Indonesian cause. They publicly reviled the Indonesian flag and *pemuda* activities, tore down nationalist posters and smeared painted nationalist slogans, wrote anti-Indonesian slogans, tore red and white badges off the clothing of Indonesians, and went around in gangs challenging Indonesians to fight. I therefore wholly agree with Frederick (1989:224) that the Dutch and Indos were primarily responsible for the precariously tense situation in Surabaya. As the latter's future was at stake as well (see above), their behaviour is of course quite understandable. In any case, in the eyes of the Indonesians the Indos had become as much a threat to their independence and their young republic as the Dutch. When in October allegedly incriminating plans and maps were found in house searches and an Allied landing and Dutch attack seemed imminent, the *pemuda* decided to put these Indos in prison to prevent them from joining the enemy (Frederick 1989:239). Differently from what Van Delden contends (1995:195; this author was not able to convince Meelhuijsen, 2000:100, either), the government took no such decision in either Surabaya or Semarang

³¹ *Djawa Timur* 1953:911; Kertapati 1964:155; *Peranan TNI* 1965:69; *Angkatan Laut* 1973:482; Nasution 1977:373; Parera 1982:16; Asmadi 1985:75; Hardjosoediro 1987:61.

³² Such as Raliby 1952:27; *Djawa Timur* 1953:910; *Peranan TNI* 1965:68; 'Insiden Bendera' 1970:53; Sumantri 1966:72; Abdulgani 1975:13; Radjab 1977:30; Parera 1982:12-6; Hadiman and Suparmin 1985:31, 79; Asmadi 1985:70; Sukadri, Soewarno, and Umiati 1991:70, 84-5; and Notosusanto 1995:13, 17. See also Malaka 1998:167, speaking in general.

(*Sejarah Pertempuran* 1977:107). In any case, many Dutch and Indo men in Surabaya were molested or killed during their incarceration.³³ Viewed from this perspective it seems rather naive to argue, as does Van den Doel (2000: 92), following Van Delden (1995:192-3, 195), that their imprisonment was primarily intended to protect them against mob violence, as the Indonesians sometimes pretended (*Enquête Commissie* 1956, Vol. 8 A&B:604) – to my mind simply to smooth the incarceration process. Probably some western-educated Indonesians tried to salve their conscience or justify the actions to foreign friends this way (for an example see K'tut Tantri 1964:278). To me Radjab (1977:110) seems more honest. Moreover, as Frederick (1989:240) argues, it was actually the sight of armed Indonesians driving truckloads of helpless Europeans and Indos away that incited the crowds to violence! After the Allied landing, the Indonesians, in violation of the agreement between Sukarno and Major General Hawthorn of 30 October, refused to turn over these men, which became one of the factors sparking off the November battle between the British and the Indonesians (Frederick 1989:264; Han 2000a:264). To liberate these prisoners, the British had no alternative but to enter the city (Pugh 1948:349; Brett-James 1951:454).

Despite growing tensions after the flag incident, the situation remained calm and peaceful for a week after that (Sukadri, Soewarno, and Umiati 1991: 84). This was also the impression of RAPWI commander D. Asjes (Asjes 1985: 116-7; Schouten 1947:119-20), who visited Surabaya on the 23rd on his way from Semarang. In the latter town he had witnessed a gradually deteriorating situation (see footnote 23). In Surabaya, on the other hand, he had the impression that the Japanese were still in full control. So when back in Semarang the next day, Asjes decided (NIOD IC 055795:55) to start implementing a major scheme for moving 5,000 (NIOD IC 065459:24), 10,000 (Tull 1995:90), or even 15,000 (Schouten 1947:95) Dutch women and children by special trains from the camps in Banyubiru and Ambarawa to Surabaya. The Japanese army commander issued Army Operation Order No. 1145 (NIOD IC

³³ Touwen-Bouwisma (1996:555, 570) raises the interesting question why in 1942 only the Chinese were attacked by the Indonesians, whereas at the end of the war both Chinese and Indos were targeted. In her view the Japanese minority policy in the intervening years had made each group more acutely aware of its own identity and ethnic loyalties. Differently from what this author alleges, however, the Indonesians did not proceed to open hostilities against the Indos immediately after the war. Therefore something else must have provided the immediate stimulus for the attacks on them. To me this seems to have been their behaviour as enemies of the Indonesian cause (compare Lucas 1984:222 for the post-war Indo assassinations in Pekalongan). Besides, as during the war many Indos had escaped from Japanese internment by claiming more than 50 percent Indonesian descent (as is mentioned explicitly by, for instance, Tantri, 1964:278, Parera, 1982:12, and Asmadi, 1985:70), the Indonesians felt betrayed by them (Thompson 1946:13). In 1942 the Dutch, who had just been defeated by the Japanese, posed no threat to the Indonesians, so that there was no reason whatever for the latter to attack them.

065459:24-6) for the implementation and protection of these transports. In view of the developments two weeks later (as mentioned above) and the two fierce battles fought by the Indonesians against the British, this measure turned out to be a terrible mistake.

Captain Huyer of the Royal Netherlands Navy, like Asjes, arrived in Surabaya on the 23rd.³⁴ According to him as well, the situation then appeared reasonably stable (*Enquête Commissie* 1956, Vol. 8 A&B:595). In view of these observations it is unlikely that the Indonesians, after raiding the Don Bosco depot and other Japanese installations, on 23 September attacked the *kempeitai*, as some sources suggest.³⁵ Otherwise Asjes and Huyer would certainly have heard shots. So it is wrong to say, as Frederick (1989:201) points out, that with the flag incident people tasted blood (Abdulgani 1975:13) and violence broke out in Surabaya. Nor had the Indonesians started on their quest for Japanese arms by that date, although the need to arm themselves had become painfully obvious to them.

Indonesian sources³⁶ claim that the Japanese remained passive during the flag incident, but according to Dutch eyewitnesses (Boer 1997:204; Broeshart et al. 2000:49; Meelhuijsen 2000:73) they put a stop to it (according to Miyamoto, 1973:103, however, there were too few Japanese to control the crowd). In any case, the Indonesians realized that the Japanese, by their very presence, had become a threat to them as well as being the source of the arms they so urgently needed (Raliby 1952:28; Abdulgani 1975:13). The Japanese army posted guards along the roads, intensified their patrols, tore down posters, and banned the display of slogans and mass meetings after the incident. On Allied orders, they helped the Dutch, supplied them with food, and prepared quarters to accommodate them.³⁷ In Central Java the Japanese assistance to the Dutch also aroused intense hatred among the Indonesians (NIOD IC 007275, 065451:9; Kido Butai 1995:172). RAPWI commander Asjes, when visiting Surabaya for a second time on 29 September (Schouten 1947:120), however, still apparently saw no reason to cancel the transport of the Dutch women and children from Semarang to Surabaya, which was to start that

³⁴ Therefore Huyer could not possibly have had anything to do with the flag incident, as *Zeni T.N.I.*, 1971:43, and Prawirodirdjo, 1987:22, for example, suggest.

³⁵ *Djawa Timur* 1953:911; *Peranan TNI* 1965:70; B.R.O'G. Anderson 1972:129; Parrott 1975:89; L. de Jong 1986:602; J.J.P. de Jong 1988:71, 1991:91; Van Poelgeest 1999:33. For the same reasons it is unlikely that, as Asmadi 1985:91 claims, the Don Bosco depot and other army units had been besieged by the 23rd.

³⁶ For example, *Djawa Timur* 1953:911; *Angkatan Laut* 1973:482; Parera 1982:17; Muhkardi 1983:17; Asmadi 1985:76; Hadiman and Suparmin 1985:33; Hardjosoediro 1987:61; and Setiadijaya 1992:111.

³⁷ *Merdeka* I-3, 3 October 1945; *Djawa Timur* 1953:911; *Peranan TNI* 1965:69; Parera 1982:18; Asmadi 1985:76; Sukadri, Soewarno, and Umiati 1991:85.

evening.³⁸ Therefore it appears that up to that point there had been no considerable arms transfers, individual cases of Japanese individuals giving arms to Indonesians on a personal basis aside. Hence it seems unrealistic to suggest, as Frederick (1997:41) mentions, that the Don Bosco arms depot was a target on 28 and 29 September. There was a traffic accident on the 29th, when a mob molested some Japanese in a car that had collided with a *dokar*, seriously wounding the Indonesian driver and passengers. Differently from Asjes, Huyer, who arrived in Surabaya late in the afternoon of the 29th, indeed found the town in a disquietingly nervous state. In the evening of that day a mob, their feelings of anger probably still running high, stopped two trucks carrying a Japanese patrol and disarmed the latter. Only then was the Don Bosco depot attacked (*Dokumentasi Pemuda* 1948:51; Frederick 1997:41, who advances the dates mentioned in Frederick 1989:212 one day). The Japanese refused to surrender their arms, however, though they gave in the next day³⁹, after discussions in which the above-mentioned Bung Tomo played an important part. Huyer (*Enquête Commissie* 1956, Vol. 8 A&B:596) nevertheless reports that on 30 September the situation was quiet again, while another Dutch eyewitness still saw Indonesians virtually without firearms in the streets, as well as still fully armed Japanese patrolling in trucks (L. de Jong 1986:603). Lieutenant Colonel Roelofsen (ARA AS 3584a:1-2) reports that the naval forces at Gubeng on 1 October were still in possession of their arms. People in the streets were not carrying firearms, and Japanese patrols were still able to chase them away with great ease, taking their *bambu runcing* from them. And when Lieutenant Commander H. Boss (ARA AS 3584b:2-3) went to the airfield to leave for Bali on 2 October, his car was still preceded and followed by trucks full of armed Japanese. On his return from Bali the next day, his plane was unable to land because Tanjung Perak airfield turned out to be entirely in Indonesian hands. Circling over the airfield at low altitude he saw a large crowd armed with *bambu runcing* swarming all over it. So apparently there had been no massive seizure of firearms from the Japanese as late as 3 October.

In the end, however, the huge number of 21,826 weapons (plus about

³⁸ Meelhuijsen, 2000:70, alleges, though without mentioning his source, that Asjes was aware at the time of the deteriorating situation in Surabaya. This is a very serious allegation since, if it is correct, Asjes would have been guilty of grave negligence in omitting to cancel the operation and putting the lives of thousands of Dutch women and children at risk.

³⁹ According to several Indonesian sources, like *Zeni T.N.I.*, 1971:26, 35, Abdulgani, 1975:14, Hadiman and Suparmin, 1985:80; Sukadri, Soewarno, and Umiati, 1991:87, and Setiadijaya, 1992:153, 170 (who Meelhuijsen, 2000:85, claims mentions 30 September as date), this happened on 1 October, and according to Roelofsen, ARA AS 3584a:2, and Muhkardi, 1983:19, even on 2 October. Japanese sources in general report that the raids on the Japanese only started on 1 October (ARA AS 5204-11b, 5205-33a:16, 5205-33b:41; Miyamoto 1973:83; *War History Series* 1976:12; and the Japanese Naval Officer referred to by Parrott, 1977:35-6).

3,000 arms seized from the navy) passed into Indonesian hands in East Java.⁴⁰ These were the arms with which the Indonesians fiercely opposed the British in the subsequent two battles of Surabaya.⁴¹ And it was this number of arms which the British insisted should be handed over – in accordance with their agreement with the Indonesians of 26 October (see Han 2000a:264) – in their ultimatum before commencing the second battle of Surabaya in November 1945. The Indonesians, it is true, had started raiding Japanese arms transports and depots in other places a week before that, such as Semarang on 25 September (Han 1996:398). The *pemuda* in East Java, however, succeeded in seizing arms from the Japanese army on a scale never to be equalled by any *pemuda* elsewhere.⁴² The question how this was possible requires a separate analysis taking various factors into account, such as, for example, the effect on both the Indonesians and the Japanese of the above-mentioned statement by the British commander-in-chief of the AFNEI, broadcast on 29 September, and the role of the Dutch Naval Captain Huyer. The achievements of the *pemuda* in East Java prompted the *pemuda* in other places to try and do the same, although not always with the same results (as in Bandung and Semarang, where the Japanese army stood firm). This is how

⁴⁰ Miyamoto 1973:347, 1986:339-40. According to Nasution (1955:18) the total number of weapons in Central and East Java came to 30,000, not including those lost in Surabaya. As he (1977:358) estimates the latter at 40,000, the total in Central and East Java would have been 70,000. This number differs significantly, however, from the totals mentioned for Central and East Java by Miyamoto and by Wehl (1948:3) and Woodburn Kirby (1969:331): around 29,461, 30,250 and 31,190 respectively. Said (1991:13) presumably for this reason omits to exclude the arms lost in Surabaya. Although Woodburn Kirby's total for East and Central Java is based on reviews of the situation by Mountbatten on 21 November, Frederick (1989:218) assumes that such a large number was seized in Surabaya alone on 2 October. See the comment in Han (1996:413). Rimmelink (1978:60-1, who, however, mentions 3 October), Squire (1979:116), L. de Jong (1986:603), Broeshart (1987:15), Boer (1997:208), Broeshart et al. (2000:49), Meelhuijsen (2000:85), and Van den Doel (2000:99) make the same mistake. Notosusanto (1995:153-4), in his survey of the Indonesian striking power in Surabaya in September and October, comes to a total of only 6,305 arms. Although Meelhuijsen (2000:285) cites this survey in his book (with the incorrect total of 6,205), he fails to see that it contradicts the above-mentioned view expressed by himself and the other authors. Moreover, Miyamoto did not exclude the arms surrendered by the Allied forces in 1942 at all.

⁴¹ Where it is stated in the summary of the first battle in Han, 2000a:257, that the Indonesians overran the Brigade Headquarters, this should be the Brigade Headquarters Officers' Mess.

⁴² Miyamoto (1973:347, 1986:339), typically again exaggerating the importance of the Japanese to the Indonesians, argues that in West Java 40,100 Japanese weapons fell into Indonesian hands. In view of the manner in which the Japanese operated in Jakarta and Bandung, this to me seems impossible. As Smail (1964:81) puts it, nowhere in West Java did the Indonesians disarm the Japanese on such a large scale as in many parts of Central and East Java. Nasution (1955:18) and Said (1991:13) claim that the Indonesians in West Java seized 10,000 arms from the Japanese. Rinzema (1989:32) was even under the impression that generally speaking there was no transfer of arms in West Java.

the Indonesians acquired the arms they needed for their struggle for freedom. In the further course of this struggle they procured weapons in other ways. This is described in Wagner 1988.

ABBREVIATIONS

AFNEI	Allied Forces Netherlands East Indies
ARA AS	Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, records of the former Algemene Secretarie
ARA PG	Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, records of the former Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië
ARA Van der Plas	Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, records of Ch.O. van der Plas, Dutch delegate to the South East Asia Command
BKR	Badan Keamanan Rakjat (Organization for the People's Security)
BPM	Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij
NIOD IC	Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Indische Collectie
NKPM	Nederlandse Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappij (later Standard Vacuum Petroleum Maatschappij)
PETA	Pembela Tanah Air (Army for the Defence of the Fatherland)
RAPWI	Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees
SEAC	South East Asia Command
SEATIC	South East Asia Translation and Interrogation Centre.

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- 5204-9 'An individual opinion which may interest the Allied Forces with regard to the future management of Indonesia', presented by letter of 23 September 1945 by Chief of Staff Yamamoto
- 5204-10 Report of the meeting on board of H.M.S. *Cumberland* at Batavia, 21st September 1945
- 5204-11a Farewell address to the personnel of the Defence Volunteer Corps by Nagano, Commander-in-Chief of the 16th Army, on 17 August 1945
- 5204-11b Report received from the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd South Seas Fleet, submitted to Headquarters Allied Military Administration by Rear Admiral Maeda on 3 October 1945

- 5204-13 E. Brunsveld van Hulten, 'Rapport over de Japansche invloeden op de Merdeka Beweging en de gebeurtenissen in de Augustusdagen', 24 July 1946
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ARA PG

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