BIJLAGEN

BEHOORENDE TOT HET ARTIKEL

Raffles' Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819.

DOOR

P. H. VAN DER KEMP.

Bijl. 1 noot *a* bl. 159. Brief van den sultan van Atjeh dd. 7 November 1786 aan den gouv.-gen. van Bengalen:

This letter is sent from your friend sultan Munson, son of sultan Ziemul Abudeen, (*a*) to you, who are a valuable and noble friend, and who are known to Hindostan and Arabia. God grant you long life and preserve you from the distresses of the world. I received your letter by the hands of captain Steven, and understand its contents. The articles which accompanied it, as per annexed list, I also received. My heart was gladdened by the arrival of your letter — my arrival with you is not far off — may our mutual friendship last for ever. I am very desirous of this interview and of a lasting friendship with the English. I wrote an answer by captain Hobbs and was desirous of lasting friendship. But fate ordered to captain Hobbs that when he had sailed two days from Tringano, a classy from Java (*b*) wounded him while he was asleep. Captain Hobbs then returned to Tringano, and died after 5 of 6 days, and my letters were delayed, because I did not meet with any one that I could entrust with my letters for you which could maintain our friendship. You will ask captain Glass, captain Thomas and Mr. John Bird, who are acquainted with my affairs, and with my intention towards you. The muskets which you sent me, as mentioned in your

(*a*) Deze zal dan dezelfde moeten zijn, die in Veth's „Atchin" (1873) bl. 66 genoemd is Alaoe'd-din Mahmoed Shah Djohan; in 1781 op den troon gekomen, overleed hij in 1795.

(*b*) *Classy* w. z. een matroos. Zie Hobson-Jobson's „Glossary of Anglo-Indian Colloquial words etc." (1886). — In de verzameling ligt ook een brief van den vorst van Trengano aan den gouv.-gen. te Calcutta John Macpherson dd. 24 Februari 1787, waarin hij diens vriendschap inroept tegen de Hollanders.

letter, from not being worth anything, I have returned, and request in future you will send me such as may be useful, or I do not want any, though I ask you for 300 small muskets agreeable to a muster I send by Mr. John Bird after the death of captain Hobbs. Mr. John Bird was desirous of sailing with the effects of the deceased. I opposed this, because captain Hobbs left no such orders with me; afterwards captain Canning and Mr. Phillips etc. came to me, and I consulted them respecting the effects of captain Hobbs, and they unanimously desired me to deliver them to Mr. John Bird, and give him his discharge to take them to Bengal when captain Canning etc. gave him a letter notifying that I had given him permission to depart with them — advise and the good and bad is on Mr. John Bird (a). These articles were for Java and not for Bengal, Mr. John Bird sold these articles, and took in exchange goods for Bengal from me. He has done this himself, and has occasioned a loss upon the goods of 3891 Koors. This notice I give you, and prove the circumstance to you, my sole intention and desire is to maintain a friendship with you, and that you may continue to write me letters. I request you will fix on some one to send to me; you are doubtless so that I may ask him about all matters. Dated at twelve o'clock at night of the 14th. of Junadecul Jama in the year 125 (?). This letter was written in haste; I hope your favor to forgive, and not to perceive my faults."

Bijl. 2 noot b bl. 165. Raffles' brief aan den gouvernementssecretaris te Calcutta, gedagteekend Calcutta 31 December 1819 luidde aldus:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th August (which has only recently come into my possession) stating that in the copy of the letter addressed by the Governor in Council of Prince of Wales' Island to the Court of Directors of the 1st July 1819 there is the following passages:

«We had as full a knowledge of the instructions of the «Supreme Government on those matters as Sir Stamford Raffles «himself had, unless (which our duty will not allow us to «believe) Sir Stamford Raffles had actually *as he always stated «to our President other verbal orders from the Governor General «which appeared diametrically opposite to the spirit and letter of «his written instructions.*»

2. I request most distinctly to state that *I never did make to*

(a) Ik neem dit zoo over.

the Governor of Prince of Wales' Island the declaration above quoted.

3. Had Colonel Bannerman been now alive I should have contented myself with this unequivocal denial and have left to him the task of offering such explanation as might be in his power. Under the circumstance of his lamented death, a regard for his character and memory induces me to consider every circumstance attending our communications in order if possible to discover or trace anything which could in the most remote degree bear upon the question or afford color to such a misconception.

4. After the most serious consideration and reflection, I can only recall to mind two circumstances which can possibly be supposed to have given such an idea.

5. On my arrival at Penang Colonel Bannerman informed me that the dispatches which I had brought, contained the first and only intimation he had received of my intended mission to the Eastward, that the subject was quite new to him, and that he was consequently unprepared for it, but that I should receive his sentiments in writing, a mode which he recommended in preference to verbal communication, and in which I fully acquiesced. As it appeared however that he had not been furnished with any supplementary instructions, I forwarded to him an attested copy, and the correspondence which ensued is before the Supreme Government.

6. A reference to this correspondence will show that Colonel Bannerman conceived it to be my duty to proceed direct to Acheen, agreeably to the letter of instructions to the Commissioners, but that I considered it entirely left to my judgement to proceed there in the first instance or not, as circumstances might dictate.

7. The second circumstance relates to the difference of opinion which arose with regard to the destination of the artillery-detachment which accompanied me from Bengal; Colonel Bannerman insisted that this detachment was intended for the service of Acheen, and referred to the communications from the Supreme Government in support, I explained to him that the party in question was destined for the relief at Bencoolen and had no connection with the service of Acheen; Colonel Bannerman desired me to produce a written authority to this effect, I told him that I had none, but that I concluded it was in orders and that of course Lieutenant Ralfe, who commanded the detachment, must be in possession of them. He then observed that Lieutenant Ralfe had no such orders; that point, he added, had been ascertained. In this situation I explained to Colonel

Bannerman that I had personally suggested to Lord Hastings the advantage of taking the party round with me, and that no written communication had taken place on the subject. This did not satisfy Colonel Bannerman, and I of course left it to discretion to detain the party or not, as he thought proper. This passed in conversation and I subsequently repeated in writing that the detachment was in no way connected with «any proposed arrangements for Acheen, that party being appointed to relieve the artillery-detachment doing duty at Fort Marlborough».

8. These are to the best of my recollection the only points in the course of our correspondence in which reference was had (?) to verbal communications which had passed between myself and the Governor General and they are the only points not included in the written instructions on which I personally requested an opinion or offered a suggestion.

9. It is almost unnecessary for me to observe that there was nothing in these circumstances in any degree inconsistent with or in opposition to the tenor of the written instructions of the Supreme Government; it is obvious that in the first case where success mainly depended upon time, such a discretion must necessarily be understood, and that the second originated in mistake on the part of Colonel Bannerman. It is not impossible however that the hasty temper of Colonel Bannerman may have led him to form a premature and incorrect judgement on the subject, and in the violence of party spirit to indulge in a warmth and latitude of expression which I cannot doubt he would on more mature consideration have been ready to correct.

Bijl. 3 noot c bl. 167. Brief van Raffles gedagteekend «At sea 20th January 1819» aan «Lieutenant Criddle commanding the Honorable Company's ship *Minto*»:

Sir,

In consequence of the measures already pursued or which they may be in contemplation with regard to Acheen it has been deemed important that an early intimation should be made to the Chiefs of the appointment of a commission by the Supreme Government of British India to negotiate and make final arrangements on the part of the English, and such intimation having already been made to the Chiefs of Acheen proper, as well to Syed Hussain, the father of the Chief residing at Tullosumoy, you are directed to proceed to Pedir and there personally inform the Chief who is usually termed Rajah Lama, that the Honorable Sir Stamford Raffles and Captain Coombs have been

appointed to this mission with full power to make all arrangements of a political and commercial nature between the countries of Acheen and Great Britain.

2. You will at the same time enquire what communication has been received from the Dutch and whether any further attempt at negotiation on their part is expected.

3. In order that no mistake or misapprehension of the object of your visit may arise, you are to consider the enclosed Memorandum as transmitted to you for your guidance and that it contains all that you are authorized to say to this Chief on the occasion.

I am

Sir, etc. etc.

T. S. RAFFLES.

Memorandum.

20th Januari 1819.

You are desired to apprise the Sultan Lama, that the Governor-General of British India & c., & c., & c., has appointed the Honorable Sir Stamford Raffles and Captain Coombs to be his agents and representatives for the purpose of negotiating and concluding such arrangement as may tend to the peace of the kingdom of Acheen and to perpetuate the good understanding and friendship which has so long subsisted between Acheen and the British nation.

You are further directed to inform Rajah Lama that it is the intention of the Commissioners to proceed in the first instance to Pedir should Sultaun Lama still continue there, in order to ascertain by a personal enquiry the nature of a communication said to have been made by the Dutch Government, but as it may probably be three or four weeks before the Commissioners could proceed to its destination, it is deemed proper to give notice of it's approach to Sultaun Lama, in order that he may not be induced to enter into a negotiation with any other European nation.

The Sultaun Lama may rely with confidence on the justice and due consideration of the British Government.

T. S. RAFFLES.

Bijl. 4 noot 6 bl. 168. De particuliere brief van Timmerman Thyssen dd. 16 Maart 1819 aan schout-bij-nacht Wolterbeek te Batavia luidde aldus:

Uit mijne vorige letteren heeft UHEG. bereids vernomen, hetgeen de heer Raffles in deze quartierien verricht, thans is er alweder

iets bijgekomen 't welke ik met leedwezen mijne waardige vriend ga bedeeën. De heer Carnegy, over wien ik thans zeer te vrede ben, en wezentlijk mij veel dienst bewijst met de navorschingen die ZEd. te Penang doet, heeft mij bedeed, dat van daar gezeild waaren twee scheepen met drie honderd man troepen bestemd naar de Carrimons met intentie om deeze ylanden in bezit te neemen, dat de heer Raffles met nog drie scheepen en vier honderd man meede op zijn vertrek stond naar Adcheen, dit laatste geloof ik niet, en denk dat hij zich spoedig met zijne vrienden bij de Carrimons zal vereenigen en dan een aanval wagen op Lingen mijne omstandigheden worde dus ieder dag benarder, want ik kan tegens de vorsten geen hooge toon aannemen ik heb geene fregatten of groote scheepen aan handen om hunlieden vertrouwen in te boezemen op de magt der Nederlanders, welke helaas! den Inlander zo gering door de heer Raffles wordt afgemaald: — wat ik u dus bidde mag gebruikt uwe invloed bij Zijne Excellentie de Gouverneur Generaal en laat eene geduchte magt zich spoedig hier vertoon en bovendien zoude men dan bezit kunnen neemen van Pahang, Lingen en alle zulke plaatszen als ons convenieerde, magt aan hande hebbende, zoude men ook die middelen kunnen beramen, dat de Engelsche wijnig voordeel zoude genieten van de geroofde plaatzen; al was al eens dat onze Koning door politieke omstandigheden genoopt, dezelve aan de Engelsche te late verblijven.

Ik zal voor het tegenswoordige over deeze zaak niet verder uitwijden, doordien ik mij vleije UHEG. spoedig alhier te zien om het werk door ons begonnen, en zo wij met grond mogte denke honorable geeindigd, finaal te termineeren.

Verder moet ik Uwe Excellentie bedeeën, dat deze watere krioelen van zeeroovers, zo meede dat de Tommegong van Sincapour in zee heeft negen wel gewapende pengojabja, deeze vaartuige geloof ik dat niet zo zeer loeren op roof als wel op de dépêches welke met Santa Maria (alias Teunes) verwacht worden.

P. S. 18 Maart, met vreugde kan ik UHEG. melden, dat de komst van kapitein Robson het geheele nieuws door kapitein Smith meedegebragt heeft geannuleerd, en dat de scheepen, die hij te Carrimon moest aantrefven, scheepen zijn, die van Pulo Penang over Benkoelen derwaarts bestemd waaren, zij moesten te Benkoelen ammunitie en andere benodigheden inladen, alzo de heer Raffles van de Gouverneur Bannerman niet konde bekomen wat hij wenschte, en dat uit zijn Gouvernement daarin heeft voorzien; deeze scheepen waren vertrokken

van Penang waar de tijding kwam dat hij had afgezien van de bezitneming van de Karrimons en zich had genesteld te Singapoera, dus dit raadsel is opgelost.

Wij lezen in dezen brief, dat gouverneur Thyssen ontevreden was geweest over zekeren *Carnegy*. In een particulieren brief dd. 5 December 1818 van Thyssen aan Wolterbeek, waarin hij hem onrustbarende geruchten mededeelde over plannen tot aanval op Malakka, die, naar den gouverneur vertrouwde, echter wel konden bestreden worden, dank ook 4000 man onder commies Kraal — zie bl. 41 van mijne Malakka-Riouwverhandeling — laat Thyssen namelijk dit volgen:

„In mijne betrekking ontmoet ik hier dagelijks onaangenaamheden, de menschen zijn niet oprecht, sinds het vertrek van de Havenmeester Carnegy, heb ik ook moeten ontwaren, hij een huichelaar is. UHed. zult u rappelleeren, tijdens wij het zegel wilden invoeren, hij ons bekend stelde, dat een zegel van ééne gulde, praauwen van vijf kojangs, en kleinere te veel zoude bezwaaren, en daardoor dezelve van deeze haven verweideren, waarna wij dan ook overgingen hetzelfde te verminderen; maar hij melde ons niet dat hij onder het Engelsch bestier 2 matten voor uitklaring genoot van praauwen van vijf kojangs, een mat voor die van drie kojangs, en van verderen kleinere een halve mat, hierbij heeft het nu deeze vriend niet alleen gelaten, maar heeft onder ons bestuur op een eigendunkelijke wijze een nieuw tarief daargesteld, en nam van praauwen van vijf kjang en daarenboven vijf ropijen voor de uitklaring, en van die van mindere groote vier, drie en twee ropijen, dit dunkt mij was een beeter middel de praauwen weg te jagen en de Pulo Pinangers te helpen, ik was razend over dit bedrog, en heb er de Gouverneur Generaal over geschreven, ik hoop egter hartelijk, uit egaards voor de heer Koek dat men geene verdere mesures tegen hem zal neemen, en slegts zijn post door een goede braave Hollander late vervullen, UHedG. weet zelve, dat de havenmeestersplaats te Malakka een neusje van de zalm is.”

Deze opmerkingen over gemis aan goeden trouw trokken mijne aandacht, omdat een dergelijke naam ook genoemd wordt in de *Memoir* van Raffles' weduwe (a). Er is daarin namelijk een

(a) Uitg. 1830 bl. 402. In uitg. 1835 dl. II bl. 39 niet opgenomen.

brief van *Carnegie* afgedrukt, gedagteekend Penang, 2 Juli 1819, waarin met verrukking over de stichting van Singapore wordt gesproken en welke aldus wordt besloten:

"I have a letter from Sir S. Raffles of the 17th ultimo from Singapore, informing me that there are now five thousand souls there. When we got possession of it in the end of January there were only five hundred; they are the inhabitants from Malacca and Rhio that are gone there. Our ships of war can ride there in war time, and run out off Pulo Auro, and see the coast clear, and back again in a week."

Carnegy's vrouw moest van Malakka wegens eene moord-geschiedenis vluchten, terwijl haar man op reis naar China heette te zijn; zie bl. 96 van mijn Malakka-Riouwverhandeling.

De Gouv. Gen., van Thyssen's klachten kennis genomen hebbende, schreef particulier dd. 9 Januari 1819 uit Buitenzorg aan Wolterbeek te Batavia: "Het gedrag van eenige ambtenaren te Malakka heb ik met ongenoegen vernomen. T. moet ferm blijven. Elk Gouvernement moet dit in het algemeen in Indië zijn." — Heeft de heer Van der Capellen zelf dit wel altijd in practijk gebracht?

Bijl. 5 noot *c* bl. 168. Brief gedagteekend "Fort Marlborough the 30th September 1819" van Raffles aan "C. F. Metcalfe Esq. Secretary to the Governement Fort William", in zake het eigenmachtig wegzenden van de *Minto* naar Pedir:

It was only on the twenty sixth instant, that I had the honor to receive your letter of the eight April last, on the subject of my having sent the *Minto* to Pedir.

2. I lose no time in stating for the information of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council that the circumstances under which the *Minto* was sent to Pedir were as follows.

3. His Excellency is apprized of the reasons which induced me at a short notice to embark from Penang in order to accompany major Farquhar to the Eastward. The communication from the Governor on which that resolution was taken, was not received until late in the afternoon of the preceeding day, and I had not the opportunity of a personal conference with captain Coombs; I had only time to exchange an official communication with him, and to inform the Governor of my intentions.

4. After we had left the harbour, I think the next or the
6^e Volgr. VII.

following day, it occurred to me for the first time, that in my anxiety to secure our interests at the Southern entrance of the Straits, those at Acheen might possibly be sacrificed during my absence by the measures of the Dutch, and that in such case blame would justly attach to me for not having proposed precautionary measures — the circumstances under which I had left Penang were peculiar and the suddenness of my departure prevented me from adverting to this difficulty in time to consult with captain Coombs on the subject. I had now no means of communicating with him, and being once embarked, it was essential that I should proceed to our destination without delay.

5. Before I left Penang the belief was general that the Dutch had already attempted to negotiate with the old King — we were officially and positively assured of this fact by colonel Bannerman, and it was on this ground, and this alone, that we had resolved to proceed to Pedir in the first instance. The discussions on the prosperity of our proceeding to Pedir are entered on the early part of our proceedings, in which His Excellency will perceive that although we differed in opinion with regard to the possible effects of this measure, no doubt remained on our mind of the Dutch having actually commenced the negotiation, and that although captain Coombs objected to the Commissioners going to Pedir themselves, he admitted the propriety of some immediate communication in writing — the difficulty of wording such a written communication with reference to the existing circumstances of the King stood in the way of its adoption, and it was finally resolved that we should touch at Pedir on our way to Acheen, in order to ascertain the real state of the negotiation opened by the Dutch and check any further attempt that might be contemplated, and that an intimation of our appointment and objects should be sent direct to the Chiefs of Acheen, proper and to Syf ul Allum at Tellasamoy through the medium of his father, who attended our next meeting for the purpose.

6. In this state I left the question, and we had, with reference to the resolution taken of visiting Pedir, communicated in writing the arrival of our mission at Penang to the Chiefs of Acheen and also to Syf ul Allum, common justice demanded that as a further and indefinite delay was now to take place, a similar communication should be made to the other party concerned, and as my colleague (a) had already fully concurred with me

(a) Coombs.

in the propriety, and indeed necessity, of making a written communication if we did not proceed to Pedir ourselves, I not only saw no objection, but under the existing circumstances in which I was accidentally placed, felt it to be incumbent on me to make a similar intimation to Jowar Allum Shah, at the same time that I availed myself of the opportunity of ascertaining the nature of the Dutch interference which was stated to have taken place. Not relying entirely on my own judgement I consulted major Farquhar on the propriety of the measure, and as he fully concurred with me, I detached the Minto with the instructions, of which I have the honor to enclose a copy for His Excellency's information.

7. From those His Excellency will perceive that not only was the object strictly confined to the communication of our appointment and the interference of the Dutch, but that the very words, in which captain Criddle was alone authorized to express himself, were laid down for his guidance. The reply of Jowar Allum Shah was verbal; he stated that he had received no communication from the Dutch Government, and that we might be assured that he would not enter into any negotiation of the kind.

8. I had no opportunity of communicating with captain Coombs until my return to Penang, when I personally informed him *verbatim* of the particulars of this communication and of the result and it was agreed that the papers should be placed on Record at our first meeting.

9. Various unexpected circumstances delayed us at Penang for above a fortnight, during which my time was principally occupied with the affairs of Singapore, and in the correspondence on different subjects which the Government of Penang had entered into. To avoid discussion and collision with this authority as much as possible, I urged to my colleagues the propriety of our deferring all possible questions regarding our mission and proposed negotiations until we embarked. His Excellency in Council will however perceive on reference to our Proceedings that a short time before leaving Penang, I received a private note from captain Coombs, requesting more particular information on the subject of the mission on which the Minto had been sent and particularly respecting an occurrence reported by captain Criddle, and in which captain Coombs had understood that a vessel under British colours had recently been plundered «which if founded in fact, demanded, in his judgement, the notice of the Commissioners.” My reply to this note is on Record, and His Excellency in Council will

perceive that it was to this circumstance that captain Coombs directed his further enquiries, and that with regard to the communication to Jowar Allum Shah, and the mission of the Minto, he neither offered objection or remark.

10. In explanation of my declining to enter on the subject of the occurrence alluded to, I request to observe that the communication made by captain Criddle on the subject was very general; he stated that the King had informed him of a native vessel being recently plundered, but as this did not fall within the limits of his duty, which has been successively and carefully defined, he merely reported the circumstance personally both to me and captain Coombs, and as a discussion of the question could lead to no advantage at Penang, and any enquiry into it there would only have led us from the immediate objects of our mission, I did not consider it a part of my duty to enter upon it, particularly as it might if necessary be fully investigated on the spot. At the conclusion of our negotiations at Pedir His Lordship will observe that an enquiry accordingly took place and that the subject was not one, which ought to have directed our attention in the first instance, and of which I believe captain Coombs was himself subsequently convinced.

11. Having offered this detailed explanation at the desire of His Excellency, I trust it will appear that there was nothing very extraordinary or irregular in the proceeding, on which render the peculiar circumstances in which I was placed may not have been justifiable and proper, while the advantage derived by it in ascertaining that the whole of the information which had been communicated to us by the government of Penang respecting the negotiation of the Dutch (like the supposed contents of my former complimentary letter to the King) was a fabrication, became essential and important in directing our future proceedings.

12. I cannot conclude this letter without expressing my regret at the necessity which may have existed for explanation on any point connected with the part I may individually taken in the late joint Commission.

13. I am unacquainted with the nature and object of the representation on this and other subjects which may have reached the Supreme Government, but had they been accompanied by a statement of the grounds of my opinion and proceedings, which were fully known to the parties and by that attention to correctness which was due to the occasion, I may presume that the necessity for reference would have been obviated.

14. It always appeared to me, that our duty as Commissioners for Acheen was comprized under two heads — the prevention of Dutch influence and the settlement of the country by a treaty with its proper Chief whoever that might be found to be. The first was of paramount and immediate importance, and the positive assurances given us by the Government of Penang that negotiations on the part of the Duth had actually commenced, rendered our early attention to it indispensable and called for direct measures; the other question could only properly be investigated on the spot, and in the disposition in which I found the Government of Penang, I had no hesitation in declining to consider this part of the question in any shape until we had actually arrived off Acheen. Thus in the communication alluded to in this letter, the object was expressly confined to the first and most essential point, without the most remote reference to the ultimate investigation with regard to the rival candidates for the throne. This view of the subject and mode of proceeding was fully explained by me to captain Coombs and to colonel Bannerman and I shall not presume to account for any other view or line of action which may have been attributed to me. This question as to the Chief to be eventually acknowledged was entirely distinct from and in a great measure secondary to the other, although it did not appear to be so considered by the Penang Government or my colleague.

15. In refraining from further observations on this subject, I am guided by the same principle which prevented me from noticing at the time various obstructions, misrepresentations, and insinuations, which occurred during the progress of the mission; they were evidently dictated by a spirit of personal opposition and an attention to them would only have diverted us from the direct objects of our appointment. To this spirit may be attributed the enormous bulk of our proceedings, which while they exhibit the captiousness and litigiousness which prevailed on the one side, will shew that no measures of conciliation consistent with the due performance of my duty were wanting on the other. The most candid and unreserved communication of my information and sentiments was in every instance offered, and every attention which could publicly raise or personally gratify my colleague was invariably shewn by me; it is not for me to account for this conduct on my part not having made its due impression.

Bijl. 6 noot a bl. 184. Brief dd. 27 Augustus 1824 van den sultan van Deli aan den gouverneur van Penang:

I dispatch this letter to the new Governor of Pulo Penang (*a*) for the purpose of acquainting him that I was on terms of friendship with Mr. Phillips, and I have just been informed that he is about to return to Europe, wherefore I write to my new friend in order that the friendly intercourse between Delli and Pulo Penang may not be interrupted.

I have to acquaint him also, that many of the districts of Pulo Puchee (*b*) are in a very disturbed state at present, for the Rinchis (*c*) have determined to attack all the different states and render them tributary, to become obedient to all their peculiar laws and orders, none of us Rajahs in this quarter will consent to obey them, but many countries have already been reduced to subjection and rendered tributary, amongst the rest are Tanah Putih, Balah and Panei, and they have now expressed their determination to attack Batu Bara and Delli. When they do attempt to carry their threats into execution, we shall endeavour to oppose them with all our might and I shall proceed to Batu Bara myself if hostilities commence.

If my friend has any compassion or friendship for all us Rajahs in these districts of Sumatra, we beg you will instruct us how we may obtain assistance from him and I request that he will reply to this letter with as little delay as possible.

In my opinion, if these and the adjoining States on the Eastcoast of Sumatra are ruined, they will prove a source of loss to my friend's country also. I beg to assure him that my friendship and attachment both for himself and Mr. Phillips can never be shaken, wherefore I am induced to give timely notice of the expected events in order that my friend may take the matter into consideration.

As to my friend's subject, the son of Syed Hussein, I formerly acquainted Mr. Phillips that I had adopted him as a son, and I beg now also to inform my friend of this circumstance.

I have nothing to offer my friend as a token of my respect but two cakes of bees wax, which I beg his acceptance of.

Dated the 27th August 1824.

Bijl. 7 noot 6 bl. 187. Brief dd. 4 December 1822 van de drie Sagis van Atjeh aan den Gouverneur van Pinang:

We acquaint our friend that we received our friend's letter and understood its contents and the advice it gave us. We

(*a*) R. Fullerton.

(*b*) Sumatra.

(*c*) Padries.

now explain to our friend and companion the Governor of Penang that formerly a letter came from our friend at Penang to us, the three Sages of Acheen, saying that a chief warrior of the English, named captain Coombs had come from Bengal to Acheen bringing much good tidings and our friend directed him to be received with distinction because he was a person of respectability and not a bad man. Such were the contents of our friend's letter. Upon that it came to pass that the ship arrived at Acheen and we received him with great distinction and when he enquired of us who was our sovereign who ruled in Acheen, we answered Syful Allum Shah the illustrious, the shadow of the Almighty prevading (?) the Universe, the son of Syed Hussain and we gave this under our signatures. A year after that came two chief warriors of the English named captain Coombs en Mr. Raffles Governor of Bencoolen and made the same enquiry of us as before and we answered with a true pen and faithful tongue as we had done before and that we could not alter, and we gave this to them under our signatures (a). Now in like manner we can never change and forget those expressions; perchance our friend may either forget or remember them, but to our minds it will not be proper for our friend to forget them, he being wise and prudent with uprightness to that agreement. If it be so, let our friend be kind to us and order back our sovereign Syful Allum to Acheen, so that we may be happy and our friend's vessels go to and from Acheen with safety whether on commerce or for amusement. As to the old Rajah we acquaint our friend that we will never have him for our Rajah more, for we have deposed him and sworn to it on the tomb of Tunhar Anjung of Kampong Java and we never can alter. Moreover we acquaint our friend the Honble the Governor of Penang that we request his kindness to us not to examine strictly into the respectfulness of our address, for we are peasants and not well acquainted with Malay languages, but let our friend consider only the meaning of our letter.

Bijl. 8 noot a bl. 189. Extract uit de missive dd. 25 Februari 1824 van den gouvernementssecretaris R. Ibbetson te Pinang

(a) De lezer van mijn „Sumatra's Westkust verhandeling” zal zich wellicht herinneren, dat de Atjehers ook aan Pické hadden medegedeeld, dat de Engelschen in Atjeh hadden gevraagd, wie er koning was, doch dat toen ten antwoord was gegeven: *wat kan jullie dat schelen!* Zie bl. 224 dl. XLIX (1898) van dit tijdschrift; ov. 20.

aan den gouvernementssecretaris George Swinton te Calcutta.

N.B. In de B-verzameling liggen over de Atjehsche zaken in verband met sultan Djohor's dood onderscheidene brieven. Ik achtte echter het hier volgend uittreksel voldoende, dat begint met verwijzing naar een brief dd. 11 November 1820, waarbij reeds het bestuur te Pinang op het nemen van militaire maatregelen voor Atjeh had aangedrongen.

The Right Honorable, the Gouverneur-General in Council will there see that in deference to the opinion of the Commissioners for Acheen, the idea of then sending a resident, or troops to enforce the observance of the treaty has been relinquished, but affairs between the British and Achinese Governments have now arrived at that crisis when decisive and even coercive measures alone can prove beneficial to the interests of our Honorable employers. Pecuniary assistance and military stores to a great amount were afforded in 1819 by the agents of the Governor-General with the view of securing to the legitimate house of Acheen its sovereignty, and the peaceful and undisputed exercise of its authority, but it must be now seen that temporising measures are unavailing and that a further interference in their concerns unless vigorously maintained will only be productive of great and fresh expense and be but the means of partially extinguishing the animosities among the Achinese themselves which in all probability will in a short time blaze forth with renewed internal hostility. — The Honorable the Governor in Council would submit therefore that the present state of Acheen is misrule and instability in its authorities — and that if disposed to recur to those measures of positive interference contemplated in 1819, the occasion now offers to the British for establishing the legitimate heir, and for giving a tone and efficiency to the Government of this fine country, which was at that time contemplated! — The Honorable Governor in Council in conclusion would propose for the consideration of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, whether such a line of conduct should be adopted, or whether all future interference in the Acheen concerns should be relinquished, it is almost unnecessary to observe in a political view how prejudicial to the British interests might be the alliance of the Dutch with the Achinese and that any such offer would possibly be accepted with avidity by the ejected party, and the Honorable the Governor in Council therefore submits the whole subject to the wisdom and decision of the Supreme Government, respectfully observing that the period

has now arrived when our relations with Acheen should be distinctly determined.

- Bijl. 9 noot *b* bl. 189. De Atjeh-paragrafen 3 en 4 uit de Londensche dépêche dd. 4 Augustus 1824, waarbij het met Nederland gesloten tractaat van 17 Maart te voren, geratificeerd naar Calcutta werd gezonden, luiden als volgt:

We have never approved of an intimate connection with that State; and we apprehend that, even if our relations with it had not been affected by the engagements which have been contracted with the Dutch, it would have been necessary to revise the treaty concluded with Djohor Allum as king of Acheen in 1819. That chief, so far as we can collect from your correspondence, not having possessed an established authority in the country which he assumed to represent, has never been in a situation to maintain the relations into which he entered; while that part of the treaty, the execution of which depended upon the British, appears to have been punctually fulfilled. The treaty therefore might even now be fairly considered as a dead letter. We are, however, disposed to conduct ourselves with liberality towards this chief, and we therefore authorise you in negotiating with him (should he now exercise the powers of government) for the annulment or modification of the treaty of 1819, to offer him a pecuniary compensation.

You will observe that the Netherland Plenipotentiaries, in their Note, contemplate the existence of the king of Acheen in a state of independence, after England shall have withdrawn herself from Sumatra; and on comparing both notes, that you are at liberty to enter into a mere commercial arrangement with him, if you should think it desirable.

- Bijl. 10 noot *a* bl. 192. R. Fullerton's beschouwingen dd. 21 Maart 1825 ten betooge der noodzakelijkheid, dat Nederland nooit gezag erlange over Sumatra's Oostkust:

With respect to the future establishment of European influence over Acheen, it may be observed that such an arrangement on our part was long considered a desirable object, but it has been found utterly impracticable without employing a large military force to overawe the inhabitants, in plain terms without completely subjugating the country. An alternative which it never suited British policy to resort to!!

Whether the Netherlands Government will pursue the same course of moderation remains to be ascertained, but if we are to judge of the future from the past, it may be inferred that a

more direct interference will be exerted. It already appears on the records that an offer of 2000 men had been made by the Dutch to the king Jowhar Alun to support his authority. It was then declined by the King in hopes of assistance from the British Government; the state of Acheen, it may be feared, will at no distant period afford an opening for interference; the present occupier of the throne is not the legitimate heir. A disputed succession will probably ensue on the legitimate son now under custody of the Queen-Mother coming of age. Should the Netherlands Government take part on either side, troops will be employed, and the country, whoever may be nominal King, will in reality be under the complete control of the State, exercising the military power. It will become our duty therefore to watch with vigilance the effect that may be produced on our trade by any departure from the spirit of the late treaty on the part of the Netherlands Government.

Fullerton wijst dan op de artt. 9 en 10 der Londensche conventie, volgens welke Engeland geheel afziet van bemoeiing op Sumatra, en Nederland hetzelfde belooft ten aanzien van Malakka, waarna de *Minute* vervolgt:

That right that the one abandons, it is to be presumed the other enjoys; it follows that the Netherlands Government enjoy the right of making treaties and forming settlements on the island of Sumatra, and vice versa that the British enjoy the right of making treaties and forming settlements on the Malayan Peninsula. If the Netherlands Government act on the spirit of the treaty and observe the same forbearing system we have done, no alterations will take place favourable (*ongunstig?*) to our trade. From their proximity to us, constant communication with Acheen, and the other states on the eastcoast of Sumatra takes place commercial intercourse and connection have long been completely established; their duration must now depend on the forbearance of the Netherlands Government.

By article 3 they can make no treaty having for its object the exclusion or the establishment of higher duties on the general trade with the State they treat with; but it is feared they may produce the effect more completely by using their political influence and military power in establishing a port or commercial station at the principal sea ports, hoisting their own colours and by imposing the duty provided by article 2 put an end to the trade. Against such a result the treaty appears to afford only one and that an indirect means of counteraction. By article 6 it is agreed that orders shall be sent to the respec-

tive local governments of the contracting parties to form no new settlement without authority from their own government; and by the 3rd article it is provided that all treaties hereafter concluded shall be reciprocally communicated to each other by the contracting parties. If construing these two articles together, their spirit and intention be to afford to the one who considers its commercial interests aggrieved by any treaty by the other, the means of making a fair remonstrance thereon, and if such remonstrance be attended to, the evil anticipated in respect to the trade with the northern coast of Sumatra may be prevented. The same reasoning applies to the petty states of Delhi, Langkat and Siack. They are unable to resist any powerful interference from the Dutch and the extensive trade we now carry on with them is liable to the same risk as that of Acheen. If the right of making treaties carries with it the right of forming settlements and establishments along the coast, the right of levying duties follows of course, and even the lowest rate which the treaty of 17th Marth, 1824, contemplates, would embarrass, if not put an end to the trade with all those States. But as it must be the duty of those entrusted with the charge of British interests in this part of the world to keep their principals well-informed of the probable views and objects of foreign governments in this neighbourhood and their possible effects, the vast importance of the Acheen trade has appeared to me to warrant the submission of even a possible contingency, as worthy of notice and consideration on the present occasion.

The treaty seems indeed to contemplate the necessity of mutual explanation hereafter, and such will in all probability be required in respect to our trade with Sumatra, and for which we should be duly prepared.

Bijl. 11 noot b bl. 192. De afgetreden resident van Singapore, John Prince, was op het einde van 1827 te Batavia. Daar vernam hij, dat commissaris-generaal Du Bus het voornemen had om het oorlogschip *Bellona* naar Sumatra's Oostkust te zenden, ten einde er de hoofden tot handel met Riouw op te wekken. Naar aanleiding hiervan, berichtte Prince bij schrijven, gedagteekend Batavia 29 November 1827, het volgende aan het bestuur te Pinang:

I have the honor to state for the information of the Honbl. the Governor in Council that it has been reported to me through a private channel, that the Commissioner-General has been

advised to send a mission by the Netherlands frigate *Bellona* to the ports on the East Coast of Sumatra, which carry on trade with Singapour, with the object of inducing the natives to discontinue the purchase of salt from us, and to take it from Rhio, where it is to be delivered at as low a rate as it can be got at the former place.

2. As the appearance of a ship of that description carrying such a commission, may make an impression on the natives of the several ports of Siak, Kampar, Jambi & c., unfavourable to the commercial interests of Singapore, inasmuch as they may be intimidated into a compliance with the views of the Netherlands Government, and grant through fear, what their interests and better reason would otherwise condemn, I trust to be pardoned the presumption of submitting this subject to the notice of Government, and of drawing the attention of the Honbl. Board to that part of the late Treaty which specifically engages for a perfect freedom of intercourse with the Natives of the East by the subjects of both nations, whereby it might be considered expedient to acquaint these respective Chiefs with the privileges, so guaranteed to them that they may not consider themselves obliged to conform to any requisitions of this nature from the Netherlands Government.

3. To the best of my recollection the imports into Singapore from these places on the East Coast, consist of about 800 pds of coffee, half as much pepper, and immense quantity of rottans for the China Market, wax, and gold dust which are bartered for nearly 1100 Coyans of Siam salt, a quantity of Java tobacco and the manufactures of Western India and Europe.

4. The feeling of the Netherlands Government at Batavia towards Singapore is so truly inimical from the injury it has caused to their colonial commerce, that there are no exertions or pains they would hesitate to take for its destruction, and one prefatory step thereto is reducing the price of Java salt from 70 to 30 rupees per coyan (*a*), but as the commerce with the Eastcoast of Sumatra is one of considerable importance to

(a) De aanzienlijke verlaging van den prijs voor het Gouvernementszout op Java, bestemd ten uitvoer, had vooral plaats op advies van het bekende lid van de raad van Indië Van de Graaff, en beoogde inderdaad dat het Java-zout op de Buitenbezittingen niet langer zou worden verdrongen door Siameesch, Makassaarsch en Bimaneesch zout. Zie mijn Zoutwerk, bl 153—154. De verlaging stond met *vinnige vijandschap tegen Singapore* in geen ander verband, dan dat ieder belanghebbende tracht zijne waren aan den man te brengen of den handel naar zich toe te leiden. Doch als dit geschiedt met benadeeling van *Engelsche* belangen, heet dit specifiek *vijandschap*!

Singapore, the Honbl. Board may deem it necessary to adopt measures to counteract the attempts of the Batavian Government to reduce it. At present the salt imported into the ports already mentioned, from Singapore, finds its way into the interior of Sumatra, and the Netherlands Government at Padang on the Westcoast, complaining of its affecting the sale of the Java-salt, imported into Padang for a similar purpose. Should the Dutch succeed in restraining the merchants on the Eastcoast of Sumatra from buying salt at Singapore, considerable inconvenience and reduction will arise in our trade with Siam, from whence it is solely imported, and as other articles, such as sugar, rice and oil, come from the same source, they will comparatively suffer a proportionable reduction in the quantity of such articles imported into our station.

De gouverneur van Pinang R. Fullerton legde daarop in de vergadering van zijn raad de volgende *minute* dd. 16 Maart 1828 over:

Of the contemplated mission of the frigate Bellona to Siak I received information from other sources — a letter has already been addressed to the chiefs of Siak, expressing in general terms our anxiety to continue and promote the growing trade between that State and our settlements on the Malay side of the Straits, and particularly with Malacca immediately opposite, and I trust that letter as well as their own interests will prevent their acquiescence in the projected arrangements; that the Netherlands Government will avail themselves of the exclusive right which they conceive vested in them by the Treaty of 1824 of forming political relations with the Chiefs of Sumatra, to the full extent of their means I have no doubt, and that the political influence so established, will be rendered entirely subservient to the promotion of their own trade and deterioration of ours is as little to be doubted. On this part of the subject, and on the probable proceedings of the Netherlands authorities in respect to Sumatra, whenever their affairs in Java will permit (a) as well as the effect to be expected to be produced on our trade, I have already entered at length in my minute of 23rd November 1827. I propose addressing to all the chiefs on the Eastcoast of Sumatra with those States we now carry on trade similar to the one addressed to those of Siak.

Hieronder volgt de circulaire dd. 21 Mei 1828 van gouverneur Fullerton aan negen Siaksche hoofden:

(a) Bedoeld wordt de opstand van Dipo Negro.

Seeing that we are especially desirous of advancing the welfare of all persons who live under our authority, and bearing in mind that the prosperity of Malacca is intimately connected with the flourishing state of affairs in the surrounding countries, and being sensible that these united objects can be best attained under God, by a continued interchange of good offices, and by affording every facility, safety and confidence to the merchant, who may resort to our with the produce of their respective countries. We have, at the humble suggestion of the merchants of this settlement of Malacca, determined to address our friend with a view to strengthen the amicable relations which have long since and now do subsist between and Malakka.

We should therefore invite our friend to encourage the traders of to bring down the goods (*here mention the staples*) to Malacca, where we assure our friend that they shall be free to come and to go without the payment of duties, and without imposition or hindrance. Should any case arise wherein the traders of our friend have just cause to complain, our friend may rest assured that we shall give the utmost heed to them.

We would suggest to our friend in like manner the advantage which might occur to our friend's country, were our friend to interdict individuals from levying heavy imposts upon our traders who may pass through our friend's territory. Our traders have long complained of this and it may be that our friend is not aware of the fact. We therefore apprise our friend of it.

It might also tend to the reciprocal advantage of the traders of both countries, if our friend would direct that dollars of all denominations of a proper weight and standard should be current through our friend's countries. There are many dollars of good stamp, of standard weight and touch, which do not appear to be current in our friend's territory.

In Fullerton's nota lazen we, dat de Gouverneur te voren reeds een brief aan den sultan van Siak had gezonden. Zij was gedagteekend Singapore 7 Februari 1828 en luidde aldus:

I have to inform my friend that Malacca is now permanently under the British Government and I have arrived at Singapore to enquire into the general state of the trade going on at these two settlements. It affords me much satisfaction to find that the trade between Siak and Prince of Wales Island, Malacca and Singapore is much encreasing to the mutual advantage of all these countries. This letter is written from the continued

desire to keep up amicable relations with Siack and all the States on the Eastcoast of Sumatra, and to extend the trade and commercial communication between them and the several British settlements in the Straits of Malacca. I shall be happy at all times to hear of my friend's welfare and to pay attention to any suggestions that he may have to offer for the improvement of the commercial intercourse now subsisting.

In token of friendship I beg to send mij friend a few small presents as noticed in annexed list (a).

Een dergelijken brief schreef tevens de translateur Anderson, op last van het bestuur te Pinang aan den pangeran van Siak.

De Sultan gaf op het schrijven, na erkenning van ontvangst, het volgende antwoord:

My friend informs me that Malacca has been permanently transferred to the English Company, and I am much gratified to hear that the three countries of Pulo Penang, Singapore and Malacca, have been finally secured under the Government of the English Company.

Moreover my friend expresses a desire that the friendly relations between Siak and Malacca and Pulo Penang may be maintained. I am ten times as anxious as my friend can be to preserve them, for I have lately succeeded my fathers's younger brother, who has been afflicted with sickness and has lost his understanding, which rendered him quite incapable of business. The presents which my friend sent with the letter I duly received with much satisfaction. I have nothing to offer as a token of my friendship but many compliments. Dated 21 Dulkaida—4th June 1828.

Bijl. 12 noot c bl. 214. Over de Transvaalsche suzeriniteitsquaestie schreef D. P. Faure den volgenden brief aan minister Chamberlain, welken ik afgedrukt vond in de *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* van 28 Mei 1899:

De kwestie of de suzeriniteit van Groot-Brittannië over de Z.-A. R. nog bestaat of dat deze is afgeschafte door de Londensche conventie, schijnt snel de gedaante aan te nemen van een brandende kwestie van den dag en zal misschien tot gevolg hebben dat de vrede van Zuid-Afrika in gevaar wordt gebracht;

-
- (a) 1 piece scarlet silk canoblet,
 1 „ Chintz Europe,
 1 silk umbrella,
 1 piece Bengal silk hankfs.

onder deze omstandigheden oordeel ik het mijn plicht om UEd. over dit onderwerp een woord te zeggen.

Toen in 1883 de Britsche regeering er in toestemde een deputatie uit Transvaal te ontvangen, was ik op advies van Lord Rosmead (toen Sir Hercules Robinson) door Lord Derby aangezocht om die deputatie te vergezellen en als tolk op te treden. Ik was daardoor tegenwoordig bij alle conferenties die plaats hadden tusschen de vertegenwoordigers van Transvaal en die van de imperiale regeering. De laatste zijn allen dood. Zij waren Lord Derby, Sir Robert Herbert en Sir Hercules Robinson (Sir Evelyn Ashley was, naar ik geloof, bij een of twee gelegenheden aanwezig).

Het doel der deputatie was, zooals wel bekend is, om de verwijdering van zekere grieven te verkrijgen. Een van deze grieven was de suzeriniteit (sec. C. 3947, 1884, bl. 3). Hieraan hechtten de Transvaalsche vertegenwoordigers groot, indien niet het grootste belang. Aan den anderen kant beschouwden Lord Derby en Sir Hercules Robinson het geheel en al als een zaak van klein belang. Ik ben er trotsch op te mogen zeggen dat Sir Hercules Robinson groot vertrouwen in mij stelde en ik had vele malen een onderhoud met hem in zijn private woning, in zijn club en in Brooks' Hotel, Albemarlestraat, somtijds hem op zijn verzoek gaande zien en somtijds ongenoodigd.

Ik herinner mij zeer duidelijk een gezegde van hem in den loop van een van deze gesprekken, dat hij niet kon begrijpen waarom president Kruger zoo begeerig was de suzeriniteit afgeschafte te zien; dat het werkelijk niets beteekende; dat zelfs wanneer het niet bestond Engeland toch Transvaal niet zou toestaan met vreemde mogendheden verdragen te sluiten, welke Engeland verderfelijik kon beschouwen voor zijn eigen belang, en dat hij daarom er geen bezwaar in zag om de Transvaalsche gevoeligheid tegemoet te komen. Ik herinner mij ook dat Lord Derby op een van de conferenties zeide dat met betrekking tot de suzeriniteit de deputatie van een molshoop een berg maakte, maar hij verzette er zich tegen dat een artikel zou worden opgenomen in de nieuwe conventie, waarbij Hr. Ms. suzeraine rechten nadrukkelijk werden herroepen, omdat hij er geen lust in had de parlementaire oppositie wapenen in de handen te geven om het ministerie aan te vallen, een argument welks gewicht de deputatie erkende, want zij wisten dat er een sterke partij in het Lagerhuis was, welke krachtig de retrocessie van de Z.-A. R. had afgekeurd en nu besloten was om geen verdere concessie te doen.

Ja zelfs, terwijl de onderhandelingen gaande waren, was er

een publieke bijeenkomst in het Mansion House gehouden, waar Lord Shaftesbury voorzitter was, en waar al de sprekers zich tegen verdere toegeeflijkheid tegenover Transvaal hadden verklaard. Van deze conferentie met de deputatie zal er waarschijnlijk geen notulen op uw bureau aanwezig zijn, want er werden geen aantekeningen gemaakt en al de vertegenwoordigers van het koloniale departement, die deelnamen aan deze conferenties of gesprekken, zijn sinds overleden. President Kruger, een van zijn kollega's en zijn secretaris leven nog, maar zijn belanghebbende partijen. Ik heb het daarom goed geacht dat ik, als de eenige overlevende niet-belanghebbende getuige, en als iemand die in geen deele is bevooroordeeld ten gunste van de Z.-A. R., zooals hier welbekend is, in het belang van waarheid en gerechtigheid mijn getuigenis moest aanbieden en dit getuigenis is dat het duidelijk verstaan en overeengekomen was door beide contracteerende partijen dat Hr. Ms. suzereiniteit zou worden afgeschaft, behalve tot den omvang, bepaald in art. 4 der Londensche conventie, welke daarna werd geteekend. En de Transvaalsche deputatie verliet Londen volkomen voldaan met den uitslag van hun zending, uitgezonderd met betrekking tot de nieuwe grenslijn.

Om aan te toonen dat het in bovenstaande regels geschrevene geen later gevormde opinie of geen vergissing is, voortspruitende uit een gebrekkige herinnering, haal ik hier een paar regels aan van een artikel, hetwelk ik onmiddellijk na mijn terugkeer aan de Kaap in het Volksblad, een Hollandsche courant, waarvan ik toen editeur was, schreef. In de uitgave van deze courant, dd. 17 April 1884, komen deze woorden voor:

«Last but not least» is de suzereiniteit afgeschaft. Dit was, naar wij verstaan, volgens het gevoelen der Transvaalsche republikeinen....; en dit, de pijnlijkste van hun grieven, is nu verwijderd. De Volksraad kan van nu af aan zijn huiselijke aangelegenheden regelen zooals het hun behaagt» enz.

Ter versterking van mijn meening, haal ik ook eenige zinsneden aan, die voorkomen in een verhaal van een onderhoud van den editeur der Saturday Review met Lord Rosmead, in genoemd weekblad gepubliceerd na zijn dood op 3 November 11. De interviewer merkt daar op: «Menschen in Engeland houden vol dat de suzereiniteit in de conventie van 1884 was inbegrepen, zooals zij ook duidelijk was neergelegd in die van 1881; maar is dit waar?» Hierop antwoordde Lord Rosmead: «Wel, ik behoor het te weten, omdat ik die conventie ontwierp; het begrip suzereiniteit werd teruggetrokken en het woord met opzet uitgelaten. Kruger was niet tevreden met de conventie van 1881,

wegens de aanspraak op suzereiniteit door Engeland gemaakt, en wij hadden de bedoeling die aanspraak in 1884 terug te trekken.»

Ik vertrouw dat het niet zal beschouwd worden als een verbreking van vertrouwen aan mijne zijde, wanneer ik bovenstaande feiten publiceer, te meer daar zoodanige publicatie in de toekomst kan strekken tot handhaving van den vrede in Zuid-Afrika.