The Chinese Tributary System and Traditional International Order in East Asia during the Ming and Qing Dynasties from the Sixteenth to Nineteenth Century

Throughout the history of East Asia, various polities in modern-day Korea, Japan, and Vietnam accepted investitures bestowed by the Chinese royal court. Many of these states also established their own vassal structures based on this tributary system. In light of this, it would be more accurate to describe the traditional international order of East Asia as a system of investitures and tributes, an “investiture-tribute system.” The significance of this system is the royal court being revered by its tributaries, which acknowledge it as the superior power. Looking at the vassal relationship between the Ming [1368-1644] and Qing [1644-1911] courts and the states of Joseon 朝鮮 , Ryukyu 琉球 , and Vietnam under various names, it is clear that the tributary system was a basic mechanism that facilitated bilateral trade, cultural exchange, border control, and judicial cooperation. Moreover, when vassal states encountered threats to their national security, the Chinese government assisted them with diplomatic and military resources befitting its position as the imperial court. Yet, although the tributary system enabled a relationship in which the royal court enjoyed a position of superiority and its vassal states an inferior one, none of the vassal states formed an alliance that revolved around the Chinese empire. Hence, in the near-modern period, the system struggled to contend with both the great world powers that made use of the treaty system and the expansion of Japan in East Asia.


Chen
Journal of chinese humanities 5 (2019)  first brought about the unification of the realms, he did not send troops to pacify the independent Nam Viet 南越, which had been established by Triệu Đà 趙佗  during the chaos that ensued at the end of the Qin  dynasty. Instead, in 196 BCE he sent Lu Jia 陸賈 [240-170 BCE] to visit Zhao Tuo and bestow upon him the title of "king of Nam Viet," with the aim of brokering peace on the periphery.6 The Book of Han [Hanshu 漢書] also records that Liu Bang asked Lu Jia to receive the imperial seal and tassel and that Zhao Tuo made obeisance, acknowledging that he was an imperial subject.7 Early in the reign of Emperor Wu of Han , Zhao Tuo even sent his crown prince to go to Chang'an 長安 as his bodyguard. Later in the emperor's reign, Zhao Tuo requested that his kingdom fall under imperial subordination and that its designation be changed from "outer vassal" [waichen 外臣] to "inner vassal" [neichen 內臣].
Consider, also, the historical context of the Korean Peninsula. According to the Records of the Grand Historian, Wei Man 衛滿 [Wi Man,fl. 194], originally from the Han dynasty [202 BCE-220] kingdom of Yan 燕, ordered troops to attack the government at Gojoseon 古朝鮮 and establish a new regime with him as king, called Wiman Joseon 衛滿朝鮮 . These events coincided with the unification of China by the Han dynasty. It is recorded that "the Liaodong governor made an agreement with Wei Man, making him an 'outer vassal' to defend against the outer barbarians and thwart border raids; meanwhile, the barbarian chieftains wished to enter the imperial realm to pay tribute to the Son of Heaven, and they were not prohibited."8 The essential duties of "outer vassals" included not only sending tribute missions to the Han court but also refraining from preventing barbarian chieftains from seeking an audience with the emperor. At the end of the second century BCE, a number of high-ranking military officers who were guarding the frontiers were assassinated in conflicts between the people of Wiman Joseon and the Han dynasty. In response, Emperor Wu of Han raised an army to destroy Wiman Joseon and immediately established the Four Commanderies of Han [Sagun 漢四郡] in the northern Korean Peninsula, including the Lelang [Nangnang 樂浪] Commandery.9 Subsequently, the Korean tribes in the southern peninsula submitted to the rule of the Han court and the might of the Cao Wei 曹魏   These three states all paid tribute to the Chinese imperial court.11 For instance, Silla was able to bring about the destruction of Baekje and Goguryeo in 660 and 668 respectively12 through tributes to the Tang court and the military alliances with the Chinese that those tributes achieved. Goguryeo also submitted and paid tribute to various Chinese courts, including the Later Tang [923][924][925][926][927][928][929][930][931][932][933][934][935][936], Later Jin [936][937][938][939][940][941][942][943][944][945][946][947], Later Han [947][948][949][950][951], and Later Zhou [951][952][953][954][955][956][957][958][959][960], as well as the Northern Song , Liao , Jin , Yuan , and Ming dynasties. On account of this, its kings were bestowed with investitures.13 After the founding of the Joseon dynasty 朝鮮王朝 , its rulers also submitted and paid tribute to the Ming and Qing courts. After the Qing lost the First Sino-Japanese War 甲午戰爭 [1894][1895], Japan abolished the Sino-Korean tributary system through the Treaty of Shimonoseki 馬關條約.14 These facts demonstrate that the various polities on the Korean Peninsula accepted the tributary system set up by the Chinese empire and that they carried out political exchanges with China in their role as vassal states.
These Korean polities also used the tributary system as a way to maintain order with the smaller tribes on their periphery. At the beginning of the reign of Emperor Wu, Wiman Joseon obtained military might and resources, overthrew small border states, and acquired territory that expanded it by several  , demanding that the king pay tribute to Japan.25 In 1591, Hideyoshi entrusted merchants to assist him with delivering a letter to Luzon 呂宋 (in the present-day Philippines). In the letter, Hideyoshi demanded that Luzon pay tribute to Japan and warned he would wage a punitive expedition against the island should it fail to comply in a timely fashion.26 In 1592, Hideyoshi issued an imperial edict to Taiwan, urging the island to surrender to Japan.27 Evidently, these actions by Hideyoshi constitute an attempt to bring about an international political order in which Japan would play the dominant role.
From 1592 to 1598, Hideyoshi launched two invasions of Korea, known in Japanese as the Bunroku 文禄 and Keichō 慶長 Campaigns.28 Japan intended to use Korea as a springboard from which to attack the Ming and hoped that it could replace China as the decisive factor in the East Asian international order. Japan even proposed candidates for "prime minister of China" after   dynasties all used the tributary system to engage in political exchanges with the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties. The Vietnamese rulers also used the system to carry out political exchanges with small neighboring tribes and states, with the aim of establishing a regional order centered on Vietnam.31 The Ryukyu kingdom began paying tribute to the Chinese empire much later than these three states. Not until the fifth year of the reign of the Hongwu 洪武 emperor [r. 1368-1398] did the kingdom pay tribute to the Chinese court, having received an imperial edict.32 Thereupon, the King of Ryukyu was required by the Ming courts, and later the Qing, to pay tribute once every two years. However, Ryukyu repeatedly sent additional vessels to Fujian province under the guise of paying tribute. This practice continued until the fifth year of the Guangxu 光緒 emperor [r.  of the Qing dynasty, when Ryukyu was annexed by Japan. The Ryukyu royal family actively paid tribute to the Chinese imperial court undoubtedly because of important economic and political interests: financial interests and national security respectively.33 Notably, these considerations were not unique to the Ryukyu kingdom. From the perspective of the various political regimes in modern-day Korea and Vietnam, a political relationship between them and the various Chinese dynasties could be obtained through the tributary system. With the recognition of the powerful Chinese empire, the regimes had the means to survive and defend themselves. It was also possible for them to obtain external legitimacy for their rule through this relationship. It has been suggested that the tributaries paid tribute as a way of obtaining trade opportunities from China.34 In fact, with the border trade system implemented by the Song, Liao, Jin, Yuan, and Qing dynasties, these states were able to obtain trade opportunities through private channels. Obviously, this does not explain why Korea and Vietnam were motivated for commercial reasons to pay tribute to the Chinese. This motivation only affected Japanese tribute to the Sui and Tang courts, which was paid to introduce Chinese culture to Japan in order to effect social change, and the tributes paid by the Muromachi shogunate to the Ming to further Japan's economic interests.35 After civil maritime trade between China and Japan was initiated, the Japanese found it difficult to continue paying tribute to the Chinese empire. This demonstrates that, although the Chinese tributary system was adopted by China's neighbors in East Asia, the motivations driving Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Ryukyu were different. Therefore, by the sixteenth century Japan had already exited the tributary system, whereas Ryukyu, Vietnam, and Korea were forced to stop paying tribute to the Qing under the influence of Japan and France.

The Tributary System and the Investiture-Tribute Relationship
The previous section demonstrated that the tributary system facilitated political exchange in the Chinese cultural sphere of East Asia and that the vassal states of China used the system to construct their own self-dominating modes of international order. In light of this, what designation should be given to this mode of international order in East Asia constructed through a tribute system? Many different terms have been used by scholars, which has led to inconsistency in the literature. Many have simply called it a "tributary system";36 others have opted for "Hua-Yi 華夷 order,"37 or "Huaxia 華夏 order."38 Japanese scholars, in response to the "tributary trade system" theory, have also proposed the "mutual trade system" theory,39 while others have suggested the theory of a Tianchao 天朝 system.40 Evidently, in considering the issue of the traditional international order in East Asia, it is necessary to discuss the various system designations that have been proposed. 36 The concept of the "tributary system" was first proposed by John K. Fairbank and Yang Lien-sheng 楊聯陞; see John K. Fairbank, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System," Journal of Asiatic Studies 6, no. 2 (1941). However, the term was used primarily to describe relations between the Qing court and foreign states. Hamashita Takeshi proposed the concept of "tributary trade system" in Hamashita Takeshi  What is meant by the "traditional international order in East Asia" is the relatively stable relationship models, structures, and states formed by the various premodern polities in East Asia during processes of exchange, with particular emphasis on the connection between its relationship structure and relations between neighboring states. Although the "tributary system" theory advocated by most scholars posits that the tributary system was the main way in which the Chinese empire maintained political relations with its neighbors in East Asia, it focuses only on the core, international system of the dominant state, as opposed to the structure of the traditional political relationship between the dominant state and its neighbors. The term "relationship" used here refers to an association of two or more things. However, in the "tributary system" theory, tributes are perceived as only one-way exchanges that the dominant state expects from the neighboring state and thus fails to explain the two-way nature of the relationship.
Many treatises have characterized the political relationship between China and its neighboring states under the tributary system as one of suzerainty. However, it would not be historically accurate to claim that this was a constant state and ignore the realities in particular periods. Although historical documents have always referred to China's tributary states as vassals, the Chinese empire always referred to itself as the Celestial Empire [tianchao 天朝] during tributes, whereas vassal states referred to China as the superior domain [shangguo 上國] and not a "suzerain," a concept known in Chinese as zongzhuguo 宗 主國. The term "suzerain" has traditionally been applied to the European powers that colonized Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The term "suzerainty" was then used to describe the political power that Western countries had over their colonies. Therefore, the relationship between modern Western countries and their colonial counterparts is often described as consisting of a suzerain and its tributary states. However, considering both the term "suzerainty" and its definition, it would not be historically accurate to use it to describe the political relationship between the dominant Chinese empire and its neighboring states under the tributary system. This is because China generally did not interfere in the internal affairs of its tributaries.41 Furthermore, the "vassal system" theory42 is somewhat similar to the "tributary system" theory, in that it merely points at the intention of the Chinese empire to realize order at its peripheries and fails to denote how relations that informed traditional order in East Asia at the time were structured. Although the "Hua-Yi order" theory considers the relationship between the two sides, the concept of Hua and Yi is essentially a cognitive problem; a recognition of the self and the other cannot accurately express the interaction between the two in terms of particular patterns, structures, and states. Although the somewhat similar "Hua-Xia order" theory also expresses the dominant ideology of Chinese dynasties to some extent, it fails to express the main behavioral patterns and structures of the relationship between East Asian states.
Although the "mutual trade system" theory demonstrates a model of the relationship between China and foreign states in the Song dynasty and beyond, it is only an economic relations model. Therefore, it ignores or even avoids the political premise of institutional arrangements for such economic relations. After all, the essential function of international order as maintained between different regions is informed by the political relationship between states.
The premise of the "Tianchao system" theory is based on the bias and insufficiency of the "tributary system" and "mutual market system" theories. It is intended to integrate the two but is flawed, as it is focused on the Chinese empire. Even though the Chinese empire played a dominant role in maintaining international order in its region, the concept fails to take into account the other side of the relationship between other states. Moreover, the "Tianchao system" as a term and concept used to describe relations between premodern China and foreign polities was used only in the context of the Qianlong 乾隆  and Xianfeng 咸豐 [1851-1862] eras of the Qing dynasty. It also has institutional and authoritative connotations.43 For those reasons, it would be inappropriate to use a term that is dependent on a particular historical period, or semantically inconsistent, to denote the long-standing foreign relations of the Chinese empire.
Because the traditional international order in East Asia refers mainly to the primary relationship model and structure of political exchanges between states in the region, in particular China and its neighbors, it is necessary to examine the tributary system as the primary mode of political relations between the Chinese empire and its neighboring states. This then allows an analysis of the relationship structure that was informed by the various states. Generally, when the Chinese empire received tributes from its neighbors, it reciprocated with investitures and tributes. Investitures established a relationship in which the Chinese empire enjoyed superior standing, and tributaries an inferior one. Tributes were economic rewards bestowed upon the tributary states by the imperial court. Through these investitures and tributes, China formed a political relationship with its neighbors, thus achieving regional order in its international relations, as intended. Because the main structure of the traditional international order in East Asia at this time was made up of a system of investitures and tributes, a proper designation for this system is an "investiture-tribute system [fenggong tixi 封貢體系]."

The Tributary System as a Mechanism for Settling Bilateral Matters
The Qing government stipulated that when foreign tribute missions went to China, relevant documentation first had to be submitted to the viceroy and inspector general [dufu 督撫] at the port of entry for transfer to the court. Furthermore, in addition to tribute affairs, foreigners also had to send official documents to viceroys and inspector generals at the Chinese border, who then read the documentation, discussed its contents, provided a response, and then reported back to the court. Notably, viceroys and inspector generals were not allowed to send official documents to neighboring tributary states without authorization. a jaejahaeng 齎咨行, to distinguish it from an ordinary diplomat.46 The Korean envoys were usually served by official linguists proficient in Chinese or lowerranking military officers whose titles were lower than those of the official envoys. Unlike the missions of the official envoys, which involved handling the political relationship between the Qing court and Korea and its various rituals, the ziwen envoys were responsible for reporting on specific affairs between the two states, such as requests by the Korean court for almanacs, bilateral trade, border surveys, investigations into cross-border crimes, unlawful cross-border fishing, and maritime disaster relief. The issue of cross-border crimes in the border areas between China and Korea was a common feature of the ziwen and subsequent consultation between the Qing and Korean courts. During the reign of the Shunzhi 順治 emperor [r. 1643-1661], Koreans crossed the border into China to hunt and collect ginseng. When they were discovered, the Ministry of Revenue sent a ziwen to the Korean court, and the Chinese court sent a special envoy to Korea to represent it at the Korean court.47 Not long thereafter, the judicial authorities in the Chinese and Korean courts then prosecuted the offenders through a joint trial.48 For serious cases, such as those involving Koreans entering China and committing a homicide, in general the Ministry of Rites issued the ziwen, and Korea responded by dispatching a special envoy to China with a ziwen issued by the king that contained a briefing on the situation. After an imperial decree was issued, both sides sent judicial officers to Fenghuang 鳳凰 or Shengjing 盛京 to conduct the trial or the Koreans held it in Korea.49 When Chinese men crossed the border to fish on the Korean coastline, Korea also dispatched special envoys to the Ministry of Rites, and the Chinese court ordered the local government to investigate and address the matter. For , those with intact vessels will be repatriated by sea, while those without vessels will be transported to Fenghuang."51 In fact, Korea assisted Chinese who had been shipwrecked in Korean waters by helping them to repair vessels that were salvageable and by supporting with food and clothing those who were repatriated. For those who could not repair their boats, the government provided funds for purchasing their goods and registered the shipwrecked merchants' names, ages, place of residence, and cargo. They also dispatched officials to Fenghuang to return them and gave the Ministry of Rites a ziwen from the Korean court that had reported the particulars of the incident.52 The Qing court also stipulated that foreigners who had been shipwrecked had to be rescued where they were discovered and provided food and clothing paid for with public funds. Their boats were then repaired, their cargo was returned, and then they were repatriated. As for the repatriation arrangements of Korean shipwrecked merchants whose boats could not make the voyage back to Korea, local officials verified their identities, and the Provincial Surveillance Commission [Anchasi 按察司] of the province where they were found reviewed the case and then transferred it to the Ministry of Rites. The Ministry of Rites then sent a ziwen to the Korean court and repatriated the shipwrecked merchants through the tribute mission. In a month when Korean had no mission in Beijing, the Ministry of Rites directly sent escorts to Joseon to complete the handover.53 Acting out of compassion for the people in the vassal states, in some cases the Qing court arrested looters of Korean shipwrecks. For example, in the second month of the eleventh year of the reign of the Daoguang 道光 emperor [r. 1821-1850], a Korean merchant's shipwreck drifted to Huangyan 黃岩 county, Zhejiang province, and its cargo was looted by a small number of villagers. After the county magistrate heard about the incident, he sent men to take in those who had been aboard the vessel so they could take refuge in the county. He sealed off their remaining cargo for safekeeping and ordered the arrest of five of the looters. He then seized cloth and other belongings from the looters and returned them to the Korean merchants. After receiving a petition from Sun Erzhun 孫爾准, the then-viceroy [zongdu 總督] of Min-Zhe 閩浙, the Daoguang emperor issued an edict ordering additional aid to be given to the Korean merchants and compensation to be paid in advance by Huangyan county for looted items that had not yet been recovered. The emperor also stipulated that the damaged vessels be sold at a fixed price, with the proceeds given to the merchants. Before long, these merchants traveled to Beijing under the escort of local officials. The Ministry of Rites informed the king by a ziwen about the relief given to the merchants and arranged for them to return to Korea with the tribute mission.54 The compendium of diplomatic documents collected by the royal government of the Ryukyu kingdom, titled Precious Documents of Successive Generations [Rekidai hōan 歴代宝案], spans 1424 to 1867. Most of these documents are communications between the kingdom and the Ming and Qing courts. These documents contain a large volume of ziwen exchanged between the kings of Ryukyu and the Ministry of Rites and the Provincial Administration commissioners [buzhengshi 布政使] in Fujian. The ziwen are mainly notices on trade affairs, reports on navigation and shipwrecks, information on maritime crimes, intelligence on pirates who raided the coastlines of China and Korea from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries, known as wokou [wakō 倭寇], and even reports on the Western powers.55 After the establishment of the tributary relationship between the Qing dynasty and the Lê dynasty, the viceroys of Liangguang 兩廣 (modern-day Guangdong and Guangxi provinces) and Yungui 雲貴 (modern-day Yunnan and Guizhou provinces) used ziwen to negotiate with Vietnamese emperors on border trade affairs that affected the two countries and even boundary settlements. During the early reign of the Yongzheng 雍正 emperor [r. 1709-1722], a land dispute broke out between local officials and chieftains in parts of Vietnam and southern China. The governor of Guangxi, Li Fu 李紱 [1675-1750], sent a ziwen to the emperor of Vietnam to negotiate an immediate resolution to the dispute.56 The tribal lands in Yunnan, which spanned an area of over a hundred li 里, were also occupied by the Vietnamese on account of their silver and copper reserves. The governor of Yunnan province Gao Qizhuo 高 其倬 [1676-1738] sent officials to the border to investigate, report what they found to the Chinese court, and keep the emperor of Vietnam informed using a ziwen. This demonstrates that the tributary system was not only the basic means by which either side could stay up to date on bilateral affairs but was also an important mechanism for settling bilateral matters and cooperating on border affairs.

The Tributary System and the National Security of Vassal States
An examination of the initial implementation of the tributary system during the Han dynasty makes it clear that the Chinese empire consistently used the system to develop relationships with foreign states, with the self-serving strategic aim of securing peace and order on its periphery, whether in states such as the Nam Viet, the Wiman Joseon, or the Western Regions [Xiyu 西域].57 The system was used for the same purpose during the Qing dynasty as a kind of selfdefense mechanism.58 From the perspective of international relations in East Asia, what role did China's tributary system play in the context of regional and international order? Clearly, the essence of the tributary relationship lies in its subordinate nature; the tributary state submits to the imperial court, while the royal court offers tributes, investitures, and protection to the tributary state. In light of this, it is necessary to examine whether the Ming and Qing courts bore their responsibility for protecting the national security of their tributaries. Consider, for example, the Joseon dynasty, a Korean dynastic kingdom that lasted from 1392 to 1897. In 1592,59 Hideyoshi led a large-scale invasion into Korea. As the Japanese army rapidly approached the imperial capital, Korea sent a ziwen to the Ministry of War at the Ming court to provide emergency assistance.60 The Ming decided to defend Korea against the Japanese on the Liaodong Peninsula and in Shandong province.61 After the troops that the Ming had sent in advance lost their advantage, the Wanli emperor ordered the Korean court to await further assistance by the Ming's main forces.62 In the eighth month, the Ming appointed Li Rusong 李如松 [1549-1598] to lead the army as commander in chief to support the Korean military against the Japanese invasion. The Ming army were victorious in Pyongyang 平壤 and Kaesong 開城 but were frustrated in the Battle of Byeokjegwan 碧蹄館之戰, and so had no option but to hold peace talks with the Japanese. However, when the Japanese demanded annexation of Gyeonggi 京畿, Chungcheong 忠 清, Jeolla 全羅, and Gyeongsang 慶尚 provinces, the Ming categorically refused and resolved to safeguard Korea's territorial integrity. In 1597, Japanese mobilization in Korea once again led to the outbreak of war. The Ming immediately appointed the minister of war, Xing Jie 邢玠  Gao 楊鎬 [d. 1629] commanding an army 70,000 strong. By December 1598, the Japanese army was finally expelled from Korea. Soon after the war ended, the Ming government recalled its troops from Korea.
After the establishment of the Meiji government, discussion once again arose in Japanese political circles about invading Korea in what became known as the Seikanron 征韓論, a major debate that centered on whether Japan should launch a punitive expedition against Korea. Initially, the Japanese statesman Kido Takayoshi 木戸孝允  proposed that Japan establish diplomatic relations with China and Korea, arguing that a punitive expedition against the country could be launched if it continued to be "obstinate" and "disrespectful." In November 1868, Japan sent an envoy to Busan 釜山 to deliver a message from the emperor of Japan. The official in charge of Korea's negotiations with Japan ensured that the message included terms such as "the emperor," "the court," and "decree," leading him to conclude that it implied Korea was a vassal of Japan. He thus refused to accept the Japanese emperor's message, which renewed discussion among the Japanese about invading Korea. Some Japanese believed that, if Japan did not make the first move, Western countries would take Korea before them and that annexing Korea would provide space for their failed seigniors.63 In 1875, Japan dispatched its gunboat Un'yō 雲揚 [Rising Cloud] to Korea as a show of force, an incident that eventually enabled them to induce Korea to sign the Treaty of Ganghwa 江華條約 and open up ports at Incheon 仁川 and Wonsan 元山 to Japanese merchants. 64 Qing court officials were extremely concerned about how to cope with Japanese expansion into Korea. As early as the sixth year of the reign of the Tongzhi 同治 emperor [r. 1862-1874], officials in the Qing government responsible for foreign affairs read in newspapers that Japan was preparing to invade Korea. The Qing court informed Korea that Japan's attempts at aggression should be nipped in the bud.65 The Qing was also incredibly concerned about Korea's national security and its "hermit kingdom" policy. The Guangxu emperor ordered Li Hongzhang 李鴻章    69 In the first year of the reign of the Guangxu emperor, Japan announced that it was preparing to annex the kingdom in its "punishment of Ryukyu." The Qing government ordered its diplomatic minister stationed in Japan He Ruzhang 何如璋 [1838-1891] to represent it with Japan. In the ninth month of the fourth year of the reign of the Guangxu emperor, He sent a diplomatic note to the Japanese diplomat Terashima Munenori 寺島宗則 [1832-1893], claiming that Ryukyu was a dependency of China and that China was opposed to Japan's planned invasion and occupation. 70 In the fifth year of the reign of the Guangxu emperor, the Qing sent a cordial invitation to former president of the United States Ulysses S. Grant requesting he serve as mediator between China and Japan. However, the Chinese were ultimately unable to prevent Japanese annexation of the Ryukyu kingdom on account of the weak state of the Qing dynasty.
A similar scenario played out in Vietnam. In 1802, Nguyễn Phúc Ánh 阮福映 [1762-1820], the powerful minister of the Later Lê-a dynasty that had been founded independently in southern Annam-launched a punitive expedition in northern Vietnam that destroyed the Tây Sơn 西山 regime. Thereafter, he proclaimed himself Emperor Gia Long 嘉隆, the first emperor of the Nguyễn dynasty. Not long afterward, Gia Long sent an envoy to the Qing court to pay tribute and request approval of the dynastic name change. The Qing court registered the name Yuenan 越南 (corresponding to modern-day Vietnam) and bestowed investiture upon Gia Long as its ruler. Henceforth, China and Vietnam established investiture-tribute relations of a political nature. Early in the reign of the Tongzhi emperor, remaining members of the secret Heaven and Earth Society [Tiandi hui 天地會]  These events demonstrate how the Ming and Qing courts carried out the tributary system when conducting diplomacy with its neighboring states in East Asia. In particular, they provided high levels of assistance to their tributaries at the political and even military level. Therefore, the investiture-tribute relationship in which the Ming and Qing courts played dominant roles was the primary mechanism used to maintain the stability of international order in East Asia. Even if the Ming and Qing courts had been successful in countering challenges to its regional order from other nation-states during the premodern period, after China began to modernize it lacked the ability to cope with Japan's expansion into its neighboring states during the Meiji Restoration 明治維新 [began 1868] as well as the great world powers of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Thus, the international order in East Asia that had once been dominated by the Chinese empire and its investiture-tribute relationships had to give way to a new system of international order instituted by the Western powers.

Conclusion
The tributary system established in East Asia during the Ming and Qing dynasties quickly dissolved when confronted with the Western powers. This was due to the weakness of the Qing regime and its neighboring tributaries and the conspiracy of Western aggression against China. An examination of the international relations system constructed by Western countries clearly reveals the structural defects of the tributary system. The tributary network built and maintained by the regimes of premodern China was made up of many concentric circles, and the relationship between the imperial court and the tributaries was based entirely on unilateral relations. No effective alliance was formed between the two parties. The various states neither cooperated nor supported one another in matters of national security involving the imperial court. Therefore, this tributary system, which was essentially a unilateral relationship, could not withstand the treaty system manifested in the context of multinational cooperation, whose primary purpose was to satisfy the mutual needs of the relevant states. Ultimately, the structural defects of the traditional tributary network meant the system could not meet the needs of regional security and international order in modern East Asia. However, although ceremonial inequalities existed in the tributary system, which is an important mechanism for maintaining traditional international order in East Asia, the imperial court rarely intervened in the internal affairs of the tributaries. In this way, it could maintain peace and order among the states in the region for long periods. Moreover, the relationship between the imperial court and the tributary states became the basic mechanism for cooperation in bilateral affairs between the Ming and Qing dynasties, as well as their neighboring states. They could conduct trade and cultural exchanges, control the frontiers, and engage in judicial cooperation against cross-border crimes. In addition, after the Ming and Qing dynasties entered into tributary relationships with their neighboring states, the Chinese courts always assumed an obligation to maintain the national security of their tributaries. From this, a case can be made that, to ensure China's stability in the East Asian region, as well as the stability of international order more broadly, the ruler not only had to govern with integrity and benevolence to bring about peace and prosperity but also had to create a mechanism that would enable a rapid response in bilateral and multilateral affairs. Additionally, considerable military might was needed to resist challenges and expansion by hostile forces.