Attacking Punitive Retribution at Its Heart – A Restorative Justice Thrust

Restorative justice, aimed at restoring human relations instead of just punishing offenders, is often defended with reference to biblical values like reconciliation, forgiveness, and mercy. Advocates of retributivism, which is the philosophy that underlies the practice of punishing perpetrators with the sole goal of inflicting hardship on them, regularly ridicule such defenses. In response we will not directly defend restorative justice, but critically inquire in the main theoretical arguments with which advo-cates of retributivism seek to rationalize their view. We point out the weaknesses of these arguments and why we believe that restorative procedures can do much better in serving the goals of (criminal) justice


Introduction
Against a dominant culture which favors punitive retribution (leading in the United States to the mass incarceration of alleged criminals1) advocates of restorative justice try to establish procedures that enhance reconciliation and rehabilitation instead of simple punishment. Many of the original theorists of restorative justice speak from a Christian background, like Howard Zehr,2 Christopher Marshall,3 Thomas Noakes-Duncan4 and Daniel W. Van Ness.5 And many supporters and practitioners of restorative procedures do so motivated by their religious beliefs. Zehr sees biblical justice as shalom, that is as serving the wholeness and peace of the community, and therefore as restorative and not retributive. 6 Marshall has expanded and deepened Zehr's work on the biblical worldview of justice by arguing that justice is satisfied not by retributive punishment but by repentance, restoration and renewal.7 In his Beyond Retribution Marshall argues that the New Testament conception of justice (diakosune) is continuous with the Hebrew conception of righteousness (sedaqah) which is intentionally restorative.8 Noakes-Duncan has asserted that the biblical understanding of justice in early Christianity formed the basis of an ecclesial practice of seeking 'peace and reconciliation between people and their communities, who have suffered relational injury' , because of wrongdoing.9 Van Ness has worked for long in implementing such a practice into the reality of the criminal justice system, through the provision of restorative justice Bible studies for professionals working with incarcerated offenders. 10 Because of contributions like these there is a growing interest in integrating restorative procedures in the criminal justice system. Even so, the truth is that restorative justice as a philosophy and movement of reform still only plays a fairly marginal role in criminal justice. Retributivism, which is the conception of justice that underlies the practice of 'giving offenders their due' is dominant in the public opinion. Although advocates of restorative justice have in many ways criticized retributivism,11 unfortunately they only sparsely have addressed the philosophical arguments with which retributivists rationalize their own view. A thorough criticism of retributivism on a theoretical level seems to be lacking. Prominent spokesmen of retributivism like Michael Moore, Anthony Duff and Andrew von Hirsch have written lengthy warnings against the restorative paradigm though.12 Moore even ridicules those who support restorative justice with religious arguments by characterizing Jesus' protests against the stoning of an adulteress as a 'pretty clumsy moral philosophy' .13 It is time for a counter-argument. 10 Daniel W. Van  We contend that theology has a responsibility in publicly addressing and criticizing the way influential criminologists, legal theorists and other opinion makers try to rationalize punitive retribution as 'right' and 'just' . Such an address should take a form that is accessible to the theologically uninformed public.14 Our arguments will make sparse use of biblical-theological or dogmatic ideas. The intention is not to directly defend restorative justice as a theory and practice, but rather to point out the serious weaknesses of the seemingly appealing arguments and theories with which retributivists advocate for that point of view.
This article distinguishes and analyzes five of such theories: its goal is to contribute to the theoretical discussion between retributive and restorative justice. It is important to do so as there is always the danger that restorative justice becomes 'preoccupied with process and technique' .15 The intention is also to consider the relationship between arguments mounted against retributivism and a biblical and theological understanding of justice. Marshall has warned that when theological insights are translated into secular categories there is a danger that 'what is most distinctive and essential to the Christian worldview is filtered out.'16 We believe however that many elements of a Christian anthropology and a Christian view of the character of human communities can be made plausible in secular terms. Christianity's alternative interpretation of reality that competes with the story of the liberal secularism that underlies retributivism need not be convincing only to believers.

Restorative Justice and Retributivism
Restorative justice is a term referring to a set of theories and practices that are critical of the existing criminal justice system and the retributivist philosophy.
Although there is no fixed definition of restorative justice (it is an ambiguous concept17) most of the theories and practices involved have at least the following characteristics.
(1) Restorative justice understands transgressions and crimes not primarily as a violation of rules, but as a violation against persons and human relations.18 Transgressions are regarded as conflicts that need to be given back to their rightful owners to resolve: offenders/victims and their communities.19 (2) Restorative justice therefore gives primary attention to the needs of the injured persons involved: first the victim and the related community and second the perpetrator and related community. It seeks 'the liberation of the victims from being just victims as well as the liberation of the offender from being just an offender, and liberating the community from their infliction in guilt' .20 (3) Restorative justice procedures are based on values like non-domination, empowerment of victims, respectful listening, equal concern for all stakeholders, and accountability.21 (4) Restorative justice does not regard sentence and punishment as the crucial criteria in order to establish justice. Instead it aims in Victim-Offender Mediation programs at a constructive dialogue between victims, offenders, and their communities, seeking to identify responsibilities and obligations, to meet needs and to promote healing and dignity. Restorative justice thus aims at the healing of victims, offenders and communities that have been injured by crime and requires active involvement of them 17 'Over the last two decades, Restorative Justice has emerged in varied guises with different names, and in many countries; it has sprung from sites of activism, academia, and justice system workplaces. The concept may refer to an alternative process for resolving disputes, to alternative sanctioning options, or to a distinctively different, new model of criminal justice organised around principles of restoration to victims, offenders and the communities in which they live. in the justice process 'as early and as fully as possible.'22 It covers a wide set of practices. These do not necessarily exclude punishment of offenders, because trial, conviction, and punishment may be part of the whole restorative process. But punitive retribution is never regarded as the ultimate goal and justification of inflicting hardship upon the perpetrator. Restorative justice advocates refuse to believe that justice can be done by adding suffering (of the perpetrator) to suffering (of the victim). Retributivism, however, is the contention that offenders should suffer solely because they deserve hardship as punishment for their wrongful acts. Usually this positive claim is distinguished from a negative one: those that do no wrong may not be punished or in other ways be addressed by the criminal justice system (a negative claim that is endorsed by most advocates of restorative justice). Here we focus our theoretical response on the positive claim. Although many varieties of positive retributivism may be distinguished,23 most retributive theorists will support the following four claims.
(1) We are obliged to punish those who have been found to commit an offence. Punishment here is understood as the intentional imposition of some cost or burden (or at least the withdrawal of benefits) in response to a wrong done by the perpetrator, sending a message of condemnation.24 (2) The offender's desert is a sufficient reason for punishing them. consequences that may follow upon such punishment (for instance, the effect of special or general deterrence). Most restorative justice advocates strongly oppose these desert-oriented claims. This does not necessarily mean that they completely reject the criminal justice system (though some hold that the system is fundamentally flawed and should be replaced by a restorative scheme28). Restorative justice is concerned with what happens after a perpetrator's guilt has been established. Before restorative procedures can be applied we need the police and other officials to inquire a crime. By officially investigating a case the state empowers individuals to seek and obtain acknowledgment for wrongs committed to them. It is often only after judicial adjudication of guilt, that restorative procedures like mediation, conferencing circles, and panels may be applied. Such procedures can be combined with imprisonment or other sanctions, as it may be necessary to incapacitate dangerous perpetrators, in order to protect (potential) victims. Such deterrent or incapacitating back-up sanctions could be part of restorative justice practices.29 Sanctions, like imprisonment, may also be applied in order to encourage perpetrators to comply to restorative procedures.30 Finally, in restorative processes perpetrators can be asked to make amends that may also be burdensome to them (just as sincere regret and apologies may be difficult for them31). But the hardship of such painful obligations is never vindictive or retributive.
Advocates of restorative justice oppose the idea that justice may require punishment simply for the sake of punishment. Taking 'just desert' as the prime criterion for doing justice will not lead to the healing of victims, offenders and communities that have been injured by crime, even when victims ask for 'revenge' . Retributive justice simply is defective in elevating human dignity, transforming people and healing traumas caused by crime. What are the arguments then with which advocates of retributivism rationalize their views?

Fair Play and Trust
An appealing one is the Fair Play argument which says that we need to impose hardship on offenders in order to re-balance the distribution of benefits and burdens which is upset by the criminal offence.32 The idea is that it is to our mutual benefit that we live together in a society, but doing so requires that we accept certain limits on our behaviour (for example, not interfering with others, use violence or steal property). If a person fails to exercise such selfconstraint, he -as Herbert Morris phrased it -'renounces a burden others have voluntarily assumed and thus gains an advantage which others, who have restrained themselves, do not possess.'33 This unfair advantage has to be erased by punishing the 'free rider' , thus 'exacting the debt' he has to other citizens and thereby restoring the balance of justice. So the idea is that a criminal has the double advantage of not obeying the law while enjoying the advantages of the rule of law, thanks to his law-abiding fellow-citizens. Punitive retribution is meant to restore the balance of benefits and burdens. Such re-balancing makes the hardship imposed on offenders 'fair' . Attractive as this justification of retribution from fairness at first sight may be, it is much too one-sided to really gain argumentative weight. The logic of the argument imagines that the greater the imbalance of benefits and burdens the more serious the crime and the more severe the punishment should be. But fraud may produce a much greater advantage than manslaughter, though the latter is usually regarded as the more serious crime. In general, the seriousness of crimes like murder or manslaughter cannot be explained in terms of free riding and a lack of fair play. Most people who violently abuse or murder someone are not deliberately renouncing a burden that others would like to renounce too, though they refrain from doing so. It is ill conceived to regard murder as a form of free riding. Such a view seriously distorts the essential character of crime. The wrongfulness of rape or murder does not consist in taking an 'unfair advantage' . The rapist or murderer does not wrong society by 'not 32 Michael The basic problem of the fair play theory, even from a secular point of view, is that it pictures society as a project of cooperation for mutual advantage, thereby reducing civic interrelation to interactions between rational egoists. There is much more at stake between civilians than rational interest. In a complex society people need to trust each other in a very basic way, and this is a kind of trust that is not based on considerations of fairness ('you will be fair to me if I will be fair to you'). With most co-civilians we only have temporally limited interactions with no iterated encounters that might create possibilities for weighing burdens against benefits. We simply need a system that helps to maintain conditions of basic trust in a society -that is, 'trust in each other, in the first instance, and trust in the legal system itself as an institution designed to maintain trust secondarily' .35 Trust theory seems better suited to justify retribution. Offenders who commit a crime demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness, because of their willingness to violate the conditions of basic trust in society. That is the reason why they deserve punishment.
Even so, one may question why a display of untrustworthiness merits the hardship involved in punishment. Advocates of trust theory hold that punishment is necessary to reaffirm for the members of the community the commitment to basic trust: Those who commit offenses demonstrate that the ability of the law to maintain the conditions of trust in the community is not complete; punishing the criminal, however, serves to reestablish that trust and demonstrates that individuals need not adopt recourse to anticipatory violence as a means of protecting their interests against those who are willing to harm them.36 But why would the state (as the agent of the community) need to impose violence by punishing trespassers in order to demonstrate its ability to maintain trust in society? We doubt that the violation of the conditions of basic trust in the community can be properly remedied by the imposition of punishment upon the offender. Why not engage in procedures that are meant to directly foster trust and interpersonal reliance? Restorative justice promotes trust through a constructive dialogue between victims, offenders, and their communities, seeking to promote healing and reliance. The procedures of a restorative are not only much better suited to enhance self-assurance and trust in victims and their peers.37 They may also serve to give offenders a 'human face' , thus diminishing nightmarish caricaturing among the public that might produce insecurity and fear.38 Restorative justice is probably much more suited to restore conditions of trust than punitive retribution. It also avoids a problem that is inherent if one recommends retributive punishment as the best way to restore the conditions of trust: how would it ever be possible to determine what proportion of punishment is needed to restore specific breaches of trust? What is even more troublesome is the following question: how do we determine what kind of trust violations should be punishable? There are a great many violations of trust, among people of varying degrees of intimacy, that are not illegal (and should not be). Infidelity is considered by the betrayed partner as a serious breach of trust, but it would be absurd to make it into a punishable offense. The Trust theory has not only hardly an answer to the problem of proportionality of punishment. It stands even weaker in solving the problem of distinguishing punishable from non-punishable trust violations.39

Communication Theory: Punishment as Censuring Crime
It is perhaps possible for these problems to be handled by regarding the infliction of punishment not as a way of restoring basic trust, but as a forceful way of communicating society's censure of criminal offences. According to Antony Duff the authority of the law lies in its power 'to call alleged wrongdoers to public account, to judge their conduct, and to condemn and punish their criminal wrongdoing' .40 This calling to public account must include judgment and The question however is why penal hard treatment is needed to successfully communicate society's censure. Why would the infliction of punishment be necessary? Mark that punishment, as Duff understands it, involves 'the imposition of something that is burdensome independently of its censorial meaning.'42 Restorative procedures are usually burdensome for offenders, morally, psychologically, and economically. But there is no burden involved independently of what serves acknowledgment of wrongfulness, recognition of victims and reconciliation between parties. Duff however, argues that the burden of hard treatment is necessary to induce in the offender 'a properly repentant understanding of what he has done' .43 Burdensome punishment makes it 'harder for the offender to ignore the message that punishment communicates' . A penitential suffering would provide for an adequate moral reparation for the wrong that was done, at least something that costs more than an apology.
Even so, arguing that penal retribution will induce a repentant consciousness in offenders conveys an unfounded psychology that in the past has inspired many forms of inhuman treatment of prisoners, like years of solitary confinement with nothing else to read than a Bible or forced labor to teach prisoners 'discipline' . Solitary confinement drives prisoners crazy instead of turning them into repentant sinners. And hard treatment, like forced labor, has hardly ever resulted in moral conversion and rehabilitation, let alone in sincere motions of apology. Hard treatment rather results in bitterness and a hardening of the heart. Duff  Yet, what good does this bring to victims? What good does the recognition of their suffering by the public bring them, if the offender who has wronged them gives them a dishonest apology and a crooked defense? The encounter between perpetrators and victims in restorative justice processes will bring victims much more in terms of recognition, clarification (what has happened? why me?), and regained self-respect (looking the offender in the eyes and personally calling him to account). A sincere apology, an honest explanation, and the opportunity for the victim to speak up for herself are infinitely more valuable than a formal, public condemnation of what the perpetrator has done.

Vindication of Victims
It can be argued that, although punitive retribution may not be the most ideal way of communication with perpetrators, it may bring victims more than just the formal solidarity and recognition by their fellow citizens (formal because mediated by a criminal trial). Jean Hampton has convincingly shown that punishment in some way vindicates victims by defeating wrongdoers. Crime does not just cause harm, like a loss of possessions, psychological distress and longterm feelings of insecurity. For victims the symbolic meaning of crime often is more important: they have been wronged by the perpetrator who has wrongfully invaded their house, damaged their property or caused physical injury. Much of the sting of being harmed derives from the identity implication of the crime. To be taken advantage of, exploited or hurt is resented because it implies that one is the sort of person who can be taken advantage of, indirectly through an agent of the victim, e.g. the State) that symbolizes the correct relative value of wrongdoer and victim. It is a symbol that is conceptually required to reaffirm a victim's equal worth in the face of a challenge to it.46 Retribution is thus sought for because it may have a function in restoring the victim's self-image and dignity. This is the reason why victims are not content with a mere compensation (if possible) that restores the status quo (stolen goods are returned, damages are paid for). The violation they have experienced has not only material, but also (and often predominantly) symbolic meaning. This is confirmed in empirical research.47 Victimization means that the offender has violently appropriated status and power over the victim and the wider community.48 Punishing an offender may then serve the victim in three ways:49 (1) it restores the victim as an active actor (autonomy): she is no longer (just) a passive sufferer; (2) it restores the victim's prestige (status) by degrading and disempowering the offender; (3) it gives the victim voice as defender of the values that she and the offender are supposed to share.50 If victimization means loss of dignity then the urge for retribution and 'getting the perpetrator back' might best be understood as an attempt to regain agency and dignity: 'The lord must be humbled to show that he isn't the lord of the victim.'51 Even so, punitive retribution is a notoriously indirect and inefficient way of annulling the affront that the victim has experienced. It is not difficult to see that restorative processes are much more effective and efficient in restoring the dignity and autonomy of victims. Because restorative justice sees crime as an issue of relationships it promotes practices that directly foster the 46 Jeffrie G. Murphy  restoration of interpersonal respect and worth.52 Restoration processes may be profoundly empowering because victims can exercise much more control than in regular criminal procedures. Victims can be 'agents' instead of 'patients' .53 They may have the opportunity to face the offender in a safe environment and can say what they want to say, ask questions for further information, and enter into a dialogue about values. It appears that victims who participate in Victim-Offender Mediation programs have a much better sense of being heard and acknowledged than in the context of criminal justice procedures where they are often only heard as witness.54 Victims feel validated when offenders are able to offer an apology,55 but even when this result does not obtain they experience their active role and the respectful treatment by the mediator and others involved as distinctively empowering .56 These procedures of restorative are also much better suited to reach clarification than the adversarial practices in retributive procedures (like interrogations in court). Entering into a dialogue with the offender is not only a matter of getting the answers for the sake of knowing the answers. Simply receiving some response ultimately fosters a feeling of acknowledgement, which is conductive to dignity.57 In general, for victims the restorative procedure itself is more important than the outcome. A restorative justice process is a much better way of making sense of the victimizing event. It serves victims in acquiring autonomy, dignity and standing as active agents in their case, sometimes accompanied by painful emotions in case of testimonies, and as initiators of reflection and action with regard to the moral values at stake. Not retributive punishment but restorative justice procedures are the prime way of promoting the vindication of the victim. This does not preclude that restorative justice procedures may be painful for the perpetrator, because of the hardship of moral condemnation, loss of standing, and particular reparative obligations. But such hardship is not the aim of restorative justice as it is in punitive retribution. Punishment for the sake of making the offender suffer so that he may be humiliated and the victim dignified is not the appropriate way to vindicate victims.

Kantian Theory
But perhaps punitive retribution is not so much needed to vindicate the victim, but to acknowledge the responsibility and related status of the offender as a moral agent. By calling the transgressor to account we treat him as a responsible fellow member of the moral community.58 In other words we treat him as an agent and not as a patient, that is as someone who cannot be held responsible because of a psychic illness or mental handicap which has driven him to break the law. that I will be punished if I murder someone is saying nothing more than that I submit myself along with everyone else to the laws.'62 Punishing a criminal with the sole purpose of 'paying him back' is thus a sign of recognition of his status and dignity as an autonomous agent. Punishing a criminal therefore is a strict duty of public justice that his fellow citizens cannot discharge.
Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by the consent of all its members (for example, if the people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse themselves throughout the world), the last murderer remaining in prison would first have to be executed, so that each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators in this public violation of justice.63 This argument is flawed on a theoretical level as well as on the practical level of our institutions for punishment. On a theoretical level Kant seems to be in conflict with his argument in The Groundwork about the moral impermissibility of suicide. He argues there that if a person 'destroys himself in order to escape from a trying condition' he uses himself 'merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life.'64 Christine Korsgaard, one of the most respected Kant-scholars, interprets this argument by pointing out that 'the tolerable condition' that is pursued is only a 'good end' (or goal) 'because of the value conferred upon it by the choice of a rational being' . However, by destroying the rational being, there is no 'good end' anymore, as the person for whom it is good does not exist any longer.65 It is contradictory to destroy one's own life (and thereby one's autonomy) because that would amount to using oneself 'merely as a means' . In the same way we can argue that executing a murderer in order to respect his status as an autonomous, responsible agent, is contradictory. We then use him as a 'mere means' in order to express our respect. We aim to respect his autonomy by destroying his autonomy, which is inconsistent. That punishment is justified because it constitutes the expression of respect for the agential dignity of the guilty criminal may be theoretically correct in cases other than the death-penalty. Yet, given the reality of our institutions of punishment the argument is as self-contradictory as is Kant's argument in favor of the execution of the murderer. Incarcerated offenders have to live in conditions that are meant to express disrespect of their agential dignity. The permanent control of their daily life not only infantalizes inmates, but the miserable conditions under which they live also 'serve to repeatedly remind them of their compromised moral status and stigmatized social role as prisoners' .66 It is a travesty to think that incarceration is a form of respecting inmates' autonomy. One of the main characteristics of confinement in a 'total institution' like a prison is the loss of nearly all forms of self-determination and thereby the loss of the capacity of autonomy.67 Prisoners have to adjust to the paramount muting of self-initiative, as the prison institution not only determines daily routine but also takes over nearly all decisions for its inhabitants. What is more: prisons impose meticulous and continuous surveillance and apply a fine-graded system of punishments (and rewards) in order to discipline the behavior and thoughts of the inmates. Inhabitants of prisons are surrounded with such an extent network of enforceable regulations that inmates 'gradually lose the capacity to rely on internal organization and self-imposed personal limits to guide their actions' .68 In practice the punishment of criminals in our society has nothing to do with respect for their agential dignity.

Evolution
There is one last argument for retaliation that must be mentioned, as it is often used in popular discussions despite its flawed nature. The argument is that most people have strong and persistent intuitions supporting the punishment of perpetrators with proportional harsh treatment. wrongdoer in order to give him his just desert rather than to achieve any future goal, like the prevention of future offenses through incapacitating the perpetrator or deterring potential villains.69 In concrete cases just desert for most people in most cultures is the primary sentencing motive. This is not because punishment satisfies people's feelings of revenge. Studies have shown that perpetrator punishment only partially, and moreover only transitorily, satisfies feelings of revenge.70 Moreover, people are willing to retaliate even if they know that on all counts it will cost them more than it will bring them, as is shown in the famous Ultimatum Game experiments. 71 The explanation of this phenomenon is probably evolutionary.72 People have evolved a moral punishment instinct because it was adaptive in promoting cooperation. Punishment is used to get back free riders and deter future deserters. This is why people have an inborn tendency to punish. Punishment is associated with the activation of old, emotional regions of the brain.73 Even young children, including eight-month-old babies, punish.74 As a result of evolutionary developments the urge to punish has become part of our neural hardware. The fact that retributivist intuitions are deeply grounded in our make-up as part of the evolutionary history of humans does not mean that such intuitions should be trusted and used to rationalize retributivism as a philosophy and practice. Prejudiced and tribal intuitions are also deeply ingrained impulses, probably resulting from evolutionary developments.75 As the Implicit Association Test shows, racist and sexist responses are deeply embedded in our minds (also among people of colour and among women) and can hardly be educated.76 People all over the world are prejudiced towards others based on group affiliations, be they racial, ethnic or religious. Research among monkeys suggest that the roosts of these prejudices lie deep in our evolutionary past.77 Even so, this does not mean that we can take such impulses to rationalize or justify racism or tribalism. Taking evolutionary results as an argument for justifying current human reactions or practices is a blatant fallacy. 'Is' never can ground 'ought' as far as evolution is concerned. Deeply ingrained as the retributivist urge may be, strong and persistent intuitive reactions and emotions can never, as such, be used to rationalize retributivism.

Ideal Theories for a Non-Ideal World
Thomas Noakes-Duncan78 has rightly noted that it was not so much criminologists or correctional experts who promoted retributivism in the 1970s (in criticism of the rehabilitative idealism of the early 1900s that saw criminals as patients in need of treatment). It was philosophers and jurists who promoted the retributivist agenda, like Andreas von Hirsch whose Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration (1976) -published under the title Doing Justice -was very influential.79 These scholars however formulated ideal theories, 'which tell us what aims and values a system of punishment must embody if it is to be unqualifiedly justified.'80 Of course, no actual system will match the ideal and the question, therefore, is what the value is of the arguments with which retributivism is defended. Fair Play Theory may have some argumentative weight in case of some crimes like fraud or theft. But in a society where the benefits and advantages are not fairly distributed and in which offenders usually belong to the most disadvantaged groups, one can hardly say that offenders culpably take 420 van Willigenburg and Van der Borght International Journal of Public Theology 15 (2021) 401-425 an unfair advantage for themselves. Is justice done by punishing offenders in a society that is in itself deeply unjust? 81 Even from a secular standpoint, it will be clear that a religious-Christian worldview that takes into account the essential imperfection of our world is a much more realistic starting point for thinking about justice. In a Christian view our world is broken and humankind suffers from the sin of selfishness and greed. This leads to structural injustices, between countries and within societies. Such a realism does not lead to pessimism though. From a religious-Christian point of view there is reason for hope (understood as the (interpersonal) process of imagining and anticipating a better future). For Christians God's eschatological promises of liberation may stimulate the hopeful imagination of a better future which may excite positive feelings of anticipation and the willingness to contribute to reform and transformation.82 This is the reason why religious pastors and Christian volunteers visit prisoners, support rehabilitation programs, serve victim support groups and strife to create the kind of cross-communal social networks needed to have opportunities of encounter so that trusting relationships may develop.83 The religious-Christian worldview is realistic but certainly not pessimistic about the 'condition humaine' .
Such a religious-Christian view accords better with a communitarian conception of society than the liberal conception from which retributivists start. In a liberal conception the focus is not so much on the interconnectedness of citizens, understood as social creatures who need each other. The focus is on the rights and liberties of citizens, understood as free, autonomous individuals who are capable of making choices for which they can be held accountable. According to this view personal dignity is grounded in the rational autonomy that individuals universally possess. However, such an idea of individual autonomy and dignity is an ideological fiction. It is an abstract idea that is not only psychologically untenable, it also suffers from serious sociological naivety. Personal dignity is a result of much more than the acknowledgment of rational autonomy, understood as the ability to make rational, moral choices as an agent who is not just a victim of his inclinations or incentives. 84  their self-worth from particular acknowledgments in the various roles and identities they fulfill, as spouse, as parent, or as colleague.85 Social esteem is the main source of a sense of dignity and self-worth. 86 What matters for social esteem is 'the recognition of particular qualities of individuals insofar as these qualities can be recognized as capacities and achievements that contribute to socially shared goals' .87 Restorative justice procedures are aimed at recognizing and promoting the dignity of victims and perpetrators, because restorative justice understands dignity and self-esteem as resulting from mutual acknowledgment in specific relationships. Restorative practices not only contribute to the dignity of the victim, but also to the dignity of the perpetrator, whose (life)-story is also heard and whose position as partner in a respectful dialogue is acknowledged.
Taking into account someone's messy life-story (and not just his abstract status as an autonomous agents) is of crucial importance given the sociological fact that people rarely live in ideal communities in which responsible individuals are bound together as equals who acknowledge rules that benefit everyone. Actual human societies are not like this at all. Most criminal offenders completely fail to correspond to the abstract picture that underlies the philosophical defenses of retributivism. Murphy88 cites one of the letters of Kant in which the philosopher himself seems to recognize this problem: In a world of moral principle governed by God, punishments would be categorically necessary (insofar as transgressions occur). But in a world governed by men, the necessity of punishments is only hypothetical, and that direct union of the concept of transgression with the idea of deserving punishment serves the ruler only as a suggestion for what to do.89 By promoting a retributivist agenda -based on arguments for an ideal world -criminal justice policy in the real world has become deeply oppressive, as shown by slogans like 'Prison works' , 'Adult time for adult crime' , leading to 422 van Willigenburg and Van der Borght International Journal of Public Theology 15 (2021) 401-425 a system of mass incarceration and systematic humiliation and infantilization of offenders.

Mercy and Forgiveness
Because human reality is messy, every human story is different and crime is not just a matter of 'making the wrong choice' . Crime has to be understood against the background of numerous social and psychological factors. From a Christian point of view justice therefore cannot be separated from mercy. As Marshall notes: '[c]ompassionate acceptance of human fallibility is essential to the functioning of healthy relationships.'90 The restoration of healthy relationships is often better served by mercy than by retaliation. Christians regard retaliation and revenge as something to be countered in favour of moral indignation about crime combined with the persistent will to see and treat the offender as one's neighbor. Jesus, so Marshall argues, has set the retributive lex tallionis aside as a governing norm and has preached about what is needed to restore human dignity and human relations.91 Forgiveness is an ideal that Christians are called to put into practice wherever possible. Retributivism has no place for the values of mercy or forgiveness. It sees mercy, understood as the 'remitting or mitigating of a burden of penalty to which the recipient would otherwise be liable' as infringement of the domain of justice.92 Forgiveness, understood as the overcoming of resentment and the bracketing off of guilt, is seen as morally bad, at least in cases of serious wrongs. Forgiveness is disqualified as a sign that the victim lacks sufficient respect for herself or does not take seriously the public wrong involved in breaking the law. 93 Retributivists' aversion to mercy and forgiveness in the realm of criminal justice can be explained by reference to its abstract, non-relational picture of perpetrators and victims. Arguing that a failure to resent moral injuries done to me is a 'failure to care about the moral value incarnate in my own person'94 ignores that people may find dignity and pride in being able to overcome their hostile feelings towards the wrongdoer. Holding that forgiveness and mercy cannot operate in the sphere of justice presupposes a specific conception of justice instead of supporting such a conception. Restorative justice does not conceive forgiveness as a unilateral act of the victim, but underlines its relational character.95 Restorative justice does not hold that being merciful contradicts the demands of penal justice, it holds that mercy may play a substantial role in penal justice.
What is then to be made about the complaint that mercy will always be unfair to those who do not receive it, because it discriminates between offenders whose penal desert is relevantly similar?96 According to restorative justice fairness is more than equity. It requires that one takes the life story and character of the perpetrator seriously in such a way that his condition may be seen as demanding a different response than in case of a seemingly similar offender. The objection that a liberal criminal law should respect an offender's privacy and avoid intruding into the deeper, more personal aspects of his life97 again favors a kind of formal role-playing in the court room and an abstraction from the real life of perpetrators. Restorative justice is critical of such abstractions and formalities.
We want to be clear, however, that we do not regard forgiveness as a moral requirement that can be imposed on victims. Forgiveness is always a supererogatory attitude and act, which may be inspired by a range of motives and considerations related to the particular situation of the victim, the particular situation of the perpetrator and the character of their encounter(s). Nor do we suggest that mercy or forgiveness should be unconditional. In restorative justice procedures the offender may be required to make amendments by compensating victims, apologizing, and performing community service. Forgiving is not condoning. If I forgive the wrongdoer I no longer hold it against him that he has wronged me. That does not mean that harms should not be repaired nor that I stop condemning and protesting against the kind of wrongdoing that I have experienced.98 Overcoming hostile feelings toward the offender does not imply that I stop hating the offence. Mercy and forgiveness involve an attitude of good will towards the wrongdoer, not towards the wrong done. Forgiveness is a relational attitude fostering reconciliation and restoration with the person. Of course, restoration of relationships may have its limits, for instance, when restoring the relationship would be dangerous to the forgiver (think of a battered wife and her abusive husband that dangerous offenders are subject to crime prevention restraints.99 But such measures and limitations are not the result of a lack of concern for the wellbeing of the wrongdoer. An attitude of good will towards the wrongdoer can very well accompany a concern for safety of the victim and of the public in general. The crucial difference between restorative justice and retributivism is the way the latter conceives of mercy and forgiveness as incompatible with criminal justice. Regarding mercy as an 'intrusion' into the sphere of justice, rather than as an aspect of the restoration that justice aims at, is morally dubious, so we contend. It conveys a seriously limited conception of what justice, also in the sphere of crime, involves. Restorative justice incorporates not just values like fairness and equity, but also reconciliation, forgiveness, dignity and rehabilitation. Such a conception of justice deserves full support and a fierce defense against its critics. Humility, forgiveness and reconciliation amounts to anything but a 'clumsy moral philosophy' in the realm of justice. Forgiveness and reconciliation are values in service of human dignity and peaceful social communities. Forgiveness and reconciliation serve the flourishing of human beings, which is the best kind of moral philosophy you can get. As Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela remarks in her discussion of a South-African mother who granted her son's murderer forgiveness: 'forgiveness…. is primarily concerned about giving human face to a man who is begging, not for the slate to be wiped clean, but for a chance to take the first steps towards rehabilitation and to live among fellow human beings.'100

Conclusion
We have analyzed the five main theories with which proponents of retributivism try to underpin their philosophy: they are Fair Play/ Trust theory, Kantian theory, Moral Communication theory, Vindication of Victims theory, and Evolutionary theory. We have seen that Fair Play, Kant and Evolution fail to justify punitive retribution of crime. We have argued that restorative justice procedures can do much better than retribution in serving the goals of Trust, Moral Communication and Victim Vindication. Of course, restorative justice procedures, like victim-offenders encounters, are in practice less ideal and successful than the theory would like it to have.