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INTRODUCTION

This special issue is dedicated to Chinese Buddhist philosophy. In dealing with the concepts and issues of Chinese Buddhist philosophy, we pay particular attention to the continuity and discontinuity between Chinese and Indian Buddhist philosophy.

The current mainstream of Buddhist studies tends to divide the discipline according to region, for example, South/Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Central Asia. Contributing to this tendency, to a great extent, is the fact that vast numbers of Buddhist texts remain in the classical Buddhist languages, that is, Pāli, Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan. Even those scholars with purely philosophical interests are required to have the philological skills necessary to work on at least one collection of primary sources. Owing to the linguistic limitations of the scholars themselves, the field has been compartmentalized by linguistic and geographical boundaries into Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan Buddhism. As a result, academics living and working in one subfield are almost totally sequestered from those working in other subfields.

I do not consider this situation to be satisfactory. In my view, Buddhism may be divided by schools of thought that were developed inside the tradition, but it should seldom be divided by outside circumstances. Thus, I consider the emergence of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism and, more recently, Sino-Tibetan Buddhism to be a hopeful sign. With the publication of this special issue, we hope to promote the development of a field that may be called “Indo-Sinitic Buddhism,” or “Sino-Indic Buddhism” if we stress a Chinese Buddhist perspective. With these comparative studies involving two or more cultural traditions, it will contribute to a more integrative study of Buddhism as a philosophical discipline.

We planned to cover all of the major Chinese Buddhist philosophical schools, that is, Sanlun 三論-Madhyamaka, Faxiang 法相-Yogācāra, Huayan 華嚴, Tiantai 天台, and Chan 禪. We have received one contribution on Tiantai and Chan respectively, two on Faxiang-Yogācāra, three on Huayan, and an additional one on Buddhist ethics. The only

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school that is not covered turns out to be Sanlun-Madhyamaka. This lack itself is interesting and significant, especially in contrast to the over-emphasis on Madhyamaka among our colleagues from Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.

In his contribution on Tiantai, Brook Ziporyn examines certain Tiantai Buddhist conceptions of “mind” (*xin* 心) and “thought” (*nian* 念), and what is meant by Tiantai claims that mind or thought “creates” (*zao* 造), “inherently includes” (*ju* 具), and “is identical to” (*ji* 即) all phenomena. He focuses especially on two Tiantai writers, that is, Jingxi Zhanran 荆溪湛然 (711–782) and Siming Zhili 四明知禮 (960–1028), and examines closely their usage of the term *xing* 性, usually translated as “the Nature,” and the relation between mind and the Nature in their thoughts. This relation can be best illuminated by unraveling the Tiantai meditative practices known as “contemplation of mind” (*guanxin* 觀心) and “contemplation of inherent inclusion” (*guanju* 觀具). Through an understanding of these two terms and their interplay, we will be in a position to understand the distinctive Tiantai interpretation of certain compounds which are of great importance for a broader comprehension of Chinese Buddhism and of Chinese thought in general.

Imre Hamar, Zhihua Yao, and Nicholas Jones contribute to the Huayan school. According to Hamar, Huayan Buddhism is indebted to the Dilun 地論 and Shelun 攝論 schools, which were early advocates of the Yogācāra school in China. These schools agreed that the ultimate level of consciousness, *ālayavijñāna* (*alaiye shi* 阿賴耶識), *tathāgatagarbha*, or *amalavijñāna* (*amoluo shi* 阿摩羅識), is pure and untainted. This view was later challenged by *Xuanzang* 玄奘 who, in accordance with his education in classical Yogācāra in India, propounded that the final reality, the *ālayavijñāna*, contains both pure and impure seeds and that, consequently, the pure entity behind the phenomenal world cannot be substantiated. Hamar shows how the Huayan masters treated the old and new schools of Yogācāra philosophy, how they classified these teachings into their system of doctrinal classification (*panjiao* 判教), and how they established their own stance based on the tenets of these schools. They gave priority to old schools in their *panjiao* system. Thus Xuanzang’s teaching came to be regarded as the elementary teaching of Mahāyāna, while the teachings of Dilun and Shelun schools became the advanced teaching. They further applied the common tenet of consciousness-only as found in both Yogācāra schools to reveal the purport of the *Avatamsaka-sūtra* (*Huayan Jing* 華嚴經), formulating their own distinctive school—the round teaching of one vehicle.

Yao closely follows Hamar in dealing with the tensions between old and new Yogācāra, as seen in the Huayan sources, which, in turn,

reflect discontinuity between Indian Yogācāra and its reception in China. His particular focus is on the concept of karmic appearance (*karmalakṣaṇa*, *yexiang* 業相), as developed in the *Awakening of Faith* and further elaborated on by many Huayan masters. This concept illustrates the sudden arising of deluded thoughts and provides us with a paradigm for the approach to the problem of delusion, a problem that is deeply rooted in Tathāgatarbha Thought and addresses the origin of deluded thoughts against the backdrop of the pure mind. This Huayan solution resembles the concept of free will, as developed in mainstream Christian theology after Augustine attempted to solve the problem of evil, and the concept of playfulness (*līlā*) found in Indian Vedānta theology to explain the creation of the illusory world.

Jones, in contrast, attempts to solve the age-old problem of the one over the many, that is, pulling a cart's handle suffices for pulling the cart itself. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School treats this concept as evidence that wholes are just as real as their parts. Yet, taking wholes and their parts as equally real seems to violate the general principle that distinct entities cannot occupy the same space at the same time, which is the problem of the one over the many. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika attempts to solve this problem by positing that parts contain their wholes, in virtue of the presence of an eternally existing inherence relation. However, as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars understand the inherence relation as an entity that exists eternally, their solution violates Buddhism's basic commitment to the impermanence of existence. Accordingly, most Indian Buddhists infer that wholes and their parts are not equally real and that the former are unreal. Huayan Buddhists, in contrast, have developed a solution to the problem of the one over the many that preserves the reality of wholes without treating the whole-part inherence relation as eternal. Jones situates the Huayan solution within the context of Buddhism's historical development and shows how to construe Huayan mereology as continuous with the broader tradition of philosophizing about part-whole relations. His article also highlights the way in which this mereology combines the virtues of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Indian Buddhist solutions to the problem of the one over the many while avoiding their vices.

Van der Braak deals with the key idea of enlightenment in Chan. He believes that early studies of Chan approached enlightenment from an internal and philosophical viewpoint. Recently, however, much such research has adopted an external, historiographic perspective, focusing on how notions of enlightenment are formed, informed, and intended, and how and why claims to enlightenment have been accepted as warranted by certain kinds of people. Van der Braak's article adopts a philosophical, hermeneutical approach and uses as a case study the anti-enlightenment rhetoric that can be found in the

Linji Lu 《臨濟錄》, a work by the famous ninth-century Chan master Linji Yixuan 臨濟義玄. He first investigates, from a genealogical, philosophical perspective, how this rhetoric fits within the evolution of Chan notions of enlightenment, using the dialectic between kataphatic and apophatic discourse in the Chan tradition and focusing on the claim that Linji was a champion of deconstruction. He then interprets this rhetoric from an external, historiographical perspective, using his findings on the way in which the text, and image, of the *Linji Lu* developed over the course of Chan history. Van der Braak's research addresses several fundamental questions with regard to the challenges for a new, twenty-first-century philosophical hermeneutical approach to Chan enlightenment that is grounded in textual history, historiography, and cultural history.

Guang Xing discusses the Buddhist refutation to the Chinese criticisms of Buddhists being unfilial. Buddhism faced challenges from the local Chinese culture, particularly Confucianism because the Buddhist way of life primarily focuses on individual liberation, so it is very different from Confucianism, which chiefly focuses on family and society. In particular, the life of Buddhist monks, who were required to leave their homes and families, was incompatible to Confucian practice of filial piety as found in the *Xiao Jing* 《孝經》. Chinese Buddhists responded to the criticisms both in theoretical argumentation and in practice. In his article, Guang Xing concentrates on the scholarly refutations to the charge of unfiliality and analyzes it into three stages of development finally reaching a stage arguing that the Buddhist practice of filial piety is superior to that of Confucianism because the Buddhist concept of filial piety had the characteristics of universality and superiority. It was universal because Buddhists respected all living beings without harming them so that peace pervaded in the world and it was superior because Buddhists extended the practice of filial piety not only to their own parents but to all sentient beings.

Chen-kuo Lin and Wing-cheuk Chan contribute to the Faxiang-Yogācāra school. Lin focuses on the two senses of truth and their corresponding stages of meditation, as found in the *Samādhinirmocana Sūtra* (*Jie Shenmi Jing* 《解深密經》), a foundational Yogācāra scripture. One such sense is ontological truth, which takes the particular as its object, whereas the other is propositional truth, which takes the universal. How are these two senses of truth to be known? Can they be known synchronically or diachronically? The Yogācārins hold that truth cannot be obtained without being situated in a course of meditation. Levels of truth are also differentiated in accordance with different stages of meditation. Ontological truth (truth as reality) is obtained in the final stage, whereas propositional truth (truth expressed through propositions) is obtained in the penultimate stage.

Between these two stages, a radical transformation of mind takes place, that is, from the conceptual to the nonconceptual. The conceptual mind takes propositional truth as its object, whereas the nonconceptual mind considers ontological truth. Between these two levels of knowledge, a deconstructive practice known as “wedge-evicted-by-wedge” (*yi xie chu xie* 以楔出楔) is required to achieve the radical transformation necessary.

Chan relies primarily on Yogācāra master Paramārtha (Zhendi 真諦) ’s doctrine of *tathāgatagarbha* (*rulai zang* 如來藏) to take up the important initiative of refuting the “two dogmas” of Critical Buddhism advocated by Japanese scholars such as Noriaki Hakamaya (1943–) and Shirō Matsumoto (1950–), a radical movement that attempts to expel all non-Madhyamaka philosophical schools from orthodox Buddhism. Through careful textual and philosophical analysis, Chan reaches two conclusions: (i) only by overcoming intellectualism is an individual able to properly understand Paramārtha’s thesis that the *tathatā* (*zhenru* 真如) is neither pure nor impure and his justification of the Buddhist idea of equality in terms of assigning the *tathāgatagarbha* to all sentient beings; and (ii) it is a mistake to identify the *tathāgatagarbha* as a *dhātu* (*jie* 界) in the sense of Brahmanism.

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