they did not separate the two manuals. Rather with the directories as foundational they guided their readers from spiritual discernment into a moral context by eventually giving them the ethical cases directly and not through the mediation of a confessor. Here too the Christian became more active in developing her/his conscience, not through the confessional screen but by an accompanying pastoral presence who encouraged the individual's formation of conscience through the practices of these integrated directories and casuistries.

Moreover, inasmuch as the directories often enjoyed biblical foundations, these more integrated texts of the Anglicans eventually developed a moral guidance much more rooted in Scripture than that by the Jesuit casuists.

Sedgwick could have finished his work with the achievement of William Perkins, as the first English Reformed moralist; indeed, his is a great chapter. But Sedgwick takes us into the life of Anglican theology, first, through the writings of Richard Hooker who as a Reformed and a Renaissance theologian revived the tradition of moral theology. Then he treats us to the Carolingian moralists, William Ames, Joseph Hall, and Robert Sanderson. He concludes with the enormously robust and versatile Jeremy Taylor who wrote casuistries and directories complete with his notions of probabiliorism and exemplarism, concluding with his *Ars moriendi* work, *Holy Dying*.

Sedgwick closes his generous work noting the death of casuistry that was eventually precipitated by Blaise Pascal, but he reminds us that contemporary ecumenical engagements could well examine their differing, but at times, overlapping pasts, so as to forge a singular tradition that integrates the spiritual and the moral. This very satisfying work rightly reminds us how beholden the future is to the past.

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Rudolf Schuessler

The Debate on Probable Opinions in the Scholastic Tradition. Leiden: Brill, 2019.

Pp. xii + 526. Hb, \$179.00.

Rudolf Schuessler's monograph is a wide-ranging and richly detailed exploration of the theoretical contours of different scholarly methods for managing the plurality of probable (or approvable) opinions. Much of the volume is about one such method in particular: probabilism, traditionally understood as

a moral system in which an individual could adopt an opinion contrary to the weight of authoritative opinion if it were supported by a recognized authority's well-reasoned argument. Yet, Schuessler challenges some traditional understandings of probabilism's meaning and significance. He situates his study in the context of probable opinions more generally, emphasizing the importance of probabilism's philosophical antecedents and rivals.

While the volume sporadically discusses practical application, it stresses elite, academic debates about "the rules and norms with which disagreement and a sprawling plurality of opinions were managed" (1). Given the intricacy and complexity of these debates, the prose can make for demanding reading at times. Schuessler seems to presume some familiarity with the subject, which might make this daunting for the uninitiated. Nevertheless, the sheer weight of detail itself substantiates one of Schuessler's arguments: that Scholasticism, as a school of thought, was not as moribund in early modernity as it is sometimes depicted. The specificity of some of these disagreements attests to a Scholastic scene in which there was still significant investment.

Chapters one through three chart the evolution of different traditions of approaching probable opinions. Schuessler begins in the medieval period, explaining how probable opinions became a focus of Scholastic debate. He is particularly concerned that tutorism has been misunderstood by modern scholars. It is often portrayed as a rigorist position, stipulating that the doubtful soul should always follow the weight of scholarly opinion, maximizing the individual's chance of avoiding sin. Schuessler observes that this "safety first" approach was mandated only in instances when a moral agent "lacked sufficient reasons to assume that the opinion allowing his or her action is more likely true than not" (52). For much of the Middle Ages, Schuessler contends, tutorism was not a rigorist position. Thus, he challenges historical interpretations that over-emphasize the disjuncture between tutorism in the Middle Ages and probabilism in early modernity. In chapter two, Schuessler discusses how probable opinions were handled between the late fifteenth century and the emergence of probabilism in 1577. Chapter three offers a history of probabilism from 1577 to the present. Schuessler divides this history into five periods: the rise of probabilism (1577–1620), its peak (1620–56), the controversy between probabilism and anti-probabilism (1656–1700), the diversification and fracturing of probabilist approaches (1700–73), and the perseverance of probabilism (1773–present). The useful, brief summation in this chapter will make a handy reference for future researchers of this topic.

Schuessler's book then shifts to a thematic approach, focusing in chapters four through seven on particular issues that became important in the rise of probabilism. Chapter four explores how "extrinsic" authorities (the Aristotelian

concept of *endoxon*) lost their sole position as the means of arbitrating probable opinions in early modernity as “intrinsic” probability, or individual reasons, became another acceptable means. Schuessler challenges the primary place that scholars, such as Robert Maryks, have argued the Jesuits held in the emergence of “reason-oriented” means of dealing with probable opinions (150). In particular, Schuessler reassesses the place of both the Jesuit Gabriel Vázquez and the Society’s Ciceronian influences in this development. While Schuessler acknowledges the Society of Jesus’s contributions to a dual extrinsic/intrinsic approach, he situates them as part of a broader “front in scholastic thought” (183).

Chapter five examines the emergence of various criteria for the selection of extrinsic opinions. The sixth chapter addresses views on the number of theological authorities required to justify a position. Chapter seven discusses how early modern scholars attributed values to the opinions of various ancient and contemporary authorities.

The final five chapters of the book address questions that formed the basis of the controversial debates about probabilism in the mid- to late seventeenth century. Chapter eight introduces the diversity of epistemological objections to probabilism that emerged in the second half of the seventeenth century. Significantly, the chapter describes the emergence of probabiliorism as one such rival, which stipulated that one could follow only the most probable opinion when confronted with incompatible propositions. How probabilist thinkers such as Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz conceptualized the degree of probability of an opinion is addressed in chapter nine. In the tenth chapter, Schuessler explains how the evolution of ideas about greater or lesser degrees of probability eventually demanded reconsiderations of older Scholastic notions about doxastic voluntarism, the role of the will in determining individual belief. New articulations of this idea emerged in the work of probabilists such as the English Jesuit Anthony Terill. He and others intended these theories to facilitate logical assent to the opinions of others that one considered to be less probable than one’s own. Schuessler argues that Terill’s work in relation to doxastic voluntarism in probabilism brought him considerable renown. The Jesuit may well have been more influential at the time than his contemporary, Caramuel, who is better known to modern scholars.

Chapter eleven addresses more macroscopic historical questions about whether probabilism was an instrument of social control or a move within early modern Catholicism toward liberty-oriented decision making. This is some of Schuessler’s most intriguing material. Here, he defends an earlier characterization of probabilism as liberty-favoring against the argument of Stefania Tutino that probabilism was a balance between liberty and tutelage.

In the final chapter, the relationship between probabilism as a form of moral theology and the emergence of a mathematical understanding of probability in the second half of the seventeenth century, particularly in relation to the work of Caramuel, is explored.

Schuessler's volume contributes to a recent resurgence in scholarly interest in probabilism. His work takes some provocative stands in relation to the positions of other scholars in the field, and throughout the volume he raises several important issues for further consideration. Readers of this journal might well find Schuessler's views on these matters thought-provoking, but they will also benefit from his attention to some lesser-known Jesuit figures in the history of probabilism, such as Anthony Terill.

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Jason M. Rampelt

Distinctions of Reason and Reasonable Distinctions: The Academic Life of John Wallis (1616–1703). Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, 306. Leiden: Brill, 2019. Pp. xix + 309. Hb, €115.00, \$139.00.

It is not uncommon for thinkers to be studied through a lens that does not correspond to their real intellectual interests. One paradigmatic case is John Locke, who, judged merely in light of his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, is considered above all as a philosopher of knowledge and language when in reality he was an erudite whose field of fundamental interest was theology and politics. Research into John Wallis also falls into this academic malady of paying scant attention to the facts. As Jason M. Rampelt states, "there is presently no intellectual biography of John Wallis and, while this book is not a comprehensive one, it presents the main themes which ought to be present in any account of his thought" (5). Only recently has Wallis been properly recognized as a philosopher absorbed in the issues of his time, the seventeenth century. Until now, the prevailing view has been to regard Wallis solely as a mathematician. Rampelt reminds us that the principal monographs on Wallis have been dominated by this mentality. Thus, Wallis has never found a place within the general histories of philosophical thought. Nor in the general histories of science has he been afforded his due as a scientist beyond his mathematical works. In line with this trend, his theological