Ocean-based Climate Action and Human Rights Implications under the International Climate Change Regime

After drawing attention to the crucial role of marine biodiversit y, including that of deep-sea ecosystem s, in current scientific understanding of the ocean-climate nexu s, this article highlights the limited extent to which the international climate change regime has so far addressed the ocea n. The focus then shifts to how the international climate change regime could contribute to the protection of marine biodiversity as part of mitigatio n, adaptation and finance, taking into account human rights impacts and standard s, drawing a comparison with REDD+. The article concludes with an original proposa l, inspired by the Climate and Clean Air Coalitio n, to develop urgen t,


Introduction
The ocean and its biodiversity play a key role in regulating the global climate and slowing climate change by absorption of excess heat, carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.1This is the so-called 'ocean-climate nexus' .The ocean has absorbed 90 per cent of the warming that has occurred since 1955 due to increasing greenhouse gas emissions; the top few metres of the ocean store as much heat as the Earth's entire atmosphere.2For example, if the lower 10 kilometres of the atmosphere were to have taken up the same amount of heat as the ocean from 1971-2010, the atmosphere would have warmed by 36°C.3Protecting and restoring ocean habitats is estimated to have the potential to sequester carbon dioxide from the atmosphere at rates up to four times higher than terrestrial forests can.In addition, offshore wind energy holds crucial The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 potential to replace fossil fuel-based energy generation.4 Yet the potential of the ocean and marine ecosystems to achieve the international climate goals are still largely overlooked in intergovernmental climate negotiations.
Meanwhile, climate change has increasingly negative impacts on the ocean, which is warming, rising, acidifying and losing oxygen.5 In addition, there are more frequent and intense extreme weather events as well as marine heatwaves, which are predicted to further increase into the future, causing a plethora of biological and socioeconomic impacts.6Indeed, under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 7 196 Parties have recognised since 2008 that climate change is a major driver of biodiversity loss,8 but also that climate change response measures can have negative impacts on biodiversity and on the human rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities.9A new global target has thus been set under the CBD to 'minimise the impacts of climate change and ocean acidification on biodiversity and increase its resilience through mitigation, adaptation, and disaster risk reduction actions … through nature-based solutions and/or ecosystem-based approaches, while minimising negative and fostering positive impacts of climate action on biodiversity' by 2030' .10 The UN Human Rights Committee, in 2022,11 recognised the negative impacts of climate change on ocean-dependent livelihoods and cultures, including the ability to transmit to children and future generations traditions related to the sea.This is particularly the case when marine resources are essential components of distinctive ways of life and when alternatives to subsistence livelihoods are lacking, such as on small islands.12The lack, delay or inadequacy of ocean-based climate change adaptation is considered a violation of human rights when the ability of human rights-holders to cope is compromised, and negative impacts on their human rights are foreseeable, serious and attributable to State authorities.13 This understanding of State obligations14 is also rapidly surfacing elsewhere.15 International legal scholarship to date has focused heavily on the existential threats arising from sea level rise,16 on climate migrants,17 and there is ever-growing legal scholarship on ocean acidification18 and the law of the sea and climate change.19 There is, however, a much broader array of negative impacts on the marine environment arising from climate change that deserves reflection on from an international law perspective.20This is notably the case The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 for the full range of marine ecosystem services that are negatively impacted by climate change (food and water supply, renewable energy, benefits for health and well-being, cultural values, tourism, trade, and transport) and on which various dimensions of human well-being,21 which are protected as international human rights, are dependent.22Marine ecosystem services are not yet fully understood23 because of the uncertainty related to the environmental conditions of pelagic (open ocean) and deep-sea ecosystems, but there is sufficient knowledge to avoid 'foreseeable negative impacts on human rights' that can arise from decisions that may negatively affect marine biodiversity.24 In this article, we draw on biodiversity and fisheries science to complement the scientific understanding synthesised in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) landmark Special Report on Oceans and the Cryosphere published in 2019,25 to expand the understanding of the ocean-climate nexus, including deep-sea ecosystems in addition to coastal marine ecosystems, on which so far international human rights bodies have focused.Against this background, we explore to what extent ocean-based climate action could contribute to the achievement of the goals of the international climate change regime, and to what extent the regime could contribute to the protection of marine biodiversity, thereby preventing diffuse negative impacts on the human rights of ocean-dependent communities and everyone's human right to a healthy environment.26We thus do not focus on redress, and for that reason we do not engage in this article with the burgeoning literature on loss and damage,27 or climate change litigation,28 while acknowledging that further anthropogenic climate change is already irreversibly set in motion and will produce significant human rights impacts.We rather focus on the need for more synergistic, preventive and precautionary approaches to the interdependencies of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and the protection of marine biodiversity and human rights, in the face of the continued failure to reverse current biodiversity loss trends and their knock-on effects on the realisation of the majority of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).29 The scene is set by reviewing the current state of knowledge on marine ecosystems and their benefits to human well-being and climate change, with a focus on blue carbon, considering its growing international attention.Then the opportunities for strengthening action related to the ocean-climate nexus in the international climate change regime are assessed, reflecting on concerns about climate change responses that do not take sufficient account of biodiversity and human rights.Considering the widely shared hopes across the international communities that climate finance can plug the gaping hole of resources devoted to SDG 14 (Life below water),30 the focus shifts to institutional preconditions at the multilateral level for channelling climate finance into inclusive and sustainable ocean-based climate actions.31To that end, lessons are drawn from ongoing efforts under the international climate change regime related to addressing deforestation and climate change.The motivation is to explore experiences from creating innovative funding mechanisms for nature-based solutions under the international climate change regime.The ocean is both a heat and carbon sink.In terms of heat energy sequestration, the ocean is able to take up and retain heat at over 1,000 times greater than the atmosphere.38The top layer of the ocean holds more heat than the Earth's atmosphere.39Of the additional heat created by anthropogenic climate change since 1950, 91 per cent has been absorbed by the ocean.40While this latent heat absorption has mitigated some of the worst effects of global climate change, there are limitations to the ocean's carrying capacity to store excess heat from global warming.This is causing a rapid rise in global ocean temperatures, though recent studies using improved methodologies indicate that the ocean is warming faster than previously estimated.41 The IPCC confirmed that since 1993, the average rate of ocean warming has more than doubled.42Against this background, international legal scholars generally agree that, considering that the definition of marine pollution under the LOSC43 encompasses both 'substances' and 'energy' ,44 the addition of excess heat into the ocean from the atmosphere as a consequence of climate change constitutes pollution of the marine environment and therefore should be prevented by States through the reduction of GHG emissions.45 Also central to climate regulation is the role of the ocean in sequestering and storing CO 2 from the atmosphere.46It is noteworthy that it is both the physical ocean as a body of water and its biodiversity that play vital roles in the regulation of the climate.The ocean is a sink for approximately a quarter of anthropogenic CO 2 , with dissolved organic carbon equating to approximately 200 times that of marine biomass,47 and phytoplankton responsible for approximately 50 percent of global primary production of organic matter.48 The biophysical process for this involves atmospheric CO 2 dissolving across the sea surface water, so as atmospheric concentrations increase, more CO 2 passes into the ocean.CO 2 is removed from the surface by physical means (e.g., mixing and downwelling) and, crucially, by phytoplankton.Through photosynthesis, phytoplankton fix dissolved CO 2 and export it to deeper water as they decompose and sink, or are consumed by herbivorous zooplankton.The larger zooplankton and their faecal pellets can be re-ingested by other organisms, working their way along the marine food web,49 and ultimately sink out of the upper layers of the ocean to be broken down by microbes.50Thus LOSC obligations to adopt measures to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems, as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life,51 are also relevant at the ocean-climate nexus.
As for the deep sea,52 carbon stored in bottom waters or sediments is considered to be removed from the atmosphere for millions of years.53The IPCC reports provide estimates of carbon sequestered that range from 0. the interpretation and implementation of LOSC provisions on the prevention of marine pollution, the protection of the marine environment, and the application of precaution at the ocean-climate nexus.More specific considerations in this connection arise from the emerging literature and policy discussions on 'blue' carbon ecosystems, which are discussed next, with a view to signposting knowledge gaps and opportunities for ocean-based climate action.

Blue Carbon Ecosystems and Ocean-based Climate Action
'Blue carbon' commonly refers to the carbon captured by coastal marine ecosystems, typically specified as saltmarshes, seagrass and mangroves, which accumulate large stocks of organic carbon in their soil and biomass.65In addition to sequestering CO 2 as an ecosystem service, these coastal habitats also provide coastal protection from erosion and extreme weather, are rich in biodiversity and are important nurseries for fish species, including those that are commercially and nutritionally important.Considering the range of benefits that blue carbon ecosystems provide, they can be framed as providers of mitigation-adaptation co-benefits.Other sinks for organic carbon (carbon stored in living things) include the biomass associated with marine animals and plants.Fish sequester organic carbon as they die, sink and decompose at depth.70 Macroalgae are widely abundant and as a result are garnering increasing attention for their potential as a carbon sink, however this potential remains unquantified.71Furthermore, this potential is contested by research that indicates that not only are macroalgae an inefficient pathway for carbon storage,72 but that they could also be a source of carbon to the atmosphere.73These uncertainties highlight the large knowledge and data gaps in relation to the controls and sensitivities of this ecosystem service in these relatively 'well-known' habitats.74Despite the uncertainty, administrative and financial risks posed by restoration of marine blue carbon habitats, these risks are outweighed by the associated co-benefits of this activity in terms of supporting local blue economies and climate adaptation potential.75 One way to promote sequestration of carbon by these ecosystems is the reduction of wider pressures on blue carbon ecosystems that limit their ability to sequester carbon from the atmosphere.76In policy terms, this could be achieved through the creation and management of marine protected areas (MPAs) as blue carbon assets, in addition to their conservation features.77In addition, it is recommended to consider conserving potential climate refugia, understood as '[areas] where climate change will not severely affect a species or its habitat' , and designating dynamic MPAs, understood as 'MPAs that are planned to shift across latitudinal gradients as species distribution [is] expected to shift according to climate change models' .78Reference is also made to climate-responsive marine spatial planning (MSP), which will involve managing 'pressures' exerted on the environment as a proxy target for effective protection of marine ecosystems, including an increase in blue carbon asset 'value' as an area is allowed to recover.79Another way of promoting blue carbon is through the restoration of blue carbon habitats (planting of seagrass beds, kelp, mangroves, seeding of biogenic reefs) that offer climate protection and reduce the impacts of climate-induced extreme weather events, such as tidal waves and storminess.80 In addition, a reduction in damaging fishing practices has been proposed as one option for blue carbon stock protection (and long-term enhancement).81Trawling and dredging of the seabed can resuspend carbon held in sediment into the water column, perpetuating its release back into the atmosphere.82Fishing more generally interrupts the transport of carbon to seafloor sediments by dead and vertically migrating organisms and storage through the removal of organisms from the system entirely.83This is of particular importance in the context of the emerging industrial mesopelagic (200-1,000 metres below the ocean surface) fishery,84 such as hatchetfishes and lanternfishes, which are of commercial interest for production of fish oil supplements and animal feed (including for commercial aquaculture).85Many mesopelagic fish species shift in and out of deep water daily, avoiding predators during the day and feeding at the surface at night,86 thereby actively sequestering and transporting carbon to deep water for storage at a high rate.87As these fish species are estimated to be one of the most abundant groups of vertebrates in the world, maintaining mesopelagic fish stocks at healthy levels is imperative to ensure their carbon sequestration,88 hence the growing calls for a global moratorium on mesopelagic fishing.89The protection and restoration of fish and other marine vertebrate populations to healthy levels should be considered a key ocean nature-based climate mitigation option, thanks to the greater capacity for carbon storage than some coastal blue carbon ecosystems.90However, such protection and restoration are not yet formally considered under the international climate change regime.
Ocean-based carbon dioxide removal has also been identified as a potential option to enhance the drawdown of atmospheric carbon dioxide into blue carbon stocks.91In addition, blue carbon options could arguably include ocean fertilisation and macroalgal culture to promote photosynthesis and drawdown and storage of carbon via an enhanced biological pump,92 the deposition of terrestrially based organic waste, artificial up/downwelling, ocean alkalinity enhancement, coastal enhanced weathering and direct capture methods.93However, methods such as these, many untested at scale or locally, have the potential to lead to myriad negative impacts at all depths of the ocean.94These impacts may in turn alter the dynamics of the ocean ecosystem and themselves risk degrading ecosystem services, including nutrient cycling and commercial fish stocks and, consequently, carbon sequestration.95These options, therefore, raise critical questions with regard to the application of the ecosystem and precautionary approaches, which have already been identified, to some extent, under the CBD.96 In summary, consideration of blue carbon emphasises the need to support under the LOSC and the international climate change regime, marine ecosystem restoration, climate-responsive MPAs and MSP, and reductions in damaging fishing practices as ocean nature-based solutions, which also contribute to complying with the CBD.On the other hand, ocean-based carbon dioxide removal technologies raise concerns about negative impacts on biodiversity and human rights that have already been identified, at least to some extent, under the CBD and are relevant under the LOSC general obligations to protect the marine environment.

The International Climate Change Regime and the Ocean:
Where Are We?
Against the foregoing background, this section reflects on the growing, but still very limited, relevance of the ocean under the international climate change regime.While the IPCC has been assessing the relevant science on the pivotal role played by the ocean in both driving the climate system and mitigating climate change since the 1990s when negotiations for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)97 were launched, there has been slow consideration of the ocean-climate nexus under the UN climate change regime to date.98This cannot be over-emphasised in the current debate on the integration of ocean-based climate action.The First Assessment Report by the IPCC, published in 1990, warned that climate change would fundamentally impact the ocean and coastal areas, as well as marine ecosystems:99 'the projected global warming will cause sea-level rise, modify ocean circulation, and cause fundamental changes to marine ecosystems, with considerable socioeconomic consequences' .100The IPCC projected that sea level rise could render some island countries uninhabitable and displace millions of people.101It also predicted that climate impacts on the global ocean will lead to 'changes in habitats, a decrease in biological diversity and shifts in marine organisms and productive zones, including commercially important species.Such regional shifts in fisheries will have major socioeconomic impacts' .102 The UNFCCC's main objective is to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,103 including the ocean.104In addition, among general commitments, an obligation for Parties to cooperate towards conserving and enhancing carbon sinks and reservoirs explicitly refers to coastal and marine ecosystems.105Further, UNFCCC Parties are required to 'support and further develop, as appropriate, international and intergovernmental programmes and networks or organisations aimed at defining, conducting, assessing and financing research, data collection and systematic observation' ,106 which led to the creation of various intergovernmental scientific bodies for climate monitoring and information exchange.107Reports by these bodies are regularly considered by the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and at https://oneoceanhub.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Figure -1 Technological Advice (SBSTA).Since 2019, the SBSTA has also considered the ocean in the context of the Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change.108On the back of substantial advocacy by the global ocean community, including scientific institutions, non-governmental organisations and large ocean States, the Paris Agreement109 preamble recognised 'the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans' .110As the preambles of international treaties are considered to have interpretative value, we argue that the legal structure of the Paris Agreement includes elements that should be interpreted so as to consider the ocean-climate nexus.The Paris Agreement sets the goal of limiting the global average temperature increase to well below 2°C from pre-industrial times and undertaking efforts to limit it to 1.5°C,111 with the current focus being on the 1.5°C target.Under the Paris Agreement's mitigation regime, climate targets and mitigation actions are being determined at the national level112 and complemented by requirements for transparency and reporting for all Parties.113The Agreement also includes a number of procedural legal obligations relating to NDCs, including that each Party must have an NDC and regularly increase its ambition, with guidance on their formulation adopted internationally.114NDCs focus on mitigation, but they can also cover adaptation and needs for financial support.Current international guidance on NDCs does not refer to most detailed mitigation policies, including those related to the ocean.115

Towards Increased Recognition of the Ocean-Climate Nexus under the UN Climate Regime
As a result of prominent ocean advocacy since 2009,116 and the adoption of several high-level political declarations,117 ocean-related issues have been increasingly reflected in UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) decisions.118 In 2019 in Madrid, the COP mandated the convening of the first ocean and climate dialogue.119Recommendations arising from the 2020 dialogue pointed to the need to strengthen the profile and consideration of the ocean across existing UNFCCC processes; address gaps and needs in relation to ocean and climate knowledge and action under the UNFCCC process; include the ocean in the assessment of collective progress and in the global stocktake; recognise and amplify synergies, complementarities and collective efforts across the UN; align global finance to support ocean and climate action; and develop technical guidelines for accessing finance and approaches for innovative financing structures.120In addition, the 2020 dialogue recommendations also focused on national-level action, namely, to include ocean action through ambitious NDCs; support mainstreaming of coherent action across biodiversity, ocean and climate change agendas; invest in ocean science and monitoring; develop and/ or strengthen integrated national policies for ocean and climate action; and invest in ocean and climate action that is biodiversity-neutral and, ideally, biodiversity-positive.121 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 The 2021 Glasgow COP invited the SBSTA Chair to hold an annual dialogue on strengthening ocean-based action and to prepare an informal summary report for subsequent COPs.122Moreover, the preamble of the Glasgow Climate Pact referred to ensuring the integrity of ocean ecosystems when taking action to address climate change,123 and underscored the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring marine ecosystems acting as carbon sinks to achieve the long-term goal of the Convention.124It also invited relevant work programmes and constituted bodies under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement to consider how to strengthen and integrate ocean-based action in their existing mandates and work plans and report on these activities.125This was considered by the ocean community as the potential start of inter-governmental work on the ocean-climate nexus under the international climate change regime,126 but clearly fell short of launching action on the detailed recommendations from the 2020 dialogue.
The 2022 Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan referred to the international recognition of the human right to a healthy environment and reiterated the importance of marine ecosystems acting as sinks for greenhouse gases.127It further specified details of the ocean and climate dialogues, by mandating two co-facilitators, selected by Parties biennially, to decide specific topics for the dialogue, in consultation with Parties and observers, and prepare informal summary reports for consideration by the COP.128In addition, the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan focused attention on national-level action, by encouraging 'Parties to consider, as appropriate, ocean-based action in their national climate goals and in the implementation of these goals, including but not limited to [NDCs], long-term strategies and adaptation communications' .129Once again, the opportunity was missed to endorse in more detail the recommendations from the 2020 and 2021 dialogues.130

Opportunities for Further Action under the UNFCCC?
Our argument is that the future ocean and climate dialogues should lead to identifying continuing workstreams under the UNFCCC that can enhance and support Parties' progress on ocean-based climate action.One possibility relates to enhancing the role of blue carbon under the market-based mechanisms established under the Paris Agreement.131However, there are doubts about how to quantify emission reductions in the context of blue carbon, and setting up an institutional structure for governing blue carbon markets can be more complicated than for land-based carbon markets.Many projects would only be financially viable at a larger scale and therefore placed in the context of complex management frameworks and overlapping jurisdictions.132In addition, experience from the use of market mechanisms highlights the importance of considering environmental integrity and human rights in implementing carbon projects.Concerns include 'increasing risks to the enjoyment of human rights to food, water, sanitation and housing, especially for people and communities whose livelihoods depend on land' , particularly Indigenous peoples' .133 This risk may be considered even higher in the context of marine areas, where there is less recognition of historical dispossession.134 In anticipating what potential approaches could be taken in this connection, the following section The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 draws a comparison with the approach used for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), for which COP decisions were taken to set institutional arrangements, identify features to enable finance for forest protection and establish requirements to report on how implemented projects avoid social and environmental harm.135 On climate adaptation, the Paris Agreement recognises the role of adaptation in protecting ecosystems and livelihoods.136It calls for adaptation actions that take into account vulnerable groups and ecosystems 'guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of Indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions' .137There is also a recognition by CBD Parties that ecosystem and biodiversity functions contribute significantly to climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction.138  water') is the least funded of all the 17 SDGs, receiving less than one per cent of all SDG funding from official development assistance (ODA) up to 2019.142The scaling disparity between climate and ocean funding is thus notable: targeting just 20 per cent of climate finance annually towards the ocean would suffice for delivery of SDG 14.143And thanks to the high degree of interdependence of SDG14 with other SDGs,144 investments focussed on SDG 14 can achieve multiple policy objectives, from adaptation resulting in food security and livelihoods, to transport (i.e., maritime) and energy generation (e.g., offshore wind).That said, it cannot be overemphasised that climate funding and ODA funding should be kept separate, and that the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement defer very much to national decisions on means of implementation and targets for climate finance.
There is clear disparity between the amount of ocean-related climate finance and the growing number of Parties to the Paris Agreement which are formally recognising ocean-based climate action in their NDCs.According to the latest NDC Synthesis Report by the UNFCCC Secretariat: An increasing number of Parties (40 per cent) are targeting ocean-based climate action.Some Parties (26 per cent) include an ocean-based climate target, policy or measure.Ocean-related measures reported in the NDCs relate more often to adaptation than to mitigation, there has been an increase in adaptation measures identified related to fisheries and aquaculture and relatively few Parties mentioned offshore renewable energy as a mitigation solution.145 Out of 106 new or updated NDCs from island and coastal States, 73 per cent include at least one target, policy, or measure aimed at ocean-based climate actions and 31 of those include at least one target, policy, or measure aimed The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 specifically at supporting vulnerable ocean-dependent communities.146The further integration of ocean-based action within NDCs as encouraged by the Sharm el-Sheikh work programme can also provide a clearer entry point for channelling ODA towards ocean-based climate action, considering that, for developing countries, climate finance needs to be additional to ODA.147 In addition to ocean nature-based solutions, it can be expected that attention at the national level focuses on other activities that can reduce fossil fuel emissions,148 such as marine renewables.149Given the increasing demands for ocean goods and services, the inclusion of ocean-based climate action in NDCs has been linked with MSP processes,150 which incorporate consultation and participation in the decision-making process, so as to safeguard substantive and procedural human rights.151And in effect the Glasgow Climate Pact recognises planning as an important locus of decision-making related to the protection, conservation and restoration of ecosystems.152It thus encourages Parties to the UNFCCC to take an integrated approach to planning to ensure that ecosystems continue to deliver 'crucial ecosystem services, including acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, reducing vulnerability to climate change impacts and supporting sustainable livelihoods, including for indigenous peoples and local communities' .153CBD Parties have also recognised that MSP is 'a participatory tool to facilitate the application of the ecosystem approach' with the full and effective participation of Indigenous peoples and local communities.154UNESCO-IOC and the European Commission have developed international guidance on climate-smart MSP,155 the implementation of which could be supported by climate finance.156But MSP practices remain limited in their evidence base to integrate climate change, as well as socio-ecological dynamics.157There is also criticism of public participation in MSP, which remains more akin to 'communication through public comment' than the more 'interactive and proactive approaches' of 'facilitation, negotiation and consensus-building' .158 And there is a tendency to support a logic of neoliberalism,159 thereby '[legitimising] the agendas of dominant actors'160 (say, the development of the offshore renewable energy sector) to the detriment of the manifold social, cultural and spiritual connections between people and the ocean.161This points to the need for international guidance and support to national processes linking NDCs and MSP that can help different Parties not to fall into the same pitfalls and rather benefit from lessons learnt across the world.
As discussed in the preceding section, increased financial resources, improved spatial planning and more meaningful participation are required to ensure better integration of ocean-based climate action.An existing initiative under the international climate regime, REDD+, offers valuable lessons.The following section will thus consider how REDD+ focused on climate adaptation The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 together with mitigation, as well as biodiversity and human rights co-benefits, with a view to drawing any lessons to advance consideration of ocean-based climate action.The comparison with REDD+ will then serve to clarify a suitable institutional pathway to channel international climate finance to ocean-based climate action.

International Guidance and Finance for Ocean-based Climate Action: What Lessons Can Be Learnt from REDD+?
The idea behind REDD+162 was relatively simple: 'forested developing countries reduce deforestation and are financially compensated for their contribution to combating climate change by means of carbon absorption and storage' .163REDD+ also supported adaptation, in addition to mitigation, as well as capacity-building.REDD+ has mobilised over US$350 million of results-based payments to date.164 And while the initial proposal of REDD+ was for a market-based mechanism, a market under the UNFCCC has not emerged.165The main market demand for REDD+ credits has remained circumscribed to the voluntary carbon market, beyond the purview of the Climate Convention.166Instead, REDD+ has been conceived as a framework for voluntary efforts by developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation, as well as an incentive mechanism whereby countries apply for financial payments after implementing and delivering mitigation results through results-based payments.167Even if the results-based payments approach placed high expectations on accounting and additionality, in the end accounting was less strict than initially envisioned.168 In that sense, REDD+ can be considered an example of a 'nature-based solution' (a payment for an ecosystem service) as opposed to the initially expected 'market-based solution' .This example indicates that uncertainty in the measurement of blue carbon flux and storage that impact on certification and crediting169 would not necessarily stop action under and around the UNFCCC on blue carbon.Basic norms on REDD+ were agreed on under the UNFCCC, but despite years of negotiations, Parties 'were unable to agree on the establishment of an institution in charge to ensure coherence and coordination in the delivery of financial and technical support to REDD+'170 under the UNFCCC.Thus, REDD+ was implemented by other international institutions which created ad hoc multilateral financing initiatives and programmes, such as the World Bank and the Green Climate Fund, and by donor countries which developed bilateral partnerships to collaborate with developing countries on REDD+.171 Using UNFCCC rules as a minimum threshold, organisations outside the UNFCCC developed faster, further social and environmental rules than UNFCCC Parties were willing to agree on.172Drawing also from other multilateral environmental agreements and international human rights guidance, these standards had 'significant legal and practical effects, including by interpreting and fleshing out the content of treaties, becoming part of legally binding funding agreements, being integrated into national laws and inspiring the adoption of other international norms' .173Admittedly, this led to 'a lack of consistency among international rules and practices on diverse -and often The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 controversial -subjects, generating competing discourses promoted by different rulemaking sites' .174It also led to diminished transparency in the adoption of safeguards175 and a shift in decision-making power from developing (REDD+ host) countries to developed (donor) countries.176The adoption of these standards, however, did not prevent negative impacts on the environment177 and Indigenous peoples' human rights.178For that reason, the REDD+ financing initiatives, such as the Green Climate Fund, set up additional requirements, such as redress mechanisms at the entity and project levels.179Furthermore, it has been argued that with the adoption of the Paris Agreement, REDD+ has transformed from 'a means to merely enable developing countries to reduce emissions on a voluntary basis, to a means to enable them to comply with the pledges made in their NDCs' , with finance coming from 'a variety of sources' that has been 'disbursed beyond market-based logics and the institutional remit of the UNFCCC' .180In a similar way, blue carbon could be used to contribute to the accomplishment of NDCs with support from a variety of financing sources.Many developing countries have received funding for REDD+ preparatory activities, which would be also an interesting aspect to incorporate in the consideration of the establishment of blue carbon projects.This would be instrumental to enabling ocean-based climate action at a larger scale, as the REDD+ experience has shown that only a few actors have completed the preparatory stages and applied successfully for results-based payments from the Green Climate Fund.181Another opportunity offered by the approach proposed is that the Green Climate Fund has some valuable ocean connectivity and the need for longer time scales before direct benefits of restoration are observed.187Equally, climate finance and technological development towards ecosystem restoration should be prioritised over ocean-based carbon dioxide removal, when the former supports restoration at local scales that is not only beneficial to mitigating climate hazards, but is a way to build stewardship in relation to the 'human-centred benefits of food production, economic livelihoods and emotional well-being' arising from marine ecosystems.188Restoration of blue carbon ecosystems may not result in economically viable carbon financing or crediting systems.However, it has the potential to increase climate adaptation, food provisioning and conservation opportunities, and is socially justified, based on the multiple benefits.189 The next section outlines a conceptual proposal that could make a meaningful contribution towards prioritising climate finance towards ocean-based climate action.

A Multi-actor, Bottom-up Coalition to Integrated and Inclusive Ocean-based Climate Action
As has also been learnt in the REDD+ context, '[g]iven the politicized nature of the UNFCCC regime and the sheer number of its agenda items' , bringing in, under the international climate change regime, 'yet another major mitigation item may not be the most effective solution' .190 To achieve faster and transparent progress on ocean-based climate action under the UNFCCC and at the national level, a bottom-up approach could be used instead.This section explores an opportunity for interested countries, UN bodies and non-State actors to move forward on ocean-based climate action outside of the UN climate negotiations, albeit with a view to mobilising climate finance under the Paris Agreement and taking into account the lessons learnt under REDD+.It draws on the example of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to promote action on black carbon, which can accelerate warming and is also an air pollutant.The proposed multi-actor partnership would include new mitigation goals even when challenges persist in quantifying the contribution that emission reductions make to a country's mitigation target, which is one of the key uncertainties with regard to blue carbon.A partnership approach would also by-pass both the priority assigned to mitigation over biodiversity co-benefits and human rights protection, and the limitations in public participation under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.On the latter, the international climate change regime can be seen as one of the weak global systems of accountability that currently do not hold all actors, particularly large-scale industries and the private sector, responsible for negative environmental impacts and related human rights abuses.191As affirmed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Climate Change and Human Rights, Ian Fry, '[i]t is a regretful indictment of the current decision-making process that those who are most affected and suffering the greatest losses are the least able to participate in current decision-making.New participatory processes need to be found urgently' .192However, those who benefit most from fossil fuel and carbon-intensive industries have 'disproportionate access to decision-makers' and are not yet 'held accountable for the human rights abuses they are underwriting ' .193The Climate and Clean Air Coalition is voluntary and flexible, and its emergence was supported by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which proved 'very successful, in agenda setting on novel environmental issues' .194 The Coalition was founded in 2012 and currently consists of 80 States, but also non-State actors such as different UN bodies, scientific institutions, civil society and businesses.195 The objective of the Coalition is 'slowing of the rate of near-term global warming through the reduction of short-lived climate pollutants' , but it does not set 'collective reduction targets or require its members to establish concrete goals and reduction pathways' .196Every member then independently decides what it wants to achieve under the Coalition and makes a relevant declaration when joining.In addition, members contribute voluntarily either through donations or non-monetary activities, such as knowledge.197 In the case of the ocean-climate nexus, the goal would be 'protecting and restoring the ocean's contributions to climate regulation, human well-being and planetary health' .UNEP's work on marine ecosystems, on the one hand, and on human rights and the environment, on the other, could be brought together to provide a basis for the Coalition.Other UN bodies could include the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, to support climate action within the fisheries sector and the integration of small-scale fishers' knowledge on climate change, 198  In effect, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition as a whole has served 'an integrative, bridging function within the UN System' ,205 and across different international legal frameworks, which is one of the key points in the ocean-climate nexus literature and was a challenge under REDD+.One opportunity for the proposed ocean-climate coalition is to support UN-wide coordination during the overlapping (but still disconnected) UN Decade for Ocean Science and the UN Decade for Ecosystem Restoration (2021-2030), notably with a view to prioritising progress on the gaps and limitations on the integration of NDCs and MSP processes, focusing on context-specific approaches and meaningful participation of local communities.
The Climate and Clean Air Coalition is a 'State-led' initiative as they have 'stronger representation in the decision-making body, which has oversight and final say in decision-making, notably funding project proposals' .206Non-State actors support 'state-based action through information, analyses, and scientific assessments' , notably as part of a Scientific Advisory Panel, which offers suggestions on project proposals to be funded, scientific expertise for policy-making processes, as well as methodologies and tools provided for members.207This would be particularly important also for the proposed ocean-climate coalition, given the scientific uncertainties on deep-sea ecosystem services relevant to climate regulation and on blue carbon, as discussed above.Here it would be crucial to ensure equal representation of natural and social sciences, as well as of researchers from the Global South and North, particularly in consideration of the significant equity issues in deep-sea science.208 Crucially, given the limitations in public participation within the UNFCCC, the proposed ocean-climate coalition should provide for wide contributions from civil society on the ocean, climate change and human rights perspectives, Indigenous peoples and local communities, and specifically support the participation of children and youth that have been very vocal internationally about the ocean-climate nexus.209In addition, different knowledge systems, including Indigenous and local knowledge, need to be included, as also called for by the BBNJ Agreement.210As discussed above, to date MSP continues to be The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 limited in regard to knowledge integration and knowledge inclusion.211What is therefore needed is careful consideration of how Indigenous and local knowledge systems can inform these processes from the start and throughout with Indigenous and local knowledge holders in committees, working groups and expert panels.
Another aspect relevant also for ocean-based climate action is that the Climate and Clean Air Coalition is not just about climate change, but rather emphasises the multiple benefits (air quality, health, food security, human well-being, and overall progress in sustainable development),212 which have been articulated in harmonised policies, thereby allowing for diverse political interests to be pursued.213Notably, the Coalition provides opportunities to address (and fund) progress in both policy and science at the nexus of air quality and climate change.214This could provide a helpful approach to enhancing further synergies across the ocean-climate nexus; for instance, with regard to the implementation of the future plastics treaty.215 Overall, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition has succeeded in terms of capacity-building, and methodology improvement and the development of national laws, and complements the UNFCCC in that it raises capacities to increase and implement mitigation targets under the Paris Agreement.Additionally, the Coalition has served as 'a broker or an intermediary to help countries access funding from third parties, such as the Green Climate Fund or the German International Climate Initiative' .216This has included supporting national planning processes and NDCs, and is concomitant with the above reflections on the emerging potential of linking NDCs and MSP.The proposed ocean-climate coalition could undertake an analysis of international climate finance and ODA flows that can support a country-led prioritisation of ocean-based climate actions, rather than reflecting exogenous and narrower development partner interests.217 Overall, coalition arrangements such as the above can be productive mechanisms to building awareness of the opportunities of ocean-based climate action, as well as developing biodiversity and human rights safeguards, thereby assisting in the preparation of new policy and legislative shifts at national and international levels.Such coordinated arrangements between State and non-State actors that work outside formal UN processes, but include them in their networks, complement and at times fast-track UNFCCC objectives.218Fundamentally, however, if ocean-based climate actions are to ensure that human rights implications are confronted and mitigated against, extreme caution needs to be exercised against creating decision-making processes that reproduce existing power hierarchies and exclusion.219 The High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism thus recommended strengthening UNEP and the UN Environment Assembly with a mandate to regulate the private sector, which continues to be driven by 'profit-motivated exploitation of natural resources' .220In addition, the Board urged 'mov[ing] beyond the mahogany table where a small number of powerful actors can dictate terms to the rest of the world' and 'evolve into a less hierarchical, more networked system where decision-making is distributed, where the efforts of a large number of different actors are harnessed, and where the collective mission is driven by delivery for people and planet' .221 The proposed ocean-climate coalition should indeed nurture systemic changes that protect the world's marine ecosystems and the people who most depend on them, by devising genuine learning from Indigenous and local knowledge systems, as well as the distinct knowledge of women and children.222

Conclusion
There is an urgent need to enhance efforts to protect the marine environment from the negative impacts of climate change, and prevent further negative human rights impacts on ocean-dependent communities and everyone's human right to a healthy environment.Despite the international scientific The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 recognition of climate change-related risks for ocean health since the birth of the international climate change regime, ocean-based climate action has been only mentioned, but not operationalised, in the past two (or rather, thirty) years.And the role of the ocean in having already contributed significantly to climate change mitigation remains virtually unaccounted in the context of climate finance.Drawing on the REDD+ approach,223 it has been possible to transcend uncertainties in carbon accounting and integrating other ecosystem services as co-benefits, integrating mitigation and adaptation, and seeking to ensure protection of biodiversity and human rights.
That said, growing discontent with the dominant approaches and limited public participation in the international climate change regime could be overcome by an alternative, multi-actor partnership approach that can draw on the experience of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition.Notably, the latter developed a partnership to address a mitigation topic that had not yet been addressed by the UNFCCC and mobilised synergies across the UN system, while supporting States that were taking early action at the national level.It is essential, however, that such an alternative governance approach is genuinely inclusive of different knowledge systems and fully informed by human rights standards, substantively and procedurally.These governance innovations can allow for a shift towards supporting a more integrated and inclusive development of NDCs and MSP that serve to co-identify ocean, human rights-based climate action that prevents further marine pollution and protects fragile ecosystems to the benefit of everyone's human right to a healthy environment.
Ocean-based Climate Action and Human Rights ImplicationsThe International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 While the Paris Agreement largely defers to the national level in terms of concrete adaptation actions, the Adaptation Committee has not yet discussed ocean-based adaptation.With regard to finance, the ocean has limited traction, as around 90 per cent of the estimated US$850-940 billion of climate finance flows for 2021139 going towards climate mitigation is largely focussed on energy systems and transport.Only 3.7 per cent of global climate finance annually flows into the water and waste sector.140The lack of an explicit category for the ocean under the Green Climate Fund means that it is not clear what proportion of the total Fund expenditure of US$45.1 billion (including co-financing) over 216 approved projects relates to ocean issues.141Meanwhile, SDG 14 ('life below The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 Ocean-based Climate Action and Human Rights ImplicationsThe International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 and the secretariat of the 2023 Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement), as this new agreement under the law of the sea specifically addresses the ocean-climate nexus and includes considerations of human rights.199Other UN members would include the CBD Secretariat, whose 2022 Global Biodiversity Framework includes goals on human rights,200 nature-based solutions to climate change,201 increasing marine protected areas202 and ecosystem restoration,203 as well as guidance on ecosystems integrity, people's resilience and biodiversity-based livelihoods in the face of climate change.204The proposed ocean-climate coalition should also involve Ocean-based Climate Action and Human Rights Implications The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 human rights experts, such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Special Rapporteurs on Climate Change and on Human Rights and the Environment.
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN Doc A/HRC/34/49 (19 January 2017).23 C Liquete et al., 'Current status and future prospects for the assessment of marine and coastal ecosystem services: A systematic review' (2013) 8(7) PLos One e67737.Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN Doc A/RES/76/300; see also pre-existing treaty bases, the evolving interpretation of which has been summarised in 21 IPCC, 'Summary for Policy Makers' in SROCC Report (n 5), at p. 5; see E Morgera, 'The ecosystem approach and the precautionary principle' in E Morgera and J Razzaque (eds), Encyclopedia of Environmental Law: Biodiversity and Nature Protection Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2017) 70-80.22 Human Rights Council (HRC), the Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, in HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN Doc A/HRC/37/59 (24 January 2018) [Framework Principles].

related Marine Ecosystem Services and Their Relevance for the LOSC This
The article concludes with an original proposal to develop an alternative, partnership-based governance arrangement that can influence the international climate regime through coordinated action taken across the UN System on ocean, human rights-based climate action.section reflects on climate-ocean science and its relationship with international law, based on the need for mutually supportive interpretation of relevant treaties, for the State Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),32 the CBD, the Paris Agreement,33 and international human rights.34This section emphasises the role of marine biodiversity in allowing the ocean to act as both a carbon sink and a heat sink.The role of climate-related marine ecosystem services (or ecosystem's benefits to people)35 is emphasised, as well as other critical benefits to humanity, including from the deep sea, with a focus on 'blue carbon,'which has received growing attention in scientific research.36Importantly, blue carbon has recently entered the UN climate policy discussion under the concepts of 'ocean-based action' and 'nature-based solutions' to the impacts of climate change.3732 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 396 [LOSC].33 Paris Agreement to the UNFCCC (Paris, 12 December 2015, in force 4 November 2016) 55 ILM 740 [Paris Agreement].34 E Morgera and M Lennan, 'Ensuring Mutual Supportiveness of the Paris Agreement with other Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Focus on Ocean-Based Climate Action' in A Zahar (ed), Research Handbook on the Law of the Paris Agreement (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2023 forthcoming); available on www.ssrn.com;see also L Baars, 'The Salience of Salt Water: An ITLOS Advisory Opinion at the Ocean-Climate Nexus' (2023) 38(3) IJMCL, this issue.35 Note the shift of focus by IPBES, from ecosystem services to 'nature's contributions to people' , to acknowledge culture and Indigenous and local knowledge as pivotal in appreciating and understanding human-nature interactions.See S Díaz et al., ' of the deep sea limits the assessment of climate change risks.56In addition, the deep sea is heterogenous and possesses a range of environmental characteristics that support a variety of ecosystems,57 so knowledge of climate feedbacks in biological systems is limited.58Projected consequences of a warmer,59 more acidic deep sea with less oxygen60 includes species and productivity redistributions,61 habitat compression, biodiversity loss and changes in body size, food webs and connectivity that can influence commercial harvest, carbon sequestration and nutrient cycling.62Climatic changes will also negatively affect food supply, essentially particulate organic matter, on the deep seafloor.63Understanding how climate change will influence important physical drivers of benthic carbon cycling, ecosystem functions and derived ecosystem services remain understudied.As a result, predicted changes remain largely unresolved.Nevertheless, dismissing the heterogene- chronicity-Earth-High-Deep-Seas-Insight.pdf.Deep-sea research does not take into account the superficial layer (epipelagic systems) of the high seas.53 Ducklow et al. (n 49).54 AD Rogers, 'Environmental change in the deep ocean' (2015) 40(1) Annual Review of Environment and Resources 1-38; CW Armstrong et al., 'Services from the deep: Steps towards valuation of deep sea goods and services' (2012) 2 Ecosystem Services 2-13.55 Armstrong et al. (n 54).understanding ity of deep-sea ecosystems in climate change scenarios could have unprecedented and potentially irreversible outcomes, so in light of the precautionary principle, deep-sea ecosystems should be considered 'rare or fragile' under the LOSC and protected from interference from human activities.64Therefore, marine biodiversity and ecosystems are a vital component of the climate system and its functioning that deserve urgent protection as part of 56 LA Levin, 'IPCC and the deep sea: A case for deeper knowledge' (2021) 3 Frontiers in Climate 720755.57 E Ramirez-Llodra et al., 'Deep, diverse and definitely different: Unique attributes of the world's largest ecosystem' (2010) 7(9) Biogeosciences 2851-2899; M Baker et al. (eds), Natural Capital and Exploitation of the Deep Ocean (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020).58 SROCC Report, Summary for Policy Makers (n 21); Levin (n 56).59 DG Desbruyères et al., 'Deep and abyssal ocean warming from 35 years of repeat hydrography' 43(19) Geophysical Research Letters 10356-10365.60 D Breitburg et al., 'Declining oxygen in the global ocean and coastal waters' (2018) 359(6371) Science eaam7240.61 M Pinsky et al., 'Preparing ocean governance for species on the move' (2018) 360(6394) Science 1189-1191.62 AK Sweetman et al., 'Major impacts of climate change on deep-sea benthic ecosystems' (2017) 5(4) Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene 1-23; I Brito-Morales et al., 'Climate velocity reveals increasing exposure of deep-ocean biodiversity to future warming' (2020) 10(6) Nature Climate Change 576-581; LA Levin et al., 'Climate change considerations are fundamental to management of deep-sea resource extraction' (2020) 26(9) Global Change Biology 4664-4678.63 Sweetman et al. (n 62); Levin et al. 2020 (n 62); Bindoff et al. (n 20).64 LOSC (n 32), Article 194(5); see also CBD (n 7), Preamble; CBD Decision II/10, Annex II, para 3, as discussed in The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of The Philippines v.The People's Republic of China), Award, 12 July 2016, Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), PCA Case No. 2013-19, ICGJ 49, paras 939-945.The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 Annual Review of Marine Science 41-66; LA Levin et al., 'Deep-sea impacts of climate interventions' (2023) 379(6636) Science 978-981; SM Smith et al.
99 See, IPCC, 'Policymakers' Summary of the Potential Impacts of Climate Change: Report from Working Group II to IPCC' (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990) 89 (para 24) available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/763957?ln=en.107 See in particular, the Global Climate Observing System co-sponsored by the World Meteorological Organization, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO and the International Council for Science.For a discussion, see F Yamin and J Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) 199-200.The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 162 UNFCCC, 'Decision 4/CP.15,Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries' in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010).163 ME Recio, 'Legal Transformation in an Era of Globalization: The Case of REDD+' (PhD Thesis, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, 2022) 9, available at https://erepo.uef .fi/handle/123456789/26983. 164 D Maniatis et al., 'Toward REDD+ implementation' (2019) 44 Annual Review of Environment and Resources 373-398.165 A Savaresi, 'A glimpse into the future of the climate regime: Lessons from the REDD+ architecture' (2016) 25(2) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 186-196, at p. 188.166 Recio (n 163), at p. 57.167 C Streck, 'Who owns REDD+?Carbon markets, carbon rights, and entitlements to REDD+ (9)ance' (2020) 11(9)Forests 2020 959-974; Recio 2022 (n 163), at p. 44.Downloaded from Brill.com08/28/2023 09:22:33AM via free access Ocean-based Climate Action and Human Rights Implications The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36 'GCF Support for the Early Phases of REDD+' , GCF Doc GCF/B.17/16(2 July 2017), para 25.The document clarifies that 'key actors may include governments (national, subnational, local); local communities (indigenous communities, rural communities, forest-dependent groups, etc.); private sector (producers, providers, financial institutions, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 38 (2023) 1-36