“Editorial”

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Historians have written many books describing instances where the United States has asserted its dominance in international affairs during the Cold War. However, it is important to remember that U.S. leaders have not been able to act unilaterally in implementing its policies in the nearly half century after World War II. For example, the United States seemed to have its way at the United Nations until the entrance of many new nations freed from European colonial rule entered the international organization during the 1960s. In fact, U.S. leaders had to alter policy proposals at the United Nations almost from the moment of its creation in 1945. For example, during the Korean War, Washington was unable to persuade the General Assembly to approve aggressive and confrontational policies toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) after it intervened in the conflict. Moreover, the United States had to adjust its policies in Korea because of contrary input from its allies in Western Europe who had committed military forces to defend South Korea, forcing it to adopt more conciliatory proposals during the negotiations for an armistice at Kaesŏng and then P'anmunjŏm. President Dwight D. Eisenhower considered the use of atomic weapons in North Korea or Manchuria, but objections from U.S. allies prevented him from doing so. In April 1954, the Eisenhower administration could not act on its desire to intervene in Indochina because of the refusal of U.S. allies to join in a “united action” to save French forces at Dien Bien Phu. Just months later, it was forced to accept Vietnam's partition because France was desperate to withdraw and Britain wanted a peace settlement over U.S. objections. These are only a couple of examples from the early Cold War years exposing the limits on U.S. power to control events in international affairs during the postwar period.

Studies of the Occupation of Japan after World War II have emphasized how the United States determined the policies for reconstruction of that country, even though it was ostensibly an Allied operation. But after Japan's defeat, the other Allies made plain their desire to have a role in the nation's rehabilitation. To meet this demand, the Truman administration proposed on 21 August

1945 creation of a “Far Eastern Advisory Commission” to make recommendations for policies to enforce provisions of the instrument of surrender. After its establishment in October, the Soviet Union refused to participate because it saw the United States as retaining total power under the plan. At the Moscow Conference in December, the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed to form a Far Eastern Commission (FEC) that consisted of thirteen members who would meet in Washington, D.C. to provide advice and guidance on occupation policies. Representing the FEC in Japan would be an Allied Council that consisted of four delegations who represented the United States, the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth (Australia jointly representing Britain, New Zealand, and India), and China. General Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. occupation commander, would serve as chair of the body. Aware that the Allied Council’s job was to keep a close watch over his actions, MacArthur resented its presence. Although it had some influence on land reform and political purges, the Allied Council developed the reputation of being a mere token presence, especially with the emergence of the Cold War in 1947. However, Christopher Aldous, in the first article of this issue titled “The Anatomy of Allied Occupation: Contesting the Resumption of Japanese Antarctic Whaling, 1945–1952,” provides a compelling example of how the occupation of Japan to the end was “a multinational operation in more than just name.”

Aldous examines how the Natural Resources Section (NRS) of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ SCAP) reacted to the opposition from Britain, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand to its decision to allow Japan to resume Antarctic whaling beginning in 1946. These U.S. allies not only objected to Japan catching whales in an area they wanted to control, they also pointed to its prewar refusal to sign international whaling accords and “past record of wasteful and inefficient operations.” Relying on their preponderant power, the NRS and MacArthur refused to prohibit Japanese Antarctic whaling, but negotiated with U.S. allies to resolve their complaints. For example, the NRS placed an inspector on each Japanese whaling ship to ensure compliance with conservation agreements. Aldous describes how “the Occupation authorities were careful to treat the Allied observers with respect, to listen to their comments, and to accommodate their concerns.” However, the allies assumed that the 1946–1947 season was “a one-off venture” and MacArthur’s decision to authorize a second Japanese Antarctic whaling expedition for 1947–1948 ignited a “diplomatic furor.” “Charges of bad faith embarrassed the State Department,” Aldous reports, “causing the Occupation to double the number of Allied observers on the whaling factories and MacArthur to reject the case for any expansion of Japanese pelagic whaling capability beyond two fleets.” In addition, the NRS ordered Japanese factory vessels to prioritize oil

yields as the allies demanded, abandoning its justification for Japanese whaling as necessary to meet domestic food shortages. "This case study," Aldous persuasively concludes, "represents the Allied Occupation of Japan as a coalition of the willing, a combination of American leadership and dependence on its coalition partners."

Domestic opinion constituted another important constraint on U.S. policy during the Cold War. An example was how many Americans did not respond positively to former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain Speech" in March 1946, believing that his call for an Anglo-U.S. military alliance to halt Soviet expansion was really a maneuver to gain U.S. help in defending the British Empire. A year later, Michigan Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg reportedly told President Harry S. Truman that he had better "scare [the] hell out of the American people" if he hoped to achieve support from his containment policy. Truman did and secured congressional approval for military and economic aid for Greece and Turkey. He was not successful, however, in overcoming public displeasure with his China policy, which prevented him from vigorously pursuing diplomatic relations with the PRC during the nine months after the Communists prevailed in the Chinese Civil War. The China Lobby instead demanded that Truman support Chiang Kai-shek's government in exile on Taiwan. Emerging during World War II to promote assistance for Chiang, the China Lobby was a loose and disparate collection of private citizens and members of Congress, who claimed that disloyal, if not treasonous, U.S. diplomats in China had orchestrated Chiang's defeat. The Korean War forged a consensus among Americans behind its opposition to U.S. recognition of the PRC. Thereafter, the China Lobby relied on domestic and congressional opinion to ensure that the U.S. government maintained a militant anti-PRC stance. The Korean War also led to creation of the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations, whose significance Jeffrey Crean describes in the second essay of this issue titled "Nixon is With Us on China: Raging Against the Dying of the Lobby."

Crean explains the reasons for the success and then the failure of the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations. After its creation in 1953, the Committee worked hard to build bipartisan support, relied on the leadership of Marvin Liebman, and struggled to deal with a persistent lack of funding. For a decade, the Committee was successful as a lobbyist in convincing "often an overwhelming majority" of congressmen to support its demand for a U.S. policy of "no travel to China, no trade with China, no entry of Mao Zedong's regime into the United Nations, and no diplomatic recognition of Communist China." A second prong of its strategy to use publicity to mobilize and influence public opinion was not as effective

because of limited financial resources. Its influence peaked in 1962, but this was so because it “faced no organized opposition,” leaving it unprepared, Crean perceptively explains, to react when “an actual threat materialized.” An emerging shift in informed opinion against the Committee became public and gained force beginning in March 1966 with the Fulbright Senate Hearings on China, where academics urged an end to the U.S. policy of isolating and containing the PRC. Thereafter, liberal and moderate congressmen deserted the Committee, eliminating its claim to bipartisan support. Its hopes revived with anti-Communist Richard M. Nixon’s election as president, but with his initiation of Ping-Pong diplomacy, the Committee’s final efforts to block U.S. support for the PRC’s admission into the United Nations failed. The Committee’s downfall, Crean concludes, “illustrated both the limits of power of American conservatives over U.S. foreign policy while *détente* was ascendant, and the discontinuity in priorities between the Old Right from which the Committee emerged and the New Right that left it behind.”

In October 1971, the United Nations admitted the PRC and expelled Chiang’s Republic of China (ROC). Eight years later, President Jimmy Carter formally recognized the PRC, along with abrogating U.S.-ROC defense treaties and withdrawing American military personnel from Taiwan. His latter action, however, represented only a small reduction in the enormous number of U.S. soldiers stationed in a multitude of military bases around the globe. Many citizens who resided in these host countries objected to the American military presence, often staging protests demanding U.S. departure. For example, after 1960, disgruntled South Koreans regularly held demonstrations calling for the eviction of American troops, arguing that their presence prevented movement toward reunification. Popular hostility toward what many viewed as U.S. occupation of South Korea peaked in June 2002 after a U.S. military vehicle hit and crushed two South Korean schoolgirls. While the U.S. military would stay in South Korea, by contrast, it left the Philippines. Philippine nationalists often had denounced the military bases that the United States had established in their country after the Spanish-American War as violations of sovereignty and sources of social ills such as prostitution and illegitimate children. In June 1991, the volcanic Mount Pinatubo exploded, destroying Clark Air Base—then the largest U.S. overseas military installation—and forcing its closure. In November 1992, the United States would leave Subic Naval Base as well, refusing to pay the huge sum of money that the Philippines was demanding in rent. Where it still maintains overseas bases, the U.S. military strives to build local support for its presence, as Carl A. Gabrielson explains in this issue’s last article titled “Welcome to Japan!: How U.S. Marine Corps Orientation Materials Erase, Coopt, and Dismiss Local Resistance.”

Gabrielson examines how the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) acts to build support in Japan for the existence of its military bases in that country, striving to preempt any questioning of the wisdom of its presence and make troops feel comfortable in fulfilling their military mission. The article focuses on analyzing the contents of “welcome texts”—online materials and orientation programs that the USMC develops and distributes to incoming personnel. Texts and images that the USMC deploys at its bases in Japan, Gabrielson insightfully explains, provide new American arrivals with “three methods of neutralization—suggesting the Japanese people are absent or just part of the scenery, thereby erasing them; coopting those Japanese people who do appear as willing servants and romantic partners to U.S. Marines; and dismissing Japanese in Okinawa (the prefecture with the most U.S. Marines) as unwitting dupes in local politicians’ schemes to use base controversies for political gain.” All U.S. troops, civilian contractors, and accompanying family members older than ten must attend mandatory orientation sessions that seek to promote an understanding of the local culture. In describing the printed materials, videos, and websites that the USMC bases produce and distribute, Gabrielson shows how these official educational materials instead foster attitudes of superiority and privilege among the U.S. Marines. Despite U.S. claims that its presence provides protection and economic benefit, the Japanese resent the “crime, pollution, land seizures, jet noise, aircraft crashes, and other real and potential risks that simply would not exist if the base was not there.” The USMC’s providing base personnel with justification for the U.S. imperial presence in Japan, Gabrielson concludes, is a prime example of “a process vital to the maintenance of the globally military hegemony of the United States.”

In closing, the editor-in-chief extends his sincere thanks to those scholars who served as manuscript reviewers during the past calendar year— Michael A. Barnhart, Gordon H. Chang, Carol Chin, Carolyn Eisenberg, Sean Fear, Dennis Giangreco, Charles W. Hayford, Fintan Hoey, T. Christopher Jespersen, Noriko Kawamura, Noam Kochavi, Charles Kraus, Mitchell B. Lerner, Peter Mauch, Dael Norwood, Barry Rigby, Priscilla Roberts, Michael E. Robinson, John Schrecker, K. Ian Shin, Mark A. Stoler, Aiko Takeuchi-Demirci, Carlyle A. Thayer, Naoko Wake, Guoqi Xu, Thomas W. Zeiler, and Yanqui Zheng. Without their unrewarded assistance, it would be impossible to fulfill the journal’s commitment to providing prompt reviews of submissions and publication decisions.