Turntablism in the History of International Law

This chapter uses the metaphor of turntablism to shed light on the confinement of international lawyers’ engagement with history to the terms, vocabularies, and categories of the very historical narratives they seek to evaluate, disrupt, or displace. For the sake of this chapter, turntablism is understood here as the art of creating new music and sound effects by using one or several turntables on which a record is placed. This chapter argues that twenty-first century international lawyers engaging with the history of international law are talented turntablists in that the many historiographical works of international lawyers produced since the so-called ‘historical turn’ have remained confined to the very terms, categories, and vocabularies of the histories whose creation they have been discoursing and theorising. This chapter ultimately shows that turntablism is not the inevitable fate of international lawyers engaging with history, and that a radical historical critique is possible and should be promoted.


Introduction
Turntablism is the art of creating new music and sound effects by using one or several turntables on which a record is placed. The so-called turntablistsbetter known as DJs -manipulate records on turntables by moving them with their hand to cue the stylus to exact points thereon, and by touching or moving the record to stop, slow down, speed up, or spin the record backwards.1 Using [474] 407 that follows around the so-called 'historical turn' . The discussion that follows could thus be critically scrutinised in the very same way as it itself evaluates recent critical histories.

1
The 'Historical Turn' as a 'Historiographical Turn' According to a common disciplinary narrative -for which the so-called 'historical turn' is a widespread shorthand3 -international lawyers are said to have discovered, approximately two decades ago, the merits of robust engagement with the history of international law and emancipated themselves from the linear and one-dimensional historical accounts that had been dominating the field since the end of the nineteenth century. Before that, international lawyers, as this disciplinary narrative goes, were the complacent recipients of some linear disciplinary histories inherited from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and which they were trained to reproduce while refraining from critically engaging with them.4 It is submitted here that one can hardly deny that the end of the twentieth century witnessed a rise of interest by international lawyers in the study of history, as well as enhanced suspicion towards the linear mainstream disciplinary histories of international law that had been perpetuated throughout the twentieth century.5 This change of attitude can be evidenced somewhat Periodization of the History of International Law' , in The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, eds. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 996-1113, 996. 3 On the turn to history in contemporary international legal scholarship see Craven, Matthew. ' , 297-320, 297 ('… international law has always had a deep engagement with the past. Past text and concepts are constantly retrieved and taken up as a resource in international legal argumentation and scholarship. Thus the "turn to history" trope marks a turn to history as method, rather than a turn to history in terms of engaging with the past rather than the present ' , ibid. 297, 307). This growing interest in the history of international law is also witnessed in relation to private international law. empirically, at least to the extent that the amount of scholarly publications that engage with the history of international law can plausibly constitute an indicator of greater engagement with the history of international law.6 This change of attitude can also be institutionally illustrated by reference to the creation of new scholarly journals and book series specifically dedicated to the history of international law, which have themselves been the receptacle of a prolific body of scholarship on the subject. In this context, it seems difficult to deny the change in attitude and scholarly focus, as well as the much greater engagement with the history of international law, in the international legal literature over the last two decades.7 One important dimension of the disciplinary narrative about the 'historical turn' is the association of the latter with an invigoration of historical consciousness in the field. In fact, it is common for twenty-first century international lawyers to think of themselves as historically conscious and critically inclined in their engagement with history. It is true that, for instance, this 'historical turn' has brought with it unprecedented challenges to the classical linear histories inherited from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the form of counter-histories8 and greater critical or methodological See, e.g., Banu, Roxana. Nineteenth-Century Perspectives on Private International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). It has been said that a historical turn has similarly been witnessed in international relations. For an illustration about the current engagement with the history of international relations, see Bell, Duncan. ' Barreto, 'Cerberus' 2017 (n. 11), 158 ('Grotius has not lost his place between the founding fathers of modern international law. He remains inhabiting such an Olympus, yet in another sense or for different reasons. It has been made clear that Grotius is not the founder of international law defined as a system that regulates the affairs between equal and sovereign states. Together with Vitoria, Grotius remains in the selected group of the "early parents of modern international law", a legal regime that is understood as emerging out of imperialism's needs for legitimation, and that regulated the relations between its subjects, including early modern companies'  Koskenniemi, Martti. been severely questioned. Likewise, the very linear character of the common disciplinary histories similarly came under attack from claims that the history of international law should instead be seen as being 'pockmarked by a series of catastrophes and mutations' .13 It is submitted here, however, that the association of the 'historical turn' with an invigoration of historical consciousness is rather simplistic given the fact that the Enlightenment -which provided its dualistic patterns of thought and progress narratives to international law -itself came with an unprecedented historical consciousness.14 For instance, when embarking on the creation of a disciplinary history during the professionalisation of the discipline,15 nineteenth and twentieth century international lawyers understood and situated [478] 411 themselves as agents of a disciplinary project, and demonstrated some remarkable historical consciousness.16 Indeed, it is with international law becoming a self-standing object of study in university institutions which created professorships specifically dedicated to the teaching of international law,17 as well as the primary focus of learned societies and scholarly periodicals,18 that the perceived need to endow the field with a disciplinary history became very pressing. 19 For international lawyers of the time, providing a disciplinary history for international law20 proved to be a way to confirm the maturity and respectability,21 identity,22 and scientificity23 of the field, entrench it in a tradition,24 and make it a universal necessity.25 It is in this context that the first systematic and comprehensive histories of international law26 came to be produced with a great sense of historical consciousness. For this reason, if the greater engagement with the history of international law over the last two decades, for which the 'historical turn' is a shorthand, were only 'historical' , it would hardly be a turn but rather a perpetuation of the modern tradition of international law. It is argued here that the change of attitude witnessed two decades ago and dubbed the 'historical turn' marks not the historical self-consciousness of international lawyers or their historicising activities, but rather an upsurge of scholarly works discoursing and theorising about the specific forms and meanings given to the past by international lawyers and the way in which this past is written.27 Whilst international lawyers' historical consciousness could be witnessed as early as the end of the nineteenth century, the gist of the change in the discipline of international law in the last two decades lies in their greater aptitude and inclination to discourse and theorise about the specific forms and meanings which their common histories of international law have provided to the past and the way in which such a past has been created. Discoursing and theorising about the specific forms 21  [480] 413 and the meanings provided to the past and the way in which such a past is created is characteristic of what is called historiography.28 This is why the 'historical turn' is better understood as a 'historiographical turn' .29 The reference to a 'historical turn' as a shorthand for such a change of attitude of international lawyers is a misnomer. Twenty years ago, international lawyers did not wake up with an invigorated historical consciousness but, more simply, with a greater historiographical appetite.

The 'Historical Turn' as Turntablism
This section uses the abovementioned metaphor of turntablism to shed light on one particular dimension of the historiographical attitude that has informed international lawyers' engagement with history over the last two decades, and which has been sketched out in the previous section. It is argued here that the 'historical turn' , construed here as a 'historiographical turn' , has been characterised by a very strong conservatism that makes engagement with history by international lawyers look like an exercise in turntablism. In other words, this section makes the argument that the historiographical works of international lawyers in the last two decades have remained confined to the very terms, categories, and vocabularies of the histories whose creation they have been discoursing and theorising. Using the metaphor of turntablism, it is thus argued here that, while undoubtedly creating new musical effects and melodies, international lawyers have simply not changed the records on their turntables and have used the same sounds. International lawyers' engagement with history over the last two decades has boiled down to spinning existing records differently. The turntablism practised by those international lawyers engaging with history since the 'historical turn' , and thus the confinement of international lawyers' engagement with history to the same categories, vocabularies, markers, events, texts, figures, periodisation, causalities, etc., can be illustrated as follows. Such turntablism expresses itself, for instance, in the fact that the historiographical imagination of international lawyers has continued to revolve around the same genealogical inquiries, namely whether Gentili, Vitoria, Grotius, Vattel, Lauterpacht, etc., are the spearheads, the heroes, the founding fathers, the (re-)inventers, or the heirs of the Western Enlightenment and (preor post-)modern international law. Although international lawyers today are prone to recognise that Gentili, Grotius, or Vattel may not have been the cosmopolitan humanitarians with which their status as fathers of international law endowed them, international lawyers' histories today continue to be historical narratives about Gentili, Vitoria, Grotius, Vattel, Lauterpacht, etc.30 It could even be argued that the very critical discussions of some of these 'heroes' may well have contributed to their further canonisation, for critically engaging with those considered the 'fathers' only reinforces their fatherly place in disciplinary histories. A good example of this is provided by the numerous and well-known critical engagements with the legacy of Lauterpacht that have been witnessed in the literature. Indeed, while showing the limits and contradictions of Lauterpacht's scientific cosmopolitanism,31 such studies have inevitably led to a further consolidation of Lauterpacht's stature in the linear disciplinary histories of the field.32 It could even be ventured that Lauterpacht may not have been perceived to be as much a pivotal figure as he is today until the 'historical turn' and the critical engagement therewith.33 Turntablism is also found today in the restriction of international legal scholarship to the same periodisation as mainstream histories of international law: the scholastic, the pre-modern, Westphalia, the Enlightenment, the [482] 415 modern, colonisation, the nineteenth century, the interwar period, the post-League of Nations, the post-Second World War, decolonisation, the cold war, the post-cold war, etc.34 It could be contended that even the agendas debated in recent historiographical literature are identical to those in previous histories: humanism, cosmopolitanism, modernism, state-centrism, voluntarism, hegemony, capitalism, etc. Albeit surprisingly, some similar turntablism can be witnessed in the many recent post-colonial histories that have very appropriately moved attention away from the writings of Western jurists and the practice of international law in Western locations, and opened new horizons.35 Despite their immense merits and the refreshing disruption they offer, as well as all the work that still must be done in this respect, many of these studies have continued to resort to markers, periodisation, and causal sequencing all located in the West.36 Turntablism can also be found in those works that seek to emphasise non-European perspectives,37 for many of them re-centre non-Western locations and perspectives within a very Eurocentric history, and through European markers, periodisation, and causal sequencing.38 When they do not seek a re-centring of non-Western locations and perspectives within a very Eurocentric history, these studies continue to treat non-Western contexts as 'peripheral' ,39 or as a response to (or an encounter with) European or Western international law.40 What is more, some of these histories, whilst rightly lamenting the resilience of the colonial project and the mirage of universality, still pursue the project of a universal international law according to a very European idea of universality.41 By the same token, many of these histories, notwithstanding their very valuable disruptive insights, continue to rely on markers, periodisation, and causal sequencing of histories of international law built around, for instance, roman Although still trying to redeem non-Western practice through Western heroes and concepts, C. H. Alexandrowicz has tried to propose a new periodisation in the history of international law that does away with the Peace of Westphalia and is centred on 1815, that is the time, not only of the Congress of Vienna but also the moment when the Kingdom of Poland was created. According to Alexandrowicz, this milestone is what allows the distinction between pre-nineteenth century law of nations based on natural law and universality and the positivist and European conception of international law. On this aspect of Alexandrowicz' work, see Armitage/Pitts '"Modern Grotius"' 2017 (n. 39), 19. 45 Eslava, Luis, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah, eds. Bandung, Global History, and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 46 Shahabuddin, 'The "Standard of Civilization"' 2019 (n. 41), 13-32 (focusing on the preexisting hierarchical order in the Far East and highlighting the relevance of non-European regional order in the discourse on international legal history exceptions, turntablism has been very resilient and most critical histories at work in the literature since the 'historical turn' , notwithstanding their irrefutable insightfulness and sophistication, have commonly boiled down to variants of the very same markers, periodisation and causal sequencing as the ones on which dominant linear disciplinary narratives are built. They have provided very refreshing meaning-giving for mainstream linear disciplinary histories but have failed to liberate disciplinary imagination.
In the light of the foregoing, turntablism can be construed as a dominant attitude in international legal scholarship over the last two decades. The potential of the 'historical turn' does not seem to have been fully unlocked.

The Resilience of Turntablism after the 'Historical Turn'
At this stage of the discussion, it is important to highlight that the turntablism of international lawyers' engagement with the history of international law and, thus, the confinement of their recent historiographical studies to the very terms, categories, vocabularies, markers, events, texts, figures, periodisation, causalities, etc., of those narratives they are trying to question do not constitute a restriction that is unheard of. The critical historian Hayden White demonstrated how every discipline is made up of (and organised around) a set of restrictions on imagination.48 From such a perspective, it could be said that historiography cannot be the home of critique as it is bound to be articulated around the very markers, causalities, and vocabularies of the historical narratives it engages with. It is noteworthy that international lawyers interested in critical historical inquiries have shown some reasonable awareness for the abovementioned conservatism as well as of the Eurocentric character of their inquiries.49 This is Vincent Chetail (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2014), 673-709. It must however be stressed that the tone and presentation of this work remains very Eurocentric as those other experiences of international law are situated by reference to modern European international law. 48  As was shown in the previous section, there can be good reasons for international lawyers to satisfy themselves with the limits of their historiographical studies and their turntablist attitudes. After all, the historiographical works produced since the 'historical turn' , and especially those works that focus on law and empire as well as non-Western contexts, locations, and practices, have very appropriately changed the way in which international lawyers engage with history. In that sense, it cannot be denied that international lawyers' engagement with history has been dramatically transformed in the last decades. And yet, the last part of this chapter argues that international lawyers should take their cue from the few critical histories that actually do away with Eurocentric markers, periodisation and causal sequencing and which have been mentioned in the previous section with a view to limiting turntablist engagement with history. It is submitted here that there is room for a more systematic radical historical critique that consists of writing and rewriting historical narratives that consciously ignore the terms, categories, vocabularies, markers, events, texts, figures, periodisation, causalities, etc., of the dominant histories.57 Such radical historical critique refers here to a critical engagement that moves beyond a mere historiographical attitude58 and does away with the terms, categories, vocabularies, markers, events, texts, figures, periodisation, causalities, etc., of the dominant histories. From the perspective of the metaphor of turntablism used in this chapter, such radical historical critique corresponds to an engagement with history where music is created not only through a different spinning of the turntables but, more radically, through the use of new records.
The plea made here for a radical historical critique -and thus for a move away from the dominant turntablism of the discipline -requires that the very idea of radical historical critique be spelled out further. The radical historical critique envisaged here boils down to a conscious intervention to redraw the past and mobilise it to serve a present claim in a way that deliberately and consciously repudiates existing terms, categories, vocabularies, markers, events, texts, figures, periodisation, causalities, etc. In that sense, radical historical critique not only entails the production of counter-histories, but calls for new modes of thinking which register the terms, categories, vocabularies, markers, events, texts, figures, periodisation, causalities, etc., of the dominant histories with a view to consciously ignoring them in a new space of narrativisation.59 Radical historical critique is thus interventionist: it registers accepted terms, categories, vocabularies, markers, events, texts, figures, periodisation, causalities, etc., and purposefully turns a blind eye to them. For that reason, using old materials in an innovative way60 falls short of such radical historical critique. It is also important to highlight that such radical historical critique cannot seek to be scientific, truth-searching, or universalist in character.61 Radical historical critique is better understood as what Rancière calls a 'poetry of knowledge' (poétique du savoir).62 It does not aim at creating a new totality or intelligibility framework.63 Radical historical critique pursues a rupture with the common historical referent of international lawyers' discourses.
Is it submitted that there is much to gain from a move towards such a radical historical critique. Such a move is about enabling the production of a wide range of new discourses about international law itself. The radical historical critique promoted here would allow international lawyers to imagine new contexts, new places, and new moments where legal claims and legal practices are made and unmade. It must be acknowledged that embracing such a radical historical critique and discontinuing the turntablism of current legal scholarship does not constitute an easy posture. The route towards radical historical critique is not without pitfalls, some of which having been famously experienced in relation to the critique offered by those scholars affiliated with TWAIL.64 Four obstacles to the radical historical critique envisaged here must be mentioned. First, there is the obstacle associated with the total loss of empirical rigour and, thus, the corresponding risk that radical historical critique veers into some disgusting revisionism. This is the risk that anything goes, which should be taken extremely seriously. In this respect, it must be pointed out that the radical historical critique envisaged here cannot be reduced to an exercise of literary creation. From the perspective of radical historical critique, engagements with history would still need to abide by some elementary empiricism and factual evidence when it comes to the materials that feed into the narrativisation concerned. It is true that the evidence and the empiricism informing the establishment of the facts populating the narrativisation would themselves be the object of discussion. Yet, those engaging with history would remain bound by those -admittedly fluctuating -constraints that apply to any argument for it to be plausible, intelligible, and acceptable for the audience that receives it. The foregoing does not mean, however, that the radical historical critique would be subject to any pre-defined methods or techniques. In particular, since such a radical critique ought to stop short of seeking to substitute one linear, progressive, scientific, true, and universal history for another, it shall certainly not espouse any pre-defined mode of investigation that is recognised as properly 'historical' . 65 Secondly, there are important linguistic barriers that radical historical critique must reckon with. Indeed, writing historical narratives around new markers, new figures, new locations, new places, new empires, etc., would often necessitate international lawyers going beyond their usual linguistic and cultural communities and venturing into the study of locations, contexts, and practices possibly foreign to the author of the radical historical critique. 66 Such material and linguistic obstacles should not be played down or treated lightly. Yet, it is submitted here that they are not insurmountable.
Thirdly, there are important social and cultural obstacles, as those international lawyers engaging with history may simply not know other terms, categories, vocabularies, markers, events, texts, figures, periodisations, causalities, etc., than those found in the mainstream histories. It may be that they cannot think of their world outside those terms, categories, vocabularies, markers, events, texts, figures, periodisations, causalities, etc. Again, this should not sound insurmountable. If the discipline cannot have its turntablists change [490] 423 the records on their turntables, it is yet another reminder that new turntablists and new voices must constantly be invited to the arena. Radical historical critique necessitates a much greater opening of the stage to new voices, and especially to those trained outside the usual schools.
Finally, there is the risk of unintelligibility. In fact, the radical historical critique contemplated here, by disrupting common historical referents of international lawyers' discourses and by rejecting their terms, categories, vocabularies, markers, events, texts, figures, periodisation, causalities, etc., inevitably comes to distort intelligibility frameworks and, thus, bring about unintelligibility in historical discourses. This is the risk of cacophony. Yet, it is submitted here that such unintelligibility should not be feared or viewed in a dim light. Indeed, the intelligibility of current histories should not be exaggerated, for many of the histories found in the international legal literature rest on impressions of intelligibility. What is more, the loss of some degree of intelligibility of the historical discourses that would follow the radical historical critique advocated here constitutes a form of disobedience characteristic of critique.67 Because these obstacles, although very serious, are deemed here to be surmountable, it is argued at the ultimate stage of this chapter that the turntablism discussed in section 2, and notwithstanding the forces that make it so resilient and that were mentioned in section 3, ought not to constitute the dominant attitude of international lawyers engaging with history. Indeed, as is illustrated by the few works that depart from the Eurocentric terms, vocabularies, and categories of the dominant histories and which have been mentioned in section 2, there is room for a critical engagement with history that, as described in section 4, moves beyond a mere historiographical attitude68 and does away with the terms, categories, vocabularies, markers, events, texts, figures, perio disation, causalities, etc., of the dominant histories. Such radical historical critique is not an end in itself but should arguably be pursued as a means to unlock the full potential of the 'historical turn' in international law. Said in terms of the metaphor of turntablism used in this chapter, exploiting the full potential of the 'historical turn' in international law requires that international lawyers engaging with history load new records on their turntables in order to start producing new sounds and new melodies, enabling the ravers in the arena to liberate their imagination, their discourses, and their worlds of possibilities.