Integrating the Thought of Mencius and Xunzi and the Problem of Modernizing Chinese Society

How should people today deal with the teachings of Mencius 孟子 and Xunzi 荀子 ? This is a question of utmost importance in reviving Confucianism. The thought of Mencius and Xunzi has many inherent complexities and contradictions. After all, they have been revised, reconstituted, and reused alongside shifts in lifestyles and social structures; their respective influence also waxed and waned accordingly. Xunzi’s teachings flourished during China’s transition from monarchical feudalism to imperial autocracy, an indication that Xunzi’s thinking has Legalist elements. The rulers in the imperial period adopted “sole veneration of Confucian learning” [ du zun rushu 獨尊儒術 ], so the suspiciously Legalist teachings of Xunzi went into decline while the orthodox Confucian teachings of Mencius were on the rise. At the same time, Xunzi’s thought continued to play an important, perhaps even fundamental, role in hidden ways. This is the political path of being “openly Confucian, covertly Legalist” [yang ru yin fa 陽儒 陰法 ] practiced under autocratic authority. As Chinese society began to modernize, Xunzi’s teachings enjoyed a revival, revealing that some of its strains were compatible with modern Enlightenment ideas. Further, this modern revival of Xunzi occurred on the heels of a Confucian revival. The fact that the two then more or less continued to coexist indicates the need to rethink the two schools of thought in an integrated way. To do this, I take a page from modern value systems and consider the existing distinctions between Mencius’s and Xunzi’s thinking via a “profit and loss analysis.”

How should people today approach the thought of Mencius 孟子  and Xunzi ? With approval or dismissal? As juxtaposed or integrated entities? Even contemporary scholars who tend to share similar values engage in endless debate over these questions because it is possible to find in the texts of Mencius and Xunzi evidence supporting both sides of their arguments. This reflects the many existing complexities and contradictions in the thought of Mencius and Xunzi; to attempt to use them to demonstrate or prove contemporary research and ways of thinking is not sound. Instead, I observe the rise and fall of each during key shifts in China's social structure to confirm the attitude that we, as contemporary people, should take with regard to the thought of Mencius and Xunzi.
In a previous essay, I argued that existing histories of Confucianism as well as Chinese thought "tend to depart from a sense of the historical periods discussed, functioning essentially as an intellectual exercise and obscuring the actual characteristics of Confucianism's historical contexts…. Narratives of Confucianism which treat it as an echo-chamber existing apart from reality and life … obscure or bury important questions of historical change."1 In reality, any way of thinking is a product of its times; its influence both during and after its times will rise and fall in tandem with changes and shifts in society. In premodern China, a particularly intimate relationship always existed between thought and scholarship and the politics of its time, as can be seen in the fact that the Hundred Schools of Thought all "took governance as its purpose" [wu wei zhi zhe 務為治者].2 Therefore, what is known as "the thought of Mencius and Xunzi" is, in fact, the thought of Mencius and Xunzi as interpreted and applied throughout different periods. Aspects of their thinking are bound to be emphasized, exaggerated, and altered in this continual process of reconstruction. The primary question of concern in this discussion is how the thought of Mencius and Xunzi should be reconstructed and integrated within China's current movement toward modernization?

The Shifting Influence of Mencius and Xunzi and the Emergence of China's Autocratic Empire
Throughout the past two thousand years of Chinese intellectual history, the schools of thought of Mencius and Xunzi have gone through many ups and downs in influence. Xunzi's influence was stronger from the end of the Warring States period  to the early years of the Eastern Han dynasty . Starting in the latter years of the Eastern Han dynasty, Mencius's teachings steadily gained ground while Xunzi's thought officially went into decline while maintaining practical application behind the scenes. In the period from the Ming  to the Qing  dynastiesespecially during the latter-Xunzi's thought enjoyed a steady revival even as Mencius's maintained its stable position of influence. To understand these shifting trends, one must look beyond the teachings of Mencius and Xunzi to understand the development and the changing structure of Chinese society. As I have written elsewhere, the social history that best helps us understand these shifts can be delineated as follows:   to the Qing dynasties 4. the era of individual human rights: Republican period  5. the second great social upheaval: the modern period to the present. Xunzi far overshadowed that of Mencius" is more historically accurate.5 In fact, it is not just during the early Han but throughout the entire Han period [202 BCE-220], perhaps even beyond, that Xunzi's influence was greater. As to how this came to be, many scholars attribute it to issues of textual transmission following the Qin dynasty's burning of books. As Wang Zhong 汪中 [1744-1794 writes, "Most schools of Confucian thought were unable to establish a foothold during the Han. After weathering the violent upheavals of the Warring States period and Qin dynasty, it was mostly due to Xunzi's thought that the Six Arts of Confucianism could be transmitted."6 Liang Qichao 梁啟超  writes, "though, after the fall of the Han dynasty, the official position was to develop and venerate the teachings of Confucius, the sect of Confucianism that was actually passed down was Xunzi's."7 In addition, some scholars believe that:

The Heyday of Xunzi's Teachings and the First Great Social Upheaval
Among the Han period Confucian scholars, it was not just those classically trained, such as Fu Qiubo 浮丘伯, Fu Sheng 伏生, and Master Shen 申公, who began studying Xunzi; even the Confucians whom they acknowledged-such as Lu Jia 陸賈, followed by Yang Xiong 揚雄, Wang Fu 王符, Zhong Changtong 仲長統, and Xun Yue 荀悅-were without exception inheritors of Xunzi's thought. It seems that in the academic realm of the two Han dynasties … nearly all Confucian scholars of note were followers of Xunzi's philosophy.8 Although none of these statements are false, they are but superficial observations.
It is not incidental that the rise of Xunzi's thought should occur during the "first great social upheaval," the period of China's transition from monarchical feudalism to imperial autocracy. Xunzi conformed to the direction of social change in his time, one that ideologically embodied Legalist thought. Xunzi's thought is essentially the melding of Confucianism and Legalism. As  , who would respectively serve as the great theorist and great politician of the tyrannical Qin dynastybut his own teachings also include elements of despotism. Tan Sitong 譚嗣同 [1865-1898] has a famous saying: "Two thousand years of governance all mirror the politics of the Qin dynasty; it is a politics based on usurpation. Two thousand years of thought all boil down to Xunzi's teachings; they merely reflect the desires of country folk."10 Despite the extreme wording, the meaning is not hard to grasp. Tan's invective is directed at the "overtly Confucian, covertly Legalist" [yang ru yin fa 陽儒陰法] form of state-sanctioned Confucianism ushered in with imperial autocracy. Liang Qichao has also remarked: "What has been in practice for two thousand years is in reality the political system of the Qin dynasty, and its true nature can be found in Xunzi's political ideology."11 Other scholars claim that "Xunzi is the true 'godfather' who has overseen the more than two-thousand-year-old political system of single-ruler autocracy in place since the Qin."12 Some even believe that Xunzi advocated serving tyrannical rulers.13 It is apparent that the flourishing of Xunzi's thought was due to its elements that are ideologically compatible with imperial autocracy. This is something that we must be particularly wary of when it comes to the today's revival of Xunzi's doctrine.

1.2
The Heyday of Mencius's Teachings and the Era of Imperial Autocracy Curiously, although Xunzi's thought seems well suited to a system of imperial autocracy, it went into decline at the start of the imperial era. Of course, this decline did not signal that imperial rulers had abandoned Xunzi's doctrine or even Legalism, for that matter. Scholars generally agree that nearly all the ruling houses in imperial China took the path of being "openly Confucian and covertly Legalist." As the Han emperor Xuan 漢宣帝 [r. 74-49 BCE] famously said, "the Han ruling house has our unique system of governance based on simultaneously following the Way of the tyrant and the Way of the king."14 "The Way of the king" points to Confucian ideas whereas "the Way of the tyrant" references Legalist thought. One might even say that this idea beats within the hearts of all dynastic emperors. Another classic example of this is the fact that both Mou Zongsan 牟宗三  and Li Zehou 李澤厚 consider Zhu Xi 朱熹 [1130-1200] and Xunzi to be of the same ilk. In his assessment, Mou goes so far as to say Zhu Xi was "speaking of Confucius's humanity [ren 仁] with Xunzi's disposition."15 Li, however, admires Zhu Xi for "raising Mencius's banner while practicing Xunzi's doctrine."16 It would seem that, in the history of imperial China, state-sanctioned Confucianism almost always included elements of Xunzi's doctrine, with varying degrees of integration between Confucianism and Legalism, depending on how each ruling house negotiated being "openly Confucian and covertly Legalist." All the same, even if only in name, Xunzi's teachings, indeed, went into decline. There was a time in imperial China when the Tang  For what reasons, then, did Xunzi's teachings go into decline, and why did imperial rulers, having chosen to adhere to Confucianism, nevertheless distance themselves from Xunzi's strain of Confucianism? To understand this, one must look more closely at the idea of being "openly Confucian, covertly Legalist." On the one hand, openly applying Confucianism meant raising the banner of Confucianism when it came to extolling ideas of "the kingly Way" and "benevolent rule." The imperial system achieved stability during the period when the Han dynasty inherited its political system from the Qin dynasty. This political "grand unification" required an accompanying ideological "grand unification"; this resulted in "discarding all other ways of thinking, venerating solely Confucian teachings."20 Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 [179-104 BCE] writes: "As for the schools of thought that do not espouse the Six Classics and the sects that diverge from Confucian teachings, we must cut off all avenues of dissemination so that they cannot develop in tandem with Confucianism."21 In reality, the Han imperial decision to venerate Confucianism exclusively did not originate with Dong; rather, it was a process involving a collective shift in ideology. It is recorded in the "Biographies of Confucian  These accounts reveal that it is not just Xunzi's teachings but also aspects of traditional Confucianism that serve the needs of imperial autocracy. This is another point that people today must understand.
On the other hand, covertly applying Legalism is necessary, as one cannot openly support the despotism of the Legalist school without risking being known for tyranny. Although Xunzi's teachings fall under the umbrella of Confucianism, they had Legalist leanings. An imperial government that claimed to model itself on the principles of "kindness and virtue" as well as "filial governance of all under Heaven" could not very well draw on a school such as Legalism, which tended to be associated with the Qin. Therefore, Xunzi's teachings could only "work behind the scenes." Thus, in accordance with the "sole veneration of Confucian learning" [du zun rushu 獨尊儒術], the teachings of Mencius, who was the only major Confucian figure who had standing equal to that of Xunzi, flourished.

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Journal of chinese humanities 6 (2020) 21-42 Qianjia Confucians have two qualities that can be considered "modern". The first is their method, which was based on seeking truth from facts. As Liang Qichao said, "The research style of the Qianjia scholars was based on reality as it is. It is similar to today's scientific method. We can thus call them the scientific classical school."26 Hu Shi 胡適 [1891-1962] also remarked that "their method and spirit reflect positivism, whose hallmark is the presentation of evidence."27 The second way in which they are modern is their way of thinking, which recalls Enlightenment thinking. Dai Zhen's 戴震  work Evidential Analysis of the Terms in the Mencius [Mengzi ziyi shuzheng 孟子字 義疏証] is a classic example of this. While venerating Mencius, this work also acknowledges aspects of Xunzi's ideas. In the words of Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 , "Dai Zhen's beliefs are largely in agreement with those of Xunzi."28 Qian Mu 錢穆 [1895-1990 wrote, "Although [Dai Zhen] shares Mencius's belief in the basic goodness of human nature, his rhetoric is often closer to Xunzi's."29 Put another way, one could say that the teachings of both Mencius and Xunzi have elements that work together to resist the ideological premise of imperial autocracy and despotism.
A more recent sign of Xunzi's revival is in the debate that emerged in the academic context of the late Qing between New Text Confucians (i.e., Xia Zengyou 夏曾佑, Tan Sitong, Liang Qichao) who wished to suppress Xunzi's thought and the Old Text School of Confucians (i.e., Yu Yue, Zhang Taiyan), who advocated for Xunzi's thought. The movement to suppress Xunzi took place largely during the period from 1895, the year of China's defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War, to 1898, the failure of the Hundred Days' reform movement. Both events are consequences of the autocratic system in place since the Qin dynasty. Xia Zengyou believed that "autocracy as law" was established because Xunzi "served the [wise] ruler of his time."30 Tan Sitong believed that Xunzi "acted in Confucius's name, but betrayed Confucius's way by claiming one should 'serve the wise ruler of one's time and follow the great unifying vision of that ruler."31 It has been remarked that "by taking a position to get rid of Xunzi's thought," Liang Qichao "wished to express his opposition to both political and academic despotism."32 On the other side of this debate were those who advocated following Xunzi's teachings. In the opening passage of Writings to Incite Action [Qiu shu 訄書], Zhang Taiyan writes that "following Xunzi is the first step."33 Certainly, Zhang is known to have had Legalist leanings, as can be seen in this apologist passage: "applying the strictness of Legalism is what ultimately allows the people to work and live in peace; applying Legalist systems and regulations ultimately allows the people to profit and prosper."34 At the time this passage was written, there was a real need for revolution in China; however, the tendency for revolution to lead to authoritarian autocracy is also a modern political phenomenon. This aspect of Xunzi somewhat recalls Machiavelli.35 The point focuses attention on a contradiction: how does Xunzi's thought, which helped establish imperial authority in the early Han dynasty, come to enjoy a revival when the historical tides in China were shifting toward antiimperialism? The only explanation is that some elements of Xunzi's teachings can deconstruct imperial rule. The most conspicuous example of this is Xunzi's belief that "human nature is evil" but that "if one works to change one's nature, one can give rise to different behavior in the future." The resonance between

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Journal of chinese humanities 6 (2020) 21-42 this idea and discussions of "natural state" in the Enlightenment movement has been discussed at length by many scholars.

Integrating the Thought of Mencius and Xunzi and the Modern Turn of Confucian Philosophy
That the modern revival of Xunzi's thought did not result in the decline of Mencius's influence breaks the long historical pattern of their mutual incompatibility. Their new relationship, instead, resembles Hegelian incorporation.
It is no wonder that arguments for integrating the thought of Mencius and Xunzi have become a recent trend in academia.

The Scholarly Trend of Integrating Mencius and Xunzi
As part of this recent trend, Li Zehou's 2017 suggestion that we inherit both schools of thought played an influential role. The call to "raise Mencius's banner while practicing Xunzi's doctrine" that he advocates is "a way of using an ontologically emotional worldview together with a religious morality to model and build a fitting public, rational, and modern social ethics."36 He goes on the label the latter ("religious morality") a "modern form of Xunzi's doctrine" and the former ("ontologically emotional worldview") a "modern form of Mencius's banner." Further, "such 'mutual exploitation between Confucianism and Legalism' has always been an intrinsic part of Confucianism."37 Here, "Mencius's banner" refers to the emotional dimension of ethics while "Xunzi's doctrine" points to the dimension of ethics that deals with agency. In any case, it makes Xunzi's Legalist tendencies quite clear and, from my perspective, dangerous. Regarding this, Li writes: It defines ethical action by allowing an external, a priori rationale to dictate and meld with an internal ethical disposition…. By defining a system of standards based on a predetermined set of hierarchical relations, it reduces "all manner of things"-which are in fact the diverse actions taken by humans-to a set of moral concepts and ethical hypotheses that are actionable and applicable, rather than capacious and thorough. From this, it is clear that Li Zehou's adage may be applicable in the era that followed the path of being "overtly Confucian and covertly Legalist"; however, it is not a path that we should try to follow today as it suggests authoritarian proclivities.
As early as 2007, I brought up the question of "integrating Mencius and Xunzi."39 I once summarized my view of what Confucian thinking affords us as follows: "Whether you engage with Mencius or Xunzi, all roads go through Confucius."40 For example: The principles of "profit" were made widely known by Western Enlightenment thinking, but one can find it in Xunzi as well. Similarly, benevolent love, a concept appropriate to the present, can also be found in Mencius…. The work we need to do is twofold: first, to find the connection between readings of Xunzi and various spiritual dimensions of Western Enlightenment thinking; and, second, to find the connection between readings of Mencius and the spiritual dimension of Western Protestantism. By doing so, we can integrate Mencius and Xunzi via Confucius. This is the way to reconstruct a "Chinese theory of justice."41 I have spent the years since bringing up the integration of Mencius and Xunzi's thought building just such a Chinese theory of justice.

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Journal of chinese humanities 6 (2020) 21-42 spoken regularly on the topic at a number of public presentations.43 One can say that the Chinese theory of justice is essentially the result of integrating Mencius and Xunzi into a theoretical system of Confucian justice. The method I use is similar to Feng Youlan's 馮友蘭  "method of abstract inheritance."44 That is, I rigorously teased out both the aspects of Mencius and Xunzi that deal with everyday social problems in history and the aspects of the two thinkers that transcend history. The latter tends to be a set of fundamental Confucian principles-such as "Chinese theory of justice"-and it is possible to deduce from it not only the structure of early modern systems but also the construction of modern systems. This brings up two principles that inform the Chinese theory of justice: legitimacy and suitability. Liang Tao 梁濤 was one of the first scholars to bring up integrating the thought of Mencius and Xunzi in the conclusion of his 2008 book, The Guodian Bamboo Strips and the Si-Meng School [Guodian zhujian yu Si-Meng xuepai 郭店 竹簡與思孟學派], which he later reflects was a move that "remade Confucian orthodoxy."45 Thereafter, especially in recent years, intermittent publications have appeared on the topic, gradually developing it into a scholarly trend. Most recently, three articles published in the second issue of Literature, History, and Philosophy [Wen shi zhe 文史哲] in 2020 are representative of the state of the discussion. The first article is Liang Tao's "Transcending 'Venerate Mencius, Suppress Xunzi': Returning to Venerating Both Masters," which argues for incorporating Mencius's idea of "governing through virtue" and Xunzi's idea of "establishing a state through ritual" into one theory of political ethics.46 Whether Liang Tao succeeds in incorporating these two, however, is still up for debate.47 The second article is Liu Yuedi's 劉悅笛 "A Theory of Incorporating The reference in Guo's title to reception acknowledges that "the root of [modern] Confucian democratic thinking and intellectual discourse is the tradition of Xunzi's thought." Further, the phrase "rectified according to Mencius" reflects how "the tradition of Mencius's thought prepared the best ingredients" for us to engage in the postmodern work of "rectifying in order to repair the damage left by modernity."50 Guo's work is commendable as a contribution to conversations regarding Confucianism's modernization; however, the relationships between pre-Qin Confucianism and modernity and between modernity and postmodernity warrant further discussion.51

The Intellectual Path of Integrating Mencius and Xunzi
To this day, scholars who advocate for the integration of Mencius and Xunzi still have not reached any conclusions about how exactly one should go about doing so. From my perspective, so long as the thought of Mencius and Xunzi has inherit contradictions, reductively expressed prescriptions such as "raising Mencius's banner while practicing Xunzi's doctrine" have little meaning. Is the banner for Mencius being raised in the name of his ethics of lord-servant relations or his critique of autocracy? Is the Xunzi doctrine that we should put in practice the aspects that fuel autocratic thinking or Enlightenment thinking? It should be clear by now that integrating the philosophies of these two thinkers requires us to exercise a profit and loss analysis. (Profit and loss can also

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Journal of chinese humanities 6 (2020) 21-42 be found in Confucianism, in which "loss" means to divest oneself of some old things, and "profit" means acquiring some new things.)52

3.2.1
Profit-Loss Analysis of the Thought of Mencius and Xunzi Based on Their Mutual Compatibility As Mencius and Xunzi both represent Confucian schools of thought, they are compatible in some areas. For instance, where Mencius says, "all persons have the capacity to become Yao or Shun,"53 Xunzi says, "any ordinary person walking on the street can become Yu."54 Both believe in the fundamental equality of humans, a precious resource Confucianism provides in modern times. Another example can be found in the fact that Mencius, while not in favor of autocracy, does support monarchism. He and Xunzi share the belief from Confucian ethics regarding lord-servant relationships that "a ruler should act as a ruler and a servant should behave as a servant." Unlike the first example, this way of thinking is a clear impediment to the modernization of Confucianism.
However, the thought of Mencius and Xunzi also contains elements that are irreconcilable. Therefore, it is necessary to do a profit-loss analysis for both schools of thought. Otherwise, they will repel and reject one another.
As far as I can see, there are two main patterns for analysis. The first affirms one party while disavowing the other, such as affirming Mencius' idea that "the people are more important than the ruler" and disavowing Xunzi's support of autocracy. The second decides that neither position should be maintained. One obvious case of this is where Mencius says "human nature is good" and Xunzi says "human nature is evil." This kind of nature versus nurture debate is quite outdated, as the existence of something called "human nature" can be neither proven nor disproven. I am personally in more agreement with Wang Fuzhi's 王夫之 [1619-1692] view on human nature: "the disposition of one's heart is something that endlessly changes through daily experience and development."55 Thus, human nature is not unchanging but grows and develops within the context of life.

3.2.2
Profit-Loss Analysis of the Thought of Mencius and Xunzi Based on the Historical-Period Context The historical context is a dimension of utmost importance when it comes to a profit-loss analysis of Mencius and Xunzi's respective schools of thought. This is because the value systems that inform the very idea of "profit" and "loss" reflect the values of human civilization and society at any given time. Otherwise, they just devolve into fundamentalism.
Loss: We must abandon the aspects of the thought of Mencius and Xunzi that are not modern. Many elements of their teachings were relevant to their time but of no use in the present, which operates on the basis of a vastly different set of civilizational values. A few critical examples of the kinds of elements that must be abandoned are those that are incompatible with modern ideas of freedom, equality, justice, democracy, and law.
Profit: We would benefit from innovatively building on the ideas of Mencius and Xunzi. When considering the needs of modern society and life, many of Mencius and Xunzi's ideas are far from complete and in need of development and supplementation. In doing so, it is especially important to avoid regressive tendencies in academia that oppose civilizational progress.
Apart from these two points, there is also the question of incorporating Chinese and Western perspectives. Here, it is worth considering the words of Zhang Taiyan: Nowadays, if you want to be Xunzi's discipline, you can find all the Western discourses here. Please study accordingly. If you want to be Mencius' disciple, you must study works on rituals and music going back beyond the three periods of antiquity. After the works of the seventy-two disciples of Confucius, you must then master the scholarly works of the Han and Tang dynasties as well as the fruits of 240 years of diligent study by scholars in the Qing to the present.56 Zhang's casual characterization of Xunzi as a Western scholar and Mencius as traditional is arguable. However, the juxtaposition of "integrating Mencius and Xunzi" with "integrating China and the West" is a maneuver worth affirming.

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Journal of chinese humanities 6 (2020) 21-42 I would like to add that the issue is not actually one of China versus the West, but classical versus modern or premodern versus modern. As I have pointed out many times elsewhere, we must resist the academic tendency to bury questions of historical change in discussions regarding the difference between China and the West. This is effectively a disavowal of modern civilization. I conclude by way of summary. The thought of Mencius and Xunzi has many inherent complexities and contradictions, as they have been revised, reconstituted, and reused alongside shifts in lifestyles and social structures; their respective influence also waxed and waned accordingly. Xunzi's teachings flourished during China's transition from monarchical feudalism to imperial autocracy, an indication that they have Legalist elements. The rulers of the imperial period "solely venerated Confucian learning," so the suspiciously Legalist teachings of Xunzi went into decline while the orthodox Confucian teachings of Mencius were on the rise. At the same time, Xunzi's thought continued to play an important, perhaps even fundamental, role in hidden ways. This is what came to be known as the political path of being "openly Confucian, covertly Legalist," practiced by autocratic rulers. As Chinese society began to modernize, Xunzi's teachings enjoyed a revival, revealing strains that were compatible with modern Enlightenment ideas. However, this revival of Xunzi's thought occurred along with a revival of Confucianism, so it did not result in a subsequent decline in Mencius' influence. This raises the need to rethink the two schools of thought in an integrated way. To accomplish this, we must take a page from modern value systems and consider existing distinctions between Mencius' and Xunzi's thinking using analyses of associated "profit and loss."