The Heart of Self Formation

The Overlap of Moral Selfhood and Legalities in Ancient Scriptural Discourse

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Abstract

This article discusses the “heart” as part of the terminology for selfhood in ancient Jewish literature. After discussing a couple of criticisms of studies of the self and showing how these criticisms fail to persuade, the paper examines a range of texts in the Hebrew Bible, the Dead Sea Scrolls, and beyond for conceptions of the moral self. Special attention is given to the legal S tradition in the Scrolls as a fruitful illustration of how the self and law are recurring conceptual companions. In this legal tradition, a universalizing conception of selfhood and agency is rooted in local, practical concerns of a community.

Keywords

law – selfhood – moral self – heart – Community Rule

This article discusses portrayals of the self and its formation in ancient Jewish scriptures and their environment.1 Responding to some challenges for studies of the self in ancient texts, the paper engages recent theoretical contributions to personal identity and selfhood and applies their relevance for approaching the לב as a culturally significant term in ancient articulations of the moral self. After examining biblical and inscriptive sources, the paper concludes in a

1 It is a pleasure to contribute to this edition of Dead Sea Discoveries which honors Carol A. Newsom, whose work has been so important for thinking about multiple issues, including the self in ancient Jewish literature. I have long found her rigorous research inspiring for reconsidering what kinds of questions are possible in biblical scholarship.
discussion of the Community Rule’s position within a broader legal discourse. It is proposed that the self and legalities are recurring conceptual companions that, when considered, can enrich our understanding of the self and law alike.

1 Challenges in Studies of the Self: Issues of Anachronism and Socio-centrism

Challenges of different sorts have confronted biblical scholarship’s subfield which discusses how the self and other elements of human agents were understood. Two significant challenges will be addressed in what follows. Both deserve to be taken seriously, but neither one on its own nor a combination of the two should deter scholarly work on individual selves in ancient Jewish literature. Addressing these two challenges will transition into a discussion of moral selfhood and law.

1.1 Retrojecting a Modern Dualism?

Biblical scholars have sought to increase our awareness of how our historical and disciplinary contexts impact what is held to count as literary depictions of the self, and how philological research can be of service in this way. For researching the anthropologies in ancient Jewish scriptures, it is widely seen as anachronistic to expect a self-contained, interior, vaguely ghost-like self governing a material body or endowing that body with significance that it otherwise could not have as a material entity.²

A number of expectations embedded within our approaches are indebted to particular notions of the soul from consciously revisionist thinkers in early-modern Europe.³ There have been no shortage of warnings about this idea’s standing. In an article about consciousness from 1904, William James wrote that those who entertain such conceptions “are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing ‘soul’.”⁴ Not long after James signaled this soul’s disappearance, Sigmund Freud in 1930 wrote that “das Gefühl unseres Selbst, unseres eigenen Ichs,” usually seems secure to us as a unified, autonomous reality bracketed from anything else. He then says that to rest

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² Lambert, “Desire’ Enacted in the Wilderness,” 25–49. However, on the longstanding debate about the soul's bodily connections or lack thereof, with discussion of the broader cultural context, see Schaper, “Elements of a History of the Soul in North-West Semitic Texts,” 156–76; Steiner, Disembodied Souls.
³ Harrison, The Bible; and also Nagel, Mind and Cosmos.
assured in the self’s buffered, autonomous standing is “ein Trug” (Eng. “delusion, deception”). Having occupied a range of disciplines for over a century, then, it is hardly new to resist such conceptions of the self.

More than a century after James and Freud’s work, why then are concerns with “the” modern self ongoing in historical research? One reason these concerns persist has to do with how early-modern contrasts between “soul, spirit,” on the one hand, and “matter,” on the other, continue to shape our outlooks and expectations at fundamental levels. As David Lambert has emphasized, anachronism may be active in deeper ways than biblical scholarship is wont to acknowledge. One way is our inherited notion of a “spirit” or “soul” that stands in opposition to “matter,” the latter of which was re-defined as a mechanistic concept during the 16th century and into the Enlightenment. For example, in studies of ancient Jewish literature, to dismiss a variety of the Cartesian self as anachronistic in favor of more materialist or strictly empirical methods can end up relying on a comparably Cartesian notion of materiality as the counterpoint, so that our thinking remains firmly within the same early-modern categories, even if just one pole of this dualism ends up preserved.

Unless we proceed with due caution, the critique that Lambert rightly raises can end up assuming the same early-modern categories whose influence the critique seeks to highlight. “Spirit” or “soul” in the 16th century was re-defined in tandem with what, in our research field at least, is a lesser discussed re-definition of matter. In tune with the era’s intentional efforts to reject Aristotelian thought with its wider range of causality, materiality was conceived anew as a strictly quantitative, non-symbolic, intrinsically purposeless phenomenon—i.e., “mere” matter. The new conception of matter included the body, be it the heart or otherwise. This shift encouraged the idea that any notion of selfhood would need to be something bracketed from one’s physical body; whatever the soul was, it could not be native to materiality. And when bracketing ghostly substances did not seem persuasive, a related move was to

5 Freud, Das Unbehagen in Der Kultur, 10 = Civilization and Its Discontents, 38.
7 Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 35, mentions the revised “concept of objective physical reality” which drove 17th century intellectual movements; he notes elsewhere that “the ordinary methods of science are basically Cartesian” (idem, The Last Word, 21). On the roots of this redefinition in the Reformation era, see Gregory, The Unintended Reformation.
8 In addition to the sources in the previous note, see Taylor, A Secular Age, 97–99; Kolakowski, Metaphysical Horror, 20; Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 12–18.
9 At one point, James himself confessed to “grieve” over his apparently “materialistic” musing that that soul might be reduced to the physical act of breathing (see idem, “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?,” 491).
propose eliminating the soul or self as illusion or, at bottom, the same as matter. Modern dualism has a history of tilting toward one pole or the other, so that one side of the contested dichotomy just ends up being favored in a way which leaves the era’s overall picture intact.

Biblical scholarship seems to have focused more on the pole of “spirit” as a substance. However, each pole of modern dualism should be contextualized. That can help us better appreciate the differences we encounter in ancient Jewish literature, where Second Temple period writers like Philo of Alexandria display semantically charged conceptions of materiality, including the body’s material parts like the heart (for physiological usages of ἡ καρδία, see Alleg. Interp. 1, 59; Prov. 2, 17; most are about the soul and virtues). In these texts and others, terms that include physical body parts are about something other than body parts alone (4Q416 ii 13–14; also the “ear” in ii 18). They can exhibit what Thomas Krüger calls soul-ish aspects (“[die] seelischen Aspekte” or “[s]eelische’ Funktionen”). What may strike us as a non-intuitive usage of physiological terminology hints that not only understandings of the psychical, but also the physical, and hence of their relationship, differ between modern philologists and ancient scribes. Philo and at least parts of canonized literature stand in concord in this respect: for these scribes, there may have been no such thing as mere matter. Likewise, in the Two Spirits Treatise, the locale from which a transcendent “spirit of iniquity” (הלועחור) must be purged is none other than someone’s “innermost flesh” (ורשבימכתמ; see 1QS 4:20–21). Within modern, roughly Cartesian categories, these outlooks have an uncom-

10 Unless, of course, the material pole is what gets explained away. For comments on how this modern dualism can lead to internal collapses favoring just one side of the polarity, see the physicist Schrödinger, My View, 97–102.
11 E.g., Alleg. Interp. 1, 68; Sacr. 136; Post. 85, 137; Names 123, 237–238; Dreams 1, 30–32, 33; Dreams 2, 180; Spec. Laws 1, 213–215, 218, 304; Spec. Laws 4, 137; Virt. 183; Rewards 80; others are clearly in the context of creation theology, such as Creation 117–118; Alleg. Interp. 1, 12; Alleg. Interp. 2, 6; Worse 90; Dreams 1, 30–32, 33.
13 In making this claim, I want to be clear that I am not saying that ancient scribes simply differed from Descartes on “the mind–body problem,” as though this “problem” were a topic recognizable to any intellectually engaged person throughout history. On this quasi “doctrinal” approach to intellectual history, see Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding,” 3–53.
14 In a discussion of Philo’s thought (e.g., Mut. 184; Leg. 1.38), one recent study notes that “humans stand as a part of the creation, but they also have the ability to transcend the limits of that creation as well.” Furthermore, “without a spark of God’s divine spirit intermingling with humanity’s mortal, bodily existence at the creation, humans would have no hope of reconnecting with God.” See Forger, “Divine Embodiment,” 237.
fortable fit: texts like 1QS 4:20–21 have a qualitative conception of materiality with no place in early-modern thought (cf. above on modern quantitative revisions). Worldly objects could have multiple meanings and participate in higher truths. In Proverbs 1–9, for instance, the is a recurring focus in an ethical-intellectual project and the venue for divinizing human knowledge. The scribal vision in this text block is one where, amidst quasi parent-child relationships, a pupil’s education enables the self’s elevation toward transcendent rationality and even a degree of unity with that rationality. The “physical” and “spiritual” alike were conceptualized in ways different from major early-modern tenets, so that studies of self formation in ancient texts certainly require historical and theoretical care.

Marya Schechtman has recently introduced distinctions that are useful for our considerations. Schechtman is conversant with John Locke, who in 1690 maintained that sameness of person does not require sameness of substance and, moreover, described the self as a forensic concept: “It is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery.” Refining Locke’s case, Schechtman distinguishes between a “moral self” and a potentially metaphysical “forensic unit.” She critiques and expands Locke’s scope of practicality so that law is not essential to personal identity, but also defends him by arguing that conceptions of moral selfhood are finally dependent on a forensic unit. This is her “dependence model” regarding personal identity. She develops the model against “independence models,” whose advocates argue that we should sharply separate metaphysical from practical concerns in analyses of personal identity. According to Schechtman, this separation is not and cannot be so: questions of anyone’s moral responsibility and similar practical concerns are only coherent in view of something like a forensic unit.

What Schechtman means by a forensic unit is, “a suitable target about which particular forensic questions can be raised and judgments made.” To ask what

19 For her discussion of “the expanded practical,” see Staying Alive, 68–88.
20 She develops this model through critical engagement with intellectually diverse “independence models,” represented by naturalistic and Kantian scholars (ibid., 43–67).
21 Ibid., 14. The modal verb “can” in Schechtman’s definition is important, since it allows that selfhood is distinct from a legal framework but that a legal framework and other practical
constitutes this target is “a question whose answer is inherently connected to practical considerations.” By contrast, “to see the limits of a single person as set by the very actions and experiences for which she is in fact held rightly accountable” involves a notion of “person as ‘moral self.’” Trying to ground the envisioned “target” as a substance or entity may invite Cartesian dualism or some other metaphysical theory. And here is where Schechtman’s distinction is illuminating: to label studies of individual selfhood in the Hebrew Bible and related literature as anachronistic because these texts do not aim to ground or elaborate on “soul,” “self,” etc. as isolated substances turns out to be a non sequitur. Even if we assume for the sake of conversation that these texts offer absolutely no written, propositional theory of forensic units, it does not logically follow that they are silent about the moral self. The symbolic motifs of the body mentioned above certainly indicate otherwise, situating agents in multilayered relations of accountability. Schechtman persuasively argues that philosophical conceptions of forensic units depend on and are entangled with practical concerns which lie at the core of human social existence.

1.2 The Self as or in Social Roles?

These broader relational connections recall the influence of heavily socio-centric conceptions of the self or personal identity—one might say, the opposite of stressing a disembodied, ego-centric self. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a topic in anthropological theory was the difference between an originally ancient, primitive mentality and a modern, individualistic Western one. For example, according to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, primitive psychology tends toward collective ideas and collective representations. In contrast to a modern European person, a primitive person is “far less distinct from his group,” with the group being “a living body” and the person being “more completely a member of the group.” Citing this body of research, H.W. Robinson greatly

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22 Schechtman, Staying Alive, 65.
23 Ibid., 15 (original emphasis).
24 See also Sorabji, Self, who notes that “much opposition to the idea of the self ... turns out to be [opposition] to a particular philosophical idea of self ...” (here 4).
25 E.g., see Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality. From a different angle, see the earlier work on cultural evolution in Tylor, Primitive Culture. Tylor viewed evolutionary, historical-ethnographic studies as working to help civilization progress, likening it to active reform: “Thus, active at once in aiding progress and in removing hindrance, the science of culture is essentially a reformer’s science” (here 2:410).
26 Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality, 400.
influenced biblical scholarship through his 1935 paper entitled, “The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality.”

Robinson held that, to the degree that ancient Israel evinces an individualism, it is a partial individualism dependent on a prophetic tradition which in his telling largely postdates the Bible’s pertinent legal material. Israel’s “primitive psychology” involved “the expansion of the individual consciousness to that of the group,” so that the individual and the group were in a fluid relationship, with the group having priority. Later, Robert Di Vito argued similarly that there is a “very different construction of personal identity” between modernity’s conception of the self and the Hebrew Bible, where individual subjects are “relatively transparent, socialized, and embodied,” so that they are “altogether lacking in a sense of ‘inner depths’.” The lack of “inner depths” correlates with the ancient self’s strong embedding within and usual conformity to social roles. Individuals are thus inconceivable aside from, and possibly reducible to, concrete social roles and the identities which those roles convey.

But a strongly socio-centric conception of the self has problems. First, the idea that ancient Israelites had a “corporate” sense of selfhood unlike modern Europeans’ “individualist” selfhood risks treating local observations as timeless analytical scaffolding. Such scaffolding collapses under closer scrutiny. Indeed, anthropological studies of people in allegedly collectivist, non-Western communities indicate not only obedience, but also resistance, toward normative expectations. Second, defining the self strictly in terms of practical, social

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27 The essay was eventually published alongside another one about the individual and the group; see Robinson, Corporate Personality, 25–44 (and p. 31, where Lévy-Bruhl is cited). Robinson held that a theory of corporate personality “largely removes the sharp antithesis between the collective and the individualistic views” (here 38).

28 Ibid., 39, 42.


30 On the denied yet rather unclear phenomenon of “inner depths,” see the responses to Di Vito by Newsom, The Spirit Within Me; and Frevel, “Person—Identität—Selbst,” 65–89. One might add that narratives such as but not limited to the book of Ruth indicate an interest in the inner lives of individual characters, such as the flustered or nervous depiction of Boas’s servant boy. See Hurvitz, “Ruth 2:7,” 121–23; and more recently Holmstedt, Ruth, 117.

31 For a recent affirmation of a view along these lines, see Neumann, “Person,” 362–63.

32 There is hardly just one modern conception of selves, nor are modern outlooks always individualistic in this way. A case in point would be the equally modern theory of intersectionality, where there is a major emphasis on defining individuals in view of their belonging to broader categories of race, gender, sexuality and the like. Worth noting is its articulation by a legal scholar, namely, Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins,” 1241–99.

33 See Spiro, “Western Conception of the Self,” 107–53. Spiro argues that “the Western self and/or its conception is not all that ‘peculiar,’ for the alleged ‘egocentric,’ ‘independent,’
roles is of questionable coherence, raising concerns like what Schechtman calls the problem of multiplicity. Since there are so many practical, social roles that any given individual may simultaneously occupy (e.g., parent; employee; representative at town council; avid supporter of the local football club; etc.), such socio-centric models struggle to account for how, or even whether, there is any unified locus behind the various roles. Such a unity is presupposed in everyday relations and the practices that sustain them; furthermore, this presumed unity is not obviously deniable to ancient Israelite contexts. Socio-centric theories can easily fall short in accounting for that unity, which becomes a problem for an argument like Robinson’s or Di Vito’s. We can fruitfully understand selves as acting in and being formed by social roles without treating them as those roles—which the self’s relation to law can illustrate (see below on the Covenant Code).

Even if cultural conceptions of the self are not coherent or systematic, any culture will have some model(s) of the individual self and its agency. A common coordinate when mapping agency is to situate it “inside” the individual, suggesting a self in control, though agency can also stem from “outside” the individual, suggesting a self more shaped by or under the control of external forces (i.e., that which is non-self), whose sway will inform conceptions of self and agency. Such models may well end up combined. In ancient Jewish literature and its broader environment, the בלב, “heart,” while a bodily organ, belongs to a lengthy history of articulating conceptions of the self in terms of thinking, feeling, desiring, and acting. It is a seat of cognitive, affective, volun-

and ‘autonomous’ Western self is perhaps just as prevalent among non-Western, more particularly some Asian, peoples” (here 142–44). Cf. the argument of Di Vito, “Old Testament Anthropology,” 217–38. Like the earlier theories informing Robinson, Di Vito argues that in contrast to “the modern Western identity,” within ancient Jewish literature “a very different construction of personal identity looms” (here 219, 221). Among other more socio-centric elements, this different view of the self measures authenticity in terms of obedience to social expectations.

To illustrate what I mean by a presumed unity of personhood, consider a mother named Becky and her son John. Generally, Becky probably does not assume of John that, because of his multiple social relations, there is therefore a multiplicity of Johns. Rather, Becky likely assumes that a more fundamental unity is exactly what enables John’s multiple social relations in the first place. The same would also hold for what John assumes of his mother Becky.

According to Lock, a psychologist, “The concepts of self and culture are interdependent: one cannot exist without the other.” See Lock, “Universals in Human Conception,” 19.

Ibid., 34–35.

Like the usages of καρδία in Philo, בלב in the Hebrew Bible exhibits plainly physiological usages, but they are in the minority. See further Janowski, Anthropologie, 148–55.
taristic processes that act into wider relations, retaining the analogy of an individual even when applied to a group. To be sure, the heart’s capacities were not isolated or self-contained. The heart could locate agency within individuals and it could also be subject to forces beyond the individual. It was porous, and sometimes escaped individuals’ self-understanding (e.g., 1 Sam 16:7). Nevertheless, I do not want to stress an inside/outside duality in this study. In the relevant texts, sharp contrasts between these aspects become a bit unstable with physiological terms. Words for body parts like the heart could be about something other than body parts alone, which seem repeatedly to have been symbolic objects pertaining to broader relational connections, be they interpersonal or theological. As shown fragmentarily in the following sketch, the heart belonged to a cultural vocabulary of the self, which we can understand in terms of the moral self, marked by concerns about targets of accountability, praise or blame, and the like.

2 From Royal to Non-royal Portrayals of the Self, “Hearty” and Less “Hearty”

Scholars have traced a West Semitic scribal extension of agency from royal to non-royal figures, helping us to identify interest in individual selves. By the Neo-Assyrian period, there are rather clear indications of an interest in the living units which are capable of filling social roles and bearing responsibility in these roles. Even though neither “heart” terminology nor legal texts were necessary conditions, they did become important factors in scribal portrayals of the moral self. What we know as the Hebrew Bible and related Jewish literature participated in broader cultural discourses, which need not be totally isolated from each other as “biblical,” “Qumran,” and so on. A reason to begin with relatively early texts is to avoid the impression that attention to a non-sociocentric self is

38 On this conceptual metaphor and other issues of agency, see Newsom, “Models of the Moral Self,” 131–35.
39 Lambert is sensitive to the tendency in some modern idealist notions of “self as mind” to present the self as entirely bracketed from the broader world (Lambert, “Refreshing Philology,” 332–56). From denying this self-contained sense of self in and beyond the Hebrew Bible, it does not follow that heart was unimportant for or somehow unidentifiable with fundamental human capacities; see the discussion of heart as addressing a correspondence between a subject’s inner life and outer, material context in Janowski, Anthropologie, 152.
40 “Control” can also come from “outside” of the individual. See Heelas, “The Model Applied,” 39–41; for examples in biblical texts of how the heart is depicted in some writings as regulated by human agents and in other writings by God, see Lasater, Facets of Fear, 70–97.
a latecomer in the history of ancient Jewish literature and its intellectual environment. A few sources can be illustrative for our purposes, beginning with a couple less “hearty” texts, lest we suppose that there could be no self without corporeal terminology to designate it.

Monumental inscriptions enabled rulers to mediate their presence in material form, so that anyone who read or heard or saw an inscribed message would be reminded of a figure’s mighty deeds. A1 An example dating to the late 9th century Levant is the Mesha stela, which is the first alphabetic inscription known to address an audience in a vernacular, first-person voice. The central protagonist is introduced in the opening line: “I am Mesha, the son of Kemosh[-yatti], the king of Moab, the Dibonite.” A2 The voice purports to be a royal one and the audience is purely implied; “you” the reader are never actually acknowledged. When other agents are mentioned by name, it is in the third person and generally limited to other rulers and the Moabite god Kemosh, whose spoken revelation to king Mesha is mentioned twice (l. 14, wy’mr.ly.kmš; and l. 32, [wy]’mr.ly.kmš). Bolstered by revealed instruction from Kemosh, the inscription presents Mesha as the one who politically unified Moab by defeating enemies as well as incorporating local sub-state groups into early Moab. A3 A royal I declares that “I was king” (l. 2); “I made” (l. 3); “I built” (l. 9); “I captured … and I killed” (l. 10); “I have added to the land” (l. 29); and the like. On the terms of this stela, agency and understanding are a king’s prerogative and his deeds amount to the story, where nothing is filled in by a “you.” The story is a basis for assessing Mesha as a successful king. The inscription is a tangible, enclosed affirmation of him as an individual agent in this role.

Of course, monumental inscriptions are not the only writings. Out of public view, the 8th century Siloam tunnel inscription in Jerusalem exhibits the aspect of story, but the story is not a king’s. Instead, it recounts the accomplishment of non-royal workers who, with hand-held picks, had broken through limestone and dolomite for the sake of an engineering project. Their agency is recalled in an act of writing whose focus is the past “story” or “account” itself (l. 1, wzh hyh dbr, “This was the account…”). A4 And around the same time in the 8th century Amos traditions, prophecy is loosened from the royal institutions in which it had been situated. We find stories focusing on Amos, with prophetic revelation

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41 On the various ways in which ancient inscriptions “spoke” to those we would deem both “literate” and “illiterate,” see Mandell, “Reading and Writing,” 256–57; see also Sanders, *Invention of Hebrew,* 114–16.
42 Smelik, “The Inscription of King Mesha,” in *cos* 2.
aimed beyond and at times against kings by a protagonist like Amos who traditionally did not qualify as a prophet at all but who, like Mesha, received and then acted on divine instruction (7:10–15; in v. 15, note זה). In this period, Levantine scribal activity displays an extension of agency and revelatory channels beyond kings into a kind of public. The agency of the Siloam tunnel excavators and a herdsman like Amos generated stories that did not serve royal interests in any straightforward way. Both writing and the nature of reading underwent changes that were conducive to conscious interest in nonroyal selves.

During the same general time in the Levant, law was detached from its royal moorings and legal texts addressed a public. An expanded scope for agency was being presupposed. This change is important for thinking about a scribal definition of selves in ancient Israel. Even though conceptions of the self probably differed from a ghost-like Cartesian soul, the self was hardly interchangeable with a social role(s). Predating its current Pentateuchal context, the Covenant Code is the Hebrew Bible’s oldest legal collection and can illustrate this point. First, unlike the Mesha inscription whose narrating “I” tells an enclosed story which never explicitly acknowledges readers or hearers, the Covenant Code’s non-royal “I” speaks to “you” readers or hearers and requires “your” participation. It seems crafted in a way that invites being filled in. Second and relatedly, the Covenant Code’s legal categories divide up social life into various roles, such as buyer, seller, master, slave, neighbor, stranger, and the like. The “you” whom the Covenant Code addresses is distinct from any particular social role named therein; instead, the “you” typifies a prior foren-
sic unit capable of becoming one or another of these social roles and bearing accountability for them. The Covenant Code is involved in defining a non-royal, legal self whose potential actions are, eventually at least, set against the background of an exodus story. The idea seems to be that the addressed self’s actions contribute to the narrative’s continuation.49 This legal collection’s first documented reception is in Deuteronomy, which maintains and heightens the Covenant Code’s attention to “you,” developing a character or personalizing “you” with heart imagery. The legal self addressed in Deuteronomy tends to be deemed capable of responsible agency if that agency is based on a chosen submission to and knowledge of revealed instruction (e.g., Deut 4:10; 14:23; 17:29; 31:12–13). But Deuteronomy is just one overheard part of a larger discussion in which both human capabilities and the causal networks in which they are situated are depicted differently.

In this cluster of preexilic cultural shifts, writings can zero in on the individual, and we see “heart” imagery supplying a terminology of selfhood or personal identity. Engraved on an ostraca, Lachish 3 is a piece of early 6th century correspondence between a soldier named Hoshayahu, who expresses personal irritation at some earlier, written correspondence from his commander Yaush. The letter is non-royal agency preserved in clay, with debatable status as a case of “official Hebrew.”50 An important reason is that Hoshayahu himself distances his ability to read and write from professional scribes’ instruction or input: like Amos the prophet who was not a “real” prophet, Hoshayahu is a scribe who is not a “real” scribe. He exhibits a “mastery of messages... between media and participants,”51 including divine revelation from a prophet (ll. 19–21, where he passes on content אבנהתאמ, “from the prophet”). Hoshayahu’s self assessment and defense occupy the bulk of the letter, where he complains about Yaush’s presuming that Hoshayahu would need external help even for

49 One wonders whether something like a narrative conception of selfhood is operative behind the Covenant Code and thus at the foundation of biblical law. The Covenant Code initiates a development where persons participate in laws and laws end up becoming personified. On “idealized biographies” in Philo, as well as the idea that “the enacted laws... may be properly regarded as memorials of the lives of the patriarchs,” see Najman, Seconding Sinai, 89–91. For more on narrative selfhood, see Nelson, “Narrative,” 17–36; and also Schechtman, “The Narrative Self,” 395–416.

50 Discussions of “official Hebrew” have focused on a linguistic competency that may characterize professional scribes; see Schniedewind, “Sociolinguistic Reflections,” 157–67. See more recently Rollston, Writing and Literacy, who likewise separates the Lachish letters from professional scribes but holds that “literate elites” extended beyond scribes per se into the “broader officialdom” (129).

51 Sanders, Invention of Hebrew, 144.
basic reading comprehension: “As YHWH lives, no one has ever ventured calling a scribe for me!” (ll. 9–10).52 Near the beginning of this remarkably personal letter, the soldier introduces his complaint by telling Yaush to “open the ear of your servant” regarding the earlier, offensive letter (Hif. חצרמרסילארקלשיאהסנמאהוהיח, see ll. 4–5). Hoshayahu wants this clarification “because the ה ל of your servant has been ill ever since you sent [it] to your servant” (ll. 6–7). This “illness” of ה ל is said to result from personal offense rooted in inadequate interpersonal understanding, so that affective and cognitive concerns are present in Hoshayahu’s evaluation of his relationship with Yaush (ueblo, “to be ill, sick”; in Lev 12:2, “to menstruate”). Going beyond strictly mandatory details for communication, a reference to the ה ל’s “illness” helps articulate an individual’s self-presentation in terms of damage done and aspirations toward repair. Hoshayahu senses that Yaush has fallen short of the expectations that define their relationship; this sense seems to look past their social roles and toward the soldier’s sense of self, which Hoshayahu illustrates through “sickness” of the ה ל. While the ה ל’s entanglement in social networks of accountability challenges some modern dualist outlooks on the self,53 the heart is not reducible to social roles per se. More fundamentally, it echoes an assumption of discrete life units which are capable of adopting stances of relatedness, agency, accountability, vulnerability, and formation. The ה ל belongs to cultural models of personal identity or selfhood.54

Whether we consider Lachish 3 or the Pentateuch’s legal traditions, the use of ה ל in filling out relations of accountability overlaps with ideas of a moral self. The above distinction between a potentially metaphysical forensic unit, on the one hand, and a moral self, on the other, is instructive for clarifying what we are tracking in ancient Jewish literature. The moral self is more at the forefront in our textual witnesses. And while it certainly appears outside of texts deemed legal, legal traditions play a prominent role. This anthropological role of legalities has been overlooked. The self is a significant element of legal discourse in ancient Jewish scriptures, whose traditions of law are now being helpfully assessed in less isolating ways.55 Legalities participated in, and served as vehicles for, cultural conceptualizations and adaptations of selfhood.

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52 Without altering the point much, this statement could also be rendered as, “As YHWH lives, no one has ever ventured reading a letter to me!”
53 See the precautions voiced in Lambert, “Refreshing Philology,” here 347.
54 For a focus on different texts, see Newsom, “Sin Consciousness,” 225–37. Newsom argues that “the heart, in particular, has a distinctive role in relation to emotion, volition, and reflection” (here 226).
3 Legal Selves in the S Tradition

Portrayals of the self in Neo-Babylonian and later texts have been fruitfully discussed recently, with notable publications by Carol A. Newsom, Susan Niditch, and Maren Niehoff. For this edition of *Dead Sea Discoveries*, I will briefly discuss legal texts discovered in the caves at Qumran as a way to retain a focus on law’s contribution to self formation. A fundamental notion of personal identity in terms of forensic units is what gives rise to motifs such as בָּל articulating the moral self. The heart is not some isolated entity. Even for corporate metaphors to make sense, the בָּל has to be graspsable as someone’s בָּל, the בָּל of x, with x being an analogized agent(s) capable of bearing accountability. Legalities had long been important for articulations of moral selfhood, and the Scrolls can be contextualized as part of this wider discussion.

The growth of Israel’s legal traditions helped foster a pointed interest in the moral self. When questions ostensibly raised in the Sinai Narrative (Exodus 19–24) are taken up in Deuteronomy 4–5 and 30, these post-exilic supplements to Deuteronomy’s preexilic legal core (12–26) affirm moral agents’ ability to embody revealed law through carefully disciplining the heart, while also calling this same ability into question. On the one hand, divine speech in Deut 5:29 suggests that if there is to be alignment between Israel’s בָּל and “all of my commandments,” that alignment will be achieved by Israel. Accountability can be followed up by right action. Deuteronomy 5:29 resembles the circumcision metaphor from an earlier layer, where “you” are told to remove the “foreskin” of “your” hearts for the sake of submitting properly to God and fulfilling the revealed commandments and statutes (Deut 10:12–19, with 2nd person plural בָּל in vv. 12, 16). The heart can successfully be regulated by human agents. On the other hand, possibly informed by an outlook akin to the new covenant oracle of Jeremiah 31, Deuteronomy 30 insists on revealed...
law’s accessibility to human agents. But this text attributes the heart’s positive capacity for revelation to a prior divine agency. יְהֹוָה here is the subject of המל, a divine act that enables obedience to the revealed commandments (30:6, 8). Unlike הנב וּבָא in Jer 31:33, Deut 30:14 leaves unsaid how revelation arrives בפִּי וּבְלֵבֶךָ, “in your mouth and in your heart.” What is clear is that human agents are deemed accountable in this respect and so need to undergo formation conducive to closing the gap between themselves and revealed instruction. Such an alignment indicates good covenantal standing, but not being so formed raises questions about where the problem lies: with moral agents, with the instruction itself, with God, or some other possibility? Grappling with people’s success or failure to align with revealed instruction occupied various Second Temple compositions, which maintain heart terminology for understanding moral selves and their accountability to revealed instruction. This is certainly the case in the writings discovered at Qumran, where earlier traditions like the Covenant Code exhibit ongoing vitality (e.g., Exod 23:7 in 1QS 5:15).63

Among the best preserved and theologically multifaceted Qumran texts to engage these issues of selfhood are legal compositions. The Community Rule continues to be considered as an example of legal writing, having emerged over time through a process of literary growth, which was borne of interpretive engagement with prior writings64 and the community’s own internal changes (i.e., reflected in 1QS and its earlier forms).65 By presenting a relatively local social life and, eventually, humankind as a whole through generalizing, abstract categories and rules, the Community Rule illustrates a recurrent feature of law across cultures.66 Law tends toward generalization and abstraction, and its rules depend on assumed categories which are distinct from social fact. Categories in 1QS like “the sons of light” (1QS 3:13, 24, 25) and “the sons of iniquity” (3:21) are distinct from any concrete group or individuals; they are abstractions into which persons are situated. In the Community Rule, the most far-reaching anthropological generalizations fall within the Two Spirits Treatise (3:13–4:26), which, despite a well known paleographic anomaly, likely belongs to the latest layers of S.67 This portion of 1QS contains usages of בל that are “more compre-

63 On the issue of written traditions’ vitality, see Najman, “The Vitality of Scripture,” 497–518.
64 Bakker, “Wisdom,” 141–53.
65 See the recent discussion in Zahn, Genres of Rewriting, 123–26. See also Stuckenbruck, “The Interiorization of Dualism,” 145–68, who argues that the Two Spirits Treatise reflects a community’s “history of ups and downs” (here 166).
66 On the non-pejorative idea of “legalism” as understood by legal anthropologists, see Pirie, The Anthropology of Law.
67 Cave 4’s shorter fragments (4QSb, 4Qsd, and 4Qse) are dated later on paleographic grounds, but likely represent earlier stages of the S tradition than does 1QS. In addition
hensive in scope,” basically indicating “human nature as a whole” and thus being a target of cosmic forces—powers of light and darkness, holiness and iniquity (see 1QS 4:2 and בְּלָבָב נֶר in 1QS 4:23). The Treatise’s broad assessment of human moral capacity grew out of what Charlotte Hempel designates S’s “constitutional core” (i.e., at least 1QS 5–7, 8). After examining this core, I want to note an implication of this literary history for understanding portrayals of the self in ancient Jewish literature.

What occupies 1QS 5–7, 8 are practical considerations about voluntarily joining the community and maintaining good standing within it. Matters to which members are held accountable include “torah, property, judgement, practicing faithfulness together with humility, righteous justice, devoted love, and carefully going in all their ways” (1QS 5:3–4). In contrast to this virtuous life, lines 4–6 state the following:

May no man go in the stubbornness of his בְּלָבָב, erring after his בְּלָבָב and his eyes and and the thoughts of his inclination (וּרְצוֹ). Rather, he is to circumcise in the community the foreskin of (his) inclination and stiff neck, to establish a foundation of truth for Israel, the community of the eternal covenant.

This passage addresses accountability in the community, whose leadership needs to be able to assess members’ standing positively or negatively—i.e.,

to reflecting traditional text-critical guidelines, this kind of literary growth is a common thread among what became “biblical” and “non-biblical” writings alike. For further discussion, see Porzig, “Textgeleitete und gruppenbezogene Auslegungsprozesse,” 87–111; Zahn, Genres of Rewriting, 120–24, here 124. And also Collins, Beyond the Qumran Community.

68 Stuckenbruck, “The ‘Heart’ in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 450.


70 Different from the usage in 51, 2, this case of יְדֵי seems to be a preposition.

71 In the phrasing והרי לא אלישע את נֶר, the relative particle introduces the jussive (see further DCH 1:432).

72 Note the shorter version in 4QSב,ח; going astray in the stubbornness of the בְּלָבָב seems more defined here in 1QS, where בְּלָבָב is treated more overtly as a source of error.
to identify someone as deserving praise, blame, reward, punishment, and the like. Accordingly, there is an interpersonal dimension of accountability involving an individual’s relation to others (l. 2), as well as an ethical-theological dimension involving the individual’s alignment with the virtues listed in ll. 3–4. The בל is situated in, and measured by, more than one role at once: not only relations with fellow community members, but also theological relations to “truth for Israel” and “the eternal covenant.” Resembling the metaphors from pentateuchal law mentioned above, the Community Rule appears wary of its members’ unaided moral capacity, suggesting in tune with Deut 5:29 that the human heart can nonetheless be effectively regulated by good discipline. Whatever makes the heart prone to error goes unspecified (perhaps the answer is among תורתסנה, “the hidden things,” 5:11). The point is that the البل should and can incline in one way rather than another. Moral selfhood is expressed through physiological terms whose meanings include but go well beyond physiology. The blend of bodily metaphors is a case in point, with בל and רצי overlapping due to the latter’s role here in a circumcision metaphor where البل would be expected (cf. Deut 5:29 and 1QS 5:5). Any would-be member is the subject of מהל, and it is “his רצי” and “his البل” that are in view. Contextually, the emphasis is the practical accountability of a legal abstraction: him. As a legal abstraction rather than a personal reference, such accountability may well have been perceived as a possibility for the community’s men and women alike. This local, practical emphasis shows in the next statements about atonement and bearing guilt within the community, whose members in theory pursue an orientation toward an ongoing revelation with the “whole” البل and “whole” שפנ (1QS 5:8–9). Even though no explicit theorizing of a forensic unit beneath the moral agency is provided, terms like البل presuppose and convey basic notions of living units capable of occupying and acting in variegated roles with responsibility. Without this presupposition which is similar to Schechtman’s dependency model, the Community Rule’s practical concerns are themselves unsustainable.

Near the end of column 5, the interpersonal dynamics of البل are in play amid a broader discussion of examining, forming, and hopefully “elevating” (Hif. הלע, l. 24) rather than “detaining” (Piel רחא, l. 24) moral agents for the sake of reflect-

73 This revelation includes Mosaic torah and that which is revealed to “to the sons of Zadok.” A concern about only “some of” the heart inclining toward the community’s revealed standards is perhaps implied, but likewise unaddressed in this text. Other Second Temple period texts regarding law are more interested in this concern—one case being Psalm 86. Lasater, “Law for what ails the heart,” 652–68. For discussion of Ben Sira in comparison with the Scrolls, see Stuckenbruck, “The Interiorization of Dualism.”
ing the community’s standards. Some of the same standards from 5:3–4 are repeated (in ll. 25, one again finds אתּה תֲסַפָּה, דַעְתָּה, and אֶתְוָה תַחוּשֶּׁה).  

A man should reprove his friend in truth, humility, and devoted love for a man. He should not speak to his brother in anger or murmurings or with a [stiff] neck [or jealous] spirit of wickedness. Nor should he hate him [in the foreskin] of his בבל. For in [that] day he should reprove him, lest he bear iniquity because of him.

Column 5 has an ending reminiscent of its beginning. Line 25 repeats a portion of the community’s virtue rubric (ll. 3–4), perhaps with an interest in virtues that bolster human relationships: truth, humility, and devoted love. These interpersonal virtues are then contrasted with a string of prohibited, vicious qualities that include not only a “spirit of wickedness” but also an uncircumcised בבל of “hatred” toward another community member. These are distinct problems. The “spirit of wickedness” may be be a mode of vicious speech (see earlier in the sentence: … בְּשָׁרוֹר תָּכְעַשׁ). Hating another picks up on incomplete formation of the בבל—in this case, if the textual reconstruction with תְוָא is correct, it is a matter of failing to form the heart rightly as indicated by the foreskin image. The heart’s formation or lack thereof directly impacts the quality of interpersonal relations in the community, so that habituation in the named virtues counters the unregulated בבל for the sake of the group’s stability, on the one hand, and its members’ recognizability as in fact ethically belonging to it, on the other. At least in principle, intentional self-regulation via group discipline can meet the challenge of maintaining the community’s ethical-theological identity. The context where בּלב articulates moral selfhood is a practical concern of fostering and prolonging a particular identity, namely, being or becoming a self molded into covenant community. Like earlier pentateuchal legalities, these writings supply a venue for handling concerns with the self.

Contextually, reading אֶלֶּה לֶא meaning “to, toward” is tempting, but the problem then of course becomes the apparent suffix אֶלֶּה לֶא. For the emendation “his brother,” see Hempel, The Community Rules From Qumran, 156–57.

The only other clear instance of the phrase “spirit of wickedness” is not a mode of speech. In 4Q511 frag. 1:6, there is a plural case of עֵשֶׁר חֵור, which references hostile forces that in theory are capable of “going about” (וּלְכָלָה), even if not in the envisioned region.
This terminology for the self appears twice more in the earlier layers of S. Both are in column 7, which belongs to a set of ordinances that began in column 6 about offenses and their attendant penalties (see 6:24, אֶלָּמְחָאָת, “These are the ordinances ...”). Here, the first case of בל in ll. 18–19 considers someone whose lapse results in a penalty of two years upon rejoining the community. The second case in ll. 23–24 considers someone whose lapse results in disqualification from “the community council,” with which he was previously affiliated (see l. 22). Each statement relates an individual’s “spirit” to a problematic activity (“trembling,” “betraying,” “leaving”), and it seems to be the same spirit capable of “going in the stubbornness of his בל.”

As for the man whose spirit falters from the community’s foundation, betraying the truth and going in the stubbornness of his بل—if he returns, he shall be punished for two years.

7:18–19

With a man’s “spirit” as the subject of the main feminine singular verb (זָעֵ, “to wobble, falter”), infinitives list two results before speaking of “the man’s” return (שָׁבָע, masculine singular). His spirit’s faltering leads to a betrayal of the truth and acting in the stubbornness of his בל. Despite remaining undeveloped, 7:18–19 appears to connect someone’s spirit with the operation of the בל, so that the former fashions the latter. What exactly performs this “betrayal” and “going” in the heart’s stubbornness? Are these activities done by the spirit itself or by the man? Is the referenced spirit that of the man himself, i.e., a disposition to be disciplined, or might the spirit have some standing independent of the man, i.e., a non-human or divine force that can steer human agency? The quality of a moral self’s formation is somehow an outgrowth of spirit, but spirit’s understood role in the “stubbornness” of بل is not precise.

1QS 7:23–24 makes a comparable point.

76 On this phrase and its place within the community’s development, Hempel, “The Damascus Document and 1QSa,” 60 n. 32.
... and whose spirit (re)turns,\textsuperscript{77} betraying the community, and he goes away from the many, going in the stubbornness of his בל, he shall never return to the community council.

7:23–24

Manuscript damage just before הבשו complicates the reading. But if the sentence structure of ll. 23–24 actually parallels that of ll. 18–19, the similarity in content may warrant reading the initial form הבשו as a main verb; “his spirit” as subject; and an infinitive construct indicating a result. That is, his spirit’s (re)turn effects a betrayal of the community, so that a member goes away from the many and walks in the stubbornness of his בל. The link between spirit and the condition of the בל is slightly less direct here than in ll. 18–19, but a link is nonetheless discernible. The S tradition’s earlier stages display awareness of moral agents’ volatility and vulnerability to influence, using בל as an anthropological term for reflecting on the self’s condition. The intelligibility of the moral self’s condition is a crucial consideration in 1QS 5–9:26, whose practical concerns prioritize community belonging and therefore S itself as a kind of legal rubric for helping to identify whether or not individuals are in good standing—i.e., whether they are oriented toward divine wisdom. At least in this respect, as legal literature, S is in the business of fostering practical rationality, guiding a community of moral agents in pursuit of transcendent rationality that transforms the self.\textsuperscript{78}

The \textit{yaḥad} would presumably take it for granted that column 7’s cases of someone’s lapse or betrayal were not indicative of each and every member. If S’s instruction is supposed to carry relevance for all members,\textsuperscript{79} the good standing of some in view of the suboptimal or bad standing of others could inspire efforts to clarify why the community experiences regression or internal wear and tear. Does the shortcoming lie with the community’s instruction, with the moral agents themselves, or a combination of factors? How might the issues

\textsuperscript{77} Aside from the hypothetical reconstruction in 4Q259 2:6, which is taken to parallel 1QS 7, I cannot find another case where מוהא is the subject of Qal הבשו (for Hiphil, see 4Q46 frag. 2 4:8). I leave the exact nuance of the verb open: either “return” or “turn.”

\textsuperscript{78} On the transcendent nature and transformative effect of wisdom in S and 4QInstruction, see Bakker, “Sages and Saints,” 106–18. I would add that a deeply comparable conception of wisdom informs the somewhat earlier instructions of Proverbs 1–9, where wisdom is likewise transcendent and, if acquired, seemingly transformative too.

\textsuperscript{79} This seems possible even if the manual was intended for use by the leadership, who still would have seen S as legitimate grounds for assessing the standing of subordinates. See Alexander, “Predestination,” 37–39. Alexander argues differently for the redaction-historical place of the Two Spirits Treatise (cf. n. 66 above).
above surrounding הור and בל inform questions about the community’s sense of internal order and stability? A recurring feature of legal traditions, with 1QS being no exception, is a drive toward making distinctions and clarifying ambiguities like those noted in column 7 on the moral self (e.g., how “spirit” relates to בל, etc.). 80 Tracing the בל motif seems to affirm redaction-historical arguments that 1QS expanded because of ongoing reflection on “problems arising in the community that centered on the question of what makes a person a member of the yaḥad.” 81 Indeed, the perceived unreliability of the בל could lead to self-critical reflection and a desire for a more detached standpoint from which to understand and recognize individuals’ standing more fully, pressing beyond the intentionally local focus of S’s earlier layers and into more universalizing categories of human nature. 82 Such complications of personal identity are taken up in later layers of S like column 1 and the Two Spirits Treatise (3:13–4:26), whose more systematized outlook on the self responds to ambiguities in understanding the inconsistent volatility of the human בל. From an aim of fostering practical rationality and agency, this legal tradition moves toward taxonomically accounting for practical rationality and agency and their variability.

Because of space constraints, we can mostly limit ourselves to the בל in order to see S’s transition from a background of practical considerations toward “the moral universe of human action” (on 7:18–19, 23–34, see above). 83 The בל continues to ground talk of moral agents’ accountability in various roles, be they one’s responsibility toward the community or toward God. Near the beginning of 1QS which defines the community’s objectives (1:1–20), one finds the notion of going in “the stubbornness of the בל,” though here בל is qualified as a “guilty בל” (פשעתי בל אסם בל) in conjunction with “lecherous eyes” and doing “every evil thing” (1:6–7). The idea of בלותוריםיש had previously been understandable as individual instances of failing to submit to authority, but here it seems pertinent to a problematic condition of human capacities. Volunteering oneself for and being “unified” (לחיות) with divine council is a corrective measure (1:8). 84 Rather than a straightforward notion that community membership

80 See Pirie, The Anthropology of Law, 131–57.
82 Stuckenbruck, “The Interiorization of Dualism.”
84 Like column 5, though, the assumption seems still to be that moral selves intentionally build their own fates. Cf. Proverbs 1–9, where a similar vision of unity with divine instruction is transformative but less plainly corrective of the self (with wisdom as divine knowledge, see Prov 25–6, 10).
ameliorates the heart’s stubbornness, we hear of a basic anthropological division between “sons of light” and “sons of darkness” (1:9, 10). Although 1:6–7 offers no explanation of what causes the dual taxonomy, the division can help ground the reality of lapses and fidelity alike.

Spirit’s connection to לְבֵן is resumed in column 2. In the priests’ and Levites’ blessings and curses, we read of the heart’s attachment to “idols” (אָרוֹן בְּנַלְיָל) and that someone’s spirit will be wiped out after presuming that he can have peace despite “going in the stubbornness of my לְבֵן” (בְּשָׁר יָהִיא לְבֵן). The fictionalized, individual member speaks of their own לְבֵן, laying claim to agency. Like in column 7, at some level “his spirit” correlates with agency, and agency in turn is located in the sphere of לְבֵן (also with רוּח, see 7:18–19, 23–24; cf. רְחֵם וַלַּעֲקר). The topic resurfaces in 2:26 for someone who dismisses covenantal belonging for the sake of “walking in this stubbornness of his לְבֵן” (לְלָכַת בְּשָׁר יָהִיא לְבֵן), which is related to “his soul” (מַשֶּׁש) standing opposed to “the knowledge of just judgements” (2:26–31). Privation of knowledge here is akin to a privation of goodness or “uprightness” in human capacities; human capacities themselves seem inept (זָדַע וַתְּכִיד). Those who refuse covenant status are not “justified” in “pursuing” their own לְבֵן, with human agents’ distorted prudential capacities perceiving (הִסָּכִים לִבְרֵר יָאֹר) darkness as though it were light (לְבֵן וּכְלִיל מְבָרֵר). This portion of 1QS takes a step toward extending the לְבֵן into a conception of human nature as compromised from within. However, once the compromise’s cause is specified, it grows harder to see the extent to which members would be warranted in laying claim to their agency, triggering some difficulty for understanding what grounds the community’s internal stability or lack thereof.

This murkier status of human agency becomes evident within the Two Spirits Treatise. After mentioning divinely created “spirits of light and darkness” (ברְאָל רְחֵם וָלַעֲקר), column 4 brings them to bear upon the human heart per se, which is in need of divine light—and that light perhaps comes through a repaired capacity to “submit to” divine law (4:2 לֹבָב אֵת מַדָּע; note מַדָּע אָשׁ, “to fear, submit to” in relation to law; cf. Psa 86:11). Whether or not we read this portion of 1QS as supposing a determinism that only reduces or actually eliminates human agency, divine agency is prior. And with either reading, the outcome is a conception of moral selfhood expressed paradigmatically in claims about “the

85 This same person is identified as at odds with “the sons of light” (see 3:16). On the phrasing רוּחַ in comparison with 4Q86, see Popović, “Light and Darkness,” 161–62 with n. 34.
86 In l. 3, לְבֵן וַלַּעֲקר, the Hif. inf. רְחֵם אָשׁ, “to search out, investigate” seems to maintain a claim of intentionality in how the moral self is formed.
87 The sense of “fear” terminology along these lines has to do with submission to authority and proper agency (Lasater, Facets of Fear, 23–25, 95–97, 130–32).
of man.” This anthropological faculty is what houses a struggle between “the spirits of truth and iniquity,” whose outworking is evinced practically through ethical-sociological divides (4:23, בלתבה יבר). From a locally oriented legal composition, then, 1QS generates an expansive outlook on selfhood where spirit is a divinely grounded, dualistic force which molds human moral agency. That agency is expressed through the condition of בלת.

Indeed, over the course of S’s literary history, we see traces of how the legal tradition’s theoretical conception of selfhood is an outgrowth of concrete, relational concerns in the יחד, bolstering the claims of Locke and Schectman that the self is rooted in or grounded by practical concerns—i.e., that the self is a kind of forensic concept. Its longer term treatment in ancient Israel’s legal traditions invites fresh thinking on the self and law alike. Law here is a generative, open-ended project that works to include, define, foster, problematize, refine, and transform the self.

4 Concluding Remarks for Moving Forward

We have seen that the moral self, often conveyed by terms like בלת, is a significant thread in ancient Jewish literature, and that legalities are a recurring medium for articulating conceptions of selfhood. It is unconvincing to dismiss studies of how individual selves were conceptualized by claiming they are necessarily anachronistic and dualistic, or by claiming that individual selves are a modern Western concern—an idea copyrighted by modernity, so to speak. The normative facets of concrete relationships are explicitly, and repeatedly, a focus in ancient Jewish writings, where human agents are characterized in terms of accountability or a lack thereof for their actions and experiences (Covenant Code; the S tradition; for a non-legal text, see Lachish 3, etc.). This focus characterizes what Schechtman calls the moral self, distinguishing but not detaching it from a potentially metaphysical forensic unit—i.e., the precise target or bearer of accountability defined propositionally as a substance, consciousness, or the like. The two are not equally explicit in our texts, but Schechtman’s dependence model suggests that overt attention to moral selfhood points to underlying conceptions of forensic units, which are premised on practical concerns. In conversation with Locke, her framing of selfhood as a forensic concept is important for this study of ancient Jewish legalities,

89 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 346.
opening up fresh avenues for thinking about the self and law alike in ancient scribal literature.

This model of dependence between moral selves and forensic units is a productive angle for considering the growth of the Scrolls’ legal S tradition, where a focus on local, practical concerns became itself a target of reflection which led scribes at least in the direction of unpacking a more philosophical, abstract forensic unit (i.e., בֵּית and הַיָּד in a conjoined relation which accounts for moral agency in a universalized “heart of man”; 1QS 4:23). A later layer like the Two Spirits Treatise (3:13–4:26) fills in interpretive gaps by explicating fundamental matters of why moral agency is the way it is.90 Put differently, S’s literary history moves from texts that help foster moral agency toward texts that account for moral agency and its volatility. This movement illustrates law’s tension-filled, internal drive toward abstraction, increased distinctions, definitions, and clarifications of what preceding legal phases leave unsaid. The Treatise may therefore be understood not as a separable redaction, but as a case of support for Schectman’s thesis that forensic units are bound to practical conceptions of moral selves in concrete relationships. Scribal attention to selfhood within a legal framework goes well beyond S too, being part of a wider legal discourse rooted in earlier texts. Law here is generative and open-ended—a scribal project that includes, defines, fosters, problematizes, refines, and transforms the self. But further discussion of the self’s forensic journey will have to await a future study.

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90 Notably, this addition to a legal tradition appears to mark not a rejection of what preceded, but a synthesizing effort that retains what preceded.


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