Introduction

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The contributions to this volume describe developments in Danish philosophy over the last century, with special emphasis on its interaction with international trends. In this Introduction, I shall try to extract some overall tendencies from the full collection of papers, against the backdrop of certain far-reaching organizational changes in current Danish (and international) academia.

1 The Impact of the International Philosophical Schools

In our call for papers, we asked our contributors to relate modern Danish philosophy to the great international philosophical “schools” or “traditions.” Although we suggested a couple of these, viz. positivism and phenomenology, we left it to our contributors to decide which philosophical endeavors would qualify for that title, thereby leaving them plenty of room to maneuver. One lesson to be learned from the contributions received is that the names that would be on anybody’s list of significant traditions from the beginning of the 20th century have indeed made themselves clearly felt and continue to live on in Danish philosophy at the beginning of the 21st century. Logical positivism had a stronghold at the University of Copenhagen during the early 20th century thanks to Jørgen Jørgensen. Logical positivism reinforced the classical positivism of Comte with doctrines from logic and the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of “linguistic analysis” would live on in its later ordinary language incarnation mainly at the universities of Aarhus and Odense. Today, the original engine of analytic philosophy, viz. the philosophy of language, seems to have run out of steam globally, and in current Danish philosophy, the analytic school seems to be most vital in applied ethics – a somewhat ironic turn given that ethical statements were declared to be strictly meaningless in the days of Old Vienna. Another dominant school is phenomenology, where Danish philosophers indeed contribute to the recent revival of Husserlian phenomenology. The traditions of hermeneutics and existentialism as

well have representatives in contemporary Danish philosophy, as this volume demonstrates.

The papers in this volume also show that the Danish reception of these great traditions has rarely been a matter of observing strict orthodoxy: Danish philosophers would typically mix them with local traditions. Jørgen Jørgensen's reception of the tenets of logical positivism was heavily inflected with a Danish empiricist tradition whose main figure was Harald Høffding. The version of ordinary language philosophy adopted at the universities of Copenhagen and Odense carried strong influences from the philosophical reflections of Niels Bohr, while in Aarhus, Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy would be fused with Marxist philosophy of *praxis*. The modern Copenhagen revival of phenomenology mixes the Husserlian heritage with elements from analytic philosophy. The most prominent recent Danish representative of hermeneutics melded this tradition with a version of existentialism with an unmistakable Kierkegaardian imprint. An exception to the trend may be the Danish representatives of analytic moral philosophy who, as the reader will learn, see their work as fitting fairly smoothly into the tradition of analytic philosophy. It might be noted, however, that the focus upon applied ethics in itself represents a rather fastidious selection out of the rich heritage of analytic philosophy.

To some extent, the distinctiveness of the Danish reception springs from contingencies, such as the emergence of a philosophically inclined physicist of international stature in the person of Niels Bohr. Still, there may be a more general factor at play. Denmark is geographically placed at the periphery of the European land mass with its dominant traditions. Moreover, Danes speak their own native language which shields them from the powerful intellectual influence that comes from having one of the major European languages as your mother tongue. Together, these circumstances allow Danish academics considerable freedom of maneuver. In philosophy, this makes for a pragmatic attitude with respect to the grand traditions. There is considerable suspicion towards all-encompassing philosophical systems and towards philosophers who stick to a dogmatic party line.

2 Any New Schools?

The continued importance in current Danish philosophy of the "great schools" of philosophy from the first half of the previous century mirrors the international situation. This raises an obvious question: Did the second half of the 20th century fail to produce similar collective efforts of broad philosophical

scope, organized around a set of shared research questions and agreed-on ways to address them? The apparent lack of obvious candidates could be a perspectival illusion: it is a well-known problem of writing contemporary history that existing patterns may not be evident to the observer, only to become obvious in the perspective of future historians. Clearly, important developments took place in international philosophy in the second part of the 20th century, and did indeed influence Danish philosophy. But they would not naturally be called “schools,” which may indicate a genuine difference between the typical organizational pattern of pre- and post-ww2 philosophy. Philosophers from the early part of the previous century would proudly declare themselves members of a school or even a “movement” and did not wait for historians of philosophy to so label them. Logical positivists saw themselves as a movement (cf. Chapter 1), and so did early phenomenologists. The same applies to the first generation of Critical Theory, although the appellation of the “Frankfurt School” may be a later invention. Most modern philosophers – which we may roughly define as those born after ww2 – shy away from such collectivism and doctrinal regimentation, however. Today, there is a fear among philosophers of being defined by a particular “ism.” When a wave of young French philosophers of the mid-1970s referred to themselves simply as the “new philosophers,” this was not merely a clever marketing strategy in an intellectual milieu that celebrated philosophers in the role as public intellectuals and was always on the lookout for interesting new voices; it also marked their genuine opposition to being branded as a new *ism*. They strongly distanced themselves from dominating past doctrines such as Marxism, existentialism, structuralism, and psychoanalysis.

Some of the French philosophers from this period not only rejected identification with any particular ism, but even refused to be held accountable for their own previous writings. Many of them made a point of changing perspective from book to book, striking out in ever new directions. A good example is Michel Foucault who, in the preface to *The Archeology of Knowledge*, famously implored the reader not to police the book for inconsistencies with his earlier writings. We may discern a tendency towards the individualization of academic philosophy here, at least on the Continent. One cannot be a Foucauldian, Derridian, or Žižekian in the way one could be a logical positivist or phenomenologist in the 1930s. Some critics might feel that this trend descended into an academic celebrity culture where such figures as Michel Foucault, André Glucksmann, Bernhard-Henri Lévy, Jacques Derrida, Peter Sloterdijk, and Slavoj Žižek played the role of public intellectuals, addressing current cultural and political issues. In this role, they constantly had to reinvent themselves to maintain public interest.

Thus, while some of these thinkers have indeed recruited disciples within international philosophy, this has been like a charismatic leader generating a following, rather than a group of philosophers adopting a set of abstract tenets or methodological principles. It is a matter of being inspired by a particular “master thinker” rather than committing oneself to a determinate position, let alone joining a school. These thinkers generally did not take kindly to people who would claim to develop their thoughts further, or even form a school based upon their work. Moreover, they have had a stronger impact in such disciplines as literature and languages than within strictly philosophical circles. They are among the most popular figures picked as “theorists” by Ph.D. students across a broad range of humanities disciplines.

3 The Applied and Interdisciplinary Turn

The trend away from philosophical schools is reinforced by another development within philosophy – one that does not involve only the superstars of the profession. It is similarly felt in most other areas of academia, and consists of a shift away from basic research – i.e. theoretical development – towards applied projects, large and small. This has greatly transformed the conditions for knowledge production in academia. The trend betrays itself already in the term “knowledge production,” which today hardly raises an eyebrow but which until recently would be employed only by doctrinaire Marxists. There is even a standard name for this new type of knowledge production, Mode 2, which was introduced in a highly influential publication from 1994 entitled *The New Production of Knowledge. The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies*.¹ Mode 2 is a kind of knowledge generation (to avoid the quasi-Marxist vulgarism) that is directed at practical problems and is conducted in close collaboration with external patrons, while Mode 1 is the classical linear model starting with theoretical developments, resulting from basic research, which are then subsequently put to practical use in a separate step. The change in mode is heavily favored by strong political forces and had been underway for some time before receiving a name, which explains why the new appellation was so quickly and enthusiastically adopted.

¹ Michael Gibbons, Camille Limoges, Helga Nowotny, Simon Schwartzman, Peter Scott, and Martin Trow, *The New Production of Knowledge. The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies*. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994).

As matter of fact, *The New Production of Knowledge* was essentially a white-book commissioned by the Swedish Council for Research and Planning, a major grant donor in Swedish science, and the picture of scientific research laid out in the text would naturally be understood by potential applicants as setting up an ideal for the kind of research that the Council would deem worthy of support. Indeed, in the Preface, the authors, who were all prominent figures in the international world of science organization and policy, describe the cases of knowledge production on which they base their concept of Mode 2 as “paradigmatic of sound knowledge production in the sciences” (*Op.cit.* p. 7). Thus, *The New Production of Knowledge* was as much a policy announcement as a report on an existing trend in knowledge production. The announcement would later be repeated in almost annual reprintings of the text by a prominent international publishing house, thus gaining universal attention. The notion of Mode 2 knowledge production was quickly picked up by research organizers and sponsors across the industrialized world, along with its inherent ideal of academic research organization. The white-book’s supposed description of a trend in academic organization turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

This has transformed the natural mode of operation of academic research, and in particular the conditions for academic novelties to move from bold ideas to fully fledged programs. We may analyze this in more detail in terms of Kuhn’s paradigm theory. A feature of Kuhn’s analysis that offended traditional philosophers of science, especially those of a falsificationist bent, was the value Kuhn put on theoretical “dogmatism,” i.e. the adherence to a particular idea in the face of contrary evidence. Kuhn’s point was that all truly novel and revolutionary science faces contradictory observations at the outset, in part because these “observations” will of necessity be couched in the conceptual framework of the reigning paradigm. Hence, to allow science to progress, it is necessary to shield the newcomer until it has grown strong enough to push aside the whole body of recalcitrant evidence, along with the conceptual system in which it was formulated. A fledgling scientific paradigm must be protected from the weight of extant evidence. It is permissible to put such evidence aside temporarily as mere “anomalies.” Normal science involves turning a blind eye to “anomalies” for a while, which is particularly important when a fledgling idea needs protection against distractions.

What makes Kuhn’s theory pertinent to our current issue is the fact that among the systematic threats to scientific progress, Kuhn would also include inhospitable organizational circumstances, one of which was precisely a push for science to take a practical path. A little-known fact about Kuhn’s work is

that it was introduced at a critical juncture in post-ww2 science policy and served a particular policy agenda, viz. protecting the integrity of science against a strong government push for military research during the ever-bleaker Cold War era.² This was of course not a solitary effort on Kuhn's part, but fed into a larger movement involving some key players in the American Post-ww2 science community. Among them was Kuhn's mentor at Harvard University, James Conant, who had been instrumental in organizing the ww2 effort that produced the Atomic Bomb.³ This campaign was partly successful: it resulted in a compromise, according to which scientists were allowed to do basic research on public funding yet were undisturbed by external direction, on the understanding that the research would deliver practically useful results (i.e., military hardware) down the line. This is precisely the definition of Mode 1 knowledge production.

The tendency for military research to dominate US research policy would continue until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. By then, stupendous sums of money had been spent on such projects, of which the "Star Wars" project of the mid-1980s (officially the *Strategic Defense Initiative*) represents the culmination. The economic drain on the Soviet Union in its efforts to keep up with US military development probably contributed to its collapse, but it even strained the much stronger US economy. There was general relief when the collapse of the Soviet Bloc spelled the end of spiraling military expenditure, and The Star Wars project was finally abandoned shortly thereafter.

The end of the Cold War permitted a major redirection of research resources in the US and other major Western powers (or so it was believed at the time). They could now cash the "peace dividend," as it was sometimes put. This meant a shift towards research that would benefit civilian interests, and would be carried out in collaboration with private business. The trajectory of research would no longer run from scientific discovery to advanced military hardware, but would go "from idea to invoice."

2 Cf. Steve Fuller, *Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000.

3 The breadth of the range of people who shared the worry over the integrity of future research in the US is apparent from the fact that the sentiment was echoed in Dwight D. Eisenhower's famous presidential farewell address, along with the oft-quoted warning about the influence of the "military-industrial complex." He said: "Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers" (<https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/farewell-address>).

In Denmark, the policy of turning academic ideas into marketable goods was seen as the brainchild of the then minister of research, Helge Sander, who received harsh criticism at the time. But as often seen in Danish research policy, domestic developments are merely a reflection of international trends, particularly those originating in the US. The slogan “from idea to invoice” expressed an international trend, and the general redirection of resources from military to civilian purposes was one that few would object to. Sander’s problem in marketing this shift, however, was that Danish research policy was never strongly slanted towards military use. Hence, this rationale could hardly be appealed to. Instead, Sander would launch this idea as a means to sharpen competition for funding within the academy, couching this idea in colorful terms borrowed from the world of professional bicycle racing. He would accompany this rationale with a gratuitous and somewhat populist attack upon the Humboldtian university with its emphasis upon *Bildung*, depicting it as an “ivory tower” with little concern for the society around it. This maneuver would conveniently overlook the fact that the Humboldtian university, both in its original Berlin version and in its numerous copies in Europe and later in the US, had served an indispensable societal function, viz. the training of lawyers, doctors, clergymen, teachers in higher education, and other public servants. This had also been the case in Denmark.

There was a further reason for the Danish government’s enthusiasm for the commodification of university research, one that however weighed heavier in Denmark than in the US: this was the ever-increasing cost of higher education, following from the radically increasing number of university students during the period in question. The universities had been transformed into mass institutions, accepting an ever larger proportion of each year’s crop of high-school graduates into higher education. Governments had to take a hard look at the rising costs of university education. In the US with its high proportion of private universities, the larger part of this cost could be shifted onto the students (or rather their parents) in the form of tuition fees. In Denmark with its largely public education system, the largest part was borne by the state, i.e. taxpayers, which were thought to have reached their limit of tolerance for such spending; at any rate the administration in which Sander served as minister did not want higher taxes and indeed worked energetically to make tax cuts. This created a strong additional motive for having private enterprise take over part of the financial burden of university research. Research thus funded would naturally go towards projects of direct interest to the benefactors, typically of a commercial nature. These tendencies implied the direction of university research away from theory development and towards practical applications.

In Denmark, university research and education are still predominantly funded by public money. Yet, in view of the financial stringencies, a stricter cost-benefit orientation was adopted. In particular, funds would be directed towards projects addressing such Grand Challenges as climate change, food security, biodiversity, disease control, pollution, and later also the protection of privacy and data ownership in the digital era, and many others. Due to their magnitude and complexity, these problems would be too large for private business to handle; hence the research needed for their solution could not rely upon corporate funding alone. The preferred model would involve a close collaboration and shared funding between universities, government departments, and private business. This organizational structure, which may be considered a refinement of simple Mode 2 production organization, came to be known as the *Triple Helix*.⁴ The complex nature of the Grand Challenges had implications even for the internal structure of the research teams addressing them: they would have to comprise and coordinate the academic competencies of a broad range of specialists. In short, they had to be *interdisciplinary*.

4 The Structural Impact of the Practical and Interdisciplinary Turn

The collaboration between universities, governments, and private industry on applied research projects has revolutionized the organizational structure of Danish universities. The catchword is *interdisciplinarity*, which is viewed by both governments and the large private grant foundations as a precondition for effective solution of their problems. The classical departmental structure is gradually being replaced by a matrix structure, to use the lingo of organizational theorists. This is graphically representable as a lattice of vertical columns and horizontal bars. In universities, the columns are the disciplines, i.e. the disciplinary research activities and the cumulative knowledge thereby generated, and the teaching organization that imparts both to new generations. The horizontal component consists of research groups comprising members from several different disciplines and thus providing connecting links between them. The research groups are only temporary or possess the status of research centers that may be longer-lived but typically exist only as long as they can secure funding.

4 Henry Etzkowitz & Loet Leydesdorff (2000), *The dynamics of innovation: from National Systems and 'Mode 2' to a Triple Helix of university-industry-government relations*, *Research Policy*, vol. 29, pp. 109–123.

From the perspective of current research policy, the columns are viewed with considerable suspicion and are often nicknamed “silos,” i.e. robust inflexible structures accumulating valuable intellectual goods behind windowless walls that prevent those on the outside from peeking in, and those on the inside from paying attention to what goes on in the outside world. Their valuable contents are only distributed in small portions and at the discretion of the silo’s masters. The new research policy is designed to break down these “silos” and allow a wider and speedier distribution of the valuable knowledge goods. The silo metaphor may easily be recognized as a modern update of the classical put-down metaphor of universities as “ivory towers.”

The practical and interdisciplinary turn has generated a rather inhospitable environment for theoretical novelties to gain a foothold, and it is argued here that it has specifically contributed to the dearth of radical theoretical developments within philosophy. Harking back to our Kuhnian analysis of a few pages back, we see why the applied and interdisciplinary turn is hostile to the emergence of new theoretical developments. By definition, applied work consists in putting already proven knowledge to practical use. This tautology is shorthand for a crucial feature of the modern externally financed research regime, which is that to catch the attention of funding agencies, you have to be able to present a solid record of past theoretical accomplishments, followed by a story about the tantalizing prospects of putting them to practical use. A bid for an applied project that offers to resolve a practical problem with a theoretical breakthrough that is expected to miraculously emerge during the project period, is certain to land in the bottom of the pile. This feature of the application game is underscored by the standard requirement that applications provide detailed timelines indicating precisely when each stage of the process will be reached. This precludes truly ground-breaking research, as there is no way of predicting when, if ever, the crucial “eureka” moment will occur. In brief, the practical turn is essentially conservative, systematically stifling new theoretical development.

5 The Practical Turn and Danish Philosophy

The new conditions produced by the practical turn are much more favorable to the established schools, in philosophy and everywhere else in the academic landscape. They are heirs to solid academic research traditions and can draw on large bodies of established knowledge. The situation in recent Danish philosophy illustrates the issue well, as the contributions to this volume document. In the words of the authors of Chapter 7 the members of the Center for

Subjectivity Research did not have to invent sliced bread to get started on the applied parts of their program but could deploy the rich resources of the phenomenological tradition. The practical turn has even opened up avenues for the established traditions to strike out in new directions that were not anticipated in their previous achievements. Indeed, it has been said that the practical turn undertaken by analytic moral philosophy in the 1970s actually saved it from the threat of theoretical stagnation.

The “practical” turn of current philosophy is typically an *empirical* turn. This must be carefully distinguished from what is often referred to as the “naturalization” of philosophy, which is the simple takeover of a domain of investigation by an empirical science, thereby leaving philosophy correspondingly diminished. Naturalization is the development which, over the long time-span of Western thought, replaced “natural philosophy” with natural science, and “social philosophy” with social science, and similarly for other disciplines. It is the development alluded to when it is said that philosophy is the “mother of all sciences,” which means that the empirical sciences develop under the maternal care of philosophy, only later to free themselves from mother’s apron strings and become independent.

The empirical turn, on the contrary, is not a diminution or impoverishment of philosophy; indeed, it should rather be called an empirical *enrichment* of the discipline. Philosophical terms and categories are invoked to sharpen our analytic understanding of a given empirical domain, while at the same time getting deepened and nuanced in a way that could only be achieved by confrontation with a rich body of empirical data, couched in the terminology of an empirical discipline. This has allowed insights from classical Husserlian phenomenology to become relevant to diagnostics in psychiatry. In anglophone moral philosophy, the empirical turn has generated rich and complex notions of welfare that leave the ancestral notions of utilitarianism – Bentham’s calculus of pleasure and pain – far behind. These notions are developed through continuous interdisciplinary interaction between philosophers and empirical researchers, with philosophers participating on the empirical side as well.

The empirical turn is a coming-together of philosophy and the empirical disciplines in an interdisciplinary forum akin to what the philosopher and historian of science, Peter Galison, dubbed a “trading zone.”⁵ The term alludes to the designated locations where, in centuries long gone, British traders would meet local populations in the Far East to exchange goods. To do so, they would not only have to bring along goods of interest to the other side, but would also

5 Peter Galison, *Image & logic: A material culture of microphysics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1997).

need a medium of communication in which bargaining could be conducted. Such would arise spontaneously through hybridization between the natural languages involved. The results are known as “trading languages,” technically referred to by linguists as “pidgins” or “creoles.” Galison describes how scientific pidgins or creoles have similarly emerged in scientific “trading zones” formed within interdisciplinary research groups.

Philosophers are well equipped to operate within such trading zones, since the very recognition of the typical disparities of scientific languages comes from philosophy. Within analytic philosophy of science, the notion of semantic disparities was introduced by Thomas Kuhn in his notorious theory of the “incommensurability” of the theoretical languages of science. Peter Galison’s theory of trading zones was introduced in explicit reaction to Kuhn’s theory to account for the fact that despite the problem pointed out by the latter, successful communication and collaboration between different disciplines does indeed regularly occur. Galison accepted the Kuhnian premise, but presented case studies showing how solutions had actually arisen in historical instances of interdisciplinary research through the evolution of a new, shared language based on the original competing languages – in the very same way that the emergence of pidgins and creoles had solved the communication problem for British traders in the Far East.

Incidentally, by the time these insights emerged within analytic philosophy, the same problems had long been investigated within German philosophy, under the title of *hermeneutics*. At about the same time Kuhn introduced these topics into analytic philosophy, the centuries-old German tradition was consummated in H.-G. Gadamer’s magisterial *Wahrheit und Methode*. The Gadamerian counterpart to Galison’s “creole” is the celebrated notion of *Horizontversmelzung*, a “fusion of horizons” that results when one immerses oneself in an alien world of thought and is thereby oneself transformed. Characteristically for the difference between anglophone and German philosophy, Galison’s metaphor harks from the world of trade and business and focuses on the practicalities of language use, while Gadamer’s derives from the study of the history of ideas and concerns categories of thought rather than languages.

6 Danish Philosophy and the History of Philosophy

Philosophers’ recent work on the meta-languages of theory demonstrates the utility of philosophy as the ultimate and universal meta-discipline, well positioned to examine the preconditions of any department of study. Reflection on the conditions of any discipline will quickly take one outside that discipline

and into philosophy, and from that point on upwards it is all philosophy.⁶ This points to a very noble task for professional philosophers in the current era, viz. to help establish theoretical languages in which the empirical sciences that play such an important role in modern society can make their results commensurate with each other. Maybe this was part of what Richard Rorty had in mind when he described philosophy not as a foundational enterprise, but rather as a contributor to the “great conversation of Mankind.”

It would be unfair not to acknowledge the positive impact of the practical turn on academic philosophy in Denmark from a purely occupational perspective: the number of philosophers embedded in research centers or employed in non-philosophy departments has risen dramatically. At the University of Aalborg, an entire center of applied philosophy has been instituted. Still, there are dangers inherent in this universal versatility of philosophy graduates, which is a weakening of the self-identity of the discipline. Philosophy is a particular tradition, a lineage of thinkers in Western thought starting in ancient Greece. The discipline will preserve its academic substance only as long as it continues to interact with this tradition, and its contemporary usefulness depends on such continuity. In Chapter 7 of the present volume, the authors show how psychiatrists could draw on the resources inherent in the phenomenological tradition; they did not have to develop the entire lexicon of subtle distinctions from scratch. This remark has more general implications and points to a perfectly universal fact about philosophy. Philosophical insights relevant to the present time are not only to be mined from the grand schools of the last century, but can indeed be found anywhere in the historical corpus of the discipline. One need not subscribe to Whitehead’s famous statement that all later philosophy is just footnotes to Plato to appreciate that, to a larger extent than other disciplines, even in the humanities, philosophy is engaged in a constant interchange with the totality of its own history. Philosophers living today engage in virtual dialog with philosophers of the distant past as if they were contemporaries and peers. Notoriously, modern philosophers still find inspiration in the works of one of the founding fathers of the discipline, Plato.

In light of this, philosophers ought to look at the currently popular matrix structure with some suspicion. In philosophy, the columns – the vertical disciplinary structures – are truly the pillars carrying the weight of the edifice; they are robust structures grounded in the deep historical subsoils of the discipline.

6 Notice that I am talking about an upward movement towards higher levels of reflection, not the downward search for indubitable foundations. Philosophy has by now given up the pretension of delivering the ultimate foundations of other scientific disciplines and the justification of their results.

The professional expertise is contained in the departmental columns and is imparted to new generations through the teaching going on in them. Danger arises when the pillars are weakened, which is the inevitable result of the withdrawal of public funding of the universities in favor of external funding of interdisciplinary centers and projects. For these horizontal connections cannot support the structure on their own. Like the architraves of Greek temples, they may indeed help stabilize the edifice, but if the columns crumble, the whole building will come crashing down.

Most Danish philosophy Ph.D.s currently receive their training outside of philosophy departments and in research centers instead, as a simple effect of the uneven distribution of funding. In these settings, there will inevitably be little emphasis on reaching back behind the philosophers who are relevant to the center's research goals, and invoke the entire tradition of the discipline. This is aggravated by the tendency to merge the old mono-disciplinary departments into larger multi-disciplinary organizations within which they have the status of subordinate sections, a transition that has by now happened to every philosophy department in Danish universities. The goal is, *inter alia*, to achieve economies of scale through larger student audiences and more flexible deployment of teaching resources. The increase in size of student audiences will in part be achieved by signing up students from different disciplines, which will inevitably lead to a gradual attenuation of the disciplinary content of courses. When combined with the tendency towards project organization and semi-independent centers combining people from different sections, which affects the Ph.D. and Postdoc levels of training, this creates a challenge to the survival of philosophy as a distinct academic enterprise. The food chain of the discipline will slowly become weakened.

In virtue of their meta-theoretical competencies, philosophers can help research groups develop the tools of interdisciplinary communication, Galison's "creoles," or even Gadamer's "fusion of conceptual horizons." Thereby, the group members will achieve what the sociologists of science Harry Collins called "interactional expertise," which is the ability to converse with practitioners of another discipline as a peer. This is an invaluable asset in large interdisciplinary groups, and hence in high demand from science organizers. Collins took pains, however, to distinguish such communicative competence from what he termed *contributory* expertise, which is the ability to move a discipline forward with true disciplinary novelties.⁷ The danger is that amidst their very useful efforts of helping interdisciplinary groups develop a shared theoretical

7 Collins, H. M. 1990. *Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines*. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.

idiom, philosophers neglect the task of carrying their own discipline forward, i.e. to make genuine theoretical contributions to philosophy itself.

Fortunately, the chapters of this volume demonstrate that such contributions are indeed possible within interdisciplinary research groups, and in particular how philosophy can benefit from the infusion of empirical material that comes with participation in interdisciplinary projects. It must be noted, however, that these are the achievements of a generation of Danish philosophers educated under the old regime of Mode 1 “knowledge production,” which in philosophy means an education encompassing the entire historical tradition and stressing the continuity of the philosophical enterprise from the classics on to the current generation. It is not obvious that this feature can be retained under Mode 2 knowledge production. Putting it in currently fashionable ecological terms, it is uncertain if Mode 2 knowledge production within philosophy is *sustainable* – meaning that it is moot if it is capable of continually reproducing the conditions necessary for its own future operation.

The most recent history of Danish philosophy was published in five volumes in the period 2002–4, authored by Sten Ebbesen and Carl Henrik Koch (the latter also contributes to the present volume). It took the reader as far as 1950, which is right before the major shifts in research policy and university organization that have been outlined in this Introduction. Given the general lack of attention within current Danish philosophy to the history of philosophy as a philosophical subdiscipline, it will probably be a very long time before another history of Danish philosophy will be written. By then, the long-term effect of these developments will have become clear, and it is to be hoped that the somewhat pessimistic undertones of the story told above will have been proven wrong. In any case, we hope that the articles collected in this volume will assist future historians of Danish philosophy in their work.