Han Bing Siong
Captain Huyer and the massive Japanese arms transfer in East Java in October 1945


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The interested layman surveying the historiography of Indonesia in the period immediately following the surrender of Japan will soon be struck by the obvious anti-Japanese bias of most Dutch historians (for examples see Han Bing Siong 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2001b). Many of them interpret the part played by the Japanese in events in the post-surrender period negatively, as being antagonistic to the Dutch and supportive of the Indonesian cause. And where the Japanese did fight against the Indonesians and protected the Dutch, these authors often trivialize the Japanese actions and describe them as being too hesitant and ill-timed, as being inspired by concern for their own safety or by vindictiveness, or as following on direct orders from the Allied authorities. A few exceptions aside — such as the diaries or memoirs of H.E. Keizer-Heuzeveldt (1982:77), J. van Baal (1985:368, 1989:512), and G. Boissevain and L. van Empel (1991:305), and several other contemporary publications — there is a noticeable reluctance to acknowledge that Dutch people in some cases in fact owed their lives to the Japanese.\footnote{According to Wehl (1948:41) the situation in Bandung especially was very dangerous for the Dutch. Van Sprang (1946:28) confirms the hypothesis that many Dutch people here owed their lives to the conduct of the Japanese army. Fabricius (1947:129) says that some Dutch felt so relieved when the Japanese came into action that they applauded the latter in the streets. How proud this must have made the Japanese, as a defeated army, feel. Van Delden (1989:106-7) does not say a word about this, however, although she gives an account of the Japanese military operation in Bandung. Bouman (1995:235) also keeps silent about the Japanese actions to ensure the safety of the Dutch in Bandung, and the significance of these. The British did not as a rule require Japanese officers to surrender their swords as long as it was necessary for them to maintain control of their forces, whose assistance the British still needed badly. In the case of the Japanese commanders of Bandung and Semarang, there was special cause for gratitude and leniency. Rijpma (1999:140), although acknowledging that the Japanese in Bandung were the protectors of the Dutch, claims that there is no record anywhere of what Major General Mabuchi Itsuo of Bandung did to deserve the privilege of keeping his sword. She furthermore downplays the}
never been to Indonesia, and so could not possibly have personal experience of the Japanese occupation. They are probably simply relying on the reports of older generations, and insufficiently interested in the facts to take the trouble to verify these. It is in any case indicative of the prevalence of the negative attitude towards the Japanese in general and its continuing influence in the Netherlands. This is in itself quite understandable since, as H.J. Benda (1958), B.R.O‘G. Anderson (1966), G.S. Kanahele (1967), A. Reid (1980), and more recently Gotō Kenichi (1996a) explain, it was the Japanese who initiated the process that eventually led to the proclamation of independence by the Indonesians during their occupation of Indonesia, albeit in the interests of their own war aims. They were actually instrumental in preparing the Indonesians in many ways for resisting the reimposition of Dutch colonial rule, not in the last place by debunking the myth of the white man’s superiority and instilling seishin, or a heroic patriotic spirit, in many Indonesian youths. Was it not a foregone conclusion, therefore, that the Japanese would continue to pursue their wartime policies as far as possible after their surrender, as P.J. Drooglever (1998:5) asserts?

In however negative a light these Dutch historians may put the Japanese, it is a fact – though a much neglected one in the historiography – that because the Japanese army honoured its surrender obligations, the Allied forces were able to land everywhere in Indonesia – on Java, with Surabaya as the sole exception, and Sumatra more than six weeks after the proclamation of Indonesian independence and on Bangka, Bali and Lombok even as late as 1946 – without encountering armed Indonesian opposition.² Here again a Dutch author, H.J.

² Significance of the latter’s handing over his sword as a personal present to Dutch Major General J.J. Mojet by claiming that he did so merely by way of a deferred surrender. This is overlooking the fact that only the Americans, Chinese, Russians, British and Australians were authorized to accept Japanese surrenders (Mountbatten 1969:313). Fuller (1992:44, 145) is also wrong in this respect. Authors like Van Delden (1989:105), J.J.P. de Jong (1988:83) and Van Poelgeest (1999:35 – who misinterprets B.R.O‘G. Anderson in this respect) allege that Mabuchi made a secret deal for the transfer of arms with the Indonesians. Ripma also mentions such an agreement, but considers it unlikely that Mabuchi ever intended to honour it. The point is that it did not provide for any transfer of Japanese arms at all, but on the contrary, explicitly ruled out a transfer of responsibility to the Indonesians (NA AS 5207a; see also B.R.O‘G. Anderson 1972:140). Indonesian sources (like Amar 1963:78 and Hadiman and Suparmin 1985:59), likewise ignorant of the stipulations of the agreement, allege that the Japanese agreed to stage mock fights in which they would then surrender their arms. In any case there is no evidence, according to Smail (1964:59), that Mabuchi did in fact disarm his troops or turn over his arms to the Indonesians. J.J.P. de Jong (1991:94), like NA AS 5207b, argues that Mabuchi made a move in this direction because he was thrown out of his car. Drooglever (1998:12-3), contrary to all other reports on Bandung, goes so far as to assert that, as in Semarang, the Indonesians seized all Japanese arms before the Japanese struck back at them with whatever arms they had left. Although this has often been asserted about the Japanese in Semarang, it is also untrue (Han Bing Siong 1996:397-406).
van Mook (1949:98), literally followed by C. Smit (1952:64), and to some extent also by R. Cribb and C. Brown (1995:21), misrepresents the facts by making it look as if the Allied landings went unopposed only in some places. Cribb (2000:154), in his recently published and highly acclaimed Historical atlas of Indonesia states explicitly that the Allies often met with determined armed resistance during their landings on Java and Sumatra.

Semarang was another exception, though in a totally different way. As in other places, the Japanese went to meet the Allied forces when they entered this city on 19 October 1945. This time, however, the Japanese in Semarang welcomed the Allies by firing at them, marking the start of a two-hour fight in which two Gurkhas were killed and six wounded. Van Mook (1949:98), Van der Wal (1971-72:407), Smit (1952:64), and J.J.P. de Jong (1986:170) give the impression that it was the Indonesians who fired at the Gurkhas, whereas in fact it was the Japanese, so that for a moment it seemed as if the Gurkhas would be facing their old foes of Burma once more. The Japanese, who were engaged in a fierce five-day battle against the Indonesians at the time, had mistaken the Gurkhas for Indonesians, however (Houston 1948:195; Doulton 1951:246; Mullaly 1957:390; Woodburn Kirby 1969:320-1). The Indonesians for their part regarded the arrival of the Gurkhas as an act of providence that prevented the Japanese from taking further drastic action against them. Hence the Japanese military action paved the way for the occupation of Semarang by the Allied forces and the latter’s further advance to Ambarawa.


3 In addition to the sources mentioned in this context, the reader is referred to Kido Butai 1995:177, Soltau 1995:167, and NIODIC 055759a. According to the map in Cribb (2000:154), probably again following Van Mook 1949:98 and Smit 1952:64, the Allied landing here took place on 20 October. The Dutch government was also incorrectly informed by Van Mook (Van der Wal 1971-72, II:376). The assumption seems to be widespread among Australian historians; see, for instance, Reid 1974:47, Ricklefs 2001:266, and Lucas 1984:463. Several Dutch authors, such as Helfrich 1950:266, L. de Jong 1988:726, Drooglever 1987:52, and Van Poelgeest 1999:36, also stick to 20 October as the date of the landing. J.J.P. de Jong (1988:116, 1991:95) mentions two dates, 20 and (like Ward et al. 1988:43) 17 October. B.R.O’G. Anderson (1972:149) assumes that Brigadier R.B.W. Bethell arrived on 20 October to take control of the city, thus suggesting that the Allied landing took place on that day.


5 Dokumentasi Pemuda 1948:40; Gani 1984:72. Interestingly, the Japanese army was also waiting for the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Infantry Regiment from Limburg, as the first Dutch army unit to arrive in Semarang on 9 March 1946, in this case with a view to taking charge of their conveyance to the Japanese barracks in Djatingaleh in the hills. Tussen sawahs en bergen (1948:9) typically does not mention this remarkable incident, of which I personally was a witness (see also Brommer et al. 1995:78). The British 5th Parachute Brigade Group assigned the Japanese the task of defending certain areas that were of crucial importance for the defence of Semarang, namely Gombel and the south-eastern section of the periphery of the city (IWM Darling 1946:4), which the Dutch were to take over from the Japanese.
and Magelang in the interior (Kertapati 1964:158-9; Said 1986:51). According to a British assessment, the Allied forces might possibly have met the same fate as in Surabaya and the Dutch have fallen victim to the same kind of atrocities in Semarang and Ambarawa if the Japanese had not fought the Indonesians (Tull 1995:102). Not surprisingly, as Dutch Lieutenant-Governor General H.J. van Mook (Van der Wal 1971-72, I:423) so aptly put it in a report to the government in the Netherlands in 1945, the Japanese fighting here led to a sudden change in attitude among the European internees: from aversion to them as a result of years of maltreatment and humiliation in the Japanese prison camps, to a certain gratitude and admiration. Typically, this telling report was cited by no Dutch source until 1995 (it was referred to only in an English publication of ten years previous, see Han Bing Siong 1985:40). Again, as I have tried to demonstrate before (Han Bing Siong 1996), with regard to the motives of the Japanese commander in Semarang in starting his military operation, most Dutch historians are unable to free themselves of a certain reluctance to admit that the Japanese may well have acted purely from a sense of duty.

As has been pointed out elsewhere (Han Bing Siong 2000:247), it was only in Surabaya that the Japanese were not at their post when the Allied forces arrived and only did their duty towards the latter at sea. As reported by J.H.B. (1946:76), the British flotilla heading for Surabaya was escorted by Japanese gunboats (see also Pugh 1948:322; Notosusanto 1995:27) of the 2nd Japanese South Seas Fleet, which had orders not to enter the harbour during the turbulent events of 3 October (Enquetecommissie 1956 8 A&B:597).

As has been pointed out elsewhere (Han Bing Siong 2000:247), it was only in Surabaya that the Japanese were not at their post when the Allied forces arrived and only did their duty towards the latter at sea.6 Here the Indonesians rather than the Japanese were militarily in control and tried to prevent the Allied forces from landing. But for President Soekarno's intervention, they would even have opened fire on the approaching Allied ships. C.W. Squire (1979:59) suggests that 'it was not the Japanese presence which was to cause trouble for the Allied forces in the post surrender period, but the absence of Japanese forces from their operational areas'. This was true exclusively for Surabaya, however, and, as we will see later, even there only up to a point. This gives rise to the question of what were the circumstances that led to the absence of the Japanese officials in Surabaya at the time they were supposed to meet the Allied forces landing here on 25 October 1945.7 Squire, basing himself on W.G.J. Remmelink (1978:63), attributes the Japanese absence to their policy of withdrawing to remote areas for self-internment and suggests that the effects of this were both to encourage Indonesian violence and to keep away the one force capable of containing this, namely the Japanese

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7 According to some sources, like Van der Wal (1971-72, II:376), Helfrich (1950:265), and Groen (1991:34), the British landing here took place on 26 October, and to Ward et al. (1988:43) even on 24 September.
army. In fact, a contemporary observer, A. van Sprang (1946:9), reported already in 1946 that the Japanese army was vacating its quarters and moving to areas in the mountains at the time, leaving insufficient forces in Surabaya to keep law and order. Colonel L.H.O. Pugh (1948:320), second-in-command of the first British Indian troops to be deployed in Surabaya, also asserts that the Indonesians, upon the withdrawal of the Japanese to concentration areas in anticipation of Allied orders, found themselves in sole, heady control.

The prevailing historiographical view is that the Japanese army’s self-internment rendered it powerless in general, and not only in Surabaya. Remmelink (1978) was the first to discuss the subject in depth, though other sources touched on it long before him. T.S. Tull (1995:86) introduced the term ‘self-internment’ as early as 1945, to be followed by G.W. Overdijkink (1946:65), D. Wehl (1948:3), Van Mook (1949:85), and Lord Louis Mountbatten (1969:290) in his report (which was delayed eighteen years), besides Van Sprang and Pugh in the publications referred to above. Possibly Allied observers, suspecting the Japanese of sabotage, were surprised to see the Japanese forces in Java present in much smaller numbers than they had expected, which led them to believe that this was due to the withdrawal of the Japanese army to remote areas.

In point of fact, many of the 23 Japanese battalions* that had conquered Java in a span of eight days in March 1942 had left the island again in November 1942 for deployment elsewhere, so that the strength of the occupational force in Java had been reduced to a mere eight battalions.* This inadequate strength led the Japanese army in Java to recruit heiho (Indonesian auxiliary forces) and form the Pembela Tanah Air (PETA, Army for the Defence of the Fatherland) in 1943.† Probably those authors who are inclined to construe every Japanese measure as favouring the Indonesian cause would say that the Japanese army introduced this particular measure also in order to prepare the Indonesians

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8 Nortier et al. (1994:293) estimate that these 23 battalions comprised 47,500 troops.
10 This reduced strength also obliged the then army commander, Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi, henceforth to restrict the freedom of choice of place of residence for Europeans, in order to make it easier to keep an eye on them and prevent them from collaborating with the Allied forces in the event of a landing. Dutch sources usually do not acknowledge that it was Imamura’s general policy to allow Europeans (except for Dutch officials and unemployed males) to continue in their old way of life. They hold the view that this was only for as long as the Japanese needed the Europeans’ skills for repairs on railways, communications installations, and so on (Van Velden 1977:70, 76, 81; Zwitzer 1995:66-7). The reimposition of the judicial system of special courts for Europeans (the former Raden van Justitie) at that same time clearly demonstrates, however, that Imamura was pursuing a long-term policy. When his successor in June 1943 issued orders for the internment of European women, the special courts for Europeans were abolished again (Han Bing Siong 1998:427-31). L. de Jong (1985:252-3) lists the various measures taken by the Japanese as a consequence of the diminished strength of their forces, though overlooking the formation of the PETA and the changes in the administration of justice.
The Don Bosco building where the controversial proclamation of Lieutenant-General Christison on 29 September 1945 was implemented for the first time by the Japanese (d'Oriënt, 4 December 1937)
for the struggle for independence from the Dutch. As J.C. Lebra (1977:13, 96-7) points out, however, this was definitely not the case in Java, in contrast to Burma and the Philippines. The Japanese began to contemplate future independence for the Indonesians only the following year, without specifying any date or form for this (Benda 1957:173; Kanahele 1967:161-3; Goto 1984:7). And this was not out of altruistic sympathy for the Indonesians either, but, as all relevant Japanese documents explicitly state, 'in order to aid the successful completion of the Greater East Asia War' or 'in order to contribute to the prosecution of the war' (Benda et al. 1965:267-74).

Hence after Japan's surrender, the Japanese army only had these eight battalions left in Java, the heiho and PETA having been disbanded and disarmed very soon after the Indonesian proclamation of independence (Han Bing Siong 2001b:799-808). In addition there were about five or six Japanese infantry battalions, four of them below-strength Hikari battalions of the 5th Division in the Moluccas which were in transit in Java at the time – three of which were in the vicinity of Jakarta, according to Army Operational Order No. 1117, and one in Semarang (see note 45) – as well as a number of Umi units of the 48th Division in Timor, one of them the Otsuka Battalion stationed in Yogyakarta. It is generally assumed in the historiography, however, that the Japanese remained in complete and effective military control of Java after Japan's surrender, despite the reduced strength of their army. If this was the case, this suggests that it was the withdrawal of a substantial part of their troops from the cities that rendered them generally incapable of containing the Indonesians.


11 According to Miyamoto (1973:147, 1986:334) there were two battalions comprising only sick men in Central Java. One of them would have been the Kido force in Semarang, which, however, comprised Officers Training School instructors and staff, who were busy turning out officers until May 1945 and were by no means sick men. An exaggeration in the opposite direction is a description of Kido Butai as an elite or special force, as is often found in Indonesian sources, for understandable reasons (Han Bing Siong 1996:385). If Miyamoto’s information is correct, then only the other battalion, that in Purwokerto, Central Java, under the command of Major Yuda Mitsuomi, could have been made up of sick men. The fact that Major Yuda was forced by ill health to remain in Java when his unit was sent elsewhere (Notosusanto 1979:138) might be an indication in this direction.

12 In Kanahele's view (1967:282) the presence of these units in transit raised the 16th Army's strength to almost the level of March 1942. His total of 40-50,000 troops does not tally, however, with the totals mentioned in NA AS 5205-33c:57, namely 32,853, or Miyamoto 1973:44, 20,000.

13 NIOD IC 065459:5-6.

14 Army Operational Order No. 1111, NIOD IC 065459:2.

the view that the Japanese deliberately designed the policy of self-internment to give the Indonesian freedom movement free play. Even more interestingly, Remmelink and Van Delden base this on a Japanese source whose author, Lieutenant Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo (who was sakusen sambo, or staff officer in charge of operations of the Japanese 16th Army in Jakarta), claims that the Japanese army was intent on doing its utmost after Japan’s surrender to serve the interests of the Indonesians out of gratitude for their cooperation during the war. Accordingly it felt obliged to retreat to outposts away from the political arena so as not to obstruct the Indonesians. This was possible, as the PETA and heiho had been disbanded. That this policy of self-internment was intended to avoid clashes or incidents with the Allied forces after their arrival was just a pretext to use with the Allies, according to Miyamoto (1973:59-60). In short, Miyamoto (1973:56), followed by War History Series (1976:10), Remmelink (1978:53), Drooglever (1998:5), and Squire, claims that the Japanese adopted a policy of friendship vis-à-vis the Indonesians. Remmelink and Van Delden are unaware, however, that their source is one of those Japanese ex-servicemen who try, in line with the strong post-war Japanese tendency to justify the Greater East Asia War as a war for the liberation of Asia and the Asians from the Europeans, to explain every measure of the Japanese army in the post-surrender period in terms of support for the Indonesians and their cause. In my view one should be as critical of such interpretations as Miyamoto’s as is Goto (1996a:549-50) in his comment on the favourable Japanese portrayal of the Greater East Asia War, however. It is most interesting to see how such Japanese efforts to place the conduct of the Japanese army in the post-surrender period vis-à-vis the Indonesians in a favourable light actually endorse the arguments of those Dutch authors who are inclined to do quite the opposite from the Dutch point of view. On the Indonesian side, some sources, such as Roeslan Abdulgani (1975:15), vehemently deny that the Japanese in Surabaya made it easy for the Indonesians to acquire the necessary Japanese arms and claim that the Indonesians had to put up a bitter fight for these. This is a reaction of the same category as the Indonesian denial that the Japanese occupation had a major impact on subsequent developments in Indonesia (Reid 1980:16).

The truth of the matter is that Army Operational Order No. 1120, instructing the Japanese army to prepare for the withdrawal of certain units from places which the enemy (as the Allies were still referred to) would consider it imperative to occupy, was issued by the gunshireikan, or army commander of Java, Lieutenant General Nagano Yūichirō, on 21 August 1945. The Japanese

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16 NIOD IC 065459:7-10. The British intelligence service incorrectly transliterated the katakana in this order, making it seem that Yogyakarta was the place where it was issued, whereas actually Nagano’s army headquarters were in Jakarta (Han Bing Siong 2001b:799-800). From Army Operational Order No. 1151 onward the Japanese used the pre-war name Batavia for Jakarta.
army had just begun implementing Army Operational Order No. 1113\textsuperscript{17} for the disbandment of the PETA two days previously, on 19 August, however. In this connection Miyamoto,\textsuperscript{18} who claims that the Japanese at the time expected the Allies to recognize Indonesian independence, goes so far as to argue that even this disbandment was intended for the good of the Indonesians, whose image as a peace-loving nation might otherwise have been tarnished in the eyes of the Allies. Biased Dutch historians will undoubtedly point out that Miyamoto’s view on this is fully corroborated by the words of the army commander’s farewell address to the PETA on 17 August 1945.\textsuperscript{19} In actual fact, however, the disarmament and disbandment of PETA was implemented in such a resolute, strict, and sometimes even high-handed way by fully equipped, camouflaged and battle-ready Japanese army units (Bahsan 1955:63-4; Bouwer 1988:378; Djatikusumo as cited by Bouman 1995:211) as to refute the claim that the Japanese did so with friendly intentions. Miyamoto (1973:51) himself admits that the Japanese were prepared to use force against the Indonesians if they should oppose disbandment (War History Series 1976: 9). So, as I have argued elsewhere (Han Bing Siong 2001b:803), the army commander’s words were obviously meant simply to pacify the Indonesians and cause the disarmament of PETA to proceed as smoothly as possible. Moreover, five days earlier, on 16 August, Major General Nishimura Ōtoshi (then somubuchiō or Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Japanese Military Administration) had flatly refused the Indonesian leaders Soekarno and Hatta permission to proclaim independence (although most sources fail to acknowledge this\textsuperscript{20}). When the two Indonesian leaders warned him of the danger of riots, Nishimura replied that the Japanese army would suppress any riots by force. This flat refusal – which Miyamoto (1973:52) brands as heartless – does not point to feelings of friendship or compassion for the Indonesians either. The Japanese army’s policy was based on the assumption that the Allies would be opposed to Indonesian independence.\textsuperscript{21} Hence Miyamoto’s claim that the Japanese authorities were led by the idea that the Allies would accept independence for Indonesia is wholly unfounded.

Another example of Japanese rewriting of history is the claim by Nishimura’s superior, the gunseikan (Military Administration Superintendent) and sambōchō (Chief of Staff) Yamamoto Moichirō, that this refusal was in

\textsuperscript{17} NIOD IC 065459:3-4.

\textsuperscript{18} As cited by Goto, 1976:68, who qualifies Miyamoto’s explanation as a mere pretext.

\textsuperscript{19} NA AS 5204-11a; Wehl 1948:1-2; Notosusanto 1979:166-7.

\textsuperscript{20} For the facts, see Han Bing Siong 2000:234-45, which shows that the widespread assumption that Soekarno and Hatta were in doubt as to whether or not to proclaim independence and had to be pushed into doing so by the pemuda is in disagreement with the facts as well. Raben (2001) nonetheless still puts forward the view that Soekarno wavered at the critical moment.

\textsuperscript{21} NA AS 5205-36:28; Zorab 1954:121.
the interests of the Indonesians. For if Japan was seen to have had a hand in
the latter's independence, this would discredit the Indonesians in the eyes
of the Allies. Goto (1984:11-2) is rightly sceptical about Yamamoto's motive
for this refusal and assumes that he was in fact prompted by fear of unfa-
vourable consequences for Japan's status as a nation if the Japanese were to
do anything that risked incurring the disapproval of the Allied forces.

The above-mentioned measures by the Japanese army were the outcome
of the policy decided on by the army top on 16 August. As Miyamoto (1973:
50) says, the latter had decreed that the army's main concern should be
the protection of Japanese army personnel and citizens and their interests.
Respect for the interests of the Allies should come second. Gotô (1984:9-10,
1996b:40) suggests that avoidance of any semblance of non-obedience to
Allied orders was of the essence to the Japanese, as any accusations of this
would jeopardize the continued existence of the Japanese empire and its
institution. Moreover, further guidance of the Indonesians on the road to
independence was out of the question. And the PETA and heihō had to be dis-
solved. The army top did, on the other hand, decide to allow the Indonesians
greater participation in the existing government administration. This, in my
view, was inevitable anyway, as the Japanese had replaced the former Dutch
administrators mainly with Indonesians, rather than Japanese, reserving
only the senior-most positions for themselves. So the public services were
manned by, and thus dependent on Indonesians to a far greater extent than
under Dutch rule. The army top further decided to convert industries sup-

22 Soekarno and Hatta, while preparing for the proclamation of independence, had expressed
the hope to Rear Admiral Maeda Tadashi, naval liaison officer with the army general staff, that
the Japanese would refrain from interfering. As the latter was not in a position to give the
required undertaking, he got in touch with Yamamoto. According to Gotô (1984:11-2, 15-6),
Yamamoto declined to meet the two Indonesian leaders in view of the need to maintain the
status quo – which he had decided on himself (besides the sources cited in Han Bing Siong
assert that he was acting on higher orders; such orders only arrived on 18 August, however).
Instead, he pressed Nishimura to talk to them. Although Yamamoto personally instructed the
latter to grant Soekarno and Hatta an interview, he afterwards criticized Nishimura for not
being more amenable and generous with them. Presumably he felt that Nishimura should have
explained to them that Japanese permission would have compromised Indonesia's cause, thus
overlooking the strong probability that the Indonesian leaders would certainly have found such
an explanation incredibly absurd, as well as offensive, in that it showed clear contempt for their
intelligence.
23 See also NA AS 5204-13:7.
Consequently, the Japanese were actually powerless when the pemuda started seizing office build-
ings, power stations, waterworks, telephone exchanges, railways, and other facilities (NA AS 5205-
that the Japanese were much more dependent on the Indonesians than the Dutch had been.
plying the army into industries supplying the needs of the people and to encourage the development of Indonesian industry. In view of the extreme poverty to which the Indonesian people had been reduced during the war, this was quite a sound decision from the viewpoint of effective administration. It was only in these two respects that Japanese army policy was positive for the Indonesians. Nonetheless, the Dutch author, L. van Poelgeest (1999:24), again typically, as far as I can see, asserts that the Japanese decided to focus their policy on the interests of Indonesia equally as much as those of the Allies and of Japan and the Japanese in Java. Nishijima Shigetada and Kishi Kōichi (1963:478), however, who apparently consider the points of the policy of 16 August pertaining to the Indonesians to be insignificant, omit to mention these. In B.R.O’G. Anderson’s (1961:94) and Goto’s (1984:5) view, the Japanese military top was not so much concerned with independence for the Indonesians as with protection of their own national interests. Given all these facts, a sudden and complete turn-about on 21 August, within the space of just a few days, looks highly improbable to me.\(^25\) Last but not least, the decision to leave the matter of independence for the Indonesians and the Dutch to settle between them, with the Japanese withdrawing from the arena as quickly as possible, according to Miyamoto (1973:75) himself was only taken on 21 September, after the Ikada mass rally in Jakarta. As I see it, therefore, the Japanese policy of self-internment was not at all a veiled form of support for the Indonesians, but was truly intended to avoid difficulties with the Allied forces.

However, even if the Japanese did not devise this policy with a view to removing all obstacles to the Indonesian aspirations, were they not knowingly putting law and order at risk by retreating (Van Poelgeest 1999:26)? I personally do not think that such a risk actually existed. One should not forget that the situation in general was still completely calm and peaceful at the time. As I have argued elsewhere (Han Bing Siiong 2001b:814), the order for self-internment with the aim of avoiding incidents with the Allied forces, which the Japanese expected to arrive at any moment, was quite justified under these circumstances, and was not at all in contradiction with the obligation to maintain law and order, the more so since the PETA and heiho had already been disarmed. Consequently, when the situation changed

\(^{25}\) It is all the more so in view of Zorab’s report (1954:119) that army commander Nagano on 19 August was summoned to Singapore and there given instructions to withhold support for the Indonesian independence movement (NA AS 5205-33d:6). Nishijima (NA AS 5204-19) confirms that Nagano was indeed in Singapore, though on 18 August. Nishimura (NA AS 5208a:5) also refers to instructions to this effect being received by Nagano, who passed them on to his subordinates, although he creates the impression that this was in Jakarta on 15 August. Saitō states that Nagano gave the instructions accordingly on 18 August (NA AS 5208b:4).
in mid-September, a counter-order was issued on 18 September, decreeing that preparations for the relocation be reduced to a minimum. Miyamoto keeps conspicuously silent about this counter-order, and as Remmelink consequently did not take this order seriously, its significance escaped the attention of most other historians. I will discuss the order for self-internment in greater depth later.

Whatever the purpose of Japanese self-internment may have been, it was not the immediate cause of the Japanese absence at the arrival of the Allied forces in Surabaya. Those Japanese who were present in the city at the time did not retreat in the face of the advance of the Allies at all (as is suggested by Van Poelgeest, 1999:51). Soon after the first British-Indian troops landed they learned that the Japanese, though still present in Surabaya, were no longer in control of the city and that the Allies therefore had the Indonesians to contend with. This the then Indonesian commander, Moestopo, a former daidanchō or PETA battalion commander, confirmed soon afterwards at a meeting with Pugh at which the latter explained the tasks assigned to the Allied forces. On hearing that one of these tasks was the disarmament and removal of the Japanese, Moestopo smilingly assured Pugh that the Japanese had already been disarmed and their weapons distributed. As it turned out, the Indonesians three weeks earlier had thrown thousands of Japanese in jail—a tremendous humiliation for Japanese raised in the samurai tradition of fighting to the death rather than surrender. To ensure a smooth Allied disembarkation, Japanese army headquarters sent staff officer Miyamoto to Surabaya on 25 October, probably on the assumption that he was still able to exercise authority. The Indonesians imprisoned him immediately on his arrival.

26 Army Operational Order No. 1138, NIOD IC 065459:22.
27 Remmelink (1978:61), who could find no indication that this order was ever implemented, assumes that it was 'explained away', as he calls it. However, the Japanese in Semarang in fact not only put off the preparations for self-internment, but also on 25 September 1945 stopped them altogether (Han Bing Siong 1996:408).
28 Pugh 1948:326. Nonetheless, the Indonesians the next day concluded an agreement with the British for the latter to disarm and repatriate the Japanese (Soeara Rakjat 26-10-1945; NA AS 5205-33a:43; Abdulgani 1975:25; Setiadjaya 1992:362-3; Notosusanto 1995:30).
29 Miyamoto 1973:464; NA AS 5205-33b:2; NIOD IC 007220-1. Lord Louis Mountbatten, on receiving complaints from the Dutch that the Japanese in Java were not properly observing the terms of surrender, had ordered the Japanese commander-in-chief of the Southern Army in Saigon, Field Marshal Terauchi Hisaichi, to send down a senior staff officer to ensure that they would do so (Van der Wal 1971-72, I:306), and subsequently deputy chief of staff Lieutenant General Nishioeda Yutaka was sent to Jakarta. Army commander Nagano subsequently, on 17 October, issued Army Operational Order No. 1161 (NIOD IC 065459:33, 007220-1) instructing the commanders of East, Central and West Java to redouble their efforts to maintain order. Towards this end staff officers were dispatched to each of these areas: Major Count Yamaguchi Genkichi...
The Japanese commanding officers in Surabaya, Vice Admiral Shibata Yaichirō and Major General Iwabe Shigeo, like those in other places, should have reported to the Allies on the latter’s arrival. Both were still in the city at the time. Though not imprisoned, they were under Indonesian control, however. The Indonesians only forced them to leave Surabaya at 4 a.m. the next day, 26 October. Shibata says in his memoirs that he felt like the samurai of olden times after a defeat in battle, who were obliged to abandon their castles – forgetting that the samurai code of honour prescribed seppuku (self-disembowelment, commonly called hara kiri) in such cases. On arriving at Gubeng station, he contemplated making a dash for the nearby naval barracks. The question therefore is how it was possible for the inexperienced and poorly armed Indonesians to overrun the well trained and fully armed Japanese forces.

The most obvious explanation seems to be that the Japanese forces, as Van Sprang (1946:9) says, had become too depleted as a result of self-internment to exercise effective control in Surabaya. Remmelink (1978:63) in fact confirms that the Japanese army had rendered itself powerless here by voluntarily interning its troops. P.M.H. Groen (1985:94, 96) and Zwitzer (1995:263-4) say the same for Central Java, Van Delden (1989:67-8) for Bandung and Rinzema (1989:36) for Jakarta, in spite of the Japanese military actions in these areas.

A careful scrutiny of the text of Army Operational Order No. 1120 reveals, however, that it did not at all stipulate that the actual relocation of army units should be started, but simply concerned the preparations for such an operation. It was in fact restricted to such matters as building up a six-month reserve of provisions, fuel, and medical supplies, as well as of as large as possible a supply of building-materials, and organizing billets. Obviously its purpose was to have camps ready in case the Allied forces should arrive and oblige the Japanese to retreat. In Batavia (which the Japanese then no longer called Jakarta) they were in fact only ordered to relocate to the pre-arranged assembly point at Pondok Gede on 8 October, four days after

to Bandung, Lieutenant Colonel Nomura Tetsu to Semarang and Magelang, and, if the situation should so require, Miyamoto to Surabaya. With respect to Bandung and Semarang this was a superfluous order, while for the other areas it came too late and therefore was impossible to carry out.

31 Shibata 1986:370-1. He gave up the idea on hearing gunshots from the direction of the part of the port where the Allied forces had landed. As no shooting occurred between the Indonesians and the Allied forces until the 28th of October (or the 27th, as several Indonesian sources allege), it is impossible that this is what Shibata heard, unless, as Meelhuysen (2000:139) suggests, he left Surabaya on a later date than the 26th – which seems improbable to me, as Shibata himself says that the Indonesians had given orders for the relocation of the Japanese to be completed by the 25th.

32 Army Operational Order No. 1152 of 6 October 1945, NIOD IC 0654549:28-9.
the disembarkation of the 1st Indian Infantry Brigade, which was made responsible for the maintenance of law and order. Unfortunately there are no records of the instructions given by the East Java army commander for the implementation of the relevant Army Operational Order. However, those of the Central Java army commander corroborate the above interpretation. Major General Nakamura Junji in Magelang gave orders in Chûbu Bœitai Meirei (Central Java Defence Force Command) No. 26 of 24 August for the relevant preparations to be made by his troops without leaving their current positions. Accordingly the local commander of Semarang, Major Kido Shinichirō, formed a special unit for transporting construction materials to Sumowono, a village on the slopes of Mount Ungaran designated as place of self-internment (Semarang Keibitai:4-6, 10). Strikingly, Tull (1995:86) only mentions the detachment of part of the available troops for the preparation of self-internment camps and of a large portion of the available transport for the conveyance of goods for building up reserves of all kinds, but not self-internment itself as a reason why the Japanese had difficulty maintaining law and order.

In view of the fact that the barracks had still to be constructed, it seems unlikely to me that large numbers of Japanese had left Surabaya by 1 October, when the troubles started. To take Semarang as an example again, Kido in September dispatched around 160 men to Sumowono as quartermasters to make the necessary arrangements for the relocation, but kept about 627 men in the city. Moreover, the army commander’s order of a month later (18 September) to keep the preparations for withdrawal to a minimum indicates that these preparations were then still in progress. In Semarang these preparations were suspended altogether on 25 September and Major Kido had started recalling his quartermasters from Sumowono even before the issuing of the counter-order, instructing all his troops, except for few small

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33 Doulton 1951:236; Woodburn Kirby 1969:320. Interestingly, the former states (p. 242) that the shooting in Batavia started in earnest on about 4 October.
34 The Japanese forces in West, Central and East Java were initially designated Nishibu, Chûbu and Tôbu Bœitai (West, Central and East Java Defence Force respectively). Army Operational Order No. 1130 of 3 September 1945 (NIOD IC 065459:15) stipulated that from 4 September onward these forces should be referred to as Chikutai (Sector Forces). According to Semarang Keibitai (p. 13) and Kido Butai shi (1984:17) the name was changed on 30 August.
35 Semarang Keibitai:1, 7, 10. Hence Tull (1995:86) is right in saying, with respect to Semarang, that 20 to 25% of the Japanese troops were detached to prepare the self-internment camps. He believes this high percentage is one of the reasons why the Japanese had difficulty in maintaining law and order. He contradicts himself in other reports, however, where he says explicitly that the strength of the Japanese troops was still adequate (Han Bing Siong 1996:412) – as was proved to be indeed right by the Japanese victory over the Indonesians in the battle of Semarang on 15-19 October.
units, to return to the city on 27 September. Developments in Surabaya must have been more or less the same as those in Central Java. Indeed, as a lieutenant of the Ohara Battalion stationed in Surabaya reports, the main body of this battalion was ordered to return to this city from designated assembly points on 18 September to reinforce the garrison (Suzuki 1984:119). Shibata reports that he asked for permission via the Dutch naval captain P.J.G. Huyer, who had arrived in Surabaya on 23 September, for the naval forces in East Java to withdraw to the camp at Pudjon, near Malang, which was then still under construction. As in Semarang, the Japanese in Surabaya must have had a sufficiently large number of troops at their disposal to resist the Indonesians around 1 October, therefore. J.J.P. de Jong (1988:72) criticizes Remmelink for asserting that the Japanese army had withdrawn into camps by the end of August, which he believes to be based on information from Japanese sources out to prove that the Japanese were no longer in a position to suppress the Indonesian movement. Although we have every reason indeed to treat Miyamoto’s arguments with the greatest scepticism, Remmelink (1978:54), probably influenced by Miyamoto’s statement (1973: 60) that the order was supposed to be effective as of 25 August (which led J.J.P. de Jong (1988:65) to believe that it was issued on that day), in point of fact has stated that the Japanese had implemented the policy in question to a large extent by the beginning of September. Barlan Setiadijaya (1995:130), corroborating Remmelink’s view, states that the army commander had ordered the Japanese to withdraw before 6 September. The Army Operational Order of 21 August includes no specification either of the date on which it was to become effective or when the operation was to be completed, however. In my view, therefore, both Remmelink and Setiadijaya are wrong about this, as is J.J.P. de Jong (1988:75, 94) where he states that that Japanese self-internment

36 Semarang Keibitai:18, 23-4, 27-8. Miyamoto apologized in a personal letter of 24 June 1994 for being responsible for the bloodbath in Semarang as a result of the battle between the Indonesians and Major Kido’s forces. If he had known that the troops that were then in transit were still in Semarang, he would have ordered them to withdraw to the nearby self-internment camp immediately. He says he did not know this because the Indonesians had cut communication lines. This is a most curious apology, firstly because an order to proceed with self-internment would have been in contradiction with the Army Operational Order of 18 September for its suspension, and secondly because, as Miyamoto (1973:151) himself concedes, telegraphic communication was still possible at the time (see Han Bing Siong 1996:403). On the crucial date of 12 October, when Kido decided to engage in combat with the Indonesians, the Central Java military commander, as Miyamoto (1973:151, 461) himself reports, repeatedly consulted army headquarters. Miyamoto keeps silent, however, about the order then issued to open fire on the Indonesians if necessary (see note 67).

37 NIOD IC 006959.

38 Enquetecommissie 1956 Vol. 8 A&B:595. Shibata says in one place (NIOD IC 006959) that this was on about 20 September, to state in his memoirs (Shibata 1986:348) that it was 21 September. Reid (1974:51) mentions 22 September as the date of Huyer’s first visit to Surabaya.
had become a fact in October and that only the kempeitai (military police) remained behind. But this does not make it any easier to reconcile my deviant view on this with Van Sprang’s above-mentioned report about the Japanese vacating their quarters. I believe that they did so not because they were planning to go into voluntary interment, but rather as part of the Recovery Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (RAPWI) plan to accommodate all ex-internees to be evacuated from Central Java. Towards this end, all the Japanese in Darmo and Gubeng, for instance, were instructed to leave their quarters. Beyond these areas many Japanese remained in their quarters, scattered all over the city as these were, which subsequently exposed them to intimidation, plunder, kidnap or worse. Eventually this became an excuse for the navy command to refrain from resolute suppression of the Indonesians so as not to endanger the lives of these Japanese (Shibata 1986:358).

Besides, in as much as the preparations for self-internment in some cases had already started, as I argue elsewhere (Han Bing Siong 1996:413), a recall of the troops was still an option, as in Bandung. As Frederick (1997:41) also points out, the large number of Japanese reportedly captured by the Indonesians in Surabaya at the beginning of October clearly shows that not many could have left the city. Miyamoto, interestingly, does not explain in his book how the withdrawal was carried off, as he confirmed to me in a personal letter of 19 July 1994.

The various sources disagree about the number of Japanese captured by the Indonesians in Surabaya. Whatever the actual number of Japanese still
in the city at the beginning of October may have been, it was certainly higher than the 2,000\(^{42}\) in Bandung, who, Mabuchi claims,\(^{43}\) cleared that city mainly by shooting in the air, and much higher than the approximately 1,000 Kido troops in Semarang who, assisted by about 600 civilians armed with no more than bambu runcing (bamboo spears), utterly defeated the Indonesians there (Kido Butai shi 1984:24-5). It therefore seems most unlikely, as the Japanese naval chief of staff concedes (see note 41), that the Japanese forces in Surabaya were unable to suppress the Indonesian resistance. But in that case the only conclusion can be that, if they really framed their withdrawal policy with a view to giving the Indonesians full scope for building up their strength – which, as demonstrated above, they definitely did not – a statement like Miyamoto’s (Van Delden as cited by Van Bruggen and Wassing 1998:72) that this policy in any case prevented fighting against the Indonesians and for that reason was a success is in conflict with the facts. The reason why the Japanese armed forces allowed themselves to be so ignominiously disarmed and captured by the Indonesians in Surabaya was not that they had been reduced to too small a force, but something entirely different.

\(^{42}\) I derive this number from Van Delden (1989:68, 107), but could find no confirmation on this point either in Miyamoto 1973 or in Ōiwa and Mabuchi 1998. The latter (Ōiwa and Mabuchi 1998:76) merely says that three army units with tanks were deployed in Bandung – Okano Butai (with Colonel Okano as commander), Takiguchi Butai, and Nakajima Butai (or possibly Nagai Butai; see Ōiwa and Mabuchi 1998:73) – without specifying their strength. Van Mock reported to Minister J.H.A. Logemann that a few hundred Japanese regained control of Bandung and Semarang by means of extremely drastic action (Van der Wai 1971-72, 1:548). Overdijkink writes (1946:65) that 60 kempeitai, subsequently reinforced by a few hundred Japanese from outside Bandung, cleared this city. Smail (1963:63) estimates the number of Japanese in Bandung at 1,500, because this was the number which, according to Doulton (1951:282), the British had at their disposal after their arrival, besides their Gurkha troops. \textit{Peranan TNI} (1965:49) mentions the incredibly high figure of 60,000 armed Japanese in Bandung, probably with a view to justifying the ignominious Indonesian defeat there.

\(^{43}\) Mabuchi was probably also influenced at the time he wrote his notes by the friendly relations which had developed between Japan and Indonesia after the war, and therefore put his action against the Indonesians in as favourable a light as possible for them. If what Mabuchi says is true, then the pemuda in other cities had every reason to show contempt for their fellows in Bandung. Smail says (1964:63), however, that Mabuchi’s troops actually fired at the Indonesians when they showed resistance. Nasution (1977:326) reports that there were corpses lying around in several streets in Bandung, while Hadiman and Suparmin (1985:59), arguing that the Japanese had agreed to stage mock fights but that the masses were not aware of this, state that the Japanese action cost many Indonesian lives. Even Miyamoto (1973:144) asserts that Mabuchi’s resort to armed force resulted in scores of Indonesian deaths. Van Sprang (1946:28) states that 30 Indonesians were killed and another 30 captured. Amar (1963:82), on the other hand, assumes that only a few pemuda fell in this action. Several other Indonesian sources omit to mention the Indonesian casualties altogether.
P.J.G. Huyer, Captain Royal Netherlands Navy
(Institute of Naval History, The Hague)
Seeing that the Japanese forces were still present in sufficiently large numbers, one could of course argue that they were no longer adequately equipped and armed. Miyamoto (1973:60) indeed claims that the Japanese had contemplated issuing an order for the arms of their army to be restricted to the minimum necessary for self-defence and for all other arms and ammunition to be handed in at the nearest depots as a complementary measure to that of self-internment. For fear of Allied censure they only took this step after receiving information on 29 August that the Japanese army in Singapore had left behind their arms and ammunition upon withdrawing, with the troops with guard duties carrying only five rounds of ammunition with them, in order to avoid clashes with the Allied forces. Although the order did not apply to Java, the army top here eagerly seized the opportunity provided by this Singapore precedent and decreed that the ammunition issued to the guards in the cities should likewise be restricted. Miyamoto alleges that this measure, like the withdrawal of Japanese forces, was intended to prevent the Japanese army posing an obstacle to the Indonesian freedom movement. Goto (1984:17), very interestingly, gives an altogether different explanation, namely that it was intended to prevent any arms and ammunition passing into Indonesian hands in order to avoid Allied accusations of non-obedience to their orders, or worse, the use of weapons against themselves. In any case, if this arms restriction was actually imposed in Surabaya in the way described by Miyamoto, this may explain the surrender of several thousand Japanese, who due to the shortage of arms were unable to put up any resistance, to the Indonesians. The question is whether the events really took place as Miyamoto (followed by Remmelink, 1978:53-4) described them. Doubts about this arise when we consider the Japanese action in Bandung, in which tanks were deployed (see note 42), and Semarang, in which a heavy-machinegun company and two modern (1941) fast-firing model 1 mobile 47-mm. guns were used (Kido Butai shi 1984:24; Han Bing Siong 1996:389). Let us therefore examine the relevant orders more closely.

Japanese Army Operational Order No. 1127 of 29 August 1945 starts off by stipulating that all commanders should prevent unexpected incidents involving the use of arms against the Allied forces. All arms, except those in the possession of units responsible for maintaining law and order or kept for self-defence, were to be handed over to the enemy, and for that purpose collected in depots. Units responsible for law and order or those with guard duties should be provided with no more than five rounds of ammunition. A point worth noting is that existing battalions were assigned as foci for the handing in of arms, besides the regular ordnance depots. Units other than these should take their arms to either the nearest ordnance depot or the near-
est battalion. This in my view implies that the battalions retained all their regular arms, besides having the arms handed in to them by other units at their disposal. Again comparing this with the situation in Semarang, Chūbu Bōeitai Meirei No. 38 of 30 August, reiterating the stipulations of the Army Operational Order, put Major Kido in charge of all the arms of the disbanded 5th Special Infantry Battalion rather than the ordnance depot in Magelang. As the battalions constituted the backbone of the army, the disarmament order did not essentially diminish the latter’s main strength. Even battalions not detailed to maintain law and order could take up arms and come into action immediately if the situation so required. Besides, the order stipulated that if it should be necessary to use arms, a more readily accessible storage place could be selected for them. It should be pointed out in this context that it is not correct either to say, as do Miyamoto (1973:60) and Remmelink (1978:53), that the battle troops were relieved of duties in connection with maintaining public order, which duties were then assigned to the Indonesian police and the kempeitai, reinforced with some other troops. It is true that Army Operational Order No. 1120 stipulated the disbandment of certain army units, but those actually specified for disbandment were only a few of minor importance, such as anti-aircraft and army dog and carrier pigeon units, PETA training staff, and the above-mentioned 5th Special Infantry Battalion, which only comprised 112 men after the dismissal of the Indonesian heiho.

45 Semarang Keibitai:13. The 5th Special Infantry Battalion, of which Major Kido had been commander, had been formed on 20 June 1945. It comprised 112 Japanese instructors and other staff of the closed Southern Army Officer Training School (which Miyamoto (1973:147, 1986:333-4) incorrectly refers to as a school for non-commissioned officers, which comprised only sick men) and 653 Indonesian heiho, in addition to two PETA battalions. The PETA, heiho, and 5th Special Infantry Battalion were disbanded on 24 August 1945, after which the unit comprising the 112 Japanese officers and men was referred to as Semarang Buntontai of the Central Defence Force headquarters. Two days later, however, a battalion of 675 men under Major Yagi of the 42nd Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division, arrived in Semarang on its way from the Moluccas and was put under Major Kido’s command (Semarang Keibitai:1-2,7-8). Subsequently a company belonging to the Yuda battalion in Purwokerto and commanded by Captain Yamada, which was sent to assist Major Kido’s troops with their RAPWI duties, arrived on 27 September (Semarang Keibitai:31). According to Van Delden (as cited by Van Bruggen and Wassing, 1998:72), the Japanese troops in Semarang, as in Yogyakarta, fought the Indonesians because they were from outside Java and were in transit here and had no sympathy for the Indonesian cause. This view, undoubtedly influenced by Miyamoto, seems rather simplistic, however, as the Japanese troops in Ambarawa did let themselves be disarmed without resistance, even though they formed part of the troops in Yogyakarta. On the other hand, Yamada Butai, although a company of Yuda Butai, which surrendered its arms peacefully, fought the Indonesians in Magelang in defence of the Gurkha troops. In my opinion it was all dependent on the commanding officers. In Semarang the commanding officer was Major Kido, who had been there for two years, but even so decided to suppress the Indonesians. Yamada Butai and Yagi Butai should simply obey.

46 NIOD IC 065459:10.
Moreover, Army Operational Order No. 1129 of 31 August,\textsuperscript{47} decreeing the reinforcement of the \textit{kempeitai} with army troops, contained no provisions for relieving army units of the responsibility for law and order. Lastly, Army Operational Order No. 1138 of 18 September stipulated that the weapons restrictions decreed by Army Operational Order No. 1127 should be shelved and that army units which had handed in their arms should rearm. As I have already pointed out, Miyamoto keeps conspicuously silent about this lifting of the arms restriction. If sufficiently large numbers of Japanese troops remained in Surabaya, and if these were still adequately armed, what made them surrender in their confrontation with the Indonesians?

Wehl (1948:48), referring specifically to Surabaya, says that this was due to the complete demoralization of the Japanese. Other authors, such as, for example Kahin (1952:137), Reid (1974:35), J.G.A. Parrott (1975:88, 1977:17), Van Poelgeest (1999:24, 35), and M.C. Ricklefs (2001:259-60), make more or less the same suggestion. Undeniably the Japanese troops, like their commander Nagano,\textsuperscript{48} were deeply shocked by the sudden capitulation of their country. And undoubtedly there were individual cases of demoralization. Goto (1984:24-8), describing Japanese reactions in Indonesia in 1945, lists the various motives which may have led Japanese individuals to commit suicide or to leave their units and disappear into Indonesian society or even take an active part in the Indonesian struggle for independence, thereby in all these cases disobeying the orders of their emperor.\textsuperscript{49} The percentage of Japanese soldiers and civilians who went over to the Indonesian side was extremely low, however, namely 0.39% and 0.47% respectively.\textsuperscript{50} Goto, strikingly, does

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item NIOD IC 065459:13-4.
\item Yamamoto, as cited by Goto (1984:2). NA AS 5205-36:12-5 does not say anything about Nagano’s psychological shock, however. Like the majority of the Japanese, Nagano was neutral on the question of whether or not to support the Indonesian cause. According to Zorab (1954:120), he viewed such support as only a means towards the end of strengthening Japan’s military position. After Japan lost the war, this seemed no longer relevant to him. Allen (1976:78) reports that it was Nagano who decided on 15 August to stop offering resistance to the Allies and to obey the imperial command.
\item Goto does not mention the cases of Japanese who, loyally doing their duty and fighting against the Indonesians, were disappointed and infuriated by Dutch military tribunals refusing to recognize their bravery in the post-surrender period and convicting them for crimes committed during the war. They included the only Japanese officer with the rank of captain who went on record as a deserter in Java (Miyamoto 1973:375; Goto 1984:26; 1996b:44), namely the Semarang \textit{kempeitai} commander Wada Kunishige. He broke out of prison with a few of his men after being sentenced to death, but contrary to his men, did not go over to the Indonesian side but sought refuge with a Chinese family in Batavia. For details, see Han Bing Siong 1996:407.
\item These percentages are based on the numbers of deserters provided by Miyamoto (1973:375), who mentions a total of 277 in Java. According to estimates of the Dutch army commander, however, many more had deserted, namely 1,000 (Van Poelgeest 1999:84, ignoring Miyamoto’s
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not say a word about demoralization. When one thinks of a demoralized army, one is usually inclined to associate this with lack of discipline, amok, drunken rampages, looting, rape, and murder. So far I have not come across any detailed reports of such behaviour among the Japanese in Indonesia in the post-surrender period, however. On the contrary, according to the accounts of, for instance, F.E. Crockett (1946:280), J. Fabricius (1947:22-3), A.J.F. Doulton (1951:232), and J.R.W. Smail (1964:20, 37-9), it seemed as if nothing had changed on the Japanese side after the surrender. This is also what I personally witnessed in Semarang. I remember seeing many Japanese soldiers in the streets of the city in September, neatly dressed in full field uniform, complete with the regulation bayonet and water flask, shopping and strolling in twos in a very orderly fashion, as though Japan had never surrendered. As it later turned out, these were newly arrived soldiers from the Moluccas (see note 45). I also know of a group of Japanese who dined copiously at the most expensive Chinese restaurant in the city and on leaving turned out to be short of cash. They promised to come back to pay their debt as soon as possible – without, however, leaving behind their names and addresses, so that the restaurant owner thought he could say goodbye to his money. To his great surprise, the money was brought to him shortly after the bloody battle of Semarang by a boy from the other side of town whom these Japanese soldiers had begged to take the trouble to bring it all the way to the restaurant. This illustrates that a sense of decency and honour still prevailed among the Japanese. J. Thompson (1946:49-50) reports the case of a Chinese restaurant owner in Batavia saying with reference to the conduct of members of the British 5th Parachute Brigade at Christmas 1945 (whose conduct in Semarang from January to May 1946 was impeccable, however) that the inhabitants of this city preferred the Japanese, as at least they had greater discipline. P. Dennis (1987:133) even alludes to cases of British soldiers being arrested by Japanese military police.

As Major General Nishimura proudly stated, the Japanese army in general maintained discipline among its troops even though the Japanese were in a ‘collapsed condition’. Smail (1964:20) points out that Japan’s surrender eliminated the raison d’être of Japanese rule in Indonesia in one stroke, so

lower total cited by Goto). As Miyamoto is generally at pains to demonstrate how much the Japanese supported the Indonesian struggle for independence, one would expect higher figures from him, and so these low figures seem accurate to me. Moreover, Miyamoto specifies the deserters according to rank and area of origin. The low numbers of Japanese killed or captured by the Dutch army in the course of its two military operations against the Republic, as described by Van Poelgeest, clearly indicate that the Dutch army exaggerated the numbers of Japanese deserters. In Van Poelgeest’s opinion it also exaggerated the military significance of the part played by these deserters in the Indonesian struggle.

51 NA AS 5205-24:3.
that the Japanese had no other motive in maintaining discipline than obedience to Allied orders. The strength of this motive should not be underestimated, however. It should not be forgotten that for the Japanese the future of their country and the position of their emperor were at stake. Therefore the army high command, as we saw above, on 16 August decided on a basic policy of avoidance of everything that might jeopardize the survival of Japan as a nation under the emperor. Interestingly, the Japanese commander in Semarang, when announcing to his men on 12 October that he had decided to take action against the Indonesians, explained that this was for the sake of keeping 'international faith' (Semarang Keibitai 1945:41; Kido Butai shi 1984: 20). The deep reverence and respect for the emperor, which at the beginning of the war were responsible for the incredible conquests of the Japanese army and in a later phase, when the Allies had driven them into the defensive, for their equally incredible, stubborn resistance, now served a different purpose. Once again there was an appeal to the Japanese soldier’s loyalty and dedication to his emperor and his country, filling him with patriotic zeal, though now in a different way, and so the army kept up its morale.52 Besides, from a pragmatic point of view the Japanese were well aware that failure to observe the terms of surrender could hamper a smooth, early repatriation to Japan (Goto 1995:4). Consequently, as Tull (1995:87) reports with reference to the situation in Central Java in the second half of September, ‘the Japanese at this time had retained their morale. In fact, it would be true to say that their discipline in defeat was astounding.’ A report relating to China (cited by Deacon 1982:230) states that ‘probably no nation in modern times has lost a war in quite such a dignified and disciplined manner as Japan in 1945’. The ‘Japanese troops, despite the end of the war, behaved with strict discipline and efficiency’. It seems highly improbable to me that the circumstances in Surabaya were very different. Assuming that the Japanese armed forces here too kept up their morale – individual exceptions aside – as Overdijkink (1946: 65) also points out, they can only have refrained from offering stiff resistance to mounting pressure from the Indonesians to hand over their arms due to orders from higher up.

52 This patriotic zeal led the Japanese to fight with true contempt for death in the post-surrender period, as during the war. Tull (1995:101) testifies that the Japanese in Semarang ‘fought with incredible gallantry despite losses which with most troops would have been prohibitive’. I have heard of a group of Japanese advancing via Kranggan in the direction of Kauman with a view to attacking the Pavillon Hotel from the east (compare Nasution 1977:353), who made some of their number walk in the middle of the road so as to provoke the Indonesians to fire on them and thus give away their positions, so that the Japanese concealed along the road could then locate the enemy and return fire accurately. Another eyewitness told me that on the Karrenweg the Japanese exchanged fire with the Indonesians while walking in the middle of the road, without taking cover.
The surrender of the Don Bosco depot in Surabaya in fact clearly demonstrates that the Japanese here were acting on such higher orders. As I have argued elsewhere (Han Bing Siong 2001b:817-21), the Indonesian rush on Japanese arms in Surabaya, contrary to what is often suggested, did not begin until 29 September. Cases of individual Japanese being persuaded to hand over their personal arms and raids on a number of smaller posts aside, the Don Bosco depot was the Indonesians’ first major target. F.M. Parera (1982:24-9) gives an account of the successful execution of this operation by Soetomo – the well-known revolutionary leader Bung Tomo. The siege of Don Bosco according to Bung Tomo – whose account has on the whole been confirmed by others involved in this siege who were interviewed by Moehkardi (1993:72) – began in the evening (without specification of the date), to be continued the next day. *Dokumentasi Pemuda* (1948:39) says that the *pemuda* were armed with weapons seized a few hours earlier from a Japanese patrol travelling in two trucks, but Bung Tomo only mentions the presence of pointed and sharp-edged weapons (Parera 1982:24; *Sam karya* 1968:20). The besieged Japanese had taken up positions ready to open fire on the crowd (Asmadi 1985:92). Hadiman and Suparmin (1985:80) claim that they shot a few *pemuda*, but Parera does not mention any casualties. As negotiations between the Japanese and the Indonesians began peacefully, it seems very unlikely that there was any shooting. *Polisi* (1983:95) in fact asserts that the Japanese restrained themselves, though they refused to give the Indonesians their weapons, in spite of the fact that Bung Tomo, apprehensive that the Japanese would cause a bloodbath, did his utmost to persuade them to do so.

The reaction of the commander of Don Bosco was most noteworthy from our point of view. He refused to surrender his weapons because he had not yet received any order to this effect from his superiors. This clearly indicates that he was waiting for orders he expected to come from higher up. The next day he indeed announced that he had received an order from the army high command. Bung Tomo’s account in this respect corroborates the above-mentioned Captain Huyer’s report. After an incident on 19 September in which some Indonesians tore the blue band off a Dutch flag (which according to Frederick

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55 As the Japanese usually only sent small parties of maximally ten men to patrol in trucks, one should be careful not to overestimate the significance of this feat. Patrols in Semarang from 27 September onward, for instance, only comprised one officer and a few men (Semarang Keibitai:27). For a photo of such a Japanese patrol in a truck in the war years, see *Djawa Baroe* 15-1-2603.
they attempted to replace with the Indonesian flag). The Japanese abided by the terms of surrender. They intensified their patrols, posted guards along the roads, tore down pemuda posters, and prohibited the display of slogans and the holding of mass meetings. Moreover, they swiftly prepared accommodation for the Dutch women and children coming from Central Java (Enquêtecommissie 1956 8 A&B:603) and organized storage for large quantities of rice nearby. Huyer, however, could not escape the impression that East Java army commander Iwabe had had a change of mind during the night of 30 September to 1 October, and assumed that this had been on secret orders from the army high command (Enquêtecommissie 1956 8 A&B:596).

On the second day the Don Bosco commander told the Indonesians that the army high command had ordered him to continue maintaining public order. Then followed a discussion in which the Japanese asked the Indonesians whether they were ready to undertake this task. The Japanese eventually gave in after the Indonesian police chief assured them that his men would maintain law and order provided the Japanese supplied him with more arms. The Japanese granted his request, though insisting that he give them a receipt as proof to the Allies that they had surrendered their arms for peacekeeping purposes. The Japanese insistence on making this purpose clear led J.J.P. de Jong (1988:82) to conclude most astutely that the army high command order must have been prompted by a controversial statement (reproduced in Van der Wall, 1971:184, 201) made on 29 September by Allied Forces Netherlands East Indies (AFNEI) commander-in-chief Sir Philip Christison that the government of the Republic of Indonesia was to remain in charge of the civil administration in areas beyond the British-occupied areas. J.J.P. de Jong (followed by Aboe Bakar Loebis, 1995:152) concludes from this that the Japanese thereupon considered themselves discharged from the responsibility for peace and order.

There are other versions of Christison’s statement (Raliby 1953:43; Van der Wall 1971:234), however, which, as J.J.P. de Jong (1988:79) himself admits

57 NA AS 3584a:4; Van der Wal 1971-72, I:487.
58 Polisi (1983:95) gives a different explanation. According to this source, the Don Bosco commander gave in to the Indonesians after receiving a letter from the local kempeitai chief, delivered by a policeman, saying that this chief had surrendered to the Indonesians after a short battle. To my mind this account is unreliable, as the kempeitai chief had no authority over the Don Bosco commander. Besides, there are several accounts asserting that the Don Bosco siege took place before that of the kempeitai headquarters.
59 Ch.O. van der Plas suggested as early as 1956 that the Japanese surrender of their arms to the Indonesians was the gravest outcome of Christison’s declaration (Enquêtecommissie 1956 8 CII: 1390).
elsewhere, include the added provision that the Japanese should remain responsible for this as well – which detracts from the validity of J.J.P. de Jong’s argument. Groen (1991:298) also points out that Christison did not relieve the Japanese of their responsibilities.

More significant was the Don Bosco commander’s objection to a confrontation with Indonesian crowds and his insistence on negotiations with the Indonesian authorities. This was a drastic U-turn indeed. Up till then the Japanese had considered the maintenance of public order their exclusive responsibility. In point of fact, they had never officially recognized the authorities of the Republic of Indonesia as such, and would have dealings with them only if they were at the same time officials of their own Gunseikanbu (Military Administration). As President Soekarno pointed out on 29 August 1945, the relations with the Japanese authorities had a strictly personal, individual basis (Asia Raya 30-8-2605).

On 13 September the Gunseikanbu reminded the Indonesians through Soeara Asia (4-220:1) that, although some might consider the government of Java to be in Indonesian Republican hands, the Dai Nippon army was obliged to pass the administration of the country on to the Allies, so that a transfer of power to the Indonesians was out of the question. Currently all Indonesian public servants, including the police, were in the service of the Japanese military government. Christison’s statement, however, clearly implied a de facto recognition of the Republic of Indonesia, which prompted the Japanese to abandon their previous stance. In subsequent sieges the latter likewise required the presence of Indonesian officials in order to take responsibility for the arms surrendered by them to prevent their falling into the hands of irresponsible elements (Parera 1982:41). Consequently it was the Indonesian and not the Japanese authorities who were responsible for large stocks of arms to fall into the hands of guerrilla groups, which caused serious problems for many years to come.60

Frederick (1997:40) observes in a comment on J.J.P. de Jong that there is no unequivocal documentary proof. However, Army Operational Order No. 1149, issued at 10 a.m. on 3 October,61 which I managed to track down, clearly shows that the Japanese volte-face was attributable to Christison’s de facto recognition of the Indonesian government. It further shows that the

60 See Alers 1956:284-94 and Said 1997 for the 17 October 1952 affair, and Van Dijk 1981:20, 71, 81 for the resistance of the Darul Islam core until as late as 1963. Van Mook (1949:87) suggests that the guerrilla groups were formed at the time when Japanese arms became freely available. To me it seems more likely that they were formed earlier, as they were involved in the siege of the Japanese.

61 Han Bing Siong 1996:401; NIOD IC 065459:27. As Shibata informed Allied headquarters on 3 October, he had adopted a similar policy vis-à-vis his 2nd South Seas Fleet (NA AS 5204-11b).
regional commanders were simply implementing the army high command's policy rather than acting on their own authority (Han Bing Siong 1996:401). Van Poelgeest (1999:35), overlooking this piece of information, suggests that, though army headquarters forbade all arms transfers, the regional commanders either ignored or failed to receive its instructions. The said Army Operational Order No. 1149 moreover reveals that the Japanese did not consider themselves relieved of the responsibility for law and order. It still stressed the importance of maintaining public order, instructing the Japanese army to make use of the Indonesian capabilities and facilities for this purpose, while helping, supporting, and guiding the Indonesians in their efforts. Law and order in particular should be maintained by means of the Indonesian police and vigilante groups. No arms should be issued to the latter, however. The use of arms was permitted, but only in a specified number of cases.

Although the order was issued only four days after Christison's message, undoubtedly the Japanese high command, on taking cognizance of this message, immediately considered its possible implications, and probably signaled all units to await new orders, which were to follow soon. Most likely the Don Bosco commander postponed the discussions till the next day in anticipation of such new instructions. Documentasi Pemuda (1948:51) and Frederick (1989:212, 1997:41) are therefore correct in saying, contrary to the more general historiographical opinion (as cited in Han Bing Siong 2001b:821, to which should be added Moehkardi 1993:70, which has only recently become available, mentioning a date of 30 September), that the siege of the Don Bosco depot began on 29 September – the day Christison issued his order. The Japanese army units, I assume, were informed of the essence of the new order, in anticipation of its promulgation, already the next morning, and so the Don Bosco commander was able to proceed in accordance with it. He surrendered his arms to the Indonesian police, and in doing so was convinced that he was doing his duty with respect to maintenance of law and order, albeit through the Indonesian police.

According to Frederick (1997:41), who is sceptical about the effects of Christison's speech, Iwabe told Huyer late in the evening of 29 September that he had received orders to stand firm from headquarters in Jakarta. In

62 As I have pointed out before (Han Bing Siong 2001b:821), Frederick 1997 (p. 41) brings the dates mentioned in Frederick 1989 (p. 212) forward one day. According to his note 139 he opts for 29 and 30 September, however. Moehkardi 1993 (p. 70), differently from Muhkardi 1983 (p. 9), settles for 30 September in view of the report in Soeara Rakjat of 3 October about the Indonesian feats on 1 and 2 October. This source did not mention the Don Bosco success at all, however. Apparently Moehkardi, accepting Soetomo and Mohamad Mangoeindiprodojo's report that the siege lasted two days, places its start one day before the dates given in the newspaper report.
my view, however, Iwabe was also waiting for new instructions from high command at the time without saying so. He only changed attitude after becoming acquainted with the essence of the new instructions the next day.

Christison's statement in one respect came like a bolt from the blue to the Japanese. Yamamoto had advised the highest Allied commander at the time, Rear Admiral W.R. Patterson, on 21 and 23 September, that is, to recognize the Indonesian independence movement and to cooperate with the Indonesian authorities. Christison's speech led the Japanese to believe that the Allies had heeded this advice. They also expected that the British would relieve them of all their duties and permit them to leave the military arena as quickly as possible, however. Yamamoto had implied in his advice to Patterson that it was impossible for the Japanese to maintain order by force without causing bloodshed, taking into account the highly violent and ruthless way of warfare their soldiers were trained to. They realized that a massacre would be condemned by the entire international community, including the British, and so would compromise the Japanese empire and the position of the emperor. The general staff had therefore concluded that in principle the use of arms against the Indonesians should be avoided. As until October the situation in Surabaya in general remained relatively calm and stable,

63 Frederick (1997:49) refers in note 14 to NA AS 3584b as his source. I was not able to find any statement to this effect by Iwabe here, however, but only an observation that Iwabe called Huyer's position into question as he had already received the relevant orders from Rear Admiral Patterson through Batavia headquarters.

64 Not Major A.G. Greenhalgh as Hering (2002:375) asserts, erroneously citing Anderson and Dahm.

65 NA AS 5204-9, 5204-10. Although a member of the British Foreign Office judged Yamamoto's report to be one of the most impudent documents he had ever seen, it did corroborate other reports on the situation in Java which had prompted the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, Lord Mountbatten, to revise his initial policy (Dennis 1987:83, 246), as is evident from Christison's order. Drooglever (1998:4), however, questions the accuracy of Yamamoto's representation of the situation.

66 For the Ikada mass rally and the circumstances prompting Yamamoto's advice, see Han Bing Siong 2001b:815-6.

67 In other places, where the Indonesians harassed the Japanese, this policy of course made it extremely difficult for the latter to maintain law and order, or even worse, to keep their arms. In these circumstances, shooting in the air was used as a last resort. Where this did not deter the Indonesians, however, who soon found out that the Japanese were not firing at them, the Japanese could not but surrender. Presumably this gave rise to rumours of a secret agreement between the Japanese and the Indonesians that the Japanese would stage mock fights. Hatta is very explicit about this (Noer 1990:436), but Yamamoto vehemently denied entering into such an agreement (Friend 1988:219). In view of the fact that Yamamoto after the war emphasized Japanese support for the Indonesians in their armed struggle for independence, one would expect him to mention the agreement if it actually existed. Possibly the Japanese had just informed the Indonesians about the newly adopted policy of not using arms, the implications of which the Indonesians were not slow to grasp. Tirtoprodjo (1963:30-1), as cited by Reid (1974:35),
this policy had no negative consequences, and Yamamoto’s advice was reiterated on 27 September.\(^68\) To the dismay of the Japanese, Christison on the 29th ordered them instead to remain in charge of law and order for an indefinite period. Particularly alarming to them must have been the announcement that the British would only occupy two key areas in Java: Batavia and Surabaya. When could the majority of the Japanese troops, which were stationed beyond these areas, expect the Allies to come and relieve them of their duties and repatriate them to Japan? Moreover, the Japanese inferred from Christison’s speech that the Indonesians would not be disarmed, as *Soeara Rakjat* of 6 October 1945 indeed confirmed, which in their view was totally at variance with their continued responsibility for public order. Lieutenant Colonel Nomura Tetsu of army headquarters therefore contacted Captain Winter, aide-de-camp to Dutch Major General N.L.W van Straten, who referred him to Colonel Abdoel Kadir. The Japanese, arguing that Christison’s declaration made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for their army to do its duty, asked Colonel Abdoel Kadir to persuade Christison to revoke it.\(^69\) When they received no reaction from the British, they sent a letter to the British commander in Java, Major General D.C. Hawthorn, on 3 October, informing him of their newly adopted policy of support for the Indonesians and pointing out to him that maintenance of the status quo had so far only resulted in disquiet.\(^70\) The British then on 3 October summoned Yamamoto to their headquarters to give him the direct order to use arms (Miyamoto 1973:121; Remmelink 1978:59). Before they were able to enforce the implementation of this order, however, events in Surabaya took a dramatic turn and irreparable damage was done.

In view of the above reconstruction of the date on which the Indonesians began raiding Japanese depots in Surabaya as 29 September, it will be interesting to find out if this was also a direct effect of Christison’s declaration.

\(^68\) NA AS 5203.

\(^69\) NA AS 5205-36:35-6.

\(^70\) NA AS 5204-11c.
One Japanese observer states that, when the Indonesians inferred from Christison’s speech that the British would not disarm them, they tried to seize all the arms they could from the Japanese,\(^{71}\) with which J.J.P. de Jong (1988:82, 1991:92) seems to agree. Christison’s speech was not mentioned in the Indonesian newspapers in Surabaya (Soeara Rakjat) till 6 October, however (see above), and it was some time before the Indonesians realized its implications (Poeze 1998:300). The Tentara Keamanan Rakjat (Army for the People’s Security), for example, was only formed on 5 October (Koesnodiprodjo 1951:51), pursuant to President Soekarno’s announcement on 23 August that a national army would be formed as soon as international recognition was gained.\(^{72}\) As I see it, the Indonesian quest for Japanese arms was prompted by the rapidly growing tensions between the Indonesians on the one hand and the Dutch and Indos (Eurasians) on the other, as is testified by the above-mentioned flag incident. To the Indonesians the threat posed by the returning colonial regime, and consequently the urgency of acquiring arms, had become all too obvious. In view of the Japanese cooperation with the Dutch, and especially the security measures introduced by the Japanese after the flag incident, the Indonesians realized that the latter were posing a threat to them as well. Besides, the Japanese army was the only source from which the Indonesians could seize the urgently needed arms (Raliby 1952:28; Abdulgani 1975:13). The situation nonetheless remained calm after the flag incident.\(^{73}\) I believe that this was due to the myth of violence, physical prowess and supernatural powers surrounding the Japanese (B.R.O’G Anderson 1966:20), which still awed the Indonesians,\(^{74}\) although they were also increasingly determined to attack the Japanese. Interestingly, one Indonesian author suggests that the arrival in Surabaya on 29 September of C.C.J. Maassen and

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\(^{71}\) NA AS 5205-36:35, 5208c:6.

\(^{72}\) Han Bing Siong 2001b:806-7. Said (1991:12, 25) believes the reason was that Soekarno inferred from Christison’s statement that he would not be prosecuted for collaboration with the Japanese. Hering (2002:374-5) has recently posited that it was that Soekarno no longer feared Japanese reprisals, without however explaining the reason for this. Moreover, the Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang, formed on 22 (not 23) August, was not reformed and merged with the Badan Keamanan Rakjat (BKR), which in fact was part of the former.

\(^{73}\) Sukadri, Soewarno and Umiati 1991:84; Asjes 1985:116-7; Schouten 1947:119-20; Frederick 1989:201. These authors are contradicted, however, by Abdulgani 1975:13.

\(^{74}\) Several Indonesian sources (Parera 1982:17; Radjab 1977:34; Polisi 1983:93; Asmadi 1985:76; Hadiman and Suparmin 1985:33; Sukadri, Soewarno and Umiati 1991:72; Setiadijaya 1992:110) report that it was the Indonesian Resident Soedirman who rushed to the scene of the flag incident, calmed the crowd, and urged them to return home. If this is correct, then the Dutch eyewitnesses (Boer 1997:204; Broeshart et al. 2000:49; Meelhuysen 2000:73) who claim that it was the Japanese who put a stop to the incident are right in a way. Soedirman undoubtedly was afraid of trouble with the Japanese troops on the spot. On Soedirman at the Tambaksari mass rally, see Frederick 1989:199.
W.A.J. Roelofsen, who accompanied Huyer, set the ball rolling (Soewito 1994: 18). Maassen had been Resident of and Roelofsen commander of the marines in Surabaya before the Japanese conquest of Java, so that the Indonesians were convinced that they had come to prepare the re-imposition of Dutch colonial rule. The ease with which the Indonesians seized the arms from the Don Bosco depot of course encouraged them to try to do the same at other Japanese posts or quarters – successfully so (Parera 1982:29). Many arms transfers in Surabaya therefore were unattended with violence. That the Indonesians subsequently stepped up their military activities, was thus only indirectly the result of the impact of Christison’s speech on the Japanese stance. Nonetheless, up to 3 October the Indonesians in Surabaya appear to have had no large number of arms at their disposal yet (Han Bing Siong 2001b:817-21).

My assessment seems to contradict Notosusanto’s idea (1995:14) that Don Bosco was the largest arms depot and W. Meelhuijsen’s claim (2000:65) that it was even the largest in the whole of East Java – a claim not made in other Indonesian sources, however. Soera Rakjat of 3 October 1945, for instance, jubilantly reporting the feats of the Indonesians, did not mention the Don Bosco success at all. Soetomo speaks of only herpuluh-puluh pucuk senjata api (scores of firearms – not hundreds, and certainly not thousands) being captured in the Don Bosco siege (Parera 1998:29). Although it is true that the arsenal probably contained thousands of heavy and light arms, these, as R. Kadim Prawirodirdjo (1987:52) reports, were there for repairs, while some of the guns were too big for the Indonesians to handle (Notosusanto 1995: 119, 146). Indeed, Soetomo’s detailed account, as well as the accounts in most other sources, shows that when the Indonesians later stormed the kempeitai, they were mainly armed – the Indonesian special police aside – only with bamboo spears and sharp-edged weapons, which was why they suffered heavy losses. I assume that no large numbers of arms fell into Indonesian hands, as the Japanese only placed part of their arms at their disposal at the

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75 Sukadri, Soewarno and Umiati 1991:98. Hadiman and Suparmin (1985:81) only describe the fighting against the kempeitai and the naval forces in Gubeng as being fierce. Peranan TNI (1965: 70), Barlan (1990:2), and Moekhardi (1993:73-4) only mention the fighting against these two forces. Polisi (1983:98) even contends that only the kempeitai fought back. If this is true, then a statement like Abdulgani’s (1975:15) that the Indonesians in general had to fight bitterly to get hold of Japanese arms seems rather exaggerated. Saito, as cited by Gotô (1984:20), is not correct either where he mentions the kempeitai in Surabaya as an example of Japanese surrendering without resistance. For the kempe, see Soera Rakjat 7-10-1945.

various locations. After all, the Army Operational Order stipulated that the
Japanese were to remain responsible for law and order and should only offer
support to the Indonesians. A total surrender of all Japanese arms would
have been in contradiction with this order. The situation, however, suddenly
changed drastically after 3 October, when the Japanese opened the doors of
all their arms depots.

At 9 p.m. on 3 October, East Java army commander Iwabe issued Order No.
17, stating that he had surrendered to Captain Huyer at 4.30 p.m. that day and
stipulating that from that time on all Japanese army equipment was Allied
property, which absolutely nobody was to seize. The Indonesian police and
vigilante groups were assigned the task of guarding this equipment, as well
as taking care of security in general. They were responsible for protecting the
life and property of the citizens. The Japanese were prohibited from using
armed force (as had been decided already on 21 September). Arms were to
be transferred to the Indonesians strictly only for police use (Miyamoto 1973:
125). The next day the naval command issued a similar order, specifying that
arms should only be handed over to the Indonesians in critical situations and
if navy personnel were unable to convince them that the arms were Allied
property. Both these orders explicitly state that they were issued after the
Japanese surrender to Huyer. They marked a drastic departure indeed from
the above-discussed Army Operational Order No. 1149 and the order issued
by Shibata on 1 October instructing the navy to perform its duty by force
of arms if necessary, and the Japanese no longer considered themselves
responsible for law and order, while they were to hand over all their arms to
the Indonesian authorities (Han Bing Siong 2001a:185-6).

Christison made the Japanese surrender public a few weeks later, after a
humiliating defeat suffered by his forces in Surabaya and the assassination of
Brigadier A.W.S. Mallaby (Van der Wal 1971-72, I:407; Keesing:6492). On the
basis of Japanese reports, he censured Huyer for his unlawful demand to the
Japanese to surrender, as a result of which huge numbers of arms had fallen
into Indonesian hands, enabling them to resist the British forces successfully.
He enclosed copies of a message from Huyer to Patterson, which stated:
'Personally accepted surrender Admiral and General on behalf of Supreme
Allied Command and put both HQ under my comm. with Indonesian police

77 As, for example, the naval base in Gubeng (NIOD IC 006962; Shibata 1986:358) and the
naval dockyard (NIOD IC 006973). The Ohara Battalion only surrendered a hundred weapons
78 NIOD IC 006964.
79 NIOD IC 006960.
80 NA AS 3584c.
guard’, as well as of a letter from Patterson saying that Huyer should not issue any orders to the Japanese, but should inform him if there was a need for these, in which case he would issue the necessary directives.

Huyer replied in his defence that he had had no time to ask Patterson for orders. He had indeed used this argument when Iwabe pointed out to him that the surrender demanded by Huyer should be submitted to army headquarters for approval (see the sources mentioned in note 86). Besides, Patterson’s last message to him had read: ‘Don’t ask, do!’ and ‘This is to your personal discretion’. Huyer had pointed out to the Japanese that their surrender would only be a mock surrender. Another report informs us that the reason for Huyer’s action was that Indonesian Resident Soedirman and his local National Committee had agreed to leave both the Japanese headquarters and the naval aviation yards and airfield to him if Iwabe and Shibata surrendered to the Allies. Huyer moreover argued that the Japanese had started yielding to the Indonesians on 1 October and that the Indonesians had already taken over everything, the earlier mentioned exceptions aside, at the time of the mock surrender. Dutch Vice Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich totally repudiated Christison’s criticism of Huyer on the basis of the latter’s report, and even praised him. He called Patterson’s counter-message to mind, also pointing out that Huyer had tried to prevent a further aggravation of the situation by staging the Japanese mock surrender only after the actual arms surrender to the Indonesians. Yong Mun Cheong (1982:227), however, points out that there is no record, interestingly enough, of support from Lieutenant Governor General Van Mook for Huyer during the discussions with Lord Mountbatten. Perhaps Van Mook also realized that Huyer’s acceptance of the Japanese surrender had been a mistake.

Eventually Lord Mountbatten decided to take no further action in this matter, and accordingly said nothing about it in his report on his post-surrender tasks (Mountbatten 1969). Presumably all the relevant official records were destroyed, as Woodburn Kirby (1969:322) could find none. Nonetheless, this authoritative source with a view of the recollections of Christison (see Christison’s memoirs, p. 178), like most other English sources, put the

81 NA AS 3584d.
83 NA AS 3584f; Helfrich 1950:266.
84 NA AS 3584g.
The building of the former Handelsvereeniging Amsterdam where captain Huyer single handedly urged the Japanese Major General Iwabe to surrender with all its fatal consequences (Broeshart et al. 2000:104)
blame for the large number of arms in the possession of the Indonesians in Surabaya squarely on Huyer.

As far as I have been able to discover, most Dutch authors other than Helfrich, conspicuously but not surprisingly, keep silent on the Huyer incident by contrast. It was not till 1954 that one Dutch author, Zorab (1954:124), expressed agreement with Christison's view, though without explaining why he rejected Huyer's arguments. Then, in the course of a parliamentary enquiry into the Dutch government's policy in 1940-1945 held in 1956, the Huyer incident became the subject of interrogations under oath. In the enquiry committee's view, Huyer had been wrong in staging the Japanese surrender in Surabaya without having the necessary authority for this and moreover without the necessary troops to take the Japanese arms. As the Indonesian authorities were not in control of the various Indonesian guerrilla groups, there had been no one there with sufficient authority to maintain law and order. Moreover, Huyer had not achieved his objective. Nonetheless, the committee concluded that the Dutch role in the context of the disastrous developments in Surabaya was of only minor significance. Those who were to blame were the British and the Japanese – the former because they were unable to dispatch sufficient troops to the city in time, and the latter because they could have maintained order if they had wanted to (Enquêtecommissie 1956 8 A&B:712).

In the Netherlands a parliamentary enquiry is a highly valued instrument for finding out the real facts and unearthing the truth. It is therefore very exceptional that Remmelink (1978:59-61), despite the findings of this enquiry and notwithstanding his own views on the effects of the putative Japanese self-internment policy, should hold Huyer responsible for the fact that the Indonesians at one stroke gained control over 30,000 Japanese troops and acquired more than half the arms and equipment of the future Indonesian army. Although Parrott (1975:89-90) is also of the opinion that Huyer played a vital role in this, he claims that the latter's version of events is for the greater part corroborated by Japanese accounts – contradicting those contemporary observers who tend to dismiss the Huyer report as an unreliable document because of its supposedly pro-Dutch bias. Remmelink, on the other hand, discovered a few incongruities between the two versions on studying the report of Iwabe's staff officer Tanaka, as authorized by Iwabe,86 which presumably influenced his view of the course of events. The records consulted

86 Reproduced in Miyamoto (1973:122-4), with an Indonesian translation in Setiadijaya (1992: 116-8) and a Dutch translation in Meelhuysen (2000:109). Meelhuysen's translation is incorrect in the final part, where it contradicts the given that the Japanese forces were instructed not to use force and told that the surrender of arms and so on, as well as any subsequent problems, were the responsibility of the Indonesians.
by Zorab and Remmelink led the keeper of these records at NIOD, J. Zwaan (1985:103, 144), as well to agree with the British view. Perhaps because Remmelink did not analyse the parliamentary committee’s report closely, Drooglever was the second Dutch author after Helfrich to conclude, in the third thesis accompanying his De Vaderlandse Club (1980), that the facts as we know them do not corroborate B.R.O’G. Anderson’s view (1972:153) that the Japanese surrender to Huyer was a major factor responsible for the Surabaya crisis. Subsequently J.J.P. de Jong (1988:84) put forward the argument in favour of Drooglever’s thesis that the Indonesians had already seized the Japanese arms before Huyer’s action anyway. A similar view to that of Zorab, Remmelink, and Zwaan was put forward by H.W. van den Doel (2000:99, 357), although he warned against overrating the impact of Huyer’s action. Meelhuijsen (2000:113-4) objected to the criticism of Huyer in Han Bing Siong (1996:413) – according to H. Meijer (2001) very convincingly, but in my view not convincingly at all (Han Bing Siong 2001a:185), as he merely repeats the view disputed by me without adding any evidence undermining my arguments. Due to the lack of information about the Japanese battalions outside Surabaya, he moreover fails to understand the thrust of the principal argument against Huyer as set out below. Lastly, Meelhuijsen has not studied his Indonesian sources very closely.

As regards English sources, Ricklefs (2001:266) is the first author, as far as I know, to be cautious enough not to suggest a causal connection between Huyer’s conduct and the large-scale Japanese arms transfers. Reid and Oki Akira (1986:363) are the first non-Dutch authors to oppose B.R.O’G. Anderson’s view, followed by Frederick (1989:218, 267, 1997:41), who absolves Huyer of all responsibility, assuming that an enormous stockpile of weapons had already passed to the Indonesians in Surabaya before the Japanese surrender to Huyer, namely between 2 September and 2 October.

As stated above, the parliamentary enquiry committee assessed Huyer’s action on 3 October to have been of only minor importance for the subsequent course of events in Surabaya. In other words, it did not make much difference. Obviously this assessment was based on the supposition that most Japanese had handed over their arms to the Indonesians before Huyer staged the Japanese surrender. This indeed was the argument advanced by Huyer himself and all his supporters, and it probably was the reason for Mountbatten not to take any further steps against Huyer. A member of Huyer’s team, Lieutenant Commander P.G. de Back, confirmed that the Japanese had already been disarmed and taken prisoner.87

The question to be answered here, therefore, is whether this supposition in general is borne out by the facts. To begin with one incongruence discovered

87 NA AS 3584a:3; Van der Wal 1971-72, I:487.
by Remmelink (1979:60), Huyer did not mention that Iwabe objected to his remark that the Japanese had lost their military strength. Iwabe had referred to his headquarters with its staff of 307\(^8^8\) and to the Ohara Battalion, both of which were still intact and in possession of their weapons (Miyamoto 1973:122), as constituting the army garrison’s main battle strength in Surabaya. Another source (Suzuki 1984:119-20) confirms this by saying that the Indonesians only disarmed the 1,200-strong Ohara Battalion around 10 October. In view of all this, Iwabe’s remark to my mind indicated that he was still ready to stand firm. Besides, the strong naval base force in Gubeng had surrendered only a proportion of its arms at the time,\(^8^9\) while the arms of the naval dockyard\(^9^0\) were only removed on 5 October, after Shibata’s order, issued after his surrender to Huyer, was received (see above). As Shibata regretfully remarks,\(^9^1\) some naval buildings and other property still remained to be raided after his surrender. Another example is the surrender of an army technical unit as late as 10 October (Zeni T.N.I. 1971:26; Setiadijaya 1992:171). Asmadi (1985:105) and Setiadijaya (1992:182) report, moreover, that after the occupation of the kempeitai headquarters one company of fully armed Japanese remained in the building, only to be disarmed and removed on 4 October, pursuant to Iwabe’s order. Undoubtedly there were many more similar examples.

Frederick (1989:229, note 166), in an attempt to substantiate his view that the Indonesians seized an enormous stockpile of weapons in Surabaya already before 3 October, refers to among others Woodburn Kirby, who provides a detailed list of about 31,000 weapons. This list refers to the total quantity of arms surrendered by the Japanese in the whole of Central and East Java, and not only in Surabaya, however. Moreover, as it is mentioned in the context of reviews of the situation prepared by Mountbatten on 21 November (Woodburn Kirby 1969:330), it covers the entire period up to 21 November, and is not restricted to the period of 2 September to 2 October.

Eventually the Indonesians succeeded in seizing about 24,826 weapons, including those of the navy, in the whole of East Java (Miyamoto 1973:347, 1986:339-40). This was only after the Ohara Battalion in Surabaya, the Ōkubo Battalion in Besuki, the Katagiri Battalion in Malang (though Frederick says

\(^8^8\) NA AS 5205-33c:54.
\(^8^9\) NIOD IC 006962. Shibata (1986:358) also says this, but on p. 361 alleges, in contradiction with his above-mentioned report, that the Indonesians began plundering the naval base force barracks on 3 October. Shibata, when forced to leave Surabaya on 26 October, contemplated making a dash for the nearby naval base, which suggests that its force was still intact and armed even then.
\(^9^0\) NIOD IC 006973, confirmed by NIOD IC 006964.
\(^9^1\) NIOD IC 006965.
differently\textsuperscript{92}), and the Mase Battalion in Surakarta had obeyed their commanding general's order. If the parliamentary committee had been more alert and given more attention to the presence of these battalions outside the city and the disastrous effects of their surrender, it would certainly have rejected Huyer's argument that all the Japanese had been disarmed already before he accepted Iwabe's and Shibata's surrender. It should have known about the presence of these forces, as Huyer himself mentioned them in his defence, be it in the context of his explanation that he had ordered Iwabe to let these troops outside Surabaya fight to the bitter end,\textsuperscript{93} which probably distracted the committee's attention. Although contrary to Huyer's intention, the mock surrender of the East Java army commander resulted in a huge arms surrender by all four battalions subordinate to him. Contrary to the parliamentary committee, I therefore believe Huyer’s interference to have been a factor of decisive importance for the capture of the huge number of arms by the Indonesians in East Java, and thus also for the dramatic course of subsequent events. Even if Huyer and De Back were correct (which they definitely were not) in alleging that most Japanese arms had already been seized by the Indonesians in Surabaya at the time of Huyer’s request to Iwabe and Shibata to surrender, the fact remains that the Japanese garrisons outside Surabaya were still fully armed at the time. The effect of the surrender of the East Java army commander stage-managed by Huyer was that all subordinate battalions were compelled to surrender as well. With the arms they had thus acquired, the Indonesians were subsequently able to put other Japanese units in Central Java under pressure, and eventually to fight the Battle of Semarang,\textsuperscript{94} as well as the two battles against the British in Surabaya.\textsuperscript{95}

It is important to note in this connection that these four battalions did not comply with Iwabe's order immediately. As we saw above, Colonel Ohara's battalion in Surabaya kept its arms till 10 October. Colonel Ōkubo in Besuki on 4 October objected to Iwabe's decision, warning of the dangers of an arms transfer,\textsuperscript{96} while his troops even turned out still to have some of their arms on their repatriation from Java.\textsuperscript{97} Colonel Katagiri in Malang (whose

\textsuperscript{92} Frederick (1997:41), citing Sudarno, says that the Japanese in Malang surrendered late in the evening of 3 October, thus suggesting that this took place simultaneously with and not as a consequence of Iwabe's surrender to Huyer. According to Sudarno (1993:181-2), however, the Malang garrison surrendered its arms only the next day.

\textsuperscript{93} NA AS 3584d:2, 3584e:3; Enquêtecommissie 1956 8 A&B:597.

\textsuperscript{94} NIOD IC 065451, 007154.

\textsuperscript{95} For a summary, see Han Bing Siong 2000:248-65.

\textsuperscript{96} Miyamoto 1973:125; Remmelink 1979;60; see also Sukadri, Soewarno and Umiati 1991:90.

\textsuperscript{97} Van Delden (1993:52). She alleges that the Japanese in Semarang had given up half their equipment to the Indonesians in exchange for food. According to Scholtens, however, they purchased fresh vegetables, meat, eggs and fruit for the Dutch women and children in the camps, and only at a later stage obtained such foodstuffs in exchange for cloth from their own stocks (NIOD IC 055795b:16; see Han Bing Siong 1996:411).
battalion had been instrumental in the suppression of the PETA rebellion in Blitar earlier that year) only surrendered on 4 October, after the Indonesians showed him a special order from Iwabe, for which they had had to travel to Surabaya.\footnote{Nasution 1977:378-9; Hadiman and Suparmin 1985:39-40; Sukadri, Soewarno and Umiati 1991:91; Sudarno 1993:181-2.} A very exceptional position was taken by Colonel Mase in Surakarta, who promised the Central Java RAPWI commander that he would keep his arms and maintain order provided his unit was transferred from the East Java army command to the Central Java one, which at that stage was still intact. The Central Java RAPWI commander accordingly submitted a proposal to this effect to his superiors on 7 October.\footnote{NA AS 5204-7:2.} Meanwhile Mase kept the Indonesians with their demands in check, and apparently was successful in this till 13 October.\footnote{Merdeka 16-10-1945; Sedjarah TNI 1968:33. According to B.R.O’G. Anderson (1972:144) and Djatikoesoemo (as interviewed by Bouman, 1995:213), Mase and the Indonesians agreed on an arms transfer on 3 October, while according to Partokusumo (1993:9-10) and Pour (1993:65) they did so on the 5th, which, in view of Iwabe’s order of the 3rd, received on the 4th (NA AS 5208d), is more plausible. Sumantri (1966:62) even asserts that the negotiations took place after the attack on the kempeitai on the 13th. However that may be, Mase apparently delayed the actual surrender of arms and kept the Indonesians in suspense till the 13th. Van Bruggen and Wassing (1998:72) claim that the Mase Battalion had gone into voluntary internment on the 6th. Mase still conferred with the Central Java RAPWI commander on the 7th, however, who then submitted a proposal to detach the Mase Battalion from the East Java Command (see also Schouten 1947:100). According to Van Bruggen and Wassing, it was reported by a Dutch observer that the fighting in Solo was simply mock fighting – is this another example of the typical Dutch bias? It would seem to me that mock fighting had become quite superfluous by this time, as Iwabe’s order of 3 October provided for his troops’ handing over their arms to the Indonesians. Partokusumo reports that the fighting was the result of a disagreement about how the transfer should take place.} As there was no reaction from the British high command, the Mase Battalion eventually turned over its arms and left for Tampir in the mountains on 15 October.\footnote{NAAS 5208d:3.} In view of the position taken with regard to disarmament by the battalions of the East Java army command (which did not withdraw into voluntary internment at all, incidentally), it is obvious that they were ready to fight. Therefore the course of events might have been entirely different if Huyer had not interfered.

The parliamentary committee was insufficiently alert with regard to Huyer’s arguments in another respect as well. According to Huyer’s testimony, he had repeatedly pointed out to Iwabe that he had no authority whatsoever to give him orders.\footnote{NAAS 3584e:1A, 1B; Enquêtecommissie 1956 8 A&B:595-7.} How, then, could he have ordered Iwabe to instruct the garrisons in the interior to fight? How could Iwabe have been expected to obey such an order that was issued without authority? The
Japanese accounts in point of fact say nothing about such alleged orders. Why did the committee not ask for the relevant NIOD records and Zorab’s study (1954) and did it only consult Wehl’s account (1948)? It is totally incomprehensible that it omitted to summon Huyer’s interpreter, A.F.P. Hulsewé, who was the only other non-Japanese present at the discussions with Iwabe and Shibata, to testify, seeing that accurate translations were crucial. As Hulsewé was a professor at Leyden University at the time of the parliamentary enquiry, he was certainly available.

Since Huyer was not empowered by the Allies to give orders to the Japanese, he stressed in his interview with Iwabe and Shibata that their surrender was to be only a mock surrender. Hence it was in no way his intention to relieve the Japanese of their responsibility for law and order. The orders issued by Iwabe and Shibata indicate, however, that they took the surrender seriously. As it turned out, Iwabe and his staff only learned from Huyer on 5 October that they had misinterpreted him (Miyamoto 1973:126; Remmelink 1979:60). The naval order of 4 October 1945 announced that Shibata had gone through ‘the procedure of formally surrendering’. Only afterwards, in 1946, did Shibata concede that Huyer had proposed a surrender ‘only as a matter of form’, to ignore this altogether again later in his book (Shibata 1986:362). Most regrettably Shibata’s interrogators in 1946 omitted to summon Huyer for a confrontation with him. Possibly the Japanese did not understand the meaning of the expression ‘pro forma’ at the time. Of course it is also possible that they tricked Huyer, though Iwabe’s objection that his army was still up to full strength in my opinion indicates the opposite. Could Hulsewé’s translations perhaps have been of a similar standard to those at Kalijati during the surrender negotiations, on 8 March 1942, when he was replaced by a Japanese interpreter? After all, he was a Sinologist rather than a Japanologist. The committee should have looked into this, but omitted to do so.

My conclusion, after examining the transcripts of the interrogations, is that it was irrelevant to the committee that Huyer only had a mock surrender in mind. What it was interested in was its effects. The chairman of the committee, Algera, three times repeated the question whether the surrender had in fact resulted in a power vacuum, with nobody left to keep order, and thus had aggravated the situation (Enquêtecommissie 1956 8 CII:1510, 1513), to which Helfrich gave unsatisfactory replies. Committee member Van Lier

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103 NIOD IC 006964.
104 NIOD IC 006963.
105 Bijkerk 1974:218; L. de Jong 1984:10. Frederick (1989:202) was told that Hulsewé was an interpreter at the talks between the Dutch Governor of East Java and the Japanese commander of the 48th Division at Sidoardjo, also in March 1942.
also tried to elicit a satisfactory answer by remarking that Huyer had made it impossible for the Japanese commanders to maintain law and order precisely by getting them to surrender. This time Helfrich admitted that, although it would have been possible to accept a surrender while at the same stipulating that the surrendering party should keep law and order, this would have been risky (*Enquêtecommissie* 1956 8 A&B:605). There was yet another flaw in Huyer’s arguments, however. He said he had staged the mock surrender because the Indonesian authorities had agreed to leave him the remaining Japanese military objects, provided the Japanese commanders would surrender to him. But, to underline how critical the situation was, he had twice stated that the Indonesian authorities had lost all control and that Surabaya was wholly in the power of the mobs (*Enquêtecommissie* 1956 8 A&B:596). The parliamentary committee took good note of this. If the Indonesian authorities had lost all control, then how could the arrangement have been expected to work? How could a take-over of the remaining Japanese objects by the *pemuda* have been prevented? It was a foregone conclusion that the mock surrender could only end in disaster. Huyer had had absolutely no Allied troops at his disposal and was there with only five associates. Doulton (1951:252) describes it not only as dangerous, but also as a lamentable act of stupidity. In my eyes, therefore, Huyer’s action was highly reprehensible. No wonder the committee observed in its report that there had been no authority left to maintain law and order in Surabaya due to it (see above). That it nonetheless concluded that the Dutch role in the disastrous events in Surabaya was of only minor significance is absolutely incomprehensible – as though creating a power vacuum was not an extremely serious matter. Although the committee could not have known it, Huyer’s action was the more reprehensible as it obstructed the implementation of the British order to the Japanese to use force in Surabaya.

Van den Doel (2000:357) warns against overrating the impact of Huyer’s behaviour. As on 3 October the Indonesians were already on the winning side, they would eventually have seized all Japanese arms anyway, even without Huyer, in his opinion. I hope that in this article I have proved the contrary to be true, for three reasons. Firstly, the Japanese could not have declared themselves to have been relieved of all their duties, in either good or bad faith, without Huyer. Secondly, the main force of their army was still intact and, if necessary, it could have been reinforced with the troops from the outer areas. As I have suggested elsewhere (Han Bing Siong 1996:413), without the mock surrender it would still have been possible for the four battalions to take independent action (see my remarks above) if the Indonesians had captured their commanding general. This is exactly what happened in Semarang. Thirdly, the Japanese did not turn over all their arms. Without Huyer’s intervention, the arms transfer would therefore have taken place
much more slowly and on a much smaller scale, as in West and Central Java. In that case it would still have been possible for the British high command to put the Japanese under pressure to implement its order and keep control by force (see note 67). This brings us to another oversight of Huyer’s which the committee overlooked: he should have sent news of the first Indonesian actions to Patterson immediately on observing these three or four days earlier.

I was surprised to find that the committee’s questioning (Enquetecommissie 1956 8 CII:1050-1053) was often insufficiently alert and probing. It even let Huyer fob it off with his written report of 1945, instead of requiring straight answers from him. A parliamentary enquiry in my view should be mainly an oral cross-examination, however, checking the degree of truthfulness of the 1945 report. Incredible also was the committee’s tolerance of Huyer’s quite coarse, almost rude language.

A former classmate of Huyer’s described him as ‘quite a character’ (Squire 1979:127). Hulsewé dubbed him a *bek op poten*, or loudmouth (Remmelink, personal communication 9 March 2000). And there are reports that in later years he displayed such strange behaviour that he attracted the attention of judicial and customs officials. In the 1950s he had the nerve to accept an appointment as professor of physics and applied mechanics at the University of Liberia. Later he became a senior official with the patent office (Van ‘t Haaff and Klaassen 1954:248). He seems to have been something of a braggart with a strong inclination to bluff and recklessness. I believe it quite possible that he deliberately failed to keep Patterson informed of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Surabaya and saw it as a golden opportunity to play the hero and show himself the sole master of the situation. He did in fact play a key role, albeit in quite a different way from what he intended.

It is interesting to see that most Indonesian sources keep silent about the Japanese surrender to Huyer. Only two decades later, when the NIOD records became accessible to them, did a few Indonesian sources mention the Huyer incident. Abdulgani (1975:18), although he studied these records, simply says that Huyer tried to seize control as well as arms from the Japanese as a prelude to a Dutch reoccupation of Surabaya. This is understandable in view of his tendency to deny that the Indonesians obtained Japanese arms without difficulty. An obvious reason for Abdulgani’s slant is that he was a member of the local National Committee branch which agreed to let Huyer keep both the Japanese headquarters and the naval airfield. *Sam karya* (1968:35-6) and Asmadi (1985:119) likewise mention Huyer simply to show how the British deprecated him for accepting a surrender in the absence of any troops of his own, without disclosing that large quantities of weapons and equipment fell

106 NA PG 384.
into Indonesian hands due to this surrender. Notosusanto (1995:20), citing Shibata’s report, states that, due to the surrender, Huyer became responsible for the Japanese arms and depots, which, however, the pemuda went on seizing – implying that the Indonesians achieved this independently of Huyer’s action. This is what Frederick (1997:41) in fact also posits, saying that the decisive factor was the pressure built up by the Indonesians, which the Japanese were unable to withstand. Without detracting from the Indonesian achievements, I would argue that the pemuda were only able to continue their actions undisturbed because the Japanese let them without offering resistance, as they had been ordered by their commanders in view of the Japanese surrender to Huyer.\footnote{Drooglever (1998:16) overlooks this in his similar comment on Frederick.} Had their orders been different, the outcome would have been completely different. As Frederick (1997:50, note 21) concedes, this indeed was the case in Bandung and Semarang.

Iwa Kusuma Sumantri (1966:79-80), on the other hand, does not shrink from quoting an English text according to which in Surabaya control was exercised by the Indonesians as a result of the surrender of the Japanese on the orders of a Dutch naval captain who had no forces at his disposal. Setiadijaya (1990:2-3) is surprisingly outspoken, saying that control of Japanese arms and military equipment passed to the Indonesians without a blow being struck (with the kempeitai and the naval base force in Gubeng as the only exceptions) as a result of Huyer’s blunder. He repeats this (Setiadijaya 1992:157) in his account of how the Indonesian commander, Moestopo\footnote{Achmad (1990:20-2) strangely enough, says that it was R.M. Jonosewojo.} took over Iwabe’s headquarters. Hence it is not true that Indonesian sources, as Meelhuijsen (2000:114) asserts, make no mention at all of the impact of Huyer’s unauthorized action. Setiadijaya (1992:153, 269), though able to read Dutch, writes that the Japanese surrender to Huyer was a formal one rather than pro forma. His remark that Huyer, to prevent the Indonesians’ seizing both Japanese headquarters, attempted to intimidate Soedirman, who, however, was quite a different personality from Moestopo, is also very interesting, implying as it does that Moestopo simply ignored Soedirman’s agreement with Huyer and that Soedirman indeed had no control over the Indonesian militants. As far as I have been able to discover, this is the only reference in the Indonesian historiography to the arrangement between Huyer and Soedirman and the local branch of the National Committee (of which Abdulgani, among others, was a member). Most Indonesian authors omit to mention the Huyer incident for a number of obvious reasons. In the first place, this would reveal that the Indonesians in Surabaya obtained Japanese arms with very little trouble. Secondly, to the Indonesians any accommodation with the Dutch in military matters is shameful, if not tantamount to treason, unless it is represented in
terms of a trap – which they would then certainly have found it worth mentioning, so that their silence on this point proves that there was no question of a trap. Indonesian historians should be applauded for not distorting the facts.

For the sake of completeness, we should consider Soeara Rakjat of 3 October 1945, which seemingly corroborates Huyer’s controversial view of the situation in Surabaya. It exultantly announced that after two successive days of action all office buildings, utilities, barracks, harbour installations and the airfield had fallen to the Indonesians and the Japanese had been disarmed or incarcerated. One of the military objects surrendered by them was the East Java army headquarters. The Tōbu Bōei-taicho (East Java army commander) had already decided to surrender all power to the Indonesians, who had entered into negotiations with the kempeitai commander and Iwabe in the kempeitai building the day before (that is, 2 October), after the fighting against the kempeitai, which was fiercest in Surabaya. It was thereupon decided that the Japanese would hand over everything to the Indonesians, which would henceforth take all necessary measures to maintain law and order.

This newspaper report contradicts Huyer’s story in one respect: Iwabe according to it surrendered to the Indonesians on 2 October, whereas Huyer claimed that he asked Iwabe to surrender to him on the 3rd. Could Huyer perhaps have been tricked by Iwabe, Soedirman and the local branch of the National Committee? When we read Moestopo’s account (as cited by Setiadijaya, 1992:153-7), it turns out that after Moestopo’s official acceptance of the surrender, Iwabe was taken to the Jaarmarkt (according to Miyamoto (1973:127) this was in the eastern part of the city) past a police guard of honour lining the roads, implying that actually he was detained by the Indonesians. But in that case, how could he possibly have received Huyer the next day to be persuaded by the latter to surrender for a second time?

Immediately after Iwabe’s surrender, Moestopo approached Shibata for a repetition of the same procedure. However, Rear Admiral Mori Takeo only surrendered the naval yards on Shibata’s behalf on 7 October (Angkatan Laut 1973:719; Setiadijaya 1992:176). If Shibata had already surrendered on the 2nd, a surrender by a subordinate on the 7th would have been absolutely superfluous. Sukadri, Soewarno and Umiati (1991:88-90, 95-6) in fact describe Mori’s surrender as the surrender of the Japanese navy, which was immediately preceded by that of the army on 7 October.

Notosusanto (1995:15) discusses Moestopo’s actions leading up to Iwabe’s surrender prior to the surrender to Huyer but after the capture of the Morokrembangan airfield, though he mentions no dates.109 This airfield was

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precisely one of the objects Huyer wanted to save by means of the mock surrender arrangement, however, so the Indonesians had not yet seized it when he accepted Iwabe’s surrender. In point of fact, the airfield was taken only on 5 October (Setiadijaya 1992:180; Nasution 1977:376). Huyer in fact informed the Semarang RAPWI commander, Wishart, who visited him on 5 October, that the Indonesians were wholly under control (Schouten 1947:121), implying that everything was going as he, Huyer, had planned. He spoke too soon, however, as appeared two days later.

Both the Indonesian newspaper Soeara Rakjat of 8 October 1945 and the Japanese sources confirm that the army and navy headquarters in Surabaya surrendered to the Indonesians on 7 October. Highly relevant in this context is Gani’s (1984:68) account of the effect of this surrender. The quantity of arms of the Japanese East Java Command headquarters falling into Indonesian hands was so enormous that a column of lorries stretching from the headquarters in the Handelsvereeniging Amsterdam building to the Taman Hiburan Rakjat (presumably the former Jaarmarkt) was needed to carry them away. This supports my argument that the Indonesians succeeded in seizing huge numbers of arms only after Huyer had arranged the Japanese commanders’ surrender on 3 October. It is also obvious that the dispatch of trainloads of arms by the Indonesians in Surabaya to other areas must have taken place after that.

The newspaper article of 3 October, on close analysis, appears to include a report of the negotiations between the pemuda and the Japanese, which culminated in an agreement that the Japanese merely would hand over everything to the Indonesians. According to it, the East Java army commander had taken the decision to surrender all power, but it does not say that power as well as arms had actually already been surrendered. In my view it does not corroborate Huyer’s claims in any way, therefore.

In fact, the report deals largely with the fighting against the kempeitai. As the Indonesians regarded the latter’s headquarters as the ultimate symbol of Japanese power in Surabaya, its capitulation marked the high point of their victory over the Japanese (Hardjosoediro 1987:64; Notsusanto 1995:17-8), as well as the end of the Japanese military regime (Setiadijaya 1992:1985:93) claims that all this took place on 24 September, which to my mind is impossible. Iwabe’s surrender to Moestopo was in accord with the former’s own order No. 17 of 3 October 1945, issued after his surrender to Huyer.

NA AS 5208c:6; Miyamoto 1973:127.
Notsusanto (1995:15) and Soewito (1994:24) give the impression that the arms seized from the Don Bosco depot were dispatched immediately after the capture of this depot, but Parera says nothing about this. Moehkadri (1993:73) explains, however, that they were dispatched kemudian, or later on.
132). Probably this is why the newspaper was so jubilant, exaggerating the Indonesian successes and so creating the impression that Huyer’s version of events was correct. Another reason for the newspaper’s over-optimism was perhaps the news of a talk between Moestopo and Iwabe on 2 October. Iwabe here advised Moestopo in matters in connection with Indonesian independence and the maintenance of law and order (Miyamoto 1973:117), presumably in light of Army Operational Order No. 1149, which was expected to be issued soon. As explained above, this order instructed the Japanese army to support the Indonesians and to ensure the maintenance of law and order through the Indonesian police and vigilante groups.

It will be clear, therefore, that Dutch historians are as suspicious and sceptical of the motives of the Japanese army in the post-surrender period as they are tolerant and credulous with regard to those of their own fellow-countrymen. As for the Huyer incident, the 1956 parliamentary enquiry, like a number of other enquiries, was insufficiently thorough, failing as it did to hear all the persons concerned or take note of all the testimonies recorded in the available documents. It therefore failed to lay bare all the facts.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank M.J.L. van Yperen for editing this article.

ABBREVIATIONS USED

AFNEI  Allied Forces Netherlands East Indies.
BKR  Badan Keamanan Rakjat (Indonesian Organization for the People’s Security).
IWM  Imperial War Museum, London.
NA AS  Nationaal Archief, The Hague, records of the former Algemene Secretarie.
NIOD IC  Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Indische Collectie.
PETA  Pembela Tanah Air (Indonesian Army for the Defence of the Fatherland, established by the Japanese in 1943).
RAPWI  Recovery Allied Prisoners of War and Internees
SEAC  South East Asia Command.
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